US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: New Initiatives To Reduce US Nuclear Forces
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address to the nation, Washington, DC
Date: Sep 27, 19919/27/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, North America
Country: USSR (former), United States
Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
Tonight I would like to speak with you about our future and the
future of the generations to come. The world has changed at a
fantastic pace with each day writing a fresh page of history before
yesterday's ink has even dried. Most recently, we've seen the
peoples of the Soviet Union turn to democracy and freedom and
discard a system of government based on oppression and fear.
Like the East Europeans before them, they face the daunting
challenge of building fresh political structures based on human
rights, democratic principles, and market economies. Their task is
far from easy and far from over. They will need our help, and they
will get it.
But these dramatic changes challenge our nation as well. Our
country has always stood for freedom and democracy. When the
newly elected leaders of Eastern Europe grappled with forming their
new governments, they looked to the United States. They looked to
American democratic principles in building their own free
societies. Even the leaders of the USSR republics are reading The
Federalist Papers, written by America's founders, to find new ideas
and inspiration.
Today, America must lead again, as it always has--as only it
can. And we will. We must also provide the inspiration for lasting
peace, and we will do that too. We can now take steps in response
to these dramatic developments; steps that can help the Soviet
peoples in their quest for peace and prosperity. More importantly,
we can now take steps to make the world a less dangerous place
than ever before in the nuclear age.
A year ago, I described a new strategy for American defenses,
reflecting the world's changing security environment. That strategy
shifted our focus away from the fear that preoccupied us for 40
years--the prospect of a global confrontation. Instead, it
concentrated more on regional conflicts, such as the one we just
faced in the Persian Gulf.
I spelled out a strategic concept, guided by the need to
maintain the forces required to exercise forward presence in key
areas, to respond effectively in crises, to maintain a credible
nuclear deterrent, and to retain the national capacity to rebuild our
forces, should that be needed.
We are now moving to reshape the US military to reflect that
concept. The new base force will be smaller by half a million than
today's military--with fewer Army divisions, Air Force wings, Navy
ships, and strategic nuclear forces. This new force will be
versatile, able to respond around the world to challenges--old and
new.
As I just mentioned, the changes that allowed us to adjust
our security strategy a year ago have greatly accelerated. The
prospect of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe, launched with
little or no warning, is no longer a realistic threat. The Warsaw
Pact has crumbled. In the Soviet Union, the advocates of democracy
triumphed over a coup that would have restored the old system of
repression. The reformers are now starting to fashion their own
futures moving even faster toward democracy's horizon.
New leaders in the Kremlin and the republics are now
questioning the need for their huge nuclear arsenal. The Soviet
nuclear stockpile now seems less an instrument of national
security and more of a burden. As a result, we now have an
unparalleled opportunity to change the nuclear posture of both the
United States and the Soviet Union.
If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps--some on
our own, some on their own, some together--we can dramatically
shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons. We can more
effectively discourage the spread of nuclear weapons. We can rely
more on defensive measures in our strategic relationship. We can
enhance stability and actually reduce the risk of nuclear war. Now
is the time to seize this opportunity.
After careful study and consultations with my senior
advisers and after considering valuable counsel from [British] Prime
Minister Major, [French] President Mitterrand, [German] Chancellor
Kohl, and other allied leaders, I am announcing today a series of
sweeping initiatives affecting every aspect of our nuclear forces--
on land, on ships, and on aircraft. I met again today with our Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and I can tell you they wholeheartedly endorse each
of these steps.
Theater Weapons
I will begin with the category in which we will make the most
fundamental change in nuclear forces in over 40 years--non-
strategic or theater weapons.
Last year, I canceled US plans to modernize our ground-
launched theater nuclear weapons. Later, our NATO allies joined us
in announcing that the alliance would propose the mutual
elimination of all nuclear artillery shells from Europe, as soon as
short-range nuclear forces negotiations began with the Soviets.
But starting these talks now would only perpetuate these systems
while we engage in lengthy negotiations. Last months' events not
only permit, but indeed demand, swifter, bolder action.
I am, therefore, directing that the United States eliminate its
entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range--that is
theater--nuclear weapons. We will bring home and destroy all of
our nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile
warheads. We will, of course, ensure that we preserve an effective
air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe. That is essential to
NATO's security.
In turn, I have asked the Soviets to go down this road with
us--to destroy their entire inventory of ground-launched theater
nuclear weapons: not only their nuclear artillery and nuclear
warheads for short-range ballistic missiles but also the theater
systems the United States no longer has--systems like nuclear
warheads for air-defense missiles and nuclear land mines.
Recognizing further the major changes in the international military
landscape, the United States will withdraw all tactical nuclear
weapons from its surface ships [and] attack submarines, as well as
those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval
aircraft. This means removing all nuclear Tomahawk cruise
missiles from US ships and submarines, as well as nuclear bombs
aboard aircraft carriers. The bottom line is that under normal
circumstances, our ships will not carry tactical nuclear weapons.
Many of these land- and sea-based warheads will be
dismantled and destroyed. Those remaining will be secured in
central areas where they would be available, if necessary, in a
future crisis.
Again, there is every reason for the Soviet Union to match our
actions by removing all tactical nuclear weapons from its land-
based naval aircraft and by destroying many of them and
consolidating what remains at central locations. I urge them to do
so.
START as a Springboard
No category of nuclear weapons has received more attention than
those in our strategic arsenals. The Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty [START], which President Gorbachev and I signed last July,
was the culmination of almost a decade's work. It calls for
substantial stabilizing reductions and effective verification.
Prompt ratification by both parties is essential.
But I also believe the time is right to use START as a
springboard to achieve additional stabilizing changes.
First, to further reduce tensions, I am directing that all US
strategic bombers immediately stand down from their alert posture.
As a comparable gesture, I call upon the Soviet Union to confine its
mobile missiles to their garrisons, where they will be safer and
more secure.
Second, the United States will immediately stand down from
alert all intercontinental ballistic missiles scheduled for
deactivation under START. Rather than waiting for the treaty's
reduction plan to run its full 7-year course, we will accelerate
elimination of these systems once START is ratified. I call upon
the Soviet Union to do the same.
Third, I am terminating the development of the mobile
Peacekeeper ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] as well as the
mobile portions of the small ICBM. The small single-warhead ICBM
will be our only remaining ICBM modernization program. I call upon
the Soviets to terminate any and all programs for future ICBMs with
more than one warhead and to limit ICBM modernization to one type
of single warhead missile--just as we have done.
Fourth, I am canceling the current program to build a
replacement for the nuclear short-range attack missile for our
strategic bombers.
Fifth, as a result of the strategic nuclear weapons
adjustments I have just outlined, the United States will streamline
its command and control procedures, allowing us to more
effectively manage our strategic nuclear forces.
As the system works now, the Navy commands the submarine
part of our strategic deterrent, while the Air Force commands the
bomber and land-based elements. But as we reduce our strategic
forces, the operational command structure must be as direct as
possible. I have, therefore, approved the recommendation of
Secretary [of Defense Richard] Cheney and the Joint Chiefs to
consolidate operational command of these forces into a US
Strategic Command, under one commander, with participation from
both services.
Eliminating the ICBM
Since the 1970s, the most vulnerable and unstable part of the US
and Soviet nuclear forces has been intercontinental missiles with
more than one warhead. Both sides have these ICBMs in fixed silos
in the ground where they are more vulnerable than missiles on
submarines.
I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union seek
early agreement to eliminate from their inventories all ICBMs with
multiple warheads. After developing a timetable acceptable to both
sides, we could rapidly move to modify or eliminate these systems
under procedures already established in the START agreement. In
short, such an action would take away the single most unstable part
of our nuclear arsenals.
But there is more to do. The United States and the Soviet
Union are not the only nations with ballistic missiles. Some 15
nations have them now, and in less than a decade, that number could
grow to 20. The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf demonstrates in
no uncertain terms that the time has come for strong action on this
growing threat to world peace.
Accordingly, I am calling on the Soviet leadership to join us
in taking immediate concrete steps to permit the limited
deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited
ballistic missile strikes--whatever their source--without
undermining the credibility of existing deterrent forces. And we
will intensify our effort to curb nuclear and missile proliferation.
These two efforts will be mutually reinforcing. To foster
cooperation, the United States soon will propose additional
initiatives in the area of ballistic missile early warning.
Finally, let me discuss yet another opportunity for
cooperation that can make our world safer.
Cooperation To Ensure Safety
During last month's attempted coup in Moscow, many Americans
asked me if I thought Soviet nuclear weapons were under adequate
control. I do not believe that America was at increased risk of
nuclear attack during those tense days. But I do believe more can be
done to ensure the safe handling and dismantling of Soviet nuclear
weapons. Therefore, I propose that we begin discussions with the
Soviet Union to explore cooperation in three areas:
First, we should explore joint technical cooperation on the
safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation,
dismantling, and destruction of nuclear warheads;
Second, we should discuss existing arrangements for the
physical security and safety of nuclear weapons and how these
might be enhanced; and,
Third, we should discuss nuclear command and control
arrangements and how these might be improved to provide more
protection against the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear
weapons.
My friend, French President [Francois] Mitterrand, offered a
similar idea a short while ago. After further consultations with the
alliance and when the leadership in the USSR is ready, we will begin
this effort.
The initiatives I am announcing build on the new defense
strategy
that I set out a year ago--one that shifted our focus away from the
prospect of global confrontation. We are consulting with our allies
on the implementation of many of these steps which fit well with
the new post-Cold War strategy and force posture we have
developed in NATO.
As we implement these initiatives, we will closely watch
how the new Soviet leadership responds. We expect our bold
initiatives to be met with equally bold steps on the Soviet side. If
this happens, further cooperation is inevitable. If it does not, then
a historic opportunity will have been lost. Regardless, let no one
doubt we will still retain the necessary strength to protect our
security and that of our allies and to respond as necessary.
