US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991
Title: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
Baker, Bessmertnykh
Source: Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister
Bessmertnykh
Description: Remarks at the conclusion of their meeting, Washington,
DC
Date: Jul 14, 19917/14/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former), United States
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
Secretary Baker: Ladies and gentlemen, we've been working
hard, continuously since Thursday afternoon. We have now reached
agreement on almost all of the outstanding issues that remained
when [Foreign] Minister Bessmertnykh arrived in Washington. In
fact, we had reached agreement on all of them, save for one.
We've reached agreement with respect to the issues of
downloading and data denial--or telemetry encryption--and on all
but one of the issues associated with the question of new types of
missiles.
The one issue upon which we have not been able to agree has
to do with the definition of throw-weight for the purpose of
determining whether a missile is a missile of a new type. This is a
very technical issue, and our technicians and experts will continue
to work on this issue. Perhaps the Minister and I might be able to
follow up ourselves when the two Presidents get together in London
next Wednesday.
Let me say, finally, while we were unable to conclude this one
final issue, we have made what I would characterize as outstanding
progress toward completion of a START [strategic arms reduction
talks] agreement. And I'd like to thank the Minister and his entire
delegation for the very constructive and workmanlike way in which
they have engaged with us over the course of this past 3 days.
Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: I would like to add to that
that it was really a tremendous effort on both sides to solve
several most difficult issues involving the START treaty. They
were the most difficult, because they were the last to decide. Our
people who have been dealing with those things couldn't do it for
months, and sometimes even years they spent on those issues.
So, I [am] really very much satisfied with the job we have
done together with the American team, headed by the Secretary of
State. I do believe we have managed to solve the most difficult
things that were left on the negotiating table. We have solved this
data denial issue. We have solved [the] downloading issue and
several other--maybe about a dozen other--issues that were
discussed here in Washington.
We have one very technical aspect of a problem to deal with,
and I hope we'll finish it soon. Unfortunately, we are both leaving
Washington--the Secretary's going to London, and I'm going to
Moscow. But in several hours, I'll be also going to London. So we
shall be in touch on that particular aspect, and I hope we shall be
dealing with this in the future days and solve them all.
It's a tremendous step forward to finalizing the START treaty.
The long journey of 9 years is coming really to the end, and I would
like to thank the Secretary and his fine team that worked with us
days and nights and who are a little bit exhausted. But everybody's
happy about the amount of the job we have accomplished, so thank
you very much.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991
Title: CFE: Foundation for Enduring European Security
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jul 11, 19917/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Arms Control, NATO
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am honored to appear
before you today to present the case for ratification of the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Your constitutionally
mandated role in the ratification process is critical to the
protection of America's interests around the world. And so I ask
you to weigh the merits of this treaty carefully with due regard for
its impact on our long-term strategic, political, and economic
interests.
I believe when you review this treaty in all its provisions, Mr.
Chairman, you will find it worthy of ratification. For as a legally
binding commitment, entered into by Europe's major military and
political powers, it can help protect America's national security for
decades to come.
The CFE Treaty marks a fundamental shift away from the Cold
War to a Europe whole and free. Not only is it an essential
foundation for the new Europe, but it will be a bulwark against a
return to Cold War dangers and animosities. CFE does not simply
alter the shape of military confrontation in Europe. It locks in more
stable and predictable security relations in Europe, fostering a
political and military environment that is essential to healing old
divisions and safeguarding the new democracies of Europe.
CFE and the New Europe
To understand the importance of this treaty, we need to step back
to the world before 1989, to the Cold War world that a ratified and
fully implemented CFE Treaty can help lock away forever. The
concerns we had then included:
-- The massive preponderance of Soviet offensive
forces, capable of attacking Western Europe;
-- The danger of short-warning blitzkrieg created by
military secrecy and closed societies in the East;
-- The political weight of Soviet occupation forces in
Central and Eastern Europe, burdening the prospects for reform; and
-- The economic costs of defending against the threat.
Our efforts to deal with these concerns through the Mutual and
Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks led to stalemate. For 15
years, even relatively modest reductions of forces in Central Europe
eluded us. Then, in December 1988, just months before the CFE
negotiations began, President Gorbachev announced what were then
viewed as dramatic unilateral force cuts. Yet these cuts would
have left the Warsaw Pact with a two-to-one advantage in key
capabilities, and these cuts were far from irreversible.
Gorbachev's announcement, however, did serve as a catalyst to
the CFE negotiations, setting a more hopeful environment for the
negotiations. NATO moved forward with proposals that would allow
everyone in Europe to be more secure, including the Soviet Union.
We and our allies were determined to reduce sharply the massive
forward deployments of Soviet forces. It was our hope that this
would diminish the Warsaw Pact's potential to launch a short-
warning attack, foster the prospects for political change in Central
and Eastern Europe, and lessen the burden of defense through
stability at lower levels of forces.
The CFE Treaty helps turn these hopes into realities. Let me
explain.
Strategically, the treaty codifies a radically new
European security environment and provides a strong foundation for
future European security negotiations. CFE requires the destruction
and limitation of key offensive weapons, locking in a new basis for
strategic stability in Europe. CFE also introduces the most
extensive and intrusive verification regime ever, locking in
increased openness and predictability.
The treaty will codify stability by:
-- Eliminating many thousands of pieces of military
equipment, primarily through destruction, subject to notification
and observation;
-- Reducing and limiting five categories of armaments--
tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and
combat aircraft--most suited to the conduct of offensive military
operations;
-- Limiting any one state from possessing more than roughly
one-third of the total treaty-limited equipment in the area, thereby
restricting the potential for any state to achieve military and
political hegemony on the continent;
-- Limiting equipment in active units and requiring that other
ground forces equipment under the overall ceilings be held in
designated storage sites; and
-- Creating an interlocking system of geographical
limitations on the size of military forces, thereby constraining
force concentrations and ensuring balances not only in Central
Europe but on the flanks as well.
The treaty will also codify predictability and openness by an
extremely intrusive verification regime. In conjunction with our
national intelligence means, this will virtually eliminate the
possibility of militarily significant clandestine buildups.
This regime includes exchanges of detailed information,
openness requirements, and several forms of on-site inspections to
complement national technical means. Military installations of all
22 signatory states in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone will be
subject to mandatory inspections, and challenge inspections will be
possible at any suspect site. In addition, the treaty provides for the
establishment of a Joint Consultative Group (JCG) to address any
questions relating to compliance or interpretation and to consider
measures to enhance the effectiveness and viability of the treaty.
Politically, the treaty helps lock in the removal of
Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. The treaty reinforces the
sovereignty of the emerging democracies. It provides that no state
party to CFE may station forces on the territory of another without
the express consent of that state. Reinforcing the bilateral accords
that call for the elimination of all stationed Soviet troops, the
treaty assures that any Soviet military deployments in Europe
without the consent of the host country would also violate the
treaty. And as President Havel [of Czechoslovakia] said in his
address to Congress last year, the CFE process not only facilitated
the removal of Soviet forces from his country but it also created
the conditions for the reduction of Czechoslovakia's own national
armed forces. In each of these ways, CFE helps to safeguard the
independence, security, and political development of the new
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.
Economically, CFE allows us to maintain deterrence at
lower levels of forces, allowing for reductions in the resources we
devote to Europe's defense. It also allows the Soviets to turn new
thinking into new policy and convert their defense resources to
civilian use by defining security through a negotiated, legally
binding regime rather than through the threat of a massive use of
force.
Above all, legally, CFE locks in these unprecedented
strategic, political, and economic facts through a legally binding
treaty, one agreed to by the major military powers in Europe. It is
true some of these facts could have come about through unilateral
steps taken by various states. But any unilateral action can be
unilaterally reversed. That's why we've worked so hard to get a
multilateral, legally binding, and effectively verifiable agreement.
