US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991

Title:

Conflict in Yugoslavia

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Washington, DC Date: Jul 2, 19917/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former) Subject: EC, Military Affairs [TEXT] The President deeply regrets the resumption of violent conflict in Yugoslavia and urges all parties to observe the cease-fire agreement worked out with representatives of the European Community (EC). He also urges Yugoslav authorities to accept an EC offer of international cease-fire observers. The United States is prepared to endorse such a plan at tomorrow's emergency meeting in Prague of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The President has written a letter to President Mesic of Yugoslavia expressing his grave concern over the situation in the country and urging him to ensure that civilian control over the military is reestablished and peace restored. He also expressed the hope that all parties in Yugoslavia would seek a dialogue toward a new and democratic basis for Yugoslavia's future, in which the aspirations of all the Yugoslav peoples can be realized. The President reiterated US support for the European Community's ongoing efforts to help resolve the Yugoslav crisis and urged President Mesic to continue cooperating with the United States, the EC, and others in the interest of a peaceful transition to a new Yugoslavia. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

Conflict in Yugoslavia

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from remarks during a photo opportunity at the Department of State, Washington, DC Date: Jul 2, 19917/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former) Subject: EC, Military Affairs [TEXT] Q. Yugoslavia is really quite volatile today. Do you have any observations about the way the central government is responding today? Secretary Baker. Well, we are very gravely concerned about what's happened in Yugoslavia. This is a concern, of course, that we expressed before we went to Yugoslavia and during the course of our visit there. We have condemned the use of force, the violence, and the bloodshed that have developed. And we are very hopeful that somehow the Yugoslav people will find a way through negotiation and dialogue to sort through these difficulties. We hope there can be a disengagement of the Yugoslav army with militias and that there can be a cease-fire, that we can return to the three-point program that the European Community has suggested when the Troika visited Yugoslavia. We have instructed our ambassador at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] to support the idea of observers from the CSCE going into Yugoslavia. We are very, very concerned. Q. Is it not a shift in emphasis of US policy toward Yugoslavia from insisting on territorial integrity to now insisting on an end to the use of force and the ability of the Yugoslav people to choose their own destiny? Secretary Baker. No. There's been no shift in emphasis. We made it very clear in the 10 or 11 hours that we were in Yugoslavia that our policy was based on three principles: first, democratization; second, respect for human rights; and, third, the question of unity. We laid down some very strong markers with the central government in Yugoslavia with respect to the use of force. We think that they have gone beyond those markers, and we have so expressed ourselves. And we are very, as I say, very gravely concerned about that. And we want to call upon all parties to exercise restraint, to sit down and try to work out a peaceful resolution of these problems through negotiation and dialogue. That is the only way that the matter can be approached with any hope at all of avoiding further violence and further bloodshed.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

Conflict in Yugoslavia

Baker, Van Den Broek, Andriessen Source: Secretary Baker, Netherlands Foreign Minister Hans Van Den Broek, and Frans Andriessen, Vice President of the Commission of European Community Description: Department of State, Washington, DC Date: Jul 3, 19917/3/91 Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former) Subject: EC, Military Affairs [TEXT] The dangerous situation in Yugoslavia continues to worsen. Cease-fire agreements are not being respected. The Yugoslav military apparently has rejected civilian control. We condemn the continuing use of force and particularly condemn any rejection by the military of civilian control. As the United States and the European Community have contended from the beginning of this crisis, only through peaceful dialogue can the Yugoslav peoples determine their own future. To make that possible, we call for: -- An immediate halt to the violence; -- Military forces to return to their barracks immediately; and -- An immediate cease-fire. We would support international observers going into Yugoslavia to monitor such a cease-fire. In order to provide a cooling off period and to permit negotiations to begin, we urge all leaders in Yugoslavia to exert maximum influence on armed forces of any kind throughout Yugoslavia and to refrain from the use of force or from provocative acts. We have just discussed the steps we and others in the international community can take to address this critical situation. Cooling off actions are an essential first step. Only through negotiations and dialogue can bloodshed be avoided and the peoples of Yugoslavia decide their future political arrangements peacefully and democratically. The United States and European Community, working together through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and with others in the international community, will continue to seek to defuse this dangerous situation. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

