US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: US-Turkish Relations
Bush, Ozal
Source: President Bush, President Ozal
Description: Ankara, Turkey
Date: Jul 20, 19917/20/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Turkey
Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales,
Democratization
[TEXT]
Deepening Political Dialogue
Opening statements by Turkish President Ozal and President Bush
from news conference following their talks in Ankara, July 20,
1991.
President Ozal:
Ladies and gentlemen, having just
completed the main part of our talks which covered a wide range of
issues, President Bush and I are now ready to face what might turn
out to be the most delicate part of our program--taking on the
press. I will now make a short introductory statement, which I
believe will be followed by one of President Bush later. We will be
glad to take your questions.
As your background briefs probably note, this is the second
visit to Turkey by an American President and the first one since
1959. This alone makes President Bush's presence an honor and
historic occasion. On a personal basis, my wife and I are
particularly happy to be able to reciprocate the warm hospitality
that was accorded to us by President and Mrs. Bush during our visit
to the United States.
You all know that during the recent months President Bush and
myself consulted each other frequently and, on occasions, almost
daily. Although these consultations dealt with the immediate
concern of those days, they nevertheless underline the unity of
course and parallelism of approach between our two countries.
During my last visit to the United States, we had intense
discussions in the relaxed atmosphere and seclusion of Camp David.
There we came to recognize that our long-standing relations and
cooperation have reached strategic dimensions which offered our
nations real possibilities. We decided that we should work together
and turn these possibilities into lasting benefits.
Today we went further on these issues. We noted that the
friendship and cooperation that exists between our two countries
not only serve our interest on the bilateral level but also constitute
an essential element of the broader partnership between the United
States and Europe as a whole. It's clear that Turkey's taking its
rightful place in Europe in integration will have important
implications--on the stability of regions neighboring Turkey and,
ultimately, on the peace and stability of Europe and the world.
These call for a deepening of our political dialogue. We agreed
that while the recent developments in the European security
environment allow for a more effective pursuit of dialogue and
cooperation as a means for enhancing security, an adequate defense
posture is still an essential element in facing prevailing
uncertainties and instabilities. Accordingly, the United States has
a keen interest in the modernization of Turkish armed forces.
On the economic front, we both believe that free trade should
be the driving force in our commercial ties and that there is a need
for enhancing and diversifying our economic relations through
increased and balanced trade and greater US investments and joint
ventures in Turkey.
Furthermore, we are convinced that the scope of our relations
would be incomplete if cooperation areas such as education,
science, health, technology, and culture are neglected. The
strategic dimension that our relations have already reached and the
agenda we have set for the future necessitate arrangements for an
institutional framework which will enable us to monitor the
progress that we hope to achieve.
This is why we have decided to set up a permanent mechanism
for consultations which will bring together our high level officials
on a regular basis. Different groups each asked to deal with a
different field of cooperation will meet as needed, but at least once
a year, and work to further our ties. A steering group co-chaired by
the Under Secretaries of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the US
State Department will be created to monitor and report the
progress achieved. This group will meet twice a year.
As you might expect, we also discussed the question of
Cyprus. I confirmed that Turkey is fully committed to a negotiated
settlement mutually acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot and the
Greek Cypriot peoples of the island and that political equality, bi-
commonality, bi-zonality, and the maintenance of Turkey's effective
guarantee are essential to a just and viable peace there.
I emphasize that UN Security Council Resolution 649 provided
the necessary framework for such a settlement. And that
quadripartite meeting I suggested recently, to be held in accordance
with the political equality of the two Cypriot parties, could provide
the much-needed turning point.
In summary, ladies and gentlemen of the press, this has been a
most fruitful visit. I hope and pray that what we, as the heads of
state of our countries, have set out to accomplish today will be for
the good of our nations and constitute a milestone in our
longstanding ties.
President Bush:
Thank you, Mr. President. And I'm
in Turkey to pay my respects to this great nation with which my
country has been so close for so many years.
President Ozal and I have had excellent talks today. He is a
courageous leader who has gained great credit and stature for
Turkey in the world. And I was also pleased, if I might say so, to
meet at his house, his residence, with Turkey's very impressive,
new young Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, and I want to thank him
over here for the time he gave me for fruitful talks as well.
We value Turkey's NATO partnership, its commitment to
democracy, and its integral position in the Western community. And
Turkey played a critical role, as we all know, in the international
coalition that liberated Kuwait, valiantly serving our common
interests in a lawful, international order and a stable region.
President Ozal and Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for today's
work. Both of us agreed--all three of us agreed today to build a new
strategic relationship based on closer political, security, and, yes,
economic links.
In this spirit, the United States supports Turkey's military
modernization, including its 160-plane F-16 development program.
And we have pledged to expand our trade and investment--a point
very important to both countries--and to develop new avenues of
cooperation in a lot of fields: education, environment, science and
technology, medicine, and others.
And, finally, I believe that an opportunity may exist for
progress on the Cyprus problem. The United States is committed to
support the efforts of the UN Secretary General in whatever way we
can. And I'm also convinced that the Turkish leadership is serious
about building new and better ties with the Greek Government of my
friend, Prime Minister Mitsotakis.
Let me close, Mr. President, with saying how deeply moved I
was and Barbara was, and I expect all of us were, by the warmth of
the reception from the Turkish people when we came in from the
airport. No one is so sophisticated that those outpourings of
interest in and, I think, affection for one's country--and in this
instance the United States--[don't] make a difference. I mean, it
makes a tremendous difference. And I can't tell you how moved and
touched I was--the little children all the way up to the old men and
women who greeted us along the side of the road. And I think that
started this visit off on a very high plane. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: US-Turkish Relations
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Dolmabahce Palace, Istanbul, Turkey
Date: Jul 21, 19917/21/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Turkey, Greece
Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales,
Democratization
[TEXT]
An Alliance Built on a Shared Commitment to Freedom
Remarks at Dolmabahce Palace, Istanbul, Turkey, July 21, 1991.
Mr. President and Speaker of the Parliament, Mr. Prime Minister,
members of the Turkish Government, Barbara and I want to thank
you for this warm welcome. And I am deeply honored to be the first
American president to come to this historic city.
Among the nations of the world, few claim a past as storied
as yours. Turkey stands at a crossroads of cultures and
civilizations. Here in Istanbul, one city spans two continents.
This city's ancient history is written for all to see in marble,
stone, and gold and in the monumental grandeur of the Hagia Sophia,
the serenity of the Blue Mosque, the courts of Topkapi, and here in
this beautiful palace--a treasure house of Turkish art and
architecture. Like Istanbul, Turkey is east and west, ancient and
modern. For in Turkey, what might elsewhere appear as
contradictions are dazzling facets of culture and character.
In this magnificent palace--testament to Turkey's past--in
the presence of the men and women entrusted with the future of
this nation, it is fitting to speak about new and old, about our new
world of change, about the enduring partnership that binds our two
nations.
This partnership grows out of a shared devotion to the
international ideal--the understanding that responsible nations
must work together to repel aggression to preserve the peace. From
the days of the Korean war, and the legendary bravery of the Turkish
brigade, through the long years of the Cold War, as partners in the
NATO alliance and today in our effort to forge a new world order,
Turkey has stood for this international ideal.
For 40 years, Turkey played a strategic role as the bulwark of
NATO's southern flank. The alliances, and Turkey's steadfast
adherence to common values and interests produced a stunning
triumph. Democracy triumphed over totalitarianism in eastern
Europe, and the Cold War yielded to prospects for a different kind of
world.
Then came Iraq's invasion of Kuwait--an act that defied all
that the United States and Turkey stand for--an act that exposed
your entire region, this entire region--to brutal aggression.
Turkey's response, as a key member of the international
coalition, stands as a tribute to the leadership of President Ozal, to
the professionalism of the Turkish military, and to the great heart
of the Turkish people.
Turkey's actions as a pivotal coalition member demonstrated
again our readiness to defend our common values and interests. It
proved that our alliance was built not upon the fear of communism,
but out of a profound, shared commitment to freedom and
democracy.
All during the world's effort to use diplomacy to get Iraq's
brutal dictator to remove his forces from Kuwait and then during
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, President Ozal and I were in
constant touch. There was no individual in any country that was
more resolute, more determined to see international law prevail.
Once the decision was made to use force, difficult decision that it
was, no ally was more solid than Turkey, no leader more staunch
than your president--President Ozal.
Our work as friends, allies, and coalition partners continues
today. Our two nations are part of a newly formed residual force
stationed near Turkey's border with Iraq. All of us understand that
this force will not stay permanently. But we also understand the
importance of sending a strong, unmistakable signal to Saddam
Hussein: He must not resume war against his own people.
Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, our nations for years have
fostered a strong relationship. Turkey's stand in the Gulf
demonstrated that relationship's strength. Tonight, let us pledge
to build further upon our common ties and aims, to strengthen the
links our governments have forged.
In years to come, we will continue to back our warm words
with firm deeds. Our administration hopes to deliver a $625-
million military assistance program in 1992--a substantial
increase. We support Turkey's production of 160 F-16s.
But this new strategic relationship between our nations
points beyond simply the military dimension to expanded trade and
increased investment in one of Europe's most dynamic economies.
Well before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the advent of free-
market forces in Eastern Europe, Turkey launched an ambitious
reform program. In the 1980s, Turkey outpaced every nation in the
OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] in
economic growth. In the 1990s, as the new nations discover the
power of free enterprise, as democracy dispels a long dark era of
division and distrust, Turkey can regain its historic place as a trade
hub, uniting Europe, East and West, Asia, and the Middle East.
Finally, our new relationship means building new bridges--
bringing together the best minds in both our nations in the fields of
science and technology, medicine, and the environment; opening the
doors to our universities, opening our minds to each others' ideas,
cultures, and traditions. The people of our two nations have known
and admired each other as allies. It's time now for our people to get
to know each other better as friends.
A key to this new relationship lies in the opportunities now
opening as a direct result of a decade of democracy.
Turkey today is a nation confident of its place in the world--a
confidence made clear in your nation's opening to the new
democracies of Eastern Europe--and your growing relationship with
the Soviet Union. Your Black Sea initiative, aimed at expanding
trade with the Soviets and other nations that border that great body
of water, illustrates the promise of what I have called the new
world order. East-West confrontation has made way for trade and
cooperation, the cornerstones of lasting peace.
These initiatives promise increased prosperity for the Turkish
people and increased security for the Turkish republic. In the
famous words of Ataturk, "Peace at home, peace abroad," remains a
worthy goal for all nations.
That means we must begin building a lasting peace right here
in the eastern Mediterranean. In the past 2 days, in Ankara and on
the island of Crete, I have honored the memories of Kemal Ataturk
and Eleutherios Venizelos--two statesmen whose every thought
was for the good of their nations; two statesmen who earlier this
century made possible a generation of peace between Turkey and
Greece.
Once again, Turkey and Greece have both produced leaders of
vision--both trusted friends of mine. And as a friend of Turkey, let
me say the time has come for a new opening to a neighbor and
fellow NATO ally. The time has come for lasting peace between
Turkey and Greece.
After all, Greece and Turkey have been allies in NATO,
partners in the coalition that liberated Kuwait, free European
nations devoted to a common ideal; so this sad chapter of ill will
must end. No two nations who cherish democracy should regard
each other as enemies.
This opening must include movement on the Cyprus question.
In less than 2 years' time, we have witnessed a chain reaction--a
chain reaction of change that has swept away the Berlin Wall, and
with it, 4 decades of totalitarian rule and the ever-present risk of
global war. So the message I bring to Turkey and Greece is simply
this: We've seen too much change in the world to settle for the
status quo between your two great countries -- both, I'm proud to
say, friends of the United States of America; both of whom stand to
gain much through friendship.
We've seen too much change in this region and throughout the
world to stand for the status quo in Cyprus. We support the efforts
of [UN] Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar to open the door to a
solution for the problem. But I would like to tell the people of
Turkey what I've told the people of Greece: The solution lies in your
hands. Your friends can and will offer encouragement and support,
but only Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots can reach an effective, lasting
resolution.
I believe the time is right to break through the barrier, tear
down the old taboos, and build a lasting peace. When I see the
wealth of leadership -- President Ozal, Prime Minister Elmas, Mr.
Denktesh, President Karamanlis, Prime Minister Mitsotakis,
President Vassiliou -- I know the leadership exists in Turkey,
Greece, and Cyprus to set aside old animosities and seize an
opportunity for real peace.
Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister, members of the Turkish
Government, leaders here with us tonight, I am confident that
Turkey can rise to this challenge.
A decade of free government and free enterprise have made
Turkey a rising star of Europe. Politically and economically, Turkey
is today a nation transformed. There should be no question that
Turkey deserves entry into the European Community and the Western
European Union, and Turkey can count on America's strong support.
Turkey stands as a model to those who strive for free
elections and free markets. Regimes that force the false choice
between progress and piety, between technology and tradition,
stand refuted by your experience. Turkey proves that a nation can
build a flourishing democracy and a modern economy, can embrace
freedom and tolerance and still sustain its ancient face.
Turkey aims at the vision of Ataturk--a vision all around us
evident in this city, with it minarets and modern skyscrapers, a
vision that marks out Turkey's destiny in the region, in Europe, and
in the world beyond.
More than 30 years ago, President Eisenhower came to your
country on a pilgrimage of freedom--a visit that I know some may
remember. In the generation since then, Turkey turned promise into
prosperity, creating a future few would have thought possible. But
for all that has changed, one fundamental fact remains the same, in
the words of Eisenhower, "No power on earth, no evil, no threat, can
frustrate a people of your spirit."
Once again, I thank all of you for the warm welcome that
Barbara and I have received in Ankara, and here in this fantastic
city of Istanbul. May our two nations always work to preserve
peace, freedom, and prosperity, and may God bless the people of
Turkey. Thank you all very, very much.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: US-Turkish Relations
Bush, Ozal
Source: President Bush, President Ozal
Description: Istanbul, Turkey
Date: Jul 22, 19917/22/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Turkey, Greece
Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales,
Democratization
[TEXT]
Companions on the Road to Peace
Remarks by President Bush and President Ozal, Istanbul, Turkey,
July 22, 1991.
President Bush:
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Mr.
Prime Minister, and ladies and gentlemen. Barbara and I just want
to simply thank you for our visit and for the warmth of this Turkish
hospitality. We are very grateful.
A Turkish proverb reminds us, "A long journey is shortened by
good companions." Well, our stay here has been brief, but our
companions have been splendid. And the proverb applies equally to
the quest for peace and prosperity. Its road is arduous. But good
companions shorten it, as President Ozal and Prime Minister Yilmaz
have proved over these past 2 days.
Mr. President, real peace means the triumph of a better life,
not merely the absence of war. This goal requires stout hearts and
open minds and will provide a fitting object for our new strategic
relationship.
Turkish-American ties date back more than 200 years. But
our goal must be more extensive political ties, deeper security ties,
broader economic ties, and more enduring commercial ties. I leave
Turkey knowing that our ties are as strong as they have ever been
and that they can and will grow even closer. Toward that end,
President Ozal and I talked of how to broaden cooperation between
our people in fields such as education, the environment, science,
technology. We discussed Turkey's commitment to democracy and
the free market, and how increased trade and investment can
enhance our relationship as allies and friends.
We pledged to expand the military cooperation that helped
liberate Kuwait. Our Administration supports Turkey's priority
objective of military force modernization, including its 160-plane
F-16 development program. We stand side-by-side in maintaining
an international force to preserve stability on your southeastern
frontier. And in that spirit, I'm pleased to announce that the United
States will provide $1 million to Turkish villages along the Iraqi
border that suffered economic losses during the refugee crisis.
And we will remain engaged with you, our Greek allies, the
Cypriot people, and the UN Secretary General in hopes of building a
lasting peace in Cyprus. If a wall in Berlin can fall to human
brotherhood, so can ancient hatreds on Cyprus.
I began with a Turkish proverb, so let me close with another
one: "The bird with one wing cannot fly." Mr. President, you're a
dear friend and colleague. And you know, as I do, that our strategic
relationship has two wings--one extending from Maine to Alaska
and the other spanning your vast historic land. Together, let us fly
toward a better future.
So once again, my friend, thank you for this welcome, for the
kindness that you and the Turkish people have shown over the past
few days. May God bless Turkey and the United States of America.
President Ozal:
Mr. President, Mrs. Bush,
ladies and gentlemen. We are coming to the end of the President
Bush visit to Turkey. This visit has fulfilled all our expectations.
During this visit we have not only confirmed how strong the
foundations of Turkish-American relations are, but we have also
been able to take new steps for a more comprehensive and deeper
relationship, encompassing political security, economic, and social
fields.
The fact that the second phase of the F-16 project has been
agreed upon with a production target of 160 aircraft, that a
steering group has been established to conduct intensive political
consultation on all key issues of common interest and to monitor
other aspects of our relationship are some of the concrete steps
demonstrating the political will and determination of our two
countries to forge ever-closer relations.
This visit has also provided us with the opportunity of
exchanging views on all the major issues concerning our two
countries and confirming the identity of views among us. But
alongside all these important issues, it gave all of us, Mr. President
and Mrs. Bush, the opportunity to get to know you even better, to
consolidate our friendship and to appreciate once again how lucky
the world, whole world is in having such a great leader like you as
the President of the United States at a time when such important
developments are taking place in our globe that will affect all
generations to come.
