US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: Conflict in Yugoslavia
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jul 2, 19917/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: EC, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
The President deeply regrets the resumption of violent conflict in
Yugoslavia and urges all parties to observe the cease-fire
agreement worked out with representatives of the European
Community (EC). He also urges Yugoslav authorities to accept an EC
offer of international cease-fire observers. The United States is
prepared to endorse such a plan at tomorrow's emergency meeting in
Prague of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The President has written a letter to President Mesic of
Yugoslavia expressing his grave concern over the situation in the
country and urging him to ensure that civilian control over the
military is reestablished and peace restored. He also expressed the
hope that all parties in Yugoslavia would seek a dialogue toward a
new and democratic basis for Yugoslavia's future, in which the
aspirations of all the Yugoslav peoples can be realized. The
President reiterated US support for the European Community's
ongoing efforts to help resolve the Yugoslav crisis and urged
President Mesic to continue cooperating with the United States, the
EC, and others in the interest of a peaceful transition to a new
Yugoslavia. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: Conflict in Yugoslavia
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from remarks during a photo opportunity at the
Department of State, Washington, DC
Date: Jul 2, 19917/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: EC, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
Q. Yugoslavia is really quite volatile today. Do you have any
observations about the way the central government is responding
today?
Secretary Baker. Well, we are very gravely concerned about
what's happened in Yugoslavia. This is a concern, of course, that we
expressed before we went to Yugoslavia and during the course of our
visit there. We have condemned the use of force, the violence, and
the bloodshed that have developed. And we are very hopeful that
somehow the Yugoslav people will find a way through negotiation
and dialogue to sort through these difficulties. We hope there can
be a disengagement of the Yugoslav army with militias and that
there can be a cease-fire, that we can return to the three-point
program that the European Community has suggested when the
Troika visited Yugoslavia. We have instructed our ambassador at
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] to
support the idea of observers from the CSCE going into Yugoslavia.
We are very, very concerned.
Q. Is it not a shift in emphasis of US policy toward Yugoslavia from
insisting on territorial integrity to now insisting on an end to the
use of force and the ability of the Yugoslav people to choose their
own destiny?
Secretary Baker. No. There's been no shift in emphasis. We
made it very clear in the 10 or 11 hours that we were in Yugoslavia
that our policy was based on three principles: first,
democratization; second, respect for human rights; and, third, the
question of unity. We laid down some very strong markers with the
central government in Yugoslavia with respect to the use of force.
We think that they have gone beyond those markers, and we have so
expressed ourselves. And we are very, as I say, very gravely
concerned about that. And we want to call upon all parties to
exercise restraint, to sit down and try to work out a peaceful
resolution of these problems through negotiation and dialogue. That
is the only way that the matter can be approached with any hope at
all of avoiding further violence and further bloodshed.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: Conflict in Yugoslavia
Baker, Van Den Broek, Andriessen
Source: Secretary Baker, Netherlands Foreign Minister Hans
Van Den Broek, and Frans Andriessen, Vice President of the
Commission of European Community
Description: Department of State, Washington, DC
Date: Jul 3, 19917/3/91
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: EC, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
The dangerous situation in Yugoslavia continues to worsen.
Cease-fire agreements are not being respected. The Yugoslav
military apparently has rejected civilian control.
We condemn the continuing use of force and particularly
condemn any rejection by the military of civilian control.
As the United States and the European Community have
contended from the beginning of this crisis, only through peaceful
dialogue can the Yugoslav peoples determine their own future. To
make that possible, we call for:
-- An immediate halt to the violence;
-- Military forces to return to their barracks immediately;
and
-- An immediate cease-fire.
We would support international observers going into
Yugoslavia to monitor such a cease-fire.
In order to provide a cooling off period and to permit
negotiations to begin, we urge all leaders in Yugoslavia to exert
maximum influence on armed forces of any kind throughout
Yugoslavia and to refrain from the use of force or from provocative
acts.
We have just discussed the steps we and others in the
international community can take to address this critical situation.
Cooling off actions are an essential first step. Only through
negotiations and dialogue can bloodshed be avoided and the peoples
of Yugoslavia decide their future political arrangements peacefully
and democratically.
The United States and European Community, working together
through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and
with others in the international community, will continue to seek to
defuse this dangerous situation. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: US-South Korean Relations
Bush, Woo, Baker, Solomon
Source: Presidents Bush and Roh Tae Woo, Secretary Baker,
Assistant Secretary Richard Solomon
Date: Jul 2, 19917/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: South Korea
Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
Charting a Common Course
Remarks by President Bush and President Roh Tae Woo of South
Korea during a welcoming ceremony at the White House, July 2,
1991.
President Bush: Distinguished guests and members of the Korean
delegation, and Mrs. Roh, President Roh. It is my great honor, on
behalf of the American people, to welcome all of you to the White
House.
Mr. President, we meet at a time of tremendous change, as the
long era of Cold War and conflict draws to a close, and the world
confronts the challenge of fashioning a new order where freedom
can flourish.
The Cold War cast its shadow across Korea for more than 4
decades. Mr. President, the Republic of Korea has stood fast at the
frontier of freedom--your proud capital, Seoul, a scant 25 miles
from the DMZ [demilitarized zone], the razor's edge that cuts a
nation in two.
Yet, through 4 decades of armed and uneasy peace, the
Republic of Korea has prospered. You're building a thriving
democracy--a dynamic economy that has prospered through free and
more open access to the world's economies. Korea's success stands
as a testament to the resolve of the Korean people, but much credit
belongs to you, sir, for the steady leadership that guides your
nation. Just 4 years ago, you went before the Korean nation to
proclaim a new commitment to democracy. In the succession of
elections since then, the voice of the Korean people has spoken
through their votes--and the message is clear: Korea's commitment
to democracy is steadfast and strong.
And so, sir, we meet today to chart a common course that
moves forward in this world of change.
