US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991

Title:

The Moscow Summit: Building a Relationship on Universal Human Values

Bush, Gorbachev Source: President Bush, President Gorbachev Description: Remarks at the President Bush's arrival ceremony, The Kremlin, Moscow, USSR Date: Jul 30, 19917/30/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control, Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT]
President Gorbachev:
Mr. President, Mrs. Bush, I would like to extend a warm and sincere welcome to you on Soviet soil within the walls of our ancient Kremlin. It has been little more than a year since I visited the United States. This year has seen events of tremendous importance, both in our two countries and in the world. For us in the USSR, it was a year that put to a daily test our capacity to act constructively at a critical time in the process of transition in our progress along the path of democratic transformation and reform. It was also a challenging year for the international community. It, too, is going through a period of transition to a new unprecedented system of international relations. The beginning of a new era in history has been a tough test indeed for leaders of states requiring enormous effort, a sense of high responsibility, strictest realism and vision. A great deal in world politics will continue to depend on how the Soviet Union and the United States interact with each other. For the first time ever our two countries have a chance to build their relations on the natural basis of universal human values and national interests. We are beginning to realize that we need each other, that the security, internal stability, and dynamic development of each of our two countries benefits both of them. Not only our two nations, but the entire world needs this kind of US-Soviet relationship. The world has realized this and has given us support in our joint efforts. Today and tomorrow we will be discussing with you, Mr. President, these and many other matters. The Soviet people welcome you as the leader of a great power, as a statesman who is making a great contribution to the shaping of new world politics. Mr. President, in recent months and weeks, the Kremlin, a symbol of our nation's centuries-old history has been the scene of events that will shape this country's future. Tomorrow it will witness another such event, the signing of the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. It is more than just a major step in the process of disarmament. It is a sign of a growing irreversibility of the fundamental change for the better in world developments. The results of the G-7 [Group of 7 industrialized nations] meeting in London further solidify this irreversibility. It was the beginning of a new type of international economic relations, which will form the material foundation for world politics in the 21st century. All this, I hope will allow our peoples to benefit more directly from the improving Soviet-US relationship. Allow me, Mr. President, to assure everyone who will be following our work with you in the coming days that we shall try to live up to the hopes of our fellow citizens, the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union. Once again, Mr. President, and Mrs. Bush, welcome to the Soviet Union.
President Bush:
Well, first let me thank President Gorbachev, leaders that met us last night, people along the way for their warm welcome here. We've been looking forward to this visit. And I'm honored to be in Moscow to meet with President Gorbachev for this historic summit at a time when tension gives way to a new season of hope. We need only compare the words of the Cold War with our historic accomplishments in recent years to realize that a new age of promise has dawned. No visitor to this country can fail to see the signs of change. Since my last visit in 1985, we've witnessed the opening of Europe and the end of a world polarized by suspicion. That year, Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Soviet Union, put many monumental changes into motion. He began instituting reforms that basically changed the world. And in the United States, everyone now knows at least two Russian words--glasnost and perestroika. And here, everyone appreciates the English word "democracy.'' Our nations have moved forward in every sphere--political, military and economic. We stood together for the first time in 50 years to face down aggression in the Gulf--the Persian Gulf--and this way we take, as the president just said, another historic step away from the Cold War with the signing of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] treaty. In the next 2 days, President Gorbachev and I hope to build upon this beginning to forge a US-Soviet agenda built not upon military confrontation but upon economic and security cooperation. In the economic sphere, we hope to build upon the agreements we made in Malta to normalize economic relations and work toward helping the Soviet Union integrate itself into the international economy. In the Middle East, we see new prospects for peace where once there was only contention. And together, we will work toward building a lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. And we'll also work together to resolve difficulties and conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia, just as we worked to build peace and democracy in Angola, in Namibia and Nicaragua. No longer must all the world serve as a stage for superpower stand-offs. Instead, let every place from Central America to Angola to Afghanistan offer new hopes, new opportunities. And let us pursue shared goals--a stable world, no longer polarized; mutually beneficial economic ties; cooperation on everything from weapons proliferation to environmental problems. President Gorbachev has earned our respect and admiration for his uncommon vision and courage in replacing old orthodoxy with glasnost and perestroika. But more fundamental than the relations of leaders are the shared values of their people. And here, our common humanity offers the greatest hope for mankind. And, yes, we have differences, but this hope can enable us to address our differences--differences over Cuba, or the future of the Baltic states, or what Japan calls the Northern Territories. But let's conduct all our affairs in the spirit of enduring partnership, based on politics peaceful and democratic, on economies productive and free. You see, Americans want to work with all levels of Soviet society. Beyond our central governments, we look for greater interaction between the citizens of our states and your republics. And beyond government, we seek greater understanding throughout the broad spectrum of society, among businessmen, students, artists, and scientists. So, I come here on a state visit to the Soviet Union, but I also come to discover a rapidly changing country. For the sake of peace and new prosperity, on behalf of all Americans I come here today to assure President Gorbachev, the leaders, the great people of this land, and each of its republics, that we stand with you in your historic struggle for democracy and reform. Fifty years ago, we united as allies to fight a horrible war; a war that cost the Soviet Union hundreds of thousands of lives. So this week, let us come together to seek a newer world--more stable, more just, more peaceful. And thank you, and may God bless the Soviet people--the sovereign people of this Soviet Union. We're delighted to be here, Mr. President. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

The Moscow Summit: An Era of Progress and Peace

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks by President Bush to the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Moscow, USSR Date: Jul 30, 19917/30/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control, Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] First may I salute the Acting Director, Tyulin, and of course, the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Bessmertnykh. It is a great privilege to meet with you at this critical moment of history of your nation, at this time of great hope for all the world. For four long decades, our two nations stood locked in conflict as the Cold War cast its shadow across an armed and uneasy peace. This summit marks a new beginning--the prospect that we can put an end to a long era as adversaries, write a new chapter in the history of our two nations, forge a new partnership and a sturdy peace. We have reason to hope. Indeed, we have good reason to hope. One-by-one the cruel realities of the Cold War flicker and fade, and a new world of opportunities calls us forward. In Europe--for 40 years the fault line of East-West conflict--the nations of Central Europe now find a common home in democracy. Far beyond the confines of this continent--from Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa, from Angola to Central America--regional conflicts no longer threaten to become flash points for superpower confrontation. Worldwide, the risk of global war stands lower now than at any point in the postwar era. The challenge we face at this summit, the challenge you face as present and future leaders of this great nation, is simply this: Together, our two nations must overcome a half-century of mistrust to seize this moment and build a lasting peace. During the past 2 years, President Gorbachev and I have made substantial progress in building this new relationship. Together-- the Soviet side, the United States side--we've created new opportunities for arms control. Last fall in Paris we agreed on landmark reductions in conventional forces stationed in Europe. And tomorrow, in the Kremlin, we will sign the historic START treaty-- the first treaty that significantly reduces the most dangerous and destabilizing nuclear forces. Lower tensions have also made it possible for our two nations to normalize economic relations. President Gorbachev and I made this a priority at the Malta summit [December 1989], and I'm pleased to report today that this process of normalization is now nearly complete. In May, the Supreme Soviet removed the key impediment to increased trade: Soviet restrictions on free emigration. The new Soviet emigration law stands as a major step forward--a victory for all who value human rights.
Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status
As a consequence of this progress, when I return to Washington, I will submit to the United States Congress the US-Soviet trade agreement that we signed 1 year ago. And then we can grant the Soviet Union most-favored-nation trade status. I will urge the Congress to repeal the Byrd and Stevenson amendments--restrictions that limit credits and impede trade. In addition, we will accelerate our effort to conclude a tax agreement and a bilateral investment agreement. For most of this century, the Soviet Union stood apart from the world market; stood aside as free market forces spawned unprecedented prosperity across the West. The results of that self- imposed isolation from the world economy proved very costly. But now that's begun to change. At this month's London summit, President Gorbachev spoke about the Soviet Union's interest in becoming fully integrated into the world economy. The Soviet Union should become a full participant in the global economy, and the United States will support you in that effort. Beyond two-way trade, the United States is working to open doors to Soviet entry into the economic mainstream. And that's why the United States supported Soviet observer status at the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]--and full membership when the USSR has completed the necessary reforms upon which it has embarked. That's why I proposed last December--and the G-7 has just agreed--that the USSR should enter a "special association" with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank. Though the Soviet Union has recently embarked on its massive reconstruction program of economic reform, its importance and its sheer size entitle it to this special status, which will speed the day to full qualification for benefits from the international financial institutions. These measures will make available to the Soviet Union assistance and expertise that can help ease the difficult transition to a market economy and improve the standard of living for the Soviet people.
Global Cooperation
But the crowning proof that we are overcoming the old Cold War animosities remains our cooperation in the Persian Gulf. In the depths of the Cold War era, Iraq's aggression against its tiny neighbor might well have brought our two nations, even the entire world, to the brink of conflict. Instead, our cooperation ensured the international isolation of Saddam Hussein. If Saddam Hussein thought he could exploit our differences to his own advantage, he was dead wrong. At every key point in the crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union worked together to send a strong and steady signal to Saddam that his aggression would not stand. Today, our cooperation in the Gulf holds out hope that we can work together toward a just and lasting peace in regions of the world now driven by conflict--in the Middle East, Cambodia, and Afghanistan--just as we worked together to bring peace and free elections to Namibia, Angola, and, yes, Nicaragua.
Difficult Questions
In every aspect of our relations--military, political, economic--we see positive signs of a new partnership. But for all the progress we've made, let's face it, obstacles do remain. Our ability to overcome them will be a key test of the strength of this new relationship I'm talking about. In many cases we face conflicts and quarrels rooted in the world war fought 50 years ago, frozen in place by the long Cold War that followed. Disputes like Japan's claim, which we support, for the return of the Northern Territories. This dispute could hamper your integration into the world economy, and we want to do whatever we can to help both sides resolve it. Difficult as well are questions regarding the future of the Baltic states--Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Today, a new generation of Baltic leaders--democratically elected and reflecting the will of the Baltic peoples--asks a new generation of Soviet leaders to repudiate one of the darkest legacies of the Stalin era. Surely, men and women of reason and good will can find a way to extend freedom to the Baltic peoples. Only good-faith negotiations with the Baltic governments can address the yearnings of their people to be free. We must not see the positive progress that we have made threatened or thrown in doubt. Above all, there needs to be a clear and unqualified commitment to peaceful change.
The Cuban Obstacle
Another obstacle lies close to home for the United States--I'm sure you know what I'm going to say it is. Ninety miles off the Florida coast in Cuba this obstacle remains. The United States poses no threat to Cuba. Therefore, there's no need for the Soviet Union to funnel millions of dollars in military aid to Cuba--especially since a defiant Castro, isolated by his own obsolete totalitarianism--denies his people any move toward democracy. Castro does not share your faith in glasnost; Castro does not share your faith in perestroika. And then finally, it's time for your military establishment to move to a peacetime footing. It's time to reduce military spending. We're doing that in the United States. The world has changed. As you struggle to join the international economy, we will offer our help in converting your military-industrial might to productive, peaceful purposes. Now, we appreciate the difficulties of military reform--the competing demands of people displaced when a Cold War makes way for a new world order. But we also know this: the demilitarization of your economy is key to economic transformation. It will enable you to devote more resources to economic growth and will help you fill the shelves of your stores. But the key challenge--the single most important factor in forging a new partnership between our nations--remains the outcome of the experiment now reshaping [the] Soviet economy, Soviet society. Consider the Soviet Union we see today. Gone are the days when a small cadre hidden behind the high walls of the Kremlin worked the levers of power. Gone is a rubber-stamp legislature, the one-party monopoly, enforcing one point of view. In its place we see unmistakable signs of the new Soviet Union. Dissidents who once languished in internal exile now serve as deputies in the People's Congress. Samzidat has given way to street corner critics. A new Soviet revolution has begun, a revolution marked by the emergence of many voices--inside and outside government--in the proliferation of political parties, here in Moscow and across every part of the vast reaches of this great and wonderful land. The forces of reaction and resistance still retain great power. But each day brings new alliances--a new manifesto for change, a new call to action. And some ask: Amid this shifting scene, what is our policy toward all these groups? Who and what do we support? And my answer is clear: America stands with the forces of freedom and reform wherever they are found.
US Support for Forces of Reform
My country stands ready to assist in this new Soviet revolution. In the economic sphere, the transformation must come from within. A shortage of foreign capital is not what plunged your economy into crisis, nor can your economic ills be cured by a simple infusion of cash. Only through real reform can the Soviet Union abolish the counter-productive command economy. Only through real reform can the Soviet Union unleash the ingenuity, the energy, and the entrepreneurial potential of its people. As market reform moves forward, the US stands ready to support your efforts. Right now, the next step, it seems to me, is to devise an economic strategy with the IMF and the World Bank--a strategy that wins the support of the international investment community. It should be a program that sets out priorities--one that makes great use of your enormous natural wealth. But even more; it must be a plan that unlocks the great human potential of the people, of the Soviet people. Progress rests on the pace of your reforms--on the speed with which you move from a system based on command-and-control to one based on supply and demand. As in Eastern Europe, our assistance will keep pace with your reform. But our new partnership must go far beyond the halls of government in Washington and Moscow and the capitals of Western Europe. Western governments, with their own strapped resources, are limited in what they can do. So we must bring together the businessmen from Europe and America and their partners from all across the Soviet Union. Our new partnership must bridge the thousands of miles between small-town America and Soviet cities. It means expanded exchanges of scientists and scholars, artists and engineers from the great cities of Moscow and Kiev, from the plains of Central Asia and the villages of Siberia to the port of Vladivostok and all points in between. It means students coming to study in American schools and live with American families. It means thousands more American students coming to the Soviet Union to explore your past and experience first hand the future you're working to create. For four long decades, cooperation of this kind was the casualty of the Cold War. So let this Moscow summit definitively mark the end of what all of us would agree has been an era of mistrust, and let it mark a new beginning for our two nations: an era of progress toward a new world of peace and partnership. Once again, thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to this institute. And let me just tell you that relations between the United States and Soviet Union are good and are getting better. And it is my goal as President of the United States to see that they get even better still. Thank you. And may God bless the people of the Soviet Union.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

