US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991


New Initiatives To Reduce US Nuclear Forces

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address to the nation, Washington, DC Date: Sep 27, 19919/27/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] Tonight I would like to speak with you about our future and the future of the generations to come. The world has changed at a fantastic pace with each day writing a fresh page of history before yesterday's ink has even dried. Most recently, we've seen the peoples of the Soviet Union turn to democracy and freedom and discard a system of government based on oppression and fear. Like the East Europeans before them, they face the daunting challenge of building fresh political structures based on human rights, democratic principles, and market economies. Their task is far from easy and far from over. They will need our help, and they will get it. But these dramatic changes challenge our nation as well. Our country has always stood for freedom and democracy. When the newly elected leaders of Eastern Europe grappled with forming their new governments, they looked to the United States. They looked to American democratic principles in building their own free societies. Even the leaders of the USSR republics are reading The Federalist Papers, written by America's founders, to find new ideas and inspiration. Today, America must lead again, as it always has--as only it can. And we will. We must also provide the inspiration for lasting peace, and we will do that too. We can now take steps in response to these dramatic developments; steps that can help the Soviet peoples in their quest for peace and prosperity. More importantly, we can now take steps to make the world a less dangerous place than ever before in the nuclear age. A year ago, I described a new strategy for American defenses, reflecting the world's changing security environment. That strategy shifted our focus away from the fear that preoccupied us for 40 years--the prospect of a global confrontation. Instead, it concentrated more on regional conflicts, such as the one we just faced in the Persian Gulf. I spelled out a strategic concept, guided by the need to maintain the forces required to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively in crises, to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, and to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces, should that be needed. We are now moving to reshape the US military to reflect that concept. The new base force will be smaller by half a million than today's military--with fewer Army divisions, Air Force wings, Navy ships, and strategic nuclear forces. This new force will be versatile, able to respond around the world to challenges--old and new. As I just mentioned, the changes that allowed us to adjust our security strategy a year ago have greatly accelerated. The prospect of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe, launched with little or no warning, is no longer a realistic threat. The Warsaw Pact has crumbled. In the Soviet Union, the advocates of democracy triumphed over a coup that would have restored the old system of repression. The reformers are now starting to fashion their own futures moving even faster toward democracy's horizon. New leaders in the Kremlin and the republics are now questioning the need for their huge nuclear arsenal. The Soviet nuclear stockpile now seems less an instrument of national security and more of a burden. As a result, we now have an unparalleled opportunity to change the nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union. If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps--some on our own, some on their own, some together--we can dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons. We can more effectively discourage the spread of nuclear weapons. We can rely more on defensive measures in our strategic relationship. We can enhance stability and actually reduce the risk of nuclear war. Now is the time to seize this opportunity. After careful study and consultations with my senior advisers and after considering valuable counsel from [British] Prime Minister Major, [French] President Mitterrand, [German] Chancellor Kohl, and other allied leaders, I am announcing today a series of sweeping initiatives affecting every aspect of our nuclear forces-- on land, on ships, and on aircraft. I met again today with our Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I can tell you they wholeheartedly endorse each of these steps.
Theater Weapons
I will begin with the category in which we will make the most fundamental change in nuclear forces in over 40 years--non- strategic or theater weapons. Last year, I canceled US plans to modernize our ground- launched theater nuclear weapons. Later, our NATO allies joined us in announcing that the alliance would propose the mutual elimination of all nuclear artillery shells from Europe, as soon as short-range nuclear forces negotiations began with the Soviets. But starting these talks now would only perpetuate these systems while we engage in lengthy negotiations. Last months' events not only permit, but indeed demand, swifter, bolder action. I am, therefore, directing that the United States eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range--that is theater--nuclear weapons. We will bring home and destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads. We will, of course, ensure that we preserve an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe. That is essential to NATO's security. In turn, I have asked the Soviets to go down this road with us--to destroy their entire inventory of ground-launched theater nuclear weapons: not only their nuclear artillery and nuclear warheads for short-range ballistic missiles but also the theater systems the United States no longer has--systems like nuclear warheads for air-defense missiles and nuclear land mines. Recognizing further the major changes in the international military landscape, the United States will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships [and] attack submarines, as well as those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft. This means removing all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles from US ships and submarines, as well as nuclear bombs aboard aircraft carriers. The bottom line is that under normal circumstances, our ships will not carry tactical nuclear weapons. Many of these land- and sea-based warheads will be dismantled and destroyed. Those remaining will be secured in central areas where they would be available, if necessary, in a future crisis. Again, there is every reason for the Soviet Union to match our actions by removing all tactical nuclear weapons from its land- based naval aircraft and by destroying many of them and consolidating what remains at central locations. I urge them to do so.
START as a Springboard
No category of nuclear weapons has received more attention than those in our strategic arsenals. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START], which President Gorbachev and I signed last July, was the culmination of almost a decade's work. It calls for substantial stabilizing reductions and effective verification. Prompt ratification by both parties is essential. But I also believe the time is right to use START as a springboard to achieve additional stabilizing changes. First, to further reduce tensions, I am directing that all US strategic bombers immediately stand down from their alert posture. As a comparable gesture, I call upon the Soviet Union to confine its mobile missiles to their garrisons, where they will be safer and more secure. Second, the United States will immediately stand down from alert all intercontinental ballistic missiles scheduled for deactivation under START. Rather than waiting for the treaty's reduction plan to run its full 7-year course, we will accelerate elimination of these systems once START is ratified. I call upon the Soviet Union to do the same. Third, I am terminating the development of the mobile Peacekeeper ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] as well as the mobile portions of the small ICBM. The small single-warhead ICBM will be our only remaining ICBM modernization program. I call upon the Soviets to terminate any and all programs for future ICBMs with more than one warhead and to limit ICBM modernization to one type of single warhead missile--just as we have done. Fourth, I am canceling the current program to build a replacement for the nuclear short-range attack missile for our strategic bombers. Fifth, as a result of the strategic nuclear weapons adjustments I have just outlined, the United States will streamline its command and control procedures, allowing us to more effectively manage our strategic nuclear forces. As the system works now, the Navy commands the submarine part of our strategic deterrent, while the Air Force commands the bomber and land-based elements. But as we reduce our strategic forces, the operational command structure must be as direct as possible. I have, therefore, approved the recommendation of Secretary [of Defense Richard] Cheney and the Joint Chiefs to consolidate operational command of these forces into a US Strategic Command, under one commander, with participation from both services.
Eliminating the ICBM
Since the 1970s, the most vulnerable and unstable part of the US and Soviet nuclear forces has been intercontinental missiles with more than one warhead. Both sides have these ICBMs in fixed silos in the ground where they are more vulnerable than missiles on submarines. I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union seek early agreement to eliminate from their inventories all ICBMs with multiple warheads. After developing a timetable acceptable to both sides, we could rapidly move to modify or eliminate these systems under procedures already established in the START agreement. In short, such an action would take away the single most unstable part of our nuclear arsenals. But there is more to do. The United States and the Soviet Union are not the only nations with ballistic missiles. Some 15 nations have them now, and in less than a decade, that number could grow to 20. The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf demonstrates in no uncertain terms that the time has come for strong action on this growing threat to world peace. Accordingly, I am calling on the Soviet leadership to join us in taking immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes--whatever their source--without undermining the credibility of existing deterrent forces. And we will intensify our effort to curb nuclear and missile proliferation. These two efforts will be mutually reinforcing. To foster cooperation, the United States soon will propose additional initiatives in the area of ballistic missile early warning. Finally, let me discuss yet another opportunity for cooperation that can make our world safer.
Cooperation To Ensure Safety
During last month's attempted coup in Moscow, many Americans asked me if I thought Soviet nuclear weapons were under adequate control. I do not believe that America was at increased risk of nuclear attack during those tense days. But I do believe more can be done to ensure the safe handling and dismantling of Soviet nuclear weapons. Therefore, I propose that we begin discussions with the Soviet Union to explore cooperation in three areas: First, we should explore joint technical cooperation on the safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction of nuclear warheads; Second, we should discuss existing arrangements for the physical security and safety of nuclear weapons and how these might be enhanced; and, Third, we should discuss nuclear command and control arrangements and how these might be improved to provide more protection against the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons. My friend, French President [Francois] Mitterrand, offered a similar idea a short while ago. After further consultations with the alliance and when the leadership in the USSR is ready, we will begin this effort. The initiatives I am announcing build on the new defense strategy that I set out a year ago--one that shifted our focus away from the prospect of global confrontation. We are consulting with our allies on the implementation of many of these steps which fit well with the new post-Cold War strategy and force posture we have developed in NATO. As we implement these initiatives, we will closely watch how the new Soviet leadership responds. We expect our bold initiatives to be met with equally bold steps on the Soviet side. If this happens, further cooperation is inevitable. If it does not, then a historic opportunity will have been lost. Regardless, let no one doubt we will still retain the necessary strength to protect our security and that of our allies and to respond as necessary. In addition, regional instabilities, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and--as we saw during the conflict in the Gulf-- territorial ambitions of power-hungry tyrants, still require us to maintain a strong military to protect our national interests and to honor commitments to our allies. Therefore, we must implement a coherent plan for a significantly smaller but fully capable military, one that enhances stability but is still sufficient to convince any potential adversary that the cost of aggression would exceed any possible gain. We can safely afford to take the steps I have announced today; steps that are designed to reduce the dangers of miscalculation in a crisis. But to do so, we must also pursue vigorously those elements of our strategic modernization program that serve the same purpose. We must fully fund the B-2 and SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program. We can make radical changes in the nuclear postures of both sides to make them smaller, safer, and more stable. But the United States must maintain modern nuclear forces, including the strategic triad, and thus ensure the credibility of our deterrent. Some will say these initiatives call for a budget windfall for domestic programs. But the peace dividend I seek is not measured in dollars but in greater security. In the near term, some of these steps may even cost money. Given the ambitious plan I have already proposed to reduce US defense spending by 25%, we cannot afford to make any unwise or unwarranted cuts in the defense budget I have submitted to Congress. I am counting on congressional support to ensure we have the funds necessary to restructure our forces prudently and implement the decisions I have outlined tonight. Twenty years ago when I had the opportunity to serve this country as Ambassador to the United Nations, I once talked about the vision that was in the minds of the UN's founders--how they dreamed of a new age when the great powers of the world would cooperate in peace as they had as allies in war. Today, I consulted with President Gorbachev. While he hasn't had time to absorb the details, I believe the Soviet response will clearly be positive. I also spoke with [Russian Republic] President [Boris] Yeltsin and he had a similar reaction--positive and hopeful. Now, the Soviet people and their leaders can shed the heavy burden of a dangerous and costly nuclear arsenal which has threatened world peace for the past 5 decades. They can join us in these dramatic moves toward a new world of peace and security. Tonight, as I see the drama of democracy unfolding around the globe, perhaps we are closer to that new world than ever before. The future is ours to influence, to shape, to mold. While we must not gamble [with] that future, neither can we forfeit the historic opportunity now before us. It has been said, "Destiny is not a matter of chance, it is a matter of choice; it is not a thing to be waited for, it is a thing to be achieved." The United States has always stood where duty required us to stand. Now let them say that we led where destiny required us to lead--to a more peaceful, hopeful future. We cannot give a more precious gift to the children of the world. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