Mr. President, when we met 1 year ago, Korea was on the eve
of a new opening to the Soviet Union, an opening that we fully
support. That opening to the Soviet Union has eased tensions and
increased the prospects for peace and stability not just for the
Republic of Korea but across the Pacific rim. Let me be very clear:
Korea and the United States share an interest in seeing economic
and political reform in the Soviet Union move forward.
But lasting peace will come to Korea only when Korea is made
whole. And here, too, there is hope. Mr. President, only Koreans--
North and South--can solve the problem of unification. But all
Korea--North and South--should know that the United States stands
ready to act in the interests of lasting peace.
Mr. President, our two nations are linked by ties of trade, by
the bonds of friendship and family: the more than three-quarter of
a million Americans of Korean ancestry who call this nation their
home. But here in America, Korea will always be far more than a
distant land or just a name on a map.
One week ago, the remains of US servicemen lost long ago in
Korea came home to rest--a reminder that Korea will always be the
place where America came to freedom's defense.
In the summer of 1950, when the forces of the North swept
down on the free Republic of Korea, the United Nations swiftly
condemned the invasion--and formed the UN Command to repel the
aggressor. The United States and 17 other nations answered the
call. Mr. President, the United States remains today fully
committed to protecting the peace and security of Korea--even as
Korea assumes a leading role in its own defense.
In 1950, the fate of the Republic of Korea was a testament of
the international ideal--a test of the international ideal--a proving
ground for the proposition that aggression meets a collective
response. Forty years later, this same spirit of internationalism
shines forth in Korea's contributions to Desert Storm, in the Korean
medical unit that treated coalition casualties from the battle of
Kafji.
Korea's commitment to internationalism has never wavered.
This fall, at long last--four decades after the United Nations fought
to keep Korea free--the Republic of Korea will take its rightful
place among the family of nations in the United Nations. Mr.
President, America, your ally, shares your pride.
Once again, Mr. President, it is a great pleasure to have this
chance to meet and renew our friendship. Welcome to the White
House--and may God bless the Republic of Korea.
President Roh: President and Mrs. Bush and citizens of the
United States. I am deeply grateful to you, Mr. President, for your
invitation to visit this great country and for the warm and cordial
welcome extended to me and my delegation. I am also very pleased
to bring warm greetings of friendship from the Korean people to the
people of the United States.
The world has changed enormously over the past 2 years. The
Iron Curtain, which used to divide the world into two camps, has
collapsed, and the Cold War has come to an end. With the sweeping
reforms in Eastern and Central Europe as well as in the Soviet
Union, freedom, human dignity, democratic pluralism, and market
economy are becoming universal values.
Mankind has been living in constant fear of war due to the
East-West confrontation. Today, however, we share the belief that
we may now successfully build a more peaceful world.
During the recent Gulf war, all peace-loving nations of the
world rallied around the UN flag. The coalition victory made it
clear once and for all that aggression will not stand. I pay my
respects to you, Mr. President, for your superb leadership and to the
American people for having inspired brighter hopes for a new era.
Having proudly joined the long march toward freedom
shoulder-to-shoulder with the American people, the Korean people
are very pleased to offer congratulations to America on its success.
Because their land remains divided, and because they acutely
remember the tragedies of war, the Korean people are hoping that
the current of peace and reconciliation will soon reach the shores
of Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula.
Mr. President, since we met in June of last year, significant
activities have, in fact, been taking place in Northeast Asia and the
Korean Peninsula. The changing US-Soviet relations, of course, lead
the list of events. But we have also seen exchanges between China
and the Soviet Union and contacts between the Soviet Union and
Japan, as well as between Japan and North Korea.
At the same time, the Republic of Korea ended decades of
enmity and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union
and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. More significant,
North Korea reversed its former position and announced a decision
to apply for UN membership along with us. These encouraging
activities have, of course, been spurred on by close cooperation
between your country and mine.
We must now focus our attention to removing the legacies of
the Cold War from the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia so that a
durable peace and stability may be secured for the entire Asia-
Pacific region.
Our rapid economic development has made Korea a showcase
to the former socialist countries by demonstrating the merits of a
capitalist economy and made us a model to the less-developed
countries by proving the efficiency of a free market economy and an
open society.
Based on these achievements and having experienced enormous
social-political difficulties, Korea has now entered an era of full-
fledged democracy. As the world saw during the 1988 Seoul
Olympic Games, Korea's dynamic energies and cooperative spirit
encourage a new faith in freedom and hope for prosperity around the
world.
The Korean people have now become a dependable friend and
ally of the American people, and they promise to assume
appropriate international responsibilities and make a greater
contribution to the international community.
The United States has initiated the current change around the
world and is successfully carrying out their leadership role, and our
two countries will march together into the 21st century as partners
in trust, as we have come thus far.
Our coming meeting, Mr. President, will be my fourth
opportunity to confer with you. Through it, and in my talks
with other American leaders, I shall reaffirm my faith in a bright
future for our two countries.
I wish you, Mr. President, and Mrs. Bush, the best of health and
with the American people everlasting peace and prosperity. Thank
you, and God bless America.
US-Korean Friendship
Remarks by Secretary Baker at a luncheon for President Roh,
Department of State, July 2, 1991.
President and Mrs. Roh, Mr. Foreign Minister, Mr. Minister for Trade
and Industry, your timely visit serves to reinforce our enduring
alliance. Over the past four decades, the ties between our two
countries have been forged in battle, strengthened by economic
links, and deepened by our mutual commitment to democratic
values. And our partnership has been a critical element not only to
Korea's own impressive success but also to the dynamism and
security of the Asia-Pacific region. Our partnership has also helped
pave the way for Korea's coming into its own as an impressive
player worldwide.
Moreover, President Bush and I believe that Korean-American
partnership is essential to building the new world order that we
talk about. It's an order based on political and economic freedom
for all peoples, and one where nations cooperate effectively to
deter aggression and promote stability worldwide. Already, Korea
has done much to foster that new world order at home and abroad,
politically, economically, diplomatically, and militarily.