In addition, regional instabilities, the spread of weapons of
mass destruction, and--as we saw during the conflict in the Gulf--
territorial ambitions of power-hungry tyrants, still require us to
maintain a strong military to protect our national interests and to
honor commitments to our allies.
Therefore, we must implement a coherent plan for a
significantly smaller but fully capable military, one that enhances
stability but is still sufficient to convince any potential adversary
that the cost of aggression would exceed any possible gain.
We can safely afford to take the steps I have announced
today; steps that are designed to reduce the dangers of
miscalculation in a crisis. But to do so, we must also pursue
vigorously those elements of our strategic modernization program
that serve the same purpose. We must fully fund the B-2 and SDI
[Strategic Defense Initiative] program. We can make radical
changes in the nuclear postures of both sides to make them smaller,
safer, and more stable. But the United States must maintain modern
nuclear forces, including the strategic triad, and thus ensure the
credibility of our deterrent. Some will say these initiatives call
for a budget windfall for domestic programs. But the peace
dividend I seek is not measured in dollars but in greater security.
In the near term, some of these steps may even cost money. Given
the ambitious plan I have already proposed to reduce US defense
spending by 25%, we cannot afford to make any unwise or
unwarranted cuts in the defense budget I have submitted to
Congress. I am counting on congressional support to ensure we have
the funds necessary to restructure our forces prudently and
implement the decisions I have outlined tonight.
Twenty years ago when I had the opportunity to serve this
country as Ambassador to the United Nations, I once talked about
the vision that was in the minds of the UN's founders--how they
dreamed of a new age when the great powers of the world would
cooperate in peace as they had as allies in war.
Today, I consulted with President Gorbachev. While he hasn't
had time to absorb the details, I believe the Soviet response will
clearly be positive. I also spoke with [Russian Republic] President
[Boris] Yeltsin and he had a similar reaction--positive and hopeful.
Now, the Soviet people and their leaders can shed the heavy
burden of a dangerous and costly nuclear arsenal which has
threatened world peace for the past 5 decades. They can join us in
these dramatic moves toward a new world of peace and security.
Tonight, as I see the drama of democracy unfolding around the
globe, perhaps we are closer to that new world than ever before.
The future is ours to influence, to shape, to mold. While we must
not gamble [with] that future, neither can we forfeit the historic
opportunity now before us.
It has been said, "Destiny is not a matter of chance, it is a
matter of choice; it is not a thing to be waited for, it is a thing to
be achieved." The United States has always stood where duty
required us to stand. Now let them say that we led where destiny
required us to lead--to a more peaceful, hopeful future. We cannot
give a more precious gift to the children of the world. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: Presidential Initiative on Nuclear Arms
Fitzwater
Description: Fact sheet released by the Office of the White House
Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Sep 27, 19919/27/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Eurasia, North America
Country: USSR (former), United States
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
The President is announcing a number of initiatives affecting the
entire spectrum of US nuclear weapons. The President has decided
to undertake these initiatives to dramatically reduce the size and
nature of US nuclear deployments worldwide, enhance stability, and
take advantage of recent dramatic changes in the Soviet Union. He
is calling upon the USSR to agree to similar measures. This fact
sheet summarizes the major points.
Ground-Launched Theater Nuclear Weapons
The United States will withdraw all of its nuclear artillery shells
and all nuclear warheads for its short-range ballistic missiles to
the United States. These and any similar warheads currently stored
in the United States will be dismantled and destroyed.
The President is calling on the Soviets to withdraw,
dismantle, and destroy all of their ground-launched theater nuclear
weapons, including the nuclear warheads for their short-range
ballistic missiles, nuclear air defense missiles, nuclear air defense
missiles, nuclear artillery shells, and nuclear land mines. (The
United States no longer possesses either nuclear land mines or
nuclear air defense warheads.)
Sea-Based Tactical Nuclear Weapons
The United States will remove all tactical nuclear weapons,
including nuclear cruise missiles, from its surface ships and attack
submarines. We will also remove nuclear weapons associated with
our land-based naval aircraft. Many of these weapons will be
dismantled and destroyed with the remainder placed in secure
central storage areas.
The President is calling on the Soviet Union to similarly
remove all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships, its
attack submarines, and bases for land-based naval aircraft and to
destroy many of those weapons, and to consolidate the remainder at
secure central locations. Strategic Nuclear Forces All US strategic bombers
will be removed from day-to-day alert status and their weapons returned to
storage areas.
As a comparable gesture, the President is asking the Soviet
Union to confine its mobile ICBMs to their garrisons.
The US will immediately stand down from alert all US ICBMs
scheduled for deactivation under START. After START is ratified,
the United States will accelerate their elimination. (START calls
for the treaty-mandated reductions to occur over a 7-year period.)
The President is calling on the USSR to do the same.
Development of the Peacekeeper ICBM Rail Garrison system
and the mobile elements of the small ICBM program have been
terminated. The small single warhead ICBM will be the sole
remaining US ICBM modernization program.
The President is asking the USSR to limit their ICBM
modernization efforts to one type of single warhead missile.
The nuclear short-range attack missile has been canceled.
The President is announcing the creation of a new US
Strategic Command, designed to improve command and control of all
US strategic nuclear forces.
He is proposing that the US and USSR seek early agreement to
eliminate all ICBMs with multiple warheads from their inventories.
The President is calling on the Soviet leadership to join us in
taking immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment
of non-nuclear defenses that would protect against limited
ballistic missile strikes whatever their source. The US will also
propose initiatives in the area of ballistic missile early warning.
Joint Consultations
The President is proposing that we begin discussions with the
Soviet Union to explore cooperation on nuclear command and
control, warhead security and safety, and safe and environmentally
responsible storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: The United Nations in a New Era
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address before the United Nations General Assembly, New
York City, New York
Date: Sep 23, 19919/23/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Country: Israel, Iraq
Subject: United Nations, History, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Mr. President, thank you, sir. Mr. Secretary General, distinguished
delegates to the United Nations, I am honored to speak with you as
you open the 46th session of the General Assembly.
I'd first like to congratulate outgoing President Guido de
Marco of Malta and salute our incoming President Samir Shihabi of
Saudi Arabia. I also want to salute especially Secretary General
Javier Perez de Cuellar, who will step down in just over 3 months.
But let me say, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has served with
great distinction during a period of unprecedented change and
turmoil. For almost 10 years we've enjoyed the leadership of this
man of peace; a man that I, along with many of you, feel proud to
call friend. So today, let us congratulate our friend, and praise his
spectacular service to the United Nations--and to the people of the
world: Mr. Secretary General.
Let me also welcome new members to this chamber--two
delegations representing Korea, particularly our democratic friends,
the Republic of Korea; the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania; and new missions from the Marshall Islands and
Micronesia.
Twenty years ago, when I was the permanent representative
here for the United States, there were 132 UN members. Just 1
week ago, 159 nations enjoyed membership in the United Nations.
Today, the number stands at 166. The presence of these new
members alone provides reasons for us to celebrate.
My speech today will not sound like any you've heard from a
President of the United States. I'm not going to dwell on the
superpower competition that defined international politics for half
a century. Instead, I will discuss the challenges of building peace
and prosperity in a world leavened by the Cold War's end and the
resumption of history.
History Held Captive
Communism held history captive for years. It suspended ancient
disputes, and it suppressed ethnic rivalries, nationalist aspirations,
and old prejudices. As it has dissolved, suspended hatreds have
sprung to life. People who for years have been denied their past
have begun searching for their own identities--often through
peaceful and constructive means, occasionally through factionalism
and bloodshed.
This revival of history ushers in a new era, teeming with
opportunities and perils. Let's begin by discussing the
opportunities.
First, history's renewal enables people to pursue their
natural
instincts for enterprise. Communism froze that progress until its
failures became too much for even its defenders to bear.
And now, citizens throughout the world have chosen
enterprise over envy; personal responsibility over the enticements
of the state; prosperity over the poverty of central planning.
The UN Charter encourages this adventure by pledging "to
employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic
and social advancement of all peoples." And I can think of no better
way to fulfill this mission than to promote the free flow of goods
and ideas.
Frankly, ideas and goods will travel around the globe with or
without our help. The information revolution has destroyed the
weapons of enforced isolation and ignorance. In many parts of the
world, technology has overwhelmed tyranny, proving that the age of
information can become the age of liberation if we limit state
power wisely and free our people to make the best use of new ideas,
inventions, and insights.
By the same token, the world has learned that free markets
provide levels of prosperity, growth, and happiness that centrally
planned economies can never offer. Even the most charitable
estimates indicate that in recent years the free world's economies
have grown at twice the rate of the former communist world.
Growth does more than fill shelves. It permits every person
to gain--not at the expense of others but to the benefit of others.
Prosperity encourages people to live as neighbors, not as predators.
Economic growth can aid international relations in exactly
the
same way. Many nations represented here are parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Uruguay Round--the
latest in the post-war series of trade negotiations--offers hope to
developing nations, many of which have been cruelly divided, cruelly
deceived by the false promises of totalitarianism.
Here in this chamber we hear about North-South problems.
But free and open trade, including unfettered access to markets and
credit, offers developing countries means of self-sufficiency and
economic dignity.
If the Uruguay Round should fail, a new wave of protectionism
could destroy our hopes for a better future. History shows all too
clearly that protectionism can destroy wealth within countries and
poison relations between them. Therefore, I call upon all members
of GATT to redouble their efforts to reach a successful conclusion
for the Uruguay Round. I pledge that the United States will do its
part.
I cannot stress this enough: Economic progress will play a
vital role into the new world. It supplies the soil in which
democracy grows best.
People everywhere seek government of and by the people.
They want to enjoy their inalienable rights to freedom and property
and person.
Challenges to Democracy Fail
Challenges to democracy have failed. Just last month, coup plotters
in the Soviet Union tried to derail the forces of liberty and reform,
but Soviet citizens refused to follow. Most of the nations in this
chamber stood with the forces of reform, led by Mikhail Gorbachev
and Boris Yeltsin, and against the coup plotters.
