US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991


Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

Baker, Bessmertnykh Source: Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh Description: Remarks at the conclusion of their meeting, Washington, DC Date: Jul 14, 19917/14/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] Secretary Baker: Ladies and gentlemen, we've been working hard, continuously since Thursday afternoon. We have now reached agreement on almost all of the outstanding issues that remained when [Foreign] Minister Bessmertnykh arrived in Washington. In fact, we had reached agreement on all of them, save for one. We've reached agreement with respect to the issues of downloading and data denial--or telemetry encryption--and on all but one of the issues associated with the question of new types of missiles. The one issue upon which we have not been able to agree has to do with the definition of throw-weight for the purpose of determining whether a missile is a missile of a new type. This is a very technical issue, and our technicians and experts will continue to work on this issue. Perhaps the Minister and I might be able to follow up ourselves when the two Presidents get together in London next Wednesday. Let me say, finally, while we were unable to conclude this one final issue, we have made what I would characterize as outstanding progress toward completion of a START [strategic arms reduction talks] agreement. And I'd like to thank the Minister and his entire delegation for the very constructive and workmanlike way in which they have engaged with us over the course of this past 3 days. Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: I would like to add to that that it was really a tremendous effort on both sides to solve several most difficult issues involving the START treaty. They were the most difficult, because they were the last to decide. Our people who have been dealing with those things couldn't do it for months, and sometimes even years they spent on those issues. So, I [am] really very much satisfied with the job we have done together with the American team, headed by the Secretary of State. I do believe we have managed to solve the most difficult things that were left on the negotiating table. We have solved this data denial issue. We have solved [the] downloading issue and several other--maybe about a dozen other--issues that were discussed here in Washington. We have one very technical aspect of a problem to deal with, and I hope we'll finish it soon. Unfortunately, we are both leaving Washington--the Secretary's going to London, and I'm going to Moscow. But in several hours, I'll be also going to London. So we shall be in touch on that particular aspect, and I hope we shall be dealing with this in the future days and solve them all. It's a tremendous step forward to finalizing the START treaty. The long journey of 9 years is coming really to the end, and I would like to thank the Secretary and his fine team that worked with us days and nights and who are a little bit exhausted. But everybody's happy about the amount of the job we have accomplished, so thank you very much.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991 Title:

CFE: Foundation for Enduring European Security

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jul 11, 19917/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe Country: USSR (former) Subject: Arms Control, NATO [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am honored to appear before you today to present the case for ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Your constitutionally mandated role in the ratification process is critical to the protection of America's interests around the world. And so I ask you to weigh the merits of this treaty carefully with due regard for its impact on our long-term strategic, political, and economic interests. I believe when you review this treaty in all its provisions, Mr. Chairman, you will find it worthy of ratification. For as a legally binding commitment, entered into by Europe's major military and political powers, it can help protect America's national security for decades to come. The CFE Treaty marks a fundamental shift away from the Cold War to a Europe whole and free. Not only is it an essential foundation for the new Europe, but it will be a bulwark against a return to Cold War dangers and animosities. CFE does not simply alter the shape of military confrontation in Europe. It locks in more stable and predictable security relations in Europe, fostering a political and military environment that is essential to healing old divisions and safeguarding the new democracies of Europe.
CFE and the New Europe
To understand the importance of this treaty, we need to step back to the world before 1989, to the Cold War world that a ratified and fully implemented CFE Treaty can help lock away forever. The concerns we had then included: -- The massive preponderance of Soviet offensive forces, capable of attacking Western Europe; -- The danger of short-warning blitzkrieg created by military secrecy and closed societies in the East; -- The political weight of Soviet occupation forces in Central and Eastern Europe, burdening the prospects for reform; and -- The economic costs of defending against the threat. Our efforts to deal with these concerns through the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks led to stalemate. For 15 years, even relatively modest reductions of forces in Central Europe eluded us. Then, in December 1988, just months before the CFE negotiations began, President Gorbachev announced what were then viewed as dramatic unilateral force cuts. Yet these cuts would have left the Warsaw Pact with a two-to-one advantage in key capabilities, and these cuts were far from irreversible. Gorbachev's announcement, however, did serve as a catalyst to the CFE negotiations, setting a more hopeful environment for the negotiations. NATO moved forward with proposals that would allow everyone in Europe to be more secure, including the Soviet Union. We and our allies were determined to reduce sharply the massive forward deployments of Soviet forces. It was our hope that this would diminish the Warsaw Pact's potential to launch a short- warning attack, foster the prospects for political change in Central and Eastern Europe, and lessen the burden of defense through stability at lower levels of forces. The CFE Treaty helps turn these hopes into realities. Let me explain. Strategically, the treaty codifies a radically new European security environment and provides a strong foundation for future European security negotiations. CFE requires the destruction and limitation of key offensive weapons, locking in a new basis for strategic stability in Europe. CFE also introduces the most extensive and intrusive verification regime ever, locking in increased openness and predictability. The treaty will codify stability by: -- Eliminating many thousands of pieces of military equipment, primarily through destruction, subject to notification and observation; -- Reducing and limiting five categories of armaments-- tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft--most suited to the conduct of offensive military operations; -- Limiting any one state from possessing more than roughly one-third of the total treaty-limited equipment in the area, thereby restricting the potential for any state to achieve military and political hegemony on the continent; -- Limiting equipment in active units and requiring that other ground forces equipment under the overall ceilings be held in designated storage sites; and -- Creating an interlocking system of geographical limitations on the size of military forces, thereby constraining force concentrations and ensuring balances not only in Central Europe but on the flanks as well. The treaty will also codify predictability and openness by an extremely intrusive verification regime. In conjunction with our national intelligence means, this will virtually eliminate the possibility of militarily significant clandestine buildups. This regime includes exchanges of detailed information, openness requirements, and several forms of on-site inspections to complement national technical means. Military installations of all 22 signatory states in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone will be subject to mandatory inspections, and challenge inspections will be possible at any suspect site. In addition, the treaty provides for the establishment of a Joint Consultative Group (JCG) to address any questions relating to compliance or interpretation and to consider measures to enhance the effectiveness and viability of the treaty. Politically, the treaty helps lock in the removal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. The treaty reinforces the sovereignty of the emerging democracies. It provides that no state party to CFE may station forces on the territory of another without the express consent of that state. Reinforcing the bilateral accords that call for the elimination of all stationed Soviet troops, the treaty assures that any Soviet military deployments in Europe without the consent of the host country would also violate the treaty. And as President Havel [of Czechoslovakia] said in his address to Congress last year, the CFE process not only facilitated the removal of Soviet forces from his country but it also created the conditions for the reduction of Czechoslovakia's own national armed forces. In each of these ways, CFE helps to safeguard the independence, security, and political development of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Economically, CFE allows us to maintain deterrence at lower levels of forces, allowing for reductions in the resources we devote to Europe's defense. It also allows the Soviets to turn new thinking into new policy and convert their defense resources to civilian use by defining security through a negotiated, legally binding regime rather than through the threat of a massive use of force. Above all, legally, CFE locks in these unprecedented strategic, political, and economic facts through a legally binding treaty, one agreed to by the major military powers in Europe. It is true some of these facts could have come about through unilateral steps taken by various states. But any unilateral action can be unilaterally reversed. That's why we've worked so hard to get a multilateral, legally binding, and effectively verifiable agreement. Given the continuing uncertainties we see in the Soviet Union, this treaty's contribution as a bulwark against any return to Cold War military confrontation should weigh heavily in your considerations. As the President has made abundantly clear, we support perestroika and the new thinking and are actively working toward their success. But, as I said in San Francisco almost 2 years ago: "Any uncertainty about the fate of reform in the Soviet Union, however, is all the more reason, not less, for us to seize the present opportunity. For the works of our labor--a diminished Soviet threat and effectively verifiable agreements--can endure even if perestroika does not. If the Soviets have already destroyed weapons, it will be difficult, costly, and time-consuming for any future Kremlin leadership to reverse the process and to assert military superiority. And with agreements in place, any attempt to break out of treaties will serve as [an] indicator of an outbreak of old thinking. " Those words from 2 years ago are just as true today. And that's why we ask you to give your consent to ratification of this treaty.
Article III and Resolution of Outstanding Issues
I know many of you are concerned about resolution of the so-called Article III question, so let me devote some time to that issue. Shortly after the treaty was signed last November, the Soviets asserted the right to apply treaty counting rules in a way that was at odds with the text, the negotiating record, and the views of all other 21 participants. Most importantly, the Soviets claimed that equipment in units subordinate to the navy were not accountable under various CFE limitations, despite the fact that this equipment fell within the treaty's scope of coverage. By that, I mean it met the definition for treaty-limited equipment and was permanently based on land within the CFE area of application. The President made clear that this problem would have to be rectified before the treaty could be presented to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. There were other treaty-related problems as well. During the final months of the negotiations, it became clear that the Soviets had moved tens of thousands of pieces of equipment east of the Urals, where they are not subject to the treaty's provisions. Finally, there were questions about the accuracy of Soviet data on their holdings of equipment in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone of coverage. After months of bilateral US-Soviet discussions and high- level communications, activities in the Joint Consultative Group, and a number of bilateral exchanges between Moscow and several other participants, we produced a package that preserves the integrity and inviolability of the treaty. In a separate legally binding statement, the Soviet government committed itself to a number of undertakings to reduce and limit naval infantry and coastal defense forces that will effectively bring them into compliance with treaty ceilings and other key provisions. While separate from the treaty, the preamble of the Soviet statement explicitly notes these undertakings are designed to promote implementation of the treaty. This statement also affirms the comprehensive nature of the CFE counting rules (that is, all equipment in treaty-limited categories in the zone of application is covered by the limitations of the treaty, except as provided for in the treaty and associated documents). This will reduce the likelihood of similar disputes in the future. Finally, this statement resolves another area of dispute by specifying that armored personnel carriers in strategic rocket forces, as with similar vehicles involved in analogous internal security functions, do not count against treaty ceilings. The Soviets are proscribed from increasing their holdings of such vehicles in the strategic rocket forces and from providing any other types of treaty-limited equipment to these forces. In addition, the Soviets undertook several political commitments concerning equipment east of the Urals. They will destroy or convert by 1995 at least 14,500 pieces in an open and observable fashion. They also pledged not to use the withdrawn equipment to create a strategic reserve force. These assurances satisfy our major concerns about the disposition and possible future use of this equipment. The information to be provided by the Soviets and the actions they have pledged to undertake will facilitate effective monitoring by national technical means of equipment east of the Urals. Discrepancies between our estimates and the Soviet data provided at signature have been narrowed considerably as a result of further analysis and information, including data provided by the Soviets. Remaining questions will be fully explored in the Joint Consultative Group or through other channels. In our view, none of these data issues warrant delay in acting on the treaty.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say this: In 1989, Europe underwent a political earthquake, an eruption of democratic values that changed the political map of the continent. Now, we are working with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and a reforming Soviet Union to ensure democracy continues to flourish from the Atlantic to the Urals. One of the surest ways to do that is to ratify the CFE Treaty and then move forward with its implementation. For CFE can be an enduring pact of mutual advantage, a treaty in which all Europeans and Americans find their interests advanced. And in doing so, CFE can reduce the uncertainties of the future by helping make certain that the military map of Europe reflects our fundamental interests.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991 Title:

The CFE Treaty

Date: Jul 15, 19917/15/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia Subject: Arms Control, NATO [TEXT] The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, signed on November 19, 1990, by the 22 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is a landmark agreement that will establish parity in major conventional armaments between East and West in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The treaty will limit the size of Soviet forces to about one-third of the total armaments permitted to all the countries in Europe. It includes an unprecedented monitoring regime, including detailed information exchange, on-site inspection, challenge inspection, and monitoring of arms destruction. The treaty was forwarded to the US Senate on July 9, 1991, for its advice and consent to ratification. The treaty will enter into force after it has been ratified by the 22 signatory countries.
East-West Limits
The treaty sets equal ceilings from the Atlantic to the Urals on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attack and initiating large-scale offensive operations. Neither side may have more than: -- 20,000 tanks -- 20,000 artillery pieces -- 30,000 armored combat vehicles -- 6,800 combat aircraft, and -- 2,000 attack helicopters. To further limit the readiness of armed forces, the treaty sets equal ceilings on equipment that may be with active units. Other ground equipment must be in designated permanent storage sites. Each side may not exceed the following equipment levels in active units: -- 16,500 tanks -- 17,000 artillery pieces, and -- 27,300 armored combat vehicles In connection with the CFE Treaty, the six members of the Warsaw Pact signed a treaty in Budapest on November 3, 1990, which divides the Warsaw Pact allocation by country. The members of NATO have consulted through NATO mechanisms and have agreed on national entitlements. These national entitlements may be adjusted.
Country Ceilings
The treaty limits the proportion of armaments that can be held by any one country in Europe to about one-third of the total for all countries in Europe--the "sufficiency" rule. This provision constrains the size of Soviet forces more than any other in the treaty. Country ceiling limits are: -- 13,300 tanks -- 13,700 artillery pieces -- 20,000 armored combat vehicles -- 5,150 combat aircraft -- 1,500 attack helicopters
Regional Arrangements
In addition to limits on the number of armaments in each category on each side, the treaty also includes regional limits to prevent destabilizing force concentrations of ground equipment.
Equipment reduced to meet the ceilings must be destroyed or, in a limited number of cases, have its military capability destroyed, allowing the chassis to be used for non-military purposes. After the treaty enters into force, there will be a 4-month baseline inspection period. After the 4-month baseline period, 25% of the destruction must be complete by the end of 1 year, 60% by the end of 2 years, and all destruction required by the treaty must be complete by the end of 3 years. Parties have 5 years to convert limited amounts of equipment. Large amounts of equipment will be destroyed to meet the obligations of the CFE Treaty. The Soviet Union alone will be obliged to destroy thousands of weapons, much more equipment than will be reduced by all the NATO countries combined. NATO will meet its destruction obligations by destroying its oldest equipment. In a process called "cascading," NATO members with newer equipment, including the United States, have agreed to transfer some of this equipment to allies with older equipment. "Cascading" will not reduce NATO's destruction obligation. Under the cascading system, no US equipment must be destroyed to meet CFE ceilings. Some 2,000 pieces of US equipment will be transferred to America's NATO allies.
The treaty includes unprecedented provisions for detailed information exchanges, on-site inspections, challenge inspections, and on-site monitoring of destruction. At the initiative of the United States, NATO has established a system to cooperate in monitoring the treaty. Parties have an unlimited right to monitor the process of destruction. The CFE Treaty is of unlimited duration and will enter into force 10 days after all parties have ratified the agreement. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991 Title:

Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)