Given the continuing uncertainties we see in the Soviet Union,
this treaty's contribution as a bulwark against any return to Cold
War military confrontation should weigh heavily in your
considerations. As the President has made abundantly clear, we
support perestroika and the new thinking and are actively working
toward their success. But, as I said in San Francisco almost 2 years
ago:
"Any uncertainty about the fate of reform in the Soviet Union,
however, is all the more reason, not less, for us to seize the
present opportunity. For the works of our labor--a diminished
Soviet threat and effectively verifiable agreements--can endure
even if perestroika does not. If the Soviets have already destroyed
weapons, it will be difficult, costly, and time-consuming for any
future Kremlin leadership to reverse the process and to assert
military superiority. And with agreements in place, any attempt to
break out of treaties will serve as [an] indicator of an outbreak of
old thinking. "
Those words from 2 years ago are just as true today. And that's
why we ask you to give your consent to ratification of this treaty.
Article III and Resolution of Outstanding Issues
I know many of you are concerned about resolution of the so-called
Article III question, so let me devote some time to that issue.
Shortly after the treaty was signed last November, the
Soviets asserted the right to apply treaty counting rules in a way
that was at odds with the text, the negotiating record, and the
views of all other 21 participants. Most importantly, the Soviets
claimed that equipment in units subordinate to the navy were not
accountable under various CFE limitations, despite the fact that
this equipment fell within the treaty's scope of coverage. By that, I
mean it met the definition for treaty-limited equipment and was
permanently based on land within the CFE area of application. The
President made clear that this problem would have to be rectified
before the treaty could be presented to the Senate for advice and
consent to ratification.
There were other treaty-related problems as well. During the
final months of the negotiations, it became clear that the Soviets
had moved tens of thousands of pieces of equipment east of the
Urals, where they are not subject to the treaty's provisions.
Finally, there were questions about the accuracy of Soviet data on
their holdings of equipment in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone of
coverage.
After months of bilateral US-Soviet discussions and high-
level communications, activities in the Joint Consultative Group,
and a number of bilateral exchanges between Moscow and several
other participants, we produced a package that preserves the
integrity and inviolability of the treaty.
In a separate legally binding statement, the Soviet
government committed itself to a number of undertakings to reduce
and limit naval infantry and coastal defense forces that will
effectively bring them into compliance with treaty ceilings and
other key provisions. While separate from the treaty, the preamble
of the Soviet statement explicitly notes these undertakings are
designed to promote implementation of the treaty. This statement
also affirms the comprehensive nature of the CFE counting rules
(that is, all equipment in treaty-limited categories in the zone of
application is covered by the limitations of the treaty, except as
provided for in the treaty and associated documents). This will
reduce the likelihood of similar disputes in the future. Finally, this
statement resolves another area of dispute by specifying that
armored personnel carriers in strategic rocket forces, as with
similar vehicles involved in analogous internal security functions,
do not count against treaty ceilings. The Soviets are proscribed
from increasing their holdings of such vehicles in the strategic
rocket forces and from providing any other types of treaty-limited
equipment to these forces.
In addition, the Soviets undertook several political
commitments concerning equipment east of the Urals. They will
destroy or convert by 1995 at least 14,500 pieces in an open and
observable fashion. They also pledged not to use the withdrawn
equipment to create a strategic reserve force. These assurances
satisfy our major concerns about the disposition and possible
future use of this equipment. The information to be provided by the
Soviets and the actions they have pledged to undertake will
facilitate effective monitoring by national technical means of
equipment east of the Urals.
Discrepancies between our estimates and the Soviet data
provided at signature have been narrowed considerably as a result
of further analysis and information, including data provided by the
Soviets. Remaining questions will be fully explored in the Joint
Consultative Group or through other channels. In our view, none of
these data issues warrant delay in acting on the treaty.
Conclusion
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say this: In 1989, Europe underwent
a political earthquake, an eruption of democratic values that
changed the political map of the continent. Now, we are working
with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and a
reforming Soviet Union to ensure democracy continues to flourish
from the Atlantic to the Urals.
One of the surest ways to do that is to ratify the CFE Treaty
and then move forward with its implementation. For CFE can be an
enduring pact of mutual advantage, a treaty in which all Europeans
and Americans find their interests advanced. And in doing so, CFE
can reduce the uncertainties of the future by helping make certain
that the military map of Europe reflects our fundamental
interests.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991
Title: The CFE Treaty
Date: Jul 15, 19917/15/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Subject: Arms Control, NATO
[TEXT]
The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, signed on
November 19, 1990, by the 22 members of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact, is a landmark agreement that will establish parity in major
conventional armaments between East and West in Europe from the
Atlantic to the Urals. The treaty will limit the size of Soviet
forces to about one-third of the total armaments permitted to all
the countries in Europe. It includes an unprecedented monitoring
regime, including detailed information exchange, on-site inspection,
challenge inspection, and monitoring of arms destruction.
The treaty was forwarded to the US Senate on July 9, 1991,
for its advice and consent to ratification. The treaty will enter
into force after it has been ratified by the 22 signatory countries.
East-West Limits
The treaty sets equal ceilings from the Atlantic to the Urals on key
armaments essential for conducting surprise attack and initiating
large-scale offensive operations.
Neither side may have more than:
-- 20,000 tanks
-- 20,000 artillery pieces
-- 30,000 armored combat vehicles
-- 6,800 combat aircraft, and
-- 2,000 attack helicopters.
To further limit the readiness of armed forces, the treaty
sets equal ceilings on equipment that may be with active units.
Other ground equipment must be in designated permanent storage
sites.
Each side may not exceed the following equipment levels in
active units:
-- 16,500 tanks
-- 17,000 artillery pieces, and
-- 27,300 armored combat vehicles
In connection with the CFE Treaty, the six members of the
Warsaw Pact signed a treaty in Budapest on November 3, 1990,
which divides the Warsaw Pact allocation by country. The members
of NATO have consulted through NATO mechanisms and have agreed
on national entitlements. These national entitlements may be
adjusted.
Country Ceilings
The treaty limits the proportion of armaments that can be held by
any one country in Europe to about one-third of the total for all
countries in Europe--the "sufficiency" rule. This provision
constrains the size of Soviet forces more than any other in the
treaty.
Country ceiling limits are:
-- 13,300 tanks
-- 13,700 artillery pieces
-- 20,000 armored combat vehicles
-- 5,150 combat aircraft
-- 1,500 attack helicopters
Regional Arrangements
In addition to limits on the number of armaments in each category
on each side, the treaty also includes regional limits to prevent
destabilizing force concentrations of ground equipment.
Destruction
Equipment reduced to meet the ceilings must be destroyed or, in a
limited number of cases, have its military capability destroyed,
allowing the chassis to be used for non-military purposes. After
the treaty enters into force, there will be a 4-month baseline
inspection period. After the 4-month baseline period, 25% of the
destruction must be complete by the end of 1 year, 60% by the end
of 2 years, and all destruction required by the treaty must be
complete by the end of 3 years. Parties have 5 years to convert
limited amounts of equipment.
Large amounts of equipment will be destroyed to meet the
obligations of the CFE Treaty. The Soviet Union alone will be
obliged to destroy thousands of weapons, much more equipment than
will be reduced by all the NATO countries combined. NATO will
meet its destruction obligations by destroying its oldest equipment.
In a process called "cascading," NATO members with newer
equipment, including the United States, have agreed to transfer
some of this equipment to allies with older equipment. "Cascading"
will not reduce NATO's destruction obligation. Under the cascading
system, no US equipment must be destroyed to meet CFE ceilings.
Some 2,000 pieces of US equipment will be transferred to
America's NATO allies.
Verification
The treaty includes unprecedented provisions for detailed
information exchanges, on-site inspections, challenge inspections,
and on-site monitoring of destruction. At the initiative of the
United States, NATO has established a system to cooperate in
monitoring the treaty. Parties have an unlimited right to monitor
the process of destruction.