The Moscow Summit: The Key to Soviet Prosperity

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks at a meeting of Soviet and American businessmen Moscow, USSR Date: Jul 31, 19917/31/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control, Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Good morning. May I pay my respects and thanks to our able ambassador, Ambassador Matlock. This gives me a good opportunity to thank him for the fantastic job he has done for the United States of America and I think also that he's done an awful lot to further understanding between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. May I say good morning to Mr. Bunich, Mr. Vladislalev, and Mr. Tikhonov, and say that I have been looking forward to this meeting. As Jack [Matlock] said, I was a businessman once myself. That was first in the oil drilling equipment business and then as a drilling contractor. The risks were high, but I enjoyed that phase of my life. As entrepreneurs and businessmen and risk takers, you really do hold the key to the future prosperity of the Soviet Union. You possess the power to create a better life for yourselves and your countrymen. There's an old Russian proverb. ''The one who leads makes a bridge for the others.'' Businessmen such as yourselves are building that bridge to a new and prosperous Soviet Union. All around the world we see that a free society rests upon the twin pillars of political and economic liberty, for only when free markets and free people work together can we build a better life for all people. You understand that opportunity arises when people act freely, relying on their own talents. Call it what you want-- ingenuity, resourcefulness, a "can do'' attitude. But it all comes down to this: People must be free to work, [to] save, to own their own homes, to take risks, to invest in each other. In essence, to control their own lives. There is no conclave of government experts, no matter how brilliant, can match the sheer ingenuity of a market that collects and distributes the wisdom of millions of people, all pursuing their destinies in different ways. Government does have legitimate responsibilities, such as enforcing contracts and protecting private property rights, providing the boundaries of acceptable business behavior. Government must establish rules of fair play--what we call a "level playing field," that builds trust and stability. Once established in the Soviet Union, the rule of law will further attract foreign know- how and investment. There is no question about that. The United States stands ready to help. We're going beyond loans and subsidies; we're offering our best expertise. We endorsed last year's Soviet observership in the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] to help establish normal relations with the trading nations of the world and to accelerate market reforms and your integration into the global economy. At the recently concluded G-7 meeting in London, special association for the Soviet Union in the IMF--International Monetary Fund--and the World Bank was proposed. When I return to Washington, I will [be] submitting the US- Soviet trade agreement to Congress for approval, which will generate trade between our countries. We will also seek most- favored-nation status for the Soviet Union, and I'll ask that certain restrictions--technically known as the Stevenson and Byrd amendments--be lifted, so that American businesses can better compete for export sales here. We're also negotiating bilateral tax and investment treaties, and I'd like to see them completed by year's end. They will create a better investment climate between us; help expand our economic partnership as much as possible. In sum, we want to do everything to ensure that our economic relationship expands as quickly as your reforms permit. Freedom brings the opportunity to succeed, and, yes, the risk of failure. The government can act as a referee, perhaps, but it cannot guarantee success. Free markets are based on the impulsive energy of man's imagination and creativity, and, of course, there are risks. I know that from first-hand experience years ago. But there are also rewards for success. Who would have predicted that 15 years ago a group of college students--university students in the United States--working in a garage would redefine the computer industry in America? Or that a trash collector--a garbage collector--from Philadelphia 30 years ago would today be the head of a $6 billion waste management firm in the United States. When opportunity is at work, you can be a mechanic or a millionaire--and in my country, some mechanics are millionaires. Pursuing one's destiny means building a better life. Russian values and traditions are compatible with free enterprise, and they should be preserved. Look at the members of the G-7, Western European nations. Each an industrialized democracy, each with its own values and traditions. The culture and climate of American business may be different than other places, but the power of the idea is universal. It's been applied in thousands of ways by millions of people all over the world. Those who succeed here should not be insulted and labeled as speculators and exploiters, because they're not. They are the people who will fill the shelves in your stores, put your people to work. We understand now why socialism's attempt to create the new Soviet man simply didn't work, because human nature cannot be destroyed and created anew. We seek instead to build upon the strengths of human nature, to allow men and women to control their own destinies in whatever way works best for them. This notion of free markets and free people--opportunity for all--this joint venture between political and economic liberty-- this is the spirit of democratic capitalism. Everywhere we hear the voices of men and women yearning for freedom, for the chance to control their own destiny, for a stronger link between effort and reward. Some call it the American dream, but it's more than that-- it's a universal dream. And it's a dream that the Soviet people are now striving to make real for themselves. After talks here, I believe the leaders are grasping this concept. Each of you can bring that dream alive. The creation of small and medium-sized businesses means meeting payrolls, hiring good men and women, producing goods and services that are most needed by consumers, and improving technologies and methods so as to stay competitive. Free market principles don't just mean that one or two people go out and get rich quick. It is so much more than that. As our president Woodrow Wilson said, every great man of business has got somewhere a touch of the idealist in him. For you and your employees, it means the dignity and self respect that come with a job. It means making a difference in your community. And, as more and more businesses evolve--business opportunities evolve--it means bringing back hope to the people of the Soviet Union. Your task will be difficult, but let me risk some advice. The story goes that a young man became the manager of a company. His predecessor handed him three envelopes and said that if he was ever in trouble, to open the envelopes. So one day when the business was not going well, the man decided it was time to open up envelope number one. The message inside said, ''Blame your predecessor.'' So he did, and things improved for a while, but then they got worse again. So he decided to open up envelope number two. It read, "Blame the accounting department.'' So he did that. But sales continued to go downhill, and, finally, with much hesitation, he opened up envelope number three. It said, "Prepare three envelopes.'' The moral of that story, I think, is that there are no right or wrong answers. I can't--wouldn't be bold enough to--try to tell you in three envelopes how to transform this economy from "command and control" to "buy and sell." You must find what works best for each of you and for your customers. You must make the dreams of your own people in whatever way you can come alive for them. You must define your own brand of democratic capitalism, one that is consistent with Russian cultures and values. Remember the words of Tolstoy: "The strongest of all warriors are these two--time and patience.'' Bringing free markets to life will, of course, take time and patience. But it can be done, because everyone in this room today possesses something that simply cannot be bought or sold. You possess the power of an idea. I salute you as pioneers for your vision and for your drive. It's been a great pleasure for me to meet with this very special group today, and I wish you well in the tasks that lie ahead, and may God bless you, and thank you very much.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

