US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 34, August 26, 1991

Title:

Conflict in the Soviet Union

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from remarks during a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium Date: Aug 21, 19918/21/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization [TEXT] We meet today because a small group of men has undertaken an unconstitutional, anti-democratic, and misguided coup in the Soviet Union. The constitutionally chosen President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, has been forcibly removed from office. Martial law has been declared, and tanks and troops roam the streets of the Soviet Union. We must be clear: This is not an East-West conflict. This is a conflict between the peoples of the Soviet Union and a small, illegitimate group. But these events have grave implications for the entire international community's overall relations with the Soviet Union. And as such, it requires a response on our part. With you today, let me discuss what the United States believes are the aims of the coup's leaders; the implications internally of their illegitimate act; and the steps we can take individually and collectively to deny the coup legitimacy and to support the restoration of constitutional rule and the resumption of democratic reform in the Soviet Union.
The Context
The timing of this coup was no accident. It came 1 day before several republics, including the Russian Republic, were to sign the new union treaty. These same conspirators had failed just months ago in their attempt to foil this process by constitutional means. This then was their last opportunity to salvage the remnants of the old system.
Internal Implications
Their agenda is predictable. They intend to maintain the old union, by force if required, and reassert the center's control over political and economic life. They will seek to stop and reverse the process of devolution that has been rushing forward since the April 23 signing of the "Nine-Plus-One" accord. There are several areas where the potential for widespread violence is great in the near term, most obviously in Moscow and the Baltics, where tensions are already high and people are committed to defending their hopes and aspirations for independence. The coup makers count among their numbers the leaders of all the key institutions of repression and control in Soviet society. Five years ago this would have been enough to guarantee their success. But today, as a result of glasnost and perestroika, there are new power centers in the mix that make the outcome much less certain--the democratically elected governments in most of the key republics and the societies that support them. Over the long term, tanks and diktats cannot solve the Soviet Union's real problems. The peoples of the Soviet Union have tasted the fruits of freedom. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to put the freedom genie back in the bottle. As President Havel [of Czechoslovakia] said Monday [August 19], "The wheel of history cannot turn backwards." An Agenda for Action This then is the context in which we should set out policy. President Bush has made clear that at this point we believe the immediate aim of the international community should be to work to deny legitimacy to the coup. They have no legitimacy at home. They should have no legitimacy abroad. As President Bush said Tuesday [August 20], "There will not be normal relations with the United States as long as this illegal coup remains in effect." We need to make it clear to them that this is 1991, not 1931, and that short-term power may flow from the barrel of a gun, but short- and long-term legitimacy flows from the will of the people. A common policy can be build around five elements: One, denying the coup legitimacy; Two, supporting democratic forces in the Soviet Union; Three, maintaining our commitment to the fundamental principles that have heretofore guided our policy to the Soviet Union; Four, setting out clear positions toward Soviet foreign policy; and Five, organizing unified international support behind this policy. Let me discuss each in turn.
Denying Legitimacy
As the President has made clear, we intend to avoid actions that would lend legitimacy or support to this coup. We do not intend to recognize the coup makers as the legitimate rulers of the Soviet Union. And we have put on hold our economic assistance programs to the central government for so long as these extra-constitutional measures continue. We applaud the European Community's efforts in freezing assistance. We should use NATO as a forum for ongoing consultations on this issue, with a view to achieving as common an approach as possible.
Supporting the Democrats
We should also declare our support for democratically elected leaders and our opposition to the use of force or intimidation to suppress them. With regard to the Baltics, let me stress that we will continue our support for the democratically elected governments in Tallinn [Estonia], Riga [Latvia], and Vilnius [Lithuania]. In particular, we must be on guard against actions by the conspirators to move against the Baltics while everyone is focused on events in Moscow proper.
Upholding Our Principles
In this situation of such fluidity, we must maintain commitment to those principles which have long guided our policy toward the Soviet Union. As President Bush stated Monday [see Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 33], democracy and openness in the Soviet Union have made a critical contribution toward improvements in East-West relations during the past few years. We believe we should continue to press publicly for continuation of reform, including democratization, respect for human rights, and peaceful conciliation between the center and republics. Adhering to these principles during the early days of this situation may have only limited effects on the events in Moscow. But we should not underestimate our influence. Over time, as we have consistently seen through the Helsinki process, high standards embolden democratic reformers and wear down authoritarian regimes.
Implications for Soviet Foreign Policy
We also need to send some specific signals in terms of Soviet foreign policy. As I said, we do not conceive of this as an East- West conflict. In this regard, we in the West should give no pretext for anyone in the Soviet Union to argue or believe there is danger of an external threat. But politically, we all need to make it very clear that the alliance and the international community as a whole expect the Soviet Union to strictly live up to its agreements. This should include not only agreements that have been ratified, but also agreements the Gorbachev Government signed. While denying the coup legitimacy, we remain committed to an arms control process broadly defined for the simple fact that it is in the West's interest, irrespective of who is in charge in Moscow. In other areas, for example in the Middle East, even while the Soviet role may be in doubt, we are as determined as ever to promote peace among the parties in the region.
Implications for Central and Eastern Europe
While the coup has massive consequences for everyone, no one feels those potential consequences more plainly than the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Above all, we should, collectively and independently, reassure the Central and Eastern Europeans and make clear our support for their governments and peoples, for the reform processes on which they are so courageously embarked, and for the peace and security of the region. President Bush has done this through calls to the leaders of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. We applaud the EC's [European Community] decision to accelerate the process of achieving associate membership. This Council should come out with a clear statement in support of continued democracy, reform, and independence in Central and Eastern Europe. For our part, we are also reviewing further concrete ways in which we can bolster the processes of economic and political reform in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, we should consider collective efforts to aid Czechoslovakia in building a new oil pipeline between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Not only would this make economic sense, but strategically and politically it would support Czechoslovakian independence. It would allow the Czechoslovaks, who have neither a port nor a pipeline for easy energy access, to connect to Western energy sources. This would greatly reduce their dependence on Soviet energy resources and lessen the impact of scarce energy supplies on their reforms.
Organizing Unified International Support
Finally , we need to put our new CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] mechanisms to work to maintain international standards of human rights, law, and peace. The first order of business is the position the alliance should take toward CSCE activities. I have three suggestions which I hope we all can support together. First, the United States believes the alliance should support the European Community's opinion that "until such time that constitutional order and democratic freedoms will have been restored, participation in the meeting in Moscow of the Conference on the Human Dimension in the framework of CSCE cannot be justified." That said, CSCE must continue to serve as a major international platform from which we can galvanize international support. Second, we call for immediate convening of a CSCE Emergency Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials. This will signal to the Soviet leadership the gravity with which we view this situation and their accountability to CSCE standards. This will help us support an international consensus and also bring the Central and Eastern Europeans into discussions of this issue. Third, the decrees of the coup leaders have suspended the rights to association, freedom of expression, and formation of political parties endorsed in the CSCE Copenhagen document. We intend immediately to invoke the CSCE Human Dimension Mechanism to raise the profile of this issue. Beyond this, we plan to work bilaterally and through NATO, CSCE, and other multilateral bodies to promote an international consensus behind our common policy. Together, we can help build and sustain an international consensus in support of democracy and reform.
Conclusion
In closing, let us agree here today to send two simple messages. To the leaders of the coup, we say: The whole world is watching. Legitimacy in 1991 flows not from the barrel of a gun but from the will of people. History cannot be reversed. Sooner or later, your effort will fail. So avoid bloodshed and civil war, order Soviet military forces back to their barracks, renounce the state of emergency, and restore President Gorbachev to power. To the Soviet peoples, the peoples of the Baltics, and the forces of democracy, we say: The Iron Curtain is gone, and the whole world watches. You, each man, woman, and child, are the true power in the new Soviet Union. History goes forward. Stand with courage and stand for freedom, and the world stands with you.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 34, August 26, 1991 Title:

Democracy Must be Vigilant

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Opening statement at a news conference following the NATO ministerial meeting, Brussels, Belgium Date: Aug 21, 19918/21/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization [TEXT] Let me start by saying that from the outset, America's position toward these events in the Soviet Union has been straightforward: that is, that only the Soviet peoples--freely, peacefully, and cooperatively--can determine their future. Tanks and diktats cannot solve the Soviet Union's real problems. The peoples of that country have tasted the fruits of freedom. And it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get the freedom genie back in the bottle. In the last few hours, we have heard reports and rumors which indicate that the coup may well fail. As I said earlier, we do not have confirmation of all of these reports. It's a very fast moving situation, and things are still in a certain degree of flux. But it would appear that events are at least for now moving in a positive direction. We continue to hope that this will end in a clear and positive result. These recent developments in the Soviet Union will prompt the Soviet peoples--and the international community, I think--to remember one central fact, and that is that democracy must be vigilant. So all who value democracy in the Soviet Union should continue their efforts until the coup is clearly defeated. These efforts should continue until such time as there is a return to constitutional government, democratic and constitutional practices again are in effect, and military and security forces are under the strict control of legitimate political authorities. The first order of business once these objectives are achieved should be the resumption of the process of forming a new, democratic union. The courageous resistance of the Baltic peoples has again shown their commitment to independence, a goal which the United States will continue to support. If, indeed, this coup does fail, it will be a great victory for the courageous Soviet peoples who have tasted freedom and who are not prepared to have it taken from them. It would also be a victory for the principles of democracy and fundamental human rights. Events in Moscow, Leningrad, and in the Baltic states demonstrate that these are, indeed, universal values. I think it would also, to some extent, be a victory, too, for the international community and for all of those governments which reacted strongly to these events. It is a demonstration--would be a demonstration--of the power of international opinion and of a free press with a global reach. Finally, this crisis has demonstrated, I think, the importance of our NATO alliance: First, as a political instrument for supporting democracy and reform in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union. Second, as a forum to coordinate a Western response to common political as well as military challenges; and Third, as a firm bulwark for our common security, one which permits all its members to respond to crises of this sort calmly, firmly, and effectively. If this coup, indeed, fails, it will be because the fundamental principles and democratic values which this alliance has defended for over 40 years have now planted themselves firmly in the soil of our former adversary. And that, of course, is for the good of all. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 34, August 26, 1991 Title:

New Opportunities in Hemispheric Trade

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Address following the MERCOSUR Four-Plus-One roundtable discussion, Buenos Aires, Argentina Date: Aug 6, 19918/6/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Crete, Argentina Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] Mr. Minister, Secretary Mosbacher, ambassadors, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: As most of you know, Secretary of Commerce Bob Mosbacher and several chief executive officers of US companies are here with me on a 5-day trip to Latin America. I wish we could visit all of your countries, but unfortunately time is short and we cannot. I am pleased to be here in Buenos Aires and to welcome our friends from Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. We had a good meeting this morning. As I met with President Menem earlier this morning, I said our objective was to create new opportunities. Hopefully someday, looking back on the 1990s, we will call it a decade of opportunity. This is my eighth trip to Latin America as Vice President. I am not here speaking as one man--on behalf of President Bush, I am here to extend the hand of partnership to our friends and neighbors to the south. We are gathered here at an exciting time, as we work toward regional and hemispheric integration. The Southern Cone Common Market, the MERCOSUR, is fast becoming a reality. Our long-term goal is to turn our hemisphere into the world's largest free-trading zone--and MERCOSUR is an important step in that direction. Europe is working toward an EC '92 with new economic cooperation. Asia is promoting the idea of more economic cooperation through APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]. So it is quite obvious and logical for us in the Western Hemisphere to concentrate on some new economic thinking of our own. That is why, through President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, we are trying to strengthen the Americas' economic integration, as we move toward a free trade zone--a free trade zone extending from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego--to bring new jobs, more investment opportunities, better products, and yes, prosperity for all our people. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative encourages trade, stimulates investment, and seeks to reduce the region's official debt. During a recent trip to Washington, President Menem said this, talking about the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, and I quote him: "We consider this not as a proposal of a philanthropic nature, based on a false paternalism....nor does it grow out of strategic military considerations....On the contrary, it is an ambitious business proposition....Latin America is considered this time as a new entity, as a valid interlocutor able to talk in terms of mutual interests." We have certainly seen great progress since the EAI was first announced in June of last year. We have signed 10 bilateral trade and investment framework agreements, and a regional framework accord--the Rose Garden agreement--with the four MERCOSUR countries. We are currently negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico. The Inter-American Development Bank already has approved its first investment sector loan. These loans will help Latin America compete for capital while fostering reforms that foster economic growth. Our proposal for a $1.5 billion multilateral investment fund has made a strong beginning. Japan has pledged $100 million for each of the next 5 years, for a total of $500 million. Canada, France, Portugal, and Spain have also expressed interest in supporting the fund. This fund will provide assistance for countries that undertake the difficult reforms required to attract investment and stimulate competitive free enterprise. President Bush's proposal for debt reduction also is off to what I think, and I hope you concur, is an encouraging start. In June, Chile became the first country to benefit from the EAI's official debt-reduction program. Its eligible PL-480 [Food for Peace Program] debt, totaling $39 million, is being reduced by 40%. In addition, four nations have already negotiated substantial reductions in commercial debt through the provisions of the Brady Plan. We hope that other nations, including the MERCOSUR countries, will take advantage of the plan by adopting economic reform agendas. The US business leaders with me today have a deep interest in assessing firsthand the investment potential of the MERCOSUR countries. We are here to see up close this new era for Latin America. We are all Americans, and we need to think in terms of what we can do for the Americas--North and South. We are here to open up the doors of opportunity and trade. Protection of intellectual property will be crucial to MERCOSUR's goal of stimulating investment. The protection of intellectual property rights should be a priority of MERCOSUR. Investors will hedge if they are unconvinced about the protection of their patents and copyrights on products--and, quite frankly, you can't blame them. In dismantling the trade barriers that have separated us, we should build upon the example of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. In our bilateral free trade agreement with Canada and our current negotiations with Mexico, the United States has scrupulously adhered to GATT standards. Within the Uruguay Round, we have joined our Latin American and Caribbean allies in trying to pull down protectionist barriers in Europe and Asia, and we strongly encourage you, our MERCOSUR partners, to follow similar standards in moving toward economic integration; because any regional arrangement that turns in a protectionist direction will simply be self-defeating. The United States' goal of a free trade zone with Canada and Mexico--encompassing 360 million consumers, and economies that generate more than $6 trillion in annual output--will set the stage for something that is even more dramatic: a free trade zone encompassing the entire Western Hemisphere. This is a compelling and timely vision, a vision that will allow us to link our many nations, with our diverse cultures, work forces, and creative talents, for the good of all. Yet, President Bush's initiative is more than just an economic vision. Our vision is even more profoundly a political vision--a human vision--of freedom and democracy. This initiative is truly a declaration of independence for the peoples of our hemisphere. It offers a vision of our people living in freedom, governed by democratically elected public servants, and making their own economic choices in a free and competitive marketplace. This is the vision we are all advancing today. We are indeed living at a unique moment in the history of our hemisphere. For perhaps the first time, the United States and Latin America share a common vision of a democratic and free society, with a free market economy. Now, we must act to make our common vision our common destiny. In conclusion, let me just say that Latin America holds tremendous strategic importance for the United States. With 450 million people and a combined gross national product of $823 billion, this region is the natural partner for North America. That is why the United States places such high importance in the peaceful and democratic evolution occurring in this hemisphere. Our peoples share a long and rich cultural heritage, but it is the future that has brought us here today; and as we look to the year 2000 and beyond, the old bi-polar world is passing away. A new era is dawning, one marked by the dynamism of emerging powers, including some in this great continent. The Americas, North and South, are destined to shape the future together. That is why the United States will never be indifferent as the nations of Latin America struggle to consolidate democracy and to foster open growing economies. We want you to succeed, and we will help you succeed. Together we are creating something the world has never seen: the first completely democratic hemisphere. Together we will confront the challenges of the post-Cold War world--the challenge of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, stopping narco-trafficking, and preserving our natural environment. At the conclusion of our roundtable meeting this morning, a question was raised about the future of the Americas and whether we are on an irreversible course. And I assured the gentleman that yes, in my view, we are indeed on an irreversible course. Let's face it, communism is dead. New attitudes are evident throughout Latin America. Gone are the days of slogans viewing the region as "us versus them." Gone are the dictatorships that bottled up the creative energies of so many of our hemisphere's peoples. Gone is the feeling of despair that marked these societies for so long. Instead, a new era is here, bringing with it an irreversible attitude of "we Americans," North and South; "we Americans," building on our common values. And as Americans, we do not have to look back to the old ways. We are all democracies, and we all have hope for a bright future. My grandfather was a newspaper publisher. He passed away not too many years ago. He told me that the reason the United States is a great country is that it is free. I think I can take my grandfather's thought one step further, and say that Latin America is great because Latin America is free. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 34, August 26, 1991 Title:

Democracy in Haiti

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Address before the National Assembly of Haiti, Port Au Prince, Haiti Date: Aug 9, 19918/9/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Haiti Subject: Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Mr. President of the National Assembly, Mr. President of the Chamber of Deputies, members of the National Assembly, members of the press, honored guests: it is a great honor for me today to address the members of the national legislature of the Republic of Haiti. It is an equally great honor to address the people whom you represent, the citizens of the second oldest republic in our hemisphere. To President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to the members of this democratic institution, and to all Haitians, I bring warm greetings from the President of the United States of America, George Bush, and from the American people. I was last in Haiti on August 9, 1990--exactly 1 year ago today. On my last visit, I applauded Haiti's commitment to democratic change. My message then was, "No coups, no murder, no threats, and, instead, free and fair elections that will bring honor to the brave people of Haiti." Today, 1 historic year later, I bring another message. To the brave people of Haiti, I say: "Welcome. Welcome for the first time, and finally, to the great family of the democracies." Welcome to the extraordinary revolution of liberty which is sweeping the world, throwing off the dismal legacy of dictatorship and tyranny, and--at last--unlocking the human potential of all citizens to make their own choices, in the voting booth and in the marketplace. President Bush has asked me to come here today to recognize one of the world's most inspiring struggles for human dignity and to honor one of its most resounding victories: the election of December 16, 1990. These were the first free, peaceful, and unquestionably legitimate elections in Haiti's history. To the provisional government of President Trouillot, to the armed forces of the Republic of Haiti, to the electoral council, to the courageous voters of this country, and to all who confronted the enemies of change, America says, if I may borrow a phrase from your language, Bat bravo ("Congratulations"). America salutes all those who are guiding this country along the path of democracy--the President of the Republic, Jean- Bertrand Aristide, Prime Minister Rene Preval and his cabinet, the senators and deputies, and all the elected officers who serve the Haitian people. Bound together by our mutual commitments to constitutional democracy, human rights, social justice, and free enterprise, America joins Haiti in pledging a rebirth in the relationship between our two nations--a relationship of "honor and respect." To ensure that Haitians never again suffer tyranny, you have adopted one of the world's most rigorous and precise constitutions. Through this constitution, you have chosen to restrain the powers of government, to share these powers among three branches of government, to guarantee the political and economic freedoms of your citizens, and to decentralize power through local assemblies. We are confident that, if animated by a tolerance of pluralism and a spirit of good will, if respected by the people and their elected representatives, if allowed to work in accord with the rule of law, the institutions provided for in your constitution will deliver on democracy's promise of order, justice, and prosperity. Only then can the people of Haiti be truly confident of full respect for their human rights, and the phrase "never again" will become a reality. As so many other nations in this hemisphere are discovering, a free and competitive market is the ally of democratic change and social justice. I know the Haitian people to be industrious, inventive, and enterprising, even in the face of harsh and tragic living conditions. As merchants and farmers, as "Madam Saras," as artisans, and as industrialists, free enterprise is your calling. Liberating the economic energies of Haitians means freedom for enterprising citizens to compete fairly within the established rules of business. It means removing bureaucratic and societal barriers to their enterprise. And it means providing security of ownership for the thousands of small businesses and farmers that are the backbone of this country's economy. Taken together, greater endeavors by the government in the essential areas of justice, security, education, health, and infrastructure--in partnership with private enterprise and non- governmental organizations--will go far to promote the just and prosperous community which represents the potential and promise of Haiti. In today's rapidly changing world, more and more nations are turning to free trade and investment to create more and better jobs, to lower prices, and to supply the goods and services required to sustain economic progress. New patterns of trade and investment are rapidly emerging around the world. The European Economic Community, the North American Free Trade Association, and other regional associations from the Caribbean to the Andes, to the Southern Cone--are all examples of this trend. In our hemisphere, only Cuba seems determined to block out the revolution of political and economic freedom that is changing the face of the world. But Haiti has embraced the dynamic path of change. These changes confront Haiti with important challenges, but even greater opportunities. I would encourage you to consider the advantages of President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. We invite you to join with us in negotiating a framework agreement on trade and investment--as have all but a handful of nations in this hemisphere. Foreign aid constitutes an important complement to trade and investment. In the long run, however, such assistance can never be more than a temporary--and modest--measure. Foreign aid cannot substitute for sound economic policies and fiscal restraint. Nor can it substitute for the long-lasting jobs, revenues, and foreign exchange which the private sector creates through trade and investment. The Government of President Aristide, only 6 months in office, is undertaking profound and sustained reforms in public administration and economic policy. It has also significantly stepped up its counter-narcotics efforts, with impressive results already this year. We salute the courage of your government and legislators for the difficult but essential measures you have adopted thus far. We pledge support for a vigorous fight against narcotics as well as policies that encourage efficiency, investment, and free trade. We pledge our fullest efforts to facilitate Haiti's access to American capital and markets. We are confident that the friends of Haitian democracy will help ease the adjustments you are making in your country's economic life and make the burden of these difficult economic decisions easier to bear. For as we Americans have learned in our own pursuit of the democratic dream for over 200 years, no democratic nation ever stands alone. You have honored me by inviting me to address you today. Trust the citizens of the United States of America to be your partner in this process, along with other friends of democracy. For, as I said here in Haiti exactly 1 year ago, and repeat today: "The Bush Administration, and the American people, want to assist you to achieve the historic task that lies before you." Let me close with what I understand is a Haitian saying: "No two times without a third time." That means I'll be back. Finally, let me close by citing another Haitian proverb: "With many hands the load is lighter." (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 34, August 26, 1991 Title:

US-Mauritian Relations

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from remarks upon departure of Mauritian Prime Minister Jugnauth, Washington, DC Date: Jun 5, 19916/5/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Mauritius Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] Mr. Prime Minister, it is an honor for us--our whole team, all of us- -to welcome you to the White House on this, your first official visit to Washington. . . . Your visit comes at a time of tremendous change--for my country and yours--and for all the world. We've seen a new faith in freedom sweep the globe--it's taking hold on every continent. This new "discovery" of free enterprise and free government across Africa vindicates the path that Mauritius has followed since the very first days of its independence. On the island of Mauritius, democracy has deep roots. Pluralism flourishes in a free and open multiparty system. And the free market is widely recognized as the engine of growth and development. Mr. Prime Minister, under your leadership Mauritius has experienced almost a decade of unprecedented economic growth. The challenge for Mauritius now is to diversify its economy--to ease the exclusive dependence on the export of one product--and I'm pleased that we had a chance to talk about that today. The key is creating a pro-investment climate--and here, Mauritius has made a strong beginning with its Export Processing Zone [EPZ]. Gross earnings generated by the zone, this EPZ, now surpass earnings from Mauritius' traditionally dominant sugar industry. The EPZ is responsible almost single-handedly for slashing unemployment, providing the people of Mauritius with new opportunity and new hope. Mr. Prime Minister, let me repeat here what I said in our meetings today. The United States applauds the course you have chosen. We stand ready to help. We will tailor our assistance programs to meet Mauritius' new needs, to help your nation develop new markets and industries. But we know that government-to- government programs alone cannot unlock your nation's tremendous potential for growth. So we must build ties between our private sectors. And I am pleased that this September, the Agency for International Development and OPIC--our Overseas Private Investment Corporation--plan an investment mission to Mauritius to develop promising opportunities for American industry. Under the terms of the Lome Convention, Mauritius does enjoy access to European markets, to the Middle East and Asia, and, of course, to the continent of Africa. Geography has made Mauritius a gateway to growth. There is every reason that Mauritius--the "star of the Indian Ocean"--can turn its potential to prosperity in the years ahead. In addition to the issues of increased trade and investment, I reviewed with Prime Minister Jugnauth world affairs of urgent concern--in particular, our common security concerns in the Indian Ocean. I stressed the tremendous value to Mauritius, to its neighboring nations, to the international community as a whole--of the American military presence in the region, as demonstrated so clearly in Operation Desert Storm. We talked about the Middle East. We talked about the continent of Africa. And from our view, sir, this was a far-reaching and very constructive dialogue that we had here today. Our two peoples are separated by thousands of miles, but we are linked across that vast distance by a common faith in freedom-- and by that faith, to a common future as friends. So once again, sir, it has been my real pleasure to welcome you and your able assistants--your teammates here--to the White House and to Washington. May God bless you all. And thanks for coming our way.....(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 34, August 26, 1991 Title:

Country Profile: Mauritius

Date: Aug 26, 19918/26/91 Category: Country Data Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Mauritius Subject: History, Democratization, Trade/Economics Official Name: Mauritius
Geography
Area: 1,865 sq. km. (720 sq. mi.) about the size of Rhode Island. Cities: Capital--Port Louis (pop. 137,570). Other cities--Beau Bassin and Rose Hill (92,217), Curepipe (63,336), Vacoas-Phoenix (54,594), Quatre Bornes (64,085). Terrain: Volcanic island surrounded by coral reefs. A central plateau is rimmed by mountains. Climate: Tropical; cyclone season December-April.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Mauritian(s). Population (1990): About 1 million. Avg. annual growth rate (1990): 1.8%. Ethnic groups: Indo-Mauritians 68%, Creoles 27%, Sino-Mauritians 3%, Franco-Mauritians 2%. Religions: Hindu, Muslim, Roman Catholic. Languages: English (official); Creole, French, Hindi, Urdu, Hakka, Bhojpuri. Education: Years compulsory--none. Attendance (primary school)--virtually universal. Literacy--94%. Health: Infant mortality rate--21/1,000. Life expectancy--male 66 yrs.; female 73 yrs. Work force (1990, 335,000): Government services--29%. Agriculture and fishing--27%. Manufacturing-- 22%. Other--22%.
Government
Type: Parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch, Queen Elizabeth II. Independence: March 12, 1968. Constitution: March 12, 1968. Branches: Executive--Queen of Mauritius (chief of state), prime minister (head of government). Legislative--unicameral Legislative Assembly. Judicial--Supreme Court. Administrative subdivisions: Nine. Major political parties: Mauritian Socialist Movement (MSM), Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), Mauritian Labor Party (MLP), and Mauritian Social Democratic Party (PMSD). Suffrage: Universal over 18. Central government budget (July-June, 1987-88): Recurrent budget- -$463 million. Capital budget--$167 million. Defense (1987): 1.8% of GDP. Flag: Four horizontal stripes--red, blue, yellow, green.
Economy
GDP (at factor cost, 1990): $2.3 billion. Real growth rate: (1990 est.): 6.8%. Per capita income (1990): $2,450. Avg. inflation rate (1990): 13.5%. Natural resources: None. Manufacturing (including export processing zone) 25% of GDP: Types--labor intensive goods for export, including textile and clothing, diamond cutting and polishing, optical goods, canned tuna, watches, and other consumer goods. Agriculture (14% of GDP): Products--sugar, sugar derivatives, tea, tobacco, and fisheries. Growth in tourism sector (1990): 10%. Main countries of origin-- Reunion, South Africa, France, and other West European countries. Trade: Exports--$1.1 billion (1990): textiles, sugar, clothing, molasses, tea, jewelry, leather products, canned tuna. Major markets--EC and US. Imports--$1.5 billion (1990): foodstuffs, refined petroleum products, cement, iron and steel, manufactured goods, textile raw materials. Major suppliers--EC, South Africa, Kuwait, Japan, China, Bahrain, Hong Kong, Australia, India, Taiwan, New Zealand, US. Fiscal year: July 1-June 30.
International Affiliations
UN and most of its specialized agencies, Commonwealth, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Non-Aligned Movement, associate member of European Economic Community (EEC), Indian Ocean Commission. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 34, August 26, 1991 Title:

US Considers Ratification of Driftnet Fishing Treaty

Colson Source: David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jul 24, 19917/24/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Pacific, East Asia Country: Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia, Cook Islands, Micronesia, France, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Pacific Islands, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, United States Subject: International Law, Resource Management [TEXT] I am pleased to be here today to testify on the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, commonly referred to as the Wellington Convention. The President transmitted this convention along with its Protocol I to the Senate on May 1, seeking its advice and consent to ratification of both. The United States did not directly participate in the negotiations on this treaty. However, because the Wellington Convention and its Protocol I are fully consistent with US interests, we are urging expeditious ratification of both of them. The island nations of the South Pacific are especially dependent upon the ocean and its resources. In particular, tuna stocks represent a major resource for the island developing countries--in some cases one of the few natural resources available to them. The people of the Pacific islands consume tuna; the landing of tuna into island canneries and tuna transshipments in island ports provide employment and revenue; and the payment of license fees by fishing nations for access to the tuna resources provides a significant contribution to island economies. Thus, it was with some concern that the South Pacific countries watched the dramatic increase in the 1980s of fleets from Japan, Taiwan, and Korea as they prosecuted driftnet fisheries for albacore tuna in the South Pacific Ocean. From a small experimental Japanese fishery in the early 1980s the fishery grew to about 200 vessels by 1988-89. The generally suggested annual harvest level in the 1980s for South Pacific albacore was in the area of 45,000 metric tons [mt]. With the new driftnet fishery catching approximately 25-50,000 mt, the annual total catch exceeded the suggested amount by almost double. The significant increase in the scope of these fisheries during the late 1980s raised alarms among the South Pacific states because of the devastating potential impact of the fisheries on all marine resources in general, and on albacore tuna stocks in particular. The scientific data available indicated that the South Pacific albacore stocks would be in danger of collapse if driftnet fishing continued to occur at these high levels. In response to this threat, the leaders of the South Pacific Forum nations, meeting in Tarawa on July 10-11, 1989, called for the negotiation of a convention to free the South Pacific region from driftnet fishing. The Wellington Convention is the result, negotiated by the Forum countries and concluded on November 23, 1989. It is consistent with fundamental law-of-the-sea principles and is designed to prohibit driftnet fishing in the South Pacific Ocean by its parties and to send a clear message to non-parties that driftnet fishing is not welcome in the region. The convention prohibits the use of driftnets and the transshipment of driftnet catches in waters within the convention area under the fisheries jurisdiction of the parties, and by vessels and nationals of the parties anywhere within the convention area. For the United States, these obligations will apply to the US Exclusive Economic Zone [EEZ] around American Samoa and certain unincorporated US islands, specifically Howland, Baker, and Jarvis Islands, Kingman Reef, and Palmyra Atoll, and to US nationals and vessels documented under US laws fishing within the convention area. The US EEZ around Guam and Hawaii and the Northern Mariana Islands is not within the convention area. Fourteen nations have signed the Wellington Convention, namely, Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, France, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, and the United States. It entered into force with the deposit of the fourth instrument of ratification on May 17, 1991. (Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, New Zealand, and Tokelau have ratified.) President Bush announced that the US would sign the convention at the summit meeting with Pacific Island leaders last October. The United States signed the convention on November 14, 1990, and Protocol I to the convention on February 16, 1991. Parties to Protocol I, which is open to all distant water fishing nations, agree to prohibit their nationals and vessels from driftnet fishing within the convention area. While the obligations in Protocol I essentially duplicate those that the United States would undertake in ratifying the convention, we urge ratification of Protocol I as well, both to show support for the convention's principles and as a means of encouraging other distant water fishing nations to ratify. There is also a Protocol II to the convention, in which parties adjacent to the convention area agree to prohibit driftnet fishing and transshipment of driftnet catches in areas under their fisheries jurisdiction. The United States has chosen not to sign Protocol II at the present time, but it remains under study. The President's letter of transmittal and the accompanying report from the Secretary of State recommend that ratification of the convention be made subject to two understandings. The first understanding is designed to make clear that, in ratifying the convention, we are undertaking the obligation to prohibit driftnet fishing in all parts of our EEZ that fall within the area covered by the convention and to prohibit all our nationals and vessels from fishing with driftnets in that area. The second understanding refers to Article 3 of the convention, which provides that parties may take measures consistent with international law to--among other things--prohibit the possession of driftnets by vessels within waters under their fisheries jurisdiction. Our proposed understanding would make clear our view that such a measure may not be applied so as to be an unreasonable restriction on navigation. In addition to these two understandings, we would like the record of this hearing to reflect two points that we have made known to the signatories of the convention. The first is simply that our ratification of the convention would be without prejudice to our views of the law of the sea generally. We also have made known that we would implement the convention's prohibition on driftnets greater than 2.5 kilometers in length in accordance with existing US law, which prohibits driftnets longer than 1.5 miles in length. US ratification of the convention will further US goals in opposing high seas driftnet fishing in general and in the South Pacific in particular. Shortly following the conclusion of the negotiation of the Wellington Convention, the UN General Assembly adopted Consensus Resolution 44/255 on driftnets, sponsored by the United States, along with the Pacific Island states, which noted the adoption of the Wellington Convention and called for, inter alia, a cessation of driftnet fishing in the South Pacific by July 1, 1991, to continue until a conservation and management regime for albacore tuna resources is concluded. As this committee is probably aware, the United States was a principal sponsor of two UN driftnet resolutions (44/225 of December 1989 and 45/197 of December 1990). We are taking steps to implement these resolutions. In addition to addressing the South Pacific situation, the resolutions recommend a moratorium on all large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing by June 30, 1992, unless jointly agreed effective conservation and management measures are taken to prevent the unacceptable impacts posed by the destructive driftnet fishing technique. We understand the resolution places the burden on those who use the method on the high seas to demonstrate its acceptability. If they cannot do so to our satisfaction, and that of the rest of the international community, the general moratorium will go into effect on June 30, 1992. Soon after the adoption of the UN resolution, Japan announced that it would cease driftnet fishing in the South Pacific by July 1, 1990, 1 year ahead of the date set forth in the resolution. Korea had previously indicated, even prior to the adoption of the Wellington Convention, that it would discontinue its incipient experimental fishery. Finally, late last year, Taiwan announced that it would discontinue its South Pacific driftnet fishery by July 1, 1991, in accordance with the UN resolution. Thus, there should be no longer any large-scale driftnet fishing taking place in the South Pacific Ocean. The Wellington Convention has the support of the Congress. Section 107 of Public Law 101-627, which amended the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, provides that it is the policy of the Congress that the United States should support the Wellington Convention and secure a permanent ban on the use of large scale driftnets on the high seas of the world. The same law prohibits large scale driftnet fishing in waters subject to US fisheries jurisdiction and by US vessels and nationals anywhere. Implementation of the Wellington Convention by the United States therefore requires no additional legislation. The Wellington Convention is significant in that it is the first regional treaty to deal directly with the issue of large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing on the high seas, and it does so in a manner that is consistent with and supportive of US policy. It seems clear that there is broad support in the United States for this convention. We urge the Senate to give its consent to ratification of the convention and its Protocol I as soon as possible. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 34, August 26, 1991 Title:

US Report to the UN on Driftnet Fishing

Tutwiler Description: Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman Date: Aug 26, 19918/26/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Pacific, North America, East Asia Country: United States, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Canada Subject: Resource Management, United Nations, Environment [TEXT] The United States submitted a report today to the United Nations condemning the use of large-scale pelagic driftnets on the high seas. The report, which outlines US policy concerning large-scale driftnets, states that these fisheries are ecologically "unacceptable" due to their adverse impacts on marine mammals, sea birds, sea turtles, and other living marine resources. The report renews a call for a moratorium on these driftnet fisheries no later than June 30, 1992, consistent with UN General Assembly Resolutions 44/225 and 45/197. The US report draws on the results of a June 1991 meeting held in Sidney, British Columbia, at which scientists from Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Canada, and the United States reviewed the best scientific information available on high seas driftnet fishing in the North Pacific. The data presented at that meeting highlighted the wasteful and destructive nature of this fishing method. For example, the Japanese driftnet fishery for squid in the North Pacific Ocean was estimated to have killed over 41 million sea creatures in the process of harvesting 106 million squid in 1990. This "by-catch" included over 39 million other fish, 700,000 sharks, 270,000 sea birds, 141,000 salmon, 26,000 marine mammals, and 406 sea turtles. The Japanese squid driftnet fleet consists of approximately 450 vessels, over half the total number of driftnet vessels operating in the North Pacific. Driftnet vessels from Taiwan and Korea also operate in the area. Data from monitoring programs covering the other high seas driftnet fisheries will be available soon, and it is likely that these data will tell a comparable story. The UN resolution on driftnetting allows for regional factors to be considered in the application of a global moratorium. The US report concludes that current evidence, supported by the best scientific data available, justifies a moratorium on the use of high seas driftnets worldwide "without consideration for further delay." In commenting on research being conducted to make driftnets less harmful, the report notes that "alteration of large-scale driftnets has not been shown to reduce significantly the overall indiscriminate destruction and waste associated with its use." Copies of the report are available from Mr. William Dilday, Office of Fisheries Affairs, US Department of State, Washington, DC 20520 (Tel. 202-647-2009). (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 34, August 26, 1991 Title:

US Foreign Policy and the International Environment

Date: Aug 26, 19918/26/91 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: North America, Polar Regions Country: United States, Antarctica Subject: Environment, Resource Management [TEXT] The environmental challenges confronting the world today are greater than at any time in recent history. Threats to the global environment from the depletion of the ozone layer, the potential for climate change, and a loss of biodiversity affect all nations-- regardless of their level of development or the nature of their political or economic systems. Countries, acting alone, cannot address such global concerns. As a result, the environment is becoming an increasingly important part of the foreign policy agenda. President Bush and Secretary Baker have given high priority to environmental issues, and the United States is in the forefront of global efforts. The United States believes that environmental objectives must be integrated into economic development and growth. Within the US Government, the Department of State's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs is the focal point for coordination and oversight of international environmental policy.
Forests
The world's forests provide a wide range of valuable benefits such as absorbing carbon dioxide, protecting soil and water resources, providing timber and fiber, and serving recreational and other purposes. In addition, tropical forests are the most species-rich ecosystems on earth; many species have not even been identified. This rich gene pool represents an irreplaceable habitat for 89% of the planet's remaining unknown and unspecified gene pool--a potentially valuable heritage for all humankind. The rapid destruction of forests in many regions of the world is one of the world's most pressing environmental concerns. At the July 1990 economic summit in Houston, President Bush proposed beginning negotiations as soon as possible on a global forest convention. The United States believes it should emphasize market-based mechanisms to achieve sustainable forest use and conservation, improve the health of forests, encourage reforestation, and increase the value of forest products. Potential areas for international cooperation include reforestation, research and monitoring, reform of the Tropical Forestry Action Plan, and removal of harmful subsidies.
Global Climate Change
The possibility that human activities such as fossil fuel burning and deforestation may result in climate change is a major environmental concern. The United States has been active in the international effort to develop an appropriate response to climate change and has strongly supported UN-sponsored negotiations on a framework convention on climate change, which began in Washington, DC, in February 1991. The US goal is to reach an agreement on such a convention by the time of the June 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development.
Protection of the Ozone Layer
There is scientific consensus that depletion of stratospheric ozone- -which protects human health, crops, and marine life by filtering the sun's ultraviolet rays--is a serious and growing problem. Reduced levels of stratospheric ozone, for example, may increase the number of skin cancer cases. The most recent scientific reports indicate that the degree and extent of ozone layer depletion is greater than previously believed. The United States has led efforts to address this threat to the atmosphere, beginning with a decision in 1978 to ban the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in non-essential aerosols. Because protection of the ozone layer is only possible with participation by all countries, the United States urged the conclusion of agreements to restrict CFC use. This led to a succession of landmark international agreements: -- The 1985 Vienna Convention, which established a framework to respond to the problem; -- The 1987 Montreal Protocol, which called for a 50% cut in CFC use; and -- The 1990 amendments to the Montreal Protocol, under which countries agreed to phase out the production of CFCs and most other ozone-depleting substances completely by the end of the century.
UN Conference on Environment and Development
In June 1992, the UN will sponsor a major conference in Brazil on the 20th anniversary of the landmark Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. It will address the relationship between global environmental issues and economic development. Through a series of preparatory committee meetings, the international community is discussing the issues that will be decided at the conference.
Antarctica
Protection of the fragile environment of Antarctica is a priority for the United States. Under the Antarctic Treaty, the continent has been a zone of peace and a place for conducting vital scientific research into issues such as global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion. The parties to the Antarctic Treaty have agreed to a comprehensive environmental protection protocol designed to ensure the protection of this vast wilderness for generations. The new environmental measures protect native species of Antarctic flora and fauna and place needed limits on tourism, waste disposal, and marine pollution. The protocol also prohibits mineral activity in the Antarctic for at least 50 years.
Marine Conservation and Pollution
The world's oceans are threatened by pollution and other human activities such as over-fishing. The United States long has played an active role in ocean conservation and is party to a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements to manage and conserve fisheries resources. For example, US efforts were instrumental in the International Whaling Commission's establishment of a moratorium on the commercial harvest of whales. Currently, work is underway to ensure that fishing practices by tuna and shrimp fleets have a minimal effect on dolphins and sea turtles. The United States is very active in a growing worldwide effort to address problems associated with driftnet fisheries. These fisheries, which use nets up to 40 miles in length, are responsible for a very large take of marine mammals, seabirds, and other marine species. It is increasingly clear that the great loss of marine resources as a result of driftnet fishing has a severe impact on marine ecosystems. A US-sponsored resolution agreed to by the UN General Assembly in 1990 calls for a moratorium on all large- scale driftnet fishing by June 1992. The United States is party to several international agreements on marine pollution, including: -- The Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, which regulates the discharge of harmful substances by ships at sea. -- The London Dumping Convention, which bans the ocean disposal of several types of waste and lists others that may be disposed of only with special care. Efforts also are underway to address land-based sources of marine pollution, coastal zone management, and the protection of fragile ecosystems such as mangroves and corals.
Wildlife Conservation
The United States is party to many bilateral and multilateral agreements to protect endangered species and ensure wildlife conservation. One of the most important is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which monitors and controls the effect of international trade on wild species. CITES was crucial in efforts by the United States and other countries to protect the African elephant through a ban on the trade in elephant ivory. (Demand for ivory had been identified as the main cause of the precipitous decline of elephant populations.)
Cross-Border Movementof Hazardous Wastes
US domestic hazardous waste disposal laws are among the strictest in the world--the United States exports less than 1% of the hazardous wastes it generates every year. The United States also has been a leader in requiring the formal consent of receiving countries before allowing exports of hazardous wastes. In March 1990, the United States signed the Basel Convention, an international treaty addressing the trade in hazardous wastes. The agreement provides safeguards to ensure that cross-border movements of hazardous wastes are conducted in an environmentally sound manner.
Cross-Border Pollution
All countries increasingly face the challenge of working with their neighbors to address cross-border pollution problems. The United States works vigorously with Canada and Mexico to resolve transboundary concerns. In March 1991, President Bush and Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney signed a landmark air quality accord which addresses a range of air pollution issues such as "acid rain." This agreement will complement long-standing efforts through the International Joint Commission to deal with water pollution issues in the Great Lakes and along the US-Canada border. In the case of Mexico, a framework for cooperation was established in a 1983 agreement addressing a range of environmental problems along the US-Mexican border. In November 1990, Presidents Bush and Salinas called for the development of a comprehensive border environment plan, building on the 1983 agreement. The new plan will address problems of air and water pollution, hazardous wastes, chemical spills, pesticides, and enforcement. The mandate also calls for a role for non- governmental organizations and the public in developing the plan. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 34, August 26, 1991 Title:

UN Security Council Resolutions 705, 706, and 707 on Iraq

Date: Aug 15, 19918/15/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: United Nations, Trade/Economics, Military Affairs [TEXT]
Resolution 705 (August 15, 1991)
The Security Council, Having considered the note of 30 May 1991 of the Secretary- General pursuant to paragraph 13 of his report of 2 May 1991 (S/22559) which was annexed to the Secretary-General's letter of 30 May 1991 to the President of the Security Council (S/22661), Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his note of 30 May 1991 which was annexed to his letter to the President of the Security Council of the same date (S/22661); 2. Decides that in accordance with the suggestion made by the Secretary-General in paragraph 7 of his note of 30 May 1991, compensation to be paid by Iraq (as arising from section E of resolution 687) shall not exceed 30 per cent of the annual value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq; 3. Decides further, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Secretary-General's note of 30 May 1991, to review the figure established in paragraph 2 above from time to time in light of data and assumptions contained in the letter of the Secretary-General (S/22661) and other relevant developments. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).
Resolution 706 (August 15, 1991)
The Security Council, Recalling its previous relevant resolutions and in particular resolutions 661 (1990), 686 (1991), 687 (1991), 688 (1991), 692 (1991), 699 (1991) and 705 (1991), Taking note of the report (S/22799) dated 15 July 1991 of the inter-agency mission headed by the executive delegate of the Secretary-General for the United Nations inter-agency humanitarian programme for Iraq, Kuwait and the Iraq/Turkey and Iraq/Iran border areas, Concerned by the serious nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi civilian population as described in this report, and by the risk of a further deterioration of this situation, Concerned also that the repatriation or return of all Kuwaitis and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990, pursuant to paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 686 (1991), and paragraphs 30 and 31 of resolution 687 (1991) has not yet been fully carried out, Taking note of the conclusions of the above-mentioned report, and in particular of the proposal for oil sales by Iraq to finance the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs for the purpose of providing humanitarian relief, Taking note also of the letters dated 14 April 1991, 31 May 1991, 6 June 1991, 9 July 1991 and 22 July 1991 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq and the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the Chairman of the committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the export from Iraq of petroleum and petroleum products, Convinced of the need for equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi civilian population through effective monitoring and transparency, Recalling and reaffirming in this regard its resolution 688 (1991) and in particular the importance which the Council attaches to Iraq allowing unhindered access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and making available all necessary facilities for their operation, and in this connection stressing the important and continuing role played by the Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq of 18 April 1991 (S/22663), Recalling that, pursuant to resolutions 687 (1991), 692 (1991) and 699 (1991), Iraq is required to pay the full costs of the Special Commission and IAEA in carrying out the tasks authorized by section C of resolution 687 (1991), and that the Secretary- General in his report to the Security Council of 15 July 1991 (S/22792), submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 699 (1991), expressed the view that the most obvious way of obtaining financial resources from Iraq to meet the costs of the Special Commission and the IAEA would be to authorize the sale of some Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products; recalling further that Iraq is required to pay its contributions to the Compensation Fund and half the costs of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, and recalling further that in its resolutions 686 (191) and 687 (1991) the Security Council demanded that Iraq return in the shortest possible time all Kuwaiti property seized by it and requested the Secretary-General to take steps to facilitate this, Acting under chapter VII of the Charter, 1. Authorizes all States, subject to the decision to be taken by the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 5 below and notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a), 3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990), to permit the import, during a period of 6 months from the date of passage of the resolution pursuant to paragraph 5 below, of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq sufficient to produce a sum to be determined by the Council following receipt of the report of the Secretary-General requested in paragraph 5 of this resolution but not to exceed 1.6 billion United States dollars for the purposes set out in this resolution and subject to the following conditions: (a) Approval of each purchase of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) following notification to the Committee by the State concerned; (b) Payment of the full amount of each purchase of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products directly by the purchaser in the State concerned into an escrow account to be established by the United Nations and to be administered by the Secretary-General, exclusively to meet the purposes of this resolution; (c) Approval by the Council, following the report of the Secretary-General requested in paragraph 5 of this resolution, of a scheme for the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), in particular health related materials, all of which to be labelled to the extent possible as being supplied under this scheme, and for all feasible and appropriate United Nations monitoring and supervision for the purpose of assuring their equitable distribution to meet humanitarian needs in all regions of Iraq and to all categories of the Iraqi civilian population, as well as all feasible and appropriate management relevant to this purpose, such a United Nations role to be available if desired for humanitarian assistance from other sources; (d) The sum authorized in this paragraph to be released by successive decisions of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) in three equal portions after the Council has taken the decision provided for in paragraph 5 below on the implementation of this resolution, and notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the sum to be subject to review concurrently by the Council on the basis of its ongoing assessment of the needs and requirements; 2. Decides that a part of the sum in the account to be established by the Secretary-General shall be made available by him to finance the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs, as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 687, and the cost to the United Nations of its roles under this resolution and of other necessary humanitarian activities in Iraq; 3. Decides further that a part of the sum in the account to be established by the Secretary-General shall be used by him for appropriate payments to the United Nations Compensation Fund, the full costs of caring out the tasks authorized by Section C of resolution 687 (1991), the full costs incurred by the United Nations in facilitating the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, and half the costs of the Boundary Commission; 4. Decides that the percentage of the value of exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq, authorized under this resolution to be paid to the United Nations Compensation Fund, as called for in paragraph 19 of resolution 687 (1991), and as defined in paragraph 6 of resolution 692 (1991), shall be the same as the percentage decided by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 705 (1991) for payments to the Compensation Fund, until such time as the Governing Council of the Fund decides otherwise; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit within 20 days of the date of adoption of this resolution a report to the Security Council for decision on measures to be taken in order to implement paragraphs 1 (a), (b) and (c), estimates of the humanitarian requirements of Iraq set out in paragraph 2 above and of the amount of Iraq's financial obligations set out in paragraph 3 above up to the end of the period of the authorization in paragraph 1 above, as well as the method for taking the necessary legal measures to ensure that the purposes of this resolution are carried out and the method for taking account of the costs of transportation of such Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products; 6. Further requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross to submit within 20 days of the date of adoption of this resolution a report to the Security Council on activities undertaken in accordance with paragraph 31 of resolution 687 (1991) in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990; 7. Requires the Government of Iraq to provide to the Secretary-General and appropriate international organizations on the first day of the month immediately following the adoption of the present resolution and on the first day of each month thereafter until further notice, a statement of the gold and foreign currency reserves it holds whether in Iraq or elsewhere; 8. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution; 9. Decides to remain seized of the matter. VOTE: 13-1 (Cuba), 1 abstention (Yemen).