Presidential Initiative on Nuclear Arms

Fitzwater Description: Fact sheet released by the Office of the White House Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Sep 27, 19919/27/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] The President is announcing a number of initiatives affecting the entire spectrum of US nuclear weapons. The President has decided to undertake these initiatives to dramatically reduce the size and nature of US nuclear deployments worldwide, enhance stability, and take advantage of recent dramatic changes in the Soviet Union. He is calling upon the USSR to agree to similar measures. This fact sheet summarizes the major points.
Ground-Launched Theater Nuclear Weapons
The United States will withdraw all of its nuclear artillery shells and all nuclear warheads for its short-range ballistic missiles to the United States. These and any similar warheads currently stored in the United States will be dismantled and destroyed. The President is calling on the Soviets to withdraw, dismantle, and destroy all of their ground-launched theater nuclear weapons, including the nuclear warheads for their short-range ballistic missiles, nuclear air defense missiles, nuclear air defense missiles, nuclear artillery shells, and nuclear land mines. (The United States no longer possesses either nuclear land mines or nuclear air defense warheads.)
Sea-Based Tactical Nuclear Weapons
The United States will remove all tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear cruise missiles, from its surface ships and attack submarines. We will also remove nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft. Many of these weapons will be dismantled and destroyed with the remainder placed in secure central storage areas. The President is calling on the Soviet Union to similarly remove all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships, its attack submarines, and bases for land-based naval aircraft and to destroy many of those weapons, and to consolidate the remainder at secure central locations. Strategic Nuclear Forces All US strategic bombers will be removed from day-to-day alert status and their weapons returned to storage areas. As a comparable gesture, the President is asking the Soviet Union to confine its mobile ICBMs to their garrisons. The US will immediately stand down from alert all US ICBMs scheduled for deactivation under START. After START is ratified, the United States will accelerate their elimination. (START calls for the treaty-mandated reductions to occur over a 7-year period.) The President is calling on the USSR to do the same. Development of the Peacekeeper ICBM Rail Garrison system and the mobile elements of the small ICBM program have been terminated. The small single warhead ICBM will be the sole remaining US ICBM modernization program. The President is asking the USSR to limit their ICBM modernization efforts to one type of single warhead missile. The nuclear short-range attack missile has been canceled. The President is announcing the creation of a new US Strategic Command, designed to improve command and control of all US strategic nuclear forces. He is proposing that the US and USSR seek early agreement to eliminate all ICBMs with multiple warheads from their inventories. The President is calling on the Soviet leadership to join us in taking immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses that would protect against limited ballistic missile strikes whatever their source. The US will also propose initiatives in the area of ballistic missile early warning.
Joint Consultations
The President is proposing that we begin discussions with the Soviet Union to explore cooperation on nuclear command and control, warhead security and safety, and safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