The CFE Treaty is of unlimited duration and will enter into
force 10 days after all parties have ratified the agreement. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991
Title: Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures (CSBMs)
Date: Jul 15, 19917/15/91
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Subject: CSCE, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
Background
The process of establishing confidence-and security-building
measures (CSBMs) among the 35 states participating in the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began with
the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The act embraced a
number of confidence-building measures, including requiring
nations to notify each other of large-scale military activities that
exceed a total of 25,000 troops, and encouraging invitations to
observers from other participating states. At the follow-up
conference in Madrid (1981-83), the CSCE states agreed to convene
negotiations to expand the measures endorsed at Helsinki. These
talks, convened in Stockholm, were entitled the Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe (CDE, January 1984-September 1986).
The measures adopted at the CDE Conference were specifically
designed to reduce misunderstanding or misinterpretation of
conventional force activities in Europe. The CSBMs contained in the
Stockholm Document included 42-day prior notification of certain
military activities above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks;
exchange of annual forecasts of notifiable activities; prohibition on
exercises involving more than 75,000 troops unless forecast 2
years in advance; mandatory observation of exercises above 17,000
troops; and on-site inspection (ground and air) as a means of
verification.
At the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Conference (November 1986-
January 1989) the participating states agreed to build upon and
expand the agreements reached at the Stockholm CDE by convening,
under the Madrid Mandate, follow-on CSBMs negotiations. This
mandate restricts the scope of CSBMs to militarily significant land
activity, within the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains boundary,
or those air and sea activities which have a functional link to
activities on land.
Tabling a comprehensive package on the opening day of the
Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (March
1989-present), the West forged its proposal around three themes:
transparency about military organization; transparency about
military activities; communications and contacts. The initial
Western package included 12 measures: exchange of information on
troop organization and deployment in the zone; exchange of
information on major conventional weapons deployment programs;
random evaluation system; enhanced information in the annual
calendar; enhanced information in notification; improvements to
observation modalities including lowering of observation
thresholds; improvements to inspections; lowering the threshold for
longer notice of larger-scale activities; improved access for
accredited personnel dealing with military matters; development of
means of communications; and equal treatment of media
representatives. Additionally, the Western states proposed
convening a Military Doctrine Seminar in early 1990.
Developments in the Negotiations
Early in the negotiations, delegations agreed to establish working
groups to oversee measures related to: information and
verification, contacts and communications, observation and
notification, and annual calendar and constraining provisions. The
Neutral and Non-Aligned Group tabled a set of proposals, similar to
the Western package in its inclusion of an annual exchange of
information and a number of improvements to Stockholm.
Against the backdrop of dramatic political changes in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, interest has heightened in CSBMs as a
means to bring about greater openness and transparency in the
military sphere.
-- In December 1989, Secretary Baker called for "new
substance" in the negotiations, encouraging bold approaches that
would broaden the CSBMs negotiations.
-- In January 1990, Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and his counterparts from other CSCE states
attended the Western-proposed Military Doctrine Seminar. This
provided for 3 weeks of candid discussions among military officials
and experts on defense budgets, training, and conventional force
postures.
-- In February 1990, partly as a result of the seminar, the
West introduced two new measures: one on exchanging military
budgets and a second calling for an annual implementation meeting.
-- In spring 1990, the West tabled six additional measures:
improved military-to-military contacts, a CSBM-CFE (Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe) communication network, a mechanism to
discuss unusual military activities, cooperation on reporting
hazardous military incidents, visits to combat air bases to observe
routine activities, and an information exchange on infrastructure
upgrading.
-- In July 1990, the NATO London summit declaration called
for a meaningful package of CSBMs, which was completed by the
November 1990 CSCE summit in Paris. A central aspect of the
package is a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna that serves as a
site for a number of the CSBMs under negotiation. The impending
CSCE summit quickened the pace of negotiations; by November 19, CSCE
leaders approved a package that included nearly all the
Western-proposed measures to date.
Specifically, they agreed to: the Conflict Prevention Center to
house a military information exchange as well as a mechanism to
discuss unusual military activities, a CSBM-CFE communication
system to exchange information required under those agreements,
an air base visit measure, increased military-to-military contacts,
a means to report and discuss hazardous military incidents, an
annual implementation meeting, and improvements to existing
requirements to notify each other of military activities and invite
observers to certain exercises.
The CSBM document endorsed at the November 1990 Paris
summit, entitled the "Vienna Document 1990," is intended to
stabilize the military situation in Europe, an essential condition for
furthering the democratic changes now sweeping Central and
Eastern Europe. The CSCE "Vienna Document 1990" (along with the
Paris Charter and CFE Treaty) are three documents considered
pillars of the new Europe.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991
Title: Statement Issued After The Meeting of the Five on Arms
Transfers and Non-Proliferation
Description: Paris, France
Date: Jul 9, 19917/9/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, Europe, North America, Eurasia,
MidEast/North Africa
Country: USSR (former), United States, China, France,
United Kingdom
Subject: Security Assistance and Sales,
Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control, United Nations
[TEXT]
Paris, July 9, 1991
1. Representatives of the United States of America, the People's
Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, met in Paris on the 8th and 9th of July
to review issues related to conventional arms transfers and to the
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
They noted with concern the dangers associated with the
excessive buildup of military capabilities, and confirmed they
would not transfer conventional weapons in circumstances which
would undermine stability. They also noted the threats to peace and
stability posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical
and biological weapons, and missiles, and undertook to seek
effective measures of non-proliferation and arms control in a fair,
reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner on a global as well
as on a regional basis.
2. They had a thorough and positive exchange of views on the
basis of the arms control initiatives presented in particular by
President Bush, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Major and on
other initiatives which address these problems globally and as a
matter of urgency in the Middle East. They also agreed to support
continued work in the United Nations on an arms transfers register
to be established under the aegis of the UN Secretary General, on a
non-discriminatory basis, as a step towards increased transparency
on arms transfers and in general in military matters.
They stressed that the ultimate response to the threat of
proliferation is verifiable arms control and disarmament
agreements amongst the parties concerned. They expressed strong
support for full implementation of existing arms control regimes.
For their part, they will contribute to this objective by developing
and maintaining stringent national and, as far as possible,
harmonized controls to ensure that weapons of mass-destruction
related equipments and materials are transferred for permitted
purposes only and are not diverted.
They also strongly supported the objective of establishing a
weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. They
expressed their view that critical steps towards this goal include
full implementation of UNSC [UN Security Council] resolution 687
and adoption by countries in the region of a comprehensive program
of arms control for the region, including:
-- A freeze and ultimate elimination of ground to ground
missiles in the region;
-- Submission by all nations in the region of all of their
nuclear activities to IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]
safeguards;
-- A ban on the importation and production of nuclear weapons
usable materials;
-- Agreement by all states in the region to undertake to
becoming parties to the CW [chemical weapons] Convention as soon
as it is concluded in 1992.
3. They acknowledged that Article 51 of the UN Charter
guarantees every state the right of self-defence. That right implies
that states have also the right to acquire means with which to
defend themselves. In this respect, the transfer of conventional
weapons, conducted in a responsible manner, should contribute to
the ability of states to meet their legitimate defence, security and
national sovereignty requirements and to participate effectively in
collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose
of maintaining or restoring international peace and security.
They recognized that indiscriminate transfers of military
weapons and technology contribute to regional instability. They are
fully conscious of the special responsibilities that are incumbent
upon them to ensure that such risks be avoided, and of the special
role they have to play in promoting greater responsibility,
confidence and transparency in this field. They also recognize that
a long term solution to this problem should be found in close
consultation with recipient countries.
4. They expressed the intention that:
-- When considering under their national control procedures
conventional weapons transfers, they will observe rules of
restraint. They will develop agreed guidelines on this basis.
-- Taking into account the special situation of the Middle East
as a primary area of tension, they will develop modalities of
consultation and of information exchanges concerning arms
transfers to this region as a matter of priority.
-- A group of experts will meet in September with a view to
reaching agreement on this approach.
-- Another plenary meeting will be held in October in London.
-- Further meetings will be held periodically to review these
issues.