The Moscow Summit: START Treaty Signed

Bush Source: President Bush Description: President Bush's remarks at the START Treaty signing, The Kremlin, Moscow, USSR Date: Jul 31, 19917/31/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control, Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] To President Gorbachev and members of the Soviet Government and all the honored guests here, may I salute you. The treaty that we sign today is a most complicated one--the most complicated of contracts governing the most serious of concerns. Its 700 pages stand as a monument to several generations of US and Soviet negotiators, to their tireless efforts to carve out common ground from a thicket of contentious issues, and it represents a major step forward for our mutual security and the cause of world peace. And may I, too, thank everybody who worked on this treaty-- the military, State Department arms control negotiators--really on both sides. And I would like to say that many are here today; some, like my predecessor President Reagan, [are] not here. But I think all of us recognize that there are many who are not in this room that deserve an awful lot of credit on both the Soviet side and the United States side. The START Treaty vindicates an approach to arms control that guided us for almost a decade: the belief that we could do more than merely halt the growth of our nuclear arsenals. We could seek more than limits on the number of arms. In our talks, we sought stabilizing reductions in our strategic arsenals. START makes that a reality. In a historic first for arms control, we will actually reduce US and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals. But reductions alone are not enough. So START requires even deeper cuts of the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons. The agreement itself is exceedingly complex, but the central idea at the heart of this treaty can be put simply: Stabilizing reductions in our strategic nuclear forces reduce the risk of war. But these promises to reduce arms levels cannot automatically guarantee success. Just as important are the treaty's monitoring mechanisms so we know that the commitments made are being translated into real security. In this area, START builds on the experience of earlier agreements but goes far beyond them in provisions to ensure that we can verify this treaty effectively. Mr. President, in the warming relations between our nations, this treaty stands as both cause and consequence. Many times during the START talks, reaching agreement seemed all but impossible. In the end, the progress that we made in the past year's time--progress in easing tensions and ending the Cold War-- changed the atmosphere at the negotiating table and paved the way for START's success. Neither side won unilateral advantage over the other. Both sides committed themselves instead to achieving a strong, effective treaty and securing the mutual stability that a good agreement would provide. Mr. President, by reducing arms, we reverse a half-century of steadily growing strategic arsenals. But more than that, we take a significant step forward in dispelling a half-century of mistrust. By building trust, we pave a path to peace. We sign the START Treaty as testament to the new relationship emerging between our two countries in the promise of further progress toward lasting peace.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

The Moscow Summit: The US Commitment to Reform

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Kiev, Ukraine, USSR Date: Aug 1, 19918/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control, Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Well, first [let me] thank all of you for that warm welcome, and may I take this opportunity to thank all people of Ukraine that gave us such a warm welcome, such a heartfelt greeting. Every American in that long motorcade, and believe me it was long, was moved and touched by the warmth of the welcome of the people of Ukraine. We'll never forget it. Chairman Kravchuk, thank you, sir. And to the deputies of the Soviet Supreme Soviet, may I salute you. Members of the clergy that are here, members of the diplomatic corps, representatives of American pharmaceutical and health care corporations who I understand are with us today, and distinguished guests all, Barbara and I are delighted to be here--very, very happy. We have only one regret, and that is that I've got to get home on Thursday night. I can still make it. The reason is our Congress goes out tomorrow, finishes the session they're in now, and I felt it was important to be there on that last day of the final session. This beautiful city brings to mind the words of the poet Alexander Dovzhenko: "The city of Kiev is an orchard. Kiev is a poet. Kiev is an epic. Kiev is history. Kiev is art." Centuries ago, your forebears named this country Ukraine or "frontier" because your steppes link Europe and Asia. But Ukrainians have become frontiersmen of another sort. Today you explore the frontiers and contours of liberty. Though my stay here is, as I said, far too short, I have come here to talk with you and to learn. For those who love freedom, every experiment in building an open society offers new lessons and insights. You face an especially daunting task. For years people in this nation felt powerless, overshadowed by a vast government apparatus, cramped by forces that attempted to control every aspect of their lives. Today your people probe the promise of freedom. In cities and republics, on farms, in businesses, around university campuses, you debate the fundamental question of liberty, self-rule, and free enterprise. Americans, you see, have a deep commitment to these values. We follow your progress with a sense of fascination, excitement, and hope. This alone is historic. In the past, our nations engaged in duels of eloquent bluff and bravado. Now the fireworks of superpower confrontation are giving way to the quieter and far more hopeful arts of cooperation. I come here to tell you we support the struggle in this great country for democracy and economic reform. And I would like to talk to you today about how the United States views this complex and exciting period in your history, how we intend to relate to the central Soviet Government and the republican governments. In Moscow, I outlined our approach. We will support those in the center and the republics who pursue freedom, democracy, and economic liberty. We will determine our support not on the basis of personalities but on the basis of principles. We cannot tell you how to reform your society. We will not try to pick winners and losers in political competition between republics or between republics and the center. That is your business. That's not the business of the United States of America. Do not doubt our real commitment, however, to reform. But do not think we can presume to solve your problems for you. Theodore Roosevelt, one of our great presidents, once wrote, "To be patronized is as offensive as to be insulted. No one of us cares permanently to have someone else conscientiously striving to do him good. What we want is to work with that someone else for the good of both of us." That's what our former president said. We will work for the good of both of us, which means that we will not meddle in your internal affairs. Some people have urged the United States to choose between supporting President Gorbachev and supporting independence- minded leaders throughout the USSR. I consider this a false choice. In fairness, President Gorbachev has achieved astonishing things, and his policies of glasnost, perestroika, and democratization point toward the goals of freedom, democracy, and economic liberty. We will maintain the strongest possible relationship with the Soviet Government of President Gorbachev, but we also appreciate the new realities of life in the USSR and, therefore, as a federation ourselves, we want good relations, improved relations with the republics. So let me build upon my comments in Moscow by describing in more detail what Americans mean when we talk about freedom, democracy, and economic liberty. No terms have been abused more regularly nor more cynically than these. Throughout this century, despots have masqueraded as democrats. Jailers have posed as liberators. We can restore faith in government only by restoring meaning to these concepts. I don't want to sound like I'm lecturing, but let's begin with the broad term "freedom." When Americans talk of freedom, we refer to people's ability to live without fear of government intrusion, without fear of harassment by their fellow citizens, without restricting others' freedoms. We do not consider freedom a privilege to be doled out only to those who hold proper political views or belong to certain groups. We consider it an inalienable individual right bestowed upon all men and women. Lord Acton once observed, "The most certain test by which we judge whether a country is really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities." Freedom requires tolerance, a concept imbedded in openness, in glasnost, and in our First Amendment protections for the freedoms of speech, association, and religion, all religions. Tolerance nourishes hope. A priest wrote of glasnost: "Today more than ever, the words of Paul the apostle spoken 2,000 years ago ring out: 'They counted us among the dead but look, we are alive.' " In Ukraine, in Russia, in Armenia and the Baltics, the spirit of liberty thrives. But freedom cannot survive if we let despots flourish or permit seemingly minor restrictions to multiply until they form chains, until they form shackles. Later today I'll visit the monument at Babi Yar, a somber reminder, a solemn reminder of what happens when people fail to hold back the horrible tide of intolerance and tyranny. Yet freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far- off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred. We will support those who want to build democracy. By democracy we mean a system of government in which people may vie openly for the hearts and, yes, the votes of the public. We mean a system of government that derives its just power from the consent of the governed, that retains its legitimacy by controlling its appetite for power. For years you had elections with ballots but you did not enjoy democracy. And now democracy has begun to set firm roots in Soviet soil. The key to its success lies in understanding government's proper role and its limits. Democracy is not a technical process driven by dry statistics. It is the very human enterprise of preserving freedom so that we can do the important things, the really important things--raise families, explore our own creativity, build good and fruitful lives. In modern societies, freedom and democracy rely on economic liberty. A free economy is nothing more than a system of communication. It simply cannot function without individual rights or a profit motive, which give people an incentive to go to work, an incentive to produce. And it certainly cannot function without the rule of law, without fair and enforceable contracts, without laws that protect property rights and punish fraud. Free economies depend upon the freedom of expression, the ability of people to exchange ideas and test out new theories. The Soviet Union weakened itself for years by restricting the flow of information, by outlawing devices crucial to modern communication, such as computers and copying machines. And when you restricted free movement, even tourist travel, you prevented your own people from making the most of their talent. You cannot innovate if you cannot communicate. And, finally, a free economy demands engagement in the economic mainstream. Adam Smith noted two centuries ago, "Trade enriches all who engage in it. Isolation and protectionism doom its practitioners to degradation and want." I note this today because some Soviet cities, regions, and even republics have engaged in ruinous trade wars. The republics of this nation have extensive bonds of trade which no one can repeal with the stroke of a pen or the passage of a law. The vast majority of trade conducted by Soviets companies, imports and exports, involves, as you know better than I, trade between republics. The Nine-Plus-One agreement holds forth the hope that republics will combine greater autonomy with greater voluntary interaction--political, social, cultural, economic--rather than pursuing the hopeless course of isolation. And so American investors and businessmen look forward to doing business in the Soviet Union, including the Ukraine. We've signed agreements this week that will encourage further interaction between the US and all levels of the Soviet Union. But, ultimately, our trade relations will depend upon our ability to develop a common language, a common language of commerce-- currencies that communicate with one another, laws that protect innovators and entrepreneurs, bonds of understanding and trust. It should be obvious that the ties between our nations grow stronger every single day. I set forth a presidential initiative that is providing badly needed medical aid to the Soviet Union, and this aid expresses American solidarity with the Soviet peoples during a time of hardship and suffering. And it has supplied facilities in Kiev that are treating victims of Chernobyl. You should know that America's heart, the hearts of all, went out to the people here at the time of Chernobyl. We have sent teams to help you improve upon the safety of Ukrainian nuclear plants and coal mines. We've also increased the number of cultural exchanges with the republics, including more extensive legal, academic, and cultural exchanges between America and Ukraine. We understand that you cannot reform your system overnight. America's first system of government, the Continental Congress, failed because the states were too suspicious of one another and the central government too weak to protect commerce and individual rights. In 200 years we have learned that freedom, democracy, and economic liberty are more than terms of inspiration. They're more than words. They are challenges. Your great poet Shevchenko noted, "Only in your own house can you have your truth, your strength and freedom." No society ever achieves perfect democracy, liberty, or enterprise. If it makes full use of its peoples' virtues and abilities, it can use these goals as guides to a better life. And now, as Soviet citizens try to forge a new social compact, you have the obligation to restore power to citizens demoralized by decades of totalitarian rule. You have to give them hope and inspiration, determination, by showing your faith in their abilities. Societies that don't trust themselves or their people cannot provide freedom. They can guarantee only the bleak tyranny of suspicion, avarice, and poverty. An old Ukrainian proverb says, "When you enter a great enterprise, free your soul from weakness." The peoples of the USSR have entered a great enterprise, full of courage and vigor. I've come here today to say we support those who explore the frontiers of freedom. We will join these reformers on the path to what we call, appropriately call, a new world order. You're the leaders. You are the participants in the political process. And I go home to an active political process. So if you saw me waving like mad from my limousine, it was in the thought that maybe some of those people along the line were people from Philadelphia or Pittsburgh or Detroit, where so many Ukrainian Americans live, where so many Ukrainian Americans are with me in the remarks I've made here today. This has been a great experience for Barbara and me to be here. We salute you. We salute the changes that we see. I remember the French expression, vive la difference, and I see different churnings around this chamber, and that's exactly the way it ought to be. One guy wants this and another one that. That's the way the process works when you're open and free, competing with ideas to see who's going to emerge correct and who can do the most for the people in Ukraine. And so for us, this has been a wonderful trip, albeit far too short. And may I simply say may God bless the people of Ukraine. Thank you very, very much. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