The challenge facing the Soviet peoples now--that of building
political systems based upon individual liberty, minority rights,
democracy, and free markets--mirrors every nation's responsibility
for encouraging peaceful, democratic reform. But it also testifies
to the extraordinary power of the democratic ideal.
As democracy flourishes, so does the opportunity for a third
historical breakthrough: international cooperation. A year ago, the
Soviet Union joined the United States and a host of other nations in
defending a tiny country against aggression and opposing Saddam
Hussein. For the very first time on a matter of major importance,
superpower competition was replaced with international
cooperation.
The United Nations, in one of its finest moments, constructed
a measured, principled, deliberate, and courageous response to
Saddam Hussein. It stood up to an outlaw who invaded Kuwait, who
threatened many states within the region, who sought to set a
menacing precedent for the post-Cold War world.
The coalition effort established a model for the collective
settlement of disputes. Members set the goal--the liberation of
Kuwait--and devised a courageous, unified means of achieving that
goal.
And now, for the first time, we have a real chance to fulfill
the UN Charter's ambition of working "to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and nations large and
small to promote social progress and better standards of life in
larger freedom." Those are the words from the Charter.
We will not revive these ideals if we fail to acknowledge the
challenge that the renewal of history presents.
In Europe and Asia, nationalist passions have flared anew,
challenging borders, [and] straining the fabric of international
society. At the same time, around the world, many age-old
conflicts still fester. You see signs of this tumult right here. The
United Nations has mounted more peace-keeping missions in the
last 36 months than during its first 43 years. And although we now
seem mercifully liberated from the fear of nuclear holocaust, these
smaller, virulent conflicts should trouble us all.
We must face this challenge squarely:
First, by pursuing the peaceful resolution of disputes now in
progress;
Second, and more importantly, by trying to prevent others
from erupting.
No one here can promise that today's borders will remain
fixed for all time. But we must strive to ensure the peaceful,
negotiated settlement of border disputes.
We also must promote the cause of international harmony by
addressing old feuds. We should take seriously the Charter's pledge
"to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another
as good neighbors."
Zionism Is Not Racism
UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, the so-called "Zionism is
racism" resolution mocks this pledge and the principles upon which
the United Nations was founded. I call now for its repeal.
Zionism is not a policy; it is the idea that led to the creation
of a home for the Jewish people, to the state of Israel. To equate
Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist history and
forget the terrible plight of Jews in World War II and, indeed,
throughout history. To equate Zionism with racism is to reject
Israel itself--a member of good standing of the United Nations.
This body cannot claim to seek peace and at the same time
challenge Israel's right to exist. By repealing this resolution
unconditionally, the United Nations will enhance its credibility and
serve the cause of peace.
As we work to meet the challenge posed by the resumption of
history, we also must defend the Charter's emphasis on inalienable
human rights.
Government has failed if citizens cannot speak their minds; if
they can't form political parties freely and elect governments
without coercion; if they can't practice their religion freely; if they
can't raise their families in peace; if they can't enjoy a just return
from their labor; if they can't live fruitful lives, and, at the end of
their days, look upon their achievements and their society's
progress with pride.
Politicians who talk about "democracy" and "freedom" but
provide neither eventually will feel the sting of public disapproval
and the power of people's yearning to live free.
Some nations still deny their basic rights to the people. Too
many voices cry out for freedom. For example, the people of Cuba
suffer oppression at the hands of a dictator who hasn't gotten the
word--the lone hold-out in an otherwise democratic hemisphere--a
man who hasn't adapted to a world that has no use for totalitarian
tyranny. Elsewhere, despots ignore the heartening fact that the
rest of the world has embarked upon a new age of liberty.
The renewal of history also imposes an obligation to remain
vigilant about new threats and old. We must expand our efforts to
control nuclear proliferation. We must work to prevent the spread
of chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver
them.
It is for this reason that I put forward my Middle East arms
initiative, a comprehensive approach to stop and, where possible,
reverse the accumulation of arms in that part of the world most
prone to violence.
We must remember that self-interest will tug nations in
different directions, and that struggles over perceived interests
will flare sometimes into violence.
We can never say with confidence where the next conflict
may
arise. And we cannot promise eternal peace--not while demagogues
peddle false promises to people hungry with hope; not while
terrorists use our citizens as pawns, and drug dealers destroy our
peoples. As a result, we must band together to overwhelm affronts
to basic human dignity.
It is no longer acceptable to shrug and say that one man's
terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Let's put the law above
the crude and cowardly practice of hostage-holding.
Standing Firm on Iraq
In a world defined by change, we must be as firm in principle as we
are flexible in our response to changing international conditions.
That's especially true today of Iraq. Six months after the passage
of UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688, Saddam continues
to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction and subject the Iraqi
people to brutal repression.
Saddam's contempt for UN resolutions was first
demonstrated back in August 1990, and it continues even as I am
speaking. His government refuses to permit unconditional
helicopter inspections and right now is refusing to allow UN
inspectors to leave inspected premises with documents relating to
an Iraqi nuclear weapons program.
It is the US view that we must keep the UN sanctions in place
as long as he remains in power. This also shows that we cannot
compromise for a moment in seeing that Iraq destroys all of its
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. And
we will not compromise.
This is not to say--and let me be clear on this one--that we
should punish the Iraqi people. Let me repeat, our argument has
never been with the people of Iraq. It was and is with a brutal
dictator whose arrogance dishonors the Iraqi people. Security
Council Resolution 706 created a responsible mechanism for
sending humanitarian relief to innocent Iraqi citizens. We must put
that mechanism to work.
We must not abandon our principled stand against Saddam's
aggression. This cooperative effort has liberated Kuwait, and now
it can lead to a just government in Iraq. And when it does--when it
does--the Iraqi people can look forward to better lives: free at
home, free to engage in a world beyond their borders.
The resumption of history also permits the United Nations to
resume the important business of promoting the values that I've
discussed today. This body can serve as a vehicle through which
willing parties can settle old disputes. In the months to come, I
look forward to working with Secretary General Perez de Cuellar
and his successor as we pursue peace in such diverse and troubled
lands as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cyprus, El Salvador, and the
Western Sahara.
The United Nations can encourage free market development
through its international lending and aid institutions. However, the
United Nations should not dictate the particular forms of
government that nations should adopt. But it can and should
encourage the values upon which this organization was founded.
Together, we should insist that nations seeking our acceptance
meet standards of human decency.
Where institutions of freedom have lain dormant, the United
Nations can offer them new life. These institutions play a crucial
role in our quest for a new world order, an order in which no nation
must surrender one iota of its own sovereignty; an order
characterized by the rule of law rather than the resort to force; the
cooperative settlement of disputes, rather than anarchy and
bloodshed; and an unstinting belief in human rights.
America's Place in the New World
Finally, you may wonder about America's role in the new world that
I have described. Let me assure you, the United States has no
intention of striving for a "Pax Americana." However, we will
remain engaged. We will not retreat and pull back into isolationism.
We will offer friendship and leadership. In short, we seek a "Pax
Universalis" built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations.
To all assembled, we have an opportunity to spare our sons
and daughters the sins and errors of the past. We can build a future
more satisfying than any our world has ever known. The future lies
undefined before us--full of promise; littered with peril. We can
choose the kind of world we want; one blistered by the fires of war
and subjected to the whims of coercion and chance or one made
more peaceful by reflection and choice. Take this challenge
seriously. Inspire future generations to praise and venerate you, to
say: On the ruins of conflict, these brave men and women built an
era of peace and understanding. They inaugurated a new world
order, an order worth preserving for the ages.
Good luck to each and everyone of you. And thank you very,
very much. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: Profile: The United Nations
Date: Sep 30, 19919/30/91
Category: Country Data
Subject: United Nations
[TEXT]
Established:
By charter signed in San Francisco,
California, on June 26, 1945; effective October 24, 1945.
Purpose:
To maintain international peace and
security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to achieve
international cooperation in solving economic, social, cultural, and
humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms; to be a center for harmonizing the
actions of nations in attaining these common ends.
Members:
166. Official languages: Arabic,
Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish. Principal organs:
General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council,
Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat.
Budget: UN assessment budget (calendar year 1991)--$1.1 billion.
US share--$272 million. In calendar 1990, the United States paid
its full assessment of $1.2 billion to the United Nations, its
agencies, and other international organizations, including $89
million for UN peace-keeping operations, and voluntary
contributions for other UN organizations such as UNICEF, and $112
million for UN refugee programs.
Secretariat
Chief administrative officer: Secretary General of the United
Nations, appointed to a 5-year term by the General Assembly on the
recommendation of the Security Council. Secretary General (1982-
present): Javier Perez de Cuellar (Peru).
Staff: A worldwide staff of 23,000, including more than 2,800 US
citizens. The staff is appointed by the Secretary General according
to UN regulations.
General Assembly
Membership: All UN members. President: Elected at the beginning of
each General Assembly session.
Main committees: First--Political and Security, primarily
disarmament; Special Political Committee. Second--Economic and
Financial. Third--Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural. Fourth--
Trusteeship. Fifth--Administrative and Budgetary. Sixth--Legal.
Many other committees address specific issues, including peace-
keeping, outer space, crime prevention, status of women, and UN
Charter reform.
Security Council
Membership: Five permanent members (China, France, USSR, UK,
US), each with the right to veto, and 10 non-permanent members
elected by the General Assembly for 2-year terms. Five non-
permanent members are elected from Africa and Asia combined; one
from Eastern Europe; two from Latin America; and two from
Western Europe and other areas. Non-permanent members are not
eligible for immediate re-election. The 1991 non-permanent
members are Austria, Belgium, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ecuador, India,
Romania, Yemen, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. President: Rotates monthly
in English alphabetical order of members.
Economic and Social Council
Membership: 54; 18 elected each year by the General Assembly for
3-year terms. President: Elected each year.
Trusteeship Council
Membership: China, France, USSR,
UK, US. President: Elected each year.