The United Nations in a New Era

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address before the United Nations General Assembly, New York City, New York Date: Sep 23, 19919/23/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Country: Israel, Iraq Subject: United Nations, History, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Mr. President, thank you, sir. Mr. Secretary General, distinguished delegates to the United Nations, I am honored to speak with you as you open the 46th session of the General Assembly. I'd first like to congratulate outgoing President Guido de Marco of Malta and salute our incoming President Samir Shihabi of Saudi Arabia. I also want to salute especially Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, who will step down in just over 3 months. But let me say, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has served with great distinction during a period of unprecedented change and turmoil. For almost 10 years we've enjoyed the leadership of this man of peace; a man that I, along with many of you, feel proud to call friend. So today, let us congratulate our friend, and praise his spectacular service to the United Nations--and to the people of the world: Mr. Secretary General. Let me also welcome new members to this chamber--two delegations representing Korea, particularly our democratic friends, the Republic of Korea; the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and new missions from the Marshall Islands and Micronesia. Twenty years ago, when I was the permanent representative here for the United States, there were 132 UN members. Just 1 week ago, 159 nations enjoyed membership in the United Nations. Today, the number stands at 166. The presence of these new members alone provides reasons for us to celebrate. My speech today will not sound like any you've heard from a President of the United States. I'm not going to dwell on the superpower competition that defined international politics for half a century. Instead, I will discuss the challenges of building peace and prosperity in a world leavened by the Cold War's end and the resumption of history.
History Held Captive
Communism held history captive for years. It suspended ancient disputes, and it suppressed ethnic rivalries, nationalist aspirations, and old prejudices. As it has dissolved, suspended hatreds have sprung to life. People who for years have been denied their past have begun searching for their own identities--often through peaceful and constructive means, occasionally through factionalism and bloodshed. This revival of history ushers in a new era, teeming with opportunities and perils. Let's begin by discussing the opportunities. First, history's renewal enables people to pursue their natural instincts for enterprise. Communism froze that progress until its failures became too much for even its defenders to bear. And now, citizens throughout the world have chosen enterprise over envy; personal responsibility over the enticements of the state; prosperity over the poverty of central planning. The UN Charter encourages this adventure by pledging "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." And I can think of no better way to fulfill this mission than to promote the free flow of goods and ideas. Frankly, ideas and goods will travel around the globe with or without our help. The information revolution has destroyed the weapons of enforced isolation and ignorance. In many parts of the world, technology has overwhelmed tyranny, proving that the age of information can become the age of liberation if we limit state power wisely and free our people to make the best use of new ideas, inventions, and insights. By the same token, the world has learned that free markets provide levels of prosperity, growth, and happiness that centrally planned economies can never offer. Even the most charitable estimates indicate that in recent years the free world's economies have grown at twice the rate of the former communist world. Growth does more than fill shelves. It permits every person to gain--not at the expense of others but to the benefit of others. Prosperity encourages people to live as neighbors, not as predators. Economic growth can aid international relations in exactly the same way. Many nations represented here are parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Uruguay Round--the latest in the post-war series of trade negotiations--offers hope to developing nations, many of which have been cruelly divided, cruelly deceived by the false promises of totalitarianism. Here in this chamber we hear about North-South problems. But free and open trade, including unfettered access to markets and credit, offers developing countries means of self-sufficiency and economic dignity. If the Uruguay Round should fail, a new wave of protectionism could destroy our hopes for a better future. History shows all too clearly that protectionism can destroy wealth within countries and poison relations between them. Therefore, I call upon all members of GATT to redouble their efforts to reach a successful conclusion for the Uruguay Round. I pledge that the United States will do its part. I cannot stress this enough: Economic progress will play a vital role into the new world. It supplies the soil in which democracy grows best. People everywhere seek government of and by the people. They want to enjoy their inalienable rights to freedom and property and person.
Challenges to Democracy Fail
Challenges to democracy have failed. Just last month, coup plotters in the Soviet Union tried to derail the forces of liberty and reform, but Soviet citizens refused to follow. Most of the nations in this chamber stood with the forces of reform, led by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, and against the coup plotters. The challenge facing the Soviet peoples now--that of building political systems based upon individual liberty, minority rights, democracy, and free markets--mirrors every nation's responsibility for encouraging peaceful, democratic reform. But it also testifies to the extraordinary power of the democratic ideal. As democracy flourishes, so does the opportunity for a third historical breakthrough: international cooperation. A year ago, the Soviet Union joined the United States and a host of other nations in defending a tiny country against aggression and opposing Saddam Hussein. For the very first time on a matter of major importance, superpower competition was replaced with international cooperation. The United Nations, in one of its finest moments, constructed a measured, principled, deliberate, and courageous response to Saddam Hussein. It stood up to an outlaw who invaded Kuwait, who threatened many states within the region, who sought to set a menacing precedent for the post-Cold War world. The coalition effort established a model for the collective settlement of disputes. Members set the goal--the liberation of Kuwait--and devised a courageous, unified means of achieving that goal. And now, for the first time, we have a real chance to fulfill the UN Charter's ambition of working "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and nations large and small to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." Those are the words from the Charter. We will not revive these ideals if we fail to acknowledge the challenge that the renewal of history presents. In Europe and Asia, nationalist passions have flared anew, challenging borders, [and] straining the fabric of international society. At the same time, around the world, many age-old conflicts still fester. You see signs of this tumult right here. The United Nations has mounted more peace-keeping missions in the last 36 months than during its first 43 years. And although we now seem mercifully liberated from the fear of nuclear holocaust, these smaller, virulent conflicts should trouble us all. We must face this challenge squarely: First, by pursuing the peaceful resolution of disputes now in progress; Second, and more importantly, by trying to prevent others from erupting. No one here can promise that today's borders will remain fixed for all time. But we must strive to ensure the peaceful, negotiated settlement of border disputes. We also must promote the cause of international harmony by addressing old feuds. We should take seriously the Charter's pledge "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors."
Zionism Is Not Racism
UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, the so-called "Zionism is racism" resolution mocks this pledge and the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. I call now for its repeal. Zionism is not a policy; it is the idea that led to the creation of a home for the Jewish people, to the state of Israel. To equate Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist history and forget the terrible plight of Jews in World War II and, indeed, throughout history. To equate Zionism with racism is to reject Israel itself--a member of good standing of the United Nations. This body cannot claim to seek peace and at the same time challenge Israel's right to exist. By repealing this resolution unconditionally, the United Nations will enhance its credibility and serve the cause of peace. As we work to meet the challenge posed by the resumption of history, we also must defend the Charter's emphasis on inalienable human rights. Government has failed if citizens cannot speak their minds; if they can't form political parties freely and elect governments without coercion; if they can't practice their religion freely; if they can't raise their families in peace; if they can't enjoy a just return from their labor; if they can't live fruitful lives, and, at the end of their days, look upon their achievements and their society's progress with pride. Politicians who talk about "democracy" and "freedom" but provide neither eventually will feel the sting of public disapproval and the power of people's yearning to live free. Some nations still deny their basic rights to the people. Too many voices cry out for freedom. For example, the people of Cuba suffer oppression at the hands of a dictator who hasn't gotten the word--the lone hold-out in an otherwise democratic hemisphere--a man who hasn't adapted to a world that has no use for totalitarian tyranny. Elsewhere, despots ignore the heartening fact that the rest of the world has embarked upon a new age of liberty. The renewal of history also imposes an obligation to remain vigilant about new threats and old. We must expand our efforts to control nuclear proliferation. We must work to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. It is for this reason that I put forward my Middle East arms initiative, a comprehensive approach to stop and, where possible, reverse the accumulation of arms in that part of the world most prone to violence. We must remember that self-interest will tug nations in different directions, and that struggles over perceived interests will flare sometimes into violence. We can never say with confidence where the next conflict may arise. And we cannot promise eternal peace--not while demagogues peddle false promises to people hungry with hope; not while terrorists use our citizens as pawns, and drug dealers destroy our peoples. As a result, we must band together to overwhelm affronts to basic human dignity. It is no longer acceptable to shrug and say that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Let's put the law above the crude and cowardly practice of hostage-holding.
Standing Firm on Iraq
In a world defined by change, we must be as firm in principle as we are flexible in our response to changing international conditions. That's especially true today of Iraq. Six months after the passage of UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688, Saddam continues to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction and subject the Iraqi people to brutal repression. Saddam's contempt for UN resolutions was first demonstrated back in August 1990, and it continues even as I am speaking. His government refuses to permit unconditional helicopter inspections and right now is refusing to allow UN inspectors to leave inspected premises with documents relating to an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. It is the US view that we must keep the UN sanctions in place as long as he remains in power. This also shows that we cannot compromise for a moment in seeing that Iraq destroys all of its weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. And we will not compromise. This is not to say--and let me be clear on this one--that we should punish the Iraqi people. Let me repeat, our argument has never been with the people of Iraq. It was and is with a brutal dictator whose arrogance dishonors the Iraqi people. Security Council Resolution 706 created a responsible mechanism for sending humanitarian relief to innocent Iraqi citizens. We must put that mechanism to work. We must not abandon our principled stand against Saddam's aggression. This cooperative effort has liberated Kuwait, and now it can lead to a just government in Iraq. And when it does--when it does--the Iraqi people can look forward to better lives: free at home, free to engage in a world beyond their borders. The resumption of history also permits the United Nations to resume the important business of promoting the values that I've discussed today. This body can serve as a vehicle through which willing parties can settle old disputes. In the months to come, I look forward to working with Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and his successor as we pursue peace in such diverse and troubled lands as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cyprus, El Salvador, and the Western Sahara. The United Nations can encourage free market development through its international lending and aid institutions. However, the United Nations should not dictate the particular forms of government that nations should adopt. But it can and should encourage the values upon which this organization was founded. Together, we should insist that nations seeking our acceptance meet standards of human decency. Where institutions of freedom have lain dormant, the United Nations can offer them new life. These institutions play a crucial role in our quest for a new world order, an order in which no nation must surrender one iota of its own sovereignty; an order characterized by the rule of law rather than the resort to force; the cooperative settlement of disputes, rather than anarchy and bloodshed; and an unstinting belief in human rights.
America's Place in the New World
Finally, you may wonder about America's role in the new world that I have described. Let me assure you, the United States has no intention of striving for a "Pax Americana." However, we will remain engaged. We will not retreat and pull back into isolationism. We will offer friendship and leadership. In short, we seek a "Pax Universalis" built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations. To all assembled, we have an opportunity to spare our sons and daughters the sins and errors of the past. We can build a future more satisfying than any our world has ever known. The future lies undefined before us--full of promise; littered with peril. We can choose the kind of world we want; one blistered by the fires of war and subjected to the whims of coercion and chance or one made more peaceful by reflection and choice. Take this challenge seriously. Inspire future generations to praise and venerate you, to say: On the ruins of conflict, these brave men and women built an era of peace and understanding. They inaugurated a new world order, an order worth preserving for the ages. Good luck to each and everyone of you. And thank you very, very much. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

Profile: The United Nations

Date: Sep 30, 19919/30/91 Category: Country Data Subject: United Nations [TEXT]
By charter signed in San Francisco, California, on June 26, 1945; effective October 24, 1945.
To maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to achieve international cooperation in solving economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these common ends.
166. Official languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish. Principal organs: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat. Budget: UN assessment budget (calendar year 1991)--$1.1 billion. US share--$272 million. In calendar 1990, the United States paid its full assessment of $1.2 billion to the United Nations, its agencies, and other international organizations, including $89 million for UN peace-keeping operations, and voluntary contributions for other UN organizations such as UNICEF, and $112 million for UN refugee programs.
Chief administrative officer: Secretary General of the United Nations, appointed to a 5-year term by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. Secretary General (1982- present): Javier Perez de Cuellar (Peru). Staff: A worldwide staff of 23,000, including more than 2,800 US citizens. The staff is appointed by the Secretary General according to UN regulations.
General Assembly
Membership: All UN members. President: Elected at the beginning of each General Assembly session. Main committees: First--Political and Security, primarily disarmament; Special Political Committee. Second--Economic and Financial. Third--Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural. Fourth-- Trusteeship. Fifth--Administrative and Budgetary. Sixth--Legal. Many other committees address specific issues, including peace- keeping, outer space, crime prevention, status of women, and UN Charter reform.
Security Council
Membership: Five permanent members (China, France, USSR, UK, US), each with the right to veto, and 10 non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for 2-year terms. Five non- permanent members are elected from Africa and Asia combined; one from Eastern Europe; two from Latin America; and two from Western Europe and other areas. Non-permanent members are not eligible for immediate re-election. The 1991 non-permanent members are Austria, Belgium, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Romania, Yemen, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. President: Rotates monthly in English alphabetical order of members.
Economic and Social Council
Membership: 54; 18 elected each year by the General Assembly for 3-year terms. President: Elected each year.
Trusteeship Council
Membership: China, France, USSR, UK, US. President: Elected each year.
International Court of Justice
Membership: 15, elected for 9-year terms by the General Assembly and the Security Council from nominees of national groups under provisions of the International Court of Justice Statute.
In September 1991, UN membership increased from 159 to 166 with the addition of seven new countries: Estonia, Lithuania, Korea, North, Marshall Islands, Korea, South Micronesia, Latvia (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