5. They expressed the conviction that this process of
continuing cooperation will contribute to a worldwide climate of
vigilance in this field which other countries will share. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991
Title: Key Issues at G-7 Summit
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from briefing for the media on the Group of
Seven (G-7) summit at the White House, Washington, DC
Date: Jul 10, 19917/10/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, North America, East Asia
Country: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom,
United States, Canada, USSR (former), Greece,
Turkey
Subject: Trade/Economics, International Organizations
[TEXT]
This summit takes place at what is a very important time for the
development of the global economy and world political order built
on democratic and free market values. These values are being
strengthened by the work of our very strong NATO allies, Greece and
Turkey, and the President wanted to visit those countries to
express our support to them for their continued efforts and our
thanks for their steadfastness during the recent Gulf crisis. As you
may know, it will be the first trip by an American President to
Greece or Turkey since 1958.
With respect to the summit, there are four key issues that we
face at the economic summit.
First, as I'm sure the Secretary of the Treasury [Nicholas
Brady] told you this morning, the shared objectives of all seven
countries are a sustained recovery and price stability. We also
believe that we need to pursue reforms to improve economic
efficiency and, thereby, improve the potential or capacity for
enhanced growth.
Second, we'll be continuing to push for an ambitious and wide-
ranging package for the Uruguay Round.
Third, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe
stand at what is really a critical juncture in their development of
free market economies. The seven countries will want to encourage
them to promote competitive industries and businesses that can
create jobs. That, of course, will require increasing domestic and
foreign investment. But investors and businessmen are going to
hold back if businesses don't have opportunities to sell their goods,
and that, in turn, translates into a need to stress the opening of our
markets to the exports from those countries.
Fourth, we will be discussing the evolving situation in the
Soviet Union, and we will be discussing, of course, the steps that
we can take to support economic and political reform in the Soviet
Union. Many of you are interested in this, so let me take a moment
here to go over that particular situation.
We and our G-7 partners are committed to supporting
successful economic and political reform in the Soviet Union; that
goes without saying. The real question is, how can we best support
that reform? Undoubtedly, this will be the primary focus of the
discussions at the summit with President Gorbachev, and there are
several facts that seem rather clear to us.
First, the Soviet economic crisis continues, and economic
conditions in the Soviet Union continue to deteriorate.
Second, I think we understand the gravity of the situation.
Although we are encouraged by some of the steps the Soviets have
taken recently to foster private property and foreign investment, it
is our view that much more still remains to be done. Their choices
are tough ones. We understand that. We recognize that these
choices are tough choices, but it is our view that equivocation will
really only lead to tougher choices down the road.
Three, the only plausible solution that we and our Western
colleagues see is for the Soviet leadership to say yes to real free
markets and turn what have been words into concrete deeds. That
is, the Soviet leadership needs to embrace a real market economy
with private property, with incentives, competition, laws on
contracts, a sound currency, and a price system.
Four, they need to embrace a real market economy, not for our
sake or for the sake of the West, of course, but for their sake. As
President Gorbachev has said repeatedly, it is the hard choices the
Soviets themselves make that will determine whether perestroika
succeeds or whether it will not succeed.
It is in Soviet interest--above all, the interests and well-
being of the Soviet people--for Soviet leaders to move now toward
the market. This is a country that is very rich in natural resources.
It is very rich in human potential. The Soviets need to, and, I think,
can help themselves by making a firm, irrevocable commitment to
markets.
And, finally, the Soviet leadership knows, I think, by now that
we support continued political and economic reform. I stated in a
speech in Berlin last month that we are putting together a package
of measures to support reform in an effective manner and to
demonstrate, we hope, our encouragement of their reform efforts.
That package may include, for example, special association with the
IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank to help design
and implement serious economic reforms in the Soviet Union; a
public-private project to resolve impediments to private
investment in their energy sector, investments which can earn hard
currency for them and provide an example of a successful sector
operating with property and contract rights,
and, perhaps, a mutual effort to invigorate the food distribution
sector to produce improvements for consumers through the
establishment of market incentives; work on defense conversion;
assistance to them on their efforts to convert defense industries;
enhance technical cooperation, including that in the field of
economic education; and, finally, more open trade.
I think all of us recognize that you cannot build a market
economy by throwing money at a disintegrating command economy,
but you can help a market economy develop by establishing the
political and legal conditions necessary for markets to flourish and
to attract private capital. It is our view that we can help through
technical assistance. We can help through know-how, and that's
what our package approach is intended to do. We do intend to stay
engaged to support the reform process over time, recognizing that
there are no quick fixes, and there are no simple solutions. But as
the hard work of moving from a command economy to a free market
economy proceeds, we will continue to strive to help the Soviet
reform effort succeed. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991
Title: International Narcotics Control: Andean Strategy Update
Levitsky
Source: Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for
International Narcotics Matters
Description: Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Task Force on International Narcotics Control, Washington, DC
Date: Jul 10, 19917/10/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: Colombia, Bolivia, Peru
Subject: Narcotics, OAS, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Task Force today
to discuss the progress that we have made on the Administration's
Andean Strategy, with particular focus on Colombia. The Task Force
has been very supportive of the Andean Strategy, and we appreciate
your interest and your support of our efforts to implement a sound
and effective program.
I particularly welcome this opportunity to discuss these
issues because I believe that we are reaching a crossroads in our
narcotics control efforts.
In a major initiative in 1989, the President outlined a bold
plan to address the challenge of narcotics trafficking to our well
being and to the institutions and survival of key friends and allies.
We all recognized at the time the challenges and difficulties
inherent in embarking upon this new effort. We knew it would not
be easy to uproot the entrenched trafficking organizations, to
reduce our own national demand for drugs, to assist other countries
in programs to eliminate production and trafficking, and to develop
a spirit of international commitment and cooperation. We began
with a full awareness of the obstacles to building and sustaining
domestic and international consensus on action, especially at a
time when there are pressing demands on limited resources. Yet,
the urgency of the situation and the reality of the perils of drug
trafficking to our own and others' interests brought us together to
conceive, and then approve, a strategy to address a common threat
to our nation.
That strategy could not have gone forward without the
partnership between Congress and the Administration and the
support of the public. It could not have flourished but for the
support and cooperation of our friends and allies. We have come a
long way in a short time. International cooperation and a shared
sense of the importance of the issue is further advanced than I
thought reasonable just a short while ago. We have made
considerable progress in every area of endeavor, and we can
reasonably expect even greater progress.
But I also see the potential for the effort to unravel because
of a steady erosion of funding, of consensus, and of the support it
needs to allow the program sufficient flexibility and time. I have
watched with regret, for example, recent media attention focusing
on [Colombian drug lord Pablo] Escobar's prison environment rather
than on the fact that he is in prison.
Concentrating on Escobar's terms of surrender and his prison
amenities does not ensure his conviction but tends to trivialize the
fact of his surrender and the sacrifice that Colombia has made in
bringing him and others to the bar. President Gaviria has stated
that Escobar will receive "the harshest sentence possible." We
must be prepared to move ahead collectively and help Colombia
strengthen its judicial system so that it can deal with the Pablo
Escobars.
We want to see justice done. We want to see the Colombian
legal system work, to demonstrate to the world and to Colombia
that years of violence and intimidation must now yield to law and
due process. That will take time and patience.
Our plan calls for a 5-year undertaking. It is based on a
program to reinvigorate domestic and international efforts to deal
comprehensively with the trafficking of cocaine. It encompasses
building close cooperation with the key Andean states as well as
creating more effective means within our own system to respond to
the challenge. It is a multi-year effort because we recognize that
the scope and scale of the problem will not yield to short-lived or
simplistic solutions. Sustaining a long-term effort, however, is not
easy. If, as we believe, we are beginning to see real signs of
progress in this multi-year effort, we must enhance our support;
otherwise, we will progressively undermine our ability to carry the
program forward.
I would like to turn to a brief review of the essential features
of our effort and to cover some of the signs that I believe indicate
that we are on the right track.