Let me explain:
Politically, by making the tough choice to embark upon the
path of democracy, the people of Korea have put themselves on the
cutting edge of a major global trend. Korea got an early start,
relative to many other nations. And you have come a long way on
what we recognize is often a difficult road. The United States is
confident that the people of Korea are overwhelmingly committed to
the success of your democracy and that you are prepared to continue
in what President Bush calls "the hard work of freedom."
Economically, yours already is a success story of world-class
proportions. Barely a generation ago, Korea was among the ranks of
the world's poorest nations. Today, after a generation of steady
growth, Korea is the world's 13th largest economy and America's
7th largest trading partner. A central new challenge for us all is
updating the rules of the road for world trade in order to sustain a
free trade regime.
You have pointed out, President Roh, that free trade has been
key to Korea's economic success. And, as a leading trading nation,
trade liberalization is in your interests as much as ours. So, our
government looks forward to your support as we move toward a
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round [of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--GATT].
Diplomatically, by effectively pursuing nordpolitik, the
Republic of Korea is beginning to melt the last glacier of the Cold
War. The establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union, the exchange of trade offices with China, and ascension to
the United Nations--which we expect this fall--all clear the path
for reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and ultimately for
reunification--a goal that our two peoples have shared for over 4
decades.
Militarily, you are moving toward assuming the leading role in
your own country's defense. For 4 decades, US-Korean resolve has
deterred aggression from the North, and the US security guarantee
to Korea remains as firm as ever. At the same time, however, our alliance
is being reinforced by the demonstration of our mutual commitment to
sharing responsibilities. And the Republic of Korea's principled
support of the international coalition in the Gulf shows how
seriously you take your responsibility to deter aggression not only
at home but also in the world community at large.
For over 40 years, the United States has highly valued our
partnership with the Republic of Korea. And we believe our strong
ties will be a tremendous mutual asset as our peoples face the
challenges ahead. Mr. President, the United States looks forward to
continuing our close partnership with Korea as we work together
looking to the next century. So, I ask all you to join me in a toast to
US-Korean friendship and partnership.
Review of the Presidential Discussion
Excerpts from briefing by Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the White House, July 2, 1991.
. . . Let me just give you an overview of the discussions between the
two presidents. President Bush and President Roh Tae Woo had
approximately a 40-minute one-on-one session in the Oval Office,
after which the two presidents came into the Cabinet Room, and
there was an expanded meeting that lasted about 25 minutes with
the Cabinet officers.
In the Oval Office session, President Bush and President Roh
discussed what they saw as the major trends affecting the future
of East Asia and the important roles that not only the United States
and Korea but also the other major powers--Japan, the Soviet Union,
and China--will be playing in the region. President Roh observed
that there is less of an order taking shape in this region at this
stage of the game than might be said to be the case in other parts of
the world.
The two presidents reviewed [the] commitment of the United
States to the security of the Republic of Korea. And in this regard,
they both expressed concern about the nuclear question with--
again--President Bush reaffirming our firm support and engagement
in developments on Korea beginning with our commitment to South
Korea's security.
The President also commented on how strong US-ROK
[Republic of Korea] relations are, how firm they are, and this is
reflected in the fact that we've had a state visit. President Roh
commented on, as he did in his public remarks, the leadership of the
President in the Gulf crisis. He noted the fervent desire of the
Korean people for reunification as early as possible, hopefully
before the end of the century. President Roh urged President Bush
to visit the Republic of Korea, hopefully before the year is out.
President Bush emphasized that, for all its preoccupations in
other parts of the world, the US has no intention of neglecting the
Asia-Pacific region-- noting its economic dynamism, its
importance for the future--and he noted that Secretary Baker would
be visiting the region before too long.
There was discussion about South Korea's leadership role in
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] process, and the third
ministerial level meeting of APEC will be held in Seoul in November
of this year.
In the context of their discussion of economic issues, the
President emphasized his desire to maintain engagement with China, and
that that was the reason why we firmly support MFN [most-favored-nation
trade status] for China. The President noted that if MFN were denied to
the PRC [People's Republic of China] that one of the first victims
would be Hong Kong. And as part of our effort to deal with the major
players in East Asia in the years and decades ahead, he wants to see
engagement with the PRC sustained.
The President also emphasized the desire for a successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, something for which
President Roh expressed support. There was then some detailed
discussion about the importance of maintaining open trade, both on
a bilateral basis and in terms of the multilateral trading regime,
and both presidents expressed support for as free a trading regime,
as liberal terms for trade, as possible.
And then finally, there was a note--the President noted that
in addition to President Roh's discussion with the various economic
ministers he would also be meeting with Secretary [of Defense]
Cheney and again reaffirmed our support for South Korea's security.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: US Policy in Lebanon
Kimmitt
Source: Robert M. Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs Remarks before the American Task Force for Lebanon,
Washington, DC
Date: Jun 27, 19916/27/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Lebanon
Subject: Terrorism, Democratization,
Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
I am very pleased to speak before the American Task Force for
Lebanon as you begin your conference on Lebanon, and I bring you the
greetings and best wishes from my immediate boss, Secretary of
State Jim Baker. I've thumbed through the program and it is indeed
a distinguished group. Before I take a minute to augment what the
President said, let me just say it takes a strong and respected
organization to put together a program such as you will hear over
the next 4 days. The task force and the conference organizers can
be proud of a job well done.
You have chosen an opportune time to examine Lebanon. In the
aftermath of the Gulf war, the Bush Administration--and, indeed,
all the countries of the world--are looking at the Middle East and
looking for new solutions for old problems. As you have just heard
in President Bush's message, Lebanon remains high on our foreign
policy agenda.
And let me reiterate the fundamental policy tenet laid out by
the President: The United States supports the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon, the withdrawal of
all non-Lebanese forces, and the disbanding of all militias. We
continue to believe that full implementation of the Taif agreement
provides the best opportunity to reach these goals. We thus support
the efforts of President Hrawi and the Lebanese Government to
implement fully the Taif agreement and extend their authority over
the entire country.