Fact Sheet: UN Peace-keeping Operations

Date: Sep 30, 19919/30/91 Category: Fact Sheets Subject: United Nations, Military Affairs, Democratization
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
To supervise the cease-fire between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Established: April 21, 1948 Mandate: Indefinite Personnel: 35 Funding: Regular budget
UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)
To monitor the truce in Palestine and, subsequently, supervise the General Armistice Agreement of 1949 and cease-fires of 1967. Today, it cooperates with UNDOF and UNIFIL. Established: May 29, 1948 Mandate: Indefinite Personnel: 300 Funding: Regular budget
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
To supervise the cease-fire between Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Established: March 4, 1964 Mandate: 6-month; expires December 15, 1991* Personnel: 2,150 Funding: Voluntary contributions US payment: $9 million
UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights (UNDOF)
To monitor the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights. Established: May 31, 1974 Mandate: 6-month; expires November 30, 1991* Personnel: 1,300 Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments US share: 30.6%--$11.7 million
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
To confirm withdrawal of Israeli troops, restore peace, and assist the Government of Lebanon to reestablish effective authority in southern Lebanon. Established: March 19, 1978 Mandate: 6-month; expires January 31, 1992* Personnel: 5,850 Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments US share: 30.6%--$46.7 million UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) To monitor the Esquipulas II agreement prohibiting cross-border support for rebels. Mandate expanded on March 27, 1990, to take part in the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance. Established: November 7, 1989 Mandate: 6-month; expires November 7, 1991* Personnel: 250 Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments US share: 30.6%--$8.1 million
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)
To monitor a demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and deter violations of the boundary. Established: April 9, 1991 Mandate: Indefinite; reviewed at 6-month intervals beginning October 9, 1991 Personnel: 300 observers with support units bringing the total to 950 Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments US share: 30.6%--$18.5 million for initial mandate period
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
To conduct a referendum on whether Western Sahara should become independent or be integrated into Morocco. Established: April 29, 1991 Mandate: Concludes after referendum to be held about 36 weeks after UNGA approval of its budget on May 17, 1991 Personnel: 136 personnel deployed toward a target strength of 2,700 Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments US share: 30.4%--$43.4 million for initial mandate period
UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)
To monitor implementation of the human rights agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The human rights component will be the first part of an integrated operation, which will also monitor the cease-fire and demobilization when those agreements are reached. Established: May 20, 1991 Mandate: 12-month; expires May 20, 1992 Personnel: Target strength of 160 for human rights monitoring Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments US share: 30.4%--4.2 million for initial mandate period
UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)
To oversee implementation of the Angola Peace accords. Established: May 30, 1991 Mandate: 17-month; expires October 30, 1992 Personnel: 250 deployed toward target strength of 700 Funding: Special peace-keeping assessments US share: 30.4%--$15 million for initial mandate period *Must be renewed by the UN Security Council. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

Violent Crisis in Yugoslavia

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address before the UN Security Council, New York City, New York Date: Sep 25, 19919/25/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization, CSCE [TEXT] Mr. President, Members of the Council, we meet today because the crisis in Yugoslavia has descended into open warfare. This violent conflict threatens all the peoples of Yugoslavia with terrible economic and social strife, with a sharp deterioration in the most fundamental human rights and freedoms, and, above all, with massive bloodshed and loss of life. We are equally concerned about the dangerous impact on Yugoslavia's neighbors who face refugee flows, energy shortfalls, and the threat of a spillover in the fighting. It is this danger of escalation which makes this a matter of prime concern to this Council. Many parties in Yugoslavia have contributed to the tragedy besetting that country. What we warned about in June, and for months before, has come about. Unilateral acts, including by republics, have foreclosed options for peaceful negotiations and have made the resolution of the tragic situation in Yugoslavia more, not less, difficult and complicated. Though much blood has already been lost, it is time for all parties to commit themselves to resolve their differences peacefully. All parties, especially the Serbs and Croats, need to stop the fighting. The cease-fire must be respected as a first step toward shaping a different future. However, the Government of Serbia and the Yugoslav federal military bear a special and, indeed, growing responsibility for the grim future which awaits the peoples of Yugoslavia if they do not stop the bloodshed and reverse the violent course now being pursued. Clearly, the Yugoslav federal military is not serving as an impartial guarantor of a cease-fire in Croatia. On the contrary, it has actively supported local Serbian forces in violating the cease- fire, causing deaths to the citizens it is constitutionally supposed to protect. The military has initiated what can only be described as outright military intervention against Croatia, while repudiating the authority of Yugoslav Government institutions which have sought to control it. It is equally clear that the Serbian leadership is actively supporting and encouraging the use of force in Croatia by Serbian militants and the Yugoslav military. The apparent objective of the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav military working in tandem is to create a "small Yugoslavia" or "greater Serbia" which would exclude Slovenia and a rump Croatia. This new entity would be based on the kind of repression which Serbian authorities have exercised in Kosovo for several years. This entity would also be based on the use of force-- well underway in Croatia, and beginning to take shape in Bosnia- Herzegovina--to establish control over territories outside Serbia. The aggression within Yugoslavia, therefore, represents a direct threat to international peace and security. And the use of aggression to determine the future internal borders of Yugoslavia or of Serbia also represents a grave challenge to the values and principles which underlie the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and the UN Charter. We appreciate the concerns of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, including the concerns of Serbs inside and outside Serbia about their future in the event of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. But the United States cannot and will not accept repression and the use of force in the name of these concerns. To do so would seriously undermine what we in the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] have labored to achieve during the past 16 years. The United States, therefore, firmly supports the September 3 declaration of states participating in the CSCE, cited in today's resolution [Resolution 713] , that no territorial gains or changes within Yugoslavia brought about by violence are acceptable. A tentative truce has been in place between the Yugoslav military and Croatia since Sunday. Discussions are underway aimed at further implementation of the September 17 cease-fire agreement signed by Serbia, Croatia, and the military. The Hague peace conference chaired by Lord Carrington resumes its meetings tomorrow. We call upon all parties to seize this opportunity to establish a genuine cease-fire and work toward a negotiated agreement on Yugoslavia's future. We must collectively protect as well against the spread of this cycle of violence to yet another Yugoslav republic. There can be no mistaking that the fate of Bosnia- Herzegovina also hangs in the balance. The Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav federal military have it in their power to cease violent provocations and the unjustified military occupation of that republic immediately. The United States, the European Community (EC), and the entire CSCE community have sent a clear message to the peoples of Yugoslavia: The use of force to solve political differences or to change external or internal borders in Yugoslavia is simply not acceptable. Those who resort to force in Yugoslavia, including both Serbian and Croatian irregulars, will achieve nothing but tragedy for themselves and for the Yugoslav peoples. The aggressors can only isolate themselves further from the international community by continuing the violence. And by continuing on their present course, those who resort to force will only condemn themselves to exile from the new Europe. We doubt that any of the peoples of Yugoslavia truly wish to pay the high price of this warfare. The social and economic regression and political and economic isolation that will ensue are a price we believe no rational person would wish to pay. We commend and strongly support the efforts of the European Community and its member states and the efforts of CSCE members to bring about a cease-fire, send observers, convene a conference, and bring about an arbitration commission for the peaceful resolution of all disputes. We will continue to support fully the regional arrangements of the EC and CSCE on behalf of these ends. We also welcome this resolution's support for the international arms embargo which the United States proposed back on July 3 of this year. At the same time, we support the resolution's call for the UN Secretary General to bring the good offices of this organization to bear on the Yugoslav situation in concert with the efforts of regional bodies. There is another path open to the peoples of Yugoslavia. They can address and reconcile their legitimate aspirations and concerns, including the interests of all national groups in each republic, through a process of peaceful dialogue. Indeed, ultimately they must do so. Today's resolution effectively underscores and reinforces the messages sent to the peoples of Yugoslavia by the CSCE and its participating states. It expresses the full support of the UN Security Council for the efforts of the CSCE and the European Community to help the peoples of Yugoslavia move toward peace. We support it without reservation. And we hope the peoples of Yugoslavia will heed it and pull back from the war that now sheds blood across their land. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