International Court of Justice
Membership: 15, elected for 9-year terms by the General Assembly
and the Security Council from nominees
of national groups under provisions of the International Court of
Justice Statute.
Update
In September 1991, UN membership increased from 159 to 166 with
the addition of seven new countries:
Estonia, Lithuania, Korea, North, Marshall Islands, Korea, South
Micronesia, Latvia (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: Fact Sheet: UN Peace-keeping Operations
Date: Sep 30, 19919/30/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Subject: United Nations, Military Affairs,
Democratization
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
(UNMOGIP)
To supervise the cease-fire between India and Pakistan in Kashmir.
Established: April 21, 1948
Mandate: Indefinite
Personnel: 35
Funding: Regular budget
UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)
To monitor the truce in Palestine and, subsequently, supervise the
General Armistice Agreement of 1949 and cease-fires of 1967.
Today, it cooperates with UNDOF and UNIFIL.
Established: May 29, 1948
Mandate: Indefinite
Personnel: 300
Funding: Regular budget
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
To supervise the cease-fire between Greek and Turkish communities
in Cyprus.
Established: March 4, 1964
Mandate: 6-month; expires
December 15, 1991*
Personnel: 2,150
Funding: Voluntary contributions
US payment: $9 million
UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights
(UNDOF)
To monitor the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces on the
Golan Heights.
Established: May 31, 1974
Mandate: 6-month; expires November 30, 1991*
Personnel: 1,300
Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments
US share: 30.6%--$11.7 million
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
To confirm withdrawal of Israeli troops, restore peace, and assist
the Government of Lebanon to reestablish effective authority in
southern Lebanon.
Established: March 19, 1978
Mandate: 6-month; expires January 31, 1992*
Personnel: 5,850
Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments
US share: 30.6%--$46.7 million
UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)
To monitor the Esquipulas II agreement prohibiting cross-border
support for rebels. Mandate expanded on March 27, 1990, to take
part in the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance.
Established: November 7, 1989
Mandate: 6-month; expires November 7, 1991*
Personnel: 250
Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments
US share: 30.6%--$8.1 million
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)
To monitor a demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and deter
violations of the boundary.
Established: April 9, 1991
Mandate: Indefinite; reviewed at 6-month intervals beginning
October 9, 1991
Personnel: 300 observers with support units bringing the total to
950
Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments
US share: 30.6%--$18.5 million for initial mandate period
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
(MINURSO)
To conduct a referendum on whether Western Sahara should become
independent or be integrated into Morocco.
Established: April 29, 1991
Mandate: Concludes after referendum to be held about 36 weeks
after UNGA approval of its budget on May 17, 1991
Personnel: 136 personnel deployed toward a target strength of
2,700
Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments
US share: 30.4%--$43.4 million for initial mandate period
UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)
To monitor implementation of the human rights agreement between
the Government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN). The human rights component will be the
first part of an integrated operation, which will also monitor the
cease-fire and demobilization when those agreements are reached.
Established: May 20, 1991
Mandate: 12-month; expires May 20, 1992
Personnel: Target strength of 160 for human rights monitoring
Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments
US share: 30.4%--4.2 million for initial mandate period
UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)
To oversee implementation of the Angola Peace accords.
Established: May 30, 1991
Mandate: 17-month; expires October 30, 1992
Personnel: 250 deployed toward target strength of 700
Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments
US share: 30.4%--$15 million for initial mandate period
*Must be renewed by the UN Security Council. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: Violent Crisis in Yugoslavia
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Address before the UN Security Council, New York City,
New York
Date: Sep 25, 19919/25/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former), Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization, CSCE
[TEXT]
Mr. President, Members of the Council, we meet today because the
crisis in Yugoslavia has descended into open warfare. This violent
conflict threatens all the peoples of Yugoslavia with terrible
economic and social strife, with a sharp deterioration in the most
fundamental human rights and freedoms, and, above all, with
massive bloodshed and loss of life.
We are equally concerned about the dangerous impact on
Yugoslavia's neighbors who face refugee flows, energy shortfalls,
and the threat of a spillover in the fighting. It is this danger of
escalation which makes this a matter of prime concern to this
Council.
Many parties in Yugoslavia have contributed to the tragedy
besetting that country. What we warned about in June, and for
months before, has come about. Unilateral acts, including by
republics, have foreclosed options for peaceful negotiations and
have made the resolution of the tragic situation in Yugoslavia more,
not less, difficult and complicated.
Though much blood has already been lost, it is time for all
parties to commit themselves to resolve their differences
peacefully. All parties, especially the Serbs and Croats, need to
stop the fighting. The cease-fire must be respected as a first step
toward shaping a different future.
However, the Government of Serbia and the Yugoslav federal
military bear a special and, indeed, growing responsibility for the
grim future which awaits the peoples of Yugoslavia if they do not
stop the bloodshed and reverse the violent course now being
pursued.
Clearly, the Yugoslav federal military is not serving as an
impartial guarantor of a cease-fire in Croatia. On the contrary, it
has actively supported local Serbian forces in violating the cease-
fire, causing deaths to the citizens it is constitutionally supposed
to protect. The military has initiated what can only be described as
outright military intervention against Croatia, while repudiating
the authority of Yugoslav Government institutions which have
sought to control it.
It is equally clear that the Serbian leadership is actively
supporting and encouraging the use of force in Croatia by Serbian
militants and the Yugoslav military.
The apparent objective of the Serbian leadership and the
Yugoslav military working in tandem is to create a "small
Yugoslavia" or "greater Serbia" which would exclude Slovenia and a
rump Croatia. This new entity would be based on the kind of
repression which Serbian authorities have exercised in Kosovo for
several years. This entity would also be based on the use of force--
well underway in Croatia, and beginning to take shape in Bosnia-
Herzegovina--to establish control over territories outside Serbia.
The aggression within Yugoslavia, therefore, represents a
direct threat to international peace and security.
And the use of aggression to determine the future internal
borders of Yugoslavia or of Serbia also represents a grave challenge
to the values and principles which underlie the Helsinki Final Act,
the Charter of Paris, and the UN Charter.
We appreciate the concerns of all the peoples of Yugoslavia,
including the concerns of Serbs inside and outside Serbia about
their future in the event of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
But the United States cannot and will not accept repression
and the use of force in the name of these concerns. To do so would
seriously undermine what we in the CSCE [Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe] have labored to achieve during the past
16 years.
The United States, therefore, firmly supports the September
3
declaration of states participating in the CSCE, cited in today's
resolution [Resolution 713] , that no territorial gains or changes
within Yugoslavia brought about by violence are acceptable.
A tentative truce has been in place between the Yugoslav
military and Croatia since Sunday. Discussions are underway aimed
at further implementation of the September 17 cease-fire
agreement signed by Serbia, Croatia, and the military. The Hague
peace conference chaired by Lord Carrington resumes its meetings
tomorrow.
We call upon all parties to seize this opportunity to establish
a genuine cease-fire and work toward a negotiated agreement on
Yugoslavia's future. We must collectively protect as well against
the spread of this cycle of violence to yet another Yugoslav
republic. There can be no mistaking that the fate of Bosnia-
Herzegovina also hangs in the balance. The Serbian leadership and
the Yugoslav federal military have it in their power to cease violent
provocations and the unjustified military occupation of that
republic immediately.
The United States, the European Community (EC), and the
entire CSCE community have sent a clear message to the peoples of
Yugoslavia: The use of force to solve political differences or to
change external or internal borders in Yugoslavia is simply not
acceptable. Those who resort to force in Yugoslavia, including both
Serbian and Croatian irregulars, will achieve nothing but tragedy
for themselves and for the Yugoslav peoples. The aggressors can
only isolate themselves further from the international community
by continuing the violence. And by continuing on their present
course, those who resort to force will only condemn themselves to
exile from the new Europe.
We doubt that any of the peoples of Yugoslavia truly wish to
pay the high price of this warfare. The social and economic
regression and political and economic isolation that will ensue are
a price we believe no rational person would wish to pay.
We commend and strongly support the efforts of the European
Community and its member states and the efforts of CSCE members
to bring about a cease-fire, send observers, convene a conference,
and bring about an arbitration commission for the peaceful
resolution of all disputes. We will continue to support fully the
regional arrangements of the EC and CSCE on behalf of these ends.
We also welcome this resolution's support for the
international arms embargo which the United States proposed back
on July 3 of this year. At the same time, we support the
resolution's call for the UN Secretary General to bring the good
offices of this organization to bear on the Yugoslav situation in
concert with the efforts of regional bodies.
There is another path open to the peoples of Yugoslavia. They
can address and reconcile their legitimate aspirations and concerns,
including the interests of all national groups in each republic,
through a process of peaceful dialogue. Indeed, ultimately they
must do so.
Today's resolution effectively underscores and reinforces the
messages sent to the peoples of Yugoslavia by the CSCE and its
participating states. It expresses the full support of the UN
Security Council for the efforts of the CSCE and the European
Community to help the peoples of Yugoslavia move toward peace.