The Administration, like, I think, many of you, is heartened by
the recent progress that has been made in Lebanon. For the past 8
months there has been no factional fighting. The Lebanese army has
deployed into areas north and east of Beirut that were controlled
for years by militia forces. Major Christian, Druze, and Shi'a
militias appear to be cooperating with the government. Many of
these militias have turned their weapons over to the Lebanese army.
The Lebanese cabinet has reaffirmed its plan to deploy the army
into southern Lebanon to complete the process of disarming all
militia and Palestinian groups. The United States supports this plan
and hopes to see it carried out fully and promptly. We are hopeful
that the final chapter of the history of militias in Lebanon is now
being written.
On May 22 of this year, Lebanon and Syria signed a treaty that
defines their bilateral relations. On June 6, the Lebanese cabinet
named 40 new and replacement deputies to the Lebanese parliament.
Both of these actions have been the cause of some comment--even
some opposition--but both of these actions were clearly called for
in the Taif agreement. We have made clear, both publicly and in our
discussions with the Lebanese and Syrians, that our measure of the
treaty will be whether its implementation is consistent with
Lebanese independence and sovereignty and with the Taif accord.
We will be closely following the treaty's implementation. We have
consistently told the Syrians that we expect them to live up to the
letter and spirit of the Taif agreement and to help promote
Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. We thus expect that Syrian
actions with regard to Lebanon will respect these principles and
will be in the framework of normal relations between two
sovereign states.
In addition to Lebanese politics, as the President's letter
noted, we should also look at Lebanon's economic needs. We have
encouraged Lebanon's Arab neighbors and other friends, such as the
Japanese, to assist Lebanon as best they can. Our own Agency for
International Development is currently reviewing our assistance
program for Lebanon to see if its focus should shift away from
relief toward more reconstruction and development. None of this is
meant to suggest that the Lebanese themselves cannot rebuild
Lebanon. In fact, we are quite confident that the Lebanese will see
the new opportunities that present themselves as the government
spreads its authority and stability over more of the country. I think
we have learned many times in the past never to underestimate the
ability of the Lebanese to bounce back from tragedy.
We understand many Lebanese are going home this summer.
When they return, they will find that there has been a real change on
the ground. For the first time in years, Lebanese can drive from
Sidon to Tripoli--or from West Beirut to East--and see only
Lebanese army soldiers patrolling the highway. This renewed
freedom of movement has allowed Lebanese to rediscover their own
country. Recently 20,000 Lebanese school children went on a field
trip to visit the ruins in Baalbek, which most had never seen before.
And as Lebanese have begun to travel around their country
again, they have begun to meet and speak to fellow citizens from
different regions and different religious backgrounds. They are
discovering that they have more in common than perhaps they
believed during 15 years of war.
But the progress made in Lebanon is not limited to gains on
the map and visits to historical sites. There has been a wholesale
change in the attitudes of the Lebanese themselves, inside Lebanon
and abroad. Many Lebanese have told us that the era of militia
domination is over and that Lebanese must now rebuild Lebanon's
society, institutions, and economy. As I noted earlier, thousands of
Lebanese living abroad will return to Lebanon this summer, and
many will be taking their spouses and their children with them.
Airline flights, we are told, are booked months in advance, even
though several additional airlines have recently begun, or restarted,
service to Beirut.
As your conference begins to examine Lebanon and look to the
future, you can be sure that the United States shares the goals of
all Lebanese: a peaceful, prosperous Lebanon, fully independent, and
free from non-Lebanese forces and armed militias. Lebanon's
neighbors must recognize that Lebanon is a sovereign state with its
own identity and that Lebanese must have control over their own
destiny. The Lebanese-American community and the task force have
important roles to play helping to shape US policy in Lebanon and
assisting your friends and relatives in Lebanon to overcome the
effects of 15 years of war.
My message today, then, is straightforward: We should
recognize the gains that have been made in Lebanon and work
together to build on those gains. We should be proud that the
Lebanese Government and army are expanding their control over
more of the country and should work together to find ways to
strengthen the government and institutions to revive Lebanon's
democratic tradition. We can rejoice that friends and family in
Lebanon are safer today than at any time since 1975, but our task
remains to work together to find ways to make them even safer and
more secure.
I want to wish you the best of luck and progress in your
conference. Thank you very much for letting me be with you today.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Celebrates First
Anniversary
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpts from remarks at ceremony for the first
anniversary of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative,
Washington, DC
Date: Jun 27, 19916/27/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America, Central America
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
We've come here today to celebrate the first anniversary of the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative [EAI]. As you know, this
initiative wasn't a unilateral thing; it grew out of talks between
many of us here today.
I heard many of your concerns about building a prosperous
hemisphere, of throwing off the deadening weight of debt and
economic stagnation and building strong ties of idealism and self-
interest.
With the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, we vowed to
encourage free trade, stimulate investment, and reduce the debt
burden that overwhelms so many of our neighbors and our
colleagues.
We've made great progress. In just 1 year, we've signed eight
bilateral framework agreements for trade and investment: with
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru,
and Venezuela. Make that 10 agreements, because today Carla Hills
[US Trade Representative] will sign bilateral framework agreements
with Minister DeFranco of Nicaragua and Minister Alfaro of Panama.
We also are negotiating with Guatemala and the 13-nation, English-
speaking Caribbean community.
Last week, right here, Ambassador Hills also joined
representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in
signing what we call the Rose Garden agreement, the first regional
framework accord under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.
Carla has been very busy, and I'm glad to see her bringing a lot of
these things to fruition. I congratulate her and Dave Mulford
[Deputy Treasury Secretary] and so many others who have worked
tirelessly on these projects.
Ambassador Hills and her counterparts will pull down tariff
and non-tariff barriers, protect patents and intellectual property,
strengthen investment environments, and make it possible for firms
to repatriate their profits. In short, we will build a solid
foundation for economic cooperation and prosperity.