Fact Sheet: UN Resolution 713 on Yugoslavia

Description: New York, New York Date: Sep 25, 19919/25/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements, Fact Sheets Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former) Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization, United Nations [TEXT] The Security Council, Conscious of the fact that Yugoslavia has welcomed the convening of a Security Council meeting through a letter conveyed by the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the President of the Security Council (S/23069), Having heard the statement by the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, Deeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia which is causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage, and by the consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in the border areas of neighboring countries, Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, Commending the efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia, through, inter alia, the implementation of a cease-fire including the sending of observers, the convening of a Conference on Yugoslavia, including the mechanisms set forth within it, and the suspension of the delivery of all weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia, Recalling the relevant principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and, in this context, noting the Declaration of 3 September 1991 of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that no territorial gains or changes within Yugoslavia brought about by violence are acceptable, Noting also the agreement for a cease-fire concluded on 17 September 1991 in Igalo, and also that signed on 22 September 1991, Alarmed by the violations of the cease-fire and the continuation of the fighting, Taking note of the letter dated 19 September 1991 to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of Austria (S/23052), Taking note also of the letters dated 19 September 1991 and 20 September 1991 to the President of the Security Council from respectively the Permanent Representative of Canada (S/23053) and the Permanent Representative of Hungary (S/23057), Take note also of the letters dated 5 July 1991 (S/22775), 12 July 1991 (S/22785), 22 July 1991 (S/22834), 6 August 1991 (S/22898), 7 August 1991 (S/22902), 7 August 1991 (S/22903), 21 August 1991 (S/22975), 29 August 1991 (S/22991), 4 September 1991 (S/23010), 19 September 1991 (S/23047), 20 September 1991 (S/23059) and 20 September 1991 (S/23060), from respectively the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia, the Permanent Representatives of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Charge d'affaires a.i. of Austria, and the Permanent Representative of Australia, 1. Expresses its full support for the collective efforts for peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia undertaken under the auspices of the member States of the European Community with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe consistent with the principles of that Conference; 2. Supports fully all arrangements and measures resulting from such collective efforts as those described above, in particular of assistance and support to the cease-fire observers, to consolidate an effective end to hostilities in Yugoslavia and the smooth functioning of the process instituted within the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia; 3. Invites to this end the Secretary-General to offer his assistance without delay, in consultation with the Government of Yugoslavia and all those promoting the efforts referred to above, and to report as soon as possible to the Security Council; 4. Strongly urges all parties to abide strictly by the cease- fire agreements of 17 September 1991 and 22 September 1991; 5. Appeals urgently to and encourages all parties to settle their disputes peacefully and through negotiation at the Conference on Yugoslavia, including through the mechanisms set forth within it; 6. Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia; 7. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Yugoslavia, which would permit all Yugoslavs to decide upon and to construct their future in peace; 8. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved. VOTE: Unanimous 15-0. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

Refugee Admissions Proposal For FY 1992

Eagleburger Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC Date: Sep 24, 19919/24/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, Southeast Asia Country: USSR (former), Vietnam Subject: Refugees [TEXT] Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before the committee today on the subject of the admission of refugees to the United States in fiscal year (FY) 1992. Ambassador Lafontant-Mankarious and I will discuss the President's formal proposal for the admission of up to 144,000 refugees in FY 1992. I believe the committee has also received a report which provides the detailed information stipulated in the statute.
Refugees in Today's World
I would like to take a few minutes at the outset to put our refugee policy in the broader context of US foreign policy and current developments in world affairs. We have, in my view, entered a period of historic transition in our foreign relations. The era of the Cold War is over; democracy is spreading, not just in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but throughout much of the world. Our vision of the new world order includes the hope that humane solutions will be found for the plight of the millions of refugees in the world today. The symbol of the refugee stands among the most powerful of those in the Cold War era. Just as one may say that the Berlin Wall was the most graphic symbol of East-West confrontation in Europe, it was the individual people who sought to escape to freedom across that border who most vividly represented the human tragedy caused by the communist system. Where that authoritarian ideology was exported to the Third World--in Africa, in Cuba and Central America, and in Asia--the result was conflict, persecution, and massive flows of people seeking to save their lives and reach freedom. During the post-war era, these people--the world's refugees--have come to number in the millions. Today, with the demise of Soviet communism, we are embarked on a period of worldwide conflict resolution. The past year has seen progress in Angola and Ethiopia and the very welcome recent political agreement in South Africa. Two weeks ago, Secretary Baker and President Gorbachev announced what we hope will be the first step toward conflict resolution in Afghanistan. The Cambodian factions have recently moved much closer to acceptance of a plan for a comprehensive political settlement. In our hemisphere, only Cuba now remains outside the circle of democratically elected governments. And, though arising from a different historical context, the plight of the Palestinians is a central concern of US policy as we seek to bring about a Middle East peace conference. While these developments give us reason to be optimistic about the future, we also recognize that the process of resolving longstanding conflict situations will be neither quick nor easy. Each situation is different, and each situation is complex. First there must be agreement to cease hostilities. There must be commitments by all parties to peaceful sharing of power. There must be plans for free elections and the institution of democracy. And there must be well-organized programs for the safe return home of the refugees and displaced persons. However, even though we can describe the goal and process of conflict resolution and refugee repatriation, the past year has shown that we cannot predict or control the local forces and conflicts which may emerge now as the overlay of the Cold War era and of communist suppression has been removed. The fighting in Yugoslavia is a disastrous example of the danger inherent in this period of instability. We are watching with utmost care the development of policies affecting human rights and the treatment of minorities in all areas of the former Soviet Union. Ethnic and political conflicts totally outside the Cold War context also threaten stability, as we have seen in Liberia, which alone has added 600,000 to the world's list of refugees in the past 2 years.
Worldwide Assistance
The purpose of these consultations is to determine the number of refugees to be resettled in the United States during FY 1992. Resettlement is a key element of our protection of refugees, and we are the world's leader in this regard. But resettlement is not the centerpiece of our response to the refugee situation. The overwhelming number of refugees in the world are waiting for an opportunity to return home, not to abandon their homeland forever. The short-term needs are basic support: food, water, health care, and education for the children. The long-term need is the resolution of the conflict or repression that forced these people to flee. Thus, the assistance portion of our refugee program is of great importance. I am pleased to say that, with the support and cooperation of the Congress, we have steadily increased the resources going to meet these basic needs even as we have reduced- -through various streamlining measures--the costs of our admissions program. In FY 1991, our refugee assistance budget, including drawdowns from the President's Emergency Refugee and Migration account, increased by $90 million over FY 1990. In FY 1992, we expect a further increase, especially in the basic support programs and for repatriation of refugees to their respective homelands. Recent history has certainly taught us that wars, aggression, and persecution will continue to produce new refugees and that we must be prepared to assist in meeting their basic needs. One year ago, when I appeared before this committee to review with you the President's FY 1991 refugee program, foremost on our minds was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It was not then possible to predict what the next few months would hold and how that conflict would be manifested in refugee movements and humanitarian assistance needs. In the first 10 weeks of that conflict, more than 1 million people of numerous nationalities fled Iraq and Kuwait. A truly extraordinary international effort was mobilized to ensure the physical well-being of these people and to arrange repatriation to their home countries. However, this was not the end. In March, 1 month after the war ended, nearly 2 million Iraqis--Kurds, Shi'as, Turkomens, Assyrians, and other minorities-- fled Saddam Hussein's repression in a matter of weeks. Both their sheer numbers and the compressed timeframe of this massive movement stunned the world. Only the unprecedented action of President Bush to authorize the Department of Defense to perform critical relief, supply, and transportation functions averted catastrophe. The US military and our coalition partners performed this humanitarian relief effort brilliantly until overall coordination could be transferred to the [Office of the] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). I should add, however, that the total US expenditure on the Iraqi refugee crisis may exceed $600 million. Out of that experience, we are developing ways to improve greatly the UN capacity to respond to such situations so that such unilateral action is not required. We expect that several proposals along these lines will be discussed in the UN General Assembly. We will participate actively to see that the most promising proposals are approved and implemented in the context of overall UN reform. Emigration From the Soviet Union Recent developments in the Soviet Union, specifically with regard to emigration, have had a direct impact on the US refugee admissions program that we are considering here today. In May of this year, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed far-reaching emigration legislation which we expect to be followed by new, less burdensome exit procedures. We continue to monitor implementation of this legislation at union and republic levels. We have received a few disquieting reports recently that some local emigration authorities are reverting to the restrictive practices which pertained prior to implementation of the new law. Embassy Moscow is investigating these reports. If such a trend develops as republics take over more responsibility for emigration from the central government, it will adversely affect US relations with those republics that follow such restrictive practices. Secretary Baker made clear during his recent visit to Moscow that the United States will expect CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] human rights standards to prevail in the republics and at the union level, regardless of the final shape of the new union structure agreed upon by the Soviet peoples. The dramatic events in the USSR since the failed coup have not impeded Soviet emigration to the United States. Indeed, the number of refugees departing the Soviet Union for the United States rose during the past few weeks with almost no complications. With regard to emigration to the United States, we intend in FY 1992 to address the backlog which developed in FY 1991 prior to the passage of the Soviet emigration legislation. Many individuals approved by USINS [US Immigration and Naturalization Service] for US admission were unable to depart due to their inability to obtain Soviet exit permission. We hope that implementation of the new Soviet law will solve this problem. We have been encouraged by the steady rise in the numbers of persons departing since July 1. The President's proposal, therefore, is to add the fiscal 1991 Soviet shortfall to the 50,000 admissions which had been planned for in the President's budget request for next year. I am pleased to report that, in recent weeks, many more Soviet refugees than expected have traveled to the United States, and we will be reducing the FY 1991 shortfall from 13,000--as earlier estimated in the President's proposal--to 11,000. We are optimistic, from action taken so far by the authorization and appropriations committees, that the necessary funds will be available.
Refugee Admissions From Vietnam
In addition to the impact of developments in the Soviet Union on the refugee admissions program, I would also like to report to the committee on the situation in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, because Vietnam has thus far retained its communist regime, thousands of people continue to leave due to current or past persecution. More than 2 years have passed since I led our delegation to the Geneva conference at which more than 50 countries adopted an agreement--the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA)--designed to resolve the many issues surrounding Vietnamese asylum seekers in Southeast Asia. For the most part, the CPA has worked remarkably well. Except in Hong Kong, new boat arrivals are a fraction of what they were 1 year ago. In most countries, first asylum has been maintained, and progress in screening continues. However, we remain distressed by Malaysian pushoffs, and we are concerned with the slow progress in addressing the needs of unaccompanied minors. The United States continues to oppose involuntary repatriation to Vietnam. We firmly believe that efforts are better focused on increasing the pace of voluntary returns, which has shown hopeful signs in recent months. Voluntary repatriation is critical, because the screened-out will not be offered resettlement. Resettlement of persons approved as refugees continues as a central element of the CPA. For the United States, our FY 1992 admissions proposal of 52,000 for the region reflects our commitment to the continued success of the CPA as well as to the resettlement of Amerasians and former reeducation center detainees from Vietnam through the Orderly Departure Program. During the past year, an inter-agency effort involving USINS and the Department of State has allowed the United States almost to double to a level of 10,000 the number of persons interviewed each month by the Orderly Departure Program. As a result, we hope to be able to complete all Amerasian interviews by mid-1992 and, by late 1992, to have eliminated the backlog in immigrant visa issuance in Vietnam. Former re-education center detainees are now being admitted to the United States at a rate of almost 2,000 per month. We believe that this dramatic expansion has underscored our commitment to resettlement of these persons of humanitarian concern to the United States. At the same time, we hope that persons contemplating clandestine boat departures will understand that we view the Orderly Departure Program as the most secure method and the focal point for the US refugee effort for Vietnamese.
Other Regions of the World
In other regions of the world--Africa, the Near East, Latin America, and Eastern Europe--the United States continues resettlement programs appropriate to the local needs. Moreover, we are working with UNHCR to establish mechanisms which will allow our admissions program to be even more responsive to finding resettlement opportunities for high risk or other priority needs cases. Details on our admissions proposals for these regions are provided in the report we have submitted to the committee.
To summarize the lessons of this past year in refugee affairs is difficult. The collapse of totalitarian communism in the USSR is clearly a cause for optimism. The United States is seeking to expand its existing ties and contacts with the new Baltic states and the Soviet republics, but we will in no measure reduce our emphasis on human rights and the treatment of minority populations. The United States will seize every new opportunity to work toward conflict resolution and peaceful political settlement around the world. For large numbers of the world's refugees, we are hopeful that the international community can redirect its resources to repatriation. Where the last four decades have seen an inexorable increase in the world total of refugees, it is our goal in the 1990s to see these numbers decline dramatically. But there will also be continuing challenges. Communist regimes in Vietnam and Cuba will continue to produce refugees. Iraq, Liberia, the Horn of Africa, and now Yugoslavia demonstrate all too well the potential for local conflict and instability. Moreover, beyond the populations of refugees fleeing persecution and conflict situations, the 1990s will also present the developed world with vexing policy and legal issues in coping with what are anticipated to be huge numbers of asylum seekers and other international migrants. It will be incumbent upon the United States to be engaged--with our allies and friends, as well as with the source countries--in seeking solutions to these problems on a worldwide basis. Although the era of Soviet communism may be over, the refugee and migration phenomenon will not disappear. For the foreseeable future, the United States must and will continue to perform the humanitarian leadership role which throughout the Cold War so clearly symbolized what the free world is all about. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