Date: Jul 15, 19917/15/91 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia Subject: CSCE, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT]
The process of establishing confidence-and security-building measures (CSBMs) among the 35 states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The act embraced a number of confidence-building measures, including requiring nations to notify each other of large-scale military activities that exceed a total of 25,000 troops, and encouraging invitations to observers from other participating states. At the follow-up conference in Madrid (1981-83), the CSCE states agreed to convene negotiations to expand the measures endorsed at Helsinki. These talks, convened in Stockholm, were entitled the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE, January 1984-September 1986). The measures adopted at the CDE Conference were specifically designed to reduce misunderstanding or misinterpretation of conventional force activities in Europe. The CSBMs contained in the Stockholm Document included 42-day prior notification of certain military activities above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks; exchange of annual forecasts of notifiable activities; prohibition on exercises involving more than 75,000 troops unless forecast 2 years in advance; mandatory observation of exercises above 17,000 troops; and on-site inspection (ground and air) as a means of verification. At the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Conference (November 1986- January 1989) the participating states agreed to build upon and expand the agreements reached at the Stockholm CDE by convening, under the Madrid Mandate, follow-on CSBMs negotiations. This mandate restricts the scope of CSBMs to militarily significant land activity, within the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains boundary, or those air and sea activities which have a functional link to activities on land. Tabling a comprehensive package on the opening day of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (March 1989-present), the West forged its proposal around three themes: transparency about military organization; transparency about military activities; communications and contacts. The initial Western package included 12 measures: exchange of information on troop organization and deployment in the zone; exchange of information on major conventional weapons deployment programs; random evaluation system; enhanced information in the annual calendar; enhanced information in notification; improvements to observation modalities including lowering of observation thresholds; improvements to inspections; lowering the threshold for longer notice of larger-scale activities; improved access for accredited personnel dealing with military matters; development of means of communications; and equal treatment of media representatives. Additionally, the Western states proposed convening a Military Doctrine Seminar in early 1990.
Developments in the Negotiations
Early in the negotiations, delegations agreed to establish working groups to oversee measures related to: information and verification, contacts and communications, observation and notification, and annual calendar and constraining provisions. The Neutral and Non-Aligned Group tabled a set of proposals, similar to the Western package in its inclusion of an annual exchange of information and a number of improvements to Stockholm. Against the backdrop of dramatic political changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, interest has heightened in CSBMs as a means to bring about greater openness and transparency in the military sphere. -- In December 1989, Secretary Baker called for "new substance" in the negotiations, encouraging bold approaches that would broaden the CSBMs negotiations. -- In January 1990, Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and his counterparts from other CSCE states attended the Western-proposed Military Doctrine Seminar. This provided for 3 weeks of candid discussions among military officials and experts on defense budgets, training, and conventional force postures. -- In February 1990, partly as a result of the seminar, the West introduced two new measures: one on exchanging military budgets and a second calling for an annual implementation meeting. -- In spring 1990, the West tabled six additional measures: improved military-to-military contacts, a CSBM-CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) communication network, a mechanism to discuss unusual military activities, cooperation on reporting hazardous military incidents, visits to combat air bases to observe routine activities, and an information exchange on infrastructure upgrading. -- In July 1990, the NATO London summit declaration called for a meaningful package of CSBMs, which was completed by the November 1990 CSCE summit in Paris. A central aspect of the package is a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna that serves as a site for a number of the CSBMs under negotiation. The impending CSCE summit quickened the pace of negotiations; by November 19, CSCE leaders approved a package that included nearly all the Western-proposed measures to date. Specifically, they agreed to: the Conflict Prevention Center to house a military information exchange as well as a mechanism to discuss unusual military activities, a CSBM-CFE communication system to exchange information required under those agreements, an air base visit measure, increased military-to-military contacts, a means to report and discuss hazardous military incidents, an annual implementation meeting, and improvements to existing requirements to notify each other of military activities and invite observers to certain exercises. The CSBM document endorsed at the November 1990 Paris summit, entitled the "Vienna Document 1990," is intended to stabilize the military situation in Europe, an essential condition for furthering the democratic changes now sweeping Central and Eastern Europe. The CSCE "Vienna Document 1990" (along with the Paris Charter and CFE Treaty) are three documents considered pillars of the new Europe.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991 Title:

Statement Issued After The Meeting of the Five on Arms Transfers and Non-Proliferation

Description: Paris, France Date: Jul 9, 19917/9/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia, Europe, North America, Eurasia, MidEast/North Africa Country: USSR (former), United States, China, France, United Kingdom Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control, United Nations [TEXT]
Paris, July 9, 1991
1. Representatives of the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, met in Paris on the 8th and 9th of July to review issues related to conventional arms transfers and to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They noted with concern the dangers associated with the excessive buildup of military capabilities, and confirmed they would not transfer conventional weapons in circumstances which would undermine stability. They also noted the threats to peace and stability posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and missiles, and undertook to seek effective measures of non-proliferation and arms control in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner on a global as well as on a regional basis. 2. They had a thorough and positive exchange of views on the basis of the arms control initiatives presented in particular by President Bush, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Major and on other initiatives which address these problems globally and as a matter of urgency in the Middle East. They also agreed to support continued work in the United Nations on an arms transfers register to be established under the aegis of the UN Secretary General, on a non-discriminatory basis, as a step towards increased transparency on arms transfers and in general in military matters. They stressed that the ultimate response to the threat of proliferation is verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements amongst the parties concerned. They expressed strong support for full implementation of existing arms control regimes. For their part, they will contribute to this objective by developing and maintaining stringent national and, as far as possible, harmonized controls to ensure that weapons of mass-destruction related equipments and materials are transferred for permitted purposes only and are not diverted. They also strongly supported the objective of establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. They expressed their view that critical steps towards this goal include full implementation of UNSC [UN Security Council] resolution 687 and adoption by countries in the region of a comprehensive program of arms control for the region, including: -- A freeze and ultimate elimination of ground to ground missiles in the region; -- Submission by all nations in the region of all of their nuclear activities to IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards; -- A ban on the importation and production of nuclear weapons usable materials; -- Agreement by all states in the region to undertake to becoming parties to the CW [chemical weapons] Convention as soon as it is concluded in 1992. 3. They acknowledged that Article 51 of the UN Charter guarantees every state the right of self-defence. That right implies that states have also the right to acquire means with which to defend themselves. In this respect, the transfer of conventional weapons, conducted in a responsible manner, should contribute to the ability of states to meet their legitimate defence, security and national sovereignty requirements and to participate effectively in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security. They recognized that indiscriminate transfers of military weapons and technology contribute to regional instability. They are fully conscious of the special responsibilities that are incumbent upon them to ensure that such risks be avoided, and of the special role they have to play in promoting greater responsibility, confidence and transparency in this field. They also recognize that a long term solution to this problem should be found in close consultation with recipient countries. 4. They expressed the intention that: -- When considering under their national control procedures conventional weapons transfers, they will observe rules of restraint. They will develop agreed guidelines on this basis. -- Taking into account the special situation of the Middle East as a primary area of tension, they will develop modalities of consultation and of information exchanges concerning arms transfers to this region as a matter of priority. -- A group of experts will meet in September with a view to reaching agreement on this approach. -- Another plenary meeting will be held in October in London. -- Further meetings will be held periodically to review these issues. 5. They expressed the conviction that this process of continuing cooperation will contribute to a worldwide climate of vigilance in this field which other countries will share. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991 Title:

Key Issues at G-7 Summit

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from briefing for the media on the Group of Seven (G-7) summit at the White House, Washington, DC Date: Jul 10, 19917/10/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, North America, East Asia Country: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, USSR (former), Greece, Turkey Subject: Trade/Economics, International Organizations [TEXT] This summit takes place at what is a very important time for the development of the global economy and world political order built on democratic and free market values. These values are being strengthened by the work of our very strong NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, and the President wanted to visit those countries to express our support to them for their continued efforts and our thanks for their steadfastness during the recent Gulf crisis. As you may know, it will be the first trip by an American President to Greece or Turkey since 1958. With respect to the summit, there are four key issues that we face at the economic summit. First, as I'm sure the Secretary of the Treasury [Nicholas Brady] told you this morning, the shared objectives of all seven countries are a sustained recovery and price stability. We also believe that we need to pursue reforms to improve economic efficiency and, thereby, improve the potential or capacity for enhanced growth. Second, we'll be continuing to push for an ambitious and wide- ranging package for the Uruguay Round. Third, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe stand at what is really a critical juncture in their development of free market economies. The seven countries will want to encourage them to promote competitive industries and businesses that can create jobs. That, of course, will require increasing domestic and foreign investment. But investors and businessmen are going to hold back if businesses don't have opportunities to sell their goods, and that, in turn, translates into a need to stress the opening of our markets to the exports from those countries. Fourth, we will be discussing the evolving situation in the Soviet Union, and we will be discussing, of course, the steps that we can take to support economic and political reform in the Soviet Union. Many of you are interested in this, so let me take a moment here to go over that particular situation. We and our G-7 partners are committed to supporting successful economic and political reform in the Soviet Union; that goes without saying. The real question is, how can we best support that reform? Undoubtedly, this will be the primary focus of the discussions at the summit with President Gorbachev, and there are several facts that seem rather clear to us. First, the Soviet economic crisis continues, and economic conditions in the Soviet Union continue to deteriorate. Second, I think we understand the gravity of the situation. Although we are encouraged by some of the steps the Soviets have taken recently to foster private property and foreign investment, it is our view that much more still remains to be done. Their choices are tough ones. We understand that. We recognize that these choices are tough choices, but it is our view that equivocation will really only lead to tougher choices down the road. Three, the only plausible solution that we and our Western colleagues see is for the Soviet leadership to say yes to real free markets and turn what have been words into concrete deeds. That is, the Soviet leadership needs to embrace a real market economy with private property, with incentives, competition, laws on contracts, a sound currency, and a price system. Four, they need to embrace a real market economy, not for our sake or for the sake of the West, of course, but for their sake. As President Gorbachev has said repeatedly, it is the hard choices the Soviets themselves make that will determine whether perestroika succeeds or whether it will not succeed. It is in Soviet interest--above all, the interests and well- being of the Soviet people--for Soviet leaders to move now toward the market. This is a country that is very rich in natural resources. It is very rich in human potential. The Soviets need to, and, I think, can help themselves by making a firm, irrevocable commitment to markets. And, finally, the Soviet leadership knows, I think, by now that we support continued political and economic reform. I stated in a speech in Berlin last month that we are putting together a package of measures to support reform in an effective manner and to demonstrate, we hope, our encouragement of their reform efforts. That package may include, for example, special association with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank to help design and implement serious economic reforms in the Soviet Union; a public-private project to resolve impediments to private investment in their energy sector, investments which can earn hard currency for them and provide an example of a successful sector operating with property and contract rights, and, perhaps, a mutual effort to invigorate the food distribution sector to produce improvements for consumers through the establishment of market incentives; work on defense conversion; assistance to them on their efforts to convert defense industries; enhance technical cooperation, including that in the field of economic education; and, finally, more open trade. I think all of us recognize that you cannot build a market economy by throwing money at a disintegrating command economy, but you can help a market economy develop by establishing the political and legal conditions necessary for markets to flourish and to attract private capital. It is our view that we can help through technical assistance. We can help through know-how, and that's what our package approach is intended to do. We do intend to stay engaged to support the reform process over time, recognizing that there are no quick fixes, and there are no simple solutions. But as the hard work of moving from a command economy to a free market economy proceeds, we will continue to strive to help the Soviet reform effort succeed. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991 Title:

International Narcotics Control: Andean Strategy Update

Levitsky Source: Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters Description: Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Task Force on International Narcotics Control, Washington, DC Date: Jul 10, 19917/10/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: Colombia, Bolivia, Peru Subject: Narcotics, OAS, Military Affairs [TEXT] I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Task Force today to discuss the progress that we have made on the Administration's Andean Strategy, with particular focus on Colombia. The Task Force has been very supportive of the Andean Strategy, and we appreciate your interest and your support of our efforts to implement a sound and effective program. I particularly welcome this opportunity to discuss these issues because I believe that we are reaching a crossroads in our narcotics control efforts. In a major initiative in 1989, the President outlined a bold plan to address the challenge of narcotics trafficking to our well being and to the institutions and survival of key friends and allies. We all recognized at the time the challenges and difficulties inherent in embarking upon this new effort. We knew it would not be easy to uproot the entrenched trafficking organizations, to reduce our own national demand for drugs, to assist other countries in programs to eliminate production and trafficking, and to develop a spirit of international commitment and cooperation. We began with a full awareness of the obstacles to building and sustaining domestic and international consensus on action, especially at a time when there are pressing demands on limited resources. Yet, the urgency of the situation and the reality of the perils of drug trafficking to our own and others' interests brought us together to conceive, and then approve, a strategy to address a common threat to our nation. That strategy could not have gone forward without the partnership between Congress and the Administration and the support of the public. It could not have flourished but for the support and cooperation of our friends and allies. We have come a long way in a short time. International cooperation and a shared sense of the importance of the issue is further advanced than I thought reasonable just a short while ago. We have made considerable progress in every area of endeavor, and we can reasonably expect even greater progress. But I also see the potential for the effort to unravel because of a steady erosion of funding, of consensus, and of the support it needs to allow the program sufficient flexibility and time. I have watched with regret, for example, recent media attention focusing on [Colombian drug lord Pablo] Escobar's prison environment rather than on the fact that he is in prison. Concentrating on Escobar's terms of surrender and his prison amenities does not ensure his conviction but tends to trivialize the fact of his surrender and the sacrifice that Colombia has made in bringing him and others to the bar. President Gaviria has stated that Escobar will receive "the harshest sentence possible." We must be prepared to move ahead collectively and help Colombia strengthen its judicial system so that it can deal with the Pablo Escobars. We want to see justice done. We want to see the Colombian legal system work, to demonstrate to the world and to Colombia that years of violence and intimidation must now yield to law and due process. That will take time and patience. Our plan calls for a 5-year undertaking. It is based on a program to reinvigorate domestic and international efforts to deal comprehensively with the trafficking of cocaine. It encompasses building close cooperation with the key Andean states as well as creating more effective means within our own system to respond to the challenge. It is a multi-year effort because we recognize that the scope and scale of the problem will not yield to short-lived or simplistic solutions. Sustaining a long-term effort, however, is not easy. If, as we believe, we are beginning to see real signs of progress in this multi-year effort, we must enhance our support; otherwise, we will progressively undermine our ability to carry the program forward. I would like to turn to a brief review of the essential features of our effort and to cover some of the signs that I believe indicate that we are on the right track.
The Andes
Our program in the Andes demonstrates what can be done in a relatively brief period, despite continuing problems with political will, corruption, and human rights. We have developed an integrated effort, in conjunction with the three Andean countries, that combines economic, law enforcement, and military assistance in a phased plan that takes into consideration the range of complexities inherent in dealing with the drug issue. These programs are now in varying stages of implementation. The central components of our program seek the commitment of the host governments and the enhancement of their legal structures and enforcement capabilities in order to disrupt and dismantle trafficking organizations. We are also working with these governments to improve their economic performance to offset the adverse effects of eliminating coca or cocaine production. Creating the necessary political will to deal with narcotics corruption and other impediments is a vital component of the strategy. Additionally, we are seeking to ensure greater respect for human rights by these governments. Although we are only in the second year of a multi-year effort, there have been some notable achievements. Our programs and the cooperation and commitment of these governments--often in the face of brutally violent trafficker reactions--have resulted in increased seizures, arrests, surrenders, confiscation of assets, and signs of disarray within some of the trafficking organizations. Their costs of doing business have definitely risen, and their operations have been harassed and hampered. With only the first year's funding and training actually on the ground and FY 1991 funds in the pipeline, already we are starting to see an increased drumbeat of major operations going off one after another in Colombia and Bolivia. Vigorous local law enforcement efforts, crop eradication projects, and US support for host country interdiction operations helped to disrupt the cartels' activities, which in turn lowered leaf prices and undermined the purchasing networks in Bolivia, where voluntary eradication eliminated 8,000 hectares of coca plants in 1990 alone. New cultivation in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the principal coca growing area in Peru, has stabilized. Marijuana cultivation in Colombia has been virtually eliminated. Our major focus is law enforcement. We have helped to improve counter-narcotics cooperation with the police in all three countries. INM funding is a major support for the anti-drug police in all three countries, with additional technical assistance provided by DEA [US Drug Enforcement Agency], and training and equipment provided also through military assistance. A majority of our military assistance goes to support local enforcement efforts in the three countries, either through direct supplies, equipment, and training to police units, or through indirect support to military units that aid the police in their operations. In Colombia the military has supported the police through air transport, as well as through their own direct anti-narcotics operations. Bolivian air force and navy units provide dedicated transport to police units on missions. In Peru, the military will be responsible for security for police units on operations and for alternative development efforts in the conflictive Upper Huallaga Valley. In addition, in remote regions or dangerous conditions, some military units are assigned counter-narcotics missions in Bolivia. We recently concluded an umbrella agreement with Peru to shape our cooperative effort there, and we see a constructive, if limited, role for the military in that program. The Peruvian air force has intercepted and forced down several trafficker aircraft in the Upper Huallaga Valley and along the borders, leading to the arrests of the passengers and modest seizures of cash and coca paste. The number of daylight trafficker flights has diminished sharply, and we understand the narco-pilots are asking for higher payments. We know that the impact of these efforts in all three countries has a ripple effect which disrupts trafficking operations and raises the costs of their business. Moreover, our efforts have not been limited to interdiction. We have also worked to develop economic assistance programs linked to counter-narcotics efforts. These programs include macroeconomic measures and more focused efforts to give those people involved in coca production a viable economic alternative. We are convinced that in certain situations, such as the one currently faced by Peru, a comprehensive economic assistance program linked to narcotics cooperation is the only way to stabilize the country and permanently displace narcotics in the Peruvian underground economy. Politically, the Andean governments have fulfilled many of the expectations of the Cartagena Declaration. In addition to agreements signed at Cartagena, the Andean states have undertaken a number of activities: -- All three have adopted OAS model legislation on precursor chemicals. -- Bolivia has ratified the 1988 UN convention, signed agreements on tax information exchange, essential chemicals, public awareness, and weapons control. -- Peru has signed agreements on tax information exchange, essential chemicals, public awareness, and has exchanged notes with the US on extradition. -- Colombia has signed agreements on asset sharing and essential chemicals with the US. Several areas, however, pose problems to implementing an effective narcotics control program in the Andean region. Although we believe that President Fujimori of Peru has the necessary political will to implement an effective counter- narcotics program, his efforts are hampered by a collapsed economy, anarchy, wanton terrorism, and widespread corruption. In Bolivia, government corruption continues to compromise counter-narcotics operations and slow down narcotics-related redevelopment efforts. While Colombia has implemented the most effective counter- narcotics effort over the last 2 years, we are entering a new phase where Colombia's judicial and democratic institutions will be severely tested by surrendering drug lords such as Pablo Escobar. The [Colombian] constituent assembly has also banned extradition, and there may be some indications that major trafficking figures, like the Ochoas, have kept trafficking organizations intact despite their surrender. I will be addressing the Escobar issue later in my testimony. We are continuing our efforts to have a positive influence in these areas, keeping in mind that we are working on an issue that ultimately affects fragile social, economic, and political institutions of sovereign countries. Nevertheless, we are conscious of the necessity to press the narcotics issue in order to succeed over the long term: 1. We are working with law enforcement agencies and the Andean militaries to increase substantially the pace of laboratory destruction and to dismantle trafficking organizations. Our goal in this area is to improve performance of host country operations to a point that significantly disrupts cocaine traffic and networks. We continue to work toward training and equipping law enforcement personnel so that they are prepared to take on sophisticated trafficker operations. Our model for what we wish to accomplish has been amply demonstrated by the Colombia program. 