US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: The Crisis in the Soviet Union: News Conference Excerpts
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpts from a news conference, Kennebunkport, Maine
Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Let me make a few comments about these momentous and stunning
events. While we're still watching the situation unfold--and it still
is unfolding; all is not clear--it seems clearer all the time that,
contrary to official statements out of Moscow, that this move was
extra-constitutional, outside of the constitutional provisions for
governmental change.
Clearly, it's a disturbing development; there's no question
about that, and it could have serious consequences for the Soviet
society and in Soviet relations with other countries--including the
United States. President Gorbachev is clearly a historic figure, one
who's led the Soviet Union toward reform domestically and toward a
constructive and cooperative role in the international arena. It's
important to keep in mind the enormous changes that have taken
place--toward openness, toward reform, changes in Eastern Europe,
the new-found cooperation with the United States and others in the
Gulf and many other areas. There's a whole new era of cooperation,
and we don't want to see that change, obviously.
Gorbachev's contributions have laid a foundation for progress
that I am convinced the people in the Soviet Union want to see
continue. This morning I've been in touch with other world leaders.
I just hung up from talking to Chancellor Kohl; I talked to President
Mitterrand; I talked to Prime Minister John Major. I'm sure I'll be
talking to others today. I talked to the Secretary of State, and I
talked to our DCM [deputy chief of mission] in Moscow, who,
incidentally, tells me that all our people there are safe and all are
properly accounted for. I say that to reassure any families that are
involved. Their information there, as you can imagine, is probably
as sketchy as the rest of the world's at this time.
So what we'll do is follow the events very carefully as they
unfold in order to determine the appropriate response that we, in
consultation with our allies, should make. We expect that the
Soviet Union will live up fully to its international obligations, and
clearly, any commitments that are outstanding on the part of the
West will be judged and acted on in accordance with that statement
that the Soviet Government must live up to its obligations.
Obviously, the West is not going to retreat from its principles of
reform, openness, [and its] commitment to democracy.
And there's a lot at stake here. I don't know whether to take
heart or not from [Gennady] Yanayev's statement that this does not
mean turning back the reforms, but there was such a statement
made by him. So the situation is still quite murky inside the Soviet
Union. I have the notes here of my calls from--the calls I made to--
Kohl, Mitterrand, and Major, and I think it's fair to say that all of us
are in total agreement with what I've said, with what John Major
has said. President Mitterrand will be talking to the French
television in a few hours, I'm told. So I think, at this point, what
we do is simply watch the situation unfold and we state and restate
our principles. And we'll see where matters go. It's all still
unfolding.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: The Crisis in the Soviet Union: News Conference Excerpts
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpts from a news conference, the White House,
Washington, DC
Date: Aug 20, 19918/20/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, NATO
[TEXT]
The events in the Soviet Union continue to deeply concern the whole
world. The unconstitutional seizure of power is an affront to the
goals and aspirations that the Soviet peoples have been nurturing
over the past years. This action also puts the Soviet Union at odds
with the world community and undermines the positive steps that
have been undertaken to make the Soviet Union an integral and
positive force in world affairs.
I have this morning spoken with Boris Yeltsin, the freely
elected leader of the Russian Republic, and I assured Mr. Yeltsin of
continued US support for his goal of the restoration of Mr.
Gorbachev as the constitutionally chosen leader. I also shared with
him the support that other world leaders voiced in my several
conversations yesterday, conversations I had with those leaders in
Eastern Europe and leaders in Western Europe as well--[Japanese]
Prime Minister Kaifu, and I gave him that reassurance. Mr. Yeltsin
is encouraged by the support of the Soviet people and this
determination in the face of these trying circumstances. He
expressed his gratitude for our support of him and President
Gorbachev.
The situation concerning President Gorbachev's status is still
unclear. I've twice tried to reach him by phone, including within the
last hour, but have so far been unsuccessful.
We continue to closely monitor this situation. Our new and, I
might add, very able Ambassador to the Soviet Union Robert
Strauss--just sworn in--will be departing immediately for Moscow
to take charge of our embassy, and to report to me on the situation
that he finds in the Soviet Union. So I'm asking him to go over
there, get the lay of the land, establish what will be strong
leadership--the embassy, we've got a good team in place, but this
man is in charge of this important mission--and then to return
within the next several days to give me a full, personal report on
what he sees there.
He will not be presenting his credentials on this trip. It's
going to be a short trip--and I've said that this group assumed
power extra-constitutionally.
In conclusion, I want to emphasize that we are going to
monitor the situation closely and consider its ramifications
throughout the entire world. I've emphasized in my conversation
with the East European leaders that the democratic processes in
their country cannot be reversed. Eastern Europe is important. I've
called three of the leaders, and I want to take this opportunity to
assure them of our continued interest and the need to retain calm in
those countries, and indeed, they were very grateful for the contact
by the United States.
The United States will continue to support the economic and
political reforms in their countries, and I will continue to seek the
advice and counsel of East European leaders in the days ahead. Of
course, the Secretary [of State] and I will be in close touch with the
West European leaders and others around the globe.
Because this is an ongoing process of consultations, we intend
to maintain a more formal work schedule during the remainder of
my stay in Maine. There will be a number of meetings with
government officials and private sector experts related to the
events in the Soviet Union. There will be daily briefings on a
formalized basis by my national security advisers, and I will be
keeping in touch with Secretary Baker.
As you know, I will be receiving [Canadian] Prime Minister
Mulroney and also [UK] Prime Minister Major and, of course,
receiving Ambassador Strauss when he returns.
Secretary Baker will be leaving today for the NATO
ministerial that will be held in Brussels.
These difficult events in the Soviet Union, I believe,
demonstrate the wisdom of our strong and continuous support for
the process of reform and restructuring. We'll continue to support
the democratic processes that have been set in motion in the Soviet
Union, and most importantly, I know that the American people stand
behind the people of the Soviet Union who are seeking more freedom
and more opportunity in their society.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: The Crisis in the Soviet Union: News Conference Excerpts
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statement at a news conference, Kennebunkport, Maine
Date: Aug 21, 19918/21/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, NATO
(August 21, 1991, 10:35 am)
I wanted to report to the American people on some of the latest
developments related to the situation in the Soviet Union.
I spoke at length this morning to President [of the Russian
Republic] Boris Yeltsin--the call began at about 8:30 am--and I also
talked to Ambassador Strauss who is now in our Embassy in
Moscow--in position--and I also talked in the last 20 hours to
President Menem in Argentina, to Prime Minister Mulroney, [and]
Prime Minister Major, and I will continue these kinds of
consultative calls.
President Yeltsin was clearly encouraged by the fact that he
had survived another night in the Russian Parliament building
without a major assault by the forces supporting this coup. He told
me that tens of thousands of Muscovites had turned out to help
guard the building from attack.
Yeltsin said he was encouraged by indications that more and
more military units and their commanders were abandoning support
of the coup.
His building is still surrounded, however, and special troops--
the Spetznaz--are remaining loyal to the coup plotters. It is those
troops who are moving to occupy additional sites in the Baltic
states.
President Yeltsin said that the Russian Supreme Soviet had
met and declared unanimously that the coup was illegal and without
effect, and he also mentioned the importance of the next meeting of
the Union Supreme Soviet which will be held on August 26th.