I'm asking you, Mr. President and Mrs. Bush, to convey the
greetings and best wishes of the Turkish people to the American
people. As we say good-by, we are all proud of the level the
Turkish-American partnership has reached through our mutual
efforts. Thank you. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Statement at a meeting [July 22-24] with the foreign
ministers of the six countries of the Association of South
East Asian Nations
Date: Jul 24, 19917/24/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos
Subject: Trade/Economics, International Organizations
[TEXT]
I am very pleased to have this opportunity to meet once again with
you, my ASEAN colleagues. Last year at the Post-Ministerial
Conference in Jakarta, our discussions included a wide range of
topics, including an issue of central importance to the region:
Cambodia.
Again this year, it is appropriate that Cambodia is on our
agenda. [Indonesian] Foreign Minister Alatas has done a remarkable
job of keeping negotiations on track toward a comprehensive
settlement, building on the work of the Paris International
Conference on Cambodia and on the Perm Five [five permanent
members of the UN Security Council] proposals. Thailand, too,
deserves thanks for hosting the meeting at Pattaya which appears
to have broken new--and, we hope, fertile--ground. The United
States is encouraged at the signs of progress and recommits itself
to remaining engaged in this long and sometimes arduous process.
Like you, we recognize the importance of our final goal--affording
the Cambodian people the opportunity to chose their own
government by means of free and fair elections under UN
supervision. We must not accept partial solutions. We need a
comprehensive settlement to ensure an enduring peace.
The United States draws much of its strength from a
pluralistic political system which offers people with contrasting
views an opportunity to express themselves and to influence policy.
We do not insist that our system is the only appropriate political
order, but we do believe that democratic pluralism helps make
societies resilient, dynamic, and responsive to popular aspirations.
Thus we applaud trends toward political openness in Southeast
Asia, and we view with dismay the situation in Burma, where a
self-appointed military leadership regularly violates basic human
rights and has blatantly ignored the people's voice as clearly
expressed in popular elections. We regret that a country with such
great potential for economic advancement and cultural achievement
has shut itself off from the society of nations by its political
brutality and economic disintegration.
Within ASEAN, economic development has been rapid and
exciting, greatly expanding opportunities for both foreign and
domestic businesses to trade and invest. In fact, the region's
dramatic economic growth is closely linked to the signs of political
opening I mentioned a few moments ago. When people gain economic
freedom, they hunger as well for increased political freedom.
The formation of APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]
20 months ago was another signal of the vitality of the Asia-
Pacific region, stimulated by the vast economic flows linking our
economies. It is vital for the APEC countries as a group to work
together for our mutual goal of freer trade worldwide and
particularly for a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round [of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. We are encouraged by
the vigor with which APEC's working groups have begun their
activities, and we will continue to work cooperatively and
energetically with you to make APEC succeed.
The United States has relationships of long standing with the
nations of Southeast Asia, individually and collectively, in the
economic, political, and security realms. We are committed to
these relationships. Our participation in the ASEAN Post-
Ministerial Conference is one manifestation of that commitment. I
look forward to this opportunity to discuss important issues of
mutual interest. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Date: Aug 5, 19918/5/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos
Subject: Democratization, Refugees, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Background
Secretary Baker met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, July 22-24, with
the foreign ministers of the six ASEAN countries (Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). This was the 13th
annual "post-ministerial" consultation with ASEAN at the foreign
minister level, which immediately followed the annual meeting of
the six ASEAN foreign ministers. The ministers also invited their
counterparts from Australia, Canada, the European Community,
Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea to the post-ministerial
consultation to discuss major world and regional issues.
The six ASEAN nations have a total population of more than
300 million people. Covering more than 3 million square kilometers
(1.2 million square miles), the ASEAN countries straddle strategic
sea routes linking the Pacific Ocean with the Middle East, Africa,
and Europe.
Rich in natural resources, with a talented and hard-working
population and market-oriented development policies, the ASEAN
countries grew more rapidly than most developing nations during
the 1980s. Their trade with the rest of the world slipped to $144
billion in 1985 because of slackening world trade and falling
commodity prices but rebounded quickly and by 1990 reached $295
billion. Two-way trade with the US totaled $46 billion in 1990,
making ASEAN our fifth most important trading partner.
What Is ASEAN?
The Association of South East Asian Nations was created in August
1967 with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration by the five
original member nations (Brunei Darussalam became the sixth
member on January 7, 1984, shortly after its independence).
ASEAN's major purposes are to strengthen regional cohesion and
self-reliance, emphasizing economic, social, and cultural
cooperation.
It evolved slowly because of the member countries' varied
historical and colonial heritages and because their economies
largely compete against each other. Cooperation increased after the
US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. The first two ASEAN summit
conferences of heads of state, held in 1976 and 1977, initiated
much closer collaboration in political as well as economic and
social matters. The third ASEAN summit was held in Manila in
December 1987.
ASEAN has a loosely organized structure of ministerial
meetings, committees, and a small secretariat located in Jakarta.
The six nations have not been ready to give a regional secretariat
more centralized authority, nor has there been rapid movement
toward regional economic integration.
Economic Growth
ASEAN countries averaged annual real gross domestic product
growth of more than 5% during 1978-90, one of the economic
success stories among developing countries. The average slipped to
0.6% in 1985 but rose again to 7% in 1990. Future prospects for the
ASEAN economies, which are generally among the better managed in
the developing world, remain bright.
Regional Cooperation on Cambodia
Since the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, the ASEAN
countries have collaborated effectively in working for a
comprehensive settlement that would include: 1) verified
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, 2) measures to prevent the
return to power of the Khmer Rouge, and 3) genuine self-
determination for the Cambodian people through free and fair
elections.
External Relations
ASEAN has strengthened its ties with the US and other
industrialized countries through periodic economic "dialogues" and
the post-ministerial consultations. The ASEAN governments take a
constructive, creative approach to important world issues in the
United Nations and other forums.
Private Sector Cooperation
The ASEAN governments support private sector entrepreneurial
growth, domestic and foreign investment, and an open world trading
system. In 1979, the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce joined with the
US Chamber of Commerce to form the ASEAN-US Business Council to
represent private sector concerns. The council supports the US-
ASEAN Center for Technology Exchange, formed in 1984 to promote
the exchange of business know-how and investment.
Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation
The ASEAN members agreed at their third summit to accelerate
efforts to reduce tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade to promote
industrial development. ASEAN also is trying to foster cooperative
industrial investment projects with government or private sector
involvement.
Refugees
Since 1975, more than 2 million people left Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam for "first asylum" (temporary refuge) in neighboring ASEAN
countries. More than 1.6 million of those refugees have been
resettled elsewhere. Concerned about the continuation of this
exodus, the ASEAN countries called for an international conference,
which was held in Geneva in June 1989. The conference resulted in
the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) which consisted of an
interlocking set of policies designed to resolve the problem while
preserving first asylum. The CPA has resulted in a significant
decrease in the outflow from Vietnam. Furthermore, nearly 9,000
Vietnamese from refugee camps in the region have voluntarily
repatriated to Vietnam. The Steering Committee of the CPA has
met four times since the agreement was reached. Despite some
concerns about the speed with which the problem is being handled,
each meeting reaffirmed agreement on the CPA and the practice of
first asylum. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Date: Aug 5, 19918/5/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Southeast Asia, Pacific, East Asia
Country: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, USSR (former),
Japan, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
Singapore, Philippines, South Korea
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Background
Economic relations among countries of the Asia-Pacific region have
increased dramatically over the last decade. In the clearest
example, US trans-Pacific trade equaled trans-Atlantic trade in
1980. By 1989, US trade across the Pacific ($304 billion) was 37%
greater than trade across the Atlantic.
APEC was established because there were inadequate
mechanisms to deal with the effects of growing interdependence
within the Pacific region. A new mechanism for multilateral
cooperation among the market-oriented economies of the region
was clearly needed. APEC is an informal grouping of 12 Asia-
Pacific countries formed to meet that need.1 It provides a forum
for ministerial discussion on a broad range of economic issues of
importance to the region.
APEC ministers first met in Canberra, Australia, in November
1989. The second APEC ministerial took place in Singapore in July
1990. Annual ministerials are planned in Seoul in November 1991,
Bangkok in 1992, and the US in 1993. Between ministerial
meetings, a group of senior officials (deputy assistant secretary
level for the United States) meet to guide the work of APEC and
oversee its work program. APEC relies on regular meetings of
senior officials and the government hosting the next ministerial to
oversee the work program and provide secretariat services.
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have expressed interest in
joining APEC. The United States fully supports the APEC Ministers'
agreement at their Singapore meeting that consultations should
continue with all three on arrangements for their participation, and,
at the same time, on terms agreeable to all three and to current
APEC members. South Korea, as the host of the next APEC
ministerial, is pursuing these consultations.
APEC Progress
APEC has made remarkable progress since November 1989. Its top
priority is a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round (of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and, to this end, APEC held
a special trade ministers meeting in late 1990. Its senior officials
have created 10 working groups, covering broad areas of economic,
educational, and environmental cooperation.
Data. Develops consistent and reliable data in merchandise
trade, trade in services, and investment.
Trade Promotion. Develops proposals to exchange trade and
industrial information and to promote economic and trade missions
among countries of the region. Organizes international seminars
and meetings to promote trade, an Asia-Pacific trade fair, and a
training course on trade promotion.
Expansion of Investment and Technology Transfer. Establishes
an investment and technology information network for the Asia-
Pacific region. Disseminate information on the development and
management of "techno-parks."
Human Resources Development. Seeks ways to exchange
information among Asia-Pacific countries in such areas as
business administration, industrial training and innovation, project
management, and development planning. In this working group, the
US is encouraging the APEC Partnership for Education which will
promote cooperation among educational institutions, private sector
internships, and US Government-sponsored private sector training
programs.
Regional Energy Cooperation. Develops cooperative projects,
such as a regional database on energy supply and demand, and
exchanges views on, among other things, coal utilization and
technology; energy conservation and efficiency; research,
development, and technology transfer; and resource exploration and
development.
Marine Resource Conservation. Examines the extent of the
marine pollution problem and develops recommendations for APEC
ministers concerning accession by its countries to international
legal conventions. Exchanges information on technical and policy
aspects of marine pollution, advancement of integrated coastal zone
planning, progress on collection of data on damage to shipping by
marine debris, and ways to combat pollution by non-hydrocarbons.
Telecommunications. Compiles APEC telecommunications
development activities, including a description of each member
country's telecommunications environment, to be updated annually.
Develops a manual/guideline on how to approach training in a
telecommunications organization, followed by a pilot project
reviewing needs and recommending approaches to solving them in a
selected organization. Explores ways to establish and develop
regional networks, initially in the areas of electronic customs data
interchange and teleports.
Transportation. Studies ways to improve infrastructure, to
facilitate movement of passengers and freight, to collect and
exchange data, and to enhance transportation safety and security.
This US-led working group is one of three added in March 1991. The
US proposed it because of the central importance of improved
transportation links to continued economic growth in the region.
Tourism. Studies tourism data exchange, barriers to
expansion, training programs, and current projects in APEC
countries. Because tourism is of extraordinary importance to the
economies of the Asia-Pacific region, this working group was added
in March 1991.
Fisheries. Also added in March, surveys the pattern of APEC
fisheries cooperation to develop fisheries resources. Reports on
role of APEC in coordinating and complementing the work of
existing organizations and promoting cooperative relations among
APEC participants.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: US Economic Relations With East Asia and the Pacific
Date: Aug 5, 19918/5/91
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia
Country: Japan, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong,
South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines,
Vietnam, Laos
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Background
The East Asian and Pacific region remains the world's most
economically dynamic area, despite the recent worldwide economic
downturn. Japan has become the second largest market economy and
the second largest donor of development assistance. The region's
newly industrialized economies (NIEs)--Hong Kong, Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwan--have consistently maintained high economic
growth rates over the last two decades. In the process, they have
achieved "middle-income" levels of per capita GNP and have become
major participants in international trade. Thailand and Malaysia are
fast approaching development levels close to those of the NIEs.
The East Asian and Pacific region recently has surpassed
Western Europe to become the largest regional trading partner of
the United States, both as a supplier of US imports and as a
customer for its exports. In 1990, US two-way trade with the
region was about $300 billion, about 34% of US global trade.
American direct investment in the region was $55 billion in 1989,
accounting for 15% of total US overseas investment and providing
18% of its foreign investment income.
US Support for Economic Reforms
The achievements of the successful Asian economies can be
attributed largely to market-oriented, outward-looking strategies
of growth, together with the high value these societies have
traditionally placed on education, discipline, and hard work. The
United States contributes to this success and supports appropriate
economic reforms by providing:
-- The principal market for the region's exports;
-- Leadership in promoting an open international trade and
financial system;
-- Economic assistance to the region's developing nations;
and
-- A military security umbrella.
The Philippines and Indonesia have economic reforms
underway that, if sustained, will enable them to capitalize on their
impressive potential. Australia and New Zealand also are engaged
in difficult economic restructuring and trade liberalization efforts.
Some Pacific island mini-countries are not yet fully participating
in the region's economic success. Implementation of market-
oriented reforms has boosted the economies of Laos and, to a lesser
extent, Vietnam, but both countries remain poor.
China experienced rapid economic growth during most of the
1980s as it moved toward a more market-oriented system.
Beginning in September 1988, however, China embarked on a policy
of retrenchment that has slowed economic growth and expanded
government control over the economy.
Trade Success and Imbalances
The dramatic success of East Asian and Pacific exports in the US
market has led to large, unsustainable trade imbalances. In 1990,
East Asian and Pacific economies accounted for about 74% of the
total US trade deficit of $102 billion. The United States had trade
deficits with Japan ($41 billion), Taiwan ($11 billion), China ($10
billion), and South Korea ($4 billion). On the other hand, the United
States had a $4 billion trade surplus with Australia in 1990.
Congress and US business have intensified the pressure to reduce
imports from and increase US exports to East Asian and Pacific
economies.
Some progress in reducing these trade imbalances already is
evident. Japan has made progress in opening its markets to foreign
goods and services as its economy changes from export-led to
domestic demand-led growth. The NIEs, particularly South Korea
and Taiwan, also have had some success in reducing import barriers.
This has helped reduce the overall US trade deficit with the East
Asian and Pacific region from $107 billion in 1987 to about $74
billion in 1990.
East Asian and Pacific countries have come to recognize that
their growth and export successes require them to bear a much
larger burden for the health of the world economy. Consequently,
they are undertaking appropriate adjustments to help correct
international imbalances by:
-- Ensuring realistic exchange rates;
-- Lowering barriers to imported goods, services, and
investment; and
-- Adopting macroeconomic and structural policies that
encourage growth through increased domestic demand as well as
exports.
The United States, in turn, must maintain its efforts to reduce
domestic fiscal imbalances and to keep its import markets open.
Increasing Regional Cooperation
The United States has been working with East Asian and Pacific
economies for several years to strengthen regional economic
cooperation. US officials have had extensive consultation with the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian
Development Bank, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific, the South Pacific Council, the South Pacific Forum,
and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference. Many of the
region's leaders recently have called for more intensive
consultation among the market-oriented economies of the East
Asian and Pacific region on macroeconomic policies, structural
reform, and the health of the world trading system, particularly the
current Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). Secretary Baker played a key role in the formation of
APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), a regional forum based
on those principles.
The United States works actively with its East Asian and
Pacific partners to promote APEC as a new vehicle for regional
economic cooperation. At the invitation of Australian Prime
Minister Bob Hawke, the first APEC ministerial conference convened
in Canberra in November 1989. A second ministerial meeting took
place in Singapore in July 1990, leading to the creation of work
projects in various areas of interest to the 12 APEC members. The
next APEC ministerial will be held in Seoul later this year. The
United States will host the 1993 ministerial meeting. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: US-Japan Trade
Date: Aug 5, 19918/5/91
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: East Asia
Country: Japan
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Background
The United States and Japan are the world's two largest economies,
with a combined gross national product (GNP) estimated at $8.5
trillion in 1990, almost 40% of world GNP. Japan is the United
States' second largest market after Canada, and its best
agricultural customer. About 58% of US exports to Japan are
manufactured goods. In 1990, US exports to Japan were almost $49
billion, a 9% increase from 1989, while imports from Japan were
$90 billion. In 1990, the $41-billion US trade deficit with Japan
(40% of the total US deficit) was 16% less than in 1989.
The United States is Japan's largest market. Japanese exports
to the United States consist primarily of vehicles (33% of the
total), non-electric machinery (24%), and electronic products (22%).
Japan's global current account surplus declined from $57 billion in
1989 to $36 billion in 1990.
Macroeconomic factors, such as different rates of savings and
investment as a percentage of GNP, are cited most often as the
cause for the external imbalances of the United States and Japan.
Nevertheless, US trade officials are working closely with the
Japanese Government to remove market and microeconomic
impediments, many of them cultural and structural, which restrict
access to the Japanese market. Concern about Japan's competitive
challenge and its industrial policies has focused US public attention
on the issues of high-technology trade, "economic security," and
competitiveness. US calls for managed trade have increased.
Structural Factors
Several official and semi-official Japanese studies, most notably
the "Maekawa Report," have recommended that Japan make
structural changes in its economy to reflect its more advanced
level of economic development. The studies indicate that growth no
longer should depend on exports but more on domestic demand. In
fact, domestic demand in Japan during 1985-90 grew faster than
external demand. The Japanese Government also is responding to
domestic and foreign requests for deregulation of a highly
restrictive economy. The Japanese consumer, who faces high prices
for local consumer goods, has become more active in calling for
changes in the Japanese economy.