We support it without reservation. And we hope the peoples
of Yugoslavia will heed it and pull back from the war that now
sheds blood across their land. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: Fact Sheet: UN Resolution 713 on Yugoslavia
Description: New York, New York
Date: Sep 25, 19919/25/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements, Fact Sheets
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization,
United Nations
[TEXT]
The Security Council,
Conscious of the fact that Yugoslavia has welcomed the
convening of a Security Council meeting through a letter conveyed
by the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the President of
the Security Council (S/23069),
Having heard the statement by the Foreign Minister of
Yugoslavia,
Deeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia which is
causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage, and by the
consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in the
border areas of neighboring countries,
Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes
a threat to international peace and security,
Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of
the United Nations,
Commending the efforts undertaken by the European
Community and its member States, with the support of the States
participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia, through, inter
alia, the implementation of a cease-fire including the sending of
observers, the convening of a Conference on Yugoslavia, including
the mechanisms set forth within it, and the suspension of the
delivery of all weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia,
Recalling the relevant principles enshrined in the Charter of
the United Nations and, in this context, noting the Declaration of 3
September 1991 of the States participating in the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe that no territorial gains or
changes within Yugoslavia brought about by violence are acceptable,
Noting also the agreement for a cease-fire concluded on 17
September 1991 in Igalo, and also that signed on 22 September 1991,
Alarmed by the violations of the cease-fire and the
continuation of the fighting,
Taking note of the letter dated 19 September 1991 to the
President of the Security Council from the Permanent
Representative of Austria (S/23052),
Taking note also of the letters dated 19 September 1991 and
20 September 1991 to the President of the Security Council from
respectively the Permanent Representative of Canada (S/23053) and
the Permanent Representative of Hungary (S/23057),
Take note also of the letters dated 5 July 1991 (S/22775), 12
July 1991 (S/22785), 22 July 1991 (S/22834), 6 August 1991
(S/22898), 7 August 1991 (S/22902), 7 August 1991 (S/22903), 21
August 1991 (S/22975), 29 August 1991 (S/22991), 4 September
1991 (S/23010), 19 September 1991 (S/23047), 20 September
1991 (S/23059) and 20 September 1991 (S/23060), from
respectively the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, the
Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia, the Permanent
Representatives of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, the Charge d'affaires a.i. of Austria,
and the Permanent Representative of Australia,
1. Expresses its full support for the collective efforts for
peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia undertaken under the auspices of
the member States of the European Community with the support of
the States participating in the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe consistent with the principles of that
Conference;
2. Supports fully all arrangements and measures resulting
from such collective efforts as those described above, in particular
of assistance and support to the cease-fire observers, to
consolidate an effective end to hostilities in Yugoslavia and the
smooth functioning of the process instituted within the framework
of the Conference on Yugoslavia;
3. Invites to this end the Secretary-General to offer his
assistance without delay, in consultation with the Government of
Yugoslavia and all those promoting the efforts referred to above,
and to report as soon as possible to the Security Council;
4. Strongly urges all parties to abide strictly by the cease-
fire agreements of 17 September 1991 and 22 September 1991;
5. Appeals urgently to and encourages all parties to settle
their disputes peacefully and through negotiation at the Conference
on Yugoslavia, including through the mechanisms set forth within it;
6. Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing
peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general
and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military
equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides
otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General
and the Government of Yugoslavia;
7. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which might
contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a
peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Yugoslavia,
which would permit all Yugoslavs to decide upon and to construct
their future in peace;
8. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful
solution is achieved.
VOTE: Unanimous 15-0. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: Refugee Admissions Proposal For FY 1992
Eagleburger
Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration and
Refugee Affairs of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC
Date: Sep 24, 19919/24/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, Southeast Asia
Country: USSR (former), Vietnam
Subject: Refugees
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to
appear before the committee today on the subject of the admission
of refugees to the United States in fiscal year (FY) 1992.
Ambassador Lafontant-Mankarious and I will discuss the President's
formal proposal for the admission of up to 144,000 refugees in FY
1992. I believe the committee has also received a report which
provides the detailed information stipulated in the statute.
Refugees in Today's World
I would like to take a few minutes at the outset to put our refugee
policy in the broader context of US foreign policy and current
developments in world affairs. We have, in my view, entered a
period of historic transition in our foreign relations. The era of the
Cold War is over; democracy is spreading, not just in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union, but throughout much of the world. Our vision
of the new world order includes the hope that humane solutions will
be found for the plight of the millions of refugees in the world
today.
The symbol of the refugee stands among the most powerful of
those in the Cold War era. Just as one may say that the Berlin Wall
was the most graphic symbol of East-West confrontation in Europe,
it was the individual people who sought to escape to freedom across
that border who most vividly represented the human tragedy caused
by the communist system. Where that authoritarian ideology was
exported to the Third World--in Africa, in Cuba and Central
America, and in Asia--the result was conflict, persecution, and
massive flows of people seeking to save their lives and reach
freedom. During the post-war era, these people--the world's
refugees--have come to number in the millions.
Today, with the demise of Soviet communism, we are
embarked on a period of worldwide conflict resolution. The past
year has seen progress in Angola and Ethiopia and the very welcome
recent political agreement in South Africa. Two weeks ago,
Secretary Baker and President Gorbachev announced what we hope
will be the first step toward conflict resolution in Afghanistan.
The Cambodian factions have recently moved much closer to
acceptance of a plan for a comprehensive political settlement. In
our hemisphere, only Cuba now remains outside the circle of
democratically elected governments. And, though arising from a
different historical context, the plight of the Palestinians is a
central concern of US policy as we seek to bring about a Middle East
peace conference.
While these developments give us reason to be optimistic
about the future, we also recognize that the process of resolving
longstanding conflict situations will be neither quick nor easy.
Each situation is different, and each situation is complex. First
there must be agreement to cease hostilities. There must be
commitments by all parties to peaceful sharing of power. There
must be plans for free elections and the institution of democracy.
And there must be well-organized programs for the safe return
home of the refugees and displaced persons.
However, even though we can describe the goal and process of
conflict resolution and refugee repatriation, the past year has
shown that we cannot predict or control the local forces and
conflicts which may emerge now as the overlay of the Cold War era
and of communist suppression has been removed. The fighting in
Yugoslavia is a disastrous example of the danger inherent in this
period of instability. We are watching with utmost care the
development of policies affecting human rights and the treatment
of minorities in all areas of the former Soviet Union. Ethnic and
political conflicts totally outside the Cold War context also
threaten stability, as we have seen in Liberia, which alone has
added 600,000 to the world's list of refugees in the past 2 years.
Worldwide Assistance
The purpose of these consultations is to determine the number of
refugees to be resettled in the United States during FY 1992.
Resettlement is a key element of our protection of refugees, and we
are the world's leader in this regard. But resettlement is not the
centerpiece of our response to the refugee situation. The
overwhelming number of refugees in the world are waiting for an
opportunity to return home, not to abandon their homeland forever.
The short-term needs are basic support: food, water, health care,
and education for the children. The long-term need is the resolution
of the conflict or repression that forced these people to flee.
Thus, the assistance portion of our refugee program is of
great importance. I am pleased to say that, with the support and
cooperation of the Congress, we have steadily increased the
resources going to meet these basic needs even as we have reduced-
-through various streamlining measures--the costs of our
admissions program. In FY 1991, our refugee assistance budget,
including drawdowns from the President's Emergency Refugee and
Migration account, increased by $90 million over FY 1990. In FY
1992, we expect a further increase, especially in the basic support
programs and for repatriation of refugees to their respective
homelands. Recent history has certainly taught us that wars,
aggression, and persecution will continue to produce new refugees
and that we must be prepared to assist in meeting their basic needs.
One year ago, when I appeared before this committee to
review with you the President's FY 1991 refugee program, foremost
on our minds was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It was not then
possible to predict what the next few months would hold and how
that conflict would be manifested in refugee movements and
humanitarian assistance needs. In the first 10 weeks of that
conflict, more than 1 million people of numerous nationalities fled
Iraq and Kuwait. A truly extraordinary international effort was
mobilized to ensure the physical well-being of these people and to
arrange repatriation to their home countries. However, this was not
the end.
In March, 1 month after the war ended, nearly 2 million
Iraqis--Kurds, Shi'as, Turkomens, Assyrians, and other minorities--
fled Saddam Hussein's repression in a matter of weeks. Both their
sheer numbers and the compressed timeframe of this massive
movement stunned the world.
Only the unprecedented action of President Bush to authorize
the Department of Defense to perform critical relief, supply, and
transportation functions averted catastrophe. The US military and
our coalition partners performed this humanitarian relief effort
brilliantly until overall coordination could be transferred to the
[Office of the] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). I should
add, however, that the total US expenditure on the Iraqi refugee
crisis may exceed $600 million.
Out of that experience, we are developing ways to improve
greatly the UN capacity to respond to such situations so that such
unilateral action is not required. We expect that several proposals
along these lines will be discussed in the UN General Assembly. We
will participate actively to see that the most promising proposals
are approved and implemented in the context of overall UN reform.
Emigration From the Soviet Union
Recent developments in the Soviet Union, specifically with regard
to emigration, have had a direct impact on the US refugee
admissions program that we are considering here today.
In May of this year, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed
far-reaching emigration legislation which we expect to be followed
by new, less burdensome exit procedures. We continue to monitor
implementation of this legislation at union and republic levels. We
have received a few disquieting reports recently that some local
emigration authorities are reverting to the restrictive practices
which pertained prior to implementation of the new law. Embassy
Moscow is investigating these reports. If such a trend develops as
republics take over more responsibility for emigration from the
central government, it will adversely affect US relations with
those republics that follow such restrictive practices. Secretary
Baker made clear during his recent visit to Moscow that the United
States will expect CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe] human rights standards to prevail in the republics and at the
union level, regardless of the final shape of the new union structure
agreed upon by the Soviet peoples.
The dramatic events in the USSR since the failed coup have
not impeded Soviet emigration to the United States. Indeed, the
number of refugees departing the Soviet Union for the United States
rose during the past few weeks with almost no complications.
With regard to emigration to the United States, we intend in
FY 1992 to address the backlog which developed in FY 1991 prior to
the passage of the Soviet emigration legislation. Many individuals
approved by USINS [US Immigration and Naturalization Service] for
US admission were unable to depart due to their inability to obtain
Soviet exit permission. We hope that implementation of the new
Soviet law will solve this problem. We have been encouraged by the
steady rise in the numbers of persons departing since July 1. The
President's proposal, therefore, is to add the fiscal 1991 Soviet
shortfall to the 50,000 admissions which had been planned for in
the President's budget request for next year. I am pleased to report
that, in recent weeks, many more Soviet refugees than expected
have traveled to the United States, and we will be reducing the FY
1991 shortfall from 13,000--as earlier estimated in the
President's proposal--to 11,000. We are optimistic, from action
taken so far by the authorization and appropriations committees,
that the necessary funds will be available.