The Andes
Our program in the Andes demonstrates what can be done in a
relatively brief period, despite continuing problems with political
will, corruption, and human rights. We have developed an integrated
effort, in conjunction with the three Andean countries, that
combines economic, law enforcement, and military assistance in a
phased plan that takes into consideration the range of complexities
inherent in dealing with the drug issue. These programs are now in
varying stages of implementation.
The central components of our program seek the commitment
of the host governments and the enhancement of their legal
structures and enforcement capabilities in order to disrupt and
dismantle trafficking organizations. We are also working with
these governments to improve their economic performance to offset
the adverse effects of eliminating coca or cocaine production.
Creating the necessary political will to deal with narcotics
corruption and other impediments is a vital component of the
strategy. Additionally, we are seeking to ensure greater respect for
human rights by these governments.
Although we are only in the second year of a multi-year
effort, there have been some notable achievements. Our programs
and the cooperation and commitment of these governments--often
in the face of brutally violent trafficker reactions--have resulted
in increased seizures, arrests, surrenders, confiscation of assets,
and signs of disarray within some of the trafficking organizations.
Their costs of doing business have definitely risen, and their
operations have been harassed and hampered.
With only the first year's funding and training actually on the
ground and FY 1991 funds in the pipeline, already we are starting to
see an increased drumbeat of major operations going off one after
another in Colombia and Bolivia.
Vigorous local law enforcement efforts, crop eradication
projects, and US support for host country interdiction operations
helped to disrupt the cartels' activities, which in turn lowered leaf
prices and undermined the purchasing networks in Bolivia, where
voluntary eradication eliminated 8,000 hectares of coca plants in
1990 alone. New cultivation in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the
principal coca growing area in Peru, has stabilized. Marijuana
cultivation in Colombia has been virtually eliminated.
Our major focus is law enforcement. We have helped to
improve counter-narcotics cooperation with the police in all three
countries. INM funding is a major support for the anti-drug police
in all three countries, with additional technical assistance provided
by DEA [US Drug Enforcement Agency], and training and equipment
provided also through military assistance. A majority of our
military assistance goes to support local enforcement efforts in
the three countries, either through direct supplies, equipment, and
training to police units, or through indirect support to military
units that aid the police in their operations.
In Colombia the military has supported the police through air
transport, as well as through their own direct anti-narcotics
operations. Bolivian air force and navy units provide dedicated
transport to police units on missions. In Peru, the military will be
responsible for security for police units on operations and for
alternative development efforts in the conflictive Upper Huallaga
Valley. In addition, in remote regions or dangerous conditions, some
military units are assigned counter-narcotics missions in Bolivia.
We recently concluded an umbrella agreement with Peru to
shape our cooperative effort there, and we see a constructive, if
limited, role for the military in that program. The Peruvian air
force has intercepted and forced down several trafficker aircraft in
the Upper Huallaga Valley and along the borders, leading to the
arrests of the passengers and modest seizures of cash and coca
paste. The number of daylight trafficker flights has diminished
sharply, and we understand the narco-pilots are asking for higher
payments.
We know that the impact of these efforts in all three
countries has a ripple effect which disrupts trafficking operations
and raises the costs of their business. Moreover, our efforts have
not been limited to interdiction.
We have also worked to develop economic assistance programs
linked to counter-narcotics efforts. These programs include
macroeconomic measures and more focused efforts to give those
people involved in coca production a viable economic alternative.
We are convinced that in certain situations, such as the one
currently faced by Peru, a comprehensive economic assistance
program linked to narcotics cooperation is the only way to stabilize
the country and permanently displace narcotics in the Peruvian
underground economy.
Politically, the Andean governments have fulfilled many of the
expectations of the Cartagena Declaration. In addition to
agreements signed at Cartagena, the Andean states have undertaken
a number of activities:
-- All three have adopted OAS model legislation on precursor
chemicals.
-- Bolivia has ratified the 1988 UN convention, signed
agreements on tax information exchange, essential chemicals,
public awareness, and weapons control.
-- Peru has signed agreements on tax information exchange,
essential chemicals, public awareness, and has exchanged notes
with the US on extradition.
-- Colombia has signed agreements on asset sharing and
essential chemicals with the US.
Several areas, however, pose problems to implementing an
effective narcotics control program in the Andean region.
Although we believe that President Fujimori of Peru has the
necessary political will to implement an effective counter-
narcotics program, his efforts are hampered by a collapsed
economy, anarchy, wanton terrorism, and widespread corruption.
In Bolivia, government corruption continues to compromise
counter-narcotics operations and slow down narcotics-related
redevelopment efforts.
While Colombia has implemented the most effective counter-
narcotics effort over the last 2 years, we are entering a new phase
where Colombia's judicial and democratic institutions will be
severely tested by surrendering drug lords such as Pablo Escobar.
The [Colombian] constituent assembly has also banned extradition,
and there may be some indications that major trafficking figures,
like the Ochoas, have kept trafficking organizations intact despite
their surrender. I will be addressing the Escobar issue later in my
testimony.
We are continuing our efforts to have a positive influence in
these areas, keeping in mind that we are working on an issue that
ultimately affects fragile social, economic, and political
institutions of sovereign countries. Nevertheless, we are conscious
of the necessity to press the narcotics issue in order to succeed
over the long term:
1. We are working with law enforcement agencies and the
Andean militaries to increase substantially the pace of laboratory
destruction and to dismantle trafficking organizations. Our goal in
this area is to improve performance of host country operations to a
point that significantly disrupts cocaine traffic and networks. We
continue to work toward training and equipping law enforcement
personnel so that they are prepared to take on sophisticated
trafficker operations. Our model for what we wish to accomplish
has been amply demonstrated by the Colombia program.
2. We are developing new international mechanisms to
address money laundering and the flow of precursor and essential
chemicals. We have solidified our ties in this area with the
Europeans through the Dublin Group [which includes the EC member
states, the European Commission, Japan, Australia, Sweden, Canada,
and the United States], which addresses the Andean narcotics
problem and is aimed at denying the traffickers essential chemicals
and any further inroads into the relatively small European narcotics
market. The Andean states also participate actively in the
constructive work of the multilateral Chemical Action Task Force,
along with delegations from Europe, North America, and Asia.
3. We are developing cooperative programs to deal with
violations of human rights and corruption. All three countries
require a presidential determination under the 1990 INCA
[international narcotics control act]. Colombia and Bolivia received
these determinations earlier in the year. We withheld judgment on
Peru at the time. Peru is our greatest concern in all three of the
areas above, and we are closely engaged with the Fujimori
Administration in supporting its efforts to turn around a situation
which has existed for several Peruvian administrations.
4. Currently, we are working closely with our missions in
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to develop approaches to address
specific problem areas such as judicial reform, public diplomacy,
eradication efforts, control of precursor chemicals, money
laundering, and economic support.
The goal, based on a continuing assessment of the
performance of the Andean states, is to carry forward the progress
we have made and address the shortcomings we have noted.
Knowing that we must sustain a vigorous program, we are
determined to pursue those efforts that have produced results,
reassess those that have not, and seek new approaches that will
enhance our chances of success.
The Administration's policy is to provide legitimate
governments with resources needed to establish control over areas
currently controlled or heavily influenced by drug traffickers and
narco-financed insurgent groups. Our goal is to help create a
favorable environment for effective government-sponsored
alternative development and interdiction programs.
The US Military Role
Before moving on to country-specific summaries, let me clarify a
point that comes up repeatedly in the press here and in the Andes.
There has been considerable comment recently about the possibility
or even the intention of militarizing the drug war, of
indiscriminately employing US forces in Latin America, or of
supporting local militaries at the expense of civilian institutions.
Let me be clear: it is not our policy to fight someone else's drug
fight. We never have--nor will we ever--force military assistance
on any of the drug producing countries. Nor do we have any intention
of sending US military forces into the Andean countries to fight the
drug war.