To address the root causes of the bilateral payments
imbalances, the United States and Japan launched the Structural
Impediments Initiative in September 1989. In a June 1990 report,
each country committed itself to structural reforms. In Japan,
these included reforms in the distribution system, exclusionary
business practices, keiretsu (interlocking business groups), land
use policies, and savings/investment patterns. In turn, the
Japanese urged the United States to improve its savings and
investment rates, export promotion, work force training and
education, research and development, corporate behavior, and
investment activities. The two sides will report annually during
the next 3 years on progress in implementing these commitments.
Market Access
Almost all of the expansion in US-Japan trade in recent years can be
attributed to growth in US exports to Japan. This growth (9% in
1990) continues to outpace the increase in US exports to the rest of
the world (8%). Since 1987, the peak year of the bilateral deficit,
US exports to Japan have grown by 72%, from $28 billion to almost
$49 billion, while exports to the rest of the world increased by 54%.
The Japanese market for US goods and services is twice that of the
United Kingdom and 2.5 times that of Germany.
In 1988, the United States signed agreements with Japan to
liberalize Japan's market for beef, citrus, other agricultural
products, and public works contracts. In April 1990, the two
countries successfully reached agreements on the three sectors
identified for trade liberalization under the Super 301 provision of
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: satellites,
supercomputers, and wood products. During 1990-91, agreements
were reached on amorphous metals, semiconductors, and major
projects.
Efforts to improve access to the Japanese market continue in
semiannual meetings of the Trade Committee and meetings related
to the market-oriented-sector-selective (MOSS) process. Talks
with the Japanese Government continue in medical
equipment/pharmaceuticals, auto parts, agricultural products,
construction, telecommunications, semiconductors, electronics,
intellectual property rights, and services.
US POLICY
US trade policy with Japan has several elements, including:
Negotiations and other market access initiatives that focus on
removing barriers to trade in specific Japanese markets;
Encouragement of structural changes that will open Japan's
economy and further increase imports;
Coordination of policies to align bilateral economic trends to
foster improved economic balances; and
Close coordination with Japan in multilateral trade forums,
particularly the Uruguay Round. The two countries have worked
effectively to move negotiations forward in the round and, with a
few exceptions such as agriculture, are closely allied on
substantive positions.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: Mongolia's Choice for Freedom
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks before a joint meeting of the Mongolian
parliament, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
Date: Jul 26, 19917/26/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: Mongolia
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics,
Democratization
Thank you, Mr. Vice President. ladies and gentlemen. Today, I come
to speak to you as an American, a Texan, and an outdoorsman.
As an American, I believe in democracy and free markets. And
so on behalf of President Bush and the American people, I come here
today to lend our support and to work with you for the success of
political and economic freedom here in Mongolia.
As a Texan, I believe in the strength that comes from life on
the frontier. And so I come to your land, twice the size of my home
state and one of the world's last frontiers, to support the Mongolian
people's hard work for freedom and to say to you [that] there can be
no turning back on freedom's road.
As an outdoorsman, I believe in the wonder of nature. And so I
come to your breath-taking country to marvel at the gifts God has
given it and to take back to the American people tales of its
splendor and beauty.
And, above all, I come here today to finish the visit we began
together a year ago, a visit the warm hospitality of which my
delegation and I will never forget, a visit that I am privileged in a
sense to continue by addressing this distinguished body today.
When last I was honored to be here in Ulaanbaatar, it was to
join in the high-spirited festivities celebrating your historic
elections. This people, seemingly so cut off from the peaceful
democratic revolutions of 1989, had just chosen to join those
revolutions and build democracy. This nation, seemingly so remote
from the world, had just chosen to join the growing community of
free nations.
But, in stark contrast to your courageous choice, Iraq's brutal
decision to invade Kuwait--a throwback to dictatorship and
aggression--cut short our mutual celebration of Mongolia's new-
found freedom. Neither the President, nor the American people nor
I, will forget how quickly and strongly Mongolia condemned Iraq's
brutality and worked with the international community to end
Saddam Hussein's aggression.
A year has passed. That international community has defeated
Iraq's aggression. Democracy remains ascendant across the globe.
And many more nations with diverse histories and cultures--
Albania being the latest--have joined Mongolia on the path of free
elections, free markets, and democratic institutions. For over a
year now, the Mongolian people have been engaged in what President
Bush calls the "hard work of freedom."
And, despite setbacks, hardships, and shortages, your hard
work has begun to show results. You have advanced by fostering a
spirit of cooperation and political pluralism, and you have made
great strides toward establishing the rule of law here in Mongolia.
All Americans appreciate especially your keen interest in our
Constitution, our Bill of Rights, and in the workings of our
representative government. And we hope you, too, will create
democratic institutions that will live decades and centuries into
the future.
For all of this, you have acquired great merit in the eyes of all
those who wish to see democracy prosper throughout the world. But
we, the friends of democracy, must speak under no illusions. In
Central America and Africa and throughout Central and Eastern
Europe, free peoples are discovering that their first bold and brave
steps toward freedom may well have been the easiest.
Each in their own way, nations the world over who have
embarked upon the path of democracy must wrestle with its
daunting challenges--the vigorous give and take of debate, the
checks and balances among branches of government, the push and
pull of market forces, the need to protect the rights of individual
citizens while governing for the common good.
Indeed, to some the democratic process appears to be a
prescription for anarchy and chaos. Yet, it is not. It is instead a
classic case of opposing forces, of Yin and Yang in constant creative
tension. Its vitality lies in contesting forces held in harmony by
the common embrace of shared values--values such as respect for
human rights, freedom of choice, tolerance, openness, and
cooperation. With these all-embracing values as your guide, I am
certain that you will find the way ahead.
We know that you face tremendous economic challenges. We
know that the legacy of decades of dependency and the folly of
central planning may frustrate your efforts for some time to come.
I can only urge you to stay the course. However daunting the
obstacles you face may seem, retreat to the ways of the past can
only make the move more difficult. We are confident that your
efforts to instill the discipline of the market and to open trade and
investment ties with market economies in Asia and the West
ultimately will be rewarded. Your perseverance will help lay the
foundation for a prosperous new century, and we will do what we
can to help you persevere and succeed.
We cannot take the arduous steps forward for you. Only the
people of Mongolia can do that. And those of you here today--the
people's representatives--can play a special role. You must have
the courage to lead your people by continuing your moves to free
markets. But we, and other nations who cherish democracy, can
help you along that path.
In response to a request from President Ochirbat, President
Bush is providing 30,000 tons of wheat and flour in emergency food
aid, totaling some $9 million. That's 30 lbs. for every Mongolian
man, woman, and child. And just last week, our first planeload of
medical equipment, some 60,000 lbs. arrived here in Ulaanbaatar.
To help Mongolia initiate its privatization efforts and bolster
reform, we are providing $2.4 million in technical assistance this
year, with $4 million to follow next year.
To help you overcome your present economic difficulties, I
have also asked the US Congress to approve an additional $10
million in aid from our Economic Support Fund. Provided our
Congress approves these funds, we will try to make them available
as soon as possible to help meet some of your critical needs.
In addition, we are engaging in a trade and development study
on how to help Mongolia modernize its coal-fired electric power
plants and develop its petroleum industry. And we have signed an
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) agreement with
your government. This will help us to mobilize the American
private sector to invest in Mongolia.
I am also pleased to say that the first of our Peace Corps
volunteers are now in Ulaanbaatar receiving language training at
your Pioneer Palace. They will be teaching English and computer
science as they begin to implement the agreement I signed here last
August. These people-to-people contacts will enrich Mongolians
and Americans alike.
But America's support for democracy and market reform in
Mongolia goes beyond what we alone can provide. We are actively
working to mobilize the international community to support your
efforts with the international financial institutions--World Bank,
the IMF, the Asian Development Bank--we are attempting to develop
aid programs to meet Mongolia's needs.
Most importantly, we are working closely with Japan, Korea,
and other countries to encourage support for Mongolia. We hope that
within the next 2 months a number of countries will meet to
organize and expand international bilateral support for Mongolia.
In all of these ways, the United States and other like-minded
nations are making every effort to ensure that your transitions to
democracy and free enterprise succeed, for we all recognize that
your success will strengthen our worldwide community of free
nations.
In closing, let me be so bold as to talk to you a bit about your
own history.
Some seven centuries ago, in the days of conquest under the
rule of the great Khans, Mongolia stood at the crossroads of trade
and ideas, of power and nations on the vast Eurasian continent.
Then, at the mid-point of this century, Mongolia stood as a Stalinist
outpost on the road between Moscow and Beijing.
Now today, in a vastly different sense, Mongolia has placed
itself at the crossroads of a new order for Asia and the world--an
order based on democratic values and free markets.
You were the first country in Asia to embrace communism.
Now, you are the first communist country in Asia to choose
democracy.
And to your choice, I say this: Mongolia can show others the
way ahead. By your example, Mongolians can show the world that
freedom works, that a free market works, that international
cooperation works. Showing the world that democracy and free
markets can work in Mongolia will not be easy. It will be painful.
And it will take time.
But, in your work, you will not be alone. For we will work
with you, as here on the frontier of freedom, you build a better
future for the Mongolian people. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: US Economic Sanctions on Burma
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jul 22, 19917/22/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Burma
Subject: Trade/Economics, Human Rights, Democratization,
International Law
. . . Section 138 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (the Moynihan
amendment) calls on the President to impose appropriate economic
sanctions on Burma if the President could not certify that Burma
has taken certain political reforms and improved its performance on
narcotics suppression.
Burma cannot meet these requirements, and we have so
informed Congress.
The Administration has decided to implement the sanctions
legislation by declining to renew the Bilateral Textile Agreement
with Burma, which lapsed December 31, 1990. The agreement,
which Burma has asked several times to renew, was the foundation
for that country's largest single category of exports to the United
States. In 1990, textiles accounted for just over $9 million of the
total Burmese exports to the United States of $22 million.
In just the first 5 months of 1991, Burma's textile exports to
the United
States have decreased by 26% in volume and 21% in value compared
with the same period in 1990.
I would note that the United States has already taken several
economic measures against Burma in an effort to improve the
situation in that country.
-- We have long since terminated all forms of non-
humanitarian assistance to Burma and actively urge others to do so.
-- We have suspended Burma's
GSP [generalized system of preferences] benefits.
-- We have decertified Burma on narcotics. This requires us
to oppose loans to Burma by the World Bank, the IMF [International
Monetary Fund], and other international financial institutions.
-- We have blocked the sale of arms to Burma from the United
States and have attempted to dissuade others from selling arms to
Burma. The EC [European Community] also has recently imposed an
arms embargo on Burma.
-- We have consulted with other industrial democracies to
search for further methods to increase pressure on the Burmese
regime.
Summit countries have expressed a desire to see a return to
full democracy.
As noted in Under Secretary [Counselor and Under Secretary
for Economic and Agricultural Affairs Robert B.] Zoellick's opening
statement at the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations]
post-ministerial meeting, we expect to direct further collective
attention toward Burma. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: Diplomatic Efforts To Resolve the POW/MIA Issue in the
Past Year
Kimmitt
Source: Robert M. Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Description: Remarks before the National League of Families,
Washington, DC
Date: Jul 12, 19917/12/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos
Subject: POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
Chairman Scott, Members of the Board of Directors, Ann Griffiths,
and all other family members who are here today, I welcome the
opportunity to speak to you again as I did at last year's annual
meeting. Last year I spoke to you of my deep, personal commitment
to the effort of resolving the fate of Americans who served in
Vietnam who are still missing and unaccounted for. That
commitment stems from the tour of military service that was just
described and remains as strong as ever. Secretary Baker, on whose
behalf I appear today, shares that sense of moral obligation and has
made it an integral part of our foreign policy toward Indochina.
Quite a bit has happened since we last met. So today, I would
like to describe briefly the Administration's diplomatic efforts to
obtain as many answers as humanly possible, particularly as to
whether Americans may still be alive and in captivity after these
many years. I want to reassure you, the families, veterans, and
other concerned citizens that we are doing everything within our
power to get to the bottom of this issue. We know that your support
is essential if we are to move toward a new relationship with the
countries of Indochina. We also know that your support will not be
fully forthcoming until we can assure you that we have obtained all
the answers that are readily available and have established a viable
mechanism for following up any new leads that may subsequently
come to light.
Recent Diplomatic Efforts With Vietnam
It was almost a year ago that Secretary Baker announced that we
would broaden our dialogue with Vietnam to include discussions on
Cambodia. Following that announcement, we met twice in August
1990 with Vietnam's Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to discuss Cambodia and POW/MIAs [prisoners of
war/missing in action]. The following month we took advantage of
the presence of senior Vietnamese officials in New York for the UN
General Assembly to arrange a meeting with Vice Foreign Minister
Le Mai, followed by a meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign
Minister Thach.
Having been closely involved in those discussions, I can tell
you that at each opportunity we reminded the Vietnamese of our
long-standing policy that, while a comprehensive settlement for
Cambodia will initiate the process of normalization, the pace and
scope of that process will be directly affected by the seriousness
of Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA and other humanitarian
concerns of importance to the United States.
This was underscored by the Secretary's invitation to Minister
Thach to visit Washington, the first ever for a foreign minister
from Hanoi, to work out specific steps to expedite the accounting
for missing Americans. At that meeting in October, General Vessey
and members of the POW/MIA interagency group proposed concrete
steps to obtain more rapid results and to establish an ongoing
program to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American
POW/MIAs. These steps were: first, sending a US technical team to
Hanoi to plan improved joint investigations; second, forming a joint
team of analysts to search for historical documentation on
POW/MIA incidents; and third, increased efforts by Vietnam to
recover and return the remains of US personnel.
The Foreign Minister accepted all of our proposals, and
afterward US and Vietnamese experts conducted the first two
information-research sessions, as well as the 12th and 13th joint
investigations in Vietnam. We thus made some progress but we
wanted more--on POW/MIAs as well as Cambodia.
In an effort to step up progress, in early April this year we
gave Vietnam a road map to normalization. This road map was the
product of intensive interagency discussions, including, of course,
your Executive Director representing the families' vital interest in
this process. In that road map we made clear the high economic
costs to Vietnam of continued intransigence, and the great benefits
of its cooperation on the issues, including POW/MIAs, that are
important to us. We want to put the past to rest--not by sweeping
it aside, but by resolving outstanding issues once and for all.
We have heard complaints out of Hanoi that in the road map we
are creating new conditions for normalization. To the contrary,
however, it was precisely to avoid any misunderstanding that we
set down for the Vietnamese in writing exactly what things we will
do, and when we will do them, to build a more stable and productive
relationship.
Also in April, General Vessey and members of the interagency
group traveled to Vietnam to advance the POW/MIA agenda. At the
conclusion of this visit, General Vessey and Foreign Minister Thach
reaffirmed the need for increased cooperation on POW/MIAs, and
they announced their agreement to establish a US POW/MIA office in
Hanoi on a temporary basis.
The office will support information research, investigation of
live-sighting reports, joint field activities, and forensic review and
repatriation of remains made available by Vietnam. It will engage
in POW/MIA matters only and will have no diplomatic or consular
responsibilities. How long the office actually remains in operation
depends on whether the Vietnamese give our people the freedom to
carry out their mandate. Our bottom line, as always, is results.
Laos
Our efforts have also extended to Laos and Cambodia. Along with
narcotics, the POW/MIA issue remains the top priority in our
improving relationships with Laos, and our embassy in Vientiane
regularly meets with Lao officials to discuss ways of improving
POW/MIA cooperation.
Last October, Secretary Baker met with Lao Foreign Minister
Phoun at the UN, the highest-level bilateral meeting we have had
since 1975. The Secretary said Lao POW/MIA cooperation had been
critical to the improvement we have seen in bilateral relations, and
he emphasized that continued cooperation would be necessary if
relations were to improve further. He specifically mentioned our
desire to proceed with joint investigations of discrepancy cases
involving men known to have been held by the Pathet Lao as
prisoners during the war.
Foreign Minister Phoun pledged that the Lao would continue to
cooperate on the POW/MIA issue and would fulfill their
commitments. We are pleased that in 1991 we reached expanded
POW/MIA agreements and have begun working in new areas of the
country. We continually remind the Government of Laos of the
importance we attach to the POW/MIA issue and the implementation
of the work plan that Ann Mills Griffiths helped prepare.
Cambodia
Last year for the first time we sent a team to Cambodia, where 83
men are still unaccounted for, to review remains made available by
the authorities there and repatriate any that could be those of
Americans. Six were subsequently returned, but it appears doubtful
that any of those are our missing. We have also discussed the issue
through the channel we opened between our embassies in Vientiane.
When Phnom Penh's deputy foreign minister announced last month
that his regime would investigate live-sighting reports in the areas
that it controls, we followed up again through our channel in
Vientiane. We made clear that provision of any information that
helps resolve the fate of Americans would be appreciated and
viewed as a humanitarian gesture.
Conclusion
Now that Vietnam has its seventh Party Congress behind it, we look
forward to Vietnamese actions that would allow us to move the
relationship forward. Vietnam could make enormous strides in
preparing the way for fast and full normalization by its complete
cooperation on the POW/MIA issue. We will do all that we can to
elicit that cooperation. This is an obligation that we in government
owe to you, the families, and especially to the men we still love
who have yet to return from Vietnam. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: POW/MIA Investigations
Tutwiler
Source: Statement released by the Department of State
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jul 29, 19917/29/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos
Subject: POW/MIA Issues
[TEXT]
Deputy Assistant Secretary Quinn, accompanied by a POW/MIA
specialist from the Defense Intelligence Agency, traveled to Hanoi
and Vientiane on July 26 and 27 to request Vietnam, Laos, and
Phnom Penh's urgent assistance in investigating photographs in
which family members have identified their missing relatives. In
his meetings, he conveyed the importance of this issue to the US
Government, provided information available to us on the photos, and
obtained pledges of cooperation and investigative actions.
