US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991


US Efforts To Achieve Compliance With UN Resolutions

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Washington, DC Date: Sep 16, 19919/16/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Arms Control, United Nations, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT] Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) Consistent with the authorization for use of military force against Iraq resolution (Public Law 102-1), and as part of my continuing effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I am again reporting on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. Since my last report, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the special commission created under Resolution 687 have continued to conduct inspections and other activities related to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With strong support from the United States, these bodies have been working actively under difficult conditions to identify, inspect, and arrange for the elimination of these weapons and related items. As a result, Iraq has permitted some access to facilities related to these weapons, and inspectors have viewed the destruction of some ballistic missiles and chemical munitions and catalogued large volumes of equipment related to Iraq's nuclear and other programs. Iraq continues, however, to misrepresent the scope of its programs in these areas, to use deception and concealment to prevent inspection teams from locating equipment subject to elimination under Resolution 687, and to deny inspection teams full and unrestricted access to facilities associated with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. This pattern of behavior, as well as other Iraqi violations of the requirements of Resolution 687, resulted in the adoption on August 15 of Resolution 707 which condemns Iraq for these actions and holds it in material breach of its obligations. In addition, the IAEA Board of Governors voted on July 18 to find Iraq in violation of its Safeguards Agreement and thus of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Recently, Iraq has refused to permit the UN to base helicopters inside Iraq for these purposes, contrary to an explicit Security Council demand contained in Resolution 707. The United States will not tolerate the continuation of this situation, and if necessary will take action to ensure Iraqi compliance with the Council's decisions so as to fully implement Resolution 678's call for the restoration of international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region. Significant progress has been made since my last report toward implementation of the resolution of the Security Council concerning compensation for the victims of the unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The first session of the Governing Council of the new UN Compensation Commission met from July 22- August 2 in Geneva and adopted criteria for the first category of claims to be considered by the Commission--namely, claims of individuals for up to $100,000. The Executive Secretary of the Commission and his two deputies have been appointed, as well as a number of experts on the oil industry, banking, and claims processing. The next session of the Governing Council will begin on October 14, and will focus on the adoption of a mechanism for collection and monitoring of Iraqi oil export revenues, as well as criteria for other categories of claims. On August 15, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 705, which approved the earlier recommendation of the Secretary- General that the ceiling on contributions to the Compensation Fund be set at 30% of Iraqi annual oil export revenues. On the same date, the Security Council adopted Resolution 706, which authorized sales of up to $1.6 billion of Iraqi oil, the proceeds of which would be paid to a UN escrow account and used as follows: (1) 30% would go to the Compensation Fund; (2) the UN would retain the amounts necessary for costs incurred by the Special Commission, the Boundary Commission, and other UN efforts pursuant to Resolution 687; and (3) the remainder would be used for the food, medicine, and other items for essential civilian needs, which would be provided under strict UN supervision to ensure their equitable distribution in Iraq. We are currently working with the Secretary-General and other Security Council members to implement this resolution as soon as possible. As I stated in my previous reports, the United States remains concerned about the situation of the Kurds and other internal population groups that have been the object of repressive measures by the Government of Iraq. We have informed the Government of Iraq that we will continue to monitor carefully the treatment of its citizens, and that we remain prepared to take appropriate steps if the situation requires. To this end, an appropriate level of forces will be maintained in the region for as long as required by the situation in Iraq. I remain grateful for the support of Congress for these efforts, and I look forward to continued cooperation toward achieving our mutual objectives. Sincerely, George Bush. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991 Title:

UN Security Council Resolution 712 Relating to Iraq

Description: New York, New York Date: Sep 18, 19919/18/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: United Nations, Trade/Economics, Human Rights [TEXT] Resolution 712 (September 18, 1991) The Security Council, Recalling its previous relevant resolutions and in particular resolutions 661 (1990), 686 (1991), 687 (1991), 688 (1991), 692 (1991), 699 (1991), 705 (1991) and 706 (1991), Expressing its appreciation for the report (S/23006) dated 4 September 1991 submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 706 (1991), Reaffirming its concern about the nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi civilian population, and the risk of a further deterioration of this situation, and underlining the need in this context for fully up-to-date assessments of the situation in all parts of Iraq as a basis for the equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi civilian population, Recalling that the activities to be carried out by or on behalf of the Secretary-General to meet the purposes referred to in resolution 706 (1991) and the present resolution enjoy the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Confirms the figure mentioned in paragraph 1 of resolution 706 (1991) as the sum authorized for the purpose of that paragraph, and reaffirms its intention to review this sum on the basis of its ongoing assessment of the needs and requirements, in accordance with paragraph 1 (d) of resolution 706 (1991); 2. Invites the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to authorize immediately pursuant to paragraph 1 (d) of resolution 706 (1991), the release by the Secretary-General from the escrow account of the first one-third portion of the sum referred to in paragraph 1 above, such release to take place as required subject to the availability of funds in the account and, in the case of payments to finance the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs which have been notified or approved in accordance with existing procedures, subject to compliance with the procedures laid down in the report of the Secretary-General as approved in paragraph 3 below; 3. Approves the recommendations in the Secretary-General report as contained in its paragraphs 57 (d) and 58; 4. Encourages the Secretary-General and the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to cooperate, in close consultation with the Government of Iraq, on a continuing basis to ensure the most effective implementation of the scheme approved in this resolution; 5. Decides that petroleum and petroleum products subject to resolution 706 (1991) shall while under Iraqi title be immune from legal proceedings and not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment or execution, and that all States shall take any steps that may be necessary under their respective domestic legal systems to assure this protection, and to ensure that the proceeds of sale are not diverted from the purposes laid down in resolution 706 (1991); 6. Reaffirms that the escrow account to be established by the United Nations and administered by the Secretary-General to meet the purposes of resolution 706 (1991) and the present resolution, like the Compensation Fund established by resolution 692 (1991), enjoys the privileges and immunities of the United Nations; 7. Reaffirms that the inspectors and other experts on mission for the United Nations, appointed for the purpose of this resolution, enjoy privileges and immunities in accordance with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and demands that Iraq shall allow them full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities; 8. Confirms that funds contributed from other sources may if desired, in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of resolution 706 (1991), be deposited into the escrow account as a sub-account and be immediately available to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991) without any of the obligatory deductions and administrative costs specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 706 (1991); 9. Urges that any provision to Iraq of foodstuffs, medicines or other items of a humanitarian character, in addition to those purchased with the funds referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, be undertaken through arrangements which assure their equitable distribution to meet humanitarian needs; 10. Requests the Secretary-General to take the actions necessary to implement the above decisions, and authorizes him to enter into any arrangements or agreements necessary to accomplish this; 11. Calls upon States to cooperate fully in the implementation of resolution 706 (1991) and the present resolution in particular with respect to any measures regarding the import of petroleum and petroleum products and the export of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), and also with respect to the privileges and immunities of the United Nations and its personnel implementing this resolution; and to ensure that there are no diversions from the purposes laid down in these resolutions; 12. Decides to remain seized of the matter. VOTE: 13 for, 1 against (Cuba), 1 abstention (Yemen).(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991 Title:

UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712 on Iraq

Date: Sep 23, 19919/23/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Trade/Economics, United Nations, Human Rights [TEXT]
Resolution 706 allows a limited, one-time sale of Iraqi oil to fund the purchase of humanitarian items needed for the Iraqi people as well as for Iraqi reparations for war damages. Resolution 712 (see p. 696) implements Resolution 706 (see Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 34).
-- UN Security Council Resolution 706 (1991), adopted on August 15, 1991. Sets out the broad elements of the program to implement the Resolution 706. -- Report by the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 706 (1991); submitted on September 4, 1991. Provides detailed recommendations on implementation of the program. -- UN Security Council Resolution 712, adopted on September 19, 1991. Approves the recommendations in the Secretary General's report.
Key Elements Of the Program
Sale of Iraqi Oil
-- Iraq will be permitted to export petroleum and petroleum products up to the value of $1.6 billion over a 6-month period beginning September 19, 1991. -- Oil will be marketed and sold by the Iraqi state oil company, SOMO, under the control of the UN Sanctions Committee. Each contract will be reviewed by UN inspection agents and approved by the Sanctions Committee under a 24-hour "no objection" procedure. -- The full amount of each purchase price will be deposited by the purchaser into an escrow account set up and administered by the United Nations. -- All oil will be exported via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline which runs through Turkey. UN inspectors, reporting regularly to the Sanctions Committee, will be posted at points of Iraqi access to the pipeline, at the loading terminal in Turkey, and at the Iraq- Turkey border, to monitor the flow of oil and to ensure compliance with the resolution. -- Iraq will compensate Turkey for use of the pipeline at a negotiated price. Iraq will be permitted to export an additional quantity of oil to pay Turkey in kind for this service.
Disbursements From The UN Escrow Account
Disbursements will be made from the escrow account for the following purposes (Secretary General's cost estimates in parentheses): -- Thirty percent deduction as a contribution to the Compensation Fund, toward settlement of claims arising from Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait ($480 million); -- Deductions to help pay for the activities of the Special Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency, boundary demarkation, and the return of Kuwaiti property ($96 million); -- UN administrative costs in implementing the resolution ($25.3 million); -- Assistance to be provided by the UN directly to vulnerable groups in Iraq outside the reach of the official government distribution system ($65 million); -- Purchase and transportation of food, medical supplies, and other essential civilian needs for the Iraqi people to be distributed through normal Iraqi channels ($933.7 million). The amount of $1.6 billion in the escrow account will be released by successive decisions of the UN Sanctions Committee in three equal tranches. Release of the first tranche was authorized on September 19, 1991, subject to controls over actual disbursements as described below.
Purchase and Deliveries of Humanitarian Goods
-- The Government of Iraq will prepare a list of its specific needs in the way of foodstuffs, medical supplies, and other essential civilian goods. This list will be reviewed by the Executive Delegate of the Secretary General, revised as necessary, and submitted to the UN Sanctions Committee for approval under a "no objection" procedure. -- After the list has been approved, the Iraqi Government (under UN supervision) will arrange for the purchase and delivery of humanitarian goods. In accordance with Resolution 687, goods other than food and medical supplies must be approved individually by the Sanctions Committee, under the "no objection" procedure, upon the request of the exporting country's government. -- The Secretary General will approve disbursements from the escrow account for approved purchases to the extent that funds are available in the current authorized tranche. -- UN inspection agents will be stationed at the relevant ports of unloading and at the border entry points into Iraq. UN personnel will monitor the arrival of the supplies at border entry points and their transportation to designated distribution centers. -- UN personnel in Iraq, assisted to the extent possible by non-governmental organizations, will continue to monitor the movement and impact of these supplies as they are distributed, through normal Iraqi channels to all segments of the Iraqi population. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991 Title:

African Democracy and the Rule of Law

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Excerpts from an address before the African Attorneys General Conference, Abuja, Nigeria Date: Sep 9, 19919/9/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Subject: International Law, Democratization [TEXT] Mr. President, Attorneys General from Africa, and friends: This is my first trip to Africa. Yesterday, I was in Cape Verde and later in the week I will be visiting Malawi, Namibia, and Cote d'Ivoire. As we watch the world race toward embracing democracy and democratic values, it is of great importance to speak to the Attorneys General who will have the great responsibility of implementing democracy. As you may or may not know, both my wife Marilyn and I are attorneys-at-law. Almost half of our Congress is made up of lawyers. Unfortunately, the United States is the most litigious society in the world. This is not necessarily good news, and I, as President Bush's Chairman of the Competitiveness Council, aim to do something about it. I'll share with you a political anecdote that happened to me when I was running for Congress in Indiana. I was 29 and wanted to get as many votes as I could. I met one gentleman who told me that he wouldn't vote for me just because I was a lawyer. I then told him I was a lawyer, but I had another profession as well. He said, "What do you do?" I said I was a newspaper publisher. He promptly told me that was worse. Mr. President, I bring special greetings from President Bush and from the American people to you and to the Nigerian people. We stand with you in your determination to return Nigeria to civilian rule and to democracy, we appreciate your leadership of the Organization of African Unity, and we thank you for hosting this important conference. Ladies and gentlemen, in his Inaugural Address in January 1989, President George Bush predicted that the world was entering a new era. "The day of the dictator is over," he declared. "The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like the leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree." Today, the truth of these words is clearer than ever. Events in the Soviet Union have demonstrated that decades of repression cannot crush the freedom-loving spirit of ordinary people. The Soviet people were willing to stand up to tanks and guns to preserve the freedoms they only recently gained. Clearly, democracy is an idea whose time has come, and no one should underestimate the world's desire for true democracy. Today, Africa is in transition. From East to West, from North to South, an entire continent is moving away from authoritarianism and one-party states and toward democracy. Democracy is indivisible. All who enjoy its blessings are duty-bound to help those who do not. Make no mistake about it: The United States will do its duty. But how should we encourage democratic reform? In my opinion, one of the surest protections for democracy is free and open criticism. Democracy welcomes criticism from inside and outside. The true democrat has no fear of opposing views or of unsolicited advice. We, in America, know that our democracy is far from perfect, and we welcome the constant reminders--from friends and foes alike--that much remains to be done. Yesterday's Africa resisted criticism. We were told that Africa was not ready for democracy, that tradition called for a strong leader, that multi-party democracy would always reinforce tribalism, and that we had no business questioning internal modes of governance. In contrast, we have been forthright in expressing our support for democracy and market-oriented economies. In the current springtime of freedom around the world, new democratic institutions have blossomed in the Philippines, in Korea, in Nicaragua, in the Soviet Union, and in Africa. Let me stress, however, that we will not interfere in the internal affairs of others. We have no candidates; we have no favorite parties. But we do have our views about the democratic process and the rule of law, and we will make them known. We believe that there is no single model for democracy in Africa. Presidential systems, parliamentary systems, proportional representation, and single member districts--we can respect all of these. There is no country on the face of the earth whose citizens do not desire a government that respects the basic principles of democracy: Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom from arbitrary intimidation and arrest, and the rule of law, which is the life-blood of democracy. Ensuring that basic human rights are respected is a responsibility of the judiciary. Democracies must be governed by laws, not men. No man, be he rich or powerful, can be above the law. If justice is denied, democracy cannot survive. The Attorneys General and other government prosecutors must be free to pursue justice against whomever they reasonably suspect of criminal activity. At the same time, the Attorneys General have a special responsibility to ensure that suspects are treated in accordance with the law during all phases of their incarceration. Those who are accused of crimes are entitled to certain rights: They must be charged expeditiously, they must be free from physical abuse, the conditions of their imprisonment must meet minimum standards, and they should be tried quickly and fairly. All persons, no matter what their status or background, are entitled to equal treatment under the law. The Attorneys General assembled here today carry the awesome responsibility of turning these ideals into reality. If you do not uphold the rule of law--then who will? If you do not insist on the independence of the judiciary--then who will? And if you do not protect the rights of the people--then who will? In a democratic society, public officials must be held accountable for their actions, and a free press is the people's watchdog. The press must be free to investigate and to publish what it finds to be true--even if it embarrasses or hurts the careers of powerful figures, in or out of office. The free press, along with the judiciary, stands guard against abuses of human rights--preventing them whenever possible, exposing them when they occur. If respect for human rights, the rule of law, and a free press are essential ingredients, then the relationship between democracy and the market economy is the basic recipe for success. The United States is encouraged by the growing acceptance by African governments and African people of the market-oriented economic model. In the past, African governments adopted policies that actually inhibited economic growth. There was over-reliance on the state and under-reliance on the creativity and energy of the private sector and far too much dependence on foreign aid. Now, however, almost three-fourths of Africa's countries are embarked on economic reform programs designed to reduce the role of the state and free the forces of individual initiative. The full benefits of economic reform will not be realized unless there is equally deep democratic reform. Only when the powerful engines of democracy and the free market are harnessed together, in a single system, will Africa achieve its full economic potential, and Africa's potential is tremendous. There is a revolution sweeping the world today, a revolution that knows no geographic boundaries. I have recently traveled to Eastern Europe, where millions of people are struggling to rebuild their societies after decades of one party domination. I have just visited South America, where democracy and economic growth are sweeping away the sad legacy of military rule and statist economics. The democratic revolution is spreading all around the globe because our people want to be empowered. Our people want respect. Our people want a good life. Our people want hope and an opportunity to live their dreams. Make no mistake about it--Africa is part of this global revolution. You are part of this revolution. Your own efforts as Attorneys General to uphold the rule of law and the rights of the individual will be far more vital to the success of the democratic cause in Africa than any foreign aid program. The United States, as it always has, will remain engaged. We are a caring, peace-loving nation. We want peace, not war. We want democracy, not dictatorships. We want hope, not despair. As a nation, America will continue to support and assist the democratic cause throughout Africa. . . .(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991 Title:

Africa Must Develop Its Private Sector

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Address before the African Development Bank, Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire Date: Sep 14, 19919/14/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, Cape Verde, Namibia Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] President N'Diaye, your excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, first, on behalf of President Bush and the American people, I bring you special greetings from the United States, a country that greatly cares about the future of Africa. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, in his famous "winds of change" speech delivered in 1960, former British Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan, drew the world's attention to the inevitable drive for independence sweeping across the continent of Africa. Back then, it was widely believed that the end of colonialism would usher in a new era in African history--one of hope and opportunity. For much of Africa, these high hopes, unfortunately, have not been realized. Today, however, the winds of change are blowing across the African continent once again. The revolutionary events occurring elsewhere--especially in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union--have provided an additional impetus for change. The question is: Do the historic events taking place in Africa and around the world offer new hope to ordinary men and women in Africa? Or will future historians look back on the 1990s and conclude that, once again, high hopes and great expectations went largely unfulfilled? I am here to reaffirm America's faith in Africa--in its people, in its leaders, in its traditions, and in its future. I have visited five African countries this past week: -- In Cape Verde democracy is established. -- In Nigeria, the military regime has stated it will give way to civilian rule and hold federal elections in 1992. -- Unfortunately, Malawi, a small poor country, still has a one-party system, but changes will come to Malawi as well. -- In Namibia, independence and democracy have brought new hope that opportunities for education and investment can be developed for all of Namibia's people. -- In Cote d'Ivoire, we have seen the economic openness which can bring about the full measure of political development in Africa. For Africa's movement toward economic and political reform to succeed, we must first confront the mistakes of the past. In my judgment, Africa's frustration in trying to fulfill its potential can be traced back to the pernicious effects of two ideas. Both of these ideas were once widely held in Africa and in many Western countries. Both were misguided. The first idea is that democracy was not an appropriate political model for Africa. We often heard concern, for example, that multi-party democracy would only reinforce tribalism and that African tradition called for a strong leader. By now, everyone can see how misguided these notions were. If it only had been recognized that democracy is the best system for building real unity among culturally diverse peoples, then things would have been better. A second idea that has held back Africa's prospects is that economic development in Africa required a centralized, state- managed economy. Today, of course, momentous events have taught the world a lesson in economics--that a command economy is a recipe for disaster. Too many of Africa's governments found themselves on a treadmill of escalating costs, rising debt, and bloated government payrolls. Large public but uncompetitive investments produced little, while private producers were punished with excessive taxation. Unfortunately, the private sector, right from the start, never had a chance to compete and grow on a level playing field. I am offering you my candid advice as a friend. My advice today is no different than what I have said in Eastern Europe and Latin America and what we are telling the Soviet Union. The age of large-scale, government-to-government aid is over; Africa must develop a vigorous private sector if it is to grow. Foreign aid can help alleviate short-term needs, and lending from international financial institutions can facilitate medium- term structural adjustments. Over the long term, however, there is one and only one path to reaching your full economic potential, and I will repeat it: Africa must develop its private sector. So let us talk about plans and policies that will position Africa for an exciting new era of growth in the 21st century. In many places, a good start has been made. Today, almost three- fourths of Africa's countries have adopted economic reform programs designed to reduce the role of the state and free the forces of individual initiative. Until full-blown economic reforms, like privatization, have become a reality, real growth will not displace decay in Africa. That is why I am pleased to acknowledge the promising new initiative of the Africa Development Bank [AFDB] under the able leadership of President N'Diaye. The AFDB is quickly moving to the forefront of efforts to promote private enterprise in Africa. The bank has established a private sector development unit, to provide direct financing and technical assistance to African private enterprise. The United States is pleased to be involved in this important new initiative. We have supported the AFDB's efforts for a long time, and we will continue to support it. Through USAID [the US Agency for International Development], OPIC [the Overseas Private Investment Corporation], and our trade development program and by working with the World Bank, we will lend our support to the bank's new private sector development efforts. I am very gratified that participation by US private firms in AFDB projects has doubled. The bank's private sector development unit is providing exactly the kind of services needed to build on this promising new trend. Equally importantly, the bank is assisting African governments in preparing state-owned enterprises for privatization. My friends, this is the kind of activity that will bring Africa out of the economic doldrums. This is the kind of trend the United States is happy to support. We are already a major market for African goods. In 1990, we imported almost $13 billion in goods from Sub-Saharan Africa. US investment in Sub-Saharan Africa totaled some $2.7 billion at year-end 1990. This year, the Untied States provided approximately $150 million in direct assistance to the private sector in Africa. The United States has also moved decisively to address Africa's debt burden. In recognition of the economic reforms undertaken by a number of African nations and based on need, we have signed agreements to forgive development loans. So far, we have forgiven some $755 million in development loans. I am pleased to announce today that the US Government will provide immediate, additional debt forgiveness of over $419 million to eight Sub-Saharan African countries: Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. This new debt relief authority was established for least developed countries making significant efforts at economic reform in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund [IMF] or the World Bank. We all know Africa needs capital. The investment capital is out there. It is available, but it is limited--and it will go where it finds genuine opportunities. I have worked with private sector leaders to create enterprise funds in the reformed economies of Central and Eastern Europe. I have traveled to Latin America with some of America's top corporate executives to spur the economic reform process. And this week, I have participated in candid discussions with African policy officials and foreign investors. Everywhere, I have learned the same lesson: I can lead a horse to water, but I cannot make him drink. Only the governments of Africa, working with the AFDB and other reform-minded entities and governments, can make the investment climate appealing to foreign capital. We want you to tell potential investors: "Take a new look at Africa. You can do business there." We hope you will make it easier for us to deliver that message. The United States will do its part to get that message across. We are prepared to offer seminars to African government and business executives on how better to use the American generalized system of preferences (GSP) program. Under this program, Sub- Saharan nations which are GSP beneficiaries export nearly $150 million in goods duty-free into the United States. These seminars will show how to use the program more effectively and shall promote more trade and investment. The United States currently sponsors numerous investment missions to Africa. The United States is also encouraging all parties involved in South Africa to continue forward to a political settlement establishing a non-racial, multi-party democracy. We continue to work vigorously to eliminate the ugly system of apartheid. So, these are some highlights, not the complete list, of American commitments to Africa. The US Government's commitment to Africa is for the long haul. As President Bush has said, we will not forget our African friends, no matter what happens elsewhere in the world. We can help, and we will help, but the bulk of the job must be done by Africans themselves. You hold your destiny in your own hands. Africa today stands at the threshold of a bright and promising future. An era of African history is coming to an end, and a new one is beginning. A new breed of politician is rising from the cities and towns and universities of Africa--ready to participate in multi-party democracy. A new breed of legal scholar is emerging in Africa-- ready to assume the awesome responsibility of upholding equal rights for all in an independent judiciary. Now it is clear to me, we must encourage the development of a new breed of African businessman, a new breed of African economist--and with it, we must encourage a new business ethic. Let's join together to wipe away the corruption, the monopoly power, and the "robber baron" exploitation of Africa's resources. This was Africa's sad legacy of elitist, state-run economies in the post-independence period, and let us never repeat it. Nationalized industries should be privatized. Small business should be welcomed. Encouraging the creative energies of Africa's small entrepreneurs is a key to economic growth--one which will bring greater social justice. Government agencies have to welcome private capital sources instead of "crowding out" private enterprise. Government bureaucracies have to provide efficient services that private producers need and can rely upon instead of stifling the competitive energies of the people. Government leaders have to attack corruption wherever it is found, starting with the example they set for the business community and the society as a whole. Openness, accountability, pluralism, tolerance, and respect for human rights are the principles of a growing Africa. You are Africa's economic pioneers, Africa's new breed, and Africa's hope for the future. The future is yours. I hope you take every opportunity to compete with reforming countries all over the world. I hope you can develop Africa to its fullest potential. If you do, historians of the future will surely say that this time, the "winds of change" blowing through the world marked the start of a new world order--not only in Eastern Europe, not only in Latin America, not only in Asia and the Middle East, but in Africa as well. And through it all, we, the United States, will gladly extend the hand of friendship and partnership. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991 Title:

Angolan President Visits Washington, DC

Date: Sep 23, 19919/23/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola Subject: International Law, Military Affairs, Democratization, United Nations [TEXT] Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos met with President Bush at the White House on September 16, 1991, 2 days after Jonas Savimbi, the President of Angola's other major political party, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), met Vice President Quayle in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. The meetings underscored the US commitment to help promote national reconciliation in Angola since the warring parties signed a peace accord on May 31, 1991, which the United States helped to negotiate. During the signing ceremonies in Lisbon, Secretary Baker promised that the United States would do all that it could to assist Angola's transition to democracy. He noted that democracy in Angola offers the best chance for stability not only in that country, but for the southern African region as well.
The Angolan civil war began in 1975 between the Luanda government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and UNITA. It ravaged the countryside, causing considerable disruption of political and economic life. After 1979, UNITA effectively controlled the southeastern quarter of the country. The presence of Cuban and South African forces in Angola complicated the civil war. In 1988, the United States successfully mediated negotiations leading to the departure of these foreign forces from the country, as well as the independence of Namibia. Between April 1990 and May 1991, negotiations between the Luanda government and UNITA were conducted under the mediation of Portugal. The United States and the Soviet Union were official observers at these negotiations and played a facilitative role in helping the two parties reach the agreements which were signed on May 31.
US Policy in Angola
US policy in Angola has long sought a negotiated settlement to the civil conflict, including free and fair elections in which UNITA and all other Angolan political parties are free to participate. A little more than 1 year ago, Secretary Baker met with President dos Santos in Windhoek during the Namibian independence celebrations. He assured him that US policy was aimed at promoting negotiations to achieve peace and stability, and he urged President dos Santos to accept negotiations leading to free and fair elections. President dos Santos accepted Secretary Baker's recommendation and asked the Portuguese Government to mediate negotiations, at which the United States and the Soviet Union were official observers. The resulting negotiations progressed, but in December 1990 reached an impasse. During their meetings in Houston in December 1990, Secretary Baker and then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reviewed the status of the negotiations for a settlement in Angola. They expressed their continued support for the important role played by Portugal. To facilitate the negotiations, and to advance the achievement of peace and stability, they made a special effort to break the impasse. The United States and the Soviet Union co- sponsored a meeting in Washington, DC, with all parties on December 13. On the previous day, Secretary Baker met with the Angolan Foreign Minister, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met with President Savimbi of UNITA, demonstrating their determination to bring the two parties together. These meetings resulted in a document called the Washington Concepts Paper, which established a framework for an overall settlement. This intervention by Secretary Baker and the Soviet Foreign Minister demonstrated the overall success of US policy toward Angola and US-Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflicts.
The Peace Accords for Angola
On May 1, 1991, following weeks of intensive discussions in Lisbon, the parties reached agreement in substance on all issues related to a cease-fire and political settlement. At Estoril, high- level UNITA and Luanda government officials initialed agreements on a UN-monitored cease-fire and supplementary principles guiding a final settlement, including free and fair multi-party elections and the formation of new, politically neutral, national armed forces. On May 15, a de facto cease-fire began when the parties informed the Portuguese Government of their acceptance of the agreements reached. A formal cease-fire entered into force when the final agreements were signed by President dos Santos and UNITA President Savimbi on May 31.
US Role Under the Accords
Under the cease-fire agreements, the United States, as an observer to the JPMC and the JVMC, is supporting implementation of the agreements. In June, it opened an office in Luanda, where the JPMC is headquartered. This did not constitute establishment of diplomatic relations with the Luanda government. The United States will establish diplomatic relations with the government in Angola which emerges from free and fair, internationally monitored elections scheduled to be held between September and November 1992. The accord binds both parties to avoid further importation of lethal materiel into Angola. The US and the USSR are complying with this provision. Non-lethal aid is specifically permitted.
UN Role
The UN was asked to authorize the establishment of a mission of several hundred observers to assist in monitoring the cease-fire. They began to arrive in Angola as soon as the cease-fire agreements were signed and will remain until the results of national elections have been proclaimed.
Provisions of the Agreement
Cease-Fire Agreement, which includes the formation of a Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (JVMC) to monitor cease- fire implementation. Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace, which includes the formation of a Joint Political and Military Commission (JPMC), with overarching responsibility for implementation of all aspects of the agreements. Washington Concepts Paper, which contains fundamental concepts underlying a framework for settlement. The "Estoril Accords," (named after the Portuguese town, near Lisbon, where they were negotiated), which include six annexes on: -- Free and fair multi-party elections between September and November 1992; -- Internal security (neutrality of the police force will be guaranteed by the presence of UN monitors); -- Structure and mandate of JPMC; -- Administrative structures for the UNITA-held areas; -- A definition of UNITA's political rights once the cease- fire is signed; and -- The formation of a new, politically neutral, national armed forces.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991 Title:

Angola Peace Accords

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Washington, DC Date: Sep 16, 19919/16/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola Subject: Democratization, United Nations [TEXT] The President used the occasion of the private visit of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola to review with him the status of the Angola peace accords. The President reiterated our firm commitment to the Angola peace process and to the full and timely implementation of all aspects of the accords. In light of the recent difficulties concerning the assembly and cantonment of troops and the slow pace at which discussions are proceeding toward agreement on an electoral calendar, including a precise date for elections, the President urged President dos Santos to resolve these issues quickly so that the peace process will maintain its momentum and genuine national reconciliation can finally be established in Angola. The President informed President dos Santos that we remain committed to establishing diplomatic relations with the government which emerges from free and fair internationally monitored elections. The President noted that he is looking forward to Angola's elections next year and reiterated our preference, also contained with the accords, that they be held in September.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991 Title:

US Support for Peruvian Reform

Bush, Fujimori Source: President Bush, Peruvian President Fujimori Description: Remarks upon President Fujimori's departure, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Sep 17, 19919/17/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Peru Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization, Narcotics [TEXT]
President Bush:
Mr. President, it has been a great pleasure and a privilege to meet with you today and exchange views on the important issues that our two countries must overcome together. You, sir--you, Mr. President--are Peru's hope for the future. We have spoken openly, discussing the tough challenges Peru faces--from economic hardship to renegade insurgencies, from the war against drugs to the battle to preserve human rights. Much has been done on all these fronts--but much more waits to be achieved. Mr. President, since taking office, you have cut government spending, eliminated price controls, knocked down barriers to trade and investment. Those reforms have begun paying off. They've begun paying dividends. Inflation has eased; net international reserves have risen. Peruvians feel confident in themselves, their economy, and their nation. We want to be a full partner in your efforts to restore Peru's economy because your people deserve the fruits of economic growth after so many years of suffering. We also discussed narcotics trafficking and production, a scourge that blocks Peru's path to a peaceful and prosperous future, drains its resources, drives insurgency, and dampens its hope for a better tomorrow. Under your leadership, sir, Peru has moved to combat this deadly threat. You've both strengthened police and military operations against the drug industry and stressed the need for alternative crop production. The United States and other nations have joined to support Peru's efforts with training, resources, and equipment. And in this spirit, I was pleased to reaffirm last May's accords in which we agreed to cooperate closely in combating drug trafficking. To support these efforts, my Administration wants to send $94 million in economic and military assistance to fight drugs. Unfortunately, Congress has placed a hold on disbursement of these funds, chiefly because of stated human rights concerns. We share these concerns and so do you, Mr. President. But you have made progress on human rights, and let's also, then, see progress on releasing these funds. Without this needed aid, cocaine traffic will continue unabated, and violence and abuses will increase unredressed. So I urge Congress to help Peru and the Andean nations create economic alternatives to coca production by passing my Andean Trade Preference Initiative. Mr. President, you've combined strong leadership with swift action. You've replaced police officers suspected of corruption and abuse, begun to open up detention centers to prosecutors, and pledged to strengthen your military code. Your reforms have begun to help improve the human rights record of the security forces, and your deeds echo the words of your country's constitution, "That all men, equal in dignity, have rights of universal validity." Rights abuses have fallen sharply since you took office last year. And Mr. President, your leadership and your nation deserve our support, and you have it. Our Government is pleased to co-chair with Japan an international group to help Peru with its debt problems and hasten its reintegration into the international financial community. A number of other countries, including several in Latin America, have joined this process which is so important for Peru's future. We hope the democratic community will rally generously to support your people. Mr. President, you are confronting the challenge of change with courage and vision. And you're building a new Peru with a sound economy, respect for law, and a new sense of social justice and national reconciliation. You're steering your country steadily toward a place of renewed leadership in the community of democratic nations which Peruvian patriot Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzman once called "the great family of brothers." And so, once again, sir, it has been an honor to welcome you and, yes, your family to the White House and your excellent team that you brought with you. We welcome you once again, and let me just say may God bless you and the people of Peru.
President Fujimori:
Mr. President, as President of Peru, I would like to express my appreciation and that of the Peruvian people for all your hospitality during our trip and for the considerable assistance that your government has provided to my country through your leadership of the [inaudible] group. Thanks to your support, Peru will be able to resume normalized relations with the international financial community. As we have discussed together, Peru and the United States have joined in a terrible intimacy in the war against drugs. Our country can play a significant role in the effort to wipe out drug trafficking. Peru produces 60% of the world's cocaine, while the United States consumes 80% of the world's coca leaf. The efforts on the part of both our countries to fight this scourge, within the framework of the anti-drug agreement which we have signed and with the support of the coca-growing farmers of Peru, are critical. And we all recognize that each victory in this fight will benefit the youth of the entire world. In order to replace the coca leaf with other crops in Peru, it will be necessary to change our systems and create the conditions for a true market economy. It is only in this manner that the coca- growing farmer can switch to alternative and profitable crops. We are making progress in this difficult war. We have achieved a national consensus which includes all of the coca- growing farm organizations for a move to legal crops and alternative development. Through intelligent efforts based on the shared vision between our two countries, we can consolidate a relationship which will vanquish drug trafficking. As I informed you, we have established a new policy in Peru for the protection of human rights which will complement our fight against drug trafficking and terrorists and will guarantee the full respect of those rights. We are committed to ending the problems in Peru without abandoning the rule of law and democracy. Our plan for fighting drugs in Peru calls for identifying the coca-growing farmers. By identifying the coca farmers, we will also be able to identify the drug traffickers. I wish to assure you that our efforts to put an end to the activities of drug trafficking will be implacable. I am certain that with the cooperation of the United States of America, with its friendship and fraternity, together we will be able to free humanity of the terrible scourge of drug trafficking. Mr. President, again, my sincere thanks. Your support and concern for the reconstruction of my country will long be remembered by myself and the people of Peru. Many thanks. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991 Title:

Visit of Peruvian President Fujimori

Date: Sep 17, 19919/17/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: South America Country: Peru Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics, Narcotics [TEXT] Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori made his first official visit to Washington, DC, on September 17, 1991. He met with a wide array of government and business leaders, including President Bush and Acting Secretary Eagleburger. There was discussion on a full range of issues, notably US assistance and human rights concerns as well as Peru's efforts to stabilize its economy and control narcotics production/trafficking.
US-Peru Relations
President Fujimori has pursued a pragmatic approach to challenges facing Peruvian democracy and has strengthened relations with the United States. His Administration has moved to address the problems he inherited from the previous government: a severe economic recession, insurgent violence, corruption, and narcotics production/trafficking. In particular, Fujimori has aimed to restore international confidence in Peru's economy by substantially increasing reliance upon a free market system and seeking to reinsert Peru into the world financial community. In addition, President Fujimori's democratically elected government has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to the counter-narcotics struggle. Under the Andean strategy, a 5-year cooperative program with the Andean countries designed to combat cocaine production and trafficking, the US has sought to improve the operational capabilities of the Peruvian, Colombian, and Bolivian law enforcement and military forces engaged in the drug war. In addition, the United States has sought to put in place economic programs designed to encourage alternatives to coca cultivation. To achieve these goals, the US and Peru have signed four counter-narcotics agreements in the last 4 months: an umbrella agreement in May, followed by three supplemental agreements specifically concerning law enforcement aid and economic and military assistance. Disbursement of funds for economic and military assistance cannot take place until Congress releases these funds.
Consolidation of Democracy
Since 1980, when the constitution drafted in 1979 went into effect, Peru has had a freely elected democratic government, composed of an executive branch headed by a president, a bicameral legislature, and a separate and independent judiciary. Elections are held every 5 years for both the office of president (who serves a single 5-year term) and for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The president appoints the Council of Ministers which approves all presidential decrees and proposed legislation before they are sent to the legislature. After two rounds of intensely contested national elections for president, Alberto Fujimori, a former university president, was inaugurated in July 1990. Presently, no single party holds a majority in the legislature. Peru's democratic government must confront a troubled economy, which is suffering from the disastrous economic policies of the prior Administration. In addition, Peru faces threats from the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the pro-Cuban Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Both groups have some control over parts of Peru's major coca-growing region, the Upper Huallaga Valley, where they have been linked to the illegal drug trade. In the face of a violent, brutal insurgency, the Government of Peru has taken measures that demonstrate President Fujimori's personal commitment to human rights. While much work remains to be done, there has been progress and important steps have been taken. With 1 year in office, the new Government of Peru has announced that prosecuting attorneys will have full access to all military barracks and police detention centers to verify that detainees' human rights are respected and has granted the International Committee of the Red Cross permission to staff and operate additional offices.
Economy and Trade
President Fujimori's Administration inherited a government without international reserves, shunned by external credit markets, and burdened with a number of extraordinarily unprofitable public sector companies. The economy was in deep recession with an accelerating four-digit inflation rate (more than 7,600% at its height in 1990 ) and seriously deteriorated infrastructure. In response, President Fujimori instituted an economic stabilization and adjustment program. As a result, inflation is expected to decline to about 220% in 1991. Government price controls and subsidies have been eliminated, along with nearly all barriers to foreign trade and investment. Foreign ownership and investment are welcome; foreign exchange is unlimited; Peruvian banks may now accept foreign currency deposits. The exchange rate system has been unified, controls on commercial bank interest rates have been eliminated, and the national currency has been allowed to float. Consequently, government revenues and expenditures are in balance and net international revenues have increased. The United States is Peru's largest trading partner. Other major trading partners are the European Community and Japan. Exports include petroleum, copper, silver, zinc, lead, fishmeal, coffee, cotton, and canned or frozen fish. Peru imports machinery, cereals, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and equipment for petroleum and minerals extraction. The Fujimori Government eliminated the requirement for import licenses and the ban on imports of 300 items. Most US investment in Peru is concentrated in the mining and petroleum sectors, and many US subsidiaries manufacture consumer products or provide services.(###)
Peru at a Glance
The third largest country in South America, Peru is bordered by Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, and Brazil and has a 2,240- kilometer (1,400 mi.) Pacific Ocean coastline. It has three topographical and climatic regions: the coastal area, the Andes Mountains, and the eastern jungle. Lima, the capital, has no extreme temperatures and little daily variation. When the Spanish explorer Francisco Pizarro arrived in 1531, Peru's territory was the nucleus of the highly developed Incan civilization. By the time of the wars of independence, Peru had become the chief Spanish stronghold in America. Spain recognized its independence in 1879. Until 1980, when civilian government was restored under the 1979 constitution, the Peruvian military repeatedly interrupted civilian constitutional government. Peru's population of 20 million is mainly comprised of Indians, mestizos, and Hispanic Europeans. Since 1980, primary school education has been free and compulsory. Public school attendance at all levels is about 84%. Education and urban migration are helping develop a more homogeneous national culture, especially in major cities. Literacy is 72% in urban areas, where the fiction of such internationally famous writers as Mario Vargas Llosa and Alfredo Bryce Echenique is popular. Probably the most prominent world figure from Peru at the present is Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General of the UN since 1982. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991 Title:

Country Profile: Peru

Date: Sep 23, 19919/23/91 Category: Country Data Region: South America Country: Peru Subject: History, Trade/Economics, International Organizations [TEXT] Official Name: Republic of Peru
Area: 1.3 million sq. km. (496,222 sq. mi.); three times larger than California. Cities: Capital--Lima (pop. 6.5 million, 1989 est.). Other Cities-- Arequipa, Trujillo, Chiclayo, Piura, Chimbote, Cuzco, Huancayo, Iquitos, Tacna. Terrain: Western coastal plains, central rugged mountains (Andes), eastern lowlands with tropical jungle (the Amazon headwaters). Climate: Coastal area, arid and mild; Andes, temperate to frigid; eastern lowlands, warm and humid.
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Peruvian(s). Population (1990 est.): 22 million (69% urban). Annual growth rate (1989 est.): 2.5%. Ethnic groups: Indian 45%, mestizo 37%, white 15%, black, Asian, and other 3%. Religion: Predominantly Roman Catholic. Official languages: Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara. Education: Years compulsory--11. Literacy--88%. Health: Infant mortality rate--83/1,000. Life expectancy--61 yrs. Work force (7.4 million): Agriculture--35%. Industry and mining-- 13%. Government and other services--52%.
Type: Constitutional republic. Independence: July 28, 1821. Constitution: Took effect July 28, 1980, but often referred to as the 1979 constitution because constituent assembly met to write it that year. Branches: Executive--president, two vice presidents, Council of Ministers. Legislative--Senate and Chamber of Deputies. Judicial-- Supreme Court and lower courts, Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees. Administrative subdivisions: Historically divided into 24 departments and 1 constitutional province; currently being reorganized into 12 regions (under the terms of the 1979 constitution). Political parties: American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), Popular Action (AP), Popular Christian Party (PPC), Liberty Movement (LIBERTAD), Change 1990 (CAMBIO '90), plus United Left (IU) and Socialist Left (IS) coalitions. Suffrage: Universal and mandatory, ages 18 to 70 (members of the military and police may not vote). Central government budget (1991): $4.6 billion. Defense (1990): $506 million. Flag: Three vertical stripes--red, white, red--with coat of arms on center stripe.
GDP (1990 est.): $19 billion. Annual real growth rate (1990): -4.6%. Average annual real growth (1985-90): -9%. Per capita GDP (1990 est.): $1,377. Inflation rate (1990): 7,650%. Natural resources: Minerals, metals, petroleum, forests, fish. Agriculture (11% of GDP): Products--coffee, cotton, sugar, rice, corn, potatoes. Industry (25% of GDP): Types--mineral processing, oil refining, fishmeal, textile, food processing, light manufacturing, automobile assembly. Trade (1990): Exports--$3 billion: copper, fishmeal, zinc, petroleum, lead, coffee, silver, cotton, textiles. Major markets--US (24%), European Community, Japan. Imports--$3 billion: cereals, machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, petroleum and mining equipment. Major suppliers--US (27%), Andean Pact countries, EC, Brazil, Japan. Fiscal year: Calendar year. US assistance (FY 1990): Economic-- $70 million. Military--$1.5 million. Law enforcement--$10 million.
Principal Government Officials
President--Alberto Fujimori Prime Minister--Carlos Torres y Torres Lara Foreign Minister--Carlos Torres y Torres Lara Ambassador to the United States--Roberto MacLean Ambassador to the United Nations--Ricardo V. Luna Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS)--Luis Marchand Stens (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991 Title:

Proposed US Economic and Military Aid to Peru

Aronson Source: Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Sep 12, 19919/12/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Peru Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales, Narcotics, Human Rights, Terrorism [TEXT] I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you our relations with Peru and the economic and military aid we propose to provide to Peru in fiscal year 1991. My colleagues and I also appreciate the participation of so many members of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Task Force on International Narcotics Control, because this program deserves wide attention and scrutiny in Congress. Let me speak plainly: The Administration believes that this year's aid to Peru is indispensable to the war on drugs. Without that aid--$60 million of economic aid and $34 of million military aid--we would suffer a setback not just in our work to stop cocaine trafficking in Peru. Because of Peru's leading position as a coca leaf supplier and its central geographical position, we also would suffer a setback in our overall Andean effort. We would offer a sanctuary to traffickers who are now feeling the heat of successful interdiction operations in Bolivia and Colombia. Make no mistake: If this aid is denied, more cocaine will enter the United States. We will also miss an opportunity to collaborate closely with a brave democratic leader who is working to improve respect for human rights and strengthen a democracy under attack by a brutal guerrilla insurgency.
The Peruvian Context
Many of the problems facing Peru can be described in superlatives: Peru is the world's largest producer of coca leaf; it is plagued by Latin America's most brutal and ruthless guerrilla group, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path); it confronts the most severe economic crisis in this hemisphere. All of these crises were inherited by the current government. To add to Peru's troubles, its people have been hardest hit by the cholera epidemic, with over 240,000 cases recorded. When President Fujimori took office in July 1990, he faced almost 3,000% inflation, a bankrupt treasury, real wages down 60% since 1985, and about one-third of the country's children suffering moderate to severe malnutrition. His predecessor made very limited payments on Peru's international debt, and as a result Peru was isolated from international financial institutions and cut off from new credit. Just to return to its 1987 level of per capita economic production, Peru will need 8 consecutive years of 5% annual growth. I have described the full dimensions of Peru's problems to give you a sense of the immense tasks President Fujimori faces in governing Peru. While we seek to help President Fujimori as much as possible, our principal foreign policy interests lie in helping the Government and people of Peru to consolidate democracy, stop drug traffic, and protect human rights. These principles govern our counter-narcotics efforts. First, any serious international effort to stop the supply of cocaine requires that we work in Peru fully engaged with the Government of Peru. Because Peru supplies 60% of the world's coca leaf, any effort that leaves Peru out is a partial effort at best. Second, the cocaine problem in Peru cannot be solved in isolation, strictly as a problem of law enforcement. Any permanent solution also requires comprehensive action in the areas of economic development, human rights, and security. Third, economic aid alone, without other effective counter- narcotics efforts, will fail. Coca growers will switch to alternative crops when relative prices favor that choice, markets are accessible, and the required infrastructure is in place. To drive down the price of coca, we have to disrupt the cartels' production and transportation systems. Fourth, security is essential both for an effective counter- narcotics program and an effective economic development program. Economic development workers cannot do their jobs if they are attacked and killed by guerrillas and narco-traffickers. On August 14, a rocket attack gutted a drug awareness office in the Education Ministry; this is a project funded by the US Agency for International Development. Fifth, while the police have the lead role in counter-narcotics, the participation of the Peruvian military is essential in a country where two powerful insurgencies are allied with drug producers. Only the military can provide the security that is essential for law enforcement, interdiction, eradication and economic development efforts. Sixth, improved respect for human rights is essential to our program. It is a fundamental goal of US policy. Moreover, improved respect for human rights will help Peru's police and military earn the trust of the people and their elected government, thus strengthening democracy. Finally, seventh, the war on drugs will not be waged or won like Desert Storm. We need patience, long-term vision, and commitment to work steadily in our schools and streets, in the Caribbean where drugs are transported, and all the way to the Andean highlands where coca is grown. Next week, President Fujimori will arrive in Washington for an official working visit with President Bush. I know that many of you will have a chance to meet him, and you will see what those of us who work closely with Peru see on a regular basis--that he is a thoughtful, sincere, and highly determined President committed not just to fight poverty and drug trafficking but to lead Peru into a new historical era. In his inaugural address, he boldly decried Peru's system of "injustice." That was not just rhetoric. In 1 year in office, he has done more to advance the cause of human rights than all of his predecessors. President Fujimori gave civilian prosecutors access to police and military detention centers nationwide; he dismissed 246 majors, colonels, and generals from the national police; he invited the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to visit Peru in October; he began the first programs of human rights training for Army cadets and military officers; and he is revising both the military code of justice and the civilian penal code to create new prohibitions and penalties for human rights abuses. This is just a partial list of President Fujimori's actions. President Fujimori's actions have been equally bold in economic policy. He reduced the government payroll by 50,000 employees in 6 months, cut government spending from 10% of gross domestic product (GDP) to 8%, boosted government revenues from 4% to 8% of GDP, cut average tariffs from over 80% to 17%. Foreign ownership restrictions, commercial bank interest rate limits, and controls on foreign exchange remittances have all been lifted. President Fujimori has stated his personal determination to fight drug trafficking in addresses to the Peruvian people and Congress, and he has negotiated and signed four agreements with the United States which define a broad counter-narcotics program. President Fujimori is determined to make a difference, and we are committed to work with him.
Peru and the Andean Strategy
In February 1990, President Bush traveled to Cartagena, Colombia, for a summit with the presidents of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. This meeting was long overdue. For too long, producer and consumer nations allowed the drug problem to fester and grow, then we engaged in a sterile, finger- pointing debate over who is to blame. At Cartagena, we ended that debate and agreed on a common agenda to attack a problem that confronts us all. At home, demand for drugs is down, and cocaine prices are up. This seemingly paradoxical result can only be explained by the difficulties and increased risks drug dealers face in supplying the US market. In the United States, cocaine use is down 29% from 1988 levels. Drug-related medical emergencies are down 18%. Best of all as a sign for the future, current adolescent drug use decreased by 13% from 1988 to 1990, and adolescent cocaine use has fallen 49% over the same period. Young Americans are also changing their attitudes, increasingly saying they disapprove of drug use. This change in our youth mirrors societal changes. An estimated 40% fewer Americans use drugs now as compared to 1985. In the Andes, we also see positive results of our efforts to disrupt cocaine production and transportation networks. For the first time in a decade, the land area under coca cultivation in the Andes did not grow in 1990. The price coca farmers receive for their crop is down. In the Andes, coca leaves sell in hundred-pound units which brought prices as high as $200 as recently as 1987. Today, the high prices are in the $60-$80 range, and the price at times dips to $10, well below the estimated $30-$40 breakeven point. This reflects success in disrupting the cartels' production and transportation operations, which causes backups in the processing of cocaine and a glut of unprocessed coca. Our cooperation has been closest, and our work most advanced, in Colombia and Bolivia. Now we are prepared to build on those programs by greatly expanding our work in Peru. President Fujimori took office committed to combat[ing] cocaine production. In a speech to the Peruvian people last October, he said: "Peru produces more than 60% of the world's coca production. More than 200,000 peasant families--that is, approximately 1 million people--currently depend on coca production. This illegal and black market upsets the national economy and generates, in alliance with terrorism, a criminality that is increasing every day....We cannot think about overcoming our national crisis and attaining our economic and social development without the disappearance of the illegal production of coca leaves." From the first, President Fujimori has emphasized the need to provide legal, profitable economic alternatives for those who now make their livelihood in the coca economy. The small farmers who produce coca leaf receive as little as one dime for every coca dollar coming into Peru; this gives them an average yearly income under $2000. Most would welcome an economic alternative to the dangerous, high-risk, low-profit job of cultivating coca. No one knows what long-term health damage will by suffered by those who work with the highly toxic chemicals involved in cocaine processing. Moreover, as President Fujimori has said, "Very few Peruvians are happy earning their living at the cost of enslaving others with drugs." President Fujimori draws his expertise from his professional experience as an agronomist, and we agree with his belief that our strategy won't work if it doesn't provide for economic development. Starting last December, we worked with his government to reach agreements that met his concerns about the prominent role of economic development. On May 16, we signed an umbrella agreement to define the overall effort. President Fujimori addressed a joint session of the Peruvian Congress and called the agreement "another pillar on which a different Peru will be built." Later in May we signed a law enforcement annex, and, in July, we signed the military and economic assistance annexes to set out the terms of these programs in greater detail. To unify the Peruvian Government's counter-narcotics effort, President Fujimori will unite law enforcement, economic development, military, and health agencies under a single coordinating mechanism, the Autonomous Authority for Development Alternatives. Through a March 1990 agreement, we are already providing over $19 million in equipment and training to the Peruvian National Police to support counter-narcotics operations primarily in the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru. The center of this effort is the Santa Lucia counter-narcotics base. In the 1-year period ending in March 1991, the police have mounted air operations which have destroyed 150 labs, seized over five metric tons (mt) of coca paste, and disrupted trafficking networks based in the Upper Huallaga Valley. With support from the Peruvian military, we hope that the Peruvian national police will be able to extend their operations into areas currently held by insurgents.