Refugee Admissions From Vietnam
In addition to the impact of developments in the Soviet Union on the
refugee admissions program, I would also like to report to the
committee on the situation in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately,
because Vietnam has thus far retained its communist regime,
thousands of people continue to leave due to current or past
persecution.
More than 2 years have passed since I led our delegation to
the Geneva conference at which more than 50 countries adopted an
agreement--the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA)--designed to
resolve the many issues surrounding Vietnamese asylum seekers in
Southeast Asia. For the most part, the CPA has worked remarkably
well. Except in Hong Kong, new boat arrivals are a fraction of what
they were 1 year ago. In most countries, first asylum has been
maintained, and progress in screening continues. However, we
remain distressed by Malaysian pushoffs, and we are concerned with
the slow progress in addressing the needs of unaccompanied minors.
The United States continues to oppose involuntary
repatriation to Vietnam. We firmly believe that efforts are better
focused on increasing the pace of voluntary returns, which has
shown hopeful signs in recent months. Voluntary repatriation is
critical, because the screened-out will not be offered resettlement.
Resettlement of persons approved as refugees continues as a
central element of the CPA. For the United States, our FY 1992
admissions proposal of 52,000 for the region reflects our
commitment to the continued success of the CPA as well as to the
resettlement of Amerasians and former reeducation center
detainees from Vietnam through the Orderly Departure Program.
During the past year, an inter-agency effort involving USINS
and the Department of State has allowed the United States almost
to double to a level of 10,000 the number of persons interviewed
each month by the Orderly Departure Program. As a result, we hope
to be able to complete all Amerasian interviews by mid-1992 and,
by late 1992, to have eliminated the backlog in immigrant visa
issuance in Vietnam. Former re-education center detainees are now
being admitted to the United States at a rate of almost 2,000 per
month. We believe that this dramatic expansion has underscored our
commitment to resettlement of these persons of humanitarian
concern to the United States. At the same time, we hope that
persons contemplating clandestine boat departures will understand
that we view the Orderly Departure Program as the most secure
method and the focal point for the US refugee effort for Vietnamese.
Other Regions of the World
In other regions of the world--Africa, the Near East, Latin America,
and Eastern Europe--the United States continues resettlement
programs appropriate to the local needs. Moreover, we are working
with UNHCR to establish mechanisms which will allow our
admissions program to be even more responsive to finding
resettlement opportunities for high risk or other priority needs
cases. Details on our admissions proposals for these regions are
provided in the report we have submitted to the committee.
Conclusion
To summarize the lessons of this past year in refugee affairs is
difficult. The collapse of totalitarian communism in the USSR is
clearly a cause for optimism. The United States is seeking to
expand its existing ties and contacts with the new Baltic states and
the Soviet republics, but we will in no measure reduce our emphasis
on human rights and the treatment of minority populations. The
United States will seize every new opportunity to work toward
conflict resolution and peaceful political settlement around the
world. For large numbers of the world's refugees, we are hopeful
that the international community can redirect its resources to
repatriation. Where the last four decades have seen an inexorable
increase in the world total of refugees, it is our goal in the 1990s
to see these numbers decline dramatically.
But there will also be continuing challenges. Communist
regimes in Vietnam and Cuba will continue to produce refugees.
Iraq, Liberia, the Horn of Africa, and now Yugoslavia demonstrate
all too well the potential for local conflict and instability.
Moreover, beyond the populations of refugees fleeing persecution
and conflict situations, the 1990s will also present the developed
world with vexing policy and legal issues in coping with what are
anticipated to be huge numbers of asylum seekers and other
international migrants. It will be incumbent upon the United States
to be engaged--with our allies and friends, as well as with the
source countries--in seeking solutions to these problems on a
worldwide basis. Although the era of Soviet communism may be
over, the refugee and migration phenomenon will not disappear. For
the foreseeable future, the United States must and will continue to
perform the humanitarian leadership role which throughout the Cold
War so clearly symbolized what the free world is all about. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: Overview of Proposed Refugee Admissions
Description: Overview from the report "Proposed Refugee Admissions
for FY 1992," released to Congress, Washington, DC
Date: Sep 30, 19919/30/91
Category: Reports
Subject: Refugees
[TEXT]
Overview of Proposed Refugee Admissions
(The complete report is available by writing to the Bureau of Public
Affairs, Public Information Division, Washington, DC, 20520)
In the resolution of refugee problems, the United States gives
highest priority to the safe, voluntary return of refugees to their
homelands. This policy, embodied in the Refugee Act of 1980, is
also the first priority for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). If safe, voluntary repatriation is not feasible, settlement
in countries of asylum within the region is sought as the next
preferred alternative. Often, however, political differences, lack of
economic resources to support large numbers of additional people,
or ethnic, religious or other deep-rooted animosities prevent this
option from being exercised. Finally, consideration is given to
resettlement in third countries, including the United States.
The United States considers for admission persons of special
humanitarian concern who can establish persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The
legal basis of the refugee admissions program is the Refugee Act of
1980 which embodies the American tradition of granting refuge to
diverse groups suffering or fearing persecution. The Act adopted,
for the purpose of our refugee admissions program, the definition of
"refugee" contained in the UN Convention and Protocol relating to
the status of refugee. The definition which may be found in Section
101 (a) (42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as
amended by the Refugee Act, is as follows:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country
of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, is outside any country in which such person last
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection
of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such
circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as
defined in section 207 (e) of this Act) may specify, any person who
is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of
a person having no nationality, within the country in which such
person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
The term "refugee" does not include any person who ordered,
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
The estimated world population of refugees and externally
displaced persons is 16 million; persons displaced within their own
countries by war, famine and civil unrest may equal twice that
number. The United States works with other governments, and
international and private organizations to protect refugees and
displaced persons and strives to ensure that survival needs for food
health care and shelter are met. Under the authority contained in
the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, the
United States contributes to the international activities of the
UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
other international and private organizations which provide ongoing
relief and assistance for refugees and displaced persons. The
United States has been instrumental in mobilizing a community of
nations to work through these and other organizations in alleviating
the misery and suffering of refugees throughout the world.
The United States, aware that more than 75% of the world's
refugees are women and young children, recognizes the special
needs of this vulnerable group, particularly in the areas of
protection and assistance. We support the UNHCR and other relevant
international governmental and non-governmental organizations in
their efforts to involve refugee women in implementing programs
on their own behalf. We also support the assigning of women
officers to positions where they can impact favorably on the
protection and well-being of women and children refugees.
We continue to press for the most effective use of
international resources directed to the urgent needs of refugees and
displaced persons. During FY 1991, the United States supported
major relief programs in Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia,
South Asia and the Near East, including the Gulf region.
Contributions for these funds were made through organizations
including the UNHCR, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP),
the ICRC, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). This support
averted further human tragedy and helped sustain life by providing
food and other assistance to meet the basic human needs of
refugees. Details are provided in the World Refugee Report [to be
released].
With regard to refugees resettled in the United States, the US
Government aims to promote economic self-sufficiency as quickly
as possible, limiting the need for public assistance and encouraging
refugees to contribute to the diversity and enrichment of our
country as previous newcomers have done. To this end, short-term
English language and cultural orientation programs for certain
groups of refugees have been established overseas to initiate the
process of adapting to our complex society. Particular attention is
paid to the health of refugees to ensure that communicable diseases
are controlled before entry into the United States. Federally funded
programs administered by the states provide cash and medical
assistance, training programs, employment and other support
services to many refugees soon after arrival in the United States.
These services are performed by a variety of institutional
providers, including private voluntary agencies who also perform
initial reception and placement services under cooperative
agreements with the Department of State. All of these benefits are
intended for short-term utilization during a refugee's transition to
an independent, contributing member of the national economy and of
American society.
Further to the table of proposed US refugee admissions in FY
1992 (Table II), the President also proposes to specify that special
circumstances exist so that, for the purpose of admission under the
limits established above and pursuant to Section 101(a)(42)(B) of
the INA, certain persons, if they otherwise qualify for admission,
may be considered as refugees of special humanitarian concern to
the United States even though they are still within their countries
of nationality or habitual residence. The proposed designations for
FY 1992 are:
-- Persons in Vietnam;
-- Persons in Laos;
-- Persons in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; and
-- Persons in the Soviet Union
In addition to the proposed admission of refugees from abroad,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) will be authorized
to adjust to permanent resident alien status 10,000 persons who
have been granted asylum in the United
States and have been in the United States for at least 1 year,
pursuant to Section 209 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
In the regional descriptions which follow, an overview of
refugee-generating conditions is provided. In addition, voluntary
repatriation, resettlement within the region, and third-country
resettlement opportunities are mentioned. There is also reference
to refugee resettlement by countries other than the United States.
More detailed information and statistics are found in the companion
World Refugee Report. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: Update on the Philippines
Quinn
Source: Kenneth M. Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington,
DC
Date: Sep 25, 19919/25/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: Philippines
Subject: Military Affairs, Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify here today on recent events
in the Philippines.
On September 16, the Philippine Senate, by a vote of 12 to 11,
refused to ratify the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security
that was signed on August 27, 1991, after 15 months of intense
negotiations. A two-thirds majority, or 16 senators, was required
for ratification. This was an extremely disappointing outcome to a
long negotiating process, so ably conducted by our special
negotiator Rich Armitage, which produced a document that both
governments were able to support and sign.
We continue to believe that this is a fair treaty which is in
the interest of both the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America. It remains our hope that a way can be found for
this agreement to take effect, but I would emphasize that this is
now a Philippine decision, to be made by Filipinos in accordance
with Philippine laws and procedures.
That decision-making process is now continuing in Manila.
Prior to the final Senate vote, President [Corazon] Aquino announced
her Administration's intention to seek a national referendum and
send the issue of this new agreement straight to the Filipino people
should the Senate reject the treaty.