In Hanoi on July 26, he met with officials from various
agencies, the most senior of whom was Vice Foreign Minister Le
Mai. Although the Vietnamese officials restated their position that
the Government of Vietnam holds no American POWs, in a
humanitarian spirit and in acknowledgment of the compelling family
identifications, the Vietnamese promised full cooperation.
Specifically, they:
-- Assured us that they are already publicizing the photo
through print and television media;
-- Agreed to an immediate search with US personnel of a
prison west of Da Nang and the surrounding area where a report
indicates the photo could have been taken;
-- Agreed to further investigation of Colonel Robertson's
case, including immediate excavation of his crash site;
-- Provided additional information from war-time archives
and recent witness statements on the Robertson case;
-- Promised similar cooperation as soon as we deliver the
photos in which family members have identified Lieutenant Borah
and Captain Carr;
-- Indicated strong interest in moving expeditiously on the
remaining discrepancy cases that are the priority focus of our
ongoing joint activities.
In Vientiane, Quinn met with a number of senior Lao officials.
They also promised full cooperation. The Lao Government said it
would distribute the photo and instruct local officials to seek
further information. It agreed to similar actions once it obtains the
photos of Carr and Borah. Laos also agreed to provide unprecedented
access to Lao officials who may have important POW/MIA
information.
In Vientiane, Quinn also met with the ambassador from Phnom
Penh to propose that a US POW/MIA team go to Phnom Penh for
further investigations. The authorities in Phnom Penh have since
agreed, and a small team of American POW/MIA specialists should
arrive there on July 31 for a stay of about a week or two.
In all his meetings, Mr. Quinn emphasized the very great
importance the US Government and the American people attach to
the POW/MIA issue, particularly the possibility of live Americans
missing from the Vietnam war. We will continue to press ahead
vigorously in our efforts to resolve this issue. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: Vice President Quayle's Trip to Latin America
Date: Aug 9, 19918/9/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: South America
Country: Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Haiti
Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid,
Democratization, Nuclear Nonproliferation,
Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
Vice President Quayle visited Argentina, Brazil, Haiti, and
Venezuela August 5-9. During his four-country trip, the Vice
President encouraged trade and investment opportunities with the
United States as well as among other countries of the hemisphere.
He underscored US support for democracy and free markets and
stressed the Bush Administration's view that free markets and
democratic institutions lay the best foundations for protecting the
region's fragile environment.
ARGENTINA
US-Argentina Relations. The primary US goal in Argentina is to
strengthen democracy by encouraging political pluralism and
economic reforms that will promote sustained growth and social
stability. US policy toward Argentina aims to support the
consolidation of democratic institutions, assure maximum
cooperation between our countries, and resolve any differences in
the spirit of mutual respect and understanding.
US-Argentine relations are cordial and cooperative and
involve daily official and private contacts at all governmental,
business, social, and cultural levels. Based on a shared respect for
democracy, ties have strengthened since the return of democratic
government to Argentina in December 1983. President Menem's
visits to the United States in September 1989 and October 1990 and
President Bush's successful visit to Buenos Aires in December 1990
reflect this improvement in bilateral relations.
Consolidation of Democracy. Argentina is in its eighth year of
democratic civilian government. Peronist Carlos Menem, elected in
1989, formed a broad-based government and appointed many non-
Peronists to top positions. In October 1989, he pardoned military
officers accused of human rights violations during the 1976-83
period of military rule. Some leftist terrorists were also pardoned.
The pardons, intended to promote national reconciliation, were
criticized by human rights groups but appear to have been accepted
by the population as a whole. President Menem also has announced
his intention to pardon military junta leaders from this period who
are presently in jail. The leaders of three army rebellions since
April 1987 have been retired from the military.
Economic and Debt Issues. In 1989, Argentina suffered
perhaps its worst economic crisis of this century. Inflation for the
year was almost 5,000%. Upon taking office, President Menem
embarked on a bold economic reform program to halt hyperinflation,
privatize inefficient state enterprises, open up the economy to
greater trade and competition, encourage foreign investment, and
reform the tax system. Although monthly inflation fell to single
digits a few months after Menem took office, by the end of 1989
hyperinflation had returned and the value of the currency (the
austral) had plunged. A comprehensive program of fiscal and
monetary measures implemented in April 1991 has reduced
inflation dramatically. The root cause of Argentina's chronic
economic problems remains the government's fiscal deficit.
Argentina is the third-largest debtor among developing
countries, with more than $61 billion in external debt. One year
ago, Argentina began to make small interest payments on its $31-
billion debt to commercial banks. Interest arrears are currently
about $8 billion. The Menem Government is reducing its debt burden
by allowing debt-equity swaps in privatizations. Payments due on
much of Argentina's non-bank debt were rescheduled in the Paris
Club (official government creditors) in December 1989.
Foreign Policy Issues. Under President Menem, Argentina has
pursued a foreign policy designed to produce practical benefits for
the country. Pursuit of closer economic integration with its
neighbors--particularly Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay--and strong
ties to the West, especially to the United States, are key elements
of this policy. Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay are
currently negotiating a new Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR). In June 1991, they and the United States signed the
first regional trade and investment framework agreement under the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.
The positions of the Menem Government generally have
coincided with US positions on major issues. Argentina's overtures
to the United Kingdom led to resumption of diplomatic relations
between the two countries in February 1990. (Relations had been
broken in early 1982 during the war over the Falkland Islands,
which are known in Argentina as the Islas Malvinas). Argentina had
two ships participating in the multinational naval force in the
Persian Gulf.
Nuclear and Military Issues. Argentina has the most advanced
nuclear-energy program in Latin America. Argentina signed the
Treaty of Tlatelolco, a hemispheric non-proliferation accord, but
has not yet ratified it. President Menem has renewed Argentina's
commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On November
28, Presidents Collor and Menem announced a common nuclear policy
calling for a bilateral safeguards system and joint negotiations of a
full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Negotiations with the IAEA have been under
way since late winter. Both governments have said they will
address Tlatelolco once safeguards are completed.
On May 28, Minister of Defense Gonzalez publicly announced
the termination of the Condor II missile program, creation of a new
civilian space agency, and the Government of Argentina's
willingness to adhere to Missile Technology Control Regime
guidelines.
Argentina at a Glance. About the size of the United States
east of the Mississippi River, Argentina is the second-largest
country in South America, after Brazil, and the eighth largest in the
world. Its population of 32 million is 97% European, primarily
descendants of Italian and Spanish immigrants. The Indian
population, estimated at 50,000, is concentrated in the provinces of
the north and northwest. Eighty percent of the population lives in
urban areas, with about one-third of the total in the metropolitan
area of the capital, Buenos Aires. Education is compulsory for 7
years; 94% of Argentines are literate.
The country's topography ranges from subtropical lowlands in
the north to the towering Andes mountains in the west and the
bleak, windswept Patagonian steppe and Tierra del Fuego in the
south. Argentina's heartland is the rich temperate plains, known as
the pampas, in the east central part of the country. This is some of
the finest farmland in the world, from which come large quantities
of wheat, corn, sorghum, soybeans, and sunflower seeds. The
pampas also provide year-round pasturage for Argentina's important
cattle industry. Argentina is one of the largest exporters of
foodstuffs in the world.
BRAZIL
US-Brazilian Relations. The United States was the first country to
recognize Brazil's independence in 1822. During the 1950s and
1960s, Brazil received about $2.4 billion in US economic assistance.
Due to Brazil's impressive economic development and its increased
ability to obtain loans and technical assistance from private and
multilateral sources, most US assistance programs were phased out
during the 1970s.
The United States is Brazil's most important commercial
partner and largest investor. US-Brazilian relations are cordial and
cooperative, and the two countries' shared respect for democracy
and commitment to economic liberalization has strengthened ties
since the return of democratic government in the mid-1980s.
President Collor's successful pre-inauguration visit to the United
States in January 1990 and his state visit to Washington in June
1991 as well as President Bush's visit to Brazil in December have
contributed to an increased warmth in bilateral relations.
Consolidation of Democracy. Major events in the transition to
democracy include the return to civilian rule in 1985, promulgation
of a new constitution in 1988, and the presidential election of
1989. More than 80 million voters went to the polls in November
and December 1989 for elections that were both peaceful and free
of irregularities. Congressional elections were held in October
1990 for all 503 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and one-third of
the 81-member Senate. Many parties are represented in Congress,
and party affiliations are highly fluid.
Economic, Trade, and Debt Issues. When President Collor
assumed office, inflation exceeded 80% per month. He introduced a
sweeping program of economic adjustment and reform, beginning
with an attack on inflation through a sharp freeze on liquidity. He
also announced plans to privatize state enterprises, eliminate the
fiscal deficit, and dramatically reduce government intervention in
the economy and foreign trade. In response, inflation dropped
sharply at first but reappeared by mid-1990. In early 1991, the
government introduced a temporary wage-price freeze which is now
being phased out. The government continues to work on detailed
plans for the sale of state enterprises, reducing the federal work
force, and new foreign trade regulations.
Brazil enjoyed a foreign trade surplus of $11 billion in 1990
(down from $16.5 billion in 1989). The United States and other
trading partners have objected to Brazilian import restrictions,
including outright prohibition of imports, market reserves, and
other non-tariff barriers. President Collor has made progress in
eliminating these practices, and the United States has ended its
trade actions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1988. Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay are currently negotiating a new
Southern Cone Common Market Agreement (MERCOSUR). In June
1991, the United States and the MERCOSUR countries signed a
regional trade and investment framework agreement under the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, with Presidents Bush and
Collor in attendance.
Brazil is the largest developing- country debtor, owing $112
billion to external creditors. It has remained current in payments
to international financial organizations, although not to other
governments (including the United States). The government entered
a de facto moratorium on payments to foreign commercial banks in
September 1989. It began partial debt service this year and
recently agreed on a schedule to repay $8 billion of arrears to the
banks. The government plans talks with the International Monetary
Fund and debt-rescheduling negotiations with foreign commercial
banks.
Environmental Issues. International concern about the
destruction of the Amazon rain forest was heightened by the
December 1988 murder of environmentalist-labor leader Chico
Mendes. In April 1989, the government began an environmental
program called "Our Nature," designed to slow the destruction of the
rain forest while seeking alternatives to develop the region.
However, the government lacks the financial resources to
implement this ambitious program. President Collor has shown a
strong personal commitment to environmental protection. Burning
of Amazon forests has decreased over the past year, partly as a
result of his policy. Brazil will host the 1992 UN Conference on
Environment and Development.
Foreign Policy Issues. President Collor has signaled his
interest in shifting Brazilian foreign policy toward the
industrialized countries and away from the Third World focus that
has characterized it in the past. He has made improvement of
relations with the United States a high priority. The resolution of
trade differences with the United States during the early weeks of
his term has done much to remove earlier points of friction in that
relationship.
Nuclear Issues. The constitution prohibits non-peaceful uses
of nuclear energy, but Brazil has an unsafe-guarded nuclear
research and enrichment program. It is also committed to
developing its own nuclear-powered submarine. Brazil has signed
and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a hemispheric non-
proliferation accord, but has not yet taken the final steps required
to put the treaty into effect. Shortly after his inauguration,
President Collor ordered a complete review of nuclear programs and
policy. President Collor told the UN General Assembly in September
1990 that Brazil would not undertake any experiments involving
nuclear explosions, even for peaceful purposes. In late November,
he and President Menem of Argentina issued a Declaration of
Common Nuclear Policy at Iguazu Falls calling for joint negotiation
of a full-scope nuclear safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and for steps to bring the Treaty of
Tlatelolco into force. Negotiations with the IAEA have been under
way since late winter. Brazil has a national space program aimed
at developing and launching its own satellites.
Brazil at a Glance. With more than 150 million people, Brazil
is the largest nation in Latin America and the fifth largest in the
world. More than two-thirds of the population live in urban areas.
Though 76% of Brazilians are functionally literate, only 20% of
those who begin public school complete the primary grades. Per
capita income exceeds $2,400 per year, putting Brazil in the ranks
of middle-income developing countries. There are wide disparities
in income distribution, with only 2% of national income going to the
poorest 20% of the population and 65% going to the richest 20%.
Brasilia is the capital.
Forests cover approximately one-half of Brazil's interior,
which includes a major share of the Amazon Basin and the largest
tropical rain forest in the world. Largely self-sufficient in food,
Brazil is the world's leading exporter of coffee and orange juice
concentrate; the second-largest exporter of cocoa and soybeans; and
a major exporter of sugar, meat, and cotton.
HAITI
US-Haitian Relations. US policy seeks constructive and cooperative
relations with Haiti. It supports democracy, human rights, and the
alleviation of poverty. Under the auspices of the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the United Nations, and with US
financial support for the electoral process and to help defray
observer expenses, some 200 election observers from 22 countries
witnessed the Haitian election and helped guarantee its fairness.
President Bush appointed an official US delegation to observe the
December 1990 presidential election in Haiti.
The United States has responded to Haiti's movement toward
democracy by increasing its economic assistance from $38.7
million in FY 1988 to an estimated $82 million in FY 1991. The
figure projected for FY 1992 is $96.5 million.
The US Agency for International Development has been active
in Haiti since 1973, when US assistance programs were resumed
after a 10-year absence. Among USAID's activities, designed to
improve the well-being of the nation's poor, is a funding program to
provide meals to 45% of all Haitian children of primary school age.
The overall USAID program has three basic objectives:
-- Natural Resources Management: Reducing and ultimately
reversing the process of deforestation and soil erosion. Watershed
management, coffee revitalization, and agroforestry are critical
economic and environmental issues addressed by US programs.
-- Private Sector Development: Providing a sound foundation
for sustained growth in the private sector to increase opportunities
for employment and income generation. Private sector development
programs include training in technical subjects, entrepreneurial
management, export and investment promotion, and finance.
-- Human Resources Development: Strengthening the human
resources of Haiti through education, health, and family planning
assistance. US programs include using grants to strengthen the
capacity of private voluntary organizations and Haiti's
governmental health resources. Family planning and health
programs are aimed at improving prenatal care and infant and child
health and survival. Drug awareness and prevention are also priority
programs.
Haiti was designated to be eligible for the trade and
investment benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) in 1976 and under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, effective
January 1, 1984.
Consolidation of Democracy. Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide's
landslide election victory in December brought to power a leader
outspoken in his commitment to improving the lot of Haitians. His
inauguration in February 1991 had the support of the Haitian
military and was greeted by widespread public celebrations.
Economic Conditions. After two centuries of colonialism and
autocratic rule, Haiti's GNP remained the lowest in the Western
Hemisphere in spite of a capable and industrious labor force and
significant development and investment potential. GNP has not kept
pace with population expansion. The country's human resources are
handicapped by illiteracy, inadequate diet, limited educational and
health facilities, and the emigration of large numbers of skilled
workers.
Agriculture employs about 66% of the work force and provides
for about a quarter of the country's export income. Light
manufacturing has become a major employer, particularly in the
capital. The limited fertile areas are heavily overpopulated, and
farming is typically on one-family subsistence plots. Profits from
coffee, long the country's main crop and principal agricultural
export, have decreased because of diminished productivity and low
world prices. Other important exports are cocoa, essential oils, and
light manufactured products. The country has few mineral
resources.
The most dynamic area of the economy is the growth of export
oriented transformation industries, in which raw or partially
finished materials--mainly electronics, sporting goods, and
garments--are assembled for sale abroad, primarily to the US. This
sector employs about 40,000 workers. One of the biggest
incentives to manufacturers is Haiti's hard-working labor force and
low wage structures.
The United States purchases about 85% of Haiti's exports and
supplies the country with about 62% of its imports, made up mostly
of machinery, foodstuffs, petroleum, and cotton textiles.
Foreign Relations. Haiti is one of the original members of the
UN and several of its specialized and related agencies and the
Organization of American States (OAS). Haiti maintains diplomatic
relations with most countries in Latin America and Europe, although
many of those countries do not maintain embassies in Haiti.
Tensions exist between the Government of Haiti and the Dominican
Republic over recent Dominican efforts to repatriate undocumented
Haitians living in the Dominican Republic.
Multilateral Assistance. The Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), the UN Development Program (UNDP), and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintain resident representatives
in Haiti, and a small OAS technical mission has assisted the Haitian
Government since 1968. The IDB, the World Bank, and the UNDP
contribute economic assistance to Haiti, as does the European
Community, under the terms of the Lome accords, to which Haiti
became a full member in December 1989. Haiti also received
balance-of-payments financing in 1990 under a standby agreement
with the IMF. Other donors include the US, Canada, France, Germany,
and Japan.
In July 1991, Haiti successfully concluded its first
international donor group meeting in Paris. International donors,
both bilateral and multilateral, pledged strong support for Haiti's
development efforts.
Haiti at a Glance. Haiti is the oldest black republic in the
world and is the second oldest republic in the Western Hemisphere
after the United States. With 6.5 million people in 10,700 square
miles, it ranks as one of the most densely populated countries, and,
with a per capita income of $300, it is the poorest country in the
hemisphere. The economy has declined sharply during the past
decade, with per capita income falling 25% since 1980. Serious
unemployment, currently estimated as high as 70%, remains a major
concern. Although public education is free and compulsory for the
first 6 years, only half of eligible children attend. Private and
religious education provide perhaps 75% of programs offered.
Education beyond primary school is uncommon. The state religion is
Roman Catholicism. Protestants number about 10%. Traditional
African religious (Voodoo) practices are widespread, as Haitians
tend to see little conflict between them and the formal Christian
faiths.