The Moscow Summit: US-Soviet Joint Statement On the Middle East

Description: Text of a joint statement released by the White House Date: Jul 31, 19917/31/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America Country: Uganda, United States Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] President Bush and President Gorbachev reaffirmed their strong mutual commitment to promote peace and genuine reconciliation among the Arab States, Israel, and the Palestinians. They believe there is an historic opportunity now to launch a process that can lead to a just and enduring peace and to a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. They share the strong conviction that this historic opportunity must not be lost. While recognizing that peace cannot be imposed and that it can only result from direct negotiations between the parties, the United States and the Soviet Union pledge to do their utmost to promote and sustain the peace-making process. To that end, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting as co-sponsors, will work to convene in October a peace conference designed to launch bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Invitations to the conference will be issued at least ten days prior to the date the conference is to convene. In the interim, Secretary Baker and Minister Bessmertnykh will continue to work with the parties to prepare for the conference. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

US-Soviet Cooperation In Central America

Description: Text of a joint statement released by the White House, Washington, DC Date: Aug 1, 19918/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America Country: Uganda, United States Subject: Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] Foreign Minister Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh and Secretary of State James A. Baker, III noted the positive trends in Central America to settle regional disputes at the negotiating table and ease tensions through national reconciliation. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the resolution of the conflict in Nicaragua, the important agreements reached in April between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front], and the beginning of a dialogue between the Government of Guatemala and the URNG [Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity]. They noted that Soviet-US cooperation in Central America and adjacent areas has contributed to stability in Latin America. The two sides agreed that additional joint steps should be taken to promote the full agenda of the Esquipulas agreements including democratization, a cease-fire and settlement of existing conflicts, national reconciliation, economic developments, and regional disarmament. The Ministers called on the United Nations and other international organizations, as well as countries outside the region, including Cuba, to intensify their efforts to resolve the remaining political issues, secure a cease-fire and final peace settlement in El Salvador. They voiced their strong support for the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations to help negotiate an end to the conflict in El Salvador and urged the Secretary General to involve himself directly in the negotiations to help contribute toward a final settlement. They also voiced their strong support for active involvement by the Friends of the Secretary General-- Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain--in the peace process. As members of the Security Council, they offered to play a constructive, active role in support of the negotiations and implementing the final settlement. The Soviet Union and the United States are convinced that an end to the conflict in El Salvador will contribute to economic development in Central America and help remove the remaining sources of tension in the Caribbean Basin region, thereby contributing to the further peaceful integration of Latin America. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

US-Soviet Relations

Date: Aug 12, 19918/12/91 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control, Human Rights, Democratization [TEXT]
Background
Since the 1917 Russian Revolution, US-Soviet relations have evolved through several phases, including a period of minimal contact, a war-time alliance, an intense Cold War, hopes for detente, and disappointment when the competitive aspects of the relationship proved dominant. During most of this period, the Soviet Union's approach to the world--its Marxist-Leninist ideology, vast military buildup, and pattern of aggression abroad and repression at home--made the US-Soviet relationship essentially an adversarial one. Relations with the Soviet Union have improved considerably since 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev began changing the Soviet Government's policies and practices. Moscow has permitted greater freedom at home in the context of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) and shown greater restraint and a less threatening military posture abroad. Should reform continue, the basic nature of the US-Soviet relationship could be changed profoundly. A key US goal is to help Soviet restructuring become permanent.
US Policy
In a fluid situation, the United States must be prudent but willing to engage the Soviets. The US approach to the Soviet Union is based on realism about the nature of the USSR and the differences of history, geography, ideology, and national experience that set the two countries apart and guarantee that some aspects of their relationship will remain competitive. The United States must maintain its ability to protect US security and that of its allies and friends with the necessary military, economic, technological, and political strength to counter the use or threat of the use of force. At the same time, in a broad and constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union, the United States seeks new opportunities for a more stable and more cooperative relationship. The United States wants perestroika to succeed because it thinks that it will bring about a Soviet Union more interested in satisfying the needs of its people and less interested in aggressive behavior abroad.
Five-Part Agenda
The US approach toward the Soviet Union has taken into account what went wrong with the detente of the 1970s. The United States has moved beyond a relationship based largely on arms control to include all the significant issues causing suspicion and distrust. A comprehensive, five-part agenda is grounded on the basis of long- term US and Western objectives. It includes: -- Dealing with Western security relations through a coherent strategy of arms control and defense programs. The US Government engages in bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations on a range of issues in the nuclear and space talks (which include Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the defense and space talks), the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Conference on Disarmament, and in bilateral consultations on chemical weapons and missile technology proliferation. The United States seeks verifiable arms control agreements that enhance US security, reduce the risk of war, strengthen stability, and lower the levels of arms and armed forces. Signicant arms control progress was made in 1990, including the signing of the CFE Treaty, at the November summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). -- Dealing with regional conflicts that contain the seeds of direct confrontation and that, for many years, have been a source of US-Soviet tension. The United States and the Soviet Union agree in principle that regional conflicts require political and diplomatic solutions, and, despite differences, continue to discuss how to translate this common goal into practice in some difficult situations. In particular, US-Soviet consultation in the face of Iraqi aggression in Kuwait led to unprecedented cooperation. -- Addressing human rights, where the Soviet Union's behavior has been at the heart of much distrust. Dialogue has broadened to discussion of new issues such as the "rule of law." At the same time, the United States will continue to press on unresolved emigration and political prisoner cases. -- Expanding the bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, including increased cultural and scientific exchange programs, tourism, and commercial ties. Hundreds of exchanges are taking place at the official level as well as between private citizens. In June 1990, the United States signed agreements on commercial relations, civil aviation, and maritime transportation in order to promote the expansion of mutually beneficial non-strategic trade with the Soviet Union. The United States also is negotiating investment and tax treaties with the Soviets. -- Broadening dialogue into a new area of global or transnational issues. Opportunity exists for cooperation on a range of mutual concerns, including the environment, natural hazards prediction and damage mitigation, control of illegal narcotics, and international terrorism.
High-Level Dialogue
The United States and the Soviet Union have an active high-level dialogue. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev held discussions in Malta in December 1989 which helped lay the groundwork for the US- Soviet summit in Washington, DC, May 30-June 3, 1990. President Bush's conversations with President Gorbachev were marked by a spirit of candor and openness and a desire to build bridges toward an era of enduring cooperation. They signed a chemical weapons agreement, nuclear testing protocols, and a commercial agreement. They also renewed their commitment to early conclusion of the negotiations on strategic nuclear forces and conventional forces in Europe. In September, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Helsinki to discuss the Persian Gulf crisis and other urgent matters. They continued their dialogue in meetings during the Paris CSCE summit in November. These and other continuing meetings between Secretary Baker and his Soviet counterpart reflect a new ability to work constructively on a broader range of issues. As Secretary Baker has said: "Our search for points of mutual advantage has been productive. And the search must continue--in new, more ambitious ways. We now need to pursue our hopes for the post-Cold War future." The United States can begin to envision and even plan for a new relationship that clearly goes beyond the containment policies of the past.(###)
1991 Moscow Summit
President Bush's July 29-August 1 visit to the USSR for the first post-Cold War summit symbolized the start of a new stage in the US-Soviet relationship. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and issued joint statements on Yugoslavia and the Middle East. The bilateral focus of the summit was primarily economic, and the President expressed his full support for the USSR's integration into the world economy as the Soviet Union moves from a command to a market economy. President Bush announced he would ask Congress to approve the trade agreement signed at the 1990 summit, grant most-favored- nation status, and seek the repeal of the legislative restrictions that inhibit US-Soviet trade. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