Overview of Proposed Refugee Admissions

Description: Overview from the report "Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1992," released to Congress, Washington, DC Date: Sep 30, 19919/30/91 Category: Reports Subject: Refugees [TEXT] Overview of Proposed Refugee Admissions (The complete report is available by writing to the Bureau of Public Affairs, Public Information Division, Washington, DC, 20520) In the resolution of refugee problems, the United States gives highest priority to the safe, voluntary return of refugees to their homelands. This policy, embodied in the Refugee Act of 1980, is also the first priority for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). If safe, voluntary repatriation is not feasible, settlement in countries of asylum within the region is sought as the next preferred alternative. Often, however, political differences, lack of economic resources to support large numbers of additional people, or ethnic, religious or other deep-rooted animosities prevent this option from being exercised. Finally, consideration is given to resettlement in third countries, including the United States. The United States considers for admission persons of special humanitarian concern who can establish persecution or a well- founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The legal basis of the refugee admissions program is the Refugee Act of 1980 which embodies the American tradition of granting refuge to diverse groups suffering or fearing persecution. The Act adopted, for the purpose of our refugee admissions program, the definition of "refugee" contained in the UN Convention and Protocol relating to the status of refugee. The definition which may be found in Section 101 (a) (42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by the Refugee Act, is as follows: The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 207 (e) of this Act) may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The term "refugee" does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The estimated world population of refugees and externally displaced persons is 16 million; persons displaced within their own countries by war, famine and civil unrest may equal twice that number. The United States works with other governments, and international and private organizations to protect refugees and displaced persons and strives to ensure that survival needs for food health care and shelter are met. Under the authority contained in the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, the United States contributes to the international activities of the UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international and private organizations which provide ongoing relief and assistance for refugees and displaced persons. The United States has been instrumental in mobilizing a community of nations to work through these and other organizations in alleviating the misery and suffering of refugees throughout the world. The United States, aware that more than 75% of the world's refugees are women and young children, recognizes the special needs of this vulnerable group, particularly in the areas of protection and assistance. We support the UNHCR and other relevant international governmental and non-governmental organizations in their efforts to involve refugee women in implementing programs on their own behalf. We also support the assigning of women officers to positions where they can impact favorably on the protection and well-being of women and children refugees. We continue to press for the most effective use of international resources directed to the urgent needs of refugees and displaced persons. During FY 1991, the United States supported major relief programs in Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Near East, including the Gulf region. Contributions for these funds were made through organizations including the UNHCR, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP), the ICRC, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). This support averted further human tragedy and helped sustain life by providing food and other assistance to meet the basic human needs of refugees. Details are provided in the World Refugee Report [to be released]. With regard to refugees resettled in the United States, the US Government aims to promote economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible, limiting the need for public assistance and encouraging refugees to contribute to the diversity and enrichment of our country as previous newcomers have done. To this end, short-term English language and cultural orientation programs for certain groups of refugees have been established overseas to initiate the process of adapting to our complex society. Particular attention is paid to the health of refugees to ensure that communicable diseases are controlled before entry into the United States. Federally funded programs administered by the states provide cash and medical assistance, training programs, employment and other support services to many refugees soon after arrival in the United States. These services are performed by a variety of institutional providers, including private voluntary agencies who also perform initial reception and placement services under cooperative agreements with the Department of State. All of these benefits are intended for short-term utilization during a refugee's transition to an independent, contributing member of the national economy and of American society. Further to the table of proposed US refugee admissions in FY 1992 (Table II), the President also proposes to specify that special circumstances exist so that, for the purpose of admission under the limits established above and pursuant to Section 101(a)(42)(B) of the INA, certain persons, if they otherwise qualify for admission, may be considered as refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States even though they are still within their countries of nationality or habitual residence. The proposed designations for FY 1992 are: -- Persons in Vietnam; -- Persons in Laos; -- Persons in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; and -- Persons in the Soviet Union In addition to the proposed admission of refugees from abroad, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) will be authorized to adjust to permanent resident alien status 10,000 persons who have been granted asylum in the United States and have been in the United States for at least 1 year, pursuant to Section 209 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In the regional descriptions which follow, an overview of refugee-generating conditions is provided. In addition, voluntary repatriation, resettlement within the region, and third-country resettlement opportunities are mentioned. There is also reference to refugee resettlement by countries other than the United States. More detailed information and statistics are found in the companion World Refugee Report. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