2. We are developing new international mechanisms to address money laundering and the flow of precursor and essential chemicals. We have solidified our ties in this area with the Europeans through the Dublin Group [which includes the EC member states, the European Commission, Japan, Australia, Sweden, Canada, and the United States], which addresses the Andean narcotics problem and is aimed at denying the traffickers essential chemicals and any further inroads into the relatively small European narcotics market. The Andean states also participate actively in the constructive work of the multilateral Chemical Action Task Force, along with delegations from Europe, North America, and Asia. 3. We are developing cooperative programs to deal with violations of human rights and corruption. All three countries require a presidential determination under the 1990 INCA [international narcotics control act]. Colombia and Bolivia received these determinations earlier in the year. We withheld judgment on Peru at the time. Peru is our greatest concern in all three of the areas above, and we are closely engaged with the Fujimori Administration in supporting its efforts to turn around a situation which has existed for several Peruvian administrations. 4. Currently, we are working closely with our missions in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to develop approaches to address specific problem areas such as judicial reform, public diplomacy, eradication efforts, control of precursor chemicals, money laundering, and economic support. The goal, based on a continuing assessment of the performance of the Andean states, is to carry forward the progress we have made and address the shortcomings we have noted. Knowing that we must sustain a vigorous program, we are determined to pursue those efforts that have produced results, reassess those that have not, and seek new approaches that will enhance our chances of success. The Administration's policy is to provide legitimate governments with resources needed to establish control over areas currently controlled or heavily influenced by drug traffickers and narco-financed insurgent groups. Our goal is to help create a favorable environment for effective government-sponsored alternative development and interdiction programs.
The US Military Role
Before moving on to country-specific summaries, let me clarify a point that comes up repeatedly in the press here and in the Andes. There has been considerable comment recently about the possibility or even the intention of militarizing the drug war, of indiscriminately employing US forces in Latin America, or of supporting local militaries at the expense of civilian institutions. Let me be clear: it is not our policy to fight someone else's drug fight. We never have--nor will we ever--force military assistance on any of the drug producing countries. Nor do we have any intention of sending US military forces into the Andean countries to fight the drug war. The assistance we do provide, at the request of host governments, is not designed to create large new forces. Rather, we aim to create the specialized skills and units (both law enforcement and military) required to conduct or support meaningful counter-narcotics operations. We do not do this to engage in counterinsurgency or to introduce US forces into the region by the back door. Our objective is to assist local governments and narcotics law enforcement units to cope with their problems, to emphasize the need to respect human rights, and to equip and train them to address the increasingly complex nature of the drug problem. This is a necessity forced upon us and our allies by the resources available to the traffickers and their insurgent auxiliaries as a result of their willingness to use whatever force is needed to achieve their goals.
The Government of Colombia continues its efforts against traffickers and has seriously disrupted the cocaine-processing industry. Colombian Government interdiction operations resulted in seizures of over 53 mt of cocaine, the arrest of 7,000 suspected traffickers, and the destruction of over 200 cocaine processing labs in 1990. While most counter-narcotics operations were spearheaded by the national police, the Colombian military also became involved in the war on drugs in 1990, accounting for a 19-ton seizure during Operation Petrolera. Since September 1989, the Colombian Government has captured or killed more than 50 major traffickers, extraditing 24 of them to the United States. So far in 1991, the Colombian Government has seized over 53 metric tons [mt] of cocaine and dismantled several major narco-terrorist cells in the employ of the Medellin Cartel. The national police has also destroyed 40 major cocaine producing laboratories and 58 clandestine airstrips while making 1,500 drug-related arrests. It is estimated that these targets were equally divided between the two major trafficking cartels. Despite the surrounding controversy, the entire leadership of the Medellin Cartel is behind bars. Many of the complex, multi- service, heli-borne operations against trafficking and air resources were facilitated by US assistance which helped sustain Colombian Government operational efforts and kept the focus on key targets. Colombia's progress in attacking these organizations exceeds what we anticipated 2 years ago. In the course of these anti- narcotics operations, the Colombians have endured unrelenting pressure from drug traffickers and insurgent groups that has produced thousands of casualties as the result of indiscriminate bombings and assassinations, as well as targeted attacks on public officials, the police, and the military. In 1990, the Colombian national police suffered 420 casualties at the hands of traffickers, and, thus far in 1991, just the anti-narcotics unit of the National Police has lost more than 30 men. Nevertheless, as noted above, the government continues its vigorous efforts. Moreover, the government, despite the narco-generated violence and provocation, also continues to take effective action to curb official human rights abuses, including the creation of an aggressive watchdog agency and the dismissal of human rights abusers in the armed forces and police. Special courts to handle terrorism have been set up which can dispense justice more effectively and thereby deter any retaliatory abuses by government forces. We should not lose sight of the fact, however, that the traffickers resort to extreme violence to achieve their goals, ignoring all human rights standards. They also resort to vigorous disinformation campaigns against the government which are designed to discredit legitimate governmental institutions. False claims of abuse, which must be investigated, tie up resources, confuse the issue, and help to demoralize the police. While Colombian forces have inflicted significant damage on the Medellin Cartel, the Cali Cartel as well as an emerging new cartel on the North Coast have not yet been targeted as aggressively. We continue to press the Colombians on this issue and are convinced that the cartels cannot be broken unless enforcement pressure is exerted on all of them at once. At this time, I would like to address the issue of the surrender of Pablo Escobar and other major traffickers under President Gaviria's plea bargaining decree. The Government of President Cesar Gaviria used a risky two-track policy to deal with the power of the trafficking cartels and trafficker manipulation of the emotional extradition issue. By applying strong police pressure against traffickers, Gaviria induced Escobar and other major traffickers to surrender under this plea bargaining decree which guarantees reduced sentences and no extradition to the United States. The media coverage surrounding Escobar's surrender has focused on the cosmetic rather than on the essential. The reality of Escobar's physical surroundings in jail, which has been exaggerated, is not the central issue. What is of fundamental importance is the fact that Escobar is in jail. President Gaviria's plea bargaining process, not foreign to our own system, is not a program to let Escobar and other traffickers off. We should now give the Colombian Government the opportunity to let Gaviria's plan to strengthen the Colombian judiciary and prosecute Escobar and others in Colombia a chance to work. We should remember that it has been Colombia that has borne the principal burden of drug-related violence. We must also keep in mind that 18 months ago Escobar and his cartel were directly attacking government institutions and were a direct threat to Colombian democracy itself. Today, most of those traffickers are dead or behind bars. At the same time, we must do everything possible to ensure that justice is done. President Gaviria has pledged that his government will do everything possible to convict Escobar of his crimes and issue the harshest punishment possible. He has also promised that trafficking from jail cells by Escobar, the Ochoas or anyone else will not be tolerated. Trafficking from jail will result in traffickers losing all benefits obtained by surrendering under plea bargaining decrees. For President Gaviria's plan to succeed and for justice to be served, we must assist the Colombian Government [to] strengthen the judiciary so that traffickers can be successfully prosecuted and incarcerated in Colombia. For that reason, the US Agency for International Development plans to authorize $36 million of NSD [National Security Directive]-18 economic support funds to support a multi-year comprehensive justice sector support project designed to strengthen the Colombian judicial system. The goal of the project is to improve the administration, operation, and effectiveness of the Colombian judicial system. Achievement of this goal will improve the capability of the Government of Colombia to bring narco-traffickers and narco-terrorists to justice and strengthen fundamental democratic institutions in Colombia. A key portion of the administration of justice program will be the judicial protection program designed to protect judges involved in narcotics cases from intimidation. This program is already underway and has distributed armored cars and bulletproof vests to special order court judges involved in narcotics cases. Planning is currently underway to provide training and, although some major traffickers have surrendered, it is too early to determine whether the judicial system will be strong enough to withstand trafficker intimidation and corruption. However, through our assistance to strengthen the judicial system and an agreement on evidence sharing that is already in force, the Colombian Government will stand a far better chance of succeeding. Concerning human rights, President Gaviria has made frequent public statements that his administration will not tolerate human rights abuses by government officials, and, in 1990, Colombia's Procuraduria (an independent government watchdog agency) stepped up enforcement through a series of aggressive investigations into human rights violations committed by security forces personnel. The investigations have resulted in the dismissals of a number of civilian officials and military officers and enlisted men. On their own initiative, the military and police are also dismissing some human rights violators. President Gaviria has made it clear he is committed to making his new system work and remains committed to the war on drugs. We remain concerned, however, that the trafficker cartels arrayed against the Colombian Government continue to wield considerable influence in blunting the rule of law in Colombia. It is in our interest to support the Colombian Government's efforts to strengthen its judicial system while increasing the tempo of enforcement activities.