The 1991 Aid Package
New resources from our 1991 aid package will extend the reach of existing counter-narcotics programs and add to the pressure narco- traffickers are now feeling. These resources will add significantly to work being done in Peru's Huallaga Valley, a vast underdeveloped area over twice the size of El Salvador. Coca accounts for three- fourths of the valley agriculture, and is integral to the economic survival of its half-million residents. In the past, cocaine producers have operated there with near-impunity. Their allies, the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas, control much of the land area and have effectively supplanted many local governing authorities. I will begin my discussion of our military aid programs by telling you what they are not. First, they are not a militarization of anti-drug efforts. Throughout Peru, and particularly in the Upper Huallaga Valley, both the drug traffickers and the insurgents have been heavily armed and violent for a long time. Sendero Luminoso has forced campesinos to abandon other crops and begin the cultivation of coca. In many areas, alternative development projects have been attacked and destroyed, and foreign and Peruvian development workers have been murdered. Sendero is one of the most brutal guerrilla groups in the world; its barbaric practices remind many of the notorious Khmer Rouge. Sendero Luminoso has long-targeted Peruvians in positions of civil authority such as mayors and police, suspected collaborators with the security forces, and those it finds to be tied to foreign "imperialism." Since 1980, 42 Peruvians working with US Government-supported development programs in the Upper Huallaga Valley have been killed. This year, Sendero has stepped up attacks on foreign development workers and projects. On May 18, Sendero killed an Australian nun, Sister Irene McCormick, who worked with Caritas, the Catholic charity. She was killed in a public execution in a village in the Department of Junin. On August 9, two Polish priests who worked with poor children were killed by Sendero in the Department of Ancash. On August 25, an Italian priest from the same diocese was executed. Three Japanese development workers were killed near Huaral on July 12; this and other attacks led the Japanese to withdraw most of their aid workers. I cite these cases to demonstrate the vital need to provide security for those who risk their lives in counter-narcotics operations, whether they involve economic development, coca eradication, or police work. The guerrilla threat is so formidable that only by working with the Peruvian military and police can security be provided. Our aid will give Peru's military more resources to challenge the narco-traffickers by controlling Peru's airspace and the roads in the Huallaga valley. Peru's military is asked to take on two armies, those of the guerrillas and those of the traffickers, without enough resources to keep its precious few helicopters flying and without funds to keep its soldiers in boots, and sometimes even lacking basic foodstuffs for military maneuvers. Second, our aid is not a back door attempt to get into a fight against Peru's insurgent groups. Both the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and Sendero Luminoso are violent and dangerous communist movements which are attempting to overthrow the constitutionally elected government of President Fujimori. We are ideologically opposed to both groups and find the ultra-violent tactics of Sendero Luminoso--perhaps the most brutal subversive group in the history of the hemisphere--to be singularly repugnant. While President Fujimori and his people deserve our sympathy and support in their fight to maintain democratic and constitutional government, we cannot assume their burden or make their battles with Sendero and MRTA our own. Third, our military assistance programs are not designed to attack coca growers; we have no plans which would support the Peruvian military or police [in] forcibly eradicating producing crops. On the contrary, we are working with the Peruvian military in a program which will eventually help the coca growers work in other crops and businesses. Part of the military assistance will go for civic action companies to help repair roads, repair or construct bridges, drill wells, offer some medical treatment, and otherwise improve the delivery of public services to the inhabitants of the Huallaga Valley. Because of the extensive Sendero presence in much of the Huallaga, much of this work cannot be done solely by ordinary construction firms. Military units will be required. Overall, this military assistance will be used to meet the goals President Bush articulated in the first National Drug Control Strategy in 1989, "to isolate the major coca-growing areas; to destroy cocaine hydrochloride processing labs; and to dismantle the trafficking organizations. . . ." Our economic aid program will support the counter-narcotics efforts by: -- Supporting the government's economic reform program which is key to changing incentives so that legal crops can better compete with coca in a dynamic and growing economy; -- Helping private businesses, especially small businesses and those that create new export products, to grow, create jobs, and earn foreign exchange; -- Providing opportunities for coca growers through support for legal crops, rehabilitation of the transportation network, and development of legal businesses to supply the agricultural sector and market its products; and by -- Helping build democratic institutions--especially the judicial system--to better protect human rights. As this program takes hold, it should have several effects which will benefit both our countries: -- The price of coca leaf should fall, making other crops more attractive; -- Improved security conditions should permit more development work--including the improvement of vitally needed road networks--to go forward, thus improving the prospects for alternative economic development; and -- The loss of revenues from drug trafficking should weaken the guerrillas just as they confront a stronger military and police presence.
Human Rights
Neither we nor President Fujimori will tell you that Peru does not have a serious human rights problem. The State Department's Human Rights Report for 1990 describes the situation clearly: The chief causes of human rights violations in Peru remain the terrorist activities of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) Maoist guerrillas and, secondarily, the government's difficulty in mounting a disciplined response. Security forces personnel were responsible for widespread and egregious violations. . . . Peruvian human rights observers have determined that Sendero is responsible for the majority of killings in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Human rights abuses by government security forces also increased in 1990, although independent investigations remained difficult to carry out due to fears of Sendero reprisals and because military commanders restrict access to emergency zones. Unfortunately, in the past, police and military abuses have included summary executions, torture, rape, arbitrary detention, and other offenses, often in the emergency zones where the security forces are struggling to contain guerrilla activity. Our human rights report details some of these cases. President Fujimori began to confront the problem of human rights abuse immediately after his inauguration, when he dismissed 246 officers of the Peruvian police. Since then, he has: -- Given civilian prosecutors full access to police and military installations nationwide, including in the emergency zones, to check conditions of detainees; -- Invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to visit Peru in October to assess the human rights situation. The Commission will visit detention centers, interview judges and human rights activists, and issue a comprehensive report; -- Begun the first program of human rights training for all army cadets in officers' training. This program is conducted by military officers, human rights experts affiliated with the Catholic Church and the International Committee of the Red Cross; -- Incorporated human rights instruction into training for military officers above cadet level; -- Initiated revision of the military code of justice to codify and emphasize human rights abuses; -- Adopted a new penal code for the first time in 60 years, which explicitly penalizes genocide and disappearances; -- Disciplined 61 members of the armed forces for abuse of authority and other crimes; -- Discharged 1,500 police officers in 1990 and 400 in 1991 for unethical conduct; -- Established an office of human rights within the joint chiefs of staff; -- Received international human rights groups such as Amnesty International and the World Council of Churches; -- Removed from command the non-commissioned army officer known as "Centurion"--he is now being prosecuted for suspected complicity in the Chilcahuaycco massacre; -- Resumed criminal proceedings against two army officers accused in the November 1988 killing of journalist Hugo Bustios; and -- Dismissed the police officers accused of the recent murder of three Lima students, Carlos Rodriguez and brothers Emilio and Rafael Gomez. The officers are awaiting trial for murder and their superiors are suspended pending review of their culpability. We have also received assurances from senior officials of the Peruvian Government that the International Committee of the Red Cross will soon have access to all military detention facilities. According to the United Nations, there were 340 disappearances in Peru from July of 1989 to July 1990. In the first year of the Fujimori Government--from July 1990 to 1991--that rate was cut by 70%. International human rights monitors have played a role in improving respect for human rights in Peru. But it would be a serious mistake to give foreigners the credit for actions that overwhelmingly reflect the initiative and courage of Peruvians, including Peru's courageous human rights community. As a candidate and as President, Fujimori has called for fair, even application of the rule of law and protection of basic rights from the abuse of state power. This message resonated with Peruvians, who in the past decade have seen the rule of law violated as never before in their history. Their sense of revulsion has created a political consensus for reform, and we see the past year's actions as the beginnings of a long-term effort to reassert a basic sense of justice. In all the objections I have heard raised against our involvement with Peru, I have seen no argument that the cocaine problem or human rights abuses would be reduced if we curtail our involvement. In fact, it is clear that if we withdraw to the sidelines, there will be less resources to combat both problems, and both will surely worsen.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, we are convinced that our aid to Peru is necessary to continue the progress that we have made to date in the war on drugs. It builds on a sound, comprehensive strategy. It will greatly add to the pressures narco-traffickers are already feeling in the Andes, and it will better enable us to work with Andean governments to bring coca growers into the legal economy. There is no short-term panacea to stop cocaine or guarantee human rights. But our efforts to engage seriously and effectively with President Fujimori will help his government continue the progress he has made in both areas. We welcome the attention you are giving this important program, and we urge your support. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 38, September 23, 1991 Title:


Date: Sep 23, 19919/23/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: North America Country: Mexico Subject: History, Trade/Economics, Democratization, Media/Telecommunications, Resource Management, Science/Technology, Environment [TEXT]
The Constitution of 1917 provides for a federal republic with powers separated into independent executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The executive is the dominant branch, with power vested in the President, who promulgates and executes the laws of the Congress. The President also legislates by executive decree in certain economic and financial fields, using powers delegated from the Congress. The President is elected by universal adult suffrage for a 6-year term and may not hold office a second time. There is no Vice President; in the event of the removal or death of the President, a provisional president is elected by the Congress. The next presidential election will be held in August 1994. The Mexican Congress is empowered to legislate on all matters pertaining to the national government. Congress is composed of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Consecutive reelection to the Congress is prohibited; 64 senators, 2 from each state and the Federal District (Mexico City), are elected to 6-year terms. Deputies serve 3-year terms. Under constitutional and legislative reforms adopted in 1986, the Chamber of Deputies was enlarged in 1988 from 400 to 500 members. In the expanded lower chamber, 300 deputies are directly elected to represent single- member districts, and 200 are selected on an at-large basis by a modified form of proportional representation. The 200 at-large seats were created to give the opposition parties more of a voice in the Chamber of Deputies. For more than 60 years, Mexico's Government has been controlled by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has won every presidential and most gubernatorial races. To secure its continuance in power, the PRI has relied on extensive patronage and massive government and party organizational resources. Following federal elections in 1988, six parties gained representation in the Chamber of Deputies and two in the Senate-- the latter a first in Mexican history. The combined opposition won an unprecedented 237 seats out of a total of 500 in the lower house and 4 of 64 in the upper. In municipal elections held through December 1989, the government recognized several opposition victories by both left-of-center and right-of-center parties. In the state of Michoacan, for example, the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution won almost half of the state's municipalities, including the state's capital and most populous city, Morelia. In midterm elections held in August 1991, the PRI bounced back with a major victory. It increased its representation to 320 in the Chamber of Deputies, won numerous local and municipal offices, and, based on official figures released, appeared to have won five gubernatorial contests; one gubernatorial race will be recontested. The judiciary is divided into federal and state court systems, with federal courts having jurisdiction over most civil cases and those involving major felonies. Under the constitution, trial and sentencing must be completed within 12 months of arrest for crimes that would carry at least a 2-year sentence. Trial is by judge, not jury, in nearly all criminal cases. Defendants have a right to counsel, and public defenders are available. Other rights include defense against self-incrimination, the right to confront one's accusers, and the right to a public trial. Supreme Court justices are appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. Mexico's armed forces in 1991 numbered about 170,000. The army makes up about three-fourths of the total. One year of limited training is required of all males reaching age 18. A paramilitary force of communal landholders is maintained in the countryside. Principal military roles include narcotics control, maintenance of public order, and civic action assignments such as road-building and disaster relief. Military expenditures constituted about 0.4% of GDP in 1990.
Political Conditions
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari began his 6-year term in 1988. Salinas, who received a Ph.D. from Harvard, was Secretary of Programing and Budget in the de la Madrid Administration (1982- 88), where he played a prominent role in formulating economic policy. Significant themes of the Salinas Administration have included facilitating economic recovery by adopting market- oriented economic policies, lowering inflation and reducing the foreign debt burden, pursuing a free trade agreement with the US and Canada, opening the political system, combating narcotics trafficking, bolstering environmental protection, and curtailing corruption and human right abuse.
The Mexican Government has taken bold steps in recent years to restructure the economy. Monetary and fiscal discipline and a wage/price stabilization program have reduced inflation from more than 150% in 1987 to 10% for the first half of 1991. With the acceleration of market-oriented reforms, Mexico's real GDP growth rate went from 2% in 1987 to 4% in 1990. The Mexican economy has gradually decreased its dependence on petroleum exports, which accounted for 34% of 1990 exports, down from 75% in 1982. The government has taken steps to put public finance on a sound footing through privatization and deregulation of state-owned companies, elimination of subsidies to inefficient industries, dramatic reduction of tariff rates, and shrinking the overall financial deficit from nearly 17% of GDP in 1987 to a projected 2% of GDP in 1991. In 1982, the Mexican Government owned 1,155 parastatal enterprises; by late 1990, the number had dropped to 452. Real short-term interest rates were down to about 9% in mid- 1991 from 30% a year earlier. In addition, in 1989 Mexico was the first country to participate in a US-sponsored plan, the "Brady Plan," to help developing countries reduce their foreign debt to foreign commercial banks. This helped reduce Mexico's foreign debt from a high of $107 billion in 1987 to about $93 billion in 1990. This has further restored business confidence and sparked a return of expatriated capital. One of the Mexican Government's most important initiatives is a proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the US and Canada, as well as similar agreements with several Latin American neighbors. The NAFTA is part of President Bush's Enterprise for the America's Initiative, which envisions a hemispheric-wide system of free trade. Mexico's economic growth is vital to its political prospects, thus of great interest to the United States. Mexico's economy also has a substantial and direct impact on US border communities. Our close economic interrelationship is important to the stability and growth of both countries. Mexico is our third-ranked trading partner, purchasing two-thirds of its imports and sending two- thirds of its exports here. Chief US exports to Mexico are motor vehicle parts, office equipment, and agricultural products; top imports from Mexico include petroleum, cars, piston engines, and coffee. The US is the source of two-thirds of direct foreign investment in Mexico. Both US exports and investment have increased as Mexico has progressively opened its economy.
Mexico's agrarian reform program began more than 50 years ago; lands have been distributed to hitherto landless farmers. By now, almost all available land has been distributed. Raising the productivity and living standards of subsistence farmers has been slow, however, due to poor soils and a burgeoning rural population. Nevertheless, increased production of basic crops, such as corn and beans, has been stressed by the government. Emphasis is also given to export crops such as coffee, tomatoes, and winter vegetables. The government hopes to revitalize food production by extending its economic reform program to the agricultural sector. After several years of stagnant agricultural production, improved weather conditions in 1990 helped boost Mexico's production of corn, sorghum, and beans. On the other hand, rice and soybean production fell, as farmers shifted toward more profitable crops.
Minerals and Energy Resources
Mexico is rich in mineral and energy resources, and mineral exports are an important element in foreign trade. A leading producer of silver, sulfur, lead, and zinc, Mexico also produces gold, copper, manganese, coal, and iron ore. The discovery of extensive oil fields in the coastal regions along the Gulf of Mexico in 1974 enabled Mexico to become self-sufficient in crude oil and to export significant amounts. With crude oil production averaging 3 million barrels per day during 1990, Mexico ranks as the world's fifth largest oil producer. About half of the oil is refined and consumed domestically, leaving the remainder for export. Proven oil reserves total 45 billion barrels, about 7% of the world's proven reserves. Total hydrocarbon reserves, including natural gas, are estimated at 67 billion barrels.
Manufacturing and Foreign Investment
During 1990, Mexico's manufacturing sector accounted for about one-fourth of the GDP and nearly 52% of exports. It grew by 5% during that year. Important gains have been made in the production of cement, aluminum, synthetic fibers, chemicals, fertilizers, petrochemicals, and paper. A growing automobile industry has become one of Mexico's most important industrial and export sectors. Approvals for foreign investment in 1990 exceeded $4 billion, up from the 1989 total of $3 billion. The Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development in 1989 announced sweeping revisions of Mexico's foreign investment regulations. Among the most important of these is the explicit permission for foreigners to have majority ownership in companies. This is, in effect, a reversal of the intent of the 1973 Foreign Investment Law which in most cases limited foreign ownership to 49%. The government also has announced that special trust funds will be set up to liberalize foreign access to the Mexican stock market. Key sectors of the economy remain restricted to Mexicans or the state, including energy, power generation, and railroads.
Transportation and Communications
Mexico's land transportation network is one of the most extensive in Latin America. The 36,000 kilometers of railroads are government owned. Tampico and Veracruz on the Gulf of Mexico are Mexico's two major ports, although the government is developing additional ports on the Gulf of Mexico and on the Pacific as well. A number of international airlines serve Mexico, with direct or connecting flights from most major cities in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Japan. Most Mexican regional capitals and resorts have direct air links with Mexico or the United States. The Salinas Administration is attempting to enhance transportation through modernization of infrastructure and services, deregulation and development of more efficient intermodal transport, and privatization in all sectors except as constitutionally restricted. Mexico has a well-developed telecommunications system, with its own satellites, hundreds of television stations, more than 1,000 radio stations, and a number of satellite receiver stations. Mexico is a member of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT). In 1990, the communications sector grew by 16%. A major development during that year was the privatization of the national telephone company, Telefonos de Mexico (TELMEX), with one-fifth of the shares going to private owners.
Principal Government Officials
President--Carlos SALINAS de Gortari Foreign Minister--Fernando SOLANA Morales Ambassador to the US--Gustavo PETRICIOLI Iturbe Ambassador to the UN--Jorge MONTANO Martinez Ambassador to the OAS--Santiago ONATE Laborde (###)
International Boundary and Water Commission
Preceded by several short-term commissions to survey and mark the boundary after its creation in 1848 and modification in 1853, the International Boundary Commission was established as a permanent joint commission by treaty in 1889. The Water Treaty of 1944 extended its authority to the land boundary and added to its responsibilities boundary water problems then becoming more important. The 1944 treaty renamed the body the Intenational Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico (IBWC). It also required that the US and Mexican comissioners be engineers. The IBWC has a wide range of responsibilities and specific programs for solution of US-Mexican water and boundary problems. These include distribution between the two countries of the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande; joint operation of international dams on the Rio Grande to control floods, conserve waters, and generate electricity; other joint flood control works along boundary rivers; solution of border water quality control problems; and stabilization of the river boundaries. These responsibilities and programs are carried out in accordance with various treaties and agreements. The IBWC has successfully resolved many difficult and longstanding problems. For example, the Chamizal Settlement of 1963 resolved a 100-year-old dispute at El Paso/Ciudad Juarez by exchange of territory and rechanneling the Rio Grande. A permanent solution to the international problem related to the salinity of the Colorado River was reached in 1973. Since the early 1980s, the IBWC has focused on troublesome border sanitation problems and has been studying groundwater resources along the boundary. (###)