The assistance we do provide, at the request of host
governments, is not designed to create large new forces. Rather,
we aim to create the specialized skills and units (both law
enforcement and military) required to conduct or support
meaningful counter-narcotics operations. We do not do this to
engage in counterinsurgency or to introduce US forces into the
region by the back door. Our objective is to assist local
governments and narcotics law enforcement units to cope with
their problems, to emphasize the need to respect human rights, and
to equip and train them to address the increasingly complex nature
of the drug problem. This is a necessity forced upon us and our
allies by the resources available to the traffickers and their
insurgent auxiliaries as a result of their willingness to use
whatever force is needed to achieve their goals.
Colombia
The Government of Colombia continues its efforts against
traffickers and has seriously disrupted the cocaine-processing
industry. Colombian Government interdiction operations resulted in
seizures of over 53 mt of cocaine, the arrest of 7,000 suspected
traffickers, and the destruction of over 200 cocaine processing labs
in 1990.
While most counter-narcotics operations were spearheaded by
the national police, the Colombian military also became involved in
the war on drugs in 1990, accounting for a 19-ton seizure during
Operation Petrolera. Since September 1989, the Colombian
Government has captured or killed more than 50 major traffickers,
extraditing 24 of them to the United States. So far in 1991, the
Colombian Government has seized over 53 metric tons [mt] of
cocaine and dismantled several major narco-terrorist cells in the
employ of the Medellin Cartel. The national police has also
destroyed 40 major cocaine producing laboratories and 58
clandestine airstrips while making 1,500 drug-related arrests. It
is estimated that these targets were equally divided between the
two major trafficking cartels.
Despite the surrounding controversy, the entire leadership of
the Medellin Cartel is behind bars. Many of the complex, multi-
service, heli-borne operations against trafficking and air resources
were facilitated by US assistance which helped sustain Colombian
Government operational efforts and kept the focus on key targets.
Colombia's progress in attacking these organizations exceeds
what we anticipated 2 years ago. In the course of these anti-
narcotics operations, the Colombians have endured unrelenting
pressure from drug traffickers and insurgent groups that has
produced thousands of casualties as the result of indiscriminate
bombings and assassinations, as well as targeted attacks on public
officials, the police, and the military. In 1990, the Colombian
national police suffered 420 casualties at the hands of traffickers,
and, thus far in 1991, just the anti-narcotics unit of the National
Police has lost more than 30 men. Nevertheless, as noted above, the
government continues its vigorous efforts.
Moreover, the government, despite the narco-generated
violence and provocation, also continues to take effective action to
curb official human rights abuses, including the creation of an
aggressive watchdog agency and the dismissal of human rights
abusers in the armed forces and police. Special courts to handle
terrorism have been set up which can dispense justice more
effectively and thereby deter any retaliatory abuses by government
forces. We should not lose sight of the fact, however, that the
traffickers resort to extreme violence to achieve their goals,
ignoring all human rights standards.
They also resort to vigorous disinformation campaigns against
the government which are designed to discredit legitimate
governmental institutions. False claims of abuse, which must be
investigated, tie up resources, confuse the issue, and help to
demoralize the police.
While Colombian forces have inflicted significant damage on
the Medellin Cartel, the Cali Cartel as well as an emerging new
cartel on the North Coast have not yet been targeted as
aggressively. We continue to press the Colombians on this issue and
are convinced that the cartels cannot be broken unless enforcement
pressure is exerted on all of them at once.
At this time, I would like to address the issue of the
surrender of Pablo Escobar and other major traffickers under
President Gaviria's plea bargaining decree. The Government of
President Cesar Gaviria used a risky two-track policy to deal with
the power of the trafficking cartels and trafficker manipulation of
the emotional extradition issue. By applying strong police pressure
against traffickers, Gaviria induced Escobar and other major
traffickers to surrender under this
plea bargaining decree which guarantees reduced sentences and no
extradition to the United States. The media coverage surrounding
Escobar's surrender has focused on the cosmetic rather than on the
essential.
The reality of Escobar's physical surroundings in jail, which
has been exaggerated, is not the central issue.
What is of fundamental importance is the fact that Escobar is in
jail. President Gaviria's plea bargaining process, not foreign to our
own system, is not a program to let Escobar and other traffickers
off. We should now give the Colombian Government the opportunity
to let Gaviria's plan to strengthen the Colombian judiciary and
prosecute Escobar and others in Colombia a chance to work. We
should remember that it has been Colombia that has borne the
principal burden of drug-related violence. We must also keep in
mind that 18 months ago Escobar and his cartel were directly
attacking government institutions and were a direct threat to
Colombian democracy itself. Today, most of those traffickers are
dead or behind bars.
At the same time, we must do everything possible to ensure
that justice is done. President Gaviria has pledged that his
government will do everything possible to convict Escobar of his
crimes and issue the harshest punishment possible. He has also
promised that trafficking from jail cells by Escobar, the Ochoas or
anyone else will not be tolerated. Trafficking from jail will result
in traffickers losing all benefits obtained by surrendering under
plea bargaining decrees.
For President Gaviria's plan to succeed and for justice to be
served, we must assist the Colombian Government [to] strengthen
the judiciary so that traffickers can be successfully prosecuted and
incarcerated in Colombia. For that reason, the US Agency for
International Development plans to authorize $36 million of NSD
[National Security Directive]-18 economic support funds to support
a multi-year comprehensive justice sector support project designed
to strengthen the Colombian judicial system. The goal of the
project is to improve the administration, operation, and
effectiveness of the Colombian judicial system. Achievement of
this goal will improve the capability of the Government of Colombia
to bring narco-traffickers and narco-terrorists to justice and
strengthen fundamental democratic institutions in Colombia.
A key portion of the administration of justice program will be
the judicial protection program designed to protect judges involved
in narcotics cases from intimidation. This program is already
underway and has distributed armored cars and bulletproof vests to
special order court judges involved in narcotics cases. Planning is
currently underway to provide training and, although some major
traffickers have surrendered, it is too early to determine whether
the judicial system will be strong enough to withstand trafficker
intimidation and corruption. However, through our assistance to
strengthen the judicial system and an agreement on evidence
sharing that is already in force, the Colombian Government will
stand a far better chance of succeeding.
Concerning human rights, President Gaviria has made frequent
public statements that his administration will not tolerate human
rights abuses by government officials, and, in 1990, Colombia's
Procuraduria (an independent government watchdog agency) stepped
up enforcement through a series of aggressive investigations into
human rights violations committed by security forces personnel.
The investigations have resulted in the dismissals of a number of
civilian officials and military officers and enlisted men. On their
own initiative, the military and police are also dismissing some
human rights violators.
President Gaviria has made it clear he is committed to making
his new system work and remains committed to the war on drugs.
We remain concerned, however, that the trafficker cartels arrayed
against the Colombian Government continue to wield considerable
influence in blunting the rule of law in Colombia. It is in our
interest to support the Colombian Government's efforts to
strengthen its judicial system while increasing the tempo of
enforcement activities.
Bolivia
We have made considerable progress in our relationship with
Bolivia. The overall operational tempo is up, cooperation is
extensive, and we have had a number of significant successes. The
Government of Bolivia has accepted the principle of performance-
based US assistance and continues to cooperate on counter-
narcotics efforts. The cooperation we receive, however, is
considerably below the potential of the Bolivian Government and is
an indication that corruption continues to be a critical factor in
holding back the counter-narcotics program. Nevertheless, we have
made significant progress in Bolivia in a very short time.
Major law enforcement achievements in 1990 included:
-- Dismantling of the notorious "Meco" Dominguez trafficking
network, resulting in the arrest of Dominguez and his closest
associates;
-- Destruction of processing laboratories; and
-- Seizure of important records, assets, real estate, and
commercial enterprises.
More recently, we have assisted the Bolivian authorities in a
number of operations aimed at disrupting trafficker activity in the
region. These have resulted in numerous arrests and seizures of
aircraft and of drugs. These types of major endeavors, which are
ongoing, underscore the progress we have made in improving local
capabilities and in working with police, military, and civilian
authorities.