And they are--this is the way he put it--they are vigorously
trying to line up support for that Supreme Soviet to declare this
coup illegal.
President Yeltsin said he told the Supreme Soviet of the
strong support being given by the United States to those resisting
the illegal emergency committee activities and that the Supreme
Soviet received the news very, very warmly.
There are at present, according to Yeltsin, flights of aircraft
carrying his representatives and also others with members of the
emergency committee on their way to the Crimea to meet with
[Soviet] President Gorbachev.
Obviously, he doesn't have all the details on that, and I won't
be able to fill you in on any details on that either.
President Yeltsin said he was prepared for all contingencies.
He thanked the United States profusely for its support, which was
making an important difference, and asked that we continue to stay
in touch with him, which we will do.
Ambassador Bob Strauss, who had just arrived, gave me a
rundown on developments in Moscow which paralleled those of
President Yeltsin--the reports he was getting there.
Overall, while the situation remains highly fluid and
uncertain, I think it is safe to say that the situation appears
somewhat more positive than in the earliest hours of this coup.
And so I will stay in touch with President Yeltsin [and],
hopefully, at some point be able to contact President Gorbachev--
which we are still unable to do, but I guess I would say to the
American people these developments are positive.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: The Crisis in the Soviet Union: News Conference Excerpts
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statement at a news conference, Kennebunkport, Maine
Date: Aug 21, 19918/21/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, NATO
(August 21, 1991, 1:15 pm)
Well, I just wanted to report that at 12:19 pm I had a phone
conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev, and it lasted about--what, 20
minutes, I think. It was a good call. Gorbachev is still in the
Crimea. He will return either tonight or tomorrow to Moscow. He
tells me that things are under control. His first call, I believe, was
with Boris Yeltsin.
He stated his sincere appreciation to the people of the United
States and others around the world for their support for democracy
and reform. He sounded in good physical condition--indeed, his
voice was buoyant. Barbara was with me, and we both asked him to
convey our respects to Raisa, which he--and he very kindly made
references to his friendship with Barbara and me on a personal
basis. But it was good; it was a good talk. It's a good development.
Now he will be going back to Moscow and, hopefully, working
with the presidents of the republic--Nazarbayev and Kravchuk, the
Ukraine leader, staying with him; there's a good basis now for all of
this.
So we'll see what happens, but, in his view, the constitutional
authorities are back in power and democracy and freedom and
reform have prevailed. That's his assessment. I hope it's not ahead
of where things stand in Moscow.
I have not talked again to President Yeltsin, but he believes
that Moiseyev has ordered the forces back to their bases. All in all,
it's a very, very positive development.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: US Policy Guidelines Concerning Events in the
Soviet Union
Fitzwater
Description: Statement released by the Office of the Press
Secretary, the White House, Washington, DC
Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
We are deeply disturbed by the events of the last hours in the Soviet
Union and condemn the unconstitutional resort to force. While the
situation continues to evolve and information remains incomplete,
the apparent unconstitutional removal of President Gorbachev, the
declaration of a state of emergency, and the deployment of Soviet
military forces in Moscow and other cities, raise the most serious
questions about the future course of the Soviet Union. This
misguided and illegitimate effort by-passes both Soviet law and the
will of the Soviet peoples.
Accordingly, we support President Yeltsin's call for
"restoration of the legally elected organs of power and the
reaffirmation of the post of USSR President M. [Mikhail] S.
Gorbachev."
Greater democracy and openness in Soviet society, including
steps toward implementation of Soviet obligations under the
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris have made a crucial
contribution to the welcome improvement in East-West relations
during the past few years.
In these circumstances, US policy will be based on the
following guidelines:
-- We believe the policies of reform in the Soviet Union must
continue, including democratization, the process of peaceful
reconciliation between the center and the republics, and economic
transformation;
-- We support all constitutionally elected leaders and oppose
the use of force or intimidation to suppress them or restrict their
right to free speech;
-- We oppose the use of force in the Baltic states or against
any republics to suppress or replace democratically elected
governments;
-- We call upon the USSR to abide by its international
treaties and commitments, including its commitments to respect
basic human rights and democratic practices under the Helsinki
accords, and the Charter of Paris;
-- We will avoid in every possible way actions that would
lend legitimacy or support to this coup effort;
-- We have no interest in a new Cold War or in the
exacerbation of East-West tensions;
-- At the same time, we will not support economic aid
programs if adherence to extra-constitutional means
continues.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: The Situation in the USSR
Woerner
Source: NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner
Description: Text of a statement made by on behalf of the North
Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium
Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, Europe
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: NATO, Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization
[TEXT]
The North Atlantic Council met for a first discussion of today's
disturbing developments in the Soviet Union and their implications.
The internal reforms and new thinking in foreign policy
pursued by the Soviet leadership in the past years have led to the
end of the Cold War era, and opened the way to building a Europe
whole and free. The Allies are deeply concerned that the latest
developments foreshadow a grave deviation from this path of
reform and the rule of law in the Soviet Union, with most serious
consequences for the Soviet Union itself, its neighbors, and the
whole international community.
The Allies expect that the Soviet Union will adhere fully to
its international commitments and obligations. With the signing of
the Charter of Paris for a new Europe in November 1990, the Soviet
Union, along with all participating states, committed itself to the
advancement of democracy based on free elections and human
rights, as indispensable in strengthening peace and security among
the member states of the CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe]. Any obstacles to further democratization in
the Soviet Union might not only endanger the essential domestic
political and economic reforms, but could also weaken that
country's ability to serve as one of the necessary underpinnings of
the new cooperative order in Europe.
The Allies will continue to monitor developments in the
Soviet Union very closely. We will follow with particular attention
the manner in which the Soviet Union's human rights obligations are
observed in regard to members of the reform movement and others
who may be opposed to today's events.
The Allies are determined to ensure that the achievements of
the last years in all fields of international policy of equal
importance for the security of all states of Europe and North
America are not reversed. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: 1991 National Security Strategy Report
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statement at Kennebunkport, Maine.
Date: Aug 13, 19918/13/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
Today I signed and forwarded to Congress the National Security
Strategy Report for 1991. This report comes at a rare moment in
history. Seldom if ever have we been offered such an opportunity--
to build a new international system in accordance with our own
values and ideals. The Cold War has at long last released its grip on
world events. Democracy is coming to Eastern Europe. The Gulf war
helped create an unprecedented consensus that aggressive force
must not be used to settle disputes and that if it is, the
international community will respond. More so than ever before, we
have seen the United Nations play the role dreamed of by its
founders. The United States and Soviet Union have signed a treaty
that, for the first time, significantly reduces their strategic
nuclear arsenals. Yet, for all these national and international
triumphs, the world remains a volatile place, with ethnic
antagonisms, national rivalries, religious tensions, spreading
armaments, personal ambitions, and lingering authoritarianism. Our
national security strategy reflects the significant achievements,
sobering realities, and important opportunities that now confront
us.
This report emphasizes the enduring political, economic, and
military foundations of our national strategy, yet acknowledges the
mandate for change in implementing elements of that strategy.
While addressing our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union
as an inescapable priority, we will work with our allies to respond
to new political challenges, taking into account a more internally
oriented and less threatening Soviet Union. While contributing to
global stability as only America can, we will shift our focus to
regional threats and peaceful engagement. While reducing nuclear
and conventional force levels on the continent, we will work with
our NATO allies to foster reconciliation, security, and democracy in
a Europe whole and free. And, while providing adequately for our
defense, our economic well-being will remain the foundation of our
long-term strength.