It is the determination of President Aquino that the
Philippine constitutional and political processes have not yet run
their full course. We have expressed our willingness to await
President Aquino's continuing efforts to seek approval of this
agreement, which public opinion polls repeatedly have indicated is
strongly favored by a large majority of the Philippine people.
Indeed, prior to this vote, President Aquino took dramatic and
unprecedented steps to demonstrate to the Senate the importance the
Filipino people attach to ratification of this agreement. She
mobilized the key groups in Philippine society and, in a step harking
back to the EDSA [Epiphanio de los Santos Avenue, February
1986] revolution, led hundreds of thousands of people through a
monsoon storm punctuated by lightning in a dramatic march to put
their desires visibly before the Philippine Senate. We appreciate
President Aquino's friendship toward the United States and respect her
determination as she continues the effort to put the treaty into
effect.
In deciding upon the US course of action I just described, a
major concern was the legal status of our military forces in the
Philippines. In May of 1990, the Government of the Philippines
presented a diplomatic note terminating the 1947 military base
agreement, effective September 16, 1991. While the United States
did not accept that the 1947 agreement could be terminated prior to
September 1992, the practical effect would have been to leave
uncertain the status of our military personnel after the date the
Philippines set for termination. On September 16, the Foreign
Ministry presented a diplomatic note which rescinded the earlier
termination notice. As a result, there is now no termination date
for the 1947 agreement, and the status of forces arrangements
remain in effect. The 1947 agreement may, in the future, be
terminated either by mutual agreement of the two parties or, after
a 1-year notice, by either party.
The coming months will, inevitably, be a period of
considerable uncertainty. At the same time, let me also stress that
we have continually affirmed that ratification of this treaty is a
matter for the people of the Philippines to resolve according to
their own constitutional and legal procedures. We will endeavor to
do nothing which will complicate this internal debate. We will
follow this process closely and will abide by its outcome. The
United States has consistently maintained that we would vacate the
naval facility at Subic Bay if that, indeed, is the wish of
the Philippines.
Since it is the Administration's position that we are awaiting
notice from the Philippine Government on the ratification or
rejection of our negotiated agreement, we will continue to stand by
that agreement and its accompanying undertakings on base-related
security assistance during the coming months as President Aquino
takes this decision to the Filipino people. Therefore, the
Administration has not sought changes to its FY 1992 request, and,
subject to congressional action, we plan to implement our FY 1992
assistance program as envisaged earlier.
Regarding assistance levels, we need to keep in mind that
this debate on the US military facilities in the Philippines takes
place against the backdrop of an unprecedented string of natural
disasters, capped on June 15 by the largest volcanic eruption seen
on earth this century. Mt. Pinatubo erupted at the exact same time a
major typhoon passed through the area. Together Mt. Pinatubo and
Typhoon "Diding" rained tons of mud on the surrounding countryside,
destroying buildings, roads, and bridges and rendering valuable
farmland useless. After the eruption, central Luzon suffered, as it
will for years to come, from mudslides and floods as the volcanic
debris on the mountain--estimated by US engineers to be eight
times that emitted by Mt. St. Helens--washes down onto the
surrounding plains and reshapes the topography. Over 500 people
have died, nearly a half-million people have been forced to leave
their homes, and altogether over 1 million people have been
adversely affected. Hundreds of millions dollars worth of
infrastructure and cropland has been damaged so far. Although our
relief and reconstruction assistance is approaching $50 million,
only a major international effort will ameliorate much future
suffering. Among the casualties were Clark Air Base and several
smaller US military installations. They have been rendered
completely inoperable as military facilities. Subic Bay Naval
Station was also badly hurt but can be repaired.
Beyond the natural disasters and the political decisions is
the human dimension of our military presence. The US military has
long been a major employer in the Philippines. Some $500 million was
pumped into the Philippine economy every year by the Clark and
Subic bases. It has been estimated that over 80,000 people in the
central Luzon area owed their livelihoods directly to the US military
presence. And many thousands more enjoyed the benefits indirectly.
Now that Clark is going and the smaller facilities are gone, the city
of Angeles must cope with the ongoing Pinatubo disaster without its
main consumer of goods and its primary source of quality jobs. Should
we also be required to leave Subic Naval Base, the same will happen to
Olongapo City, which is even more dependent on Subic than Angeles was
on Clark. This work force has been loyal, steady, and skilled.
Although we have extended unprecedented separation benefits and are
doing all we can to help those who need training and new jobs, what is
happening now at Clark, and what may happen at Subic, has profound
human ramifications.
We are at a significant crossroads in our bilateral journey
with the Philippines toward the 21st century. During the
negotiations of the past year, we have had the opportunity to
reflect on our relationship. I, for one, hope that we will continue in
step with one another on the particular issue of our security
relationship. But whatever the outcome, I am convinced that the
United States and the Republic of the Philippines are headed in the
same direction in terms of our democratic institutions and in the
development of our increasingly intertwined economies. We will
continue to share security goals in Asia, even if we approach the
objective from a slightly different direction.
From my previous assignment in the Philippines and my
current responsibilities in Washington, I have developed a deep
appreciation for the depth, the breadth, and the complexity of the
relationship between our two nations over the past century. Having
been in Manila on two separate occasions during the past several
months, I feel I can convey one other element which is not so
apparent here in our capitol. When all the acrimonious haze of the
political debate is swept aside, the one strong lasting impression I
bring back is of the breadth and depth of friendship so many, many
Filipinos feel toward the United States. There was an incredible
outpouring of good will toward our country from a wide spectrum of
the Philippine population. Whatever the outcome of the present
deliberations, I hope we keep in mind that, when all is said and
done, there are few countries in the world where a crowd
approaching a half-million people might have assembled in support
of the US military presence remaining. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: Liberia: Assistance to Regional Peace-keeping Efforts
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Sep 25, 19919/25/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Liberia
Subject: Trade/Economics, Arms Control,
Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
The September 16-17 West African summit in Yamoussoukro, Cote
d'Ivoire, represented an important step forward in efforts by the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to bring
lasting peace to Liberia. Agreement was reached on expanding
ECOMOG, the Community's peace-keeping force in Liberia, with the
addition of troops from Senegal and possibly other ECOWAS member
states.
The United States supports these regional efforts to bring
about disarmament and free and fair elections in Liberia. We are
immediately providing grants of $3.75 million in FY 1991 foreign
military financing funds to support the Yamoussoukro peace process
and those ECOMOG participants in the most dire financial
circumstances. This amount is being made available as follows:
Senegal, $1 million; Cote d'Ivoire (chairman of the ECOWAS
Committee of Five), $1 million; Ghana, $500,000; Guinea, $500,000;
Sierra Leone, $500,000; The Gambia, $250,000. The Administration
has also notified Congress of its intention to re-allocate $500,000
in peace-keeping funds to support ECOWAS peace-keeping activities.
These immediate actions represent an initial US response to
the Yamoussoukro summits. They follow the provision earlier this
year of $2.8 million to ECOWAS and a US contribution of over $130
million to humanitarian relief operations in Liberia. We are
urgently considering what additional resources can be made
available to support reinforcement of ECOMOG with Senegalese
troops and urge the international community to join with us in
assisting the Liberia peace process. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: US-Morocco: Longstanding Ties
Bush, Hassan II
Source: President Bush, King Hassan II
Description: Remarks at arrival ceremony, Washington, DC
Date: Sep 26, 19919/26/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Morocco
Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
President Bush:
It is an honor to welcome His
Majesty King Hassan to the United States of America. The
relationship between our two countries is rich, tracing back more
than 200 years to the Moroccan-American Treaty of Peace and
Friendship. And that agreement remains the longest unbroken treaty
in our history.
Your Majesty, under your leadership, relations between our
nations continue to grow and prosper in a variety of fields--in trade
and investment, in cultural contacts, and in resolving regional
disputes.
This past year has seen a world of remarkable change--
transformations that have reverberated across every continent.
Morocco is stepping forward to meet this new world. You have
lowered barriers to increased investment and trade--and begun the
privatization of many of Morocco's wholly owned state enterprises.
Already, your nation's economic opening has meant new opportunity
for American investment--some of it generated by 1989's highly
successful OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] mission
to Morocco.
Morocco is also responding to the call to all governments to
recognize the rights and freedoms of their people. In this regard,
the United States applauds Your Majesty's recent release of
political prisoners, your establishment of the Royal Consultative
Council on Human Rights in Morocco, and I know Morocco will not be
deterred from this courageous course.
Your Majesty, we are pleased to see the UN proceeding with
its efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute with Morocco's
support. It took a great deal of courage for you to agree to the UN
Secretary General's plan for a referendum, and I confirm America's
willingness to play its role in promoting a just and lasting
settlement in the Sahara, in accordance with that plan.
In the Gulf, Morocco was among the first to commit forces in
defense of Saudi Arabia. And when the issue was still in doubt,
Morocco stood on the side of justice and against aggression. Today,
I can assure you, Your Majesty, that the United States will continue
to work toward a lasting peace in the Middle East.
We now see the real prospect of a peace conference leading to
direct negotiations between Arabs and Israelis. That process aims
at a comprehensive peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338, and the principle of territory for peace.
We seek to elaborate on this principle to provide for real
security and real peace for all states in the Middle East, including
Israel, and for recognition of legitimate political rights of the
Palestinian people. Your Majesty, I look forward to working with
you toward those objectives.
Your Majesty, once again, a warm welcome to the White
House.
I look forward to our talks, and I want to extend a special welcome
to your daughter, who has accompanied you on this visit. And I trust
the fruits of our discussion will make the world a better place for
her and for all of our children.
King Hassan II
[Introductory remarks deleted]: We
are delighted to respond to your gracious invitation and to meet
with you. Our visit constitutes, indeed, one important link in a
series of previous visits during which we have come to establish
excellent friendly relations with many of your predecessors. Mr.
President, today's encounter will certainly renew and strengthen
these relations.