Update on the Philippines

Quinn Source: Kenneth M. Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Sep 25, 19919/25/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: Philippines Subject: Military Affairs, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today on recent events in the Philippines. On September 16, the Philippine Senate, by a vote of 12 to 11, refused to ratify the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security that was signed on August 27, 1991, after 15 months of intense negotiations. A two-thirds majority, or 16 senators, was required for ratification. This was an extremely disappointing outcome to a long negotiating process, so ably conducted by our special negotiator Rich Armitage, which produced a document that both governments were able to support and sign. We continue to believe that this is a fair treaty which is in the interest of both the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America. It remains our hope that a way can be found for this agreement to take effect, but I would emphasize that this is now a Philippine decision, to be made by Filipinos in accordance with Philippine laws and procedures. That decision-making process is now continuing in Manila. Prior to the final Senate vote, President [Corazon] Aquino announced her Administration's intention to seek a national referendum and send the issue of this new agreement straight to the Filipino people should the Senate reject the treaty. It is the determination of President Aquino that the Philippine constitutional and political processes have not yet run their full course. We have expressed our willingness to await President Aquino's continuing efforts to seek approval of this agreement, which public opinion polls repeatedly have indicated is strongly favored by a large majority of the Philippine people. Indeed, prior to this vote, President Aquino took dramatic and unprecedented steps to demonstrate to the Senate the importance the Filipino people attach to ratification of this agreement. She mobilized the key groups in Philippine society and, in a step harking back to the EDSA [Epiphanio de los Santos Avenue, February 1986] revolution, led hundreds of thousands of people through a monsoon storm punctuated by lightning in a dramatic march to put their desires visibly before the Philippine Senate. We appreciate President Aquino's friendship toward the United States and respect her determination as she continues the effort to put the treaty into effect. In deciding upon the US course of action I just described, a major concern was the legal status of our military forces in the Philippines. In May of 1990, the Government of the Philippines presented a diplomatic note terminating the 1947 military base agreement, effective September 16, 1991. While the United States did not accept that the 1947 agreement could be terminated prior to September 1992, the practical effect would have been to leave uncertain the status of our military personnel after the date the Philippines set for termination. On September 16, the Foreign Ministry presented a diplomatic note which rescinded the earlier termination notice. As a result, there is now no termination date for the 1947 agreement, and the status of forces arrangements remain in effect. The 1947 agreement may, in the future, be terminated either by mutual agreement of the two parties or, after a 1-year notice, by either party. The coming months will, inevitably, be a period of considerable uncertainty. At the same time, let me also stress that we have continually affirmed that ratification of this treaty is a matter for the people of the Philippines to resolve according to their own constitutional and legal procedures. We will endeavor to do nothing which will complicate this internal debate. We will follow this process closely and will abide by its outcome. The United States has consistently maintained that we would vacate the naval facility at Subic Bay if that, indeed, is the wish of the Philippines. Since it is the Administration's position that we are awaiting notice from the Philippine Government on the ratification or rejection of our negotiated agreement, we will continue to stand by that agreement and its accompanying undertakings on base-related security assistance during the coming months as President Aquino takes this decision to the Filipino people. Therefore, the Administration has not sought changes to its FY 1992 request, and, subject to congressional action, we plan to implement our FY 1992 assistance program as envisaged earlier. Regarding assistance levels, we need to keep in mind that this debate on the US military facilities in the Philippines takes place against the backdrop of an unprecedented string of natural disasters, capped on June 15 by the largest volcanic eruption seen on earth this century. Mt. Pinatubo erupted at the exact same time a major typhoon passed through the area. Together Mt. Pinatubo and Typhoon "Diding" rained tons of mud on the surrounding countryside, destroying buildings, roads, and bridges and rendering valuable farmland useless. After the eruption, central Luzon suffered, as it will for years to come, from mudslides and floods as the volcanic debris on the mountain--estimated by US engineers to be eight times that emitted by Mt. St. Helens--washes down onto the surrounding plains and reshapes the topography. Over 500 people have died, nearly a half-million people have been forced to leave their homes, and altogether over 1 million people have been adversely affected. Hundreds of millions dollars worth of infrastructure and cropland has been damaged so far. Although our relief and reconstruction assistance is approaching $50 million, only a major international effort will ameliorate much future suffering. Among the casualties were Clark Air Base and several smaller US military installations. They have been rendered completely inoperable as military facilities. Subic Bay Naval Station was also badly hurt but can be repaired. Beyond the natural disasters and the political decisions is the human dimension of our military presence. The US military has long been a major employer in the Philippines. Some $500 million was pumped into the Philippine economy every year by the Clark and Subic bases. It has been estimated that over 80,000 people in the central Luzon area owed their livelihoods directly to the US military presence. And many thousands more enjoyed the benefits indirectly. Now that Clark is going and the smaller facilities are gone, the city of Angeles must cope with the ongoing Pinatubo disaster without its main consumer of goods and its primary source of quality jobs. Should we also be required to leave Subic Naval Base, the same will happen to Olongapo City, which is even more dependent on Subic than Angeles was on Clark. This work force has been loyal, steady, and skilled. Although we have extended unprecedented separation benefits and are doing all we can to help those who need training and new jobs, what is happening now at Clark, and what may happen at Subic, has profound human ramifications. We are at a significant crossroads in our bilateral journey with the Philippines toward the 21st century. During the negotiations of the past year, we have had the opportunity to reflect on our relationship. I, for one, hope that we will continue in step with one another on the particular issue of our security relationship. But whatever the outcome, I am convinced that the United States and the Republic of the Philippines are headed in the same direction in terms of our democratic institutions and in the development of our increasingly intertwined economies. We will continue to share security goals in Asia, even if we approach the objective from a slightly different direction. From my previous assignment in the Philippines and my current responsibilities in Washington, I have developed a deep appreciation for the depth, the breadth, and the complexity of the relationship between our two nations over the past century. Having been in Manila on two separate occasions during the past several months, I feel I can convey one other element which is not so apparent here in our capitol. When all the acrimonious haze of the political debate is swept aside, the one strong lasting impression I bring back is of the breadth and depth of friendship so many, many Filipinos feel toward the United States. There was an incredible outpouring of good will toward our country from a wide spectrum of the Philippine population. Whatever the outcome of the present deliberations, I hope we keep in mind that, when all is said and done, there are few countries in the world where a crowd approaching a half-million people might have assembled in support of the US military presence remaining. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

Liberia: Assistance to Regional Peace-keeping Efforts

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Washington, DC Date: Sep 25, 19919/25/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Liberia Subject: Trade/Economics, Arms Control, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] The September 16-17 West African summit in Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire, represented an important step forward in efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to bring lasting peace to Liberia. Agreement was reached on expanding ECOMOG, the Community's peace-keeping force in Liberia, with the addition of troops from Senegal and possibly other ECOWAS member states. The United States supports these regional efforts to bring about disarmament and free and fair elections in Liberia. We are immediately providing grants of $3.75 million in FY 1991 foreign military financing funds to support the Yamoussoukro peace process and those ECOMOG participants in the most dire financial circumstances. This amount is being made available as follows: Senegal, $1 million; Cote d'Ivoire (chairman of the ECOWAS Committee of Five), $1 million; Ghana, $500,000; Guinea, $500,000; Sierra Leone, $500,000; The Gambia, $250,000. The Administration has also notified Congress of its intention to re-allocate $500,000 in peace-keeping funds to support ECOWAS peace-keeping activities. These immediate actions represent an initial US response to the Yamoussoukro summits. They follow the provision earlier this year of $2.8 million to ECOWAS and a US contribution of over $130 million to humanitarian relief operations in Liberia. We are urgently considering what additional resources can be made available to support reinforcement of ECOMOG with Senegalese troops and urge the international community to join with us in assisting the Liberia peace process. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

US-Morocco: Longstanding Ties

Bush, Hassan II Source: President Bush, King Hassan II Description: Remarks at arrival ceremony, Washington, DC Date: Sep 26, 19919/26/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Morocco Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Trade/Economics [TEXT]
President Bush:
It is an honor to welcome His Majesty King Hassan to the United States of America. The relationship between our two countries is rich, tracing back more than 200 years to the Moroccan-American Treaty of Peace and Friendship. And that agreement remains the longest unbroken treaty in our history. Your Majesty, under your leadership, relations between our nations continue to grow and prosper in a variety of fields--in trade and investment, in cultural contacts, and in resolving regional disputes. This past year has seen a world of remarkable change-- transformations that have reverberated across every continent. Morocco is stepping forward to meet this new world. You have lowered barriers to increased investment and trade--and begun the privatization of many of Morocco's wholly owned state enterprises. Already, your nation's economic opening has meant new opportunity for American investment--some of it generated by 1989's highly successful OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] mission to Morocco. Morocco is also responding to the call to all governments to recognize the rights and freedoms of their people. In this regard, the United States applauds Your Majesty's recent release of political prisoners, your establishment of the Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights in Morocco, and I know Morocco will not be deterred from this courageous course. Your Majesty, we are pleased to see the UN proceeding with its efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute with Morocco's support. It took a great deal of courage for you to agree to the UN Secretary General's plan for a referendum, and I confirm America's willingness to play its role in promoting a just and lasting settlement in the Sahara, in accordance with that plan. In the Gulf, Morocco was among the first to commit forces in defense of Saudi Arabia. And when the issue was still in doubt, Morocco stood on the side of justice and against aggression. Today, I can assure you, Your Majesty, that the United States will continue to work toward a lasting peace in the Middle East. We now see the real prospect of a peace conference leading to direct negotiations between Arabs and Israelis. That process aims at a comprehensive peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principle of territory for peace. We seek to elaborate on this principle to provide for real security and real peace for all states in the Middle East, including Israel, and for recognition of legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. Your Majesty, I look forward to working with you toward those objectives. Your Majesty, once again, a warm welcome to the White House. I look forward to our talks, and I want to extend a special welcome to your daughter, who has accompanied you on this visit. And I trust the fruits of our discussion will make the world a better place for her and for all of our children.
King Hassan II
[Introductory remarks deleted]: We are delighted to respond to your gracious invitation and to meet with you. Our visit constitutes, indeed, one important link in a series of previous visits during which we have come to establish excellent friendly relations with many of your predecessors. Mr. President, today's encounter will certainly renew and strengthen these relations. We were no more than a child when we were introduced to President Franklin Roosevelt by our late father, Mohammed V. We never knew personally Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan. Today we are received by you, Mr. President, a dear friend of ours whose distinguished career we have been following attentively. We have been following attentively your career, Mr. President, first when you were appointed Ambassador to China, then CIA director, and Vice President to our great friend, President Reagan, and finally, President of the United States of America. Throughout your career, we have at all times perceived in you a man of rectitude, humility, deep thought, true foresight, and unshakeable faithfulness toward his friends. It is true that our last visit to the United States of America dates back to 1983. However, during these 8 years, our friendly relations have never been better. It couldn't have been otherwise considering that these relations are as old as your nation. For the 1786 Treaty of Amity and Peace, signed by President Jefferson and our ancestor Mohammed III, has always been and still remains the basis of the excellent rapport existing between our two governments and nations. What makes this friendship exemplary is the fact that it has never been affected by juncture or vicissitude, nor has it been changing in dimension or level. It has rather been similar to itself, unaffected by world crises and the requirements of the Cold War. We are looking forward to the talks we shall have with your excellency and with a number of officials from the executive and legislative branch. We have no doubt that these talks will reveal the likeness of our views concerning political and economic issues. Mr. President, you know better than anyone that the Gulf crisis has made men all over the world realize that is it mandatory to rely on international legality for the solving of world issues and for the sake of peace and understanding among the nations. We sincerely hope that the same legality is applied in the case of the Middle East. It is, indeed, hard to believe that the tragedy of the Middle East has lasted half a century. As to the Kingdom of Morocco, we shall ever be ready to contribute to any peaceful solution liable to give each one his due and bring about a just and lasting peace in this area. We will constantly be on your side, mobilized in order to seek this peace in the Middle East. I pray you, Mr. President, and dear friend, to accept our thanks for your invitation, your warm welcome, and your generous hospitality. We wish you excellent health and success, and we wish the American people much prosperity. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