We've also begun making our hemisphere more hospitable to
investment. The Inter-American Development Bank [IDB] has
approved its first investment sector loan. It's $150 million to
Chile. [Chilean Finance] Minister Foxley and President Iglesias
completed arrangements for this loan today, I am told.
President Iglesias, I want to thank you, sir, and congratulate
everyone at the IDB for this important step. And we should
congratulate Chile for the impressive free market reforms that it
has undertaken. Through these loans, the IDB will help Latin
America and the Caribbean countries compete for capital and
embrace reforms that foster economic growth.
For years, the world experimented with the fantasy that
experts could manage economies. The utter failure of the
communist system demonstrated that expert cadres can no more
manage growth than they can manage the weather or anything else.
Free markets reward people who have ideas, not just those who
have connections. They allow poor people to become rich. They
make possible unprecedented levels of social mobility. And, of
course, they mean jobs. They teach people hard study, hard work,
and commitment to others--those commitments produce real
wealth.
I'm also pleased to report that our proposal for a $1.5 billion
Multilateral Investment Fund has got off to a great start. Japan has
pledged $100 million for each of the next 5 years. Canada, France,
Portugal, and Spain have expressed keen interests in supporting the
fund, which will provide targeted support for countries that
undertake the difficult reforms necessary to encourage investment
and stimulate free enterprise.
Pillar three of our proposal, debt reduction, also has gotten
off to a rousing start. Five nations already have negotiated far-
reaching reductions in commercial debt through the provisions of
the Brady Plan. Other nations will take advantage of the plan as
their economic reforms take shape.
Congress has agreed to reward economic reform and trade
liberalization by reducing a portion of a nation's debt--the food
assistance loans contracted under PL 480. Congress also supported
our recommendation to use interest on remaining debt for grass-
roots environmental projects. And this ambitious, innovative plan
already has produced results.
Today, the United States will sign an agreement with Chile,
slashing Chile's PL 480 debt by 40%, to $23 million. This is the
first example of bilateral debt reduction under EAI. We look
forward to reaching an understanding soon on the environmental
component of this agreement.
So now, just briefly, let me talk about what lies ahead. As
you know, Congress recently voted not to terminate the fast-track
trade procedures that enable us to deal in good faith with you--and
with Congress--in trade negotiations. Our goal is to create a free
trade zone that will cover all of North America. This trade zone--
360 million consumers and markets that produce more than $6
trillion in annual output--will set the stage for something even
more dramatic--a whole hemispheric zone of free trade.
I was very proud and pleased the way so many countries south
of Mexico and in the Caribbean supported the
FTA [free trade agreement], the fast-track authority, with Mexico.
It's broad vision, because it should sweep through--this whole
concept of free trade must sweep through our whole hemisphere.
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative can link our nations
with their diverse cultures, work forces, and creative forces. I
know some have worried that the EAI might indicate a reduction in
our commitment to the multilateral trading system. Not so: we
remain fully committed and fully determined to make that system
work.
Indeed, as part of the Uruguay Round, we have joined our Latin
American and our Caribbean allies in trying to pull down
protectionist barriers in Europe and in Asia. I want to stress the
importance of reaching a successful conclusion to the round. It can
establish a basis for worldwide free and fair trade. Without it,
we're going to have great difficulty moving forward.
We live in an extraordinary place at an extraordinary time.
When Cuba embraces democracy, ours will become the first truly
democratic hemisphere in the world. That is a major goal, a major
accomplishment by most countries already; Cuba being this holdout.
There's no accident of history here. From the northern tip of
Alaska to the southernmost point of Tierra del Fuego, we share
common heritages. Our people can trace their roots to all the
nations of the world. We share ties of culture, and of blood, and of
common interest. And now, as democracy sweeps the world, we
share the challenge of leadership through example.
We can lead the way to a world free from suspicion and from
mercantilist barriers, from socialist inefficiencies. We can show
the world how prosperity preserves the social order --and the land,
air, and water as well. We can show the rest of the world that
deregulation, respect for private property, low tax rates, and low
trade barriers can produce vast economic returns. We can show the
rest of the world how to build upon each other's strengths, rather
than preying upon weaknesses.
Today, I simply want to pledge to you, our friends, my full
effort to make the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative a total
reality. I urge Congress to pass promptly the legislation necessary
to enact EAI. This includes debt-reduction authority and authority
for the United States to contribute its share to the Multilateral
Investment Fund.
In 1876--I think I mentioned this the other day when
[Brazilian] President Collor was here--the Brazilian emperor, Dom
Pedro II, visited the United States and stopped in St. Louis, among
other places. And he noted that local craftsmen were using only the
sturdiest materials in building a customs house. The emperor was
stunned. "But an iron building would last 400 years," he noted. "You
do not mean to tell me that there will be any custom houses in 400
years."
We've worked miracles in 1 year; and so let us shape a
revolution in the next. Because I honestly believe that, together, we
can make our hemisphere's freedom first and best for all. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: Trade and Investment Agreement With Nicaragua and
Panama
Description: Text of a fact sheet released by the White House,
Washington, DC
Date: Jun 27, 19916/27/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Central America
Country: Nicaragua, Panama
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
The United States on June 27, 1991, signed "Framework Agreements
on Trade and Investment" with Nicaragua and Panama. The signing
of these agreements occurred on the first anniversary of the
President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI).
The Trade Pillar of the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative
The EAI specifies two approaches to bring down trade barriers in
the hemisphere: a successful outcome to the Uruguay Round [of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and a "system of free
trade" from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. The North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA) is the first step in the creation of a
hemispheric market.
In the past year, significant progress has been made in
implementing the trade pillar of the EAI (see chronology).
Framework Agreements
The United States is moving to conclude framework agreements on
trade and investment with countries and groups of countries that
wish to work toward freer trade in the hemisphere. Framework
agreements, in and of themselves, do not bind the signatories to
carry out specific trade liberalization commitments. They are
comprised of a declaration of trade and investment principles, an
agreement to consult on a regular basis, and an initial agenda for
consultation. Illustrative of the enthusiasm for the President's
initiative, 14 Latin countries have signed framework agreements
with the United States over the last year.