US-South Korean Relations

Bush, Woo, Baker, Solomon Source: Presidents Bush and Roh Tae Woo, Secretary Baker, Assistant Secretary Richard Solomon Date: Jul 2, 19917/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: South Korea Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT]
Charting a Common Course
Remarks by President Bush and President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea during a welcoming ceremony at the White House, July 2, 1991. President Bush: Distinguished guests and members of the Korean delegation, and Mrs. Roh, President Roh. It is my great honor, on behalf of the American people, to welcome all of you to the White House. Mr. President, we meet at a time of tremendous change, as the long era of Cold War and conflict draws to a close, and the world confronts the challenge of fashioning a new order where freedom can flourish. The Cold War cast its shadow across Korea for more than 4 decades. Mr. President, the Republic of Korea has stood fast at the frontier of freedom--your proud capital, Seoul, a scant 25 miles from the DMZ [demilitarized zone], the razor's edge that cuts a nation in two. Yet, through 4 decades of armed and uneasy peace, the Republic of Korea has prospered. You're building a thriving democracy--a dynamic economy that has prospered through free and more open access to the world's economies. Korea's success stands as a testament to the resolve of the Korean people, but much credit belongs to you, sir, for the steady leadership that guides your nation. Just 4 years ago, you went before the Korean nation to proclaim a new commitment to democracy. In the succession of elections since then, the voice of the Korean people has spoken through their votes--and the message is clear: Korea's commitment to democracy is steadfast and strong. And so, sir, we meet today to chart a common course that moves forward in this world of change. Mr. President, when we met 1 year ago, Korea was on the eve of a new opening to the Soviet Union, an opening that we fully support. That opening to the Soviet Union has eased tensions and increased the prospects for peace and stability not just for the Republic of Korea but across the Pacific rim. Let me be very clear: Korea and the United States share an interest in seeing economic and political reform in the Soviet Union move forward. But lasting peace will come to Korea only when Korea is made whole. And here, too, there is hope. Mr. President, only Koreans-- North and South--can solve the problem of unification. But all Korea--North and South--should know that the United States stands ready to act in the interests of lasting peace. Mr. President, our two nations are linked by ties of trade, by the bonds of friendship and family: the more than three-quarter of a million Americans of Korean ancestry who call this nation their home. But here in America, Korea will always be far more than a distant land or just a name on a map. One week ago, the remains of US servicemen lost long ago in Korea came home to rest--a reminder that Korea will always be the place where America came to freedom's defense. In the summer of 1950, when the forces of the North swept down on the free Republic of Korea, the United Nations swiftly condemned the invasion--and formed the UN Command to repel the aggressor. The United States and 17 other nations answered the call. Mr. President, the United States remains today fully committed to protecting the peace and security of Korea--even as Korea assumes a leading role in its own defense. In 1950, the fate of the Republic of Korea was a testament of the international ideal--a test of the international ideal--a proving ground for the proposition that aggression meets a collective response. Forty years later, this same spirit of internationalism shines forth in Korea's contributions to Desert Storm, in the Korean medical unit that treated coalition casualties from the battle of Kafji. Korea's commitment to internationalism has never wavered. This fall, at long last--four decades after the United Nations fought to keep Korea free--the Republic of Korea will take its rightful place among the family of nations in the United Nations. Mr. President, America, your ally, shares your pride. Once again, Mr. President, it is a great pleasure to have this chance to meet and renew our friendship. Welcome to the White House--and may God bless the Republic of Korea. President Roh: President and Mrs. Bush and citizens of the United States. I am deeply grateful to you, Mr. President, for your invitation to visit this great country and for the warm and cordial welcome extended to me and my delegation. I am also very pleased to bring warm greetings of friendship from the Korean people to the people of the United States. The world has changed enormously over the past 2 years. The Iron Curtain, which used to divide the world into two camps, has collapsed, and the Cold War has come to an end. With the sweeping reforms in Eastern and Central Europe as well as in the Soviet Union, freedom, human dignity, democratic pluralism, and market economy are becoming universal values. Mankind has been living in constant fear of war due to the East-West confrontation. Today, however, we share the belief that we may now successfully build a more peaceful world. During the recent Gulf war, all peace-loving nations of the world rallied around the UN flag. The coalition victory made it clear once and for all that aggression will not stand. I pay my respects to you, Mr. President, for your superb leadership and to the American people for having inspired brighter hopes for a new era. Having proudly joined the long march toward freedom shoulder-to-shoulder with the American people, the Korean people are very pleased to offer congratulations to America on its success. Because their land remains divided, and because they acutely remember the tragedies of war, the Korean people are hoping that the current of peace and reconciliation will soon reach the shores of Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Mr. President, since we met in June of last year, significant activities have, in fact, been taking place in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. The changing US-Soviet relations, of course, lead the list of events. But we have also seen exchanges between China and the Soviet Union and contacts between the Soviet Union and Japan, as well as between Japan and North Korea. At the same time, the Republic of Korea ended decades of enmity and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. More significant, North Korea reversed its former position and announced a decision to apply for UN membership along with us. These encouraging activities have, of course, been spurred on by close cooperation between your country and mine. We must now focus our attention to removing the legacies of the Cold War from the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia so that a durable peace and stability may be secured for the entire Asia- Pacific region. Our rapid economic development has made Korea a showcase to the former socialist countries by demonstrating the merits of a capitalist economy and made us a model to the less-developed countries by proving the efficiency of a free market economy and an open society. Based on these achievements and having experienced enormous social-political difficulties, Korea has now entered an era of full- fledged democracy. As the world saw during the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, Korea's dynamic energies and cooperative spirit encourage a new faith in freedom and hope for prosperity around the world. The Korean people have now become a dependable friend and ally of the American people, and they promise to assume appropriate international responsibilities and make a greater contribution to the international community. The United States has initiated the current change around the world and is successfully carrying out their leadership role, and our two countries will march together into the 21st century as partners in trust, as we have come thus far. Our coming meeting, Mr. President, will be my fourth opportunity to confer with you. Through it, and in my talks with other American leaders, I shall reaffirm my faith in a bright future for our two countries. I wish you, Mr. President, and Mrs. Bush, the best of health and with the American people everlasting peace and prosperity. Thank you, and God bless America.
US-Korean Friendship
Remarks by Secretary Baker at a luncheon for President Roh, Department of State, July 2, 1991. President and Mrs. Roh, Mr. Foreign Minister, Mr. Minister for Trade and Industry, your timely visit serves to reinforce our enduring alliance. Over the past four decades, the ties between our two countries have been forged in battle, strengthened by economic links, and deepened by our mutual commitment to democratic values. And our partnership has been a critical element not only to Korea's own impressive success but also to the dynamism and security of the Asia-Pacific region. Our partnership has also helped pave the way for Korea's coming into its own as an impressive player worldwide. Moreover, President Bush and I believe that Korean-American partnership is essential to building the new world order that we talk about. It's an order based on political and economic freedom for all peoples, and one where nations cooperate effectively to deter aggression and promote stability worldwide. Already, Korea has done much to foster that new world order at home and abroad, politically, economically, diplomatically, and militarily. Let me explain: Politically, by making the tough choice to embark upon the path of democracy, the people of Korea have put themselves on the cutting edge of a major global trend. Korea got an early start, relative to many other nations. And you have come a long way on what we recognize is often a difficult road. The United States is confident that the people of Korea are overwhelmingly committed to the success of your democracy and that you are prepared to continue in what President Bush calls "the hard work of freedom." Economically, yours already is a success story of world-class proportions. Barely a generation ago, Korea was among the ranks of the world's poorest nations. Today, after a generation of steady growth, Korea is the world's 13th largest economy and America's 7th largest trading partner. A central new challenge for us all is updating the rules of the road for world trade in order to sustain a free trade regime. You have pointed out, President Roh, that free trade has been key to Korea's economic success. And, as a leading trading nation, trade liberalization is in your interests as much as ours. So, our government looks forward to your support as we move toward a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--GATT]. Diplomatically, by effectively pursuing nordpolitik, the Republic of Korea is beginning to melt the last glacier of the Cold War. The establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the exchange of trade offices with China, and ascension to the United Nations--which we expect this fall--all clear the path for reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and ultimately for reunification--a goal that our two peoples have shared for over 4 decades. Militarily, you are moving toward assuming the leading role in your own country's defense. For 4 decades, US-Korean resolve has deterred aggression from the North, and the US security guarantee to Korea remains as firm as ever. At the same time, however, our alliance is being reinforced by the demonstration of our mutual commitment to sharing responsibilities. And the Republic of Korea's principled support of the international coalition in the Gulf shows how seriously you take your responsibility to deter aggression not only at home but also in the world community at large. For over 40 years, the United States has highly valued our partnership with the Republic of Korea. And we believe our strong ties will be a tremendous mutual asset as our peoples face the challenges ahead. Mr. President, the United States looks forward to continuing our close partnership with Korea as we work together looking to the next century. So, I ask all you to join me in a toast to US-Korean friendship and partnership.
Review of the Presidential Discussion
Excerpts from briefing by Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the White House, July 2, 1991. . . . Let me just give you an overview of the discussions between the two presidents. President Bush and President Roh Tae Woo had approximately a 40-minute one-on-one session in the Oval Office, after which the two presidents came into the Cabinet Room, and there was an expanded meeting that lasted about 25 minutes with the Cabinet officers. In the Oval Office session, President Bush and President Roh discussed what they saw as the major trends affecting the future of East Asia and the important roles that not only the United States and Korea but also the other major powers--Japan, the Soviet Union, and China--will be playing in the region. President Roh observed that there is less of an order taking shape in this region at this stage of the game than might be said to be the case in other parts of the world. The two presidents reviewed [the] commitment of the United States to the security of the Republic of Korea. And in this regard, they both expressed concern about the nuclear question with-- again--President Bush reaffirming our firm support and engagement in developments on Korea beginning with our commitment to South Korea's security. The President also commented on how strong US-ROK [Republic of Korea] relations are, how firm they are, and this is reflected in the fact that we've had a state visit. President Roh commented on, as he did in his public remarks, the leadership of the President in the Gulf crisis. He noted the fervent desire of the Korean people for reunification as early as possible, hopefully before the end of the century. President Roh urged President Bush to visit the Republic of Korea, hopefully before the year is out. President Bush emphasized that, for all its preoccupations in other parts of the world, the US has no intention of neglecting the Asia-Pacific region-- noting its economic dynamism, its importance for the future--and he noted that Secretary Baker would be visiting the region before too long. There was discussion about South Korea's leadership role in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] process, and the third ministerial level meeting of APEC will be held in Seoul in November of this year. In the context of their discussion of economic issues, the President emphasized his desire to maintain engagement with China, and that that was the reason why we firmly support MFN [most-favored-nation trade status] for China. The President noted that if MFN were denied to the PRC [People's Republic of China] that one of the first victims would be Hong Kong. And as part of our effort to deal with the major players in East Asia in the years and decades ahead, he wants to see engagement with the PRC sustained. The President also emphasized the desire for a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, something for which President Roh expressed support. There was then some detailed discussion about the importance of maintaining open trade, both on a bilateral basis and in terms of the multilateral trading regime, and both presidents expressed support for as free a trading regime, as liberal terms for trade, as possible. And then finally, there was a note--the President noted that in addition to President Roh's discussion with the various economic ministers he would also be meeting with Secretary [of Defense] Cheney and again reaffirmed our support for South Korea's security. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