We have made considerable progress in our relationship with Bolivia. The overall operational tempo is up, cooperation is extensive, and we have had a number of significant successes. The Government of Bolivia has accepted the principle of performance- based US assistance and continues to cooperate on counter- narcotics efforts. The cooperation we receive, however, is considerably below the potential of the Bolivian Government and is an indication that corruption continues to be a critical factor in holding back the counter-narcotics program. Nevertheless, we have made significant progress in Bolivia in a very short time. Major law enforcement achievements in 1990 included: -- Dismantling of the notorious "Meco" Dominguez trafficking network, resulting in the arrest of Dominguez and his closest associates; -- Destruction of processing laboratories; and -- Seizure of important records, assets, real estate, and commercial enterprises. More recently, we have assisted the Bolivian authorities in a number of operations aimed at disrupting trafficker activity in the region. These have resulted in numerous arrests and seizures of aircraft and of drugs. These types of major endeavors, which are ongoing, underscore the progress we have made in improving local capabilities and in working with police, military, and civilian authorities. The Government of Bolivia, in a recent counter-narcotics law enforcement operation against the largest syndicate of trafficker organizations in country, regained control over the trafficker town of Santa Ana De Yacuma, a frontier town in the cocaine processing and transshipment region of the Beni Department. The operation included an impressive coordinated raid by some 600 Bolivian rural narcotics police, air force, navy, army, and national police. Results of the operation include the seizure of 39 aircraft and the arrest of Renato Roca Suarez, the subject of outstanding indictments in the United States. He is the brother of Jorge Roca Suarez, a major Bolivian trafficker arrested in California [in] September 1990. There were no casualties. Recognition at the highest levels of the Bolivian Government that corruption poses a serious impediment to all US assistance programs was precipitated by the surprise appointment of an individual (Rico Toro) with known narcotics connections (and other dubious activities) to head the Special Force for the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking--the principal Bolivian Government counter- narcotics organization. President Paz Zamora accepted the resignation of Rico Toro, as well as [of] the minister of interior and the chief of the national police. Additionally, the Bolivian Government is cooperating in removing other corrupt law enforcement officials. Although still only a fledging effort, the Bolivian navy's Riverine Task Force has improved operational effectiveness by stepping up patrols to deny uncontested use of the rivers for movement of precursor chemicals and cocaine products. The Government of Bolivia agreed to include its army in support of the counter-narcotics effort. Counter-narcotics rural mobile patrol units of the national police demonstrated increasing willingness to initiate raids and operations. Bolivian forces, assisted by US Government agencies, have improved short-term operations against drug trafficking and production. Sustained enforcement efforts and overproduction depressed coca leaf prices, encouraging voluntary eradication. As a result, the Government of Bolivia achieved in 1990 a net reduction in coca cultivation by eradicating 8,087 hectares of the crop. The Government of Bolivia continues to face major challenges in its counter-narcotics campaign. While the government has increased law enforcement efforts, trafficking organizations have kept pace by diversifying their marketing of refined cocaine and by demonstrating a greater willingness to use violence to resist law enforcement. Widespread corruption, compounded by the Bolivian Government's weakness in implementing policy, further combined to hamper the effectiveness of counter-narcotics programs in 1990.
Peru presents the most difficult situation because of the complexity of its problems. The performance is not always what we would like to see. Even so, the Fujimori Administration has publicly committed itself to fight narcotics traffickers and their insurgent allies, and to adhere to international human rights standards. But, as a new government with a wide range of serious internal problems, it has moved slowly and sometimes uncertainly toward developing a comprehensive strategy. There is, however, significant support within the government and in the public for developing a workable counter-narcotics program in cooperation with the United States. In late 1990 and early 1991, these developments produced some results. The Peruvian air force, for example, has based interceptors at the police counter-narcotics base at Santa Lucia and forced down several trafficker aircraft. In two of these aircraft, authorities arrested five suspected traffickers and seized 220 kg of cocaine. Further, the military zone commander in the Upper Huallaga Valley [UHV] agreed to cooperate with police counter- narcotics activities and rescinded the "prior notice" requirement which had previously resulted in leaks of information from Peruvian officials to traffickers. The Peruvian army has also assigned security squads to the counter-narcotics police base at Santa Lucia, further demonstrating a strengthened commitment. There has been a noticeable movement of trafficking activities away from these counter-narcotics efforts to the northern part of the UHV, as well as a shift to night-time, dusk, and dawn flights to evade enforcement efforts. Efforts which raise the costs of doing business and disrupt trafficking networks are the initial steps in dismantling the narcotics business. Even in Peru, where we have yet to deliver any of the major new elements of the enhanced effort, we have seen increased activity and commitment. President Fujimori has been closely engaged in bilateral discussions regarding a comprehensive strategy which addresses all aspects of the Peruvian counter-narcotics effort. The plans would not only include enforcement operations, but also the restructuring of land titling regulations and provision of credit to coca farmers to help them develop licit crops. The strategy and plans for Peru are based not only on the Cartagena Declaration, but also upon the recently concluded umbrella agreement, which clearly discusses the issues and understandings upon which the United States and the Government of Peru will implement the comprehensive counter- narcotics program. The program will be detailed in three annexes covering law enforcement, military, and economic assistance. Thus far, we have concluded only the law enforcement annex with the Peruvian Government. Despite productive discussions, the Fujimori Administration is up against endemic corruption, a legacy of human rights abuses, and formidable economic, social, and political problems. Military forces in the Andean emergency zones frequently resort to extrajudicial violence while trying to defend the Peruvian Government from two of the world's most violent terrorist groups as well as narco-terrorists. The government has publicly stated its determination to respect human rights and is developing initiatives--such as a human rights commission--to that end. We are aware that Peru must receive a presidential determination under the 1990 INCA in order to receive US assistance in FY 1991. To date, we have not made this determination.
The United States supports efforts by drug producer and transit countries to export products that provide a secure base for employment and foreign exchange earnings as an alternative to drug production and trafficking. The long-term aim is to develop sustainable economic growth based on legitimate trade. The United States is pursuing a range of hemispheric trade programs, including the proposed Andean Trade Preference Act [ATPA] and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative [EAI]. The recently introduced ATPA will provide duty-free access to the US market for a broad range of imports from the Andean region for 10 years. Duty-free treatment should help to provide the Andean countries the opportunity to develop a basis for expanded trade and reduce their dependence on the illegal drug economy. In addition, the Administration is pursuing implementation of the EAI to improve economic growth, increase trade, and promote investment in Latin America. Bilateral framework agreements have already been signed with 11 Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. Besides the ATPA, the two "rounds" of Andean trade initiatives have also offered the Andean countries technical assistance to help improve trade performance, accelerated negotiations within the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--GATT], improved access under our Generalized System of Preferences, and expanded agricultural development assistance and technical cooperation. After consultations with our major trading partners, they, too, have taken steps to help the Andean countries improve their trade performance.
The Andean Strategy is having an effect. For the first time in a decade, there was a halt in the rise of coca cultivation. Total coca cultivation, which had been increasing annually by as much as 10 to 20%, levelled off; in Bolivia and Colombia, it declined. The level of police enforcement activities and operations has grown; seizures are up significantly; and, while I do not want to stress a "body count" mentality, what these reflect is better intelligence, greater coordination, and enhanced cooperation, a coming together of local effort and US support in more effective ways. To a considerable degree, this increased tempo and the supportive environment that has made it possible are a direct result of US willingness to increase its levels of support as a sign of its engagement and commitment. To retreat from that now, to signal to our friends and allies, who have undertaken significant actions, that we will not carry through on our commitments is likely to have a detrimental, long-term effect on our counter-narcotics program. What we are all interested in is performance and results. I believe that we are getting those, but they are only interim signs. It is too soon to draw the conclusion either that we have won or that we have lost. Genius is one part inspiration and nine parts perseverance. We have had the inspiration. It is now time to persevere. There is no question that serious problems with corruption, ineffectiveness of law enforcement efforts, human rights abuses, and lack of political will to attack the drug trade remain as obstacles to success in the immediate future. The traffickers continue to be strong and rich and able to adapt to changing circumstances. To achieve further success, we must continue to work cooperatively at home and with our friends overseas. We must continue our commitment and sustain our resolve. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991 Title:

International Narcotics Control

Date: Jul 15, 19917/15/91 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Country: Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina, Paraguay, Chile, Peru, Bolivia Subject: Narcotics [TEXT] International cooperation to stop narcotics production and trafficking is a central element of US foreign policy. Few foreign policy concerns have as direct a domestic impact as international narcotics. Ninety-five percent of the illicit narcotics consumed in the US comes from other countries. It is essential, therefore, to gain international cooperation to reduce drug supplies while the US works to reduce demand at home. As Secretary Baker stated in November 1989, "...there is no foreign policy issue short of war or peace which has a more direct bearing on the well-being of the American people."
US Policy
In January 1990, President Bush issued a National Drug Control Strategy that calls for increased international cooperation against drug production, trafficking, and abuse. A critical part of the strategy is increased emphasis on cooperative efforts with three Andean nations (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia) to dismantle cocaine trafficking organizations and disrupt cocaine processing and trafficking as close to the source as possible. In FY 1991, $500 million in economic, military, and law enforcement assistance is being provided to the three nations to strengthen their ability to meet these objectives. Additional economic aid will be available to these countries in FY 1991 if they use current resources effectively and establish sound economic policies. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, which has a budget of $150 million, provides $55 million to the Andean strategy funding. It has counter-narcotics programs in South and Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Southeast and Southwest Asia. In February 1990, President Bush met with the presidents of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia at the Andean summit in Cartagena, Colombia. The four presidents agreed to work closely in a number of critical counter-narcotics areas, including the control of precursor chemicals, drug education, exchange of tax information, and a broadened role for each country's military in fighting narcotics. In addition, the US is undertaking cooperative efforts with concerned governments in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Soviet Union. There is a growing consensus that the solution to the world's drug problem must be global in scope, addressing all elements of the grower-to-user chain.
Role of Developed Nations
Developed nations play a key role in global efforts to fight narcotics production and trafficking. The President's drug control strategy calls on European nations, Canada, Japan, and Australia to take greater steps to help Andean, Caribbean, and Asian countries reduce drug supply and demand. An informal consultative mechanism, the Dublin Group, has been established for this purpose. Trafficking organizations are seeking new markets for cocaine and heroin. Developed nations, recognizing the threat, are beginning to respond.
Progress in International Narcotics Control
Government leaders are focusing on the international narcotics threat and on positive solutions. In February 1990, a UN special session was devoted entirely to the narcotics issue. In April 1990, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sponsored a joint UN-UK ministerial conference on cocaine and demand reduction. Leaders of the world's seven major industrialized countries meeting at economic summits in 1989 and 1990 called for the formation of a financial action task force to counter the laundering of money generated by the sale of illicit narcotics and a chemical action task force to control the export of precursor and essential chemicals used to produce the illicit narcotics. Both task forces have advanced their purposes. Recent Colombian counter-narcotics operations have resulted in the seizure of more than 50 metric tons (mt) of cocaine throughout Colombia, and the confiscation of numerous properties and other assets belonging to drug "kingpins." Coca prices in Bolivia have dropped because of increased anti-drug pressure in Colombia and Bolivia, encouraging many coca farmers to switch to legitimate crops. Working with the US, the government of Peru constructed a secure police base in the upper Huallaga Valley to house Peruvian and US enforcement personnel. Progress has occurred in other countries as well. Mexico seized 48.5 mt of cocaine in 1990 and drug trafficking has diminished in and around The Bahamas. Ecuador has been successful in eliminating coca production. Nevertheless, much remains to be done. The estimated production of illicit narcotics supplies increased slightly in 1990. Since 1985, Burma's opium crop has doubled as the Burmese have turned their attention away from narcotics control. Worldwide, coca production leveled off last year. (###)
National Drug Control Strategy
President Bush's National Drug Control Strategy calls for: Increased economic, military, and law enforcement assistance to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia; Expanded US-Mexican cooperation in drug enforcement, "money laundering" disruption, and demand reduction programs; Continued US support for law enforcement and judicial programs in South American producer and transit countries, including Ecuador, Venezuela, Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile; Continued law enforcement and intelligence programs with Central American and Caribbean nations; Development of an international strategy focused on opium and heroin; Broadened domestic and foreign efforts to counter international money laundering activities; Expanded efforts to reduce the illegal manufacture and shipment of chemicals essential to illicit drug production; Promotion of international law enforcement cooperation through mutual legal assistance treaties and the pursuit of anti-drug initiatives at international forums; and Use of economic assistance to foster crop substitution and developmental programs.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 28, July 15, 1991 Title:

Focus on Central and Eastern Europe: Summary of Initiatives

Date: Jul 15, 19917/15/91 Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies Region: E/C Europe Country: Hungary, Romania, Poland Subject: Trade/Economics, Media/Telecommunications [TEXT]
Executive Management Programs
In a follow-up to a White House Conference on Management Training and Market Economics Education in Central and Eastern Europe held last February, the deans of several US business schools offered scholarships for their intensive executive management programs. The US Information Agency (USIA) has been working with the universities to place Central and East European managers in the programs. The first three participants, two Poles and a Yugoslav, were scheduled to go to Cornell University the week of June 16 to begin a 5-week program. USIA is paying for the participants' international travel; the universities are paying for the rest of the expenses.
USIA has approved the following grants: -- To the Soros Foundation to support a program that will put 100 US certified teachers in secondary and post-secondary schools in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. During their 10-month stays, in addition to teaching students, they also will offer seminars for teachers of English and will assist in curriculum development. -- To Harvard University/World Teach to assist in expanding a pilot program of providing English teachers to work with Polish secondary schools and language-teaching colleges for the academic year of 1991-92. The program is expected to reach 2,500 students. -- To F.H. LaGuardia Community College/City University of New York to improve the capacity of Czechoslovak faculty to teach English as a foreign language. -- To the American Bar Association to provide in-depth exposure for Central and East European law school deans to the operations of US law schools. For more information about USIA grants, call Grants Coordinator Judy Siegel at (202)619-5601.
A 2-day conference on "Relations Between the Press and Government in a Democracy" was held in Budapest May 10-11. Co- sponsored by USIA, the Hungarian Journalists' Association, and the International Media Fund, the conference attracted an audience of political decision makers, journalists, and academics. During the conference, International Media Fund representatives Leonard Marks and Marvin Stone announced plans to set up an American Journalism Center in Budapest, which is to become the nucleus of a university- level journalism department.
Non-governmental Organizations.
The Poles have created a foundation forum of 80 non-governmental organizations in Poland. This private initiative follows a trip to the United States by Poles sponsored by USIA. The visitors were shown non-profit organizations in the United States and took home many ideas and suggestions offered by the American organizations.
Economics Summer School
. Largely as a result of the February 27 White House conference mentioned above, US foundations have donated money to pay for a 5-week summer-school program in economics to be held in the Polish city of Olsztyn, near Warsaw. More than $150,000 has been donated so far. The 70 faculty-member participants will be drawn from Polish and other Central and East European universities and will be taught by an international staff of European, Polish, and US professors. Graduates of the 5-week course will be eligible for scholarships for a 1-year program at the Central European University in Prague, Czechoslovakia.
Business Management Seminar.
Working with Poland's National Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce, USIA held a business management seminar for entrepreneurs May 20-25 in Warsaw. The seminar was conducted by specialists from Syracuse University's Leavey School of Business Administration, and the themes were financial management and "How to Grow a Business."
Romanian Television (RTV)
recently aired a six- part series based on a RTV-USIA/TV cooperative project of last fall. The series was broadcast on six successive Sunday afternoons in April and May. Each part examined a different aspect of the US economy, including management techniques, small business development strategies, franchising, agriculture, and technological innovation. The result is a much-needed primer for Romanians on how a market economy actually works. (###)