VENEZUELA
US-Venezuelan Relations. The United States and Venezuela have a
similar global view--one of strengthening democratic institutions
around the world; furthering human rights; accelerating sound
economic, social, and cultural development through orderly and
progressive change within the framework of a free society; and
cooperating in the defense and security of the Western Hemisphere
against aggression or subversion.
Venezuela not only endorses the theoretical goals of
democracy but also works with the United States to promote
democracy and human rights. For example, Venezuela has adopted
the American Convention on Human Rights and supports the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. Along with the United
States, Venezuela supports the goals of nuclear non-proliferation in
the hemisphere, conventional arms restraint, anti-terrorism, and
the promotion of hemispheric economic development. Venezuela and
the United States also have similar views on the importance of
democratization as a key element in a solution to the long-term
problems of Central America and the Caribbean.
President Perez made a state visit to the United States in
April 1990, at which time he and President Bush continued their
frequent discussions on a broad range of issues. President Bush
visited Venezuela in December 1990.
Political Conditions. Venezuela's history since 1958 has been
marked by periodic competition for political power based on free
and open national elections that have earned Venezuela a reputation
as one of the most stable democracies in Latin America. In
December 1989, governors in 20 states and mayors in 269
municipalities were elected for the first time in Venezuelan
history. Those elections were also the first to use a system that
allows voters to choose individual candidates by name rather than
selecting only among party slates. Opposition parties won nine
gubernatorial contests.
Carlos Andres Perez was president from 1974-79 but was
barred by the constitution from succeeding himself. He began his
unprecedented second 5-year term on February 2, 1989, with a series of
reforms designed to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of Venezuelan
enterprises, reduce Venezuela's dependence on oil exports, and
enhance its image with the domestic and foreign investment communities. To
help prepare Venezuela for the 21st century, his economic team seeks to
reduce the state's role in the economy and scrap protectionist policies.
Economic Conditions. About the size of Oklahoma and Texas
combined, Venezuela is rich in oil and other mineral resources. The
economy is dominated by the petroleum industry, which accounts
for 80% of exports and more than 50% of government revenues.
Agriculture accounts for only 6% of GDP, with coffee and cocoa the
main export crops. Venezuela manufactures and exports
petrochemicals, steel, aluminum, textiles, apparel, beverages, and
foodstuffs. The United States is Venezuela's most important
trading partner, representing more than 45% of its international
trade. The United States exports machinery, transportation
equipment, agricultural commodities, and automobile parts in
exchange for Venezuelan oil and other natural resources. In April
1991, Venezuela and the United States signed a trade and
investment framework agreement to explore ways of expanding
commercial relations.
Foreign Policy Issues. Venezuela has numerous border
disputes with its neighbors but is actively working to resolve these
centuries-old conflicts in a peaceful manner. President Perez has
been active on the international scene. Venezuela has joined the
Non-Aligned Movement, helped monitor preparations for elections
last year in Nicaragua and Haiti, and provided substantial aid to
those countries to help consolidate democratic reforms. President
Perez is actively involved in promoting the peace process in El
Salvador.
Venezuela at a Glance. Venezuela's population of 19 million is
changing rapidly from rural to urban. In 1936, 35% of the population
lived in cities and towns of more than 1,000 inhabitants. Today,
about 80% do. One of five Venezuelans lives in Caracas, the capital.
Education is compulsory for 9 years; 88% of Venezuelans are
literate. Per capita income is $2,598. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: Panama--Road to Recovery
Aronson
Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington,
DC
Date: Jul 30, 19917/30/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: Panama
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest,
Narcotics
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee. I welcome the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the situation in
Panama and our efforts to help Panama consolidate democracy and
rebuild its economy.
Nineteen months after Operation Just Cause, Panama is free,
and democracy, I believe, is irreversible. The government chosen in
an election [that] General Noriega tried to hijack is now in office. A
free, critical press operates without fear of intimidation. Open,
vigorous competition among democratic political parties has
replaced the repression of the Noriega era. The Panamanian
Government has adopted new regulations and agreements with the
United States to combat drug trafficking. The military which ruled
and looted Panama for two decades has been abolished, and a new
civilian-controlled police is being trained to take its place.
Economic confidence is being restored and unemployment has been
cut in half. Panama has been welcomed by its Central American
neighbors into regional efforts to achieve political and economic
integration and has normalized its diplomatic relations with all
other Latin American nations.
Panama was looted and repressed for more than two decades.
As a result, the Endara Government inherited a country in ruins. The
National Bank had $1 billion outstanding in bad checks written by
the Noriega regime. Virtually every storefront in Panama City and
Colon had been ransacked, resulting in over $400 million in
business losses. Over 80% of Panama's commercial establishments
were closed at the beginning of 1990, and roughly 35% of the work
force was unemployed. Around 16,000 members of Noriega's
Panama Defense Forces [PDF] had to be either fired or retrained as
civilian policemen. Schools were reduced to hollow shells, with all
books, desks, blackboards, and even plumbing fixtures stripped from
within. Public services were at a standstill. Garbage collection did
not begin until the United States provided gasoline for the few
remaining trucks.
In December 1989, when President Bush ordered US forces
into that country, the rule of law had ceased to exist in Panama.
The results of the May 7, 1989, elections were annulled and the
regime mocked the OAS [Organization of American States] when it
tried to mediate a peaceful solution. Those who were nominally
responsible for upholding the laws were actually involved with
large-scale officially sanctioned drug trafficking and money
laundering.
There was a cocaine lab operating in the offices of the chief
of Noriega's immigration service. The regime was involved in
virtually every sort of corruption. For $10,000, visas were made
available to Cubans seeking to escape their homeland. At the same
time, the administration offered protection to Cuban front
companies established in Panama to seek ways around the US trade
embargo. The Noriega regime also established the paramilitary
"Dignity Battalions" armed by Castro, which were on their way
toward becoming a permanent paramilitary force loyal only to
Noriega. Noriega's forces were also heavily armed, as evidenced by
the seizure or purchase of 55,000 personal weapons during and
immediately after Operation Just Cause.
The political initiatives taken by General Torrijos at the end
of the decade toward restoring democratic processes were reversed
by the military after his death in 1981. Year by year, opponents of
the military regime were jailed, silenced, exiled, or killed. Not one
of the 2,000 habeas corpus petitions presented to the Supreme
Court from 1986 until 1989 was resolved in favor of a political
prisoner. Independent media voices were eliminated. Basic legal
and political rights were curtailed. By December 1989, the memory
of democratic politics in Panama was in fact over 20 years old.
On December 20, 1989, the government just empowered to
meet these challenges consisted of only three men, President
Endara and his two vice presidents. There was as yet no cabinet. In
most government offices there were no desks, no office equipment.
Government workers employed by Noriega had to be reintegrated
into an honest and accountable bureaucracy.
Despite these overwhelming problems, post-Operation Just
Cause Panama is held to a standard of performance that no
government--let alone a new coalition government taking over from
a corrupt dictatorship--could meet. Much remains to be done to
reduce poverty, improve public services, combat drug trafficking,
train a new national police force, reform the administration of
justice, and prepare for the transfer of the canal in the remaining
years before 1999. But important progress has been made in each of
these areas. Through our diplomacy and with the resources we are
able to provide, we will continue to help Panama meet these goals.
Supporting Democracy
The goal of US policy in Panama is to support and consolidate the
democratic process. We do not and will not support specific groups
or individuals in their pursuit for power or advantage. We do and
will support a process that allows all members of society to
compete through political means and makes them accountable for
their decisions. Essential to the establishment of stable democracy
in Panama--and, therefore, key US policy objectives--are a healthy,
open economy, a professional civilian police force which respects
the basic human rights and political liberties of Panamanian
citizens, and an honest, efficient, and apolitical system of justice.
The Panamanian people recognize and appreciate the role the
United States has played in re-establishing and supporting
democracy in Panama. In January 1990, a Gallup poll showed that
90% of Panamanians supported the US military action which
removed Noriega, deeming it a "liberation" rather than an "invasion."
Panama's view toward the United States has remained favorable. A
March 1991 poll showed that 80% of Panamanians have a favorable
personal opinion of the United States. A more graphic
demonstration of this close bond occurred during the first week of
July, when "Friendship Week"--in which 100,000 Panamanians
participated--was organized by Panamanians to highlight our close
bilateral ties.
Panama today is a functioning democracy. For the first time
in more than two decades, Panama is ruled by a democratically
elected government. Legal and constitutional rights have been
restored. A free media flourishes; Panama has six daily
newspapers, three commercial TV stations, and many radio stations
filling the entire range of the ideological spectrum. The
Panamanian people are exercising their political rights, including
the right to criticize their elected leaders and to debate the merits
of government policies and actions. Moreover, the elected
Government of Panama no longer facilitates the illegal narcotics
trade; instead, it is committed to cooperating with us against drug
traffickers and money launderers.
The past 19 months have seen the progressive normalization
of Panamanian political life within a democratic framework. In
January 1991, the government held legislative elections to fill nine
seats for which the May 1989 national elections had yielded
disputed results. In April, the Christian Democrats withdrew from
the governing alliance over substantive and patronage issues and
are now the principal opposition party. The Democratic
Revolutionary Party, the party associated with Torrijos and
Noriega, holds 10 seats in the 67-person Legislative Assembly,
along with three other opposition parties.
As with any newly emerging democracy, the process has not
always been tidy and smooth. Panama's problems are complex and
interrelated, its resources are constrained, and its society's claims
are varied and competing. Tension and friction are normal in an
open political process, even in industrialized democracies which
have existed for many years. These difficulties were perhaps all
the more likely in a society in which some had unrealistically come
to expect that the return of freedom would itself cure all problems.
It is not the absence of problems that constitutes evidence of
democratization but rather the resolution of those problems by
democratic means. By this standard, democratization is on track in
Panama.
Economic Progress and US Aid
I am also pleased to report that Panama continues on the path to
economic recovery. The Government of Panama estimates that GDP
grew by at least 3.4% in real terms in 1990, and private sources
place growth at over 5% for that year. Growth is projected to be at
least 5% for 1991. Exports grew by 8.4% in 1990. Trade and
construction have shown a strong recovery. The banking system has
been strengthened by capital repatriation--deposits have increased
by over $6.3 billion since Operation Just Cause. Unemployment has
decreased from over 35% to under 20%. The Panamanian Government
deficit was cut from 11% of GDP in 1989 to 3.4% in 1990. The
government is moving forward on the privatization and
restructuring of state enterprises and on clearing Panama's arrears
with international creditors. Panama's debt to official, non-
commercial creditors was rescheduled in November 1990 on highly
favorable terms.
I have provided the members of the subcommittee with a fact
sheet on the delivery of 1990 US aid in the form of Economic
Support Funds (ESF). The United States and Panama have signed
agreements covering over 95% of the $461 million provided last
year. The President's request was designed to provide sufficient
funds to "jump start" the economy. These arrangements are now in
place, and disbursements are progressing under each element of the
aid program. As of the beginning of this month, Panama had
received over $280 million in direct assistance, and $130 million of
this amount has been set aside in escrow at Panama's request to
help clear its arrears to the World Bank, IMF [International Monetary
Fund], and Inter-American Development Bank.
The $41 million of US assistance provided in February 1990 as
part of the "Urgent Assistance to Democracy Act" has been used to
help create 3,500 new jobs for Panamanians, [and] to provide loans
to small businesses that suffered damage during the looting which
followed Operation Just Cause and homes for the people of the El
Chorrillo neighborhood, which was destroyed by fleeing Noriega
forces. The remainder of the aid is being used to help the banking
system provide medium-term credit for private sector investment
and plant expansion, for budget support to assist Panama refurbish
its poorly maintained infrastructure, and for clearance of Panama's
arrears with the international financial institutions. Other funds
are for projects to help train Panama's police, to improve the
administration of justice, and to help Panama protect is
environment.
Our assistance has gone a long way toward improving social
and economic conditions in Panama, especially in the immediate
aftermath of Operation Just Cause. We have provided real
assistance to real people. Over 1,900 families from Chorrillo have
moved into their new homes. Over 250 small businesses received
loans which allowed them to reopen their doors. Over 2,000 law
enforcement personnel have attended ICITAP [the US Department of
Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program] training, and over 5,000 have taken a course in basic
police skills taught by Panamanian instructors who were previously
trained by ICITAP. Two hundred-eighty park guards are being trained
and equipped to protect Panama's natural resources.
Building the Judicial System
With US assistance, Panamanian authorities have made steady
progress in creating a new, professional, national police. With the
dissolution of Noriega's PDF during Operation Just Cause, the Endara
Government faced an urgent need to reestablish the law
enforcement functions previously performed by the PDF. At the
same time, the new government was committed never to permit
again the re-emergence of a military force that could threaten
civilian democratic rule. The PDF itself was abolished, and the
current police force now numbers 10,642 as opposed to the 16,000
PDF on the eve of Operation Just Cause. The government has
removed or replaced over half of the officers at the rank of captain
or above and all of the officers ranked at or above lieutenant
colonel. With our assistance, Panamanian authorities have made
steady progress in transforming the PDF into a professional,
civilian law enforcement entity.
The Department of Justice's ICITAP is working with the new
police to ensure that they acquire the skills necessary for the
performance of civilian law enforcement duties. ICITAP is
providing a $13.2 million in training and non-lethal equipment such
as police cars, uniforms, and communications equipment to Panama.
Over 5,000 have taken a course in basic police skills taught by
Panamanian instructors who were previously trained by ICITAP. A
new police academy, assisted by ICITAP, will train 1,250 new
recruits per year, all of which will be at least high school
graduates--an exceptional level for police in Latin America. A
civilian lawyer who opposed the Noriega regime directs the National
Police, while another civilian now directs the investigative service,
the Technical Judicial Police. Finally, to ensure that the PDF is not
reborn at some later date, Panama is amending its constitution to
abolish permanently its armed forces, thus joining Costa Rica as
one of only two demilitarized Central American countries.
Also with our assistance, the new government has taken
important steps for narcotics control. Panama continues to be a
transshipment point for drugs and essential chemicals, but
conditions in Panama and the performance of the Panamanian
Government on narcotics are far better than recent press articles
would have us believe. The July 16 GAO [US General Accounting
Office] report which has provoked criticism by the press and even
by Members of Congress states that there are no reliable statistics
on the level of drug trafficking or money laundering in Panama. Yet
those who are quick to accuse state that these problems are on the
rise in Panama. In reality, what has happened in Panama is that a
corrupt dictator who actively promoted and participated in drug
trafficking and money laundering has been replaced by a government
which actively pursues counter-narcotic efforts and is committed
to cooperating with the United States in this area.
Panama and the United States have signed a Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty, and President Endara called a special session of
Panama's Legislative Assembly which ratified the agreement on
July 15, 1991. This is the latest in a steady progression of actions
demonstrating the Endara Government's commitment and
cooperation on counter-narcotics. Within 3 weeks of taking office,
the Endara Government had signed a bilateral mutual cooperation on
narcotics agreement with us. One month later, the cabinet issued
bank regulations on the recording of cash transactions in excess of
$10,000. Agreements are in place for US authorities to board
suspect Panamanian ships and for joint patrols and training by the
US Coast Guard and the Panamanian Maritime Service.
Panama's attorney general has provided bank records for use
in six ongoing money-laundering investigations covering over 400
accounts in 12 different banks. Vice President Ford has stated that
Panama will shut down any bank proved to be involved in money
laundering and has asked that the United States provide proof rather
than allegations in such cases. Panamanian law enforcement
institutions have a credible record of narcotics seizures and drug-
related arrests. The judicial technical police captured more than
5,000 kilograms of cocaine in Panama in 1990, including a 2,118
kilogram confiscation which was the largest single seizure in
Panamanian history.
Some areas of performance, however, have been less positive,
such as the administration of justice, which is among the most
difficult problems Panama faces. The legacy of the Noriega years is
particularly difficult in this area. Court records and actual court
rooms were destroyed. Prisons were overcrowded and conditions
were well below minimum standards. The Endara Government's
objective is a professional, apolitical justice system which
protects the human rights and political freedoms of the Panamanian
people. We share and support that goal. The serious problems
within the judicial system are due to a shortage of judges,
prosecutors, public defenders and investigative personnel, their
often inadequate professional skills, and a continuing increase in an
already overwhelming caseload.
Nevertheless, the Endara Government has taken several initial
positive steps, and it is committed to further reform. Four new
judges and ten administrative officers have been appointed to begin
clearing the backlog of cases in the Panama City area. Panama's
1991 budget included funding for 15 new public defenders, bringing
the total to 31 of the 36 currently required by law. Judicial
officials have been visiting penal facilities to review cases, set
trial dates, and issue writs of release for individuals whose
sentences were nearing completion or who had been held for long
periods without trial. The number of prisoners in Panama serving
pre-trial detention has dropped from 91% of the population in 1990
to 80% today. Because of the seriousness of their offenses, many of
these accused offenders do not qualify for release on bail or
restriction to house arrest. However, the judicial reform code
enacted in January permits alternatives to preventive detention for
many accused offenders. Trials of Noriega-era criminals have
begun; on July 1, a former captain in the Noriega-era PDF received a
42-month prison sentence for extortion. This autumn, the
legislature will consider a bill providing for an 18-month window
in which trials of Noriega cronies accused of human rights
violations will be given priority in court dockets.
The United States and Panama are engaged in a 5-year project
for the improvement of the administration of justice in Panama.