US Policy in Lebanon

Kimmitt Source: Robert M. Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Remarks before the American Task Force for Lebanon, Washington, DC Date: Jun 27, 19916/27/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Lebanon Subject: Terrorism, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] I am very pleased to speak before the American Task Force for Lebanon as you begin your conference on Lebanon, and I bring you the greetings and best wishes from my immediate boss, Secretary of State Jim Baker. I've thumbed through the program and it is indeed a distinguished group. Before I take a minute to augment what the President said, let me just say it takes a strong and respected organization to put together a program such as you will hear over the next 4 days. The task force and the conference organizers can be proud of a job well done. You have chosen an opportune time to examine Lebanon. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, the Bush Administration--and, indeed, all the countries of the world--are looking at the Middle East and looking for new solutions for old problems. As you have just heard in President Bush's message, Lebanon remains high on our foreign policy agenda. And let me reiterate the fundamental policy tenet laid out by the President: The United States supports the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon, the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces, and the disbanding of all militias. We continue to believe that full implementation of the Taif agreement provides the best opportunity to reach these goals. We thus support the efforts of President Hrawi and the Lebanese Government to implement fully the Taif agreement and extend their authority over the entire country. The Administration, like, I think, many of you, is heartened by the recent progress that has been made in Lebanon. For the past 8 months there has been no factional fighting. The Lebanese army has deployed into areas north and east of Beirut that were controlled for years by militia forces. Major Christian, Druze, and Shi'a militias appear to be cooperating with the government. Many of these militias have turned their weapons over to the Lebanese army. The Lebanese cabinet has reaffirmed its plan to deploy the army into southern Lebanon to complete the process of disarming all militia and Palestinian groups. The United States supports this plan and hopes to see it carried out fully and promptly. We are hopeful that the final chapter of the history of militias in Lebanon is now being written. On May 22 of this year, Lebanon and Syria signed a treaty that defines their bilateral relations. On June 6, the Lebanese cabinet named 40 new and replacement deputies to the Lebanese parliament. Both of these actions have been the cause of some comment--even some opposition--but both of these actions were clearly called for in the Taif agreement. We have made clear, both publicly and in our discussions with the Lebanese and Syrians, that our measure of the treaty will be whether its implementation is consistent with Lebanese independence and sovereignty and with the Taif accord. We will be closely following the treaty's implementation. We have consistently told the Syrians that we expect them to live up to the letter and spirit of the Taif agreement and to help promote Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. We thus expect that Syrian actions with regard to Lebanon will respect these principles and will be in the framework of normal relations between two sovereign states. In addition to Lebanese politics, as the President's letter noted, we should also look at Lebanon's economic needs. We have encouraged Lebanon's Arab neighbors and other friends, such as the Japanese, to assist Lebanon as best they can. Our own Agency for International Development is currently reviewing our assistance program for Lebanon to see if its focus should shift away from relief toward more reconstruction and development. None of this is meant to suggest that the Lebanese themselves cannot rebuild Lebanon. In fact, we are quite confident that the Lebanese will see the new opportunities that present themselves as the government spreads its authority and stability over more of the country. I think we have learned many times in the past never to underestimate the ability of the Lebanese to bounce back from tragedy. We understand many Lebanese are going home this summer. When they return, they will find that there has been a real change on the ground. For the first time in years, Lebanese can drive from Sidon to Tripoli--or from West Beirut to East--and see only Lebanese army soldiers patrolling the highway. This renewed freedom of movement has allowed Lebanese to rediscover their own country. Recently 20,000 Lebanese school children went on a field trip to visit the ruins in Baalbek, which most had never seen before. And as Lebanese have begun to travel around their country again, they have begun to meet and speak to fellow citizens from different regions and different religious backgrounds. They are discovering that they have more in common than perhaps they believed during 15 years of war. But the progress made in Lebanon is not limited to gains on the map and visits to historical sites. There has been a wholesale change in the attitudes of the Lebanese themselves, inside Lebanon and abroad. Many Lebanese have told us that the era of militia domination is over and that Lebanese must now rebuild Lebanon's society, institutions, and economy. As I noted earlier, thousands of Lebanese living abroad will return to Lebanon this summer, and many will be taking their spouses and their children with them. Airline flights, we are told, are booked months in advance, even though several additional airlines have recently begun, or restarted, service to Beirut. As your conference begins to examine Lebanon and look to the future, you can be sure that the United States shares the goals of all Lebanese: a peaceful, prosperous Lebanon, fully independent, and free from non-Lebanese forces and armed militias. Lebanon's neighbors must recognize that Lebanon is a sovereign state with its own identity and that Lebanese must have control over their own destiny. The Lebanese-American community and the task force have important roles to play helping to shape US policy in Lebanon and assisting your friends and relatives in Lebanon to overcome the effects of 15 years of war. My message today, then, is straightforward: We should recognize the gains that have been made in Lebanon and work together to build on those gains. We should be proud that the Lebanese Government and army are expanding their control over more of the country and should work together to find ways to strengthen the government and institutions to revive Lebanon's democratic tradition. We can rejoice that friends and family in Lebanon are safer today than at any time since 1975, but our task remains to work together to find ways to make them even safer and more secure. I want to wish you the best of luck and progress in your conference. Thank you very much for letting me be with you today. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Celebrates First Anniversary

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from remarks at ceremony for the first anniversary of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, Washington, DC Date: Jun 27, 19916/27/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America, Central America Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] We've come here today to celebrate the first anniversary of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative [EAI]. As you know, this initiative wasn't a unilateral thing; it grew out of talks between many of us here today. I heard many of your concerns about building a prosperous hemisphere, of throwing off the deadening weight of debt and economic stagnation and building strong ties of idealism and self- interest. With the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, we vowed to encourage free trade, stimulate investment, and reduce the debt burden that overwhelms so many of our neighbors and our colleagues. We've made great progress. In just 1 year, we've signed eight bilateral framework agreements for trade and investment: with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela. Make that 10 agreements, because today Carla Hills [US Trade Representative] will sign bilateral framework agreements with Minister DeFranco of Nicaragua and Minister Alfaro of Panama. We also are negotiating with Guatemala and the 13-nation, English- speaking Caribbean community. Last week, right here, Ambassador Hills also joined representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in signing what we call the Rose Garden agreement, the first regional framework accord under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Carla has been very busy, and I'm glad to see her bringing a lot of these things to fruition. I congratulate her and Dave Mulford [Deputy Treasury Secretary] and so many others who have worked tirelessly on these projects. Ambassador Hills and her counterparts will pull down tariff and non-tariff barriers, protect patents and intellectual property, strengthen investment environments, and make it possible for firms to repatriate their profits. In short, we will build a solid foundation for economic cooperation and prosperity. We've also begun making our hemisphere more hospitable to investment. The Inter-American Development Bank [IDB] has approved its first investment sector loan. It's $150 million to Chile. [Chilean Finance] Minister Foxley and President Iglesias completed arrangements for this loan today, I am told. President Iglesias, I want to thank you, sir, and congratulate everyone at the IDB for this important step. And we should congratulate Chile for the impressive free market reforms that it has undertaken. Through these loans, the IDB will help Latin America and the Caribbean countries compete for capital and embrace reforms that foster economic growth. For years, the world experimented with the fantasy that experts could manage economies. The utter failure of the communist system demonstrated that expert cadres can no more manage growth than they can manage the weather or anything else. Free markets reward people who have ideas, not just those who have connections. They allow poor people to become rich. They make possible unprecedented levels of social mobility. And, of course, they mean jobs. They teach people hard study, hard work, and commitment to others--those commitments produce real wealth. I'm also pleased to report that our proposal for a $1.5 billion Multilateral Investment Fund has got off to a great start. Japan has pledged $100 million for each of the next 5 years. Canada, France, Portugal, and Spain have expressed keen interests in supporting the fund, which will provide targeted support for countries that undertake the difficult reforms necessary to encourage investment and stimulate free enterprise. Pillar three of our proposal, debt reduction, also has gotten off to a rousing start. Five nations already have negotiated far- reaching reductions in commercial debt through the provisions of the Brady Plan. Other nations will take advantage of the plan as their economic reforms take shape. Congress has agreed to reward economic reform and trade liberalization by reducing a portion of a nation's debt--the food assistance loans contracted under PL 480. Congress also supported our recommendation to use interest on remaining debt for grass- roots environmental projects. And this ambitious, innovative plan already has produced results. Today, the United States will sign an agreement with Chile, slashing Chile's PL 480 debt by 40%, to $23 million. This is the first example of bilateral debt reduction under EAI. We look forward to reaching an understanding soon on the environmental component of this agreement. So now, just briefly, let me talk about what lies ahead. As you know, Congress recently voted not to terminate the fast-track trade procedures that enable us to deal in good faith with you--and with Congress--in trade negotiations. Our goal is to create a free trade zone that will cover all of North America. This trade zone-- 360 million consumers and markets that produce more than $6 trillion in annual output--will set the stage for something even more dramatic--a whole hemispheric zone of free trade. I was very proud and pleased the way so many countries south of Mexico and in the Caribbean supported the FTA [free trade agreement], the fast-track authority, with Mexico. It's broad vision, because it should sweep through--this whole concept of free trade must sweep through our whole hemisphere. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative can link our nations with their diverse cultures, work forces, and creative forces. I know some have worried that the EAI might indicate a reduction in our commitment to the multilateral trading system. Not so: we remain fully committed and fully determined to make that system work. Indeed, as part of the Uruguay Round, we have joined our Latin American and our Caribbean allies in trying to pull down protectionist barriers in Europe and in Asia. I want to stress the importance of reaching a successful conclusion to the round. It can establish a basis for worldwide free and fair trade. Without it, we're going to have great difficulty moving forward. We live in an extraordinary place at an extraordinary time. When Cuba embraces democracy, ours will become the first truly democratic hemisphere in the world. That is a major goal, a major accomplishment by most countries already; Cuba being this holdout. There's no accident of history here. From the northern tip of Alaska to the southernmost point of Tierra del Fuego, we share common heritages. Our people can trace their roots to all the nations of the world. We share ties of culture, and of blood, and of common interest. And now, as democracy sweeps the world, we share the challenge of leadership through example. We can lead the way to a world free from suspicion and from mercantilist barriers, from socialist inefficiencies. We can show the world how prosperity preserves the social order --and the land, air, and water as well. We can show the rest of the world that deregulation, respect for private property, low tax rates, and low trade barriers can produce vast economic returns. We can show the rest of the world how to build upon each other's strengths, rather than preying upon weaknesses. Today, I simply want to pledge to you, our friends, my full effort to make the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative a total reality. I urge Congress to pass promptly the legislation necessary to enact EAI. This includes debt-reduction authority and authority for the United States to contribute its share to the Multilateral Investment Fund. In 1876--I think I mentioned this the other day when [Brazilian] President Collor was here--the Brazilian emperor, Dom Pedro II, visited the United States and stopped in St. Louis, among other places. And he noted that local craftsmen were using only the sturdiest materials in building a customs house. The emperor was stunned. "But an iron building would last 400 years," he noted. "You do not mean to tell me that there will be any custom houses in 400 years." We've worked miracles in 1 year; and so let us shape a revolution in the next. Because I honestly believe that, together, we can make our hemisphere's freedom first and best for all. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