Our response to strategic challenges has always been shaped
by what we are as a people, for our values are the link between our
past and our future, between our domestic life and our foreign
policy, between our power and our purpose. Our responsibility as a
nation remains not only to protect our citizens and our interests but
also to help create a new world in which our fundamental ideals not
only survive but flourish. That is the essence of our national
security strategy.
I look to this report to be the foundation for a productive,
non-partisan, national dialogue as we continue to develop and
articulate a strategic approach that will guide us safely into the
21st century. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: 1991 National Security Strategy Report: Fact Sheet
Fitzwater
Source: Text released by the White House, August 13,
1991.
Date: Aug 13, 19918/13/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
The President today transmitted to Congress the 1991 National
Security Strategy Report, as required by the 1986 Goldwater-
Nichols amendment to the National Security Act. The report
reflects the recent, dramatic changes in the international
environment and outlines US policies to both shape and respond to
these changes. It observes that we have reached a moment of
historic opportunity--for us and for the world--to build a new
international system in accordance with our own values and ideals.
Highlights of the report include:
-- Acknowledgement that the US containment strategy which
worked for 40 years must now be modified to reflect geo-strategic
realities;
-- Encouragement of the constructive evolution of the Soviet
Union;
-- Realization that US alliances will be fundamentally
affected by the internalization of the Soviet Union;
-- Recognition that the world is increasingly interdependent-
-politically, economically, technologically, and militarily--but that
US leadership across the board remains essential;
-- An emphasis on smaller, more agile forces to address
regional concerns and peacetime engagement but which could form
the basis for a reconstituted larger force should the need arise;
-- Continued American support of an international economic
system as open and inclusive as possible, and of NATO as the
indispensable foundation of trans-Atlantic cooperation with a
newly united and free Europe;
-- Vigorous pursuit of US policy toward the Middle East,
acknowledging the new challenges and opportunities afforded us by
our victory in the Gulf war;
-- Recognition of the continuing importance of East Asia and
the Pacific and the vital role our security ties play there;
-- Enhanced support for a revitalized United Nations to help
keep peace, improve the human condition, and ameliorate human
suffering;
-- Acknowledging through the Conventional Forces in Europe
and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks treaties a steadfast
commitment to arms control as a means to strengthen international
stability;
-- Renewed championing of the principles of political and
economic freedom as the surest guarantors of human progress and
global peace; and
-- A new global agenda to deal with refugee flows, drug
abuse and environmental degradation.
The report underscores the enduring nature of our basic
interests and objectives in the 1990s.
-- The survival of the United States as a free and independent
nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and
people secure.
-- A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity
for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at
home and abroad.
-- Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations
with allies and friendly nations.
-- A stable and secure world where political and economic
freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.
The report explains that our fundamental challenge is to
relate political, economic, and military means available to these
enduring goals in a world marked by extraordinarily positive change
but still rampant with challenges and threats to our security--and
to that of our allies and friends. The United States will remain
fully engaged in the larger world and will continue to pursue its
objectives in concert with those who share its values and concerns.
Our approach to security will continue to be shaped by the fact that
we are a nation separated by large oceans from many of our most
important friends and interests. Defending them will still require
the presence of American forces overseas, backed up by an ability
to project power from the United States. The strategy report
concludes with a call for continued dialogue, close cooperation and
consultation with Congress to help shape a security structure
appropriate for today's opportunities and tomorrow's challenges.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: Chronology: Strategic Nuclear Arms Negotiations and
Treaties, January-July 1991
Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91
Category: Chronologies
Region: Eurasia, North America
Country: USSR (former), United States
Subject: Arms Control, International Law
[TEXT]
The following was prepared by W. Taylor Fain, III, of the Office of
the Historian. (See Dispatch Vol. 1, No. 16, for the chronology from
1969 to 1990.)
January 28, 1991: In Washington, Secretary Baker and Soviet
Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh announced that the
proposed Moscow summit in February would be rescheduled, largely
because of the war in the Persian Gulf. Also, they stated, "work on
the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] Treaty will require
some additional time."
March 15, 1991: After meeting in Moscow with Gorbachev and
Bessmertnykh, Secretary Baker said, "We still have some unresolved
problems with CFE [the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Treaty], and we have not concluded all of the issues on START."
April 16, 1991: President Bush, asked about the prospects for a US-
Soviet summit, said at a Washington press conference, "we have
predicated this particular summit on a START agreement. . . . We've
said all along that's what it would take."
April 25, 1991: Baker and Bessmertnykh, meeting in Kislovodsk in
the Soviet Caucasus, discussed arms control issues including
START.
June 1, 1991: Baker and Bessmertnykh met in Lisbon after
witnessing the signing of the Angola peace accords. They resolved
outstanding issues on CFE implementation which had delayed
progress toward achieving a START agreement and directed their
negotiators to redouble their efforts to achieve a satisfactory
strategic weapons accord.
June 7, 1991: Baker and Bessmertnykh met in Geneva to discuss
outstanding issues on START. Baker told members of the media
afterward that there was still "a fair amount of work that has to be
done before we will conclude a START agreement."
June 20, 1991: Baker and Bessmertnykh met in Berlin. They
discussed remaining technical differences on START, including
definition of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs, warhead downloading,
and data denial.
July 6, 1991: US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock
delivered a message from President Bush to Gorbachev urging the
Soviet leader to send a high-level delegation to Washington to
resolve outstanding issues on START. The following day, the Soviet
Government announced that Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and
Chief of the Soviet General Staff General Mikhail Moiseyev would
lead a delegation to Washington that week.
July 11-14, 1991: Baker and Bessmertnykh met in Washington and
significantly narrowed remaining US-Soviet differences on START.
The only issue left unsettled concerned the definition of missile
throw-weight used to determine whether a missile is a missile of a
new type. Baker characterized the negotiations as "very, very
difficult" but expressed satisfaction with the "outstanding
progress" made during the previous 4 days.
July 17 1991: At a meeting in London on July 17, 1991, Presidents
Bush and Gorbachev reached agreement on the last remaining
technical issue holding up agreement on the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty
Description: Text of a White House Fact Sheet released by the Office
of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC
Date: Jul 31, 19917/31/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Eurasia, North America
Country: USSR (former), United States
Subject: Arms Control, International Law
At the Moscow Summit, the United States and the Soviet Union
signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty. This treaty
marks the first agreement between the two countries in which the
number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons will actually be
reduced. Reductions will take place over a period of 7 years, and
will result in parity between the strategic nuclear forces of the
two sides at levels approximately 30% below currently deployed
forces. Deeper cuts are required in the most dangerous and
destabilizing systems.
START provisions are designed to strengthen strategic
stability at lower levels and to encourage the restructuring of
strategic forces in ways that make them more stable and less
threatening. The Treaty includes a wide variety of very demanding
verification measures designed to ensure compliance and build
confidence.
Central Limits
The Treaty sets equal ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear
forces that can be deployed by either side. In addition, the Treaty
establishes an equal ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight (a
measure of overall capability for ballistic missile). Each side is
limited to no more than:
-- 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (deployed
intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs], submarine launched
ballistic missiles [SLBMs], and heavy bombers), a limit that is 36%
below the Soviet level declared in September 1990 and 29% below
the US level.