We were no more than a child when we were introduced to
President Franklin Roosevelt by our late father, Mohammed V. We
never knew personally Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson,
Nixon, Carter, and Reagan. Today we are received by you, Mr.
President, a dear friend of ours whose distinguished career we have
been following attentively. We have been following attentively your
career, Mr. President, first when you were appointed Ambassador to
China, then CIA director, and Vice President to our great friend,
President Reagan, and finally, President of the United States of
America. Throughout your career, we have at all times perceived in
you a man of rectitude, humility, deep thought, true foresight, and
unshakeable faithfulness toward his friends.
It is true that our last visit to the United States of America
dates back to 1983. However, during these 8 years, our friendly
relations have never been better. It couldn't have been otherwise
considering that these relations are as old as your nation. For the
1786 Treaty of Amity and Peace, signed by President Jefferson and
our ancestor Mohammed III, has always been and still remains the
basis of the excellent rapport existing between our two
governments and nations.
What makes this friendship exemplary is the fact that it has
never been affected by juncture or vicissitude, nor has it been
changing in dimension or level. It has rather been similar to itself,
unaffected by world crises and the requirements of the Cold War.
We are looking forward to the talks we shall have with your
excellency and with a number of officials from the executive and
legislative branch. We have no doubt that these talks will reveal
the likeness of our views concerning political and economic issues.
Mr. President, you know better than anyone that the Gulf
crisis
has made men all over the world realize that is it mandatory to rely
on international legality for the solving of world issues and for the
sake of peace and understanding among the nations. We sincerely
hope that the same legality is applied in the case of the Middle East.
It is, indeed, hard to believe that the tragedy of the Middle East has
lasted half a century.
As to the Kingdom of Morocco, we shall ever be ready to
contribute to any peaceful solution liable to give each one his due
and bring about a just and lasting peace in this area. We will
constantly be on your side, mobilized in order to seek this peace in
the Middle East. I pray you, Mr. President, and dear friend, to accept
our thanks for your invitation, your warm welcome, and your
generous hospitality. We wish you excellent health and success, and
we wish the American people much prosperity. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: Fact Sheet: Moroccan King Visits Washington, DC
Date: Sep 26, 19919/26/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Morocco
Subject: Trade/Economics, History, Democratization
[TEXT]
King Hassan II of Morocco made an official visit to Washington, DC,
on September 26, 1991. The King previously visited in March 1963,
February 1967, November 1978, and May and October 1983.
US-Moroccan Relations
Moroccans recognized the Government of the United States in 1777
before the end of the Revolutionary War. Formal US relations with
Morocco date to 1786, when the two nations negotiated a Treaty of
Peace and Friendship. Renegotiated in 1836, it is still in force,
constituting the longest unbroken treaty relationship in US history.
US-Moroccan relations are characterized by mutual respect
and friendship, and US and Moroccan foreign policy objectives often
coincide. Morocco's strategic location on the Strait of Gibraltar, its
agreement to regular US Navy ship visits, its persistent efforts to
seek accommodation on Middle East issues, and its religious
tolerance are factors contributing to harmonious bilateral
relations.
US objectives include maintaining cordial and cooperative
relations, supporting Moroccan efforts to develop an increasingly
effective administration, and aiding its domestic, social, and
economic progress. Although US air bases were withdrawn from
Morocco in 1963, Morocco has granted rights of transit through its
airfields for US forces and conducts joint exercises with various US
armed forces.
Since independence, Morocco has received more than $1
billion
in US grants and loans. Of this, 50% has been PL-480 loans; 40%
support assistance, military grants and credits, and development
loans; and 10% technical assistance.
Government and Politics
After the death of his father, Mohamed V, King Hassan II succeeded
to the throne on March 3, 1961. He recognized the Royal Charter
proclaimed by his father in May 1958, which outlined steps toward
establishing a constitutional monarchy.
A constitution providing for representative government under
a strong monarchy was approved by referendum in December 1962,
and elections were held the following year. In June 1965, following
student riots and civil unrest, the King invoked article 35 of the
constitution and declared a "state of exception." He assumed all
legislative and executive powers and named a new government not
based on political parties.
In July 1970, King Hassan submitted to referendum a new
constitution providing for an even stronger monarchy. Its approval
and subsequent elections formally ended the 1965 "state of
exception."
An unsuccessful coup on July 10, 1971, organized by senior
military officers, was followed by Morocco's third constitution,
approved by popular referendum in early 1972. The new
constitution kept King Hassan's powers intact, but enlarged from
one-third to two-thirds the number of directly elected
parliamentary representatives.
In August 1972, after a second coup attempt, relations
between the opposition and the Crown deteriorated, due to
disagreement on opposition participation in elections. The King
subsequently appointed a series of non-political cabinets
responsible only to him.
Stemming from cooperation on the Sahara issue,1 a
rapprochement between the King and the opposition began in mid-
1974 and led to elections for local councils, with opposition party
participation in 1976. Parliamentary elections were held in June
1977, resulting in a two-thirds majority for the government-backed
independent candidates and the allies.
A May 1980 referendum extended the parliament's 4-year
term
to 6 years. Local elections were again held in June 1983, and new
parliamentary election in 1984. A new party, the Constitutional
Union, finished first in both votes.
Economy and Trade
Private property and free enterprise drive the economy, and the
intervention of the state is being steadily reduced.
The country has been actively engaged in a program of
economic restructuring and reform since the early 1980s in
conjunction with the International Monetary Fund and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Significant
progress has been achieved in economic reforms, and performance
has improved, but problems still remain. Trade performance
deteriorated in 1989, but the foreign trade balance improved
significantly in 1990.
Morocco's responsible debt management performance has been
reflected in the willingness of the country's official and
commercial creditors to agree to successive rescheduling on
increasingly less restrictive terms. In September 1990, Morocco
became the first country to benefit from terms recommended by the
Houston summit on "Paris Club" official debt. That same year, the
country reached agreement with its "London Club" commercial
creditors which includes "Brady Plan" voluntary debt reduction
measures to be applied to a portion of outstanding debts.
Morocco's heavy debt burden, high debt service ratios, and
policies to limit further increases in indebtedness continue to limit
prospects for a significant increase of imports of consumer and
capital goods from the United States. In the past several years, the
US share of total imports has fluctuated between 6% and 12.5%,
depending on changes in demand for US-origin agricultural
products--principally cereal and feed grains and vegetable oils--
and deliveries of major equipment such as passenger aircraft to the
national airline.
Urban growth has been rapid. Nearly half the population now
lives in cities and towns, although the economy depends primarily
upon the agricultural sector. Urban unemployment stands at about
16% of the work force, and the creation of new jobs still lags
behind population growth. New entrants to the labor force number
more than 200,000 annually, and full-time employment is difficult
to find outside the unskilled, manual trades. Lack of full-time
employment also remains a problem for skilled workers and
university graduates.
Morocco claims sovereignty over the Western Sahara, a
former Spanish colony bordering Morocco to the south. However,
Morocco's claim is contested by the Polisario, an organization
demanding independence for the Western Sahara. Morocco has
agreed to the UN Secretary General's plan to hold a referendum in
the Western Sahara to determine its status. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991
Title: Country Profile: Morocco
Date: Sep 26, 19919/26/91
Category: Country Data
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Morocco
Subject: History, Trade/Economics, Democratization
[TEXT]
Official Name: Kingdom of Morocco
Geography
Area: 446,550 sq. km. (172,413 sq. mi.); about the size of Oregon
and Washington combined.
Cities: Capital--Rabat (pop. 900,000 in urban prefecture of Rabat-
Sale). Other cities--Casablanca, Marrakech, Fez, Tangier.
Terrain: Coastal plain, mountains, desert.
Climate: Mediterranean and desert.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Moroccan(s).
Population (1990): 25 million.
Avg. annual growth rate (1990): 2.5%.
Ethnic group: Arab-Berber 99%.
Religions: Sunni Muslim 99%.
Languages: Arabic (official), French, three Berber vernaculars.
Education: Years compulsory--9. Attendance--primary 81%;
secondary 31%. Literacy (1990)--33%.
Health: Infant mortality rate (1990)--78/1,000. Life expectancy
(1990)--
63 yrs. male, 66 yrs. female.
Government
Type: Constitutional monarchy.
Constitution: March 10, 1972, revised.
Independence: March 2, 1956.
Branches: Executive--king (chief of state), prime minister (head of
government). Legislative--unicameral legislature (6-yr. term).
Judicial--Supreme Court.
Administrative subdivisions: 42 provinces and 7 prefectures. The
former Spanish Sahara has been divided into four provinces.
Political parties: Constitutional Union (UC), National Rally of
Independents (RNI), Istiqlal (Independence) Party (PI), Socialist
Union of Popular Forces (USFP), Popular Movement (MP), National
Democratic Party (PND), Party of Progress and Socialism
(communist--PPS), Organization for Democratic and Popular Action
(OADP).
Suffrage: Universal over 20.
Flag: Five-pointed green star centered on a red field.
Economy
GDP (1990): $25 billion.
Per capita GDP (1990 est.): $1,000.
Inflation (1990): 7%.
Natural resources: Phosphates, fish, iron, manganese, lead, cobalt,
silver, copper, oilshale.
Agriculture (21% of GDP): Products--wheat, barley, citrus fruits,
wine, vegetables, olives, livestock, fishing.
Industry (30% of GDP): Types--phosphate mining, manufacturing and
handicrafts, construction and public works energy.
Trade (1990): Exports--$4 billion: phosphates, foodstuffs,
manufactures. Major markets--France, other European Community
(EC) countries, Spain. Imports--$5 billion: machinery, foodstuffs,
oil. Major suppliers--France, Saudi Arabia, US, EC countries.
Fiscal year: Calendar year.
Principal Government Officials
Chief of State--King Hassan II
Prime Minister--Azeddine Laraki
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Abdellatif Filali
Ambassador to the United States--Mohammed Belkhayat
Ambassador to the United Nations--Ali Skalli (###)