Fact Sheet: Moroccan King Visits Washington, DC

Date: Sep 26, 19919/26/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Morocco Subject: Trade/Economics, History, Democratization [TEXT] King Hassan II of Morocco made an official visit to Washington, DC, on September 26, 1991. The King previously visited in March 1963, February 1967, November 1978, and May and October 1983.
US-Moroccan Relations
Moroccans recognized the Government of the United States in 1777 before the end of the Revolutionary War. Formal US relations with Morocco date to 1786, when the two nations negotiated a Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Renegotiated in 1836, it is still in force, constituting the longest unbroken treaty relationship in US history. US-Moroccan relations are characterized by mutual respect and friendship, and US and Moroccan foreign policy objectives often coincide. Morocco's strategic location on the Strait of Gibraltar, its agreement to regular US Navy ship visits, its persistent efforts to seek accommodation on Middle East issues, and its religious tolerance are factors contributing to harmonious bilateral relations. US objectives include maintaining cordial and cooperative relations, supporting Moroccan efforts to develop an increasingly effective administration, and aiding its domestic, social, and economic progress. Although US air bases were withdrawn from Morocco in 1963, Morocco has granted rights of transit through its airfields for US forces and conducts joint exercises with various US armed forces. Since independence, Morocco has received more than $1 billion in US grants and loans. Of this, 50% has been PL-480 loans; 40% support assistance, military grants and credits, and development loans; and 10% technical assistance.
Government and Politics
After the death of his father, Mohamed V, King Hassan II succeeded to the throne on March 3, 1961. He recognized the Royal Charter proclaimed by his father in May 1958, which outlined steps toward establishing a constitutional monarchy. A constitution providing for representative government under a strong monarchy was approved by referendum in December 1962, and elections were held the following year. In June 1965, following student riots and civil unrest, the King invoked article 35 of the constitution and declared a "state of exception." He assumed all legislative and executive powers and named a new government not based on political parties. In July 1970, King Hassan submitted to referendum a new constitution providing for an even stronger monarchy. Its approval and subsequent elections formally ended the 1965 "state of exception." An unsuccessful coup on July 10, 1971, organized by senior military officers, was followed by Morocco's third constitution, approved by popular referendum in early 1972. The new constitution kept King Hassan's powers intact, but enlarged from one-third to two-thirds the number of directly elected parliamentary representatives. In August 1972, after a second coup attempt, relations between the opposition and the Crown deteriorated, due to disagreement on opposition participation in elections. The King subsequently appointed a series of non-political cabinets responsible only to him. Stemming from cooperation on the Sahara issue,1 a rapprochement between the King and the opposition began in mid- 1974 and led to elections for local councils, with opposition party participation in 1976. Parliamentary elections were held in June 1977, resulting in a two-thirds majority for the government-backed independent candidates and the allies. A May 1980 referendum extended the parliament's 4-year term to 6 years. Local elections were again held in June 1983, and new parliamentary election in 1984. A new party, the Constitutional Union, finished first in both votes.
Economy and Trade
Private property and free enterprise drive the economy, and the intervention of the state is being steadily reduced. The country has been actively engaged in a program of economic restructuring and reform since the early 1980s in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Significant progress has been achieved in economic reforms, and performance has improved, but problems still remain. Trade performance deteriorated in 1989, but the foreign trade balance improved significantly in 1990. Morocco's responsible debt management performance has been reflected in the willingness of the country's official and commercial creditors to agree to successive rescheduling on increasingly less restrictive terms. In September 1990, Morocco became the first country to benefit from terms recommended by the Houston summit on "Paris Club" official debt. That same year, the country reached agreement with its "London Club" commercial creditors which includes "Brady Plan" voluntary debt reduction measures to be applied to a portion of outstanding debts. Morocco's heavy debt burden, high debt service ratios, and policies to limit further increases in indebtedness continue to limit prospects for a significant increase of imports of consumer and capital goods from the United States. In the past several years, the US share of total imports has fluctuated between 6% and 12.5%, depending on changes in demand for US-origin agricultural products--principally cereal and feed grains and vegetable oils-- and deliveries of major equipment such as passenger aircraft to the national airline. Urban growth has been rapid. Nearly half the population now lives in cities and towns, although the economy depends primarily upon the agricultural sector. Urban unemployment stands at about 16% of the work force, and the creation of new jobs still lags behind population growth. New entrants to the labor force number more than 200,000 annually, and full-time employment is difficult to find outside the unskilled, manual trades. Lack of full-time employment also remains a problem for skilled workers and university graduates. Morocco claims sovereignty over the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony bordering Morocco to the south. However, Morocco's claim is contested by the Polisario, an organization demanding independence for the Western Sahara. Morocco has agreed to the UN Secretary General's plan to hold a referendum in the Western Sahara to determine its status. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 39, September 30, 1991 Title:

Country Profile: Morocco

Date: Sep 26, 19919/26/91 Category: Country Data Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Morocco Subject: History, Trade/Economics, Democratization [TEXT] Official Name: Kingdom of Morocco
Area: 446,550 sq. km. (172,413 sq. mi.); about the size of Oregon and Washington combined. Cities: Capital--Rabat (pop. 900,000 in urban prefecture of Rabat- Sale). Other cities--Casablanca, Marrakech, Fez, Tangier. Terrain: Coastal plain, mountains, desert. Climate: Mediterranean and desert.
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Moroccan(s). Population (1990): 25 million. Avg. annual growth rate (1990): 2.5%. Ethnic group: Arab-Berber 99%. Religions: Sunni Muslim 99%. Languages: Arabic (official), French, three Berber vernaculars. Education: Years compulsory--9. Attendance--primary 81%; secondary 31%. Literacy (1990)--33%. Health: Infant mortality rate (1990)--78/1,000. Life expectancy (1990)-- 63 yrs. male, 66 yrs. female.
Type: Constitutional monarchy. Constitution: March 10, 1972, revised. Independence: March 2, 1956. Branches: Executive--king (chief of state), prime minister (head of government). Legislative--unicameral legislature (6-yr. term). Judicial--Supreme Court. Administrative subdivisions: 42 provinces and 7 prefectures. The former Spanish Sahara has been divided into four provinces. Political parties: Constitutional Union (UC), National Rally of Independents (RNI), Istiqlal (Independence) Party (PI), Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), Popular Movement (MP), National Democratic Party (PND), Party of Progress and Socialism (communist--PPS), Organization for Democratic and Popular Action (OADP). Suffrage: Universal over 20. Flag: Five-pointed green star centered on a red field.
GDP (1990): $25 billion. Per capita GDP (1990 est.): $1,000. Inflation (1990): 7%. Natural resources: Phosphates, fish, iron, manganese, lead, cobalt, silver, copper, oilshale. Agriculture (21% of GDP): Products--wheat, barley, citrus fruits, wine, vegetables, olives, livestock, fishing. Industry (30% of GDP): Types--phosphate mining, manufacturing and handicrafts, construction and public works energy. Trade (1990): Exports--$4 billion: phosphates, foodstuffs, manufactures. Major markets--France, other European Community (EC) countries, Spain. Imports--$5 billion: machinery, foodstuffs, oil. Major suppliers--France, Saudi Arabia, US, EC countries. Fiscal year: Calendar year.
Principal Government Officials
Chief of State--King Hassan II Prime Minister--Azeddine Laraki Minister of Foreign Affairs--Abdellatif Filali Ambassador to the United States--Mohammed Belkhayat Ambassador to the United Nations--Ali Skalli (###)