US-Soviet Economic Policy

Date: Aug 12, 19918/12/91 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] Changes in the Soviet Union resulting from political and economic reform are helping to improve economic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. After 6 years, President Gorbachev's reform process, known as perestroika, has resulted in many political changes. Reforming the economy, however, has proved more difficult. Since last April, Gorbachev and the leaders of the majority of Soviet republics have been negotiating an economic plan that would transfer significant powers to the republics. Although its goal is to achieve transition to a market economy, it relies heavily on administrative means to run the economy and carry out reform. The internal Soviet debate on reform, however, continues. At Malta in December 1989, President Bush outlined for President Gorbachev a program of technical economic cooperation to advance the process of market-oriented economic reform in the Soviet Union. At the Washington summit in June 1990, the two presidents signed a new trade agreement. Last December, President Bush waived the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act for the Soviet Union, making the Soviet Union eligible for Commodity Credit Corporation and limited Export-Import Bank export credit guarantees. The President is now reviewing the Soviet emigration legislation passed in May. If it meets his criteria, he will submit the trade agreement to Congress for approval, paving the way for extension of most-favored-nation trade status to the Soviet Union. Bilateral trade with the Soviet Union has doubled since 1986, but it accounted for less than 1% of total US trade in 1990. Factors tending to limit trade include the centrally planned nature of the Soviet economic system, an inconvertible ruble, the uncompetitiveness of Soviet finished goods, a rigid centralized trading system, and the inability to purchase industrial inputs within the Soviet Union because resources are allocated rather than sold. Emphasis is being placed on expanding trade and investment opportunities that will build upon improved relations.
US Trade Policy
As Secretary Baker has said, "Mutually beneficial, non-strategic commercial exchanges are the best way to expand Soviet participation in the international economy." Toward that end, the United States signed a civil aviation agreement and a maritime transportation agreement with the Soviet Union at the June 1990 summit. The United States has negotiated a long-term grains agreement and is continuing negotiations on bilateral investment and tax treaties. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the Western security organization charged with safeguarding strategic technology through the use of controls on the export of strategic Western goods and services to the Soviet Union and other countries, accepted a comprehensive proposal by President Bush for modernization. COCOM's new international industrial list restricts trade only in those items that are the most sensitive in terms of US security. COCOM's comprehensive trade liberalization measures will make available to the Soviet Union many of the previously controlled items in areas such as computers, telecommunications, and machine tools. COCOM members also affirmed their belief that COCOM remains an essential element of Western security. The United States favors the integration of the Soviet Union into the global economy. The United States supported the Soviet Union's application for observer status in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was granted last May. The United States also has encouraged the Soviets to develop contacts with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Economic Cooperation
The United States wants Soviet economic reform and restructuring to succeed. Such efforts would create a more open society, transfer resources to non-military purposes, and promote Soviet integration into the world economic system. At the December 1989 summit meeting in Malta, the President proposed to the Soviets several initiatives in the area of technical economic cooperation. During his meeting with former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Paris last July, Secretary Baker proposed expanded technical cooperation and gave him a list of additional projects for consideration. These are designed to help the Soviets identify the issues involved in adopting market-oriented economic policies and devise and implement a strategy of meaningful economic reform. Projects and contacts in this technical cooperation effort already are underway, focused on small business development, formation of financial markets, banking reform, tax administration, anti-trust policy, statistical cooperation, and development of a private housing market. Most recently, the US Government proposed cooperation in energy and food distribution. At the Houston economic summit meeting in July 1990, the United States supported the decision of its G-7 partners to ask the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, and the designated president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in consultation with the European Community, to study the Soviet economy, make recommendations for its reform, and establish criteria for Western assistance that would support these reforms. This study, completed in December 1990, recommended fundamental market reform, coupled with technical assistance from the West. A joint US-Soviet Commercial Commission plays an important role in promoting bilateral trade. The private US-USSR Trade and Economic Council meets annually to promote trade and investment between the two countries. More than 100 US companies are registered to undertake joint ventures in the Soviet Union. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

Chronology: Highlights in US-Soviet Relations, 1989-July 1991

Date: Aug 12, 19918/12/91 Category: Chronologies Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: State Department, Democratization, Arms Control, History [TEXT] The following was prepared by W. Taylor Fain, III, of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State. March 7, 1989: Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, meeting in Vienna, discussed human rights, arms control, and regional conflicts. Secretary Baker expressed hope for the success of Soviet economic reform. May 10-11, 1989: During Secretary Baker's visit to Moscow, US and Soviet officials discussed regional problems (Central America, Afghanistan, and the Middle East), human rights, bilateral matters, and transnational questions. They agreed on dates for resuming bilateral arms talks. May 12, 1989: President Bush, in a public address, reaffirmed the US desire for Soviet economic reform to succeed and stated that the United States sought the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations. He proposed regular surveillance flights over NATO and Warsaw Pact territories (Open Skies) and offered improved trade relations if the Soviet Union relaxed its emigration laws. May 29, 1989: During a NATO summit meeting in Brussels, President Bush offered initiatives on conventional forces in Europe. He called for completion of an agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) within a year. June 12, 1989: The United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement in Moscow designed to prevent dangerous military activities. September 21-23, 1989: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Wyoming. They released a detailed joint statement covering the full US-Soviet agenda and signed several agreements on arms control verification and notification procedures. They signed several bilateral agreements concerning land and sea passage between the United States and Soviet Union. December 2-3, 1989: During a shipboard summit meeting near Valletta, Malta, President Bush and Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev set a series of priorities to guide US-Soviet relations and preparations for the next summit. They agreed to seek an accelerated conclusion to nuclear and conventional arms agreements and discussed economic and commercial relations and regional conflicts. President Bush offered ideas for technical cooperation and proposed negotiating a trade agreement that would lift the Jackson-Vanik restriction on most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union, provided the Soviet Government enacted a new law on emigration. They announced that a full summit would take place in the United States in June 1990. January 31, 1990: In his State of the Union Address, President Bush proposed cutting US and Soviet troops in Central Europe to 195,000 on each side. The United States would be able to maintain an additional 30,000 in peripheral nations. The Soviet Foreign Ministry called the initiative "a step in the right direction." February 7-10, 1990: Secretary Baker met with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and President Gorbachev in Moscow. They discussed a range of arms control questions, making progress on conventional, nuclear, and chemical agreements. Soviet emigration policy, German unification, and regional issues were discussed. On February 10, Secretary Baker testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet. February 13, 1990: In Ottawa, the four major World War II Allies (US, UK, France, and USSR) plus the two Germanies agreed on a framework for negotiating the unification of Germany ("Two-Plus- Four"). The Soviet Union and other CFE participants accepted President Bush's January 31 proposal for troop reductions in Europe. March 20, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met during independence ceremonies in Windhoek, Namibia. They discussed Lithuania, German unification, arms control, and Afghanistan. April 4-6, 1990: Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met with Secretary Baker and President Bush in Washington. A US-Soviet summit to be held in Washington from May 30-June 3 was announced. The sides had difficult exchanges on strategic arms control issues, with the Soviets raising issues the US believed were settled. The full US- Soviet agenda and regional issues were discussed. May 16-19, 1990: Secretary Baker met in Moscow with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and President Gorbachev to finalize preparations for the Washington summit. The ministers resolved differences on chemical and strategic weapons. Secretary Baker reiterated US policies favoring liberalized Soviet emigration, restraint and dialogue in Lithuania, and a unified Germany within NATO. May 30-June 3, 1990: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Washington and Camp David. They signed a key elements agreement for a strategic arms treaty, a chemical weapons reduction accord, and a trade agreement reducing barriers to US-Soviet commerce. Several other bilateral accords increasing cultural and scientific exchanges as well as maritime and air links were concluded. A 5- year US-Soviet grain deal was signed. The topics of German unification and Lithuania were discussed in depth. Following the summit, President Gorbachev journeyed to Minneapolis to meet local business leaders. The next day, he met former President Reagan in San Francisco before returning to Moscow. June 5, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Copenhagen during the CSCE [Conference on Security] Foreign Ministers' conference. They discussed German unification, European security, and arms control issues. June 22, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in East Berlin during a session of the Two-Plus-Four talks on German unification and discussed regional issues, particularly Afghanistan. August 1-2, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in the Siberian city of Irkutsk, where they discussed the full range of US-Soviet bilateral and security issues. August 3, 1990: Secretary Baker flew to Moscow where he and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze issued a joint statement condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2. They urged a cut-off of all arms shipments to Iraq. September 9, 1990: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Helsinki for an urgently convened summit to discuss the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. They issued a joint statement expressing their solidarity in opposition to the aggression and their intention to cooperate fully in ending the Gulf crisis. They also urged their negotiators to move forward more rapidly in finalizing both strategic and conventional arms control agreements and discussed the progress of Soviet economic reforms. September 11, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Moscow, where they discussed CFE and the Persian Gulf. Baker and Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher co-hosted a meeting of US business executives and Soviet officials. September 12, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze joined the Foreign Ministers of France, Britain, and the two Germanies to sign the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany." The event concluded the Two-Plus-Four process and provided for formal German reunification on October 3. September 13, 1990: Secretary Baker met with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow. They discussed remaining differences over CFE. September 26-0ctober 5, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met on five separate occasions in New York during the opening of the UN General Assembly and the CSCE ministerial. They resolved major differences on CFE, made good progress toward a START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] agreement, and discussed the Persian Gulf crisis. October 18, 1990: The US and Soviet Governments issued a joint statement calling for a peaceful settlement to the civil war in El Salvador. November 8, 1990: Secretary Baker met with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow. He sought Soviet support for a UN resolution which would authorize the use of force by the allied coalition against Iraq in the Persian Gulf should it prove necessary. Shevardnadze said the use of force "could not be ruled out." November 18, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Paris on the eve of the CSCE summit. They discussed the situation in the Persian Gulf and the necessity of Soviet support for a UN resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. November 19, 1990: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met at the Paris CSCE summit. They signed the CFE Treaty and a non-aggression pledge with the other leaders of the North Atlantic and Warsaw Pact alliances. Afterward, they met privately to discuss the Persian Gulf crisis. They "reaffirmed their unity and commitment" to end Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait. November 20, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, still in Paris, continued their discussion of the Persian Gulf crisis. November 28, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in New York to discuss the details of the resolution to be voted on the following day concerning the possible use of force against Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf. November 29, 1990: The United States and the Soviet Union voted together in favor of a UN resolution authorizing the use of military force against Saddam Hussein if he had not implemented the previous UN resolutions concerning his invasion and occupation of Kuwait by January 15, 199. December 9-12, 1990: Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met with Secretary Baker and President Bush in Houston and Washington. They announced that Presidents Bush and Gorbachev would hold a summit in Moscow on February 11-13, 1991, and discussed the issues of economic assistance to the Soviet Union and the START and CFE agreements. January 26-29, 1991: Secretary Baker and President Bush met with new Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh in Washington. They reaffirmed their commitment to the UN resolutions adopted in connection with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and discussed arms control, the situation in the Baltic states, and regional issues. They announced that because of the war in the Persian Gulf and technical differences which remained on the START agreement, the Moscow summit previously scheduled for February would be postponed. February 21, 1991: The Soviet Government announced that President Gorbachev and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had agreed on a formula for the "full and unconditional withdrawal" of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. President Bush welcomed the Soviet attempt to end the Gulf war through diplomatic means but pointed out that the Soviet proposal would not oblige Iraq to abide by the terms of all the UN resolutions directed against its invasion of Iraq. March 14-17, 1991: Secretary Baker, in Moscow, met with Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and President Gorbachev. They discussed CFE, START, Middle East security issues, and Soviet economic and political developments. April 24-25, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Kislovodsk, in the Soviet Caucasus, where they discussed Middle East security problems, and bilateral and arms control issues. May 12-13, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Cairo to discuss the Middle East peace process. They discussed the Kurdish refugee problem in northern Iraq, bilateral issues, including START and CFE implementation, and regional matters. June 1, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Lisbon after witnessing the signing of the Angola Peace Accords. They resolved outstanding issues which had delayed implementation of the CFE Treaty and progress toward the conclusion of a START agreement and issued a joint statement on conflict resolution in Africa. June 7, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Geneva. They discussed remaining differences over the terms of the proposed START agreement. June 20, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Berlin. They discussed remaining US-Soviet differences on START, El Salvador, Cuba, and the possibility of a Moscow summit. July 11-14, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Washington. They narrowed significantly US- Soviet differences on START. Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh presented President Bush with a letter from President Gorbachev outlining his planned presentation to the Western economic summit in London on Soviet economic reform. July 17, 1991: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met over lunch on the final day of the economic summit of the Group of Seven industrialized nations. They announced the conclusion of a START agreement and scheduled a summit in Moscow for July 30-31. They also discussed the economic situation in the Soviet Union. July 30-August 1, 1991: President Bush visited the Soviet Union. He held a 2-day summit with Soviet President Gorbachev during which the leaders signed the START Treaty and agreed to co-sponsor efforts to convene a Middle East peace conference in October 1991. On August 1, President Bush visited Kiev before returning to Washington.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