Trade and Investment Agreement With Nicaragua and Panama

Description: Text of a fact sheet released by the White House, Washington, DC Date: Jun 27, 19916/27/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Central America Country: Nicaragua, Panama Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] The United States on June 27, 1991, signed "Framework Agreements on Trade and Investment" with Nicaragua and Panama. The signing of these agreements occurred on the first anniversary of the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI).
The Trade Pillar of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
The EAI specifies two approaches to bring down trade barriers in the hemisphere: a successful outcome to the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and a "system of free trade" from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is the first step in the creation of a hemispheric market. In the past year, significant progress has been made in implementing the trade pillar of the EAI (see chronology).
Framework Agreements
The United States is moving to conclude framework agreements on trade and investment with countries and groups of countries that wish to work toward freer trade in the hemisphere. Framework agreements, in and of themselves, do not bind the signatories to carry out specific trade liberalization commitments. They are comprised of a declaration of trade and investment principles, an agreement to consult on a regular basis, and an initial agenda for consultation. Illustrative of the enthusiasm for the President's initiative, 14 Latin countries have signed framework agreements with the United States over the last year. Completion of a framework agreement with a country or group of countries does not imply that we will be proposing free trade negotiations with such countries immediately. It does establish a channel to explore various trade liberalization options and promote the EAI vision. The signing of a framework agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay on June 19, 1991, marked the first framework agreement with a regional group. The United States is also finalizing a similar agreement with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). By significantly reducing trade barriers among themselves and expanding this liberalization to other countries, these regional groupings support free trade principles that support US objectives in the current GATT negotiations. The remarkable progress on negotiating these agreements with such a broad range of countries in the Americas testifies to the commitment of so many nations in the Western Hemisphere to economic reform, liberalization, and democracy in recent years.
Chronology of EAI Trade Pillar Implementation to Date
Significant progress has been made during the past year in implementing the trade pillar of the EAI: By the end of June, the United States will have entered into "Framework Agreements on Trade and Investment" with a large number of Western Hemisphere nations: Mexico (Prior to the EAI announcement) Bolivia (Prior to the EAI announcement) Colombia (July 1990) Ecuador (July 1990) Chile (October 1990) Honduras (November 1990) Costa Rica (November 1990) Venezuela (April 1991) El Salvador (May 1991) Peru (May 1991) Argentina (June 1991) Brazil (June 1991) Paraguay (June 1991) Uruguay (June 1991) Nicaragua (June 1991) Panama (June 1991) The United States is also discussing framework agreements with numerous other countries. It expects negotiations to be completed by July with: Guatemala CARICOM countries (comprised of 13 English-speaking Caribbean nations, including Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent/Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago).(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Date: Jul 8, 19917/8/91 Category: Fact Sheets Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control, International Law [TEXT] Since its entry into force in March 1970, the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been a cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Successive US administrations have worked to achieve universal adherence to the treaty. With more than 140 parties, it has the largest number of adherents of any arms control agreement. Three of the nuclear weapon states--the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union--are parties to the treaty. France indicated years ago that it would act as though it is a party and in June 1991 stated that it would adhere to the treaty. On July 10, 1991, South Africa formally will accede to the treaty in Washington. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union--designated as depository governments in the treaty-- continue to encourage the few remaining non-parties to adhere to this important arms control treaty.
Treaty Goals and Undertakings
The treaty's substantive articles have been drawn carefully to serve three major goals (see box). Under terms of the treaty, nuclear weapon states are obligated not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state to acquire nuclear explosive devices (article I). Correspondingly, non-nuclear weapon states party to the treaty are obligated not to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices (article II). The treaty provides for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to apply international safeguards, including on-site inspection, to all nuclear material in the peaceful programs of non- nuclear weapon state parties (article III). This article also obligates the parties to require IAEA safeguards on nuclear materials and certain equipment exported to non-nuclear weapon states. The safeguards system helps to verify compliance and is designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear explosive devices. Article IV recognizes the right of parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and calls for the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties also are to have access to any benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions (article V). Article VI enjoins all parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to ending the nuclear arms race, with a view to general and complete disarmament. The NPT embodies a broadly supported international norm of non-proliferation: increasingly, world opinion has come to view acquisition of nuclear explosives as no longer legitimate and a world of many nuclear powers as undesirable.
Review Conference
Under the treaty, a review conference can be held every 5 years. Four such conferences have been held, in 1975, 1980, 1985, and August-September 1990. Each of these conferences successfully undertook an article-by-article review of the treaty's implementation, with the debate focusing on cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy (article IV) and, to an even greater degree, on efforts to negotiate arms control agreements (article VI). At the 1990 conference, participants generally recognized the treaty's important contribution to international peace and security, and a great majority of the parties attending reaffirmed their commitment to it. Agreement was reached on most of the issues discussed, including, for example, the vital role of international safeguards in preventing nuclear proliferation, the necessity of tighter export controls on nuclear technology, the need for scrupulous adherence to the obligations of the treaty, and the potential importance of the IAEA conducting "special inspections." However, no final consensus declaration emerged because a small number of non-aligned countries, led by Mexico, insisted on language linking extension of the treaty to negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty.
1995 Extension Conference
The NPT calls for a conference in 1995 to decide whether to extend the treaty indefinitely beyond its initial 25-year duration or for a fixed period or periods. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR favor an indefinite extension of the treaty. Many other NPT parties share this view. The United States strongly opposes linking the future of the treaty to a comprehensive test ban treaty or a specific arms control measure. Such linkage could undermine the treaty and the broad security benefits that derive from it.
Looking Ahead
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is vital to a safer and more secure world. The success of the 1995 conference will depend on many factors, particularly on recognition by the parties that the NPT contributes greatly to international security and stability. A world without NPT would lead to diminished political constraints on the spread of nuclear explosives, increase regional suspicion and tension, and jeopardize international peace and stability. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

