US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991


The Crisis in the Soviet Union: News Conference Excerpts

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from a news conference, Kennebunkport, Maine Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Let me make a few comments about these momentous and stunning events. While we're still watching the situation unfold--and it still is unfolding; all is not clear--it seems clearer all the time that, contrary to official statements out of Moscow, that this move was extra-constitutional, outside of the constitutional provisions for governmental change. Clearly, it's a disturbing development; there's no question about that, and it could have serious consequences for the Soviet society and in Soviet relations with other countries--including the United States. President Gorbachev is clearly a historic figure, one who's led the Soviet Union toward reform domestically and toward a constructive and cooperative role in the international arena. It's important to keep in mind the enormous changes that have taken place--toward openness, toward reform, changes in Eastern Europe, the new-found cooperation with the United States and others in the Gulf and many other areas. There's a whole new era of cooperation, and we don't want to see that change, obviously. Gorbachev's contributions have laid a foundation for progress that I am convinced the people in the Soviet Union want to see continue. This morning I've been in touch with other world leaders. I just hung up from talking to Chancellor Kohl; I talked to President Mitterrand; I talked to Prime Minister John Major. I'm sure I'll be talking to others today. I talked to the Secretary of State, and I talked to our DCM [deputy chief of mission] in Moscow, who, incidentally, tells me that all our people there are safe and all are properly accounted for. I say that to reassure any families that are involved. Their information there, as you can imagine, is probably as sketchy as the rest of the world's at this time. So what we'll do is follow the events very carefully as they unfold in order to determine the appropriate response that we, in consultation with our allies, should make. We expect that the Soviet Union will live up fully to its international obligations, and clearly, any commitments that are outstanding on the part of the West will be judged and acted on in accordance with that statement that the Soviet Government must live up to its obligations. Obviously, the West is not going to retreat from its principles of reform, openness, [and its] commitment to democracy. And there's a lot at stake here. I don't know whether to take heart or not from [Gennady] Yanayev's statement that this does not mean turning back the reforms, but there was such a statement made by him. So the situation is still quite murky inside the Soviet Union. I have the notes here of my calls from--the calls I made to-- Kohl, Mitterrand, and Major, and I think it's fair to say that all of us are in total agreement with what I've said, with what John Major has said. President Mitterrand will be talking to the French television in a few hours, I'm told. So I think, at this point, what we do is simply watch the situation unfold and we state and restate our principles. And we'll see where matters go. It's all still unfolding.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

The Crisis in the Soviet Union: News Conference Excerpts

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from a news conference, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Aug 20, 19918/20/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, NATO [TEXT] The events in the Soviet Union continue to deeply concern the whole world. The unconstitutional seizure of power is an affront to the goals and aspirations that the Soviet peoples have been nurturing over the past years. This action also puts the Soviet Union at odds with the world community and undermines the positive steps that have been undertaken to make the Soviet Union an integral and positive force in world affairs. I have this morning spoken with Boris Yeltsin, the freely elected leader of the Russian Republic, and I assured Mr. Yeltsin of continued US support for his goal of the restoration of Mr. Gorbachev as the constitutionally chosen leader. I also shared with him the support that other world leaders voiced in my several conversations yesterday, conversations I had with those leaders in Eastern Europe and leaders in Western Europe as well--[Japanese] Prime Minister Kaifu, and I gave him that reassurance. Mr. Yeltsin is encouraged by the support of the Soviet people and this determination in the face of these trying circumstances. He expressed his gratitude for our support of him and President Gorbachev. The situation concerning President Gorbachev's status is still unclear. I've twice tried to reach him by phone, including within the last hour, but have so far been unsuccessful. We continue to closely monitor this situation. Our new and, I might add, very able Ambassador to the Soviet Union Robert Strauss--just sworn in--will be departing immediately for Moscow to take charge of our embassy, and to report to me on the situation that he finds in the Soviet Union. So I'm asking him to go over there, get the lay of the land, establish what will be strong leadership--the embassy, we've got a good team in place, but this man is in charge of this important mission--and then to return within the next several days to give me a full, personal report on what he sees there. He will not be presenting his credentials on this trip. It's going to be a short trip--and I've said that this group assumed power extra-constitutionally. In conclusion, I want to emphasize that we are going to monitor the situation closely and consider its ramifications throughout the entire world. I've emphasized in my conversation with the East European leaders that the democratic processes in their country cannot be reversed. Eastern Europe is important. I've called three of the leaders, and I want to take this opportunity to assure them of our continued interest and the need to retain calm in those countries, and indeed, they were very grateful for the contact by the United States. The United States will continue to support the economic and political reforms in their countries, and I will continue to seek the advice and counsel of East European leaders in the days ahead. Of course, the Secretary [of State] and I will be in close touch with the West European leaders and others around the globe. Because this is an ongoing process of consultations, we intend to maintain a more formal work schedule during the remainder of my stay in Maine. There will be a number of meetings with government officials and private sector experts related to the events in the Soviet Union. There will be daily briefings on a formalized basis by my national security advisers, and I will be keeping in touch with Secretary Baker. As you know, I will be receiving [Canadian] Prime Minister Mulroney and also [UK] Prime Minister Major and, of course, receiving Ambassador Strauss when he returns. Secretary Baker will be leaving today for the NATO ministerial that will be held in Brussels. These difficult events in the Soviet Union, I believe, demonstrate the wisdom of our strong and continuous support for the process of reform and restructuring. We'll continue to support the democratic processes that have been set in motion in the Soviet Union, and most importantly, I know that the American people stand behind the people of the Soviet Union who are seeking more freedom and more opportunity in their society.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

The Crisis in the Soviet Union: News Conference Excerpts

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement at a news conference, Kennebunkport, Maine Date: Aug 21, 19918/21/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, NATO (August 21, 1991, 10:35 am) I wanted to report to the American people on some of the latest developments related to the situation in the Soviet Union. I spoke at length this morning to President [of the Russian Republic] Boris Yeltsin--the call began at about 8:30 am--and I also talked to Ambassador Strauss who is now in our Embassy in Moscow--in position--and I also talked in the last 20 hours to President Menem in Argentina, to Prime Minister Mulroney, [and] Prime Minister Major, and I will continue these kinds of consultative calls. President Yeltsin was clearly encouraged by the fact that he had survived another night in the Russian Parliament building without a major assault by the forces supporting this coup. He told me that tens of thousands of Muscovites had turned out to help guard the building from attack. Yeltsin said he was encouraged by indications that more and more military units and their commanders were abandoning support of the coup. His building is still surrounded, however, and special troops-- the Spetznaz--are remaining loyal to the coup plotters. It is those troops who are moving to occupy additional sites in the Baltic states. President Yeltsin said that the Russian Supreme Soviet had met and declared unanimously that the coup was illegal and without effect, and he also mentioned the importance of the next meeting of the Union Supreme Soviet which will be held on August 26th. And they are--this is the way he put it--they are vigorously trying to line up support for that Supreme Soviet to declare this coup illegal. President Yeltsin said he told the Supreme Soviet of the strong support being given by the United States to those resisting the illegal emergency committee activities and that the Supreme Soviet received the news very, very warmly. There are at present, according to Yeltsin, flights of aircraft carrying his representatives and also others with members of the emergency committee on their way to the Crimea to meet with [Soviet] President Gorbachev. Obviously, he doesn't have all the details on that, and I won't be able to fill you in on any details on that either. President Yeltsin said he was prepared for all contingencies. He thanked the United States profusely for its support, which was making an important difference, and asked that we continue to stay in touch with him, which we will do. Ambassador Bob Strauss, who had just arrived, gave me a rundown on developments in Moscow which paralleled those of President Yeltsin--the reports he was getting there. Overall, while the situation remains highly fluid and uncertain, I think it is safe to say that the situation appears somewhat more positive than in the earliest hours of this coup. And so I will stay in touch with President Yeltsin [and], hopefully, at some point be able to contact President Gorbachev-- which we are still unable to do, but I guess I would say to the American people these developments are positive. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

The Crisis in the Soviet Union: News Conference Excerpts

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement at a news conference, Kennebunkport, Maine Date: Aug 21, 19918/21/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, NATO (August 21, 1991, 1:15 pm) Well, I just wanted to report that at 12:19 pm I had a phone conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev, and it lasted about--what, 20 minutes, I think. It was a good call. Gorbachev is still in the Crimea. He will return either tonight or tomorrow to Moscow. He tells me that things are under control. His first call, I believe, was with Boris Yeltsin. He stated his sincere appreciation to the people of the United States and others around the world for their support for democracy and reform. He sounded in good physical condition--indeed, his voice was buoyant. Barbara was with me, and we both asked him to convey our respects to Raisa, which he--and he very kindly made references to his friendship with Barbara and me on a personal basis. But it was good; it was a good talk. It's a good development. Now he will be going back to Moscow and, hopefully, working with the presidents of the republic--Nazarbayev and Kravchuk, the Ukraine leader, staying with him; there's a good basis now for all of this. So we'll see what happens, but, in his view, the constitutional authorities are back in power and democracy and freedom and reform have prevailed. That's his assessment. I hope it's not ahead of where things stand in Moscow. I have not talked again to President Yeltsin, but he believes that Moiseyev has ordered the forces back to their bases. All in all, it's a very, very positive development.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

US Policy Guidelines Concerning Events in the Soviet Union

Fitzwater Description: Statement released by the Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] We are deeply disturbed by the events of the last hours in the Soviet Union and condemn the unconstitutional resort to force. While the situation continues to evolve and information remains incomplete, the apparent unconstitutional removal of President Gorbachev, the declaration of a state of emergency, and the deployment of Soviet military forces in Moscow and other cities, raise the most serious questions about the future course of the Soviet Union. This misguided and illegitimate effort by-passes both Soviet law and the will of the Soviet peoples. Accordingly, we support President Yeltsin's call for "restoration of the legally elected organs of power and the reaffirmation of the post of USSR President M. [Mikhail] S. Gorbachev." Greater democracy and openness in Soviet society, including steps toward implementation of Soviet obligations under the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris have made a crucial contribution to the welcome improvement in East-West relations during the past few years. In these circumstances, US policy will be based on the following guidelines: -- We believe the policies of reform in the Soviet Union must continue, including democratization, the process of peaceful reconciliation between the center and the republics, and economic transformation; -- We support all constitutionally elected leaders and oppose the use of force or intimidation to suppress them or restrict their right to free speech; -- We oppose the use of force in the Baltic states or against any republics to suppress or replace democratically elected governments; -- We call upon the USSR to abide by its international treaties and commitments, including its commitments to respect basic human rights and democratic practices under the Helsinki accords, and the Charter of Paris; -- We will avoid in every possible way actions that would lend legitimacy or support to this coup effort; -- We have no interest in a new Cold War or in the exacerbation of East-West tensions; -- At the same time, we will not support economic aid programs if adherence to extra-constitutional means continues.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

The Situation in the USSR

Woerner Source: NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner Description: Text of a statement made by on behalf of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, Europe Country: USSR (former) Subject: NATO, Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization [TEXT] The North Atlantic Council met for a first discussion of today's disturbing developments in the Soviet Union and their implications. The internal reforms and new thinking in foreign policy pursued by the Soviet leadership in the past years have led to the end of the Cold War era, and opened the way to building a Europe whole and free. The Allies are deeply concerned that the latest developments foreshadow a grave deviation from this path of reform and the rule of law in the Soviet Union, with most serious consequences for the Soviet Union itself, its neighbors, and the whole international community. The Allies expect that the Soviet Union will adhere fully to its international commitments and obligations. With the signing of the Charter of Paris for a new Europe in November 1990, the Soviet Union, along with all participating states, committed itself to the advancement of democracy based on free elections and human rights, as indispensable in strengthening peace and security among the member states of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. Any obstacles to further democratization in the Soviet Union might not only endanger the essential domestic political and economic reforms, but could also weaken that country's ability to serve as one of the necessary underpinnings of the new cooperative order in Europe. The Allies will continue to monitor developments in the Soviet Union very closely. We will follow with particular attention the manner in which the Soviet Union's human rights obligations are observed in regard to members of the reform movement and others who may be opposed to today's events. The Allies are determined to ensure that the achievements of the last years in all fields of international policy of equal importance for the security of all states of Europe and North America are not reversed. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

1991 National Security Strategy Report

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement at Kennebunkport, Maine. Date: Aug 13, 19918/13/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] Today I signed and forwarded to Congress the National Security Strategy Report for 1991. This report comes at a rare moment in history. Seldom if ever have we been offered such an opportunity-- to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals. The Cold War has at long last released its grip on world events. Democracy is coming to Eastern Europe. The Gulf war helped create an unprecedented consensus that aggressive force must not be used to settle disputes and that if it is, the international community will respond. More so than ever before, we have seen the United Nations play the role dreamed of by its founders. The United States and Soviet Union have signed a treaty that, for the first time, significantly reduces their strategic nuclear arsenals. Yet, for all these national and international triumphs, the world remains a volatile place, with ethnic antagonisms, national rivalries, religious tensions, spreading armaments, personal ambitions, and lingering authoritarianism. Our national security strategy reflects the significant achievements, sobering realities, and important opportunities that now confront us. This report emphasizes the enduring political, economic, and military foundations of our national strategy, yet acknowledges the mandate for change in implementing elements of that strategy. While addressing our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union as an inescapable priority, we will work with our allies to respond to new political challenges, taking into account a more internally oriented and less threatening Soviet Union. While contributing to global stability as only America can, we will shift our focus to regional threats and peaceful engagement. While reducing nuclear and conventional force levels on the continent, we will work with our NATO allies to foster reconciliation, security, and democracy in a Europe whole and free. And, while providing adequately for our defense, our economic well-being will remain the foundation of our long-term strength. Our response to strategic challenges has always been shaped by what we are as a people, for our values are the link between our past and our future, between our domestic life and our foreign policy, between our power and our purpose. Our responsibility as a nation remains not only to protect our citizens and our interests but also to help create a new world in which our fundamental ideals not only survive but flourish. That is the essence of our national security strategy. I look to this report to be the foundation for a productive, non-partisan, national dialogue as we continue to develop and articulate a strategic approach that will guide us safely into the 21st century. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

1991 National Security Strategy Report: Fact Sheet

Fitzwater Source: Text released by the White House, August 13, 1991. Date: Aug 13, 19918/13/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] The President today transmitted to Congress the 1991 National Security Strategy Report, as required by the 1986 Goldwater- Nichols amendment to the National Security Act. The report reflects the recent, dramatic changes in the international environment and outlines US policies to both shape and respond to these changes. It observes that we have reached a moment of historic opportunity--for us and for the world--to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals. Highlights of the report include: -- Acknowledgement that the US containment strategy which worked for 40 years must now be modified to reflect geo-strategic realities; -- Encouragement of the constructive evolution of the Soviet Union; -- Realization that US alliances will be fundamentally affected by the internalization of the Soviet Union; -- Recognition that the world is increasingly interdependent- -politically, economically, technologically, and militarily--but that US leadership across the board remains essential; -- An emphasis on smaller, more agile forces to address regional concerns and peacetime engagement but which could form the basis for a reconstituted larger force should the need arise; -- Continued American support of an international economic system as open and inclusive as possible, and of NATO as the indispensable foundation of trans-Atlantic cooperation with a newly united and free Europe; -- Vigorous pursuit of US policy toward the Middle East, acknowledging the new challenges and opportunities afforded us by our victory in the Gulf war; -- Recognition of the continuing importance of East Asia and the Pacific and the vital role our security ties play there; -- Enhanced support for a revitalized United Nations to help keep peace, improve the human condition, and ameliorate human suffering; -- Acknowledging through the Conventional Forces in Europe and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks treaties a steadfast commitment to arms control as a means to strengthen international stability; -- Renewed championing of the principles of political and economic freedom as the surest guarantors of human progress and global peace; and -- A new global agenda to deal with refugee flows, drug abuse and environmental degradation. The report underscores the enduring nature of our basic interests and objectives in the 1990s. -- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. -- A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad. -- Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. -- A stable and secure world where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish. The report explains that our fundamental challenge is to relate political, economic, and military means available to these enduring goals in a world marked by extraordinarily positive change but still rampant with challenges and threats to our security--and to that of our allies and friends. The United States will remain fully engaged in the larger world and will continue to pursue its objectives in concert with those who share its values and concerns. Our approach to security will continue to be shaped by the fact that we are a nation separated by large oceans from many of our most important friends and interests. Defending them will still require the presence of American forces overseas, backed up by an ability to project power from the United States. The strategy report concludes with a call for continued dialogue, close cooperation and consultation with Congress to help shape a security structure appropriate for today's opportunities and tomorrow's challenges. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

Chronology: Strategic Nuclear Arms Negotiations and Treaties, January-July 1991

Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91 Category: Chronologies Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control, International Law [TEXT] The following was prepared by W. Taylor Fain, III, of the Office of the Historian. (See Dispatch Vol. 1, No. 16, for the chronology from 1969 to 1990.) January 28, 1991: In Washington, Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh announced that the proposed Moscow summit in February would be rescheduled, largely because of the war in the Persian Gulf. Also, they stated, "work on the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] Treaty will require some additional time." March 15, 1991: After meeting in Moscow with Gorbachev and Bessmertnykh, Secretary Baker said, "We still have some unresolved problems with CFE [the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty], and we have not concluded all of the issues on START." April 16, 1991: President Bush, asked about the prospects for a US- Soviet summit, said at a Washington press conference, "we have predicated this particular summit on a START agreement. . . . We've said all along that's what it would take." April 25, 1991: Baker and Bessmertnykh, meeting in Kislovodsk in the Soviet Caucasus, discussed arms control issues including START. June 1, 1991: Baker and Bessmertnykh met in Lisbon after witnessing the signing of the Angola peace accords. They resolved outstanding issues on CFE implementation which had delayed progress toward achieving a START agreement and directed their negotiators to redouble their efforts to achieve a satisfactory strategic weapons accord. June 7, 1991: Baker and Bessmertnykh met in Geneva to discuss outstanding issues on START. Baker told members of the media afterward that there was still "a fair amount of work that has to be done before we will conclude a START agreement." June 20, 1991: Baker and Bessmertnykh met in Berlin. They discussed remaining technical differences on START, including definition of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs, warhead downloading, and data denial. July 6, 1991: US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock delivered a message from President Bush to Gorbachev urging the Soviet leader to send a high-level delegation to Washington to resolve outstanding issues on START. The following day, the Soviet Government announced that Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and Chief of the Soviet General Staff General Mikhail Moiseyev would lead a delegation to Washington that week. July 11-14, 1991: Baker and Bessmertnykh met in Washington and significantly narrowed remaining US-Soviet differences on START. The only issue left unsettled concerned the definition of missile throw-weight used to determine whether a missile is a missile of a new type. Baker characterized the negotiations as "very, very difficult" but expressed satisfaction with the "outstanding progress" made during the previous 4 days. July 17 1991: At a meeting in London on July 17, 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reached agreement on the last remaining technical issue holding up agreement on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty

Description: Text of a White House Fact Sheet released by the Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jul 31, 19917/31/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control, International Law At the Moscow Summit, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty. This treaty marks the first agreement between the two countries in which the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons will actually be reduced. Reductions will take place over a period of 7 years, and will result in parity between the strategic nuclear forces of the two sides at levels approximately 30% below currently deployed forces. Deeper cuts are required in the most dangerous and destabilizing systems. START provisions are designed to strengthen strategic stability at lower levels and to encourage the restructuring of strategic forces in ways that make them more stable and less threatening. The Treaty includes a wide variety of very demanding verification measures designed to ensure compliance and build confidence.
Central Limits
The Treaty sets equal ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear forces that can be deployed by either side. In addition, the Treaty establishes an equal ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight (a measure of overall capability for ballistic missile). Each side is limited to no more than: -- 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs], submarine launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs], and heavy bombers), a limit that is 36% below the Soviet level declared in September 1990 and 29% below the US level. -- 6,000 total accountable warheads, about 41% below the current Soviet level and 43% below the current US level. -- 4,900 accountable warheads deployed on ICBMs or SLBMs, about 48% below the current Soviet level and 40% below the current US level. -- 1,540 accountable warheads deployed on 154 heavy ICBMs, a 50% reduction in current Soviet forces. The US has no heavy ICBMs. -- 1,100 accountable warheads deployed on mobile ICBMs. -- Aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs equal to about 54% of the current Soviet aggregate throw-weight.
Ballistic Missile Warhead Accountability
The Treaty uses detailed counting rules to ensure the accurate accounting of the number of warheads attributed to each type of ballistic missile. -- Each deployed ballistic missile warhead counts as one under the 4,900 ceiling and one under the 6,000 overall warhead ceiling. -- Each side is allowed 10 on-site inspections each year to verify that deployed ballistic missiles contain no more warheads than the number that is attributed to them under the Treaty.
Downloading Ballistic Missile Warheads
The Treaty also allows for a reduction in the number of warheads on certain ballistic missiles, which will help the sides transition their existing forces to the new regime. Such "downloading" is permitted in a carefully structured and limited fashion. -- The US may download its 3-warhead Minuteman III ICBM by either 1 or 2 warheads. The Soviet Union has already downloaded its 7-warhead SS-N-18 SLBM by 4 warheads. -- In addition, each side may download up to 500 warheads on two other existing types of ballistic missiles, as long as the total number of warheads removed from downloaded missiles does not exceed 1,250 at any one time.
New Types
The Treaty places constraints on the characteristics of new types of ballistic missiles to ensure the accuracy of counting rules and prevent undercounting of missile warheads. -- The number of warheads attributed to a new type of ballistic missile must be no less than the number determined by dividing 40% of the missile's total throw-weight by the weight of the lightest RV tested on that missile. -- The throw-weight attributed to a new type must be no less than the missile's throw-weight capability at specified reference ranges (11,000 km for ICBMs and 9,500 km for SLBMs).
Heavy ICBMs
START places significant restrictions on the Soviet SS-18 heavy ICBM. -- A 50% reduction in the number of Soviet SS-18 ICBMs; a total reduction of 154 of these Soviet missiles. -- New types of heavy ICBMs are banned. -- Downloading of heavy ICBMs is banned. -- Heavy SLBMs and heavy mobile ICBMs are banned. -- Heavy ICBMs will be reduced on a more stringent schedule than other strategic arms.
Mobile ICBMs
Because mobile missiles are more difficult to verify than other types of ballistic missiles, START incorporates a number of special restrictions and notifications with regard to these missiles. These measures will significantly improve our confidence that START will be effectively verifiable. -- Non-deployed mobile missiles and non-deployed mobile launchers are numerically and geographically limited so as to limit the possibility for reload and refire. -- The verification regime includes continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production, restrictions on movements, on-site inspections, and cooperative measures to improve the effectiveness of national technical means of intelligence collection.
Heavy Bombers
Because heavy bombers are stabilizing strategic systems (e.g., they are less capable of a short-warning attack than ballistic missiles), START counting rules for weapons on bombers are different than those for ballistic missile warheads. -- Each heavy bomber counts as one strategic nuclear delivery vehicle. -- Each heavy bomber equipped to carry only short-range missiles or gravity bombs is counted as one warhead under the 6,000 limit. -- Each US heavy bomber equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs (up to a maximum of 150 bombers) is counted as 10 warheads even though it may be equipped to carry up to 20 ALCMs. -- A similar discount applies to Soviet heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs. Each such Soviet heavy bomber (up to a maximum of 180) is counted as 8 warheads even though it may be equipped to carry up to 16 ALCMs. -- Any heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs deployed in excess of 150 for the US or 180 for the Soviet Union will be accountable by the number of ALCMs the heavy bomber is actually equipped to carry.
Verification Regime
Building on recent arms control agreements, START includes extensive and unprecedented verification provisions. This comprehensive verification regime greatly reduces the likelihood that violations would go undetected. -- START bans the encryption and encapsulation of telemetric information and other forms of information denial on flight tests of ballistic missiles. However, strictly limited exemptions to this ban are granted sufficient to protect the flight-testing of sensitive research projects. -- START allows 12 different types of on-site inspections and requires roughly 60 different types of notifications covering production, testing, movement, deployment, and destruction of strategic offensive arms.
Treaty Duration
START will have a duration of 15 years, unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement. If the sides agree, the Treaty may be extended for successive 5-year periods beyond the 15 years.
Non-circumvention and Third Countries
START prohibits the transfer of strategic offensive arms to third countries, except that the Treaty will not interfere with existing patterns of cooperation. In addition, the Treaty prohibits the permanent basing of strategic offensive arms outside the national territory of each side.
Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)
START does not directly count or limit ALCMs. ALCMs are limited indirectly through their association with heavy bombers. -- Only nuclear-armed ALCMs with a range in excess of 600 km are covered by START. -- Long-range, conventionally-armed ALCMs that are distinguishable from nuclear-armed ALCMs are not affected. -- Long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs may not be located at air bases for heavy bombers not accountable as being equipped for such ALCMs. -- Multiple warhead long-range nuclear ALCMs are banned.
Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)
SLCMs are not constrained by the Treaty. However, each side has made a politically binding declaration as to its plans for the deployment of nuclear-armed SLCMs. Conventionally-armed SLCMs are not subject to such a declaration. -- Each side will make an annual declaration of the maximum number of nuclear-armed SLCMs with a range greater than 600 km that it plans to deploy for each of the following 5 years. -- This number will not be greater than 880 long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs. -- In addition, as a confidence building measure, nuclear- armed SLCMs with a range of 300-600 km will be the subject of a confidential annual data exchange.
Backfire Bomber
The Soviet Backfire bomber is not constrained by the Treaty. However, the Soviet side has made a politically binding declaration that it will not deploy more than 300 air force and 200 naval Backfire bombers, and that these bombers will not be given intercontinental capability.
Other Background
The START agreement consists of the treaty document itself and a number of associated documents. Together, they total more than 700 pages. The Treaty was signed in a public ceremony by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in St. Vladimir's Hall in the Kremlin. The associated documents were signed in a private ceremony at Novo-Ogarevo, President Gorbachev's weekend dacha. Seven of these documents were signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. Three associated agreements were signed by Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. In addition, the START negotiators, Ambassadors Brooks and Nazarkin, exchanged seven letters related to START in a separate event at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow.(###)
Magnitude of START-Accountable Reductions
Following is the aggregate data from the Memorandum of Understanding, based upon agreed counting rules in START. (Because of those counting rules, the number of heavy bomber weapons actually deployed may be higher than the number shown in the aggregate.) The data is effective as of September 1990 and will be updated at entry into force. United States Soviet Union Delivery Vehicles 2,246 2,500 Warheads 10,563 10,271 Ballistic Missile Warheads 8,210 9,416 Heavy ICBMs/Warheads None 308/3,080 Throw-weight (metric tons) 2,361 6,626 As a result of the Treaty, the above values will be reduced by the following percentages: United States Soviet Union Delivery Vehicles 29% 36% Warheads 43% 41% Ballistic Missile Warheads 40% 48% Heavy ICBMs/Warheads None 50% Throw-weight (metric tons) None 46% (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

Security Challenges and Alliances in a New Era

Solomon Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Description: Address to the American Chamber of Commerce, Auckland, New Zealand Date: Aug 6, 19918/6/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia, Pacific Country: USSR (former), Japan, New Zealand Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control, Trade/Economics [TEXT] I appreciate this opportunity to share with you some thoughts about the character of the remarkable times we are now living in--the end of the Cold War era--and our vision of the new world order that is slowly taking shape. I can't think of more dramatic examples of our times than the recent images of Mr. Gorbachev going to London bearing a program for market-oriented reform and democracy in the Soviet Union and then concluding a major arms reduction accord with President Bush in Moscow. History will no doubt record the recent G-7 and US- Soviet summits as major decision points in the quest for a post- war order. As the process of the Soviet Union's reconciliation with the West advances, we in the United States are also preparing to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Pacific war--where Americans and New Zealanders fought so valiantly together. Now, half a century later, we find ourselves at last beginning to close the books on the era of ideological competition and superpower military confrontation that emerged from that devastating global conflict. Indeed, the London and Moscow summits are but the latest events in a stunning cascade of developments that since 1989 have begun to transform our world: the evaporation of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, and changes in the character of the Soviet Union that are enabling us to redefine US-Soviet relations and to move from confrontation to new forms of cooperation. These heartening developments reflect trends of global scope: the bankruptcy of communism as a political and economic system; worldwide economic integration sparked by spectacular technological change; and an equally widespread movement toward market-oriented economics, political pluralism, and concern with human rights. The impact of these trends now places us in one of those rare and probably brief periods of history where we--the United States and its allies and friends--have an opportunity to redefine institutions and realign patterns of cooperation. Together, we can build the foundations of an international system able to ensure that the new millennium we are about to enter will be a time of enhanced security, positive social change, and sustained economic development. At the same time, the recent war in the Persian Gulf has given us our first glimpse of the dark side of this new era. Whether in the Middle East, Yugoslavia, or the Soviet Union, we see dangerous counter-trends: a renascent ethno-nationalism and the re- emergence of regional antagonisms and rivalries long frozen over by the Cold War confrontation. Today, ambitious tyrants in various regions of the world have all-too-ready access to nuclear, missile, and other technologies with which to craft weapons of mass destruction. And Saddam [Hussein's] use of terrorism and ecological aggression reinforced our well-established concerns about the environment and unconventional forms of warfare.
Post-Cold War Opportunities
I will examine in a moment some of the implications for the future of both these key developments--the end of the Cold War and the Gulf conflict. But first let me note some of the positive opportunities before us as we seek to shape the contours of a new international order. For the long term, the most important trend I see is the universalization of Western values. The widening acceptance of the concept of democracy, human rights, and economic liberty is evident not just in Eastern Europe and perhaps the Soviet Union but even in distant and land-locked Mongolia. The growing adoption of these values and principles holds the promise of creating what President Bush has called a "commonwealth of freedom." One important pillar of any new international order is an open global trade and investment regime. The success of the Uruguay Round of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and regional initiatives such as APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] are critical to sustaining a global economic and financial environment that can accelerate economic growth worldwide and counter the dangers of protectionism. One need only look back to the experiences of the 1930s to see how deceptive the simplistic lure of economic nationalism and closed regional blocs can be. Communism's demise, and the resulting transformation of Europe, has also helped to catalyze a new and unprecedented phase of strategic arms reductions which is gradually moving us away from the tense nuclear confrontation that has dominated our security concerns these past four decades. Indeed, the progress we have made of late in controlling these fearsome weapons validates our reliance on the principle of global deterrence. Beginning with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty in 1988 and including the recently concluded Conventional [Armed] Forces in Europe (CFE) and strategic arms reduction (START) accords, we are finally transforming the superpower strategic competition in a fundamental way. By last May, we and the Soviets had destroyed 2,700 declared intermediate range missiles, fulfilling that key aspect of our INF Treaty obligations. And the START accord mandates the reduction of over 7,600 US and Soviet warheads on strategic ballistic missiles. We are making equally dramatic progress in other areas of arms control. The recently concluded CFE accord will eliminate tens of thousands of tanks, combat aircraft, artillery, and combat helicopters in Europe upon full implementation. President Bush is committed to ridding the world of chemical weapons, an area of arms control where your Australian neighbors are playing a leading role. And we have established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) reflecting our growing efforts to constrain the spread of ballistic missiles. As we pursue our goals of a more secure and prosperous world order, the fate of the Soviet Union is currently at the center of our concerns and efforts. It is our hope that the Soviets will continue down the path of perestroika--toward free elections, free markets, and the free flow of people and ideas. The transformation of the Soviet Union will facilitate the goal Secretary Baker described recently in Berlin--that of building a "Euro-Atlantic community" from Vancouver east to Vladivostok.
Asian Trends
The Asia-Pacific region has not been unaffected by the trends now transforming Europe. Asia moves at its own pace and in its own way; yet the same economic and political forces evident elsewhere have long been at work in this part of the world. During the 1980s, East Asia was the pace-setting region in the transformations of the information age. This past decade saw: -- Japan's emergence as an economic superpower; -- The high-tech, export-led growth of the newly industrializing "tigers" of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore; -- Deng Xiaoping's economic opening up of China, which produced a decade of 10% annual growth--ironically and tragically creating the social and political pressures that exploded in Tienanmen Square 2 years ago; and -- Transitions to democracy in the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and now even in Mongolia. Recently, we have begun to see new international relationships emerging in the Asia/Pacific region. Whether it be Sino-Soviet normalization, Secretary Baker making his second trip in a year to newly democratic Mongolia, South Korea normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and building new economic ties with China, or Mr. Gorbachev visiting Tokyo, change is clearly in the air. As the overlay of US-Soviet competition in the Pacific diminishes, East Asia's traditional multipolarity is becoming increasingly pronounced. This region is a complex security environment in which some of the largest armed forces in the world--those of the US, the USSR, China, Japan, North and South Korea, Vietnam, and India--are deployed in response to a variety of security concerns. In this changing environment, the primary rationale for our forward- deployed military presence is evolving as well. The Soviet dimension of our security concerns is diminishing, and regional issues are acquiring heightened prominence. Reflecting these new circumstances, our East Asia Strategy Initiative--presented to the Congress early last year--outlined force adjustments we are now undertaking in order to sustain an adequate forward-deployed security presence in the region into the coming century. The vast majority of countries in East Asia and the Pacific continue to look to the United States to play the role of regional balancer, honest broker, and ultimate guarantor of stability and security. We share this view and accept the responsibility. And while the form of our security engagement will adjust to new realities, I can say unequivocally that we intend to retain the substance of this role and the bilateral defense relationships which give it structure. Our adaptation to new circumstances should not be misinterpreted as withdrawal. America's destiny lies across the Pacific. Our engagement in the region is here to stay. Despite the positive changes I have mentioned, East Asia is still burdened by several unresolved problems from the Cold War era. Most prominently, the heavily armed standoff on the Korean peninsula remains one of the world's most dangerous confrontations. And now the prospect of nuclear proliferation on the peninsula constitutes the number one threat to security and stability in Northeast Asia. The unresolved dispute over the Soviet occupation of Japan's northern territories impedes normalization between Moscow and Tokyo, despite Mr. Gorbachev's historic visit to Japan this past April. In Southeast Asia, the Cambodia conflict is only now slowly heading toward resolution. The efforts of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the Paris Conference co- chairmen, together with the new climate of reconciliation amongst the Cambodian factions, offer hope that a just and durable peace may at long last be emerging. Such a development will pave the way for a new era in Indochina and open the door for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to join the mainstream of national development that is transforming Southeast Asia.
Asian Challenges
Against this background, let me outline the challenges I see ahead in the Asia-Pacific theater if we are to enhance the relative stability of the region and promote a new cycle of economic growth. Nothing is more important to both security and prosperity in the Pacific than the US-Japan relationship. It is the keystone of our engagement in the Pacific. This relationship between the world's two largest and most technologically advanced economies--which together produce nearly 40% of the world's GNP--is multifaceted and vital to the effectiveness of the emerging international system. Our challenge is to sustain the US-Japan security alliance. We also welcome Japan's consideration of new responsibilities in global peacekeeping operations under the UN flag and disaster relief activities. At the same time, we are working to remove the impediments to a more balanced economic relationship. This will enable us to build a truly global partnership with Japan on solid political and economic foundations. We are also updating our other bilateral security alliances in the region--with the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and with Australia. In Korea, our robust ally of four decades is now progressing toward assumption of the lead role in its own defense, and in the Philippines we hope to conclude a bases agreement updated to reflect a new level of US-Philippine partnership. We must sustain our engagement with China and encourage it to resume its long march down the road of economic and political reform and to cooperate with us on regional issues of mutual concern such as Cambodia and Korea and on global issues such as nuclear and missile proliferation. One challenge of particular interest to our two countries--and one where New Zealand's engagement is especially important--is that of promoting economic development, social advance, and protection of the environment in the South Pacific. President Bush's unprecedented Honolulu summit last November with the leaders of 11 Pacific island nations and the initiatives he undertook in the areas of trade, aid, and investment reflect our strong interest in the Pacific islands. Only a few days ago, I attended the South Pacific post-forum dialogue in Kolonia. Our two countries play complementary roles in the forum and other multilateral institutions such as the Regional Environment Program. We look forward to expanding cooperation with New Zealand in this geographically dispersed but important part of the world. The single most important factor shaping the Asia-Pacific region today is the remarkable dynamism of the Pacific Rim economies. In our view, it is interdependent economic growth that holds the greatest promise of bringing an enhanced sense of community to the Asia-Pacific region. This is particularly true at a time when technological and commercial capabilities more than military strength are becoming the most relevant measures of national power and influence. For the United States, trans-Pacific trade--now over $300 billion annually-- is one-third larger than that across the Atlantic. Like the United States, New Zealand is also a maritime trading nation. We share the challenge of maintaining an open system of commerce and investment that has been the engine of global economic growth, and New Zealand's efforts in the Cairns group of the GATT demonstrate the importance you attach--along with the US--to strengthening a liberalized trading regime of worldwide scope. In the Pacific, however, economic growth has outpaced mechanisms and institutions to manage its varied political, environmental, and social effects. This is why the US joined together with Australia, New Zealand, and nine other nations of the Pacific Basin to promote economic cooperation based on free market principles by forming APEC--the initiative for enhancing the economic structure of regional integration. APEC is also an important rallying point for support of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. And the work programs of APEC are demonstrating, in practical terms, why the economies of the Pacific Basin share a common future. In addition to these economic concerns, we also face such challenges to our collective well-being as protecting the environment, managing refugee flows, defending against terrorism, and suppressing the global traffic in illicit narcotics. Such transnational issues have now moved high on our common agenda.
The Challenge of Collective Security
As we begin to grapple with the challenges that are shaping the world of tomorrow, it is important to take stock of what made possible the achievements in Western economic growth, security, and arms control I have discussed and how those lessons apply to our future efforts. Looking back at the Cold War era and, more recently, the Gulf conflict, the importance of alliances based on shared values and common interests stands out sharply. As revelation after revelation about past Soviet behavior surfaces in this age of glasnost, the value of deterrence becomes increasingly evident. Deterrence pursued by the United States and its allies limited opportunities for aggression and helped bring the weight of socialism's failures down on the Soviet system. Now a Europe whole and free enjoying the benefits of collective security is finally possible. And I must point out here that even as the Warsaw Pact has been relegated to history's dustbin, NATO continues to thrive, remodeling itself to meet the demands of a new era. Reflecting on the Persian Gulf conflict, several points are worthy of emphasis: the confrontation with Saddam Hussein demonstrated America's determination to work with the member states of the UN in responding to a threat to collective security in a distant part of the globe. The United States was not the Lone Ranger. President Bush mobilized a consensus in the United Nations and a coalition on the ground in Saudi Arabia to defend the fundamental principles of the rule of law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The Gulf conflict demonstrated the renewed vitality of the United Nations and the prospect of the UN fulfilling the role originally envisioned for the world body by its founders. The promise of an effective global system of collective security offers particular hope for the security of smaller nations. In the Gulf conflict, Saddam Hussein gave us a disturbing lesson in the security challenges we face as ambitious leaders of smaller states exploit their all-too-ready access to ballistic missiles, nuclear technology, and other weapons of mass destruction in pursuit of aggressive designs. New Zealand's positive support for the UN coalition during the Gulf crisis demonstrated a farsighted view of the country's national interest and gave a ringing endorsement to the concept of collective security. Let me say here that New Zealand's military contributions to [Operation] Desert Storm were recognized and sincerely appreciated. The deployment of transport aircraft and medical personnel reaffirmed New Zealand's longstanding commitment to the principles and peacekeeping activities of the United Nations. Indeed, New Zealand has a rich tradition of support for collective security efforts. Looking back to World War II, the outstanding contributions of New Zealanders in the European, Middle East, and Pacific theaters readily come to mind. Here in Auckland, I particularly want to salute a local hero, Royal Air Force Vice Marshall Keith Park, who with hundreds of other New Zealanders served in the RAF, contributing to the success of the Battle of Britain 50 years ago. Their exploits and sacrifices are an enduring reminder of the guts and grit displayed in the Allied fight against fascist tyranny--one of the many instances in which our two nations have fought shoulder to shoulder. As Foreign Minister Don McKinnon has pointed out, during this century a quarter of a million New Zealand troops have fought overseas in two world wars, in Korea, and in Southeast Asia. The global trends for change I have outlined, for all their promise, also underscore the undiminished need for cooperative security efforts in the times ahead. Whether it be the danger of nuclear proliferation in Iraq, on the Indian subcontinent, or in East Asia, preserving the environment, or combating drugs and terrorism, the logic of common action in support of collective security is no less valid today than it was during the darkest days of World War II or during the decades of [the] Cold War. New Zealand's voice is given weight and outreach in world affairs by its participation in the multilateral institutions of the international system--in the Cairns group of the GATT, the Group of 24, or in the United Nations. New Zealand's voice has credibility in the GATT because it is a full member respecting all the rules of the GATT regime. This same principle must also apply to the areas of defense and security. The uncertainty and dangers of the post-Cold War world--for all its opportunities as well--require steadiness of purpose which our alliances gain from shared values and common interests.
US-New Zealand
But alliances a la carte will not work. Nor can one member of an alliance adopt policies that compromise the ability of an ally to meet its responsibilities and still expect to enjoy the benefits of collective security. Shared responsibilities and shared benefits are but two sides of the same coin. The building blocks of Asian security in the era now unfolding will be primarily America's bilateral alliance relationships. As we saw in the Gulf, the ability of the United States to meet its commitments globally and regionally still depends on the credibility of our deterrent forces and on freedom of the seas. These factors for credibility and mobility are in New Zealand's interest no less than our own. Infringements on the freedom of movement of our naval forces, particularly if they inspire restrictions in other areas of the world, would seriously impair not only our ability to meet our treaty obligations but also our capacity to act as the "balancing wheel" in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, our policy of neither- confirm-nor-deny (NCND) is important to meeting our alliance commitments in Asia as in Europe. Adopting policies which impair New Zealand's ability to fulfill its collective security obligations under the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-United States] pact does more than prohibit the visits of American or British ships. It denies New Zealand access to joint training opportunities, security intelligence, and the most advanced defense technologies. It also deprives New Zealand of its proper voice in shaping future regional and global security arrangements. Let me be clear: New Zealand is an important democratic friend. We want your voice to be fully heard in the councils that are shaping the world of the 21st century. In this regard, I should add that we have taken note of the efforts of the present New Zealand Government to reject isolationism and to define New Zealand's foreign policy interests in the broad, global terms appropriate to a maritime, trading nation in this ever-more interdependent world. The Bolger Government's recent defense white paper clearly outlines a strategy of wider engagement in security areas--a view we welcome. Prime Minister Bolger recently pointed out that New Zealand's decision to ban from its ports certain naval vessels from nuclear- capable nations has not halted the expansion of nuclear weapons. What is reversing the proliferation of these instruments of mass destruction is arms control agreements negotiated with the strength and solidarity of our vital alliances. The transformations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the achievement of substantial arms reductions through the CFE and START accords demonstrate that collective security has worked. Deterrence and its corollary, NCND, have worked. Tomorrow's sources of aggression may be different from those of the Cold War era. But they will be no less threatening to our security. Tomorrow's nuclear threats will be from the Iraqs and North Koreas of the world. And banning ships of friends and allies-- forces needed to help deter the proliferating danger of nuclear and missile forces in the Third World--benefits no one. How New Zealand resolves the dilemma it has created with its allies because of its anti-nuclear legislation is a matter for New Zealanders to decide. I can say that for our part, the United States wants a fully restored relationship with New Zealand--one that will allow us to work closely with the confidence of full allies in pursuit of mutual security interests and obligations. And only New Zealand can take the steps needed to make this a reality. For the present, we are committed to sustaining cooperative relations with New Zealand outside the areas of security and defense. In matters of economics, the environment, and political affairs, we will continue to collaborate as friends and with the hope that the fully normal ties of close allies will not be long in coming.
We are fortunate to be living in a time of great promise and opportunity. The ascendancy of the values of democracy, human rights, and free markets bodes well for the future. In East Asia and the Pacific, a new sense of community is growing based on the region's economic dynamism and its integration through trade. As we have done in wars both hot and cold, we want to stand shoulder to shoulder with New Zealand in the struggle for security, prosperity, and human rights as we advance into the post-Cold War era. It is our hope that New Zealand will join us as full partners as we shape the world of the 21st century.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

US Nuclear Testing Policy

Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control [TEXT]
For more than four decades, a strong nuclear deterrent has ensured US security and helped preserve freedom. As long as nuclear weapons play a critical role in US national security strategy, they must continue to be tested underground to ensure their safety, reliability, effectiveness, and survivability. In this context, the United States and Soviet Union ratified two nuclear testing treaties and verification protocols in December 1990.
Nuclear Testing Talks
Nuclear testing talks between the United States and the Soviet Union began in Geneva in November 1987, when the two countries agreed to negotiate effective verification protocols for two existing but then unratified treaties--the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), which covers tests of nuclear weapons, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976), which covers the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes such as excavations. The treaties ban individual nuclear explosions--whether for testing nuclear weapons or for peaceful purposes--with a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (150,000 tons of TNT). However, neither treaty could be verified effectively in its original form. Following six rounds of talks, the negotiating teams completed work in May 1990 on these verification protocols, which were signed at the Washington summit, May 30-June 3, 1990. The TTBT and PNET entered into force when Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze exchanged instruments of ratification in Houston on December 11, 1990.
Effective Verification
The two protocols, which contain similar provisions, provide for effective verification of compliance with the treaties. The protocols give each side the right to employ hydrodynamic yield measurement, on-site inspection, and seismic monitoring in the territory of the testing party. Each side will have the right to use these methods in the measurement of explosions whose planned yields exceed agreed levels. For effective verification of compliance with these treaties, the United States requires and has achieved the right to make direct, on-site hydrodynamic yield measurements of all Soviet tests exceeding 50 kilotons. The US hydrodynamic method is CORRTEX (continuous reflectometry for radius vs. time experiment), the most accurate, non-intrusive technique the United States has identified. This verification method determines the yield of a nuclear test by measuring, at the detonation site, the speed of the supersonic shock wave in the earth caused by the detonation. The speed of the shock wave is determined by measuring the rate at which it crushes a coaxial cable buried near the explosive device. Seismic monitoring is the traditional method of calculating the strength of an explosion. Seismic monitors measure the explosion's shock waves as they move through the earth, as is done in measuring the strength of earthquakes, in order to arrive at an estimate of explosive yield. On-site inspections will permit each side to take core samples and rock fragments from the area of the nuclear test in order to confirm geological and geophysical data associated with each explosion. In addition, national technical means will be used to monitor all explosions.
How Do the Protocols Work?
Under the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty protocol, the United States and the Soviet Union have the right to make direct on-site hydrodynamic measurements (CORRTEX for the United States) of peaceful nuclear explosions with a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons and on-site inspections for explosions with planned yields above 35 kilotons. In addition, both sides have the right to use a network of local, on-site seismic monitors to identify the number of explosions in a group explosion with a planned aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons. Under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty protocol, both countries will have the right to make direct on-site hydrodynamic measurements (again, CORRTEX for the United States) of all nuclear weapons tests whose planned yield exceeds 50 kilotons. For tests with planned yields above 35 kilotons, on-site inspections will be allowed. In addition, under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, in- country seismic monitoring will be permitted for all tests with planned yields above 50 kilotons, using three designated seismic stations that are off-site but within the testing country's territory. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty protocol also contains some special verification provisions for tests performed in non-standard configurations and for tests involving multiple nuclear explosions. In addition, the protocol provides that, in any of the first 5 calendar years following entry into force of the treaty, if one side does not conduct at least two tests with planned yields above 50 kilotons (the criteria becomes one such test in the sixth year and thereafter), the other side may use the hydrodynamic measuring method on up to two tests (on one test in the sixth year and thereafter) with planned yields below the 50-kiloton level in that year.
Further Limits on Nuclear Testing
The United States has a step-by-step approach to further limits on nuclear testing, as Secretary Baker reaffirmed at the February 1990 Moscow ministerial. The United States believes it is necessary to observe the implementation of the two treaties and their verification protocols. This will give both sides valuable additional experience with the complex, on-site monitoring and verification methods in these protocols. After a period of observation, the United States will be better able to assess the verification process and to determine additional moves that make sense from a national security standpoint. The United States has not yet identified further limitations on nuclear testing beyond those now contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty that would be in the US security interest. A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term US objective. Such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when the United States no longer needs to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when it has achieved: -- Broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions; -- Greatly improved verification capabilities; -- Expanded confidence-building measures; and -- Greater balance in conventional forces. (###)
Why Testing Is Essential
Underground nuclear testing is necessary to maintain the credibility of the US deterrent by ensuring that nuclear weapons are: Safe--Testing permits improvements to be made in safety and security features of nuclear weapons. Reliable--Testing is needed to detect deterioration or other potentially serious problems that may arise in stockpiled weapons. Effective--Testing enables the United States to modernize weapons as needed in relation to improvement and growth in Soviet military capabilities. Survivable--Testing allows the United States to ensure that military and command and control equipment are survivable.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

United States Munitions List Proposed Rulemaking

Description: Text of a Presidential Directive released by the Department of State Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC Date: Jul 25, 19917/25/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Science/Technology, Trade/Economics [TEXT] After extensive interagency consultation, the Department of State published today six notices of proposed rulemaking that would amend the United States Munitions List [USML]. The USML is part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations [ITAR], which governs the export of defense articles and defense services. Public and industry comments are solicited on these proposals. The proposed rules are the first of the planned changes to the ITAR to fulfill the President's Directive of November 16, 1990, to "remove from the US Munitions List all items contained on the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] Dual-Use List unless significant US national security interests would be jeopardized." Pursuant to the President's directive, the Department of State led an interagency review of the COCOM Dual- Use Industrial List and the USML to identify the items of overlap on the two lists. The proposed rules cover seven categories of the USML: Category IV for robots and robot controllers; Category V for military explosives; Category VI for naval surface vessels; Category IX for military training equipment; Category XI for military electronics (except those used for intelligence or security purposes); Category XVI for nuclear equipment; and Category XX for submersible vessels. Under the proposed rules, all of the identified items of overlap on the USML and the COCOM Dual-Use List would be removed from the USML and licensed by the Department of Commerce (items of overlap were identified in Categories V, VI, XI, and XX). For the USML categories where no overlap was identified on the two lists (Categories IV, IX, and XVI), items will remain on the USML. The anticipated implementation of these proposed regulations as final rules will result in the Department of Commerce having licensing jurisdiction over many specific items currently under Department of State jurisdiction. Examples include floating dry docks, service craft, non-military deep submergence vessels, armored coaxial cable, and certain explosives. After evaluating public and industry comments, the final rules will be published by December 1, 1991. Still under interagency consideration are draft proposed rules covering five categories of the USML: Category VIII for aircraft and related equipment; a subsection of Category XI dealing with electronic equipment for intelligence or security purposes; Category XII for image intensification tubes and devices; Category XIII for auxiliary military equipment, including that used for intelligence purposes; and a new Category XV for spacecraft and related items. We anticipate that decisions regarding publication of these proposed notices will be forthcoming within the next several weeks. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

Passport Fees to Rise

Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91 Category: Features Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Travel, State Department [TEXT] Fees for a US passport are expected to rise before the end of the year. The cost for an adult 10-year passport will go from $35 to $55 and for a child's 5-year passport from $20 to $30. The fee increase is largely due to the rise in both labor and material costs as well as the need to produce a more tamper-proof and secure document. Americans who want to beat the fee increase may apply for their passport at one of the 13 US passport agencies or at one of the 3,500 post offices or clerks-of-court around the United States. First-time applicants must apply in person and present a completed DSP-11 passport application (obtained from one of the offices noted above), proof of US citizenship, proof of identity, and two identical 2x2 inch photographs. Applicants who must make a personal appearance are required to pay an execution fee which is expected to be $10. Applicants in possession of a current or recently expired passport may be eligible to apply by mail. To qualify, applicants must be able to include a previous passport issued within the past 12 years and obtained when they were over age 16. Applicants should complete a DSP-82 (available at the offices mentioned above) and mail it along with their passport, photographs, and fee to the closest passport agency. To avoid sending cash through the mail, payment should be made by money order, bank draft, or check. The new passport will be returned to the applicant by mail, usually within 3 weeks. A passport can be renewed anytime and does not have to be expired before renewal. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991 Title:

New Ambassadors April-June 1991

Date: Jun 31, 19916/31/91 Category: Ambassadorial Appointments Country: United States Subject: State Department [TEXT] Belgium--Bruce S. Gelb, June 10, 1991 Republic of Djibouti--Charles R. Baquet III, June 26, 1991 Republic of Malawi--Michael T. F. Pistor, May 22, 1991 Republic of Senegal--Katherine Shirley, May 22, 1991 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland--Raymond George Hardenbergh Seitz, May 11, 1991 Republic of Zaire--Melissa Foelsch Wells, May 14, 1991(###)