Completion of a framework agreement with a country or group
of countries does not imply that we will be proposing free trade
negotiations with such countries immediately. It does establish a
channel to explore various trade liberalization options and promote
the EAI vision.
The signing of a framework agreement with Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay on June 19, 1991, marked the first
framework agreement with a regional group. The United States is
also finalizing a similar agreement with the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM). By significantly reducing trade barriers among
themselves and expanding this liberalization to other countries,
these regional groupings support free trade principles that support
US objectives in the current GATT negotiations.
The remarkable progress on negotiating these agreements
with such a broad range of countries in the Americas testifies to
the commitment of so many nations in the Western Hemisphere to
economic reform, liberalization, and democracy in recent years.
Chronology of EAI Trade Pillar Implementation to
Date
Significant progress has been made during the past year in
implementing the trade pillar of the EAI:
By the end of June, the United States will have entered into
"Framework Agreements on Trade and Investment" with a large
number of Western Hemisphere nations:
Mexico (Prior to the EAI announcement)
Bolivia (Prior to the EAI announcement)
Colombia (July 1990)
Ecuador (July 1990)
Chile (October 1990)
Honduras (November 1990)
Costa Rica (November 1990)
Venezuela (April 1991)
El Salvador (May 1991)
Peru (May 1991)
Argentina (June 1991)
Brazil (June 1991)
Paraguay (June 1991)
Uruguay (June 1991)
Nicaragua (June 1991)
Panama (June 1991)
The United States is also discussing framework agreements
with numerous other countries. It expects negotiations to be
completed by July with:
Guatemala
CARICOM countries (comprised of 13 English-speaking
Caribbean nations, including Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,
Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent/Grenadines, and
Trinidad and Tobago).(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Date: Jul 8, 19917/8/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control,
International Law
[TEXT]
Since its entry into force in March 1970, the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been a cornerstone of
international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear
weapons. Successive US administrations have worked to achieve
universal adherence to the treaty. With more than 140 parties, it
has the largest number of adherents of any arms control agreement.
Three of the nuclear weapon states--the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union--are parties to the treaty. France
indicated years ago that it would act as though it is a party and in
June 1991 stated that it would adhere to the treaty. On July 10,
1991, South Africa formally will accede to the treaty in
Washington. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union--designated as depository governments in the treaty--
continue to encourage the few remaining non-parties to adhere to
this important arms control treaty.
Treaty Goals and Undertakings
The treaty's substantive articles have been drawn carefully to serve
three major goals (see box).
Under terms of the treaty, nuclear weapon states are
obligated not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state to acquire
nuclear explosive devices (article I). Correspondingly, non-nuclear
weapon states party to the treaty are obligated not to manufacture
or otherwise acquire such devices (article II).
The treaty provides for the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to apply international safeguards, including on-site
inspection, to all nuclear material in the peaceful programs of non-
nuclear weapon state parties (article III). This article also
obligates the parties to require IAEA safeguards on nuclear
materials and certain equipment exported to non-nuclear weapon
states. The safeguards system helps to verify compliance and is
designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material from
peaceful uses to nuclear explosive devices.
Article IV recognizes the right of parties to develop nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes and calls for the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials, and information for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Parties also are to have access to any
benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions (article
V). Article VI enjoins all parties to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to ending the nuclear arms
race, with a view to general and complete disarmament.
The NPT embodies a broadly supported international norm of
non-proliferation: increasingly, world opinion has come to view
acquisition of nuclear explosives as no longer legitimate and a
world of many nuclear powers as undesirable.
Review Conference
Under the treaty, a review conference can be held every 5 years.
Four such conferences have been held, in 1975, 1980, 1985, and
August-September 1990. Each of these conferences successfully
undertook an article-by-article review of the treaty's
implementation, with the debate focusing on cooperation on
peaceful uses of nuclear energy (article IV) and, to an even greater
degree, on efforts to negotiate arms control agreements (article
VI).
At the 1990 conference, participants generally recognized
the treaty's important contribution to international peace and
security, and a great majority of the parties attending reaffirmed
their commitment to it. Agreement was reached on most of the
issues discussed, including, for example, the vital role of
international safeguards in preventing nuclear proliferation, the
necessity of tighter export controls on nuclear technology, the need
for scrupulous adherence to the obligations of the treaty, and the
potential importance of the IAEA conducting "special inspections."
However, no final consensus declaration emerged because a small
number of non-aligned countries, led by Mexico, insisted on language
linking extension of the treaty to negotiation of a comprehensive
test ban treaty.
1995 Extension Conference
The NPT calls for a conference in 1995 to decide whether to extend
the treaty indefinitely beyond its initial 25-year duration or for a
fixed period or periods. The United States, the United Kingdom, and
the USSR favor an indefinite extension of the treaty. Many other
NPT parties share this view. The United States strongly opposes
linking the future of the treaty to a comprehensive test ban treaty
or a specific arms control measure. Such linkage could undermine
the treaty and the broad security benefits that derive from it.
Looking Ahead
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is vital to a safer and more secure
world. The success of the 1995 conference will depend on many
factors, particularly on recognition by the parties that the NPT
contributes greatly to international security and stability. A world
without NPT would lead to diminished political constraints on the
spread of nuclear explosives, increase regional suspicion and
tension, and jeopardize international peace and stability. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: South Africa To Accede to NPT
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jul 2, 19917/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: South Africa
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control
[TEXT]
I welcome and strongly commend the Government of South Africa's
decision to accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This
decision reflects the growing international conviction to halt the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as exemplified by the
adherence to the treaty by other states in the region. It further
demonstrates the statesmanship and vision of President [F.W.] de
Klerk as he takes South Africa into a new era beyond apartheid and
regional conflict; toward reconciliation and partnership.