South Africa To Accede to NPT

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Washington, DC Date: Jul 2, 19917/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: South Africa Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control [TEXT] I welcome and strongly commend the Government of South Africa's decision to accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This decision reflects the growing international conviction to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as exemplified by the adherence to the treaty by other states in the region. It further demonstrates the statesmanship and vision of President [F.W.] de Klerk as he takes South Africa into a new era beyond apartheid and regional conflict; toward reconciliation and partnership. I strongly urge those nations in the region who have not acceded to the treaty to do so, in order to join the growing community of non-proliferation, to strengthen the international regime against the spread of nuclear weapons, and to promote the cause of peace and global cooperation.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

Arms Control, Arms Transfers, and UAE Helicopters

Clarke Source: Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary for Politico- Military Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Arms Control, International Security, and Science, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun 27, 19916/27/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: United Arab Emirates Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] I have just returned from a 2-week mission to Paris to plan for five power talks on arms control in the Middle East and to five Gulf nations to consult with them on arms control and post-war security structures. I welcome this opportunity to brief this committee on those issues and to discuss with you the sale of 20 helicopters to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). First, I would like to review the President's arms control proposal for the Middle East. Second and more narrowly, I propose to focus on that element of the initiative that pertains to arms transfers. Third and most specifically, I will address the arms transfer before this committee, the UAE helicopters.
Arms Control
Arms control is virtually an unknown phenomenon to governments in the region. They have sought security in secrecy, not transparency. They have sought peace through arms alone and not through limitations. Thus, while we may have ambitious plans for arms control in the region, we know that we are at the beginning of what will be a long process. It is a process that will move in parallel with the political track and can feed back and reinforce political progress. With President Bush's Colorado Springs plan, we have started down that long path. Let me quickly review the six parts of that proposal: First, an arms embargo on Iraq and the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction: I met with leaders of the UN Special Commission charged with that latter task last week in Bahrain and can report that their difficult mission is well underway. Second, we have proposed a meeting of the five powers who are the largest exporters of arms to establish a system to prevent destabilizing exports of conventional arms, eliminate the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and their components and precursors, bring transparency to the arms transfer process, and bring about responsible arms transfer behavior. France has offered to host those talks beginning on July 8, and all five powers (US, UK, USSR, France, and China) have agreed to attend. I will return to detail this aspect of the President's proposal in a moment. Third, the President boldly proposed the elimination of all surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in the inventories of states in the region. As a first step, he called for a freeze on production, acquisition, and testing of those missiles. Fourth, he called for the rapid completion of the treaty to ban chemical weapons [CW] and its early application in the region. To accelerate that process, he announced several new US positions including the unconditional destruction of all of our CW stocks and the renouncement of the right of retaliation upon entry into force of the treaty. Fifth, the President declared that we would seek to strengthen the treaty banning biological weapons at a special meeting in September. Sixth, recognize that progress on CBW [chemical and biological weapons], will be assisted by movement in the nuclear area, the President reiterated our call for full-scope safeguards and NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] adherence in the region. He also added a call for on-site verification to ensure that no country in the area was engaged in enriching fuel to weapons-grade material. In the long term, we seek the Mubarak plan of a region free of all weapons of mass destruction, but we know that can only come when the peace process comes to fruition. We have been heartened by the support this package has received. The Paris five power meeting will address it further, as will the G-7 summit in London on July 15th. We have had, and will continue to have, talks with regional states on the specifics of the proposal.
Arms Transfers
As I turn to the details of the second point of the President's plan, let me put forward six propositions that frame our view of arms transfers to the Middle East. First, we must prevent another Iraq. The Iraqi regime had procured 6,000 main battle tanks. That force was clearly in excess of Iraq's legitimate self-defense requirements and constituted an offensive threat. No international regime existed to note this build-up and address its threatening implications. No agreed standard existed to say that it was wrong. We want to fix that. Second, arms transfers as a phenomenon are not inherently good or evil. No responsible international security analyst believes that the transfer of the Patriot missile to Israel was inherently evil or unwise. Similarly, no one would think that transferring the Tomahawk cruise missile to Libya would be anything other than criminal lunacy. These extreme examples demonstrate the point that whether to transfer arms per se is not the question, rather the policy choice is what arms go to which recipients. Third, arms transfers should not be an end in themselves but should be an instrument to other goals. I mentioned the transfer of the Patriot to Israel: that helped keep Israel out of a war. Similarly, the arms transfers associated with the Camp David agreement helped to bring Egypt and Israel into a peace. Among the goals we seek to reinforce or achieve by arms transfers to the Middle East are: -- The deterrence of aggression against friendly states by (A) demonstrating a close military cooperation with the US and (B) providing the capability to make aggression costly; -- The further integration of small militaries such as those of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] to achieve economies of scale, regional cooperation, and credible deterrence; -- The reduction of the likelihood of US forces having to be employed, through increased deterrence by regional forces and the enhanced capability of regional states to deal with small contingencies on their own; -- The ability of US forces to operate jointly with regional states (as Saudi and US F-15s and AWACS [airborne warning and control system] did so well in Desert Storm) in peacetime to deter aggression and in combat to counter aggression; -- The enhancement of US influence among key regional decision-makers through years of experience in dealing with US armed forces and politico-military officials; -- The creation of sufficient confidence in their own defensive capabilities and cooperation with us, that these key regional decision-makers are willing to engage in arms control of increasingly ambitious and effective dimensions. Fourth, it is not US arms transfers that have been the problem in the Middle East's becoming over armed and falling into wars. Patriots to Israel, AWACS to Saudi Arabia, M-60s to Egypt, F-16s to Bahrain, I-Hawks to the UAE: They have not been the problem. No Middle East state with which the United States had an ongoing military relationship at the time has been an aggressor. It was not Kuwait that invaded Iraq. It was not Tunisia that attacked Libya. We have such relations with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. They are not the problem. I believe the problems of aggression have come from the governments of Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Thus, US arms transfers are not the problem. Some point to Iran as an example of how US arms transfers can fall into the wrong hands. Iran, however, is an example of how we can effectively ground a force by pulling the plug on spare parts and technicians when a government changes from friend to enemy, as they rarely may. The US does not transfer arms willy-nilly to any regime that seeks them. It provides them to responsible, friendly, and peace- seeking governments. We have an excellent record and we do not need new regulations or legislation to prevent US excesses which do not exist in the first place. Fifth, US arms transfers have helped us to seek responsible goals in the region. The Congress appropriated $3 billion for arms transfers to Egypt and Israel last year. Why did the Congress do that? It did it because arms transfers to these two countries helped ensure their own security and, in feeling more secure, give them a real stake in peace. Arms transfers were a key element in the good relations that the US had with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey before the war. Had we refused arms to those countries we would not have had the influence with them, they would not have had the confidence in us, and they would not have had the high-quality interoperable weapons needed to participate in the coalition against Iraq. The next time someone asks what good have arms transfers gotten us in our relations with Middle Eastern States, ask them whether they think the courageous stands taken by Presidents Mubarak [of Egypt] and Ozal [of Turkey] and King Fahd [of Saudi Arabia] would have been possible if the US had denied them arms transfers. Sixth, halting arms transfers to the region while we seek an international system to regulate them is a self-defeating meat- cleaver approach. What would happen if we did halt arms transfers to the region while we negotiate? Probably the same thing that would have happened if we had ceased to improve and maintain our forces while negotiating START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] and CFE [Conventional Armed forces in Europe]. We would diminish our ability to influence the outcomes we seek. North Korea, Brazil, South Africa, and others will continue to export even if we were to get the other members of the five powers to halt. We will not get the other five powers to halt pending talks or after them. Moreover, the Administration cannot support any agreement that would prohibit such sales that are necessary for the security of our friends. I cannot imagine that the Congress would either. Therefore, holding up such sales cannot be justified on the grounds of a possible future international agreement that would prevent them. The only thing that holding up such sales will accomplish is the diminution of US influence in a region that this nation thought so critical 6 months ago that we sent a half million Americans there and fought a war.
Helicopters to the UAE
Now let us turn to the case at hand. The Administration began consulting Congress last October about its plans to sell 20 helicopters to the UAE. Now we have formally notified that sale. The UAE is not now and never will be a threat to the security and stability in the Middle East. Indeed, it is a force for peace. The UAE provided support to the US Navy during Operation Earnest Will in 1987. It did so despite threats of retaliation from Iran. Before any state (including Kuwait) asked us to act against Iraq's threats of war last summer, the UAE proposed combined US- UAE military action to deter Iraq. USAF aircraft landed in the UAE a week before the invasion of Kuwait. I went to the UAE immediately after the invasion, and they offered us anything we wanted to prosecute a war against Iraq. They did this before many of our more traditional allies. In the war, US aircraft bombed Iraq from the UAE. US ships, including aircraft carriers, operated out of UAE ports. The small Emirates air force bombed Iraqi forces. Its small army was part of the joint Arab force that punched into Kuwait City. The UAE transferred $4 billion to the US to offset our costs in the war. Even in Washington, $4 billion is a lot of money. Is this the kind of nation that we should snub by refusing them 20 helicopters? Now the UAE is planning with us a closer military relationship. That relationship is part of what I discussed 4 days ago in Abu Dhabi. My opposite number there asked me, "How will I explain to my people that we should expand our military cooperation with the US and fund some US military activities if you refuse to sell us arms?" I had no answer to that question, nor do I think there is any good answer to explain to such a friendly, courageous country that could never threaten anyone why we will not help it defend itself. These helicopters will help it to defend its oil platforms in the Gulf. Such platforms were attacked by Iran in 1987. They will permit the UAE to contribute more effectively to the GCC's combined force to deter Iraq. The technology involved is not new to the region. Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia already have bought the same helicopter. Refusing to sell these 20 helicopters to the UAE would be folly indeed. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