-- 6,000 total accountable warheads, about 41% below the
current Soviet level and 43% below the current US level.
-- 4,900 accountable warheads deployed on ICBMs or SLBMs,
about 48% below the current Soviet level and 40% below the current
US level.
-- 1,540 accountable warheads deployed on 154 heavy ICBMs,
a 50% reduction in current Soviet forces. The US has no heavy
ICBMs.
-- 1,100 accountable warheads deployed on mobile ICBMs.
-- Aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs
equal to about 54% of the current Soviet aggregate throw-weight.
Ballistic Missile Warhead Accountability
The Treaty uses detailed counting rules to ensure the accurate
accounting of the number of warheads attributed to each type of
ballistic missile.
-- Each deployed ballistic missile warhead counts as one
under the 4,900 ceiling and one under the 6,000 overall warhead
ceiling.
-- Each side is allowed 10 on-site inspections each year to
verify that deployed ballistic missiles contain no more warheads
than the number that is attributed to them under the Treaty.
Downloading Ballistic Missile Warheads
The Treaty also allows for a reduction in the number of warheads on
certain ballistic missiles, which will help the sides transition
their existing forces to the new regime. Such "downloading" is
permitted in a carefully structured and limited fashion.
-- The US may download its 3-warhead Minuteman III ICBM by
either 1 or 2 warheads. The Soviet Union has already downloaded
its 7-warhead SS-N-18 SLBM by 4 warheads.
-- In addition, each side may download up to 500 warheads on
two other existing types of ballistic missiles, as long as the total
number of warheads removed from downloaded missiles does not
exceed 1,250 at any one time.
New Types
The Treaty places constraints on the characteristics of new types
of ballistic missiles to ensure the accuracy of counting rules and
prevent undercounting of missile warheads.
-- The number of warheads attributed to a new type of
ballistic missile must be no less than the number determined by
dividing 40% of the missile's total throw-weight by the weight of
the lightest RV tested on that missile.
-- The throw-weight attributed to a new type must be no less
than the missile's throw-weight capability at specified reference
ranges (11,000 km for ICBMs and 9,500 km for SLBMs).
Heavy ICBMs
START places significant restrictions on the Soviet SS-18 heavy
ICBM.
-- A 50% reduction in the number of Soviet SS-18 ICBMs; a
total reduction of 154 of these Soviet missiles.
-- New types of heavy ICBMs are banned.
-- Downloading of heavy ICBMs is banned.
-- Heavy SLBMs and heavy mobile ICBMs are banned.
-- Heavy ICBMs will be reduced on a more stringent schedule
than other strategic arms.
Mobile ICBMs
Because mobile missiles are more difficult to verify than other
types of ballistic missiles, START incorporates a number of special
restrictions and notifications with regard to these missiles. These
measures will significantly improve our confidence that START will
be effectively verifiable.
-- Non-deployed mobile missiles and non-deployed mobile
launchers are numerically and geographically limited so as to limit
the possibility for reload and refire.
-- The verification regime includes continuous monitoring of
mobile ICBM production, restrictions on movements, on-site
inspections, and cooperative measures to improve the effectiveness
of national technical means of intelligence collection.
Heavy Bombers
Because heavy bombers are stabilizing strategic systems (e.g., they
are less capable of a short-warning attack than ballistic missiles),
START counting rules for weapons on bombers are different than
those for ballistic missile warheads.
-- Each heavy bomber counts as one strategic nuclear
delivery vehicle.
-- Each heavy bomber equipped to carry only short-range
missiles or gravity bombs is counted as one warhead under the
6,000 limit.
-- Each US heavy bomber equipped to carry long-range nuclear
ALCMs (up to a maximum of 150 bombers) is counted as 10
warheads even though it may be equipped to carry up to 20 ALCMs.
-- A similar discount applies to Soviet heavy bombers
equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs. Each such Soviet heavy
bomber (up to a maximum of 180) is counted as 8 warheads even
though it may be equipped to carry up to 16 ALCMs.
-- Any heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs
deployed in excess of 150 for the US or 180 for the Soviet Union
will be accountable by the number of ALCMs the heavy bomber is
actually equipped to carry.
Verification Regime
Building on recent arms control agreements, START includes
extensive and unprecedented verification provisions. This
comprehensive verification regime greatly reduces the likelihood
that violations would go undetected.
-- START bans the encryption and encapsulation of telemetric
information and other forms of information denial on flight tests of
ballistic missiles. However, strictly limited exemptions to this ban
are granted sufficient to protect the flight-testing of sensitive
research projects.
-- START allows 12 different types of on-site inspections
and requires roughly 60 different types of notifications covering
production, testing, movement, deployment, and destruction of
strategic offensive arms.
Treaty Duration
START will have a duration of 15 years, unless it is superseded by a
subsequent agreement. If the sides agree, the Treaty may be
extended for successive 5-year periods beyond the 15 years.
Non-circumvention and Third Countries
START prohibits the transfer of strategic offensive arms to third
countries, except that the Treaty will not interfere with existing
patterns of cooperation. In addition, the Treaty prohibits the
permanent basing of strategic offensive arms outside the national
territory of each side.
Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)
START does not directly count or limit ALCMs. ALCMs are limited
indirectly through their association with heavy bombers.
-- Only nuclear-armed ALCMs with a range in excess of 600
km are covered by START.
-- Long-range, conventionally-armed ALCMs that are
distinguishable from nuclear-armed ALCMs are not affected.
-- Long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs may not be located at air
bases for heavy bombers not accountable as being equipped for such
ALCMs.
-- Multiple warhead long-range nuclear ALCMs are banned.
Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)
SLCMs are not constrained by the Treaty. However, each side has
made a politically binding declaration as to its plans for the
deployment of nuclear-armed SLCMs. Conventionally-armed SLCMs
are not subject to such a declaration.
-- Each side will make an annual declaration of the maximum
number of nuclear-armed SLCMs with a range greater than 600 km
that it plans to deploy for each of the following 5 years.
-- This number will not be greater than 880 long-range
nuclear-armed SLCMs.
-- In addition, as a confidence building measure, nuclear-
armed SLCMs with a range of 300-600 km will be the subject of a
confidential annual data exchange.
Backfire Bomber
The Soviet Backfire bomber is not constrained by the Treaty.
However, the Soviet side has made a politically binding declaration
that it will not deploy more than 300 air force and 200 naval
Backfire bombers, and that these bombers will not be given
intercontinental capability.
Other Background
The START agreement consists of the treaty document itself and a
number of associated documents. Together, they total more than
700 pages. The Treaty was signed in a public ceremony by
Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in St. Vladimir's Hall in the Kremlin.
The associated documents were signed in a private ceremony at
Novo-Ogarevo, President Gorbachev's weekend dacha. Seven of these
documents were signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. Three
associated agreements were signed by Secretary Baker and Foreign
Minister Bessmertnykh. In addition, the START negotiators,
Ambassadors Brooks and Nazarkin, exchanged seven letters related
to START in a separate event at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Moscow.(###)
Magnitude of START-Accountable Reductions
Following is the aggregate data from the Memorandum of
Understanding, based upon agreed counting rules in START. (Because
of those counting rules, the number of heavy bomber weapons
actually deployed may be higher than the number shown in the
aggregate.) The data is effective as of September 1990 and will be
updated at entry into force.