The goal is a criminal justice system that is fair, efficient, and
free from political and extra-judicial influence. Implementation of
the program, which began in March, is principally designed to
improve the operation and coordination of the judiciary, the
prosecutors, and the public defenders in criminal investigations and
trials. To date, our assistance has helped renovate office space for
the Supreme Court; purchase office equipment, computers, and
supplies for the Supreme Court and Public Ministry; and sponsor
workshops for judges and prosecutors. We are now in the process of
providing full legal reference libraries to the courts and are
planning a training school for judges and prosecutors. In addition,
we will provide equipment and training to help the judiciary better
manage its personnel, records, and budget. Our aid will pay for a
computerized case tracking system. US assistance was used last
summer to buy a minibus to carry jurors to trials. In the period
from August to December 1990, the minibus transported jurors to
the 2nd Superior Court. As a result, the court completed 38 cases
in that period; the same court completed only 17 cases per year
from 1987-89.
The Panamanian correctional system is badly in need of
reform. In February, at the request of the Government of Panama, a
team from the US Bureau of Prisons visited Panama, surveyed the
situation, and made recommendations for correcting the stark
deficiencies of the Panamanian prisons system. These include
inadequate medical care, unsanitary conditions, insufficient and
demoralized supervisory staff, and inappropriately long pre-trial
detention periods. The Panamanian Government has asked for the
assistance of the Bureau of Prisons in implementing these
recommendations, but neither FAA [Foreign Assistance
Authorization Bill] Section 534 nor the Panama supplemental
authorizes direct assistance to prisons. We are pleased that the FY
1992 Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill that will soon go to
conference permits the kind of direct US assistance to prisons that
the Government of Panama has requested. We urge enactment of
this important expansion in regional authority for the
administration of justice program. In the meantime, we will
continue to explore other options to support the Government of
Panama in the implementation of the Bureau of Prisons
recommendations.
Panama is currently negotiating with the international
financial institutions to clear its financial arrears so that it will
become eligible for renewed lending and the disbursal of tied aid.
In so doing, Panama should recognize that the structural economic
reforms it is being asked to make represent an excellent
opportunity to open its economy and thereby stimulate long-term
economic growth.
Another important change in our bilateral relations was
symbolized by the appointment of Gilberto Guardia, the first
Panamanian administrator of the Panama Canal. The United States
is committed to implementing fully the Panama Canal Treaties.
Panama must also begin to plan carefully for the turnover of the
Panama Canal in 1999. The canal and its related properties make up
Panama's greatest resource, providing $80 million in revenues to
the Government of Panama each year and over $200 million in
salaries to Panamanians employed by the Panama Canal Commission.
Even though the Government of Panama has taken some initial steps
toward post-1999 planning, it must now fully engage in the process
to guarantee a successful outcome.
Casualties From Operation Just Cause
Let me now turn briefly to the issue of civilian casualties during
Operation Just Cause. Frankly, there should be no need to do so, but
some shoddy, demagogic reporting about Panama makes it
necessary.
There is no basis whatsoever to the reports that thousands of
civilians died in Operation Just Cause. Thorough investigations by
several human rights groups--including Physicians for Human
Rights, Americas Watch, and the Panamanian Committee for Human
Rights--found no evidence to support such allegations.
The Institute of Legal Medicine in Panama, which based its
estimates on recovered remains, suggests a range of between 270
confirmed dead and a maximum of 345 possible military and civilian
deaths. There are only two known instances in which Panamanian
nationals were interred in common graves during Operation Just
Cause. In both cases, Panamanian officials ordered the burials for
public health reasons, and the Panamanian Coroner's office
subsequently exhumed the bodies for proper identification and final
disposition. These deaths were included in the Panamanian
Government's casualty figures. I have provided a fact sheet for your
convenience which gives a detailed discussion of this subject.
With regard to compensation, according to the US Code and the
Foreign Claims Act, a claim may not be allowed if it arises as a
result of action by an enemy or as a result of military actions by
the US Armed Forces. The US Army Claims Service at Fort Clayton,
Panama, has been reviewing claims arising out of Operation Just
Cause that did not fall under the restrictions established in US law.
By July 1991, payments of over $180,000 had been made in over 150
cases to US citizens, Panamanians, resident aliens, and third
country nationals. The US aid program has also been designed to
assist others who suffered in connection with Operation Just Cause
regardless of the reason, such as the residents of El Chorrillo.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Panama has rejoined the community of
democracies in this hemisphere. Like many other nations in the
Americas which have just emerged from dictatorship, Panama is
working to overcome all the difficulties inherent in establishing
democratic processes, a sound economy, a judicial system, and a
smoothly functioning government administration all at once. The
people of Panama have made great progress to date. We are working
closely with the Government of Panama on a wide spectrum of
issues, and we expect continued progress, including in areas such as
drug enforcement and preparations for the canal transfer, which are
key to our interests.
The Panamanian people are grateful for US support, but in the
end Panama's future depends not on us, but on them. We are
confident Panama's democracy is here to stay, that Panama's
economy will continue to grow--if necessary reforms are set in
place--that as Panama's new government grows stronger its ability
to cooperate with the United States on counter-narcotics will grow,
and that democratic Panama will be able to shoulder the important
responsibility of administration of the canal in the year 2000 and
beyond. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: US Policy Toward Cuba
Aronson
Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jul 11, 19917/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Cuba
Subject: Democratization, Travel, Immigration,
Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to
join you today to discuss the Administration's views and policy
toward Cuba.
I recently returned from the annual General Assembly of the
Organization of American States, which was held in Santiago, Chile.
This meeting was more than a celebration of Chile's return to
democracy--it was the first time that all 34 nations were
represented by freely elected governments. The people of Latin
America and the Caribbean, long freed from colonial domination,
have embraced democracy as the only legitimate form of
government. To reach that aspiration, many of these states--
Nicaragua, Chile, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, Panama, and El
Salvador among them--invited the international community to
support democracy by observing and reporting on their elections.
Another trend was apparent at Santiago: these democracies
are discarding the closed economic models of the past and are
embracing open markets. No government is sticking with the failed
statist model. In the past, in too many countries in this
hemisphere, strong central government control led to closed
systems, often rigged in favor of a privileged few, where the poor
were shut out and society as a whole squandered its opportunity to
develop. In the Americas today, the future belongs to free men and
women in free, open societies, competing and developing to the
fullest of their abilities. At Santiago, the General Assembly
warmly endorsed the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative as "an
especially valuable instrument for promoting the region's
comprehensive development."
Unfortunately, Cuba stands apart from these trends. The
Government of Cuba holds no free elections and denies basic
political, civil, and economic freedoms. Cuba stands alone in
providing weapons and political support to groups such as the FMLN
[Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] in El Salvador, which are
violently assaulting democratic constitutional governments.
In defying the trend toward democratic reform of
authoritarian regimes elsewhere, the Government of Cuba has
isolated itself from its traditional sources of support, including
countries of Eastern Europe, the Non-Aligned Movement, Latin
America, and even the Soviet Union. Germany and Czechoslovakia
have, in the past year, terminated trade ties with Havana, citing its
human rights practices.
In international forums, Cuba has isolated itself by
complicating progress toward consensus on major issues. For
example, as a member of the UN Security Council, Cuba voted
against several crucial resolutions on Iraq, including the seizure of
Iraqi sea and air vessels, the use of force, the cessation of
hostilities and terms for a cease-fire.
There is another area where the policy of the Cuban
Government stands in sharp contrast to the positive and hopeful
trends in Latin America--nuclear non-proliferation. As you know,
the President of Brazil, Fernando Collor de Mello, was in Washington
recently on a state visit to meet with President Bush. I know some
of you had the chance to meet with President Collor also.
Brazil and Argentina announced last November a common
nuclear policy calling for joint negotiations of a full scope
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to guarantee the peaceful use of their nuclear programs and
to follow that step by waiving into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
On his visit to Santiago, Chile, in December 1990, President Bush
was told by President [Patricio] Aylwin that Chile intended to take
parallel action with Brazil and Argentina in waiving Tlatelolco into
force.
President Collor told President Bush in June that the
negotiations with the IAEA are on schedule, and agreement with the
IAEA should be reached later this fall. Soon, therefore, every nation
in Latin America, with the exception of Cuba, will have committed
itself by treaty to renouncing development of nuclear weapons.
I point out these trends not to engage in "Cuba bashing" but to
make a point; the Government of Cuba stands isolated today from
this hemisphere--by refusing to permit its people to vote in free
and fair elections, by refusing to permit freedom in the
marketplace, by refusing to renounce support for violent
revolutionary movements, and by refusing to join the international
community in curbing proliferation of nuclear weapons--in other
words, by its own policy decisions, not as a result of US policy.
The Cuban Government often speaks of a military threat from
the United States and wastes enormous sums of money in defense
exercises. The United States poses no military threat to Cuba; we
have no aggressive intentions toward Cuba, and we have no desire to
order Cuba's internal affairs. The US "threat" exists only as an
excuse for the Cuban Government to justify its denial of basic
liberties to the Cuban people.
Last May 20, on Cuban Independence Day, President Bush made
it clear that he would welcome changes in the US-Cuban
relationship. He said: "If Cuba holds fully free and fair elections
under international supervision, respects human rights, and stops
subverting its neighbors, we can expect relations between our two
countries to improve significantly."
We hope the Government of Cuba will choose that course.
Democratic processes could assure peaceful change in Cuba.
Democratic institutions would give legitimacy to a successor
government. Cuba could embark on a path that would bring it into
this hemisphere's democratic mainstream, and we would build the
kind of relationship with a democratic Cuba that is appropriate to
two close neighbors whose peoples share many common hopes, many
family bonds, and a long history of friendship.
Conditions in Cuba
After years of sacrifice in the name of revolutionary change, Cubans
are reaping not the fruits of success and growth, but widening
misery and continued political repression. They see empty shelves
and long lines--and government officials blaming shortages on the
"psychology of consumer anxiety," in other words, on the Cuban
people. The best restaurants, hotels, and shops are not available to
ordinary Cuban citizens but instead are reserved for wealthy
foreigners with hard currency to spend.
The economic crisis has reached such proportions that a
nationwide austerity plan, the "Special Period in Peacetime," was
announced in July 1990. The "Special Period" includes rationing of
basic goods and electricity. If a family violates the rationing
procedures, its electricity can be cut off for 1 month. Urban
workers are being sent to the countryside for 2-week stints as
field laborers. Oxen are replacing tractors, urban bus service is
being cut back, and hundreds of thousands of Chinese bicycles are on
order. We have seen one report that Cuba plans to create up to
5,000 new rural towns to return the population to agriculture.
On June 1, bread rationing began in Havana. Waiting in line for
basic goods has become such a burden that a new enterprise
sprouted up--waiting in line for a fee. This is a crime, however.
Last December, Havana television reported nine people received
fines or prison sentences for selling their places in line.
In a recent interview, Fidel Castro was looking ahead to the
October congress of the Cuban Communist Party. Despite Cuba's
current difficulties, he said "there is not even a remote possibility"
that the congress would favor a market economy. He also said:
"Changes such as abandoning the principle of the single party will
never happen."
Current Bilateral Relations
It is often suggested that Cuba and the United States hold a
dialogue. In fact, despite our deep disagreements with the
fundamentals of Cuban policy, the United States does maintain
government-to-government contact and exchanges through the US
Interests Section in Havana and the Cuban Interests Section in
Washington, DC. We recognize the usefulness of having a line of
communication on issues which concern both countries as close
geographic neighbors. We have bilateral agreements or
understandings on migration, search and rescue, and the exchange of
real-time information to aid in the apprehension of narcotics
traffickers.
Some of this cooperation, at least on our side, is prompted by
humanitarian concerns. The immigration agreement, for example,
has allowed Cuban citizens to come to this country to escape
repression and to rejoin their families. Since the Mariel Migration
Agreement was signed in December 1984, more than 19,000 Cuban
citizens have arrived in the United States as immigrants, refugees,
or parolees. Most would not have been able to come here had the
agreement not been in place. In addition, Cuba has accepted the
return of 658 Cubans who are considered excludable from the United
States under US law.
In recent months, more and more Cubans have arrived in the
United States. In a series of decisions beginning in March 1990, the
Cuban Government gradually changed its policy on travel abroad.
The age limit for foreign travel was reduced from 65 and 60 for
men and women, respectively, to 35 and 30, and exit permits were
issued to the majority of those who applied. We understand the age
limit may be reduced even further, possibly as low as 18. One
motivation for this change in policy is clearly financial, as the
Cuban Government adds $900 or more in fees, payable in US currency
only, to the cost of each Cuban's travel.
Although we welcome the decision of the Cuban Government to
liberalize exit requirements, Cubans who seek to enter the United
States should do so in accordance with US law and established
procedures. Those individuals who wish to come to the United
States to establish new lives must apply for immigrant visas, not
seek to enter on non-immigrant or tourist visas. In addition, Cubans
should not risk the hazardous passage across the Florida Straits in
small boats or rafts. This is extremely risky, and many have lost
their lives in the attempt.
Given the continuing repression and economic deterioration in
Cuba, there has been speculation about the possibility of another
"Mariel" boatlift. The President's policy is clear--the United States
will not permit another Mariel. The Cuban Government knows this.
We have plans to deal with such a contingency, and we are fully
prepared to do so.
On June 5, 1991, my principal deputy, Michael Kozak, provided
information to this subcommittee on the issue of Cuban migration
and Cuban/Soviet construction of a nuclear energy facility at
Cienfuegos, Cuba, and I will not repeat his testimony here, but I am
prepared to answer questions.
Soviet-Cuban Relations
The political transformations of the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe have led many to ask whether and when change will come to
Cuba. That question has no clear answer. What is clear is that
change in the socialist bloc has left Cuba politically isolated from
its former close allies, and it has accelerated economic decline.
Soviet aid is crucial to Cuba's economy, and the future of
Soviet aid is a major factor in any estimation of prospects for
change in Cuba. The Soviets, with economic shortages of their own,
are vigorously debating their policy toward Cuba, and the outcome
of that debate is not yet clear. As the debate continues, we receive
many conflicting signals. For example, last month an unconfirmed
news report from Moscow said that an interim barter trade
arrangement (of unstated duration) had been worked out until both
the Soviets and Cubans were capable of trading in convertible
currencies. Amid all the conflicting signals, the conclusion I draw
is that the Soviets have made some interim arrangements with
Cuba, they are doing their best to fulfill their commitments, and
their overall support is declining. The Soviet-Cuban economic
relationship is clearly not on a stable long-term footing.
Over the past 5 years, Soviet economic and military aid has
ranged as high as an estimated $5 billion annually, or, the
equivalent of about one-fifth of the total production of the Cuban
economy. The Soviet Union alone accounted for 70% of Cuba's total
trade in 1989. Total estimated Soviet military and economic aid in
1990 was $4.5 billion. There is no single country or group of
countries which can easily replace the Soviet Union as a source of
vitally needed imports and a reliable market for Cuban exports.
Soviet trade and assistance, however, do not have to remain at
1989 levels to ensure the survival of the regime. Cubans are
making do with less. Although lower than before, Soviet economic
assistance to Cuba in 1990 reached an estimated $3.5 billion in
development aid, trade credits, and subsidies.
The most important Soviet subsidy is for Cuban sugar. The
Soviet Union purchases the bulk of Cuba's sugar and nickel, in return
providing Cuba with 90% of its oil and much of its grain and
machinery. The Soviets value Cuban sugar substantially above the
world spot-market price. In 1990, total net bookkeeping subsidies
(Soviet overvaluation of sugar minus Cuban overvaluation of oil)
amounted to about $2.2 billion. This overvaluation (or subsidy)
appears to have dropped significantly during 1990 as a result of a
shift in terms of trade with the Soviet Union. In 1989, Cuba
received 3 tons of oil for each ton of sugar; in 1990, Moscow
supplied only 2.5 tons of oil for each ton of sugar. This
overvaluation will shrink further in 1991, reflecting the lower
sugar price agreed for this year, which is comparable to what the
European Community pays for imported sugar.
Last year, Soviet trade credits to Cuba (loans, as distinct
from subsidies) amounted to an estimated $500 million in
additional aid. Direct Soviet technical and development assistance
totaled approximately $792 million. We estimate that between
1989 and 1990, Soviet oil deliveries have dropped from 13 to 10
million tons annually. The two ongoing major Soviet development
projects in Cuba are the Cienfuegos nuclear energy plant and a large
oil refinery. The completion of these projects would reduce by 10%
to 15% Cuban reliance on Soviet oil.
The 1991 1-year Soviet-Cuban trade agreement projects
bilateral trade and aid at the same levels as 1990. Soviet
deliveries, however, are behind schedule. In addition, Moscow has,
in the past year, withdrawn half of its civilian technical advisers--
about 1,200--from Cuba as part of a worldwide cutback and states
that it will recall more. Eastern Europe also has curtailed most aid
to Cuba and drastically reduced trade, which used to represent 15%
of Cuba's total world trade.
For decades, Soviet military aid has allowed Cuba to build the
second largest military force in Latin America --second only to
Brazil, a country 15 times Cuba's size--and to influence and
intervene militarily in countries as diverse as Ethiopia, Angola,
Chile, Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Estimated at about $1.3
billion annually over the past 5 years, Soviet military aid declined
in 1990 as part of the overall reduction in Soviet assistance.
Reduced supplies of Soviet oil have resulted in reduced training and
use of its military equipment. However, in 1990 Cuba received a
partial squadron of Soviet MiG-29 fighters. The return of sizeable
quantities of military equipment and weapons systems from Angola
has helped mitigate the impact of reduced Soviet deliveries.
The Soviet Union continues to receive major strategic and
intelligence benefits from Cuba. The Lourdes signals intelligence
facility, for example, is the most sophisticated outside the USSR.