Group of Seven: Toward Global Economic Growth

Description: Text of a statement issued by the Group of Seven (G-7) Finance Ministers meeting in London, England Date: Jun 23, 19916/23/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, North America Country: Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Germany, France Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] (1) The Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States of America and the United Kingdom met on 23 June 1991 in London for an exchange of views on current international economic and financial issues. (2) The Ministers and Governors reviewed the global economic situation and prospects, including developments in their economies since their meeting in April. They noted with satisfaction the increasing signs for global economic recovery. They agreed that sustained global economic growth with price stability is essential to address the historic challenges and opportunities which are facing the world economy. They further agreed that pursuing such a strategy in a medium term context was the best way of meeting these challenges and accordingly they reaffirmed their support for economic policy coordination. (3) The Ministers and Governors emphasised the importance of fiscal and monetary policies which provide the basis for lower real interest rates and a sustained global economic recovery with price stability. They recognised that the approach taken would need to reflect the differing situations in each country. They noted the signs of prospective economic recovery and lower inflation in those countries which are in recession; some other countries are experiencing slower growth while in others, particular by Germany and Japan, economic activity is continuing to make a positive contribution. The Ministers and Governors also welcomed the reductions in interest rates that have taken place in a number of their countries and elsewhere. They believed that monetary policy should provide the conditions for sustainable growth with price stability in line with the differing circumstances of each country. (4) The Ministers and Governors stressed the importance of policies aimed at increasing savings. The Ministers and Governors noted the important budgetary measures taken in some of their countries to reduce significantly high budget deficits and improve the conditions for lower interest rates. Continued progress in reducing budget deficits is essential [in order] to strengthen national savings. These efforts should be complemented by measures to reduce impediments to private saving, particularly where saving rates are low. (5) The Ministers and Governors also reviewed recent developments in international financial markets and reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate closely, taking account of the need for orderly markets, if necessary through appropriately concerted action in exchange markets. (6) The Ministers and Governors noted that sustained expansion in global trade is an important engine of growth, including for countries throughout the world that are restructuring their economies. In this regard, they accorded the highest priority to a swift and successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round. In light of the particularly difficult circumstances facing Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, consideration should be given to measures which would enhance the trade prospects of these countries. (7) The Ministers and Governors welcomed the reform efforts underway in the Eastern European countries. They noted the economic situation in the Soviet Union and the need for sustained economic reform. Success of these countries in their process of transition and fundamental reform is in the interest both of these countries and global economic growth. (8) The Ministers and Governors also underscored that the adoption of measures in their countries to promote economic efficiency could provide an important spur to global economic recovery and price stability. Such measures could also send a strong and positive signal to reforming countries, implementing their own reforms. They agreed on the need to review regulations and structural policies with a view to improving the functioning of their economies. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

International Terrorism

Date: Jul 8, 19917/8/91 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Subject: Terrorism [TEXT] International terrorism is a serious threat to the US and the world. The US is a prime target because our policies, values, and culture are directly opposed by many terrorist groups and because the US has an extensive official and commercial presence overseas. Israel, Western democracies, and moderate Arab governments are also major targets. State sponsorship of terrorist activity has caused great increases in both the number of attacks and the resulting casualties. Since 1980, nearly 7,000 international terrorist incidents have occurred worldwide, killing more than 5,000 people and wounding 12,300 others. About 2,000 attacks were against American targets. American casualties since 1980 have totaled 580 dead and 610 wounded.
Terrorist Activity in 1990
In 1990, international terrorism fell to its lowest level in 13 years, with only 455 attacks recorded. A large number (197) were directed against American targets; most of these (130) occurred in Latin America and consisted of low-level bombing attacks that resulted in minor damage and few casualties. Ten American citizens were killed and 34 wounded in terrorist attacks last year. The citizens and property of 73 countries were targeted by terrorists in 1990.
Terrorism and the Persian Gulf War
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait last August, Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials repeatedly threatened to launch terrorist attacks against coalition members in the event of war and undertook actions consistent with these threats. In addition, a number of Palestinian terrorist groups pledged their support for Saddam Hussein and publicly threatened terrorist reprisals against the West, Israel, and moderate Arab targets. The US added Iraq to the list of state sponsors of terrorism in September. By the end of 1990, the US had evidence that Iraqi operatives were planning to mount a major terrorist campaign. In response to these threats, the US and 50 other nations expelled, deported, arrested, or detained hundreds of suspected Iraqi operatives, including Iraqi diplomats and embassy staff. President Bush stated that Saddam Hussein would be held "directly responsible" for any Iraqi-sponsored terrorism. Other terrorist countries were warned of the consequences of mounting terrorist attacks, and those countries in turn reined in those groups over which they have influence. Security measures were enhanced at embassies, military installations, and other possible targets; airport security was increased worldwide to the highest level ever. The disruption of Iraq's command and control infrastructure, the deterrent effect of our warnings, and tighter security all discouraged Iraqi terrorism. Iraq was linked to only a small number of attacks or attempted attacks. Some 200 terrorist incidents occurred during the Persian Gulf war, but most were perpetrated by indigenous terrorist groups in Turkey, Greece, Peru, and Chile who exploited the war to advance their own goals. The majority of these attacks were sporadic, uncoordinated bombings that caused few casualties and little property damage. About half of the attacks were directed at American targets. No "spectacular" terrorist attacks occurred during the war, and some planned attacks were thwarted. The level of international cooperation against the Iraqi terrorist threat was unprecedented. Cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence services in many countries increased the effectiveness of counter-terrorist efforts.
Steps Announced at Economic Summits
The seven industrialized countries known as the G-7 [Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States] have repeatedly issued joint statements on terrorism at their annual economic summit meetings. The most important of these commit the G-7 to sever air links with any country that refuses to "prosecute or extradite" those responsible for attacks on civil aviation (Venice, 1987) or for hijackings (Bonn, 1978). Other statements have condemned hostage-taking, attacks on diplomatic personnel and premises, and state-sponsored terrorism. The seven have repeatedly expressed their resolve to improve air safety, exchange terrorist information, work toward closer cooperation among police and security agencies, and bring terrorists to justice.
US Policy
US counter-terrorism policy was initially developed in the 1970s, and the three basic principles remain as valid today as they were then. First, the US makes no concessions to terrorists holding official or private American citizens hostage. Specifically, we will not pay ransom, release prisoners, or change our policies in response to terrorist demands. At the same time, the US Government will make every effort, including contact with the captors or their representatives, to obtain the release of hostages without making concessions. Making deals with terrorists only encourages more terrorism. Second, the US works with other countries to put pressure on terrorist-supporting countries (such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea) to persuade them that such support is not cost free. These nations help terrorists by providing training, money, weapons, travel and identification documents, diplomatic pouch privileges, safe houses, and refuge. The US, working with friendly countries, seeks to isolate such countries by imposing economic, political, diplomatic, and--if all else fails--military pressures. Third, the US cooperates with friendly nations in developing practical measures to counter terrorism. These measures include: -- Identifying the terrorists by name and learning their goals, ideologies, sponsors, and areas of operation; -- Tracking them, particularly when they cross borders, and searching them for forged documents, weapons, and dangerous materials; and -- Apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing terrorists. Although more needs to be done in these areas, we are beginning to see results. More terrorists are being caught before they can carry out their attacks, and more terrorists are being convicted and sentenced to stiff prison terms. Importantly, more terrorists are serving their full prison terms. As a result, the traditional terrorist tactic of taking hostages in order to secure the release of convicted terrorists from prison is increasingly ineffective. Laws covering prosecution, exchange of evidence, and extradition are being improved and used more frequently to punish terrorists. The US offers anti-terrorism training assistance to representatives of friendly governments trying to fight terrorism. More than 11,000 police and security personnel from nearly 70 countries have received such training since the program started in 1984. We also are working to provide more protection for American officials abroad and to make US embassies and facilities overseas more secure. Because most terrorism originates and is carried out abroad, continued international cooperation is a key to future success in countering the terrorist threat, and a high priority is being given to improving this cooperation.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