United States Soviet Union
Delivery Vehicles 2,246 2,500
Warheads 10,563 10,271
Ballistic Missile Warheads 8,210 9,416
Heavy ICBMs/Warheads None 308/3,080
Throw-weight (metric tons) 2,361 6,626
As a result of the Treaty, the above values will be reduced by the
following percentages:
United States Soviet Union
Delivery Vehicles 29% 36%
Warheads 43% 41%
Ballistic Missile Warheads 40% 48%
Heavy ICBMs/Warheads None 50%
Throw-weight (metric tons) None 46%
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: Security Challenges and Alliances in a New Era
Solomon
Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs
Description: Address to the American Chamber of Commerce, Auckland,
New Zealand
Date: Aug 6, 19918/6/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, Pacific
Country: USSR (former), Japan, New Zealand
Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control,
Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
I appreciate this opportunity to share with you some thoughts about
the character of the remarkable times we are now living in--the
end of the Cold War era--and our vision of the new world order that
is slowly taking shape.
I can't think of more dramatic examples of our times than the
recent images of Mr. Gorbachev going to London bearing a program
for market-oriented reform and democracy in the Soviet Union and
then concluding a major arms reduction accord with President Bush
in Moscow. History will no doubt record the recent G-7 and US-
Soviet summits as major decision points in the quest for a post-
war order.
As the process of the Soviet Union's reconciliation with the
West advances, we in the United States are also preparing to
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Pacific war--where
Americans and New Zealanders fought so valiantly together. Now,
half a century later, we find ourselves at last beginning to close the
books on the era of ideological competition and superpower military
confrontation that emerged from that devastating global conflict.
Indeed, the London and Moscow summits are but the latest
events in a stunning cascade of developments that since 1989 have
begun to transform our world: the evaporation of Soviet domination
in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the
reunification of Germany, and changes in the character of the Soviet
Union that are enabling us to redefine US-Soviet relations and to
move from confrontation to new forms of cooperation.
These heartening developments reflect trends of global scope:
the bankruptcy of communism as a political and economic system;
worldwide economic integration sparked by spectacular
technological change; and an equally widespread movement toward
market-oriented economics, political pluralism, and concern with
human rights.
The impact of these trends now places us in one of those rare
and probably brief periods of history where we--the United States
and its allies and friends--have an opportunity to redefine
institutions and realign patterns of cooperation. Together, we can
build the foundations of an international system able to ensure that
the new millennium we are about to enter will be a time of
enhanced security, positive social change, and sustained economic
development.
At the same time, the recent war in the Persian Gulf has given
us our first glimpse of the dark side of this new era. Whether in the
Middle East, Yugoslavia, or the Soviet Union, we see dangerous
counter-trends: a renascent ethno-nationalism and the re-
emergence of regional antagonisms and rivalries long frozen over by
the Cold War confrontation. Today, ambitious tyrants in various
regions of the world have all-too-ready access to nuclear, missile,
and other technologies with which to craft weapons of mass
destruction. And Saddam [Hussein's] use of terrorism and ecological
aggression reinforced our well-established concerns about the
environment and unconventional forms of warfare.
Post-Cold War Opportunities
I will examine in a moment some of the implications for the future
of both these key developments--the end of the Cold War and the
Gulf conflict. But first let me note some of the positive
opportunities before us as we seek to shape the contours of a new
international order.
For the long term, the most important trend I see is the
universalization of Western values. The widening acceptance of the
concept of democracy, human rights, and economic liberty is evident
not just in Eastern Europe and perhaps the Soviet Union but even in
distant and land-locked Mongolia. The growing adoption of these
values and principles holds the promise of creating what President
Bush has called a "commonwealth of freedom."
One important pillar of any new international order is an open
global trade and investment regime. The success of the Uruguay
Round of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and
regional initiatives such as APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation] are critical to sustaining a global economic and
financial environment that can accelerate economic growth
worldwide and counter the dangers of protectionism. One need only
look back to the experiences of the 1930s to see how deceptive the
simplistic lure of economic nationalism and closed regional blocs
can be.
Communism's demise, and the resulting transformation of
Europe, has also helped to catalyze a new and unprecedented phase
of strategic arms reductions which is gradually moving us away
from the tense nuclear confrontation that has dominated our
security concerns these past four decades. Indeed, the progress we
have made of late in controlling these fearsome weapons validates
our reliance on the principle of global deterrence.
Beginning with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF)
Treaty in 1988 and including the recently concluded Conventional
[Armed] Forces in Europe (CFE) and strategic arms reduction
(START) accords, we are finally transforming the superpower
strategic competition in a fundamental way. By last May, we and
the Soviets had destroyed 2,700 declared intermediate range
missiles, fulfilling that key aspect of our INF Treaty obligations.
And the START accord mandates the reduction of over 7,600 US and
Soviet warheads on strategic ballistic missiles.
We are making equally dramatic progress in other areas of
arms control. The recently concluded CFE accord will eliminate
tens of thousands of tanks, combat aircraft, artillery, and combat
helicopters in Europe upon full implementation. President Bush is
committed to ridding the world of chemical weapons, an area of
arms control where your Australian neighbors are playing a leading
role. And we have established the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) reflecting our growing efforts to constrain the
spread of ballistic missiles.
As we pursue our goals of a more secure and prosperous world
order, the fate of the Soviet Union is currently at the center of our
concerns and efforts. It is our hope that the Soviets will continue
down the path of perestroika--toward free elections, free markets,
and the free flow of people and ideas. The transformation of the
Soviet Union will facilitate the goal Secretary Baker described
recently in Berlin--that of building a "Euro-Atlantic community"
from Vancouver east to Vladivostok.
Asian Trends
The Asia-Pacific region has not been unaffected by the trends now
transforming Europe. Asia moves at its own pace and in its own
way; yet the same economic and political forces evident elsewhere
have long been at work in this part of the world.
During the 1980s, East Asia was the pace-setting region in
the transformations of the information age. This past decade saw:
-- Japan's emergence as an economic superpower;
-- The high-tech, export-led growth of the newly
industrializing "tigers" of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore;
-- Deng Xiaoping's economic opening up of China, which
produced a decade of 10% annual growth--ironically and tragically
creating the social and political pressures that exploded in
Tienanmen Square 2 years ago; and
-- Transitions to democracy in the Philippines, South Korea,
Taiwan, and now even in Mongolia.
Recently, we have begun to see new international
relationships emerging in the Asia/Pacific region. Whether it be
Sino-Soviet normalization, Secretary Baker making his second trip
in a year to newly democratic Mongolia, South Korea normalizing
relations with the Soviet Union and building new economic ties
with China, or Mr. Gorbachev visiting Tokyo, change is clearly in the
air.
As the overlay of US-Soviet competition in the Pacific
diminishes, East Asia's traditional multipolarity is becoming
increasingly pronounced. This region is a complex security
environment in which some of the largest armed forces in the
world--those of the US, the USSR, China, Japan, North and South
Korea, Vietnam, and India--are deployed in response to a variety of
security concerns.