The Government of Bolivia, in a recent counter-narcotics law
enforcement operation against the largest syndicate of trafficker
organizations in country, regained control over the trafficker town
of Santa Ana De Yacuma, a frontier town in the cocaine processing
and transshipment region of the Beni Department. The operation
included an impressive coordinated raid by some 600 Bolivian rural
narcotics police, air force, navy, army, and national police. Results
of the operation include the seizure of 39 aircraft and the arrest of
Renato Roca Suarez, the subject of outstanding indictments in the
United States. He is the brother of Jorge Roca Suarez, a major
Bolivian trafficker arrested in California [in] September 1990.
There were no casualties.
Recognition at the highest levels of the Bolivian Government
that corruption poses a serious impediment to all US assistance
programs was precipitated by the surprise appointment of an
individual (Rico Toro) with known narcotics connections (and other
dubious activities) to head the Special Force for the Fight Against
Narcotics Trafficking--the principal Bolivian Government counter-
narcotics organization. President Paz Zamora accepted the
resignation of Rico Toro, as well as [of] the minister of interior and
the chief of the national police. Additionally, the Bolivian
Government is cooperating in removing other corrupt law
enforcement officials.
Although still only a fledging effort, the Bolivian navy's
Riverine Task Force has improved operational effectiveness by
stepping up patrols to deny uncontested use of the rivers for
movement of precursor chemicals and cocaine products. The
Government of Bolivia agreed to include its army in support of the
counter-narcotics effort. Counter-narcotics rural mobile patrol
units of the national police demonstrated increasing willingness to
initiate raids and operations.
Bolivian forces, assisted by US Government agencies, have
improved short-term operations against drug trafficking and
production. Sustained enforcement efforts and overproduction
depressed coca leaf prices, encouraging voluntary eradication. As a
result, the Government of Bolivia achieved in 1990 a net reduction
in coca cultivation by eradicating 8,087 hectares of the crop.
The Government of Bolivia continues to face major challenges
in its counter-narcotics campaign. While the government has
increased law enforcement efforts, trafficking organizations have
kept pace by diversifying their marketing of refined cocaine and by
demonstrating a greater willingness to use violence to resist law
enforcement. Widespread corruption, compounded by the Bolivian
Government's weakness in implementing policy, further combined to
hamper the effectiveness of counter-narcotics programs in 1990.
Peru
Peru presents the most difficult situation because of the
complexity of its problems. The performance is not always what
we would like to see. Even so, the Fujimori Administration has
publicly committed itself to fight narcotics traffickers and their
insurgent allies, and to adhere to international human rights
standards. But, as a new government with a wide range of serious
internal problems, it has moved slowly and sometimes uncertainly
toward developing a comprehensive strategy. There is, however,
significant support within the government and in the public for
developing a workable counter-narcotics program in cooperation
with the United States.
In late 1990 and early 1991, these developments produced
some results. The Peruvian air force, for example, has based
interceptors at the police counter-narcotics base at Santa Lucia and
forced down several trafficker aircraft. In two of these aircraft,
authorities arrested five suspected traffickers and seized 220 kg of
cocaine. Further, the military zone commander in the Upper
Huallaga Valley [UHV] agreed to cooperate with police counter-
narcotics activities and rescinded the "prior notice" requirement
which had previously resulted in leaks of information from Peruvian
officials to traffickers. The Peruvian army has also assigned
security squads to the counter-narcotics police base at Santa Lucia,
further demonstrating a strengthened commitment.
There has been a noticeable movement of trafficking
activities away from these counter-narcotics efforts to the
northern part of the UHV, as well as a shift to night-time, dusk, and
dawn flights to evade enforcement efforts. Efforts which raise the
costs of doing business and disrupt trafficking networks are the
initial steps in dismantling the narcotics business. Even in Peru,
where we have yet to deliver any of the major new elements of the
enhanced effort, we have seen increased activity and commitment.
President Fujimori has been closely engaged in bilateral
discussions regarding a comprehensive strategy which addresses all
aspects of the Peruvian counter-narcotics effort. The plans would
not only include enforcement operations, but also the restructuring
of land titling regulations and provision of credit to coca farmers
to help them develop licit crops. The strategy and plans for Peru
are based not only on the Cartagena Declaration, but also upon the
recently concluded umbrella agreement, which clearly discusses the
issues and understandings upon which the United States and the
Government of Peru will implement the comprehensive counter-
narcotics program. The program will be detailed in three annexes
covering law enforcement, military, and economic assistance. Thus
far, we have concluded only the law enforcement annex with the
Peruvian Government.
Despite productive discussions, the Fujimori Administration
is up against endemic corruption, a legacy of human rights abuses,
and formidable economic, social, and political problems. Military
forces in the Andean emergency zones frequently resort to
extrajudicial violence while trying to defend the Peruvian
Government from two of the world's most violent terrorist groups
as well as narco-terrorists. The government has publicly stated its
determination to respect human rights and is developing
initiatives--such as a human rights commission--to that end. We
are aware that Peru must receive a presidential determination
under the 1990 INCA in order to receive US assistance in FY 1991.
To date, we have not made this determination.
Trade
The United States supports efforts by drug producer and transit
countries to export products that provide a secure base for
employment and foreign exchange earnings as an alternative to drug
production and trafficking. The long-term aim is to develop
sustainable economic growth based on legitimate trade. The United
States is pursuing a range of hemispheric trade programs, including
the proposed Andean Trade Preference Act [ATPA] and the Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative [EAI].
The recently introduced ATPA will provide duty-free access
to the US market for a broad range of imports from the Andean
region for 10 years. Duty-free treatment should help to provide the
Andean countries the opportunity to develop a basis for expanded
trade and reduce their dependence on the illegal drug economy. In
addition, the Administration is pursuing implementation of the EAI
to improve economic growth, increase trade, and promote
investment in Latin America. Bilateral framework agreements have
already been signed with 11 Latin American countries, including
Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. Besides the ATPA, the two
"rounds" of Andean trade initiatives have also offered the Andean
countries technical assistance to help improve trade performance,
accelerated negotiations within the Uruguay Round [of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--GATT], improved access under our
Generalized System of Preferences, and expanded agricultural
development assistance and technical cooperation. After
consultations with our major trading partners, they, too, have taken
steps to help the Andean countries improve their trade performance.
Conclusion
The Andean Strategy is having an effect. For the first time in a
decade, there was a halt in the rise of coca cultivation. Total coca
cultivation, which had been increasing annually by as much as 10 to
20%, levelled off; in Bolivia and Colombia, it declined. The level of
police enforcement activities and operations has grown; seizures
are up significantly; and, while I do not want to stress a "body
count" mentality, what these reflect is better intelligence, greater
coordination, and enhanced cooperation, a coming together of local
effort and US support in more effective ways.
To a considerable degree, this increased tempo and the
supportive environment that has made it possible are a direct result
of US willingness to increase its levels of support as a sign of its
engagement and commitment. To retreat from that now, to signal to
our friends and allies, who have undertaken significant actions, that
we will not carry through on our commitments is likely to have a
detrimental, long-term effect on our counter-narcotics program.
What we are all interested in is performance and results. I believe
that we are getting those, but they are only interim signs. It is too
soon to draw the conclusion either that we have won or that we
have lost. Genius is one part inspiration and nine parts
perseverance. We have had the inspiration. It is now time to
persevere.
There is no question that serious problems with corruption,
ineffectiveness of law enforcement efforts, human rights abuses,
and lack of political will to attack the drug trade remain as
obstacles to success in the immediate future. The traffickers
continue to be strong and rich and able to adapt to changing
circumstances. To achieve further success, we must continue to
work cooperatively at home and with our friends overseas. We must
continue our commitment and sustain our resolve. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991
Title: International Narcotics Control
Date: Jul 15, 19917/15/91
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Country: Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina, Paraguay,
Chile, Peru, Bolivia
Subject: Narcotics
[TEXT]
International cooperation to stop narcotics production and
trafficking is a central element of US foreign policy. Few foreign
policy concerns have as direct a domestic impact as international
narcotics. Ninety-five percent of the illicit narcotics consumed in
the US comes from other countries. It is essential, therefore, to
gain international cooperation to reduce drug supplies while the US
works to reduce demand at home. As Secretary Baker stated in
November 1989, "...there is no foreign policy issue short of war or
peace which has a more direct bearing on the well-being of the
American people."