I strongly urge those nations in the region who have not
acceded to the treaty to do so, in order to join the growing
community of non-proliferation, to strengthen the international
regime against the spread of nuclear weapons, and to promote the
cause of peace and global cooperation.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: Arms Control, Arms Transfers, and UAE Helicopters
Clarke
Source: Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary for
Politico- Military Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittees on Europe and the
Middle East and on Arms Control, International Security, and
Science, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jun 27, 19916/27/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: United Arab Emirates
Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
I have just returned from a 2-week mission to Paris to plan for
five power talks on arms control in the Middle East and to five Gulf
nations to consult with them on arms control and post-war security
structures. I welcome this opportunity to brief this committee on
those issues and to discuss with you the sale of 20 helicopters to
the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
First, I would like to review the President's arms control
proposal for the Middle East. Second and more narrowly, I propose
to focus on that element of the initiative that pertains to arms
transfers. Third and most specifically, I will address the arms
transfer before this committee, the UAE helicopters.
Arms Control
Arms control is virtually an unknown phenomenon to governments in
the region. They have sought security in secrecy, not transparency.
They have sought peace through arms alone and not through
limitations. Thus, while we may have ambitious plans for arms
control in the region, we know that we are at the beginning of what
will be a long process. It is a process that will move in parallel
with the political track and can feed back and reinforce political
progress.
With President Bush's Colorado Springs plan, we have started
down that long path. Let me quickly review the six parts of that
proposal:
First, an arms embargo on Iraq and the elimination of its
weapons of mass destruction: I met with leaders of the UN Special
Commission charged with that latter task last week in Bahrain and
can report that their difficult mission is well underway.
Second, we have proposed a meeting of the five powers who are
the largest exporters of arms to establish a system to prevent
destabilizing exports of conventional arms, eliminate the transfer
of weapons of mass destruction and their components and
precursors, bring transparency to the arms transfer process, and
bring about responsible arms transfer behavior. France has offered
to host those talks beginning on July 8, and all five powers (US, UK,
USSR, France, and China) have agreed to attend. I will return to
detail this aspect of the President's proposal in a moment.
Third, the President boldly proposed the elimination of all
surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in the inventories of states
in the region. As a first step, he called for a freeze on production,
acquisition, and testing of those missiles.
Fourth, he called for the rapid completion of the treaty to ban
chemical weapons [CW] and its early application in the region. To
accelerate that process, he announced several new US positions
including the unconditional destruction of all of our CW stocks and
the renouncement of the right of retaliation upon entry into force of
the treaty.
Fifth, the President declared that we would seek to
strengthen the treaty banning biological weapons at a special
meeting in September.
Sixth, recognize that progress on CBW [chemical and biological
weapons], will be assisted by movement in the nuclear area, the
President reiterated our call for full-scope safeguards and NPT
[Non-Proliferation Treaty] adherence in the region. He also added a
call for on-site verification to ensure that no country in the area
was engaged in enriching fuel to weapons-grade material. In the
long term, we seek the Mubarak plan of a region free of all weapons
of mass destruction, but we know that can only come when the
peace process comes to fruition.
We have been heartened by the support this package has
received. The Paris five power meeting will address it further, as
will the G-7 summit in London on July 15th. We have had, and will
continue to have, talks with regional states on the specifics of the
proposal.
Arms Transfers
As I turn to the details of the second point of the President's plan,
let me put forward six propositions that frame our view of arms
transfers to the Middle East.
First, we must prevent another Iraq. The Iraqi regime had
procured 6,000 main battle tanks. That force was clearly in excess
of Iraq's legitimate self-defense requirements and constituted an
offensive threat. No international regime existed to note this
build-up and address its threatening implications. No agreed
standard existed to say that it was wrong. We want to fix that.
Second, arms transfers as a phenomenon are not inherently
good or evil. No responsible international security analyst believes
that the transfer of the Patriot missile to Israel was inherently
evil or unwise. Similarly, no one would think that transferring the
Tomahawk cruise missile to Libya would be anything other than
criminal lunacy. These extreme examples demonstrate the point
that whether to transfer arms per se is not the question, rather the
policy choice is what arms go to which recipients.
Third, arms transfers should not be an end in themselves but
should be an instrument to other goals. I mentioned the transfer of
the Patriot to Israel: that helped keep Israel out of a war.
Similarly, the arms transfers associated with the Camp David
agreement helped to bring Egypt and Israel into a peace. Among the
goals we seek to reinforce or achieve by arms transfers to the
Middle East are:
-- The deterrence of aggression against friendly states by (A)
demonstrating a close military cooperation with the US and (B)
providing the capability to make aggression costly;
-- The further integration of small militaries such as those
of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] to achieve economies of scale,
regional cooperation, and credible deterrence;
-- The reduction of the likelihood of US forces having to be
employed, through increased deterrence by regional forces and the
enhanced capability of regional states to deal with small
contingencies on their own;
-- The ability of US forces to operate jointly with regional
states (as Saudi and US F-15s and AWACS [airborne warning and
control system] did so well in Desert Storm) in peacetime to deter
aggression and in combat to counter aggression;
-- The enhancement of US influence among key regional
decision-makers through years of experience in dealing with US
armed forces and politico-military officials;
-- The creation of sufficient confidence in their own
defensive capabilities and cooperation with us, that these key
regional decision-makers are willing to engage in arms control of
increasingly ambitious and effective dimensions.
Fourth, it is not US arms transfers that have been the problem
in the Middle East's becoming over armed and falling into wars.
Patriots to Israel, AWACS to Saudi Arabia, M-60s to Egypt, F-16s to
Bahrain, I-Hawks to the UAE: They have not been the problem.
No Middle East state with which the United States had an ongoing
military relationship at the time has been an aggressor. It was not
Kuwait that invaded Iraq. It was not Tunisia that attacked Libya.
We have such relations with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. They are not the
problem.
I believe the problems of aggression have come from the
governments of Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Thus, US arms transfers
are not the problem.
Some point to Iran as an example of how US arms transfers can
fall into the wrong hands. Iran, however, is an example of how we
can effectively ground a force by pulling the plug on spare parts and
technicians when a government changes from friend to enemy, as
they rarely may.