In this changing environment, the primary rationale for our
forward- deployed military presence is evolving as well. The Soviet
dimension of our security concerns is diminishing, and regional
issues are acquiring heightened prominence. Reflecting these new
circumstances, our East Asia Strategy Initiative--presented to the
Congress early last year--outlined force adjustments we are now
undertaking in order to sustain an adequate forward-deployed
security presence in the region into the coming century.
The vast majority of countries in East Asia and the Pacific
continue to look to the United States to play the role of regional
balancer, honest broker, and ultimate guarantor of stability and
security. We share this view and accept the responsibility. And
while the form of our security engagement will adjust to new
realities, I can say unequivocally that we intend to retain the
substance of this role and the bilateral defense relationships which
give it structure. Our adaptation to new circumstances should not
be misinterpreted as withdrawal. America's destiny lies across the
Pacific. Our engagement in the region is here to stay.
Despite the positive changes I have mentioned, East Asia is
still burdened by several unresolved problems from the Cold War
era. Most prominently, the heavily armed standoff on the Korean
peninsula remains one of the world's most dangerous
confrontations. And now the prospect of nuclear proliferation on
the peninsula constitutes the number one threat to security and
stability in Northeast Asia.
The unresolved dispute over the Soviet occupation of Japan's
northern territories impedes normalization between Moscow and
Tokyo, despite Mr. Gorbachev's historic visit to Japan this past
April.
In Southeast Asia, the Cambodia conflict is only now slowly
heading toward resolution. The efforts of the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council and the Paris Conference co-
chairmen, together with the new climate of reconciliation amongst
the Cambodian factions, offer hope that a just and durable peace
may at long last be emerging. Such a development will pave the way
for a new era in Indochina and open the door for Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos to join the mainstream of national development that is
transforming Southeast Asia.
Asian Challenges
Against this background, let me outline the challenges I see ahead
in the Asia-Pacific theater if we are to enhance the relative
stability of the region and promote a new cycle of economic growth.
Nothing is more important to both security and prosperity in
the Pacific than the US-Japan relationship. It is the keystone of our
engagement in the Pacific. This relationship between the world's
two largest and most technologically advanced economies--which
together produce nearly 40% of the world's GNP--is multifaceted
and vital to the effectiveness of the emerging international system.
Our challenge is to sustain the US-Japan security alliance. We
also welcome Japan's consideration of new responsibilities in
global peacekeeping operations under the UN flag and disaster relief
activities. At the same time, we are working to remove the
impediments to a more balanced economic relationship. This will
enable us to build a truly global partnership with Japan on solid
political and economic foundations.
We are also updating our other bilateral security alliances in
the region--with the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand,
and with Australia. In Korea, our robust ally of four decades is now
progressing toward assumption of the lead role in its own defense,
and in the Philippines we hope to conclude a bases agreement
updated to reflect a new level of US-Philippine partnership.
We must sustain our engagement with China and encourage it
to resume its long march down the road of economic and political
reform and to cooperate with us on regional issues of mutual
concern such as Cambodia and Korea and on global issues such as
nuclear and missile proliferation.
One challenge of particular interest to our two countries--and
one where New Zealand's engagement is especially important--is
that of promoting economic development, social advance, and
protection of the environment in the South Pacific. President
Bush's unprecedented Honolulu summit last November with the
leaders of 11 Pacific island nations and the initiatives he undertook
in the areas of trade, aid, and investment reflect our strong
interest in the Pacific islands. Only a few days ago, I attended the
South Pacific post-forum dialogue in Kolonia. Our two countries
play complementary roles in the forum and other multilateral
institutions such as the Regional Environment Program. We look
forward to expanding cooperation with New Zealand in this
geographically dispersed but important part of the world.
The single most important factor shaping the Asia-Pacific
region today is the remarkable dynamism of the Pacific Rim
economies. In our view, it is interdependent economic growth that
holds the greatest promise of bringing an enhanced sense of
community to the Asia-Pacific region. This is particularly true at a
time when technological and commercial capabilities more than
military strength are becoming the most relevant measures of
national power and influence.
For the United States, trans-Pacific trade--now over $300
billion annually-- is one-third larger than that across the Atlantic.
Like the United States, New Zealand is also a maritime trading
nation. We share the challenge of maintaining an open system of
commerce and investment that has been the engine of global
economic growth, and New Zealand's efforts in the Cairns group of
the GATT demonstrate the importance you attach--along with the
US--to strengthening a liberalized trading regime of worldwide
scope.
In the Pacific, however, economic growth has outpaced
mechanisms and institutions to manage its varied political,
environmental, and social effects. This is why the US joined
together with Australia, New Zealand, and nine other nations of the
Pacific Basin to promote economic cooperation based on free
market principles by forming APEC--the initiative for enhancing the
economic structure of regional integration. APEC is also an
important rallying point for support of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT. And the work programs of APEC are demonstrating, in
practical terms, why the economies of the Pacific Basin share a
common future.
In addition to these economic concerns, we also face such
challenges to our collective well-being as protecting the
environment, managing refugee flows, defending against terrorism,
and suppressing the global traffic in illicit narcotics. Such
transnational issues have now moved high on our common agenda.
The Challenge of Collective Security
As we begin to grapple with the challenges that are shaping the
world of tomorrow, it is important to take stock of what made
possible the achievements in Western economic growth, security,
and arms control I have discussed and how those lessons apply to
our future efforts.
Looking back at the Cold War era and, more recently, the Gulf
conflict, the importance of alliances based on shared values and
common interests stands out sharply. As revelation after
revelation about past Soviet behavior surfaces in this age of
glasnost, the value of deterrence becomes increasingly evident.
Deterrence pursued by the United States and its allies limited
opportunities for aggression and helped bring the weight of
socialism's failures down on the Soviet system. Now a Europe
whole and free enjoying the benefits of collective security is
finally possible.
And I must point out here that even as the Warsaw Pact has
been relegated to history's dustbin, NATO continues to thrive,
remodeling itself to meet the demands of a new era.
Reflecting on the Persian Gulf conflict, several points are
worthy of emphasis: the confrontation with Saddam Hussein
demonstrated America's determination to work with the member
states of the UN in responding to a threat to collective security in a
distant part of the globe. The United States was not the Lone
Ranger. President Bush mobilized a consensus in the United Nations
and a coalition on the ground in Saudi Arabia to defend the
fundamental principles of the rule of law, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity.
The Gulf conflict demonstrated the renewed vitality of the
United Nations and the prospect of the UN fulfilling the role
originally envisioned for the world body by its founders. The
promise of an effective global system of collective security offers
particular hope for the security of smaller nations.
In the Gulf conflict, Saddam Hussein gave us a disturbing
lesson in the security challenges we face as ambitious leaders of
smaller states exploit their all-too-ready access to ballistic
missiles, nuclear technology, and other weapons of mass
destruction in pursuit of aggressive designs.
New Zealand's positive support for the UN coalition during the
Gulf crisis demonstrated a farsighted view of the country's national
interest and gave a ringing endorsement to the concept of collective
security. Let me say here that New Zealand's military contributions
to [Operation] Desert Storm were recognized and sincerely
appreciated. The deployment of transport aircraft and medical
personnel reaffirmed New Zealand's longstanding commitment to
the principles and peacekeeping activities of the United Nations.