Focus on Central and Eastern Europe Summary of Initiatives

Date: Jul 8, 19917/8/91 Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies Region: E/C Europe Country: Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (former), Poland Subject: Trade/Economics, Media/Telecommunications, International Law, Environment [TEXT]
Citizens Democracy Corps
Bulgaria
. Ambassador Sol Polansky chaired the Citizens Democracy Corps' first meeting of private voluntary organizations wishing to assist in Bulgaria's transition to democracy and free markets. Ted Achilles, the Democracy Corps' representative in Bulgaria, reported on the dramatic changes in that country during the past 6 months. The Democracy Corps will focus its initial efforts on health care, agriculture, and privatization. The Democracy Corps plans to hold these meetings on a regular basis. For more information about the meetings or the Citizens Democracy Corps, call 800-321-1945 or 202-872-0933.
Media Initiatives
International Media Fund.
The United States Information Agency (USIA) has given the International Media Fund a $5-million grant out of FY 1991 special assistance funding for Eastern Europe. The grant was awarded to develop a diverse independent media essential to the growth of democratic political systems and pluralistic societies in Central and Eastern Europe. The Fund will provide assistance through financial and equipment grants to help support independent television and radio stations, newspapers, and other periodicals. It also will provide technical assistance in management, programming, marketing, technology, and other aspects of media operating in a market-oriented environment. For more information about the Fund, call its Executive Director, Aurelius Fernandez, at 202-296-9787.
Poland
. Jerome Aumente, professor and director of Rutgers University's Journalism Resource Center, is the team leader of eight US media professionals who will be professionals-in-residence at newspapers and radio and television stations throughout Poland for 2 weeks this summer.
Grant Given
. Thanks to the interest of TV commentator Bill Moyers, Professor Aumente has obtained a $300,000 grant for Rutgers University from the Florence and John Schumann Foundation for media training in Central and Eastern Europe.
Central and East European Law Initiative
Bulgaria.
On May 7, a senior US federal judge, John Fullam, arrived in Sofia to assist the American Bar Association's Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI). Judge Fullam is working with numerous Bulgarian organizations such as the Constitutional Drafting Committee of the Grand National Assembly, the Bulgarian Bar Association, Sofia University, the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the President, the Office of the Prime Minister, and various political parties. Similar visits by other legal experts are scheduled for Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania. At the request of the Secretary of the Bulgarian Grand National Assembly, CEELI provided follow-up consultations June 18-23 with the Constitutional Drafting Committee concerning the final draft of the new constitution.
Czechoslovakia.
The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic has adopted a law establishing a Constitutional Court. As follow-up to CEELI's two previous workshops in Prague on criminal law revision and judicial restructuring, a CEELI delegation will provide assistance to the federal Supreme Court on organizing the Constitutional Court.
Romania.
A CEELI delegation visited Bucharest May 13-17 to discuss Romania's draft constitution with the Constitutional Drafting Committee and review the assistance provided by three CEELI experts in November 1990. For more information about CEELI or its programs, call its Executive Director, Mark Ellis, at 202-331-2619.
Private Sector Support for Business Education
The North American Consortium for Free Market Study plans to send several hundred Central and East Europeans to a specially designed, 1-year work-study program in market economics and management offered at selected schools in Canada and the United States during the next 5 years. The consortium comprises Canadian and US corporations, foundations, governments, and schools. The first students will arrive in September 1991. The consortium was created by Edgar M. Bronfman, chairman of Joseph E. Seagram ∧ Sons, Inc., in response to President Bush's appeal that the private sector take a special role in helping with the economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe. The leaders of that region also have asked for help in sending their people to schools in North America. Seagram provided initial funding and help in finding members. The consortium has raised several hundred thousand dollars from such companies as Johnson ∧ Johnson, the Jefferson Smurfit packaging group, Du Pont, Ralston Purina, Eli Lilly, and Merck, Sharp, ∧ Dohme. Dr. Vartan Gregorian, president of Brown University, has agreed to co-chair the consortium's advisory council with Edgar Bronfman. The Institute of International Education (IIE) of New York City, the managers of the Fulbright graduate student program, has agreed to manage the consortium. IIE will select the students, pick the participating schools, and handle all the consortium's managerial needs. For the 1991-92 school year, IIE has chosen the following schools: the Katz School at the University of Pittsburgh, the Kellogg School at Northwestern University, Illinois University at Urbana/Champaign, McGill University in Montreal, and the University of South Carolina. IIE will select students from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland for the first year. Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia will be added in the second year. For more information about this effort, call James M. Montgomery of Seagram at 202-638-7777.
US Opens Ports to Central and East European Vessels
President Bush has opened all US ports to vessels from Central and Eastern Europe, including 12 ports previously closed to such vessels for national security reasons. The 12 ports are Charleston, South Carolina; Groton and New London, Connecticut; Hampton Roads, Virginia; Kings Bay, Georgia; Panama City, Pensacola, Port Canaveral, and Port Saint Joe, Florida; Port Hueneme and San Diego, California; and Portsmouth, New Hampshire. White House Press Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said in a statement issued on May 8 that the change represents "a major revision" in US port access policy and "another step by the United States in discarding Cold War restrictions." "This revision is the result of a comprehensive inter-agency review and is designed to stimulate commercial trade between the United States and the region," Fitzwater said. "It was taken in recognition of the progress these countries have made toward democracy and the rule of law." Ships from Central and East European countries now may enter any US port with 24-hours notice.
Bulgaria
The US-Bulgarian Bilateral Trade Treaty was signed in Washington, DC, on April 22, 1991. Once approved by Congress and the Bulgarian parliament, the trade agreement will extend most-favored-nation treatment to Bulgarian exports to the United States. On June 5, President Bush declared that Bulgaria was eligible for US Export-Import Bank assistance. The President's declaration will permit the Export-Import Bank to extend credit facilities to Bulgaria once that country meets the bank's credit-worthiness criteria. Bulgaria, however, had not met those criteria as of June 15.
Czechoslovakia
Environmental Exhibit. USIA sponsored an exhibit, "Environmental Action in America," that drew large crowds while it was in Prague May 15-June 6. The exhibit highlighted efforts to solve environmental problems shared by the United States and Central and East European countries. The multimedia presentation was supplemented by lectures, workshops, and factory visits, plus a resource center with 400 books and an Environmental Protection Agency-supplied data base. The crowds saw the case studies in the exhibit, Cleveland's cleanup of the Cuyahoga River and Los Angeles' attack on air pollution, as having special relevance for Czechoslovakia, which is environmentally damaged after four decades of communist rule. John Deere Family Contributes. USIA gave Iowa State University a grant in 1990 for an exchange of students with Czechoslovakia. The successful 5-week agriculture and agribusiness exchange came to the attention of a member of the John Deere family, of tractor fame, which made a $100,000 donation to Iowa State University to enable six Czech students to pursue Master of Science degrees in agriculture at that university beginning in September.
Hungary
Hungarian judges participating in a USIA exchange project formed a "Hungarian National Judicial Foundation" dedicated to ongoing training of judges and to the establishment and maintenance of links with US organizations that serve the legal profession. The judges hope to "foster high standards of scholarly achievement and administrative efficiency."
Poland
In response to the February 27 White House Conference on Management Training, South Dakota Governor George Mickelson signed an agreement in Warsaw in late April between the University of South Dakota and the University of Warsaw that provides for an academic exchange program, which will begin this fall.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991 Title:

Current Treaty Actions

Date: Jul 8, 19917/8/91 Category: Treaties/Agreements Country: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Philippines, United Kingdom, Zimbabwe Subject: Narcotics, Trade/Economics, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control, Immigration, Science/Technology, International Law, Environment, Media/Telecommunications, Resource Management, United Nations [TEXT]
Multilateral
Agriculture International agreement for the creation at Paris of an international office for epizootics, with annex. Done at Paris Jan. 25, 1924. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1925; for the US July 29, 1975. TIAS 8141. Accession Deposited: Bhutan, Dec. 14, 1990. International plant protection convention. Done at Rome Dec. 6, 1951. Entered into force Apr. 3, 1952. TIAS 7465. Adherence Deposited: Yemen, Dec. 20, 1990. Atomic Energy Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 11, 1990, regarding protection of information transferred into the US in connection with the initial phase of a project for the establishment of a uranium enrichment installation in the US based upon the gas centrifuge enrichment process developed within the three European countries (Fed. Rep. of Germany, Netherlands, UK). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 5 and 9, 1991. Entered into force provisionally Apr. 11, 1991; enters into force definitively upon receipt by the US of the last notification from the three governments of the completion of their constitutional requirements. Parties: Germany, Fed. Rep., Netherlands, UK, US. Biological Weapons Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. Accession deposited: Brunei, Jan. 31, 1991. Consular Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the US Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. Accessions deposited: Angola, Nov. 21, 1990; Maldives, Jan. 21, 1991. Customs Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1952; for the US Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. Accession deposited: Burma, Mar. 25, 1991. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Protocol for the accession of El Salvador to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Dec. 13, 1990. Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Apr. 22, 1991. Entry into force: May 22, 1991. Intellectual Property Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entry into force: Apr. 26, 1970; for the US Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. Amendment to the convention of July 14, 1967, establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 2, 1979. Entered into force June 1, 1984. Accession deposited: San Marino, Mar. 26, 1991. Judicial Procedure Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the US July 1, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-11. Ratification deposited: Argentina, Mar. 19, 1991.1 Accession deposited: New Zealand, May 31, 1991.2 Law Statute of The Hague conference on private international law. Done at The Hague Oct. 9-31, 1951. Entry into force July 15, 1955; for the US Oct. 15, 1964. TIAS 5710. Acceptance deposited: Romania, Apr. 10, 1991. Marine Science Convention for a North Pacific Marine Science Organization (PICES). Done at Ottawa Dec. 12, 1990. Enters into force 60 days after the date on which three of the signatory states have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval. Signature: US, May 28, 1991. Marriage Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage and registration of marriages. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1962. Entered into force Dec. 9, 1964.3 Accession deposited: Mongolia, June 6, 1991. Narcotics Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the US July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725. Ratification deposited: Japan, Aug. 31, 1990. Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Oct. 11, 19904; Luxembourg, Feb. 7, 1991; Singapore, Sept. 17, 1990. UN convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. Accessions deposited: Grenada, Dec. 10, 1990; Sri Lanka, June 6, 1991; Burma, June 11, 1991. Ratifications deposited: Yugoslavia, Jan. 3, 1991; Costa Rica, Feb. 8, 1991; Guatemala, Feb. 28, 1991. Nuclear Weapons-- Non-Proliferation Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. Accessions deposited: Zambia, May 15, 1991; Tanzania, June 7, 1991. Oil Pollution International convention on oil pollution preparedness, response, and cooperation, 1990. Done at London Nov. 30, 1990. Enters into force 12 months after the date on which not less than 15 states have signed without reservation as to ratification, acceptance, or approval or have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. Signatures: US, Argentina, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Fed. Rep., Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Iceland, Lebanon, Philippines, Uruguay, Nov. 30, 1990; Finland, Apr. 23, 19915; Morocco, Feb. 20, 19915; Sweden, Apr. 3, 19915; Venezuela, May 20, 19915. Patents Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733. Amendment to the patent cooperation treaty. Adopted Oct. 2, 1979. Entered into force May 3, 1984. Accessions deposited: Czechoslovakia, Mar. 20, 1991; Guinea and Mongolia, Feb. 27, 1991. Rubber International natural rubber agreement, 1987, with annexes. Done at Geneva Mar. 20, 1987. Entered into force provisionally Dec. 29, 1988; definitively Apr. 3, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-9. Ratification deposited: Greece, Mar. 12, 1991. Satellite Communications Systems Convention on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. Accessions deposited: Iceland, Mar. 26, 1991; Malta, Jan. 11, 1991. Operating agreement on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. Signatures: Iceland, Mar. 26, 1991; Malta, Jan. 11, 1991. Trade UN Convention on Contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262] Accessions deposited: Canada, Apr. 23, 1991; Romania, May 22, 1991. World Health Organization Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808. Acceptance deposited: Marshall Islands, June 5, 1991. [TEXT]
Bilateral
Argentina Agreement concerning trade in women's and girls' wool trousers, with attachment. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires May 14 and 31, 1991. Entered into force May 31, 1991. Brazil Mutual cooperation agreement for reducing demand, preventing illicit use, and combating illicit production and traffic of drugs. Signed at Brasilia Sept. 3, 1986. Entry into force: June 13, 1991. Canada Agreement extending the agreement of Mar. 11, 1981, as extended (TIAS 10111), regarding the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 30, 1991. Entered into force Apr. 30, 1991; effective May 12, 1991. China Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Feb. 2, 1988, as amended, concerning trade in textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Beijing Apr. 23 and 24, 1991. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1991. Colombia Cooperative agreement to prevent, control, and eradicate foot-and- mouth disease. Signed at Washington Feb. 25, 1991. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes confirming its provisions. Egypt Memorandum of understanding concerning a cooperative project for the development of a display subprogram for the E-2C L-304 mission computer. Signed at Washington and Cairo May 6 and 15, 1991. Entered into force May 15, 1991. Italy Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of Dec. 5, 1985, as extended, concerning energy research and development cooperation. Signed at Rome May 28, 1991. Entered into force May 28, 1991. Jamaica Extradition treaty. Signed at Kingston June 14, 1983. Ratifications exchanged: June 7, 1991. Entry into force: July 7, 1991. Japan Agreement in the field of liquid metal-cooled fast breeder reactors. Signed at Washington Jan. 11, 1991. Entered into force Jan. 11, 1991; effective July 31, 1990. Korea Visa arrangement concerning trade in textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Apr. 8 and 10, 1991. Entered into force Apr. 10, 1991. Malaysia Agreement concerning a military education exchange program. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Kuala Lumpur May 16 and 29, 1991. Entered into force May 29, 1991. Morocco Treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments, with protocol. Signed at Washington July 22, 1985. [Senate] Treaty Doc.99-18. Ratifications exchanged: Apr. 29, 1991. Entry into force: May 29, 1991. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Memorandum of understanding concerning the interconnection of the NICS TARE and the US AUTODIN network, with annex. Signed at Brussels and Washington Apr. 26 and May 31, 1991. Entered into force May 31, 1991. Panama Treaty concerning the treatment and protection of investments, with annex and agreed minutes. Signed at Washington Oct. 27, 1982. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-14. Ratifications exchanged: Apr. 30, 1991. Entry into force: May 30, 1991. Peru Agreement amending the visa arrangement of July 17 and Aug. 22, 1985, regarding trade in textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at Lima Feb. 19 and 28, 1991. Entered into force Feb. 28, 1991. Philippines Agreement regarding the relinquishment of certain areas at the San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Province of Zambales and the US Navy transmitter site at Capas, Province of Tarlac, with maps. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Jan. 31 and May 13, 1991. Entered into force May 13, 1991. Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 4, 1987, relating to trade in textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Dec. 28, 1990 and Feb. 26, 1991. Entered into force Feb. 26, 1991. United Kingdom Agreement extending application of the treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom of July 3, 1986, concerning the Cayman Islands relating to mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, to Montserrat. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 26, 1991. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1991. Zimbabwe Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Zimbabwe. Signed at Harare Mar. 18, 1991. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1991. 1 With designation. 2 With declaration(s). 3 Not in force for the US. 4 With reservation. 5 Subject to ratification.(###)