The US does not transfer arms willy-nilly to any regime that
seeks them. It provides them to responsible, friendly, and peace-
seeking governments.
We have an excellent record and we do not need new regulations
or legislation to prevent US excesses which do not exist in the first
place.
Fifth, US arms transfers have helped us to seek responsible
goals in the region. The Congress appropriated $3 billion for arms
transfers to Egypt and Israel last year. Why did the Congress do
that?
It did it because arms transfers to these two countries helped
ensure their own security and, in feeling more secure, give them a
real stake in peace.
Arms transfers were a key element in the good relations that the
US had with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey before the war. Had we
refused arms to those countries we would not have had the
influence with them, they would not have had the confidence in us,
and they would not have had the high-quality interoperable weapons
needed to participate in the coalition against Iraq.
The next time someone asks what good have arms transfers
gotten us in our relations with Middle Eastern States, ask them
whether they think the courageous stands taken by Presidents
Mubarak [of Egypt] and Ozal [of Turkey] and King Fahd [of Saudi
Arabia] would have been possible if the US had denied them arms
transfers.
Sixth, halting arms transfers to the region while we seek an
international system to regulate them is a self-defeating meat-
cleaver approach.
What would happen if we did halt arms transfers to the region
while we negotiate? Probably the same thing that would have
happened if we had ceased to improve and maintain our forces while
negotiating START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] and CFE
[Conventional Armed forces in Europe]. We would diminish our
ability to influence the outcomes we seek.
North Korea, Brazil, South Africa, and others will continue to
export even if we were to get the other members of the five powers
to halt. We will not get the other five powers to halt pending talks
or after them.
Moreover, the Administration cannot support any agreement that
would prohibit such sales that are necessary for the security of our
friends. I cannot imagine that the Congress would either.
Therefore, holding up such sales cannot be justified on the grounds
of a possible future international agreement that would prevent
them. The only thing that holding up such sales will accomplish is
the diminution of US influence in a region that this nation thought
so critical 6 months ago that we sent a half million Americans
there and fought a war.
Helicopters to the UAE
Now let us turn to the case at hand. The Administration began
consulting Congress last October about its plans to sell 20
helicopters to the UAE. Now we have formally notified that sale.
The UAE is not now and never will be a threat to the security and
stability in the Middle East. Indeed, it is a force for peace. The UAE
provided support to the US Navy during Operation Earnest Will in
1987. It did so despite threats of retaliation from Iran.
Before any state (including Kuwait) asked us to act against
Iraq's threats of war last summer, the UAE proposed combined US-
UAE military action to deter Iraq. USAF aircraft landed in the UAE a
week before the invasion of Kuwait.
I went to the UAE immediately after the invasion, and they
offered us anything we wanted to prosecute a war against Iraq.
They did this before many of our more traditional allies.
In the war, US aircraft bombed Iraq from the UAE. US ships,
including aircraft carriers, operated out of UAE ports. The small
Emirates air force bombed Iraqi forces. Its small army was part of
the joint Arab force that punched into Kuwait City.
The UAE transferred $4 billion to the US to offset our costs in
the war. Even in Washington, $4 billion is a lot of money.
Is this the kind of nation that we should snub by refusing them
20 helicopters?
Now the UAE is planning with us a closer military relationship.
That relationship is part of what I discussed 4 days ago in Abu
Dhabi.
My opposite number there asked me, "How will I explain to my
people that we should expand our military cooperation with the US
and fund some US military activities if you refuse to sell us arms?"
I had no answer to that question, nor do I think there is any good
answer to explain to such a friendly, courageous country that could
never threaten anyone why we will not help it defend itself.
These helicopters will help it to defend its oil platforms in the
Gulf. Such platforms were attacked by Iran in 1987. They will
permit the UAE to contribute more effectively to the GCC's
combined force to deter Iraq.
The technology involved is not new to the region. Israel, Egypt,
and Saudi Arabia already have bought the same helicopter.
Refusing to sell these 20 helicopters to the UAE would be folly
indeed. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: Group of Seven: Toward Global Economic Growth
Description: Text of a statement issued by the Group of Seven (G-7)
Finance Ministers meeting in London, England
Date: Jun 23, 19916/23/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, North America
Country: Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Italy,
Japan, Germany, France
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
(1) The Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States of America and the
United Kingdom met on 23 June 1991 in London for an exchange of
views on current international economic and financial issues.
(2) The Ministers and Governors reviewed the global economic
situation and prospects, including developments in their economies
since their meeting in April. They noted with satisfaction the
increasing signs for global economic recovery. They agreed that
sustained global economic growth with price stability is essential
to address the historic challenges and opportunities which are
facing the world economy. They further agreed that pursuing such a
strategy in a medium term context was the best way of meeting
these challenges and accordingly they reaffirmed their support for
economic policy coordination.
(3) The Ministers and Governors emphasised the importance
of fiscal and monetary policies which provide the basis for lower
real interest rates and a sustained global economic recovery with
price stability. They recognised that the approach taken would need
to reflect the differing situations in each country. They noted the
signs of prospective economic recovery and lower inflation in those
countries which are in recession; some other countries are
experiencing slower growth while in others, particular by Germany
and Japan, economic activity is continuing to make a positive
contribution. The Ministers and Governors also welcomed the
reductions in interest rates that have taken place in a number of
their countries and elsewhere. They believed that monetary policy
should provide the conditions for sustainable growth with price
stability in line with the differing circumstances of each country.
(4) The Ministers and Governors stressed the importance of
policies aimed at increasing savings. The Ministers and Governors
noted the important budgetary measures taken in some of their
countries to reduce significantly high budget deficits and improve
the conditions for lower interest rates. Continued progress in
reducing budget deficits is essential [in order] to strengthen
national savings. These efforts should be complemented by
measures to reduce impediments to private saving, particularly
where saving rates are low.
(5) The Ministers and Governors also reviewed recent
developments in international financial markets and reaffirmed
their commitment to cooperate closely, taking account