Indeed, New Zealand has a rich tradition of support for
collective security efforts. Looking back to World War II, the
outstanding contributions of New Zealanders in the European, Middle
East, and Pacific theaters readily come to mind. Here in Auckland, I
particularly want to salute a local hero, Royal Air Force Vice
Marshall Keith Park, who with hundreds of other New Zealanders
served in the RAF, contributing to the success of the Battle of
Britain 50 years ago. Their exploits and sacrifices are an enduring
reminder of the guts and grit displayed in the Allied fight against
fascist tyranny--one of the many instances in which our two
nations have fought shoulder to shoulder.
As Foreign Minister Don McKinnon has pointed out, during this
century a quarter of a million New Zealand troops have fought
overseas in two world wars, in Korea, and in Southeast Asia.
The global trends for change I have outlined, for all their
promise, also underscore the undiminished need for cooperative
security efforts in the times ahead. Whether it be the danger of
nuclear proliferation in Iraq, on the Indian subcontinent, or in East
Asia, preserving the environment, or combating drugs and terrorism,
the logic of common action in support of collective security is no
less valid today than it was during the darkest days of World War II
or during the decades of [the] Cold War.
New Zealand's voice is given weight and outreach in world
affairs by its participation in the multilateral institutions of the
international system--in the Cairns group of the GATT, the Group of
24, or in the United Nations. New Zealand's voice has credibility in
the GATT because it is a full member respecting all the rules of the
GATT regime. This same principle must also apply to the areas of
defense and security. The uncertainty and dangers of the post-Cold
War world--for all its opportunities as well--require steadiness of
purpose which our alliances gain from shared values and common
interests.
US-New Zealand
But alliances a la carte will not work. Nor can one member of an
alliance adopt policies that compromise the ability of an ally to
meet its responsibilities and still expect to enjoy the benefits of
collective security. Shared responsibilities and shared benefits are
but two sides of the same coin.
The building blocks of Asian security in the era now unfolding
will be primarily America's bilateral alliance relationships. As we
saw in the Gulf, the ability of the United States to meet its
commitments globally and regionally still depends on the
credibility of our deterrent forces and on freedom of the seas.
These factors for credibility and mobility are in New Zealand's
interest no less than our own.
Infringements on the freedom of movement of our naval
forces, particularly if they inspire restrictions in other areas of
the world, would seriously impair not only our ability to meet our
treaty obligations but also our capacity to act as the "balancing
wheel" in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, our policy of neither-
confirm-nor-deny (NCND) is important to meeting our alliance
commitments in Asia as in Europe.
Adopting policies which impair New Zealand's ability to fulfill
its collective security obligations under the ANZUS [Australia-New
Zealand-United States] pact does more than prohibit the visits of
American or British ships. It denies New Zealand access to joint
training opportunities, security intelligence, and the most advanced
defense technologies. It also deprives New Zealand of its proper
voice in shaping future regional and global security arrangements.
Let me be clear: New Zealand is an important democratic friend.
We want your voice to be fully heard in the councils that are
shaping the world of the 21st century.
In this regard, I should add that we have taken note of the
efforts of the present New Zealand Government to reject
isolationism and to define New Zealand's foreign policy interests in
the broad, global terms appropriate to a maritime, trading nation in
this ever-more interdependent world. The Bolger Government's
recent defense white paper clearly outlines a strategy of wider
engagement in security areas--a view we welcome.
Prime Minister Bolger recently pointed out that New Zealand's
decision to ban from its ports certain naval vessels from nuclear-
capable nations has not halted the expansion of nuclear weapons.
What is reversing the proliferation of these instruments of mass
destruction is arms control agreements negotiated with the
strength and solidarity of our vital alliances.
The transformations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
and the achievement of substantial arms reductions through the CFE
and START accords demonstrate that collective security has
worked. Deterrence and its corollary, NCND, have worked.
Tomorrow's sources of aggression may be different from those of
the Cold War era. But they will be no less threatening to our
security. Tomorrow's nuclear threats will be from the Iraqs and
North Koreas of the world. And banning ships of friends and allies--
forces needed to help deter the proliferating danger of nuclear and
missile forces in the Third World--benefits no one.
How New Zealand resolves the dilemma it has created with its
allies because of its anti-nuclear legislation is a matter for New
Zealanders to decide. I can say that for our part, the United States
wants a fully restored relationship with New Zealand--one that
will allow us to work closely with the confidence of full allies in
pursuit of mutual security interests and obligations. And only New
Zealand can take the steps needed to make this a reality.
For the present, we are committed to sustaining cooperative
relations with New Zealand outside the areas of security and
defense. In matters of economics, the environment, and political
affairs, we will continue to collaborate as friends and with the
hope that the fully normal ties of close allies will not be long in
coming.
Conclusion
We are fortunate to be living in a time of great promise and
opportunity. The ascendancy of the values of democracy, human
rights, and free markets bodes well for the future. In East Asia and
the Pacific, a new sense of community is growing based on the
region's economic dynamism and its integration through trade.
As we have done in wars both hot and cold, we want to stand
shoulder to shoulder with New Zealand in the struggle for security,
prosperity, and human rights as we advance into the post-Cold War
era. It is our hope that New Zealand will join us as full partners as
we shape the world of the 21st century.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: US Nuclear Testing Policy
Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control
[TEXT]
Background
For more than four decades, a strong nuclear deterrent has ensured
US security and helped preserve freedom. As long as nuclear
weapons play a critical role in US national security strategy, they
must continue to be tested underground to ensure their safety,
reliability, effectiveness, and survivability. In this context, the
United States and Soviet Union ratified two nuclear testing treaties
and verification protocols in December 1990.
Nuclear Testing Talks
Nuclear testing talks between the United States and the Soviet
Union began in Geneva in November 1987, when the two countries
agreed to negotiate effective verification protocols for two
existing but then unratified treaties--the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty (1974), which covers tests of nuclear weapons, and the
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976), which covers the use of
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes such as excavations. The
treaties ban individual nuclear explosions--whether for testing
nuclear weapons or for peaceful purposes--with a yield exceeding
150 kilotons (150,000 tons of TNT). However, neither treaty could
be verified effectively in its original form. Following six rounds of
talks, the negotiating teams completed work in May 1990 on these
verification protocols, which were signed at the Washington
summit, May 30-June 3, 1990. The TTBT and PNET entered into
force when Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
exchanged instruments of ratification in Houston on December 11,
1990.
Effective Verification
The two protocols, which contain similar provisions, provide for
effective verification of compliance with the treaties. The
protocols give each side the right to employ hydrodynamic yield
measurement, on-site inspection, and seismic monitoring in the
territory of the testing party. Each side will have the right to use
these methods in the measurement of explosions whose planned
yields exceed agreed levels.
For effective verification of compliance with these treaties,
the United States requires and has achieved the right to make
direct, on-site hydrodynamic yield measurements of all Soviet
tests exceeding 50 kilotons. The US hydrodynamic method is
CORRTEX (continuous reflectometry for radius vs. time experiment),
the most accurate, non-intrusive technique the United States has
identified. This verification method determines the yield of a
nuclear test by measuring, at the detonation site, the speed of the
supersonic shock wave in the earth caused by the detonation. The
speed of the shock wave is determined by measuring the rate at
which it crushes a coaxial cable buried near the explosive device.