And the Soviets maintain a 2,800-member military brigade
stationed at or near the facility. Although the Soviet presence in
Cuba has been drawn down as part of worldwide cutback, there is no
indication the Soviets intend to reduce their presence at Lourdes.
Cuba and US-Soviet Relations
Soviet military and economic aid to Cuba remains a major problem
in the Soviet Union's relationship with the United States. It helps
prolong the tenure of an anachronistic and autocratic government
and enables Castro to avoid political and economic reform. It makes
it easier for Cuba to continue to help send arms and logistical
support to violent revolutionary groups like the FMLN, contrary to
Cuba's public and private disclaimers.
The Soviet Union recognizes the difficulty of maintaining good
relations with both the United States and Cuba but is attempting to
balance their competing interests. The Soviet military does not
want to lose its valuable strategic relationship with Cuba. The
Soviet economic system is accustomed to relying on Cuba for sugar
(3.5 to 4 million tons annually), nickel, citrus fruit, seafood, and
medical care, including treatment for victims of Chernobyl. On the
political side, the Soviet Union is reluctant to jettison a 32-year
relationship with a long-time ally. Nevertheless, many Americans
find it hard to understand how the Soviet Union can claim that
economic reconstruction is its overriding priority while it provides
oil, grain, and valuable military equipment to the Castro
Government year after year.
The Outlook
It is impossible to gauge the prospects for reform in Cuba, but the
Castro regime appears committed to resist change and reform as
long as possible.
The Soviets have more influence within the Cuban Government
and with Castro personally than any other nation, certainly more
than we have. They could do more to prevent Cuban support for
violent groups like the FMLN and encourage internal reform. In our
dialogue with the Soviet Union, we will continue to urge them to do
so.
International attention also can make a difference. The
decision of the UN Commission on Human Rights in March to
establish a special representative to review human rights in Cuba
demonstrated continued world concern about Cuba and may have
contributed to the release of a number of prominent political
prisoners. Unfortunately, Cuba rejected out of hand the UN special
representative named by the Secretary General--Rafael Rivas
Posada--as soon as he was named earlier this month. Cuba's
disrespect for a decision of the UN body is particularly egregious
since it comes at the time that Cuba chairs the UN Security Council
and after Cuba fought hard to retain a seat on the UN Human Rights
Commission.
Inside Cuba, the human rights situation has deteriorated in
recent weeks. The Cuban Government brands Cuban human rights
activists "US stooges" or "worms," instead of addressing their
legitimate demands to exercise basic freedoms. Last month,
plainsclothesmen attacked and beat members of the independent
"Harmony Movement" following a Sunday church service. Then, the
group's leader Yndamiro Restano was accosted and beaten when he
tried to attend the trial of a doctor charged with conspiracy to
assassinate Castro. Restano was later briefly detained and warned
to cease his political activity. Cuban authorities may intend these
incidents to send a signal that it will not tolerate any dissident
political activity during the Pan American Games, which take place
in Havana in August. We hope the Cuban authorities release Mario
Chanes de Armas--one of the world's longest-serving political
prisoners--when his 30-year sentence ends on
July 17.
The United States also will continue efforts to assure that
the Cuban people have access to alternative sources of information
on what is happening in Cuba as well as in other countries. Radio
and TV Marti play an important role in that effort. The Cuban people
deserve to have access to alternative views--not just the party line
from the state.
On May 10, 10 Cuban intellectuals --including dissidents and
official award-winning poets and writers--issued an appeal urging
their government to prevent a national "catastrophe" by allowing
direct legislative elections, freedom of travel, the re-opening of
farmers markets, and by decreeing a general amnesty to prisoners
of conscience. This courageous statement attests to the degree of
disillusionment with Castro's revolution among those who have long
been its core ideological defenders. Four of those who signed the
appeal were leading members of the official Cuban Writers' and
Artists' Union. The "union" responded the next day by denouncing the
statement as collusion with the US Government.
To an extent almost unique in world politics, the Cuban state
is dominated by one person. Nevertheless, change in Cuba depends
on the Cuban people themselves. Throughout Cuba, and even in the
government, there are people who are well educated, capable, and
aware of the events that have swept the socialist world in recent
years. These are patriotic people who see the ways in which the
revolution has failed. They understand the kind of reforms that can
make Cubans free and prosperous, and their nation more independent
than ever. The United States hopes that the Cuban people can soon
enjoy a peaceful transition to the free, democratic future they
deserve. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: Cuba: Visa Procedures at US Interests Section
Tutwiler
Description: Statement released by the Department of State Office of
the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC
Date: Jul 29, 19917/29/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Cuba
Subject: Travel, Immigration
[TEXT]
Due to an unforeseeable increase in applications for non-immigrant
visas at the US Interests Section in Havana, the Department of
State has decided that, as of today, the Interests Section will, as a
temporary measure, suspend the acceptance of new applications for
non-immigrant visas from the Cuban public. This will enable our
consular staff to devote its full attention to the backlog of 28,000
tourist visa applications now on file and to provide faster service
to those applicants.
New applications for tourist visas will be accepted once the
backlog of old applications is cleared. In the interim, the Interests
Section will continue to accept applications for emergency travel
for humanitarian considerations, as well as from third country
travelers residing in Cuba, diplomats, and Cuban academic and
official visitors.
Normal processing of immigrant visa applications and refugee
cases, both covered under the 1984 US-Cuban migration agreement,
will continue.
We plan to increase our consular staff in order to provide
faster service in the future. Until then, we ask the Cuban public to
cooperate by not sending new applications to the Interests Section
by mail or in person.
We have had to take this temporary administrative measure
due to an increase in applications caused by the Cuban Government's
decision to lower the age limit for foreign travel. Whereas in March
1990, the age limit was 65 for men and 60 for women, today, Cuban
men may travel at age 35 and women
at 30.
The United States welcomes Cuba's decision to ease
restrictions on travel by its citizens. In order to be prepared with
adequate staff, we asked for advance notice of these changes, but
no notice was given. We have received approximately 70,000
tourist visa applications sine the beginning of fiscal year 1991--
well over twice last year's application rate--and processed over
41,000, more than in all of FY 1990. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: Andean Trade Preference Act: Essential To Combating
Narcotics Traffic
Aronson
Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House
Ways and Means Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jul 25, 19917/25/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador
Subject: Narcotics, Trade/Economics
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss H.R. [House Resolution] 661,
the Andean Trade Preference Act, with you. Granting special trade
preferences to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador is an essential
component of our effort to help these front-line states to stop the
production and trafficking of cocaine. The Administration strongly
supports its passage.
We are making progress in the war on drugs. At home, cocaine
use is down, cocaine prices are up, and drug use is waning among
young Americans.
Internationally, we have ended the sterile, finger-pointing
debate between producer and consumer nations over who is to blame
and which country bears the first obligation to act. We are allies,
we are working in close partnership with the Andean nations, and
our work is paying off.
At the Cartagena summit in February 1990, President Bush
joined the Andean presidents in mutual commitments to fight drug
trafficking through a strategy of mutually reinforcing actions to
cut demand and supply. For our part, that commitment includes
supporting the Andean nations in the development of new export
opportunities, to give their people a way out of dependence on the
cocaine economy.
The issue in this legislation, then, goes far beyond trade.
Passing the Andean Trade Preference Act means keeping our end of a
bargain with our partners in the war on drugs--partners on the
front lines who have sacrificed a great deal and who face
tremendous social and economic difficulties. Colombia lost three
presidential candidates to narcotraffickers' violence in the last
presidential campaign. Even as it confronts massive poverty and a
battle against over 200,000 cases of cholera, Peru is moving to
stop cocaine production. Bolivia, South America's poorest country,
also is devoting funds and human resources to this fight.
Last October, the European Community granted broad duty-free
treatment for Andean exports. Now it is our turn to take this
important step to advance our strategy to stop the drug trade.
The United States will derive four principal benefits from the
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).
-- By creating new export opportunities for Andean nations,
ATPA will create new economic incentives that will draw people
and resources away from the illegal economy and into legal
activities. Our current economic aid programs will have a greater
impact with ATPA in place.
-- A more prosperous legal economy will broaden the tax base
of the Andean governments and increase the resources they can
devote to fighting drugs.
-- Passage of the ATPA will reaffirm our commitment to the
Andean nations' long-term economic development and enhance the
spirit of cooperation that is essential to all facets of our counter-
narcotics work with these countries.
-- As these countries export more to us, we can expect them
to buy more of our exports. H.R. 661 is modeled on the Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI). CBI trade preferences boosted Caribbean
exports to the United States; at the same time, we increased our
exports to the Caribbean. Between 1983 and 1990, our trade
balance with CBI countries went from a $3-billion deficit to a $2-
billion surplus, and our market share compared with Japan
increased.
The Andean Strategy
To show you the impact and importance of the Andean Trade
Preference Act, let me first discuss the context into which it fits.
The world's entire cocaine supply originates in the Andes and
makes its way to markets in the United States, Europe, and Asia.
Coca leaf has been produced by peasants in the Andean highlands for
centuries, but only in the past 2 decades has a sophisticated, multi-
billion dollar industry grown up around coca's refined product,
cocaine.
To meet this challenge, we worked with Congress to put in
place the Andean strategy, a comprehensive 5-year effort to
support the Andean governments in fighting the illegal drug trade.
We are in the second year of that strategy, and we know that our
ultimate success will depend on sustained, steady work to carry out
each part of the strategy.
We are helping police and, when necessary, military forces to
acquire the training, equipment, and intelligence they need to
confront the narcotraffickers and disrupt their operations. We are
helping to develop judicial systems so they can prosecute drug
criminals effectively. Our economic assistance is geared to
creating viable economic alternatives for the people who now earn
their livelihoods in the illegal drug industry. The Administration is
requesting $250 million in Economic Support Funds and $141 million
in police and military aid to sustain these programs in fiscal year
1992.
This is a long-term struggle. It will not be waged or won like
Desert Storm. Still, even at this early stage we can cite some
important accomplishments.
-- For the first time in a decade, the land area under coca
cultivation in the Andes did not grow in 1990. In recent years, 10-
20% annual increases had been the norm.
-- The price coca farmers receive for their crop is down. In
the Andes, coca leaves sell in hundred-pound units which brought
prices as high as $200 as recently as 1987. Today, the high prices
are in the $60-$80 range, and the price at times dips to $10, well
below the estimated $30-$40 breakeven point. This reflects
success in disrupting the cartels' production and transportation
operations, which has resulted in weaker demand for the farmers'
coca leaves.
-- Cocaine seizures are up throughout the region. This year,
Colombia's law enforcement authorities are seizing cocaine at
nearly twice last year's rate.
-- Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador have all adopted laws
consistent with the model legislation developed by the Organization
of American States to restrict access to imported chemicals
essential to cocaine production.
At the same time, the United States recognizes the great
difficulties of fighting the Andean drug cartels.
-- The cartels are flexible and able to adapt to changing
conditions. They use violence to intimidate government officials
and the citizens of the Andean countries, and they are able to use
their enormous funds to corrupt others.
-- Police and military forces in these countries need training
of all kinds, including human rights instruction.
-- Political will to continue the fight must be sustained even
as these societies address other major social and economic
problems.
We have made the most progress in Colombia. With our
assistance, the police and military are now able to conduct counter-
narcotics operations by helicopter in any area of the country.
Improved intelligence and training have enabled them to use that
mobility very effectively. In consecutive weeks last April,
Colombia's national police made two 10-ton seizures of cocaine. To
date, 1991 seizures total 56 tons, more than the total for all of
last year. Marijuana cultivation has been virtually eliminated. With
our aid--$7 million this year, $36 million planned over the next 4
years--Colombia is undertaking a major judicial reform program to
protect judges, increase the effectiveness of investigators and
prosecutors, improve the administration of the court system, and
develop new laws and regulations. The leaders of the Medellin
cartel are now either in prison or dead. The surrender of Pablo
Escobar and his top lieutenants is an impressive achievement. As
little as a year ago, no one would have believed it possible.
Colombia's judicial system now faces the test of prosecuting and
convicting Escobar, and winning a jail sentence commensurate with
his crimes.
Peru faces a difficult situation because of the complexity of
its problems. Facing an economic crisis and two terrorist
movements, its performance is not always what we would like to
see. Even so, the [Alberto] Fujimori Administration has publicly
committed itself to fight the narcotics traffickers and their
insurgent allies. Last May, we signed an umbrella agreement with
Peru to set the framework for our overall counter-narcotics effort.
Last week, we signed specific agreements to implement the
economic and law enforcement parts of that effort.
There has been some progress. In 1990, Peruvian Government
forces destroyed (in coca seedbeds) the equivalent of over 15,000
hectares of mature coca, dismantled 151 coca base labs, and
completed the Santa Lucia base. Eight tons of cocaine and cocaine
base were seized in 1990, up from less than a ton the year before.
And this year, the Peruvian Air Force has repeatedly staged aircraft
at Santa Lucia for flight interdiction operations. In the last 2
months alone, 47 unscheduled aircraft were forced down, three
carrying narcotics. We are receiving reports that trafficker pilots
are now demanding large bonus payments to fly into the Upper
Huallaga Valley.
In Bolivia, we have seen successes in several areas. Eight
thousand hectares of coca were eradicated last year. A major
trafficking network was dismantled last year, and its leader, "Meco"
Dominguez, was arrested. When questions about ties to narcotics
traffickers were raised about some top government appointees,
President Paz Zamora accepted the resignations of his top counter-
narcotics official as well as the interior minister and chief of
police. Last June, a major raid in the town of Santa Ana, an area
that had been considered out of reach of law enforcement officials,
yielded the arrest of one top narcotrafficker and the seizure of
assets of many others. This raid contributed to the July 9 surrender
of Erwin Guzman, one of Bolivia's largest traffickers.
Bolivia also has achieved an important success in agricultural
development. Bolivia's Chapare Valley is an area where, in recent
years, unemployed workers--up to three-fourths of the male work
force--have migrated to coca regions to earn money cultivating
coca. One year ago, the Chapare produced no legal exports at all.
Today, with our economic aid, new crops are now being grown in the
Chapare Valley, and, as a result this year almost no workers left
the valley to work in coca-growing areas. The crops include
pineapples which are being exported to Argentina, bananas to Chile,
turmeric to Argentina and Venezuela, and passion fruit for the local
market.
Ecuador virtually wiped out its fledgling coca growing
industry in the mid-1980s and continues to eradicate any coca
found. Ecuador has enacted a comprehensive drug law which
toughens sentences for drug crimes and criminalizes drug-related
activities, including bribery and intimidation of enforcement and
judicial officials, lending assets for use in drug production or
transport, and money laundering. We have provided Ecuador with
technical assistance on chemicals control, money laundering, and
intelligence to help implement the law. In the last year, Ecuador
has eradicated 30 hectares of coca and seized over a ton of cocaine
and cocaine base. Last month we completed negotiations with
Ecuador on a money-laundering control agreement. The Borja
Government has publicly condemned and dismissed from office
public officials and judges suspected of corruption in drug crimes.
Building Alternatives to the Cocaine Economy
In large part, the drug war is an effort to change incentives and
behavior throughout the chain of production and consumption. The
more we convince users and traffickers of the likelihood they will
serve time in jail, the likelier they are to opt out of illegal activity.
When we interrupt supplies, we raise producers' cost of doing
business and the price users pay for drugs. And, as I mentioned
earlier, the Andean nations' success in disrupting cocaine
production has caused an oversupply of leaf and paste and, hence,
lower prices for coca leaf. That begins to tilt the incentive for
farmers toward legal crops and away from coca.
For our policy to succeed, we need to be ready to deal with
those who respond to new incentives. That means providing
treatment to former drug users, it means dealing with drug
traffickers who want to abandon their trade, and it means having
economic alternatives ready for farmers who are ready to abandon
coca and grow legal crops.
At the Cartagena summit in February 1990, President Bush
heard an appeal not primarily for aid but for increased trade. The
Andean presidents strongly requested new trade opportunities to
create new, legal sources of employment and foreign exchange to
permanently displace the cocaine economy in their countries.
The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) responds to that
need. It is modeled after the CBI, creating broad categories of
goods that will enjoy 10 years of preferential treatment (reduced
or eliminated tariffs) in the US market. It excludes the same
sensitive sectors that are excluded from CBI.
ATPA would complement economic development programs we
now have in place in the Andean region. These programs received a
major boost with the completion last December of a US Government
study of the problems facing agricultural development in the Andes.
An inter-agency task force, led by former Ambassador Edwin Corr,
traveled to the region and made a series of recommendations that
have been translated into an action plan by the [US] Agriculture
Department and the US Agency for International Development. This
includes measures to improve pest and disease control, to increase
knowledge of product marketing, to help Andean farmers meet US
regulatory standards and to improve infrastructure in rural areas.
The impact of these measures will be multiplied once new trade
preferences are enacted.
Based on the experience of CBI, we would expect ATPA to lead
to more exports of the products the Andean countries currently sell
to the United States and to the development of new lines of exports
to take advantage of duty-free treatment. About $300-million
worth of Andean products now charged duties would become duty-
free. These products include cut flowers, some fruits and
vegetables, zinc, and some seafood. New exports would most likely
come in sectors such as agriculture, aquaculture, and ceramic
goods. Countries receiving CBI benefits have increased their non-
traditional exports about 15% annually since the program began in
1983.
It is impossible to exaggerate how badly these countries need
new opportunities for economic development. They need to
diversify their exports. More than 90% of Bolivian and Ecuadorian
exports are primary commodities like fuel, minerals, bananas, and
coffee. The percentage for Colombia and Peru is over 75%. In
Colombia, the damage caused by guerrillas cost $376 million, the
equivalent of 1 percent of gross domestic product, in the first
quarter of this year alone. Peru is struggling with massive
international debt, a combined rate of unemployment and
underemployment of 86 % in the capital city of Lima, and a cholera
epidemic that has afflicted some 220,000 Peruvians.