Resolution 707 (August 15, 1991)
The Security Council, Recalling its resolution 687 (1991), and its other resolutions on this matter, Recalling the letter of 11 April 1991 from the President of the Security Council to the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations (S/22485) noting that on the basis of Iraq's written agreement (S/22456) to implement fully resolution 687 (1991) the preconditions established in paragraph 33 of that resolution for a cease-fire had been met, Noting with grave concern the letters dated 26 June 1991 (S/22739), 28 June 1991 (S/22743) and 4 July 1991 (S/22761) from the Secretary-General, conveying information obtained from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and the Director-General of the IAEA which establishes Iraq's failure to comply with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991), Recalling further the statement issued by the President of the Security Council on 28 June 1991 (S/22746) requesting that a high- level mission consisting of the Chairman of the Special Commission, the Director-General of the IAEA, and the Under- Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs be dispatched to meet with officials at the highest levels of the Government of Iraq at the earliest opportunity to obtain written assurance that Iraq will fully and immediately cooperate in the inspection of the locations identified by the Special Commission and present for immediate inspection any of those items that may have been transported from those locations, Dismayed by the report of the high-level mission to the Secretary-General (S/22761) on the results of its meetings with the highest levels of the Iraqi Government, Gravely concerned by the information provided to the Council by the Special Commission and the IAEA on 15 July 1991 (S/22788) and 25 July 1991 (S/22837) regarding the actions of the Government of Iraq in flagrant violation of resolution 687 (1991), Gravely concerned also by the evidence in the letter of 7 July 1991 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary- General and in subsequent statements and findings that Iraq's notifications of 18 and 28 April were incomplete and that it had concealed activities, which both constituted material breaches of its obligations under resolution 687 (1991), Noting also from the letters dated 26 June 1991 (S/22739), 28 June 1991 (S/22743) and 4 July 1991 (S/22761) from the Secretary-General that Iraq has not fully complied with all of its undertakings relating to the privileges, immunities and facilities to be accorded to the Special Commission and the IAEA inspection teams mandated under resolution 687 (1991), Affirming that in order for the Special Commission to carry out its mandate under paragraph 9 (b) (i), (ii) and (iii) of resolution 687 (1991) to inspect Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missile capabilities and to take possession of them for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, full disclosure on the part of Iraq as required in paragraph 9 (a) of resolution 687 (1991) is essential, Affirming that in order for the IAEA, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission, to determine what nuclear- weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to them need, in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 687 (1991), to be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless, Iraq is required to make a declaration of all its nuclear programmes including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material, Affirming that the aforementioned failures of Iraq to act in strict conformity with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) constitutes a material breach of its acceptance of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991) which established a cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in the region, Affirming further that Iraq's failure to comply with its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, as established by the resolution of the Board of Governors of the IAEA of 18 July 1991 (GOV/2532),1 constitutes a breach of its international obligations, Determined to ensure full compliance with resolution 687 (1991) and in particular its section C, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 1. Condemns Iraq's serious violation of a number of its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991) and of its undertakings to cooperate with the Special Commission and the IAEA, which constitutes a material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 which established a cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in the region; 2. Further condemns non-compliance by the Government of Iraq with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as established by the resolution of the Board of Governors of 18 July, which constitutes a violation of its commitments as a party to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of1 July 1968; 3. Demands that Iraq (i) provide full, final and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material, without further delay; (ii) allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect; (iii) cease immediately any attempt to conceal, or any movement or destruction of any material or equipment relating to its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missile programmes, or material or equipment relating to its other nuclear activities without notification to and prior consent of the Special Commission; (iv) make available immediately to the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams any items to which they were previously denied access; (v) allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams to conduct both fixed wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq for all relevant purposes including inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and logistics without interference of any kind and upon such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Special Commission, and to make full use of their own aircraft and such airfields in Iraq as they may determine are most appropriate for the work of the Commission; (vi) halt all nuclear activities of any kind, except for use of isotopes for medical, agricultural or industrial purposes until the Security Council determines that Iraq is in full compliance with this resolution and paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991), and the IAEA determines that Iraq is in full compliance with its safeguards agreement with that Agency; (vii) ensure the complete implementation of the privileges, immunities and facilities of the representatives of the Special Commission and the IAEA in accordance with its previous undertakings and their complete safety and freedom of movement; (viii) immediately provide or facilitate the provision of any transportation, medical or logistical support requested by the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams; (ix) respond fully, completely and promptly to any questions or requests from the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams; 4. Determines that Iraq retains no ownership interest in items to be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991); 5. Requires that the Government of Iraq forthwith comply fully and without delay with all its international obligations, including those set out in the present resolution, in resolution 687 (1991), in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA; 6. Decides to remain seized of this matter. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0) (###)