Chronology: US-Soviet Summits, 1943-1991

Date: Aug 12, 19918/12/91 Category: Chronologies Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: State Department, Democratization, Military Affairs, Security Assistance and Sales, Arms Control, History [TEXT] The following was prepared by W. Taylor Fain, III, of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State. Every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt has conferred with the Soviet leadership, either the head of the Communist Party or head of the government. These meetings, 24 in all, went through several distinct phases. During World War II, Roosevelt and Truman met with Soviet and British leaders to decide on the conduct of military operations and to make arrangements for the peace. Three meetings during the Eisenhower Presidency were expanded to include France, and Eisenhower grappled unsuccessfully in the enlarged forum over the elusive German peace settlement and the growing problem of nuclear weapons. Kennedy and Johnson each met the Soviet leadership during the 1960s in informal circumstances over issues ranging from Europe to crises in the Middle and Far East. Five Nixon-Ford meetings with Chairman Brezhnev and a subsequent Carter-Brezhnev conference in the 1970s dealt primarily with arms control. The agenda of President Reagan's five meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev at Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, Moscow, and New York included arms reductions, human rights, regional issues, and bilateral affairs. President Bush expanded the agenda to include transnational issues at Malta, Washington, Helsinki, Paris, and London.
November 28-December 1, 1943:
(Tehran: Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) Discussion centered on planning for the cross channel invasion of enemy-occupied France. The three powers also agreed to try to get Turkey to join the war and to split Finland away from the Axis powers. Also discussed were political questions, including a future world organization, and postwar policy toward Germany. The leaders issued a special declaration recognizing Iran's contribution to the war effort. Decisions on some issues, such as future Polish boundaries, were postponed. This was the only summit held outside Europe, the Soviet Union, or the United States.
February 4-11, 1945:
(Yalta: Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) The three leaders issued an invitation to the United Nations to meet in the United States and discussed the future of Poland and Eastern Europe, the status of postwar Germany, and the conditions for Soviet entry into the Pacific war. In a Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Allies pledged to assist the liberated peoples to establish order and create representative governments through free elections. In a secret agreement, the Soviet Union promised to enter the Pacific war 2 to 3 months after Germany's surrender in return for certain Far Eastern concessions. Yalta remains the most controversial summit meeting because the Soviets later unilaterally subverted the concept of free elections to establish hegemony over Eastern Europe.
July 17-August 2, 1945:
(Potsdam: Truman, Churchill and Attlee, and Stalin) The conference dealt with the military details of the Soviet entry into the Pacific war and political questions, primarily the occupation of Germany and the question of German reparations. The three powers created a Council of Foreign Ministers to work on peace treaties with the European Axis powers and their Eastern European satellites, and reached an agreement on the resettlement of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe to Germany. In a declaration issued on July 26, the United States, Great Britain, and China demanded Japan's unconditional surrender. During the conference, Truman learned of the successful test of the atomic bomb and informed Stalin in general terms.
July 18-23, 1955:
(Geneva: Eisenhower, Eden, Faure, and Bulganin and Khrushchev) At this first postwar conference, also the first to be called a "summit", Eisenhower advanced the "Open Skies" proposal calling for an exchange of military blueprints with the Soviet Union and aerial reconnaissance of each other's military installations. The participants also discussed disarmament, German reunification through free elections, European security, and the need for greater East-West contacts through travel and exchange of information.
September 15, 26-27, 1959:
(Washington-Camp David: Eisenhower and Khrushchev) Following brief meetings with Eisenhower upon his arrival in Washington on September 15, Khrushchev embarked on a 10-day trip to New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, farm communities in Iowa, and Pittsburgh, arranged to acquaint him with the American way of life. Eisenhower and Khrushchev then engaged in substantive talks for 2 days at Camp David. They agreed to expand exchanges and to remove the Soviet deadline for a Berlin settlement, but no progress was made on disarmament and the reunification of Germany. They also agreed on a four-power summit in Paris the following year. Khrushchev also visited Eisenhower's farm at Gettysburg. Just before he left, Khrushchev addressed the American people on national television. This meeting constituted the first visit to the United States of a Soviet leader since establishment of US-Soviet relations in 1933.
May 16-17, 1960:
(Paris: Eisenhower, Macmillan, De Gaulle, and Khrushchev) The four leaders planned to discuss Germany and Berlin, disarmament, nuclear testing, and the general state of East-West relations. On the second day of the conference, before any issues could be considered, Khrushchev demanded that Eisenhower apologize for the U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union on May 1. When Eisenhower refused, Khrushchev seized upon the issue to leave the conference. President de Gaulle's attempt to mediate failed.
June 3-4, 1961:
(Vienna: Kennedy and Khrushchev) The status of Berlin was the major subject of discussion, but the conflict in Laos and the question of disarmament were also on the agenda. Khrushchev's truculence on Berlin surprised and sobered Kennedy, but some progress was made when the two leaders agreed that further discussions on Laos should be continued at the Foreign Minister level. Kennedy replaced the highly-structured conferences favored by Eisenhower with more informal and personalized meetings.
June 23 and 25, 1967:
(Glassboro: Johnson and Kosygin) The meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey, was arranged and agreed on after considerable haggling over a suitable location. It followed Kosygin's visit to the United Nations, where he came to support the Arab nations' proposals for ending the Middle East conflict that led to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In addition to the Middle East, disarmament and the Vietnam war were also discussed. During the conference, the Soviet Union served as intermediary in conveying North Vietnamese willingness to negotiate in exchange for a halt to the US bombing. The US counterproposals via Moscow were never answered.
May 22-30, 1972:
(Moscow: Nixon and Brezhnev) This meeting had two principal and substantial accomplishments. First, it established a personal relationship between Nixon and Brezhnev, which facilitated the convening of subsequent meetings between the two leaders. Second, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) Interim Agreement, both of which had been in negotiation in Helsinki and Vienna for many months. Also concluded were agreements on public health, environmental cooperation, incidents at sea, exchanges in science, technology, education and culture, and a Declaration of Basic Principles of Mutual Relations.
June 18-25, 1973:
(Washington: Nixon and Brezhnev) Brezhnev's visit to the United States resulted in 47 hours of meetings with Nixon in Washington, Camp David, and San Clemente. The two leaders signed nine accords, which included an Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War and an Agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Other agreements signed at the summit dealt with scientific cooperation, agriculture, trade, and other bilateral issues. The joint communique expressed "deep satisfaction" with the conclusion of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam which had been signed the preceding January. Nixon stated at Brezhnev's departure that the meeting "built on the strong foundation that we laid a year ago."
June 28-July 3, 1974:
(Moscow: Nixon and Brezhnev) Watergate and the President's imminent resignation overshadowed the meeting with the General Secretary and limited expectations on both sides. The two leaders discussed arms control and several international and bilateral issues in Moscow and at Brezhnev's villa in Oreanda on the Black Sea. They signed a protocol limiting each side to one ABM site apiece instead of the two allowed in the 1972 ABM Treaty, and a Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which limited the size of underground nuclear weapons tests. The Test Ban Treaty was never ratified by the United States, because of concerns about its verifiability. The governments signed several other instruments dealing with scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges, and other bilateral matters. Nixon and Brezhnev also agreed to explore the possibility of a 10-year time period for a SALT treaty, which opened the way for the Vladivostok accord a few months later. The communique re-affirmed an agreement to hold regular meetings.
November 23-24, 1974:
(Vladivostok: Ford and Brezhnev) At the Vladivostok meeting, which followed visits by Ford to Japan and Korea, discussions focused on strategic arms limitations as well as on a number of bilateral and international issues, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Middle East. In the SALT II negotiations, Ford and Brezhnev reached agreement in principle on some of the basic elements that were subsequently incorporated in the 1979 treaty. They issued a joint statement on strategic offensive arms (the Vladivostok agreement) and a joint communique calling for continuing efforts at arms limitation and the development of economic cooperation.
July 30 and August 2, 1975:
(Helsinki: Ford and Brezhnev) During two sessions at Helsinki, immediately prior to and following the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ford and Brezhnev attempted unsuccessfully to reach further agreement on strategic arms limitations. Differences between the two governments over cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire bomber frustrated Ford's and Kissinger's desires to strengthen cooperation between the two superpowers and to conclude a SALT II agreement. Ford and Brezhnev held frank discussions on other issues, including the Arab-lsraeli conflict and the relationship between Soviet emigration policy and most-favored-nation trading status.
June 15-18, 1979:
(Vienna: Carter and Brezhnev) The SALT II Treaty was signed at this summit in Vienna. Carter and Brezhnev also discussed other arms control questions including the continuation of the SALT process, and had wide- ranging exchanges on human rights and trade, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Africa, China, and other regional issues. The two leaders also issued a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms. The SALT II Treaty was never ratified.
November 19-21, 1985:
(Geneva: Reagan and Gorbachev) President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev discussed a four-part agenda: human rights, regional issues, bilateral matters, and arms control. The President pressed for improvement in Soviet human rights practices, removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and the resolution of regional conflicts in a number of countries including Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. In the arms control area, both leaders called for early progress on reductions in strategic, offensive nuclear forces. They also had frank exchanges on strategic defense issues. They agreed to study the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable treaty banning chemical weapons. They endorsed a policy of regular exchanges between senior US and Soviet officials. The General Secretary accepted the President's invitation to visit the United States in 1986 and the President agreed to visit the USSR the following year. At the end of the meeting, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields, and announced that the two countries would resume civil air service.
October 10-12, 1986:
(Reykjavik: Reagan and Gorbachev) President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev held a meeting in Reykjavik to discuss all four points of the US-Soviet agenda--human rights, regional conflicts, bilateral cooperation, and arms control--with particularly intense discussions on arms reductions. The two leaders agreed in principle to 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms to a level of 6,000 warheads on 1,600 delivery systems they also reached agreement on a counting rule for strategic bombers. In addition, they agreed to seek an initial INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] agreement for a global ceiling of 100 warheads on longer-range INF missiles, with none in Europe, and constraints on shorter-range INF missiles. The President and Secretary Gorbachev agreed to expand mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation. However, on the final day of the meeting, Gorbachev insisted that further progress on INF and START be linked to new and unacceptable restrictions on the US Strategic Defense Initiative program. The President rejected such linkage, noting that the proposed Soviet restrictions on SDI were more stringent than those contained in the ABM Treaty and would cripple the SDI research program.
December 7-10, 1987:
(Washington: Reagan and Gorbachev) President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Washington to continue discussions on the four-part US-Soviet agenda: arms reductions, human rights, bilateral issues, and regional issues. They had full and frank discussions on human rights issues. The US and Soviet leaders discussed increasing bilateral exchanges, cooperation on environmental matters, and trade expansion. They held wide-ranging talks on regional issues including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, Central America, southern Africa, the Middle East, and Cambodia. The two leaders signed the "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles." They instructed their negotiators at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks to intensify efforts to complete a Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms to implement the principle of a 50% reduction in these arms, which was agreed to at the Reykjavik meeting. The leaders also instructed their negotiators to work out a new and separate treaty on defense and space issues that would commit the sides to observe the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time. Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also signed agreements to increase air service between the United States and the Soviet Union and to extend the US-Soviet world oceans agreement. General Secretary Gorbachev renewed his invitation for the President to visit the Soviet Union in the first half of 1988, and the President accepted.
May 29-June 1, 1988:
(Moscow: Reagan and Gorbachev) President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Moscow to continue substantive discussions on the four-point US- Soviet agenda: arms control, human rights and humanitarian affairs, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. A wide-ranging discussion of regional questions included the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula, Afghanistan, and other issues. The two leaders exchanged and signed ratification documents on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which the Supreme Soviet and the US Senate had approved on May 23 and 27 respectively. On Nuclear and Space Talks, understandings were reached in a number of areas, as a joint draft text of a treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms was being elaborated in the Geneva negotiations. Exchanges on START resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground. The two leaders also discussed nuclear non-proliferation, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established in Moscow and Washington, the status of ongoing negotiations toward a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global ban on chemical weapons, the status of conventional forces negotiations, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also signed or consummated through an exchange of diplomatic notes nine separate agreements, two of them related to arms control: the agreement on Advanced Notification of Strategic Ballistic Missile Launches and the Joint Verification Experiment agreement on nuclear testing. The seven other agreements covered a range of issues such as expansion of US-Soviet cultural and educational exchanges, US-Soviet cooperation on peaceful uses of atomic power and on space exploration, maritime search and rescue, fisheries, transportation technology, and radio navigation.
December 7, 1988:
(New York: Reagan and Gorbachev) President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met on Governor's Island in New York harbor, while the Soviet leader was visiting New York City to address the United Nations General Assembly. The meeting, which Vice President Bush also attended, was a private, non-negotiating session, followed by a luncheon.
December 2-3, 1989:
(Malta: Bush and Gorbachev) President Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev held a shipboard meeting in the harbor at Valletta, Malta, for an informal, personal discussion of major issues. The two leaders held a 5-hour session on December 2, including a one and one-half hour private meeting. A scheduled afternoon meeting and dinner was cancelled because of a major winter storm. They met again for 3 hours on the morning of December 3, and then held a joint news conference. During the meetings, the two leaders discussed the remarkable events leading to peaceful and democratic change in Eastern and Central Europe. President Bush noted his strong support for perestroika. Discussions also reviewed future steps in the US- Soviet relationship, economic and commercial relations between the two nations, human rights, regional issues, particularly Central America, environmental concerns, and a range of arms control issues, including chemical weapons, conventional forces negotiations, strategic arms talks, the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty, arms control verification, missile proliferation, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the situation in Lebanon. The two leaders agreed to hold a formal summit meeting in Washington in June 1990.
May 30-June 3, 1990:
(Washington: Bush and Gorbachev) Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Washington and at Camp David. During the first two days of meetings in Washington, the Presidents held wide-ranging discussions on political and economic matters including arms control, German unification, and US-Soviet trade. On June 1, the leaders signed a key elements agreement for a strategic arms treaty, a chemical weapons reduction accord, and a trade agreement reducing barriers to US-Soviet commerce. Several other bilateral accords increasing cultural and scientific exchanges as well as maritime and air links were concluded. A 5-year US- Soviet grain deal was signed. While in Washington, President Gorbachev hosted events for prominent American figures in the political and business worlds and the arts. On June 2, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev spent the day in the more informal atmosphere of Camp David, where they discussed regional issues, including Afghanistan, Lithuania, and Central America. They also discussed US-Soviet economic relations. The following day, President Gorbachev left Washington for Minneapolis, where he met with local business leaders, and San Francisco, where he met with former President Reagan, before returning to Moscow.
September 9, 1990:
(Helsinki: Bush and Gorbachev) Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Helsinki to discuss the crisis in the Persian Gulf caused by Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The summit, announced on September 1, was the product of a decision by the Presidents at Camp David in June to hold more informal and unstructured meetings as global developments warranted. The Presidents met for seven hours (three hours privately in the morning and four with an expanded group of advisers in the afternoon). They issued a joint statement expressing their solidarity in opposition to the Iraqi invasion and their intention to cooperate fully in ending the Gulf crisis. They also urged their negotiators to move forward more rapidly in finalizing both strategic and conventional arms control agreements and discussed the progress of Soviet economic reforms.
November 19, 1990:
(Paris: Bush and Gorbachev) Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met during the November 19 CSCE summit in Paris. They held a private discussion on the crisis in the Persian Gulf and Soviet support for a proposed UN resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq should it prove necessary.
July 17, 1991:
(London: Bush and Gorbachev) Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met privately over lunch on the final day of the economic summit of the Group of Seven industrialized nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States). They announced the completion of a START agreement and scheduled a summit in Moscow for July 30-31. They also discussed the economic situation in the Soviet Union.
July 30-31, 1991:
(Moscow: Bush and Gorbachev) Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Moscow. On the first day of the summit, President Bush met with the President of the Russian Republic, Boris Yeltsin. He announced that he would request Congress to confer most-favored-nation status on the Soviet Union. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met for 4 hours. They discussed the full US-Soviet agenda and the state of the Soviet economy. Secretary of State Baker signed five bilateral accords with Soviet officials covering aviation security, disaster assistance, provision of medical supplies, housing construction and finance, and technical economic cooperation. The following day, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the START Treaty and announced their determination to co-sponsor efforts to convene a Middle East peace conference in October 1991. On August 1, President Bush visited Kiev before returning to Washington.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