These countries are doing the right things to put their
economies in order and to establish the basis for economic growth.
Bolivia has been implementing market-oriented reforms since 1985.
Last year, Colombia began an ambitious program to open up its
economy to foreign trade and investment. Under President
Fujimori's leadership, Peru began an economic reform program
which the World Bank has called the most thorough in Latin America
in the post-war era.
ATPA's Impact on the US Economy
This legislation is designed to give special help to our key partners
in the war on drugs at a time when their economies are in dire need.
Its greatest impact, and the greatest benefit to the United States,
will be measured in the counter-narcotics arena. However, the
Administration has given careful consideration to ATPA's impact on
the US economy. We believe these trade preferences will carry
little or no adverse impact, and we see the potential for economic
benefits in the form of increased US exports to the Andean region.
Andean exports are not of sufficient weight in US trade to
have a major economic impact. They account for less than 1% of US
imports. Their value is about $5 billion, of which $2 billion is in
petroleum, a product excepted from ATPA treatment. ATPA would
give duty-free treatment to products that now account for $300
million of Andean exports to the United States. Worldwide, we
import $9 billion worth of these products. Favorable tariff
treatment for the Andes could result in a greater Andean share of
that $9 billion, as US importers respond to lower prices of Andean
products. Rather than an overall increase in US imports, we may
see a shift among suppliers.
Moreover, the CBI experience and recent trade patterns
throughout the hemisphere show that we can generally expect to
sell more to countries that sell more to us. When CBI began in
1983, we had a $3.3 billion trade deficit with CBI countries. Within
3 years, the deficit disappeared. By 1990, US exports to CBI
countries had grown 72% (to $9.5 billion), and our deficit turned
into a $2-billion surplus.
Looking at the hemisphere's economy as a whole, we see a
general pattern where our exports increase as our neighbors grow
more prosperous. The region's economic problems in the early
1980s caused a sharp drop in US exports, from $42 billion in 1981
to $26 billion in 1983. As the region's economy recovered, our
exports rose to $49 billion in 1989 and $55 billion in 1990.
Moreover, our market share increased. In 1980, we sold half the
exports to Latin America and the Caribbean; in 1989, we sold 56%.
Given our competitive and geographical position, the US
economy can only gain from greater prosperity in this hemisphere.
The data bear this out.
Conclusion
The Andean Trade Preference Act is clearly in our national interest.
It will fulfill an important commitment to our allies in the war on
drugs. It will build on our economic development efforts and draw
resources away from the cocaine cartels. In the long run, it is
likely to help the US economy as the Andean nations acquire a
greater capacity to buy US exports. For these reasons, the
Administration strongly urges this committee and the Congress to
help our key allies to prosecute the drug war by approving H.R. 661.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: Looking Forward to a New South Africa
Cohen
Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on Africa and on
International Economic Policy and Trade, House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jul 31, 19917/31/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: South Africa
Subject: Human Rights, Trade/Economics,
Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Thank you for inviting me to come before this hearing of the two
subcommittees. I appreciate the opportunity to continue our
dialogue on South Africa.
Since I last testified before you on April 30, progress toward
non-racial democracy in South Africa has continued. In June, the
Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act, and the Land Acts
were repealed by Parliament. In early July, the ANC [African
National Congress] held its first major conference inside South
Africa in 30 years and gave Nelson Mandela, its newly elected
president, a mandate to move ahead with constitutional talks.
Prisoner releases continued; over 1,000 prisoners have been
released under an agreement between the ANC and the government,
as well as many more under a recent remission of sentences.
On July 10, President Bush signed Executive Order 12769
terminating sanctions pursuant to the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986 . In doing so, he concluded that the
South African Government had met all five of the conditions set
forth in Section 311(a) of the act. I would like to summarize the
basis for the President's determination.
President Bush acted in full conformity with the purposes of
Section 311 and of the CAAA as a whole. The language, structure,
and legislative history of the act show that the possibility of
lifting sanctions was intended as an incentive for the South African
Government to create the conditions for good faith negotiations by
taking the five specific steps listed in Section 311(a). Lifting
sanctions was not intended as a reward to be withheld until the
apartheid system had been completely eliminated, which would
require adoption of a new constitution. The intent of Congress in
1986 was clearly expressed during House consideration of the bill
that became the CAAA. As one member stated during that debate,
"the incentives and sanctions work together to provide a carrot and
stick approach. . . . The incentives provided in the legislation are
directed toward those very necessary first steps that the South
African Government must take to end apartheid and bring about
needed reform."
We are very concerned by the recent revelations and
allegations concerning the South African Government, including the
funding of Inkatha activities, covert South African funding to
parties during the Namibian elections, and alleged complicity of
members of the security forces in the violence. We are following
these developments closely and will take appropriate action.
However, this does not lessen our conviction that an irreversible
process of change is occurring in South Africa. Let me now address
each of the conditions in the act.
-- The first condition required the South African Government
to release from prison Nelson Mandela and "all persons persecuted
for their political beliefs or detained unduly without trial." This
standard is consistent with the criteria we have long applied in our
annual human rights reports. It is different from the much broader
criteria approved by the South African Government and ANC for
defining "political prisoners" under the Pretoria Minute. Unlike the
Pretoria Minute, the CAAA criteria exclude persons incarcerated
after receiving due process, even if the offense was politically
motivated.
In light of the text, purpose, and legislative history of Section
311, we also concluded that it applies to prisoners who are
detained by the South African Government but not to persons who
may be held by other entities, be it the ANC or the authorities in the
so-called "independent" homelands. This interpretation of the CAAA
does not prejudice our firm policy against recognition of these four
pseudo-states, which must be re-integrated into the democratic,
non-racial South Africa that emerges from negotiations. Although
the release of prisoners in the homelands is not required by Section
311, I wish to emphasize that we have consistently urged the South
African Government to bring its full influence to bear in resolving
this issue, specifically in Bophuthatswana. I do so again, publicly,
today.
In late June, our Embassy in Pretoria completed an exhaustive
review of persons incarcerated by the South African Government.
The Embassy had solicited the views of the ANC, PAC [Pan
Africanist Congress], AZAPO [Azanian People's Organization], the
Human Rights Commission, the ICRC [International Committee of the
Red Cross], and other organizations, and had asked for names of
alleged political prisoners. Our personnel were granted complete
access to South African prison records and reviewed the basis for
the conviction and continued detention of each of the over 5,000
prisoners who had applied for release under the Pretoria Minute as
well as all other identifiable prisoners whose names appeared on
any of the lists we had received. Cases that the ANC and PAC
identified as of special interest were given particularly close
scrutiny. Upon completion of this extensive review, the Embassy
concluded that the South African Government held no prisoners or
detainees who met the criteria of Section 311(a).
-- The second condition in Section 311(a) required the South
African Government to repeal the state of emergency in effect in
1986. The government did so in 1990. This second condition also
required the release of all detainees held under the state of
emergency. These detainees have been freed, as confirmed by the
South African Human Rights Commission.
-- The third condition in Section 311(a) required the South
African Government to unban democratic political parties and
permit South Africans of all races to form political parties,
express political opinions, and otherwise participate in the
political process. Political parties were unbanned following
President de Klerk's speech to Parliament on February 2, 1990.
Since then, South Africans of all races have freely exercised the
right to form parties (including the ANC, PAC, AZAPO, and South
African Communist Party) and to express political opinions
(including strident denunciations of the government).
Some have asserted that this third condition requires that
black South Africans be given the right to vote. A new constitution
which will give all South Africans the right to vote must be the
outcome of negotiations, but was not a condition of the CAAA.
-- The fourth condition in Section 311(a) required the South
African Government to repeal the Population Registration Act and
Group Areas Act and "institute no other measures with the same
purposes." In June, the government repealed the two laws. The
transitional measures contained in the repeal legislation were
limited solely to maintain the existing constitution until a new
constitution is adopted. The population register was "frozen" as of
the date of repeal of the Population Registration Act, and no racial
information will be entered for newborns or added for other persons
in the future. Similarly, the residential standards provisions
adopted in connection with the repeal of the Group Areas Act are
zoning rules, not unlike those that exist throughout the United
States, and expressly prohibit racial discrimination.
-- The fifth condition in Section 311(a) required that the
South African Government agree to enter into good faith
negotiations with truly representative members of the black
majority without preconditions. It has done so. Some critics have
challenged the government's "good faith" in the negotiating process.
We are firmly convinced that President de Klerk and his government
are committed to achieving non-racial democracy in South Africa,
that they know that there can be no turning back to the policies of
apartheid and white privilege, and that they approach the coming
negotiations in good faith and with the full intention that they
succeed.
The action taken by President Bush on July 10 resulted in the
termination of the measures in title 3 of the CAAA, of two other
CAAA provisions, and of the Rangel amendment denying foreign tax
credits with respect to South African income.
A number of other South Africa sanctions remain in place.
These include the UN embargoes on arms exports and imports, the
prohibition of exports to the South African military and police, the
Gramm amendment restricting US support for IMF [International
Monetary Fund] drawings by South Africa, the ban on intelligence
cooperation, and the Fair Labor Standards Program that applies to
US firms employing more than 25 persons in South Africa. It is our
intention to monitor further developments in South Africa carefully
and to consider, in consultation with Congress, the appropriateness
of lifting or amending particular measures as the situation
warrants. We will act in strict compliance with all requirements
of existing legislation and Security Council resolutions.
The pre-negotiations phase in South Africa is coming to an
end. An all-parties conference proposed by the ANC should soon
commence, paving the way for a new constitution. Widespread
agreement already has emerged that South Africa's new, non-racial
constitution must provide for one person, one vote on a common
voters' roll in a multiparty democracy, with equal rights and
privileges enshrined in a justifiable bill of rights. This represents
a striking degree of convergence of views on fundamental elements
of the post-apartheid system.
Many of you have expressed concern that the lifting of
sanctions will take the pressure off the South African Government
to move forward with constitutional talks. But the clock cannot be
turned back. While sanctions have played a role in encouraging the
South African Government to move ahead with reforms, an
irreversible process of dismantling apartheid is now underway.
There is no viable alternative to negotiating a non-racial,
democratic constitution. President de Klerk and his governing party
have acknowledged that there can never be another general election
which excludes the majority of South Africa's citizens because of
race, and the ANC has agreed to give up the armed struggle for the
negotiating table.
South Africans have already begun to feel the positive effects
of reforms, manifested by a dramatic increase in diplomatic ties,
decisions to lift EC [European Community] and other international
sanctions, increased trade, re-admittance to the Olympic games,
and the goodwill displayed toward President de Klerk during his
widespread travels throughout Africa and overseas. These steps by
the international community have not made the South African
Government complacent; rather, they have spurred further reform
measures. Moreover, increasing acceptance overseas has
strengthened President de Klerk's support among white South
Africans--support which will be crucial for a successful, peaceful
settlement.
In its efforts to clear the way for constitutional talks, the
South African Government has not been bound by the requirements
of our sanctions legislation. In addition to the repeal of the two
pillars of apartheid cited in the CAAA, the Population Registration
Act and the Group Areas Act, Parliament also has repealed the Land
Acts, the Separate Amenities Act, and other legislation. The
government also has released many prisoners who do not meet the
CAAA criteria. Clearly, the government has not merely been ticking
off items on a CAAA checklist but is operating according to its own
reform and negotiating agenda.
The termination of CAAA sanctions does not at all lessen our
commitment to support the creation of non-racial democracy in
South Africa. While the process of change in South Africa is
primarily an internal one, we are supporting these efforts through a
balanced policy of frequent contacts with all parties. President
Bush has met with President de Klerk, Nelson Mandela, Mangosuthu
Buthelezi and other key South African political leaders. He has used
these occasions to encourage them to go forward into negotiations
and to do everything possible to advance the prospects of peaceful
change in South Africa. The President remains in direct contact
with President de Klerk and Mr. Mandela to keep them apprised of
developments in US policy and to seek their assessment of progress
in South Africa. The President also has pressed all parties to work
together to find a mutually agreeable means of dealing with the
tragic problem of violence which has taken an enormous human toll
and distracted energy and attention from the all-important process
of negotiations on South Africa's political future. Lastly, the
eagerness of South Africans across the political spectrum to draw
on our political system and our experiences as they endeavor to
establish their own non-racial democracy ensures a continuing US
role.
We have not hesitated to state forcefully our concerns to any
party engaged in actions detrimental to negotiations, including,
most recently, revelations of covert South African Government
financial support to Inkatha. Such actions could seriously
undermine the integrity of the negotiating process. The South
African Government must provide a full account of its activities in
this regard and take appropriate action against those responsible.
We are closely monitoring the South African Government's response
to this development.
We also urge the South African Government to finalize an
agreement with the UNHCR [UN Human Rights Commission] so that
the return of South Africa's tens of thousands of exiles can move
ahead more rapidly. We have announced our intention to pledge $4
million to a UNHCR repatriation effort.
We will continue to press actively for further measures to
redress 40 years of legalized discrimination and isolation. Much
more must be done to address the basic human needs of the black
majority. The beginning of a new South Africa lends particular
urgency to efforts to prepare disadvantaged South Africans to
participate fully in the revitalization of the economy and assume
future leadership positions. To this end, the President directed this
month that financial assistance to South Africa's black majority
should be doubled from $40 million to $80 million. The current
assistance program in South Africa is designed to prepare
representatives of the black majority for leadership in the post-
apartheid South Africa. We plan to focus the additional $40 million
on housing and education. We will work to develop and support
credit and financing programs for home ownership for black South
Africans. Our current education program will be expanded to
include scholarships for secondary education, and vocational
training and adult literacy programs. My colleagues and I look
forward to working with Congress to make sure this increased
assistance is disbursed rapidly and effectively.
Termination of sanctions will stimulate the economic growth
which is essential to providing jobs and allowing South Africa to
address the gross economic inequalities which are the tragic legacy
of apartheid. Those who oppose the lifting of sanctions, including
many state and local governments which have imposed their own
measures, should bear in mind that the burden of continued
sanctions will fall particularly on the future non-racial,
democratically elected government which will emerge from
negotiations. Inevitably, there will be a considerable lag between
the end of sanctions and substantial external contributions to
economic growth in South Africa. Deprived of the resources
generated by growth, the future majority government will be less
well equipped to address the aspirations of its people to overcome
the damage done by 4 decades of apartheid.
CAAA sanctions were one facet of a comprehensive US
approach toward South Africa. Our goal remains firm and
unswerving--to encourage broad-based negotiations toward the
establishment of a non-racial, multi-party democracy in South
Africa, with a constitution which enshrines individual rights and
establishes the legal basis for a viable, market-based economy. The
role of the United States in helping bring about democracy in South
Africa will continue to be an active one. The Administration looks
forward to continuing to work with Congress in bipartisan efforts
aimed at furthering peaceful democratic change in South
Africa.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 31, August 5, 1991
Title: Gulf Responsibility-Sharing
McAllister
Source: Eugene J. McAllister, Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs
Description: Statement before the House Ways and Means Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Jul 31, 19917/31/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Kuwait, Greece, Portugal, Yugoslavia (former),
Germany, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates
Subject: Military Affairs
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on Gulf
responsibility-sharing efforts. We believe that our efforts to
assure a fair responsibility-sharing among our allies and partners
were an unprecedented success.
-- Over $70 billion in total financial commitments was
raised. This $70 billion in extraordinary spending is greater than
the GDP of a number of countries, including Greece, Portugal, and
Yugoslavia.
-- In the sphere of economic assistance, 26 countries have
committed $16 billion in 1990 and 1991, mainly for those front-
line states critical to the sanctions regime, notably Egypt and
Turkey. This effort has been coordinated through the US led Gulf-
Crisis Financial Coordination Group.
-- In military responsibility- sharing, our partners have
committed $54 billion to the United States: $9.7 billion in 1990, or
73% of the $13.2 billion in 1990 incremental costs; and $44.2
billion for 1991 incremental military costs.
-- In addition, contributors to responsibility-sharing have
assisted our military partners. Germany, for instance, provided
$822 million to the United Kingdom, and Japan provided $330 to the
UK. Gulf states--Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates--have provided more than $5 billion to support our
military partners.
Let me briefly describe the status of Desert Shield/Desert
Storm contributions to the United States.
--- Germany has disbursed all of its Desert Shield/Storm
commitments. Germany's strong commitment to responsibility-
sharing was demonstrated by its very rapid disbursements of
military financing in support of Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
Chancellor Kohl committed $5.5 billion for Desert Storm. Two
months later, all of that committed funding had been deposited in
the defense cooperation account.
--- Japan has disbursed all of its 1991 commitments, and
we are concluding the final accounting of 1990 disbursements.
--- Korea, in recognition of its global responsibilities, also
contributed financially to offset our costs and has disbursed $220
million of its $355- million Desert Shield/Storm commitments.
The remaining account consists of in-kind support for which
delivery is being arranged.
--- The United Arab Emirates has disbursed all of its $4-
billion 1990 and 1991 Desert Shield/Storm commitments.
--- Kuwait has met all of its 1990 Desert Shield
commitments. Kuwait also has disbursed $10 billion of its 1991
Desert Storm commitments.
--- Saudi Arabia has disbursed $12.7 billion of $16.8 billion
in Desert Shield/Storm pledges. This is the largest amount for both
disbursements and pledges of any country.
In summary, the United States has received $46 billion, or
85%, of the $54 billion in total commitments. We are confident that
we will receive all of the commitments in a timely manner. (###)