US Policy
In January 1990, President Bush issued a National Drug Control
Strategy that calls for increased international cooperation against
drug production, trafficking, and abuse. A critical part of the
strategy is increased emphasis on cooperative efforts with three
Andean nations (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia) to dismantle cocaine
trafficking organizations and disrupt cocaine processing and
trafficking as close to the source as possible. In FY 1991, $500
million in economic, military, and law enforcement assistance is
being provided to the three nations to strengthen their ability to
meet these objectives. Additional economic aid will be available to
these countries in FY 1991 if they use current resources effectively
and establish sound
economic policies. The State Department's Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters, which has a budget of $150
million, provides $55 million to the Andean strategy funding. It has
counter-narcotics programs in South and Central America, Mexico,
the Caribbean, and Southeast and Southwest Asia.
In February 1990, President Bush met with the presidents of
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia at the Andean summit in Cartagena,
Colombia. The four presidents agreed to work closely in a number
of critical counter-narcotics areas, including the control of
precursor chemicals, drug education, exchange of tax information,
and a broadened role for each country's military in fighting
narcotics.
In addition, the US is undertaking cooperative efforts with
concerned governments in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Soviet Union.
There is a growing consensus that the solution to the world's drug
problem must be global in scope, addressing all elements of the
grower-to-user chain.
Role of Developed Nations
Developed nations play a key role in global efforts to fight
narcotics production and trafficking. The President's drug control
strategy calls on European nations, Canada, Japan, and Australia to
take greater steps to help Andean, Caribbean, and Asian countries
reduce drug supply and demand. An informal consultative
mechanism, the Dublin Group, has been established for this purpose.
Trafficking organizations are seeking new markets for cocaine and
heroin. Developed nations, recognizing the threat, are beginning to
respond.
Progress in International Narcotics Control
Government leaders are focusing on the international narcotics
threat and on positive solutions. In February 1990, a UN special
session was devoted entirely to the narcotics issue. In April 1990,
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sponsored a joint UN-UK
ministerial conference on cocaine and demand reduction. Leaders
of the world's seven major industrialized countries meeting at
economic summits in 1989 and 1990 called for the formation of a
financial action task force to counter the laundering of money
generated by the sale of illicit narcotics and a chemical action task
force to control the export of precursor and essential chemicals
used to produce the illicit narcotics. Both task forces have
advanced their purposes.
Recent Colombian counter-narcotics operations have resulted
in the seizure of more than 50 metric tons (mt) of cocaine
throughout Colombia, and the confiscation of numerous properties
and other assets belonging to drug "kingpins." Coca prices in Bolivia
have dropped because of increased anti-drug pressure in Colombia
and Bolivia, encouraging many coca farmers to switch to legitimate
crops. Working with the US, the government of Peru constructed a
secure police base in the upper Huallaga Valley to house Peruvian
and US enforcement personnel.
Progress has occurred in other countries as well. Mexico
seized 48.5 mt of cocaine in 1990 and drug trafficking has
diminished in and around The Bahamas. Ecuador has been
successful in eliminating coca production.
Nevertheless, much remains to be done. The estimated
production of illicit narcotics supplies increased slightly in 1990.
Since 1985, Burma's opium crop has doubled as the Burmese have
turned their attention away from narcotics control. Worldwide,
coca production leveled off last year. (###)
National Drug Control Strategy
President Bush's National Drug Control Strategy calls for:
Increased economic, military, and law enforcement assistance
to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia;
Expanded US-Mexican cooperation in drug enforcement, "money
laundering" disruption, and demand reduction programs;
Continued US support for law enforcement and judicial
programs in South American producer and transit countries,
including Ecuador, Venezuela, Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile;
Continued law enforcement and intelligence programs with
Central American and Caribbean nations;
Development of an international strategy focused on opium and
heroin;
Broadened domestic and foreign efforts to counter international
money laundering activities;
Expanded efforts to reduce the illegal manufacture and shipment
of chemicals essential to illicit drug production;
Promotion of international law enforcement cooperation through
mutual legal assistance treaties and the pursuit of anti-drug
initiatives at international forums; and
Use of economic assistance to foster crop substitution and
developmental programs.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991
Title: Focus on Central and Eastern Europe: Summary of Initiatives
Date: Jul 15, 19917/15/91
Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Hungary, Romania, Poland
Subject: Trade/Economics, Media/Telecommunications
[TEXT]
Executive Management Programs
In a follow-up to a White House Conference on Management Training
and Market Economics Education in Central and Eastern Europe held
last February, the deans of several US business schools offered
scholarships for their intensive executive management programs.
The US Information Agency (USIA) has been working with the
universities to place Central and East European managers in the
programs. The first three participants, two Poles and a Yugoslav,
were scheduled to go to Cornell University the week of June 16 to
begin a 5-week program. USIA is paying for the participants'
international travel; the universities are paying for the rest of the
expenses.
Grants
USIA has approved the following grants:
-- To the Soros Foundation to support a program that will put
100 US certified teachers in secondary and post-secondary schools
in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. During
their 10-month stays, in addition to teaching students, they also
will offer seminars for teachers of English and will assist in
curriculum development.
-- To Harvard University/World Teach to assist in expanding
a pilot program of providing English teachers to work with Polish
secondary schools and language-teaching colleges for the academic
year of 1991-92. The program is expected to reach 2,500 students.
-- To F.H. LaGuardia Community College/City University of
New York to improve the capacity of Czechoslovak faculty to teach
English as a foreign language.
-- To the American Bar Association to provide in-depth
exposure for Central and East European law school deans to the
operations of US law schools.
For more information about USIA grants, call Grants
Coordinator Judy Siegel at (202)619-5601.
Hungary
A 2-day conference on "Relations Between the Press and
Government in a Democracy" was held in Budapest May 10-11. Co-
sponsored by USIA, the Hungarian Journalists' Association, and the
International Media Fund, the conference attracted an audience of
political decision makers, journalists, and academics. During the
conference, International Media Fund representatives Leonard Marks
and Marvin Stone announced plans to set up an American Journalism
Center in Budapest, which is to become the nucleus of a university-
level journalism department.
Poland
Non-governmental Organizations.
The Poles have
created a foundation forum of 80 non-governmental organizations in
Poland. This private initiative follows a trip to the United States
by Poles sponsored by USIA. The visitors were shown non-profit
organizations in the United States and took home many ideas and
suggestions offered by the American organizations.
Economics Summer School
. Largely as a result of
the February 27 White House conference mentioned above, US
foundations have donated money to pay for a 5-week summer-school
program in economics to be held in the Polish city of Olsztyn, near
Warsaw. More than $150,000 has been donated so far. The 70
faculty-member participants will be drawn from Polish and other
Central and East European universities and will be taught by an
international staff of European, Polish, and US professors.
Graduates of the 5-week course will be eligible for scholarships for
a 1-year program at the Central European University in Prague,
Czechoslovakia.
Business Management Seminar.
Working with
Poland's National Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, and the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce, USIA
held a business management seminar for entrepreneurs May 20-25
in Warsaw. The seminar was conducted by specialists from
Syracuse University's Leavey School of Business Administration,
and the themes were financial management and "How to Grow a
Business."
Romania
Romanian Television (RTV)
recently aired a six-
part series based on a RTV-USIA/TV cooperative project of last
fall. The series was broadcast on six successive Sunday afternoons
in April and May. Each part examined a different aspect of the US
economy, including management techniques, small business
development strategies, franchising, agriculture, and technological
innovation. The result is a much-needed primer for Romanians
on how a market economy actually works. (###)