Helsinki Human Rights Day

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Proclamation given in Kiev, USSR Date: Aug 1, 19918/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Subject: CSCE [TEXT] In 1975, when the United States, Canada, and 33 European states joined in adopting the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], we affirmed "the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole." Signatories to the Helsinki accords also recognized that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is essential not only to achieving lasting peace among nations but also to promoting their social and economic development. During the past 16 years, the CSCE process begun at Helsinki has played a leading role in building mutual confidence, reducing the risk of conflict, and enhancing the growth of democracy and openness in Europe. This year we welcome Albania's entry into the CSCE community and its commitment to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms that this symbolizes. The tremendous changes that have swept central and eastern Europe underscore the CSCE's effectiveness in advancing the goal of universal compliance with the Helsinki accords. At their meeting in Paris last November, CSCE members welcomed the emergence of a new transatlantic partnership of nations based on a mutual commitment to upholding human rights and the rule of law. In signing the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, Members added to existing CSCE principles new and sweeping commitments to political pluralism, free elections, free enterprise, and the rule of law. New CSCE institutions established at the Paris summit--such as the Office for Free Elections in Warsaw, the CSCE Secretariat in Prague, and the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna--strengthen the CSCE's ability to help consolidate and to build upon recent gains. The United States encouraged and welcomed these developments as evidence that the CSCE can serve not only as a catalyst for change but also itself change to reflect the demands of an evolving Europe. During the June meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in Berlin, the Conference endorsed the report of the Valletta Meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and agreed to designate the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna as the nominating institution to help settle disputes. Members also agreed on a mechanism for holding emergency official-level meetings of the CSCE, which has first been called into action in the current Yugoslav crisis. As the Yugoslav crisis demonstrates, major challenges remain. The United States will continue to suggest that the CSCE strengthen its capacity to address the political sources of conflict. One area of special concern to us is the persecution of ethnic minorities. Ethnic tensions in Europe provide a solemn and urgent reminder that we still have much work to do in achieving universal compliance with both the letter and the spirit of the Helsinki accords. The United States has sought to lead other member-states in exploring ways that the CSCE can help reduce these tensions and fulfill the promise of a Europe that is whole and free, and at peace with itself. As an expression of the special importance that the United States continues to attach to the CSCE in a changing Europe, the Congress, by House Joint Resolution 264, has designated August 1, 1991, as "Helsinki Human Rights Day" and has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this day. Now, therefore, I, George Bush, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim August 1, 1991, as Helsinki Human Rights Day and reaffirm the United States dedication to the principles of human dignity and freedom--principles that are enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. As we Americans observe this day with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities, let us call on all signatories of the Final Act to fulfill their obligation to respect the rights and dignity of all their citizens. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this thirty- first day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and sixteenth. GEORGE BUSH (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

Anniversary of Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Opening statement by President Bush from a press conference in Washington, DC Date: Aug 2, 19918/2/91 Region: MidEast/North Africa, Europe Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Today, August 2, provides an opportunity for all Americans to reflect upon the past year. It was just 12 months ago today that Saddam Hussein, lacking provocation or cause, ordered an attack upon Iraq's small and defenseless neighbor, Kuwait. What followed, the world now knows, was nightmare of brutal occupation; a nightmare that only came to an end several months ago. What liberated Kuwait was an unprecedented effort, one that brought together most of the international community, initially in support of sanctions, ultimately in support of military force, and always consistent with the principles and resolutions of the United Nations. Our task has not ended. We must ensure that Iraq complies fully with all UN resolutions and eliminates its weapons of mass destruction. And we must work to reintegrate Iraq and its people into the region once the Iraqi people choose new leadership. Most significantly on this August 2nd, we note that two new opportunities for peace have emerged as a byproduct of our efforts in the Gulf. In the Middle East, we're close to convening a conference this October that will launch direct talks among Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab States. I welcome Prime Minister Shamir's statement that he supports our proposal, and I call upon Israel and the Palestinians to clear away remaining obstacles and seize this truly historic opportunity for peace. And I'm pleased, too, on another front, that Prime Minister Mitsotakis and President Ozal have informed me that Greece and Turkey have agreed to attend a meeting concerning Cyprus. This meeting would be well-prepared and both convened and chaired by the UN Secretary General under his Security Council mandate. Greek and Turkish leaders will work in support of the Secretary General's efforts in advance of the meeting, planned for September in the US, provided that adequate progress is made [in] narrowing differences before then. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

American Foreign Policy Supplement Released

Description: Released by the Department's Office of the Historian. Date: Aug 7, 19918/7/91 Category: Features Subject: State Department, History [TEXT] The Department of State today released American Foreign Policy: Foreign Affairs Press Briefings and Treaties, 1989, Supplement. This microfiche publication contains the original transcripts of the special press briefings by senior Department and White House officials on foreign policy issues and all the formal daily press briefings conducted by the Department's Spokesman, including posted statements, during 1989. Also included are treaties, protocols, and agreements signed by the United States in 1989, specifically those international agreements requiring formal Senate consent in the ratification process. This publication supplements the official record of principal messages, addresses, statements, and briefings in the printed volume American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1989 published in December 1990. The briefings presented in this publication focused on all of the major themes in US foreign policy including US support for democratic revolution and self-determination, peaceful changes in the communist world, the spread of free enterprise, economic assistance to Poland and Hungary, and the unification of Germany. The briefings cover the continued improvements in US-Soviet relations including the Baker-Shevardnadze meetings in Moscow and Jackson Hole, Wyoming, and the Bush-Gorbachev summit in Malta. This publication documents multilateral discussions on arms control, regional security, and economic and trade policy; the unfolding crisis in Panama; human rights and refugees issues; and efforts to combat terrorism and atmospheric pollution. Significant diplomatic initiatives highlighted here include the Bipartisan Accord on Central America and the Brady Plan on Third World Debt. In addition, this publication contains documents detailing the Paris International Conference on Cambodia, the calls for restraint and nonviolence during the student demonstrations in China, and the reaffirmation of the US commitment to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe process as a forum for East-West cooperation. This publication comprises about 400 documents totaling about 5,600 pages on 61 microfiche cards. The documents are presented in two parts. Part I contains the Department of State daily press briefings and the Department of State and White House Special Briefings and Press Conferences, in chronological order, held in 1989. Part II contains treaties, protocols, and agreements concluded by the United States in 1989. The 125-page printed guide lists all briefings and treaties included in the microfiche and the names and positions of all on-the-record briefers, and includes a comprehensive index for both parts. This microfiche publication was prepared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Copies of this microfiche publication (Department of State Publication No. 9863, GPO Stock No. 044-000-02314-8) may be purchased for $19.00 from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. For further information, contact: Sherrill B. Wells (202) 663- 1149 or Evans Gerakas (202) 663-1147.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 32, August 12, 1991 Title:

Current Treaty Actions

Date: Aug 12, 19918/12/91 Category: Treaties/Agreements Country: Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Honduras, Israel, Madagascar, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Solomon Islands, USSR (former), Venezuela, Antarctica Subject: Environment, Science/Technology, Security Assistance and Sales, Human Rights, International Law, Narcotics, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Resource Management, Terrorism [TEXT]
Multilateral
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. TIAS 8062. Accessions deposited: Burkina Faso, Apr. 17, 1991; Liechtenstein, May 30, 1991.
Conservation
Convention on wetlands of international importance especially as waterfowl habitat, as amended by the Protocol of Paris of Dec. 3, 1982. Done at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. Entered into force Dec. 21, 1975; for the US Dec. 18, 1986. TIAS 11084. Accession deposited: Panama, Nov. 26, 1990.
Copyright
Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of Sept. 9, 1886, completed at Paris May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin Nov. 13, 1908, completed at Berne Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome June 2, 1928; at Brussels June 26, 1948, at Stockholm July 14, 1967, and at Paris July 24, 1971, amended in 1979. Entered into force for the US Mar. 1, 1989. Accessions deposited: Ecuador, July 8, 1991; Ghana, July 11, 1991; Malawi, July 12, 1991.
Defense
Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, with protocols and annexes. Done at Paris Nov. 19, 1990. Entered into force provisionally Nov. 19, 1990. Enters into force definitively 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-8. Signatures: United States, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, USSR, and the United Kingdom, Nov. 19, 1990.
Gas
Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force Feb. 8, 1928; for the US Apr. 10, 1975. TIAS 8061. Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, Oct. 5, 1990.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the US Feb. 23, 1989. Accession deposited: Zimbabwe, May 13, 1991.
Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.1 Accessions deposited: Malta, Sept. 13, 19902,3; Zimbabwe, May 13, 1991; Nepal, May 14, 1991. International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.1 Ratification deposited: Malta, Sept. 13, 1990.2,4
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague Nov. 15, 1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969. TIAS 6638. Accession deposited: China, May 6, 1991.3 Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the US July 1, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-11. Signature: Denmark, Apr. 17, 1991. Ratification deposited: Denmark, Apr. 17, 19913 Accessions deposited: New Zealand, May 31, 19913; Mexico, June 20, 1991
Narcotics
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. Ratification deposited: Brazil, July 17, 1991; Sweden, July 22, 1991; Venezuela, July 16, 1991; United Kingdom, June 28, 1991.
Nuclear Weapons--
Non-Proliferation Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. Accession deposited: South Africa, July 10, 1991.
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. Ratification deposited: Cote d'Ivoire, Jan. 31, 1991. TIAS 8733. International convention for the protection of new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961, as revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978. Entered into force Nov. 8, 1981. TIAS 10199. Ratification deposited: Canada, Feb. 4, 1991.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.1 Accession deposited: Zimbabwe, May 13, 1991.
Seabed Disarmament
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London and Moscow Feb. 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. Accession deposited: Liechtenstein, May 30, 1991.
Seals--Antarctic
Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1978. TIAS 8826. Accession deposited: Brazil, Feb. 11, 1991.
Terrorism
International convention against the taking of hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the US Jan. 6, 1985. TIAS 11081. Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, Apr. 29, 1991.
Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987.1 Accession deposited: Nepal, May 14, 1991.
Whaling
International whaling convention and schedule of whaling regulations. Done at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849. Adherence deposited: Venezuela, July 11, 1991.
Wills
Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an international will, with annex. Done at Washington Oct. 26, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 9. 1978.1 Accession deposited: Italy, May 16, 1991.
Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Done at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.1 Accessions deposited: Zimbabwe, May 13, 1991; Central African Rep., June 21, 1991. Ratification deposited: Nepal, Apr. 22, 1991.
Bilateral
Brazil
Agreement extending the complementary agreement of November 6, 1986, as extended, for technical cooperation in the area of irrigation. Exchange of notes at Brasilia Mar. 22 and May 22, 1991. Entered into force May 22, 1991.
Bulgaria
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Sofia June 7, 1991. Enters into force on the date on which Bulgaria communicates to the US that its constitutional or other legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Cape Verde
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Washington and Praia Apr. 17 and June 17, 1991. Enters into force Aug. 26, 1991.
Chad
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at N'Djamena Apr. 19 and June 8, 1991. Entered into force June 8, 1991.
Chile
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts owed to the United States Government and its agencies, with appendices. Signed at Washington June 27, 1991. Enters into force upon receipt by Chile of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
China, People's Republic of
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Jan. 31, 1979, as extended (TIAS 10921), on cooperation in science and technology. Signed at Washington May 22, 1991. Entered into force May 22, 1991; effective Apr. 30, 1991.
Ecuador
Memorandum of understanding on measures to prevent the diversion of chemical substances. Signed at Quito June 17, 1991. Entered into force June 17, 1991.
Egypt
Grant agreement for cash transfer. Signed at Cairo May 30, 1991. Entered into force May 30, 1991. Agreement amending the air transport agreement of May 5, 1964 (TIAS 5706; 15 UST 2202). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo May 27, 1991. Entered into force provisionally May 27, 1991; definitively on the date of exchanging written notification that the constitutional requirements of both parties have been fulfilled.
Honduras
Grant agreement for economic stabilization and recovery program IV. Signed at Tegucigalpa June 5, 1991. Entered into force June 5, 1991. Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific, technical and policy cooperation in the earth and mapping sciences, with annexes. Signed at Tegucigalpa June 10, 1991. Entered into force June 10, 1991.
Israel
Memorandum of understanding for cooperation in scientific exchanges and workshops, with annexes. Signed at Washington and Jerusalem Apr. 30 and June 26, 1991. Entered into force June 26, 1991.
Madagascar
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Antananarivo June 19, 1991. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Madagascar of written notice from US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
New Zealand
Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation, with annex and exchange of letters. Signed at Washington May 21, 1991. Entered into force May 21, 1991.
Philippines
Agreement regarding the relinquishment of certain areas at the San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Province of Zambales and the US Navy transmitter site at Capas, Province of Tarlac, with maps. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Jan. 31 and May 13, 1991. Entered into force May 13, 1991. Agreement relating to radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Feb. 13 and June 4, 1991. Entered into force June 4, 1991.
Poland
Agreement concerning provision of training related to defense articles under the United States International Military Education Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw Apr. 25 and June 6, 1991. Entered into force June 6, 1991.
Solomon Islands
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Honiara and Washington Apr. 19 and June 27, 1991. Entered into force August 1, 1991.
USSR
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the mapping sciences, with annexes. Signed at Moscow May 14, 1991. Entered into force May 14, 1991.
Venezuela
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in management and protection of national parks and other protected natural and cultural heritage sites. Signed at Washington July 1, 1991. Entered into force July 1, 1991. 1 Not in force for the US. 2 With reservation(s). 3 With declaration(s). 4 Reservation made upon signature withdrawn. (###)