Seismic monitoring is the traditional method of calculating
the strength of an explosion. Seismic monitors measure the
explosion's shock waves as they move through the earth, as is done
in measuring the strength of earthquakes, in order to arrive at an
estimate of explosive yield.
On-site inspections will permit each side to take core
samples and rock fragments from the area of the nuclear test in
order to confirm geological and geophysical data associated with
each explosion.
In addition, national technical means will be used to monitor
all explosions.
How Do the Protocols Work?
Under the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty protocol, the United
States and the Soviet Union have the right to make direct on-site
hydrodynamic measurements (CORRTEX for the United States) of
peaceful nuclear explosions with a planned yield exceeding 50
kilotons and on-site inspections for explosions with planned yields
above 35 kilotons. In addition, both sides have the right to use a
network of local, on-site seismic monitors to identify the number
of explosions in a group explosion with a planned aggregate yield
exceeding 150 kilotons.
Under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty protocol, both countries
will have the right to make direct on-site hydrodynamic
measurements (again, CORRTEX for the United States) of all nuclear
weapons tests whose planned yield exceeds 50 kilotons. For tests
with planned yields above 35 kilotons, on-site inspections will be
allowed. In addition, under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, in-
country seismic monitoring will be permitted for all tests with
planned yields above 50 kilotons, using three designated seismic
stations that are off-site but within the testing country's territory.
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty protocol also contains some
special verification provisions for tests performed in non-standard
configurations and for tests involving multiple nuclear explosions.
In addition, the protocol provides that, in any of the first 5 calendar
years following entry into force of the treaty, if one side does not
conduct at least two tests with planned yields above 50 kilotons
(the criteria becomes one such test in the sixth year and
thereafter), the other side may use the hydrodynamic measuring
method on up to two tests (on one test in the sixth year and
thereafter) with planned yields below the 50-kiloton level in that
year.
Further Limits on Nuclear Testing
The United States has a step-by-step approach to further limits on
nuclear testing, as Secretary Baker reaffirmed at the February 1990
Moscow ministerial. The United States believes it is necessary to
observe the implementation of the two treaties and their
verification protocols. This will give both sides valuable additional
experience with the complex, on-site monitoring and verification
methods in these protocols. After a period of observation, the
United States will be better able to assess the verification process
and to determine additional moves that make sense from a national
security standpoint. The United States has not yet identified
further limitations on nuclear testing beyond those now contained
in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty that would be in the US security
interest.
A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term US objective.
Such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when the United
States no longer needs to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure
international security and stability, and when it has achieved:
-- Broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions;
-- Greatly improved verification capabilities;
-- Expanded confidence-building measures; and
-- Greater balance in conventional forces. (###)
Why Testing Is Essential
Underground nuclear testing is necessary to maintain the credibility
of the US deterrent by ensuring that nuclear weapons are:
Safe--Testing permits improvements to be made in safety
and security features of nuclear weapons.
Reliable--Testing is needed to detect deterioration or other
potentially serious problems that may arise in stockpiled weapons.
Effective--Testing enables the United States to modernize
weapons as needed in relation to improvement and growth in Soviet
military capabilities.
Survivable--Testing allows the United States to ensure that
military and command and control equipment are survivable.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: United States Munitions List Proposed Rulemaking
Description: Text of a Presidential Directive released by the
Department of State Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Jul 25, 19917/25/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Security Assistance and Sales,
Science/Technology, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
After extensive interagency consultation, the Department of State
published today six notices of proposed rulemaking that would
amend the United States Munitions List [USML]. The USML is part of
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations [ITAR], which governs
the export of defense articles and defense services. Public and
industry comments are solicited on these proposals.
The proposed rules are the first of the planned changes to the
ITAR to fulfill the President's Directive of November 16, 1990, to
"remove from the US Munitions List all items contained on the
COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls]
Dual-Use List unless significant US national security interests
would be jeopardized." Pursuant to the President's directive, the
Department of State led an interagency review of the COCOM Dual-
Use Industrial List and the USML to identify the items of overlap on
the two lists.
The proposed rules cover seven categories of the USML:
Category IV for robots and robot controllers; Category V for
military explosives; Category VI for naval surface vessels; Category
IX for military training equipment; Category XI for military
electronics (except those used for intelligence or security
purposes); Category XVI for nuclear equipment; and Category XX for
submersible vessels.
Under the proposed rules, all of the identified items of
overlap on the USML and the COCOM Dual-Use List would be removed
from the USML and licensed by the Department of Commerce (items
of overlap were identified in Categories V, VI, XI, and XX). For the
USML categories where no overlap was identified on the two lists
(Categories IV, IX, and XVI), items will remain on the USML.
The anticipated implementation of these proposed regulations
as final rules will result in the Department of Commerce having
licensing jurisdiction over many specific items currently under
Department of State jurisdiction. Examples include floating dry
docks, service craft, non-military deep submergence vessels,
armored coaxial cable, and certain explosives.
After evaluating public and industry comments, the final rules
will be published by December 1, 1991.
Still under interagency consideration are draft proposed rules
covering five categories of the USML: Category VIII for aircraft and
related equipment; a subsection of Category XI dealing with
electronic equipment for intelligence or security purposes;
Category XII for image intensification tubes and devices; Category
XIII for auxiliary military equipment, including that used for
intelligence purposes; and a new Category XV for spacecraft and
related items. We anticipate that decisions regarding publication
of these proposed notices will be forthcoming within the next
several weeks. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: Passport Fees to Rise
Date: Aug 19, 19918/19/91
Category: Features
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Travel, State Department
[TEXT]
Fees for a US passport are expected to rise before the end of the
year. The cost for an adult 10-year passport will go from $35 to
$55 and for a child's 5-year passport from $20 to $30. The fee
increase is largely due to the rise in both labor and material costs
as well as the need to produce a more tamper-proof and secure
document.
Americans who want to beat the fee increase may apply for
their passport at one of the 13 US passport agencies or at one of the
3,500 post offices or clerks-of-court around the United States.
First-time applicants must apply in person and present a completed
DSP-11 passport application (obtained from one of the offices noted
above), proof of US citizenship, proof of identity, and two identical
2x2 inch photographs. Applicants who must make a personal
appearance are required to pay an execution fee which is expected
to be $10.
Applicants in possession of a current or recently expired
passport may be eligible to apply by mail. To qualify, applicants
must be able to include a previous passport issued within the past
12 years and obtained when they were over age 16. Applicants
should complete a DSP-82 (available at the offices mentioned
above) and mail it along with their passport, photographs, and fee to
the closest passport agency. To avoid sending cash through the
mail, payment should be made by money order, bank draft, or check.
The new passport will be returned to the applicant by mail, usually
within 3 weeks. A passport can be renewed anytime and does not
have to be expired before renewal. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 33, August 19, 1991
Title: New Ambassadors April-June 1991
Date: Jun 31, 19916/31/91
Category: Ambassadorial Appointments
Country: United States
Subject: State Department
[TEXT]
Belgium--Bruce S. Gelb, June 10, 1991
Republic of Djibouti--Charles R. Baquet III, June 26, 1991
Republic of Malawi--Michael T. F. Pistor, May 22, 1991
Republic of Senegal--Katherine Shirley, May 22, 1991
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland--Raymond
George Hardenbergh Seitz, May 11, 1991
Republic of Zaire--Melissa Foelsch Wells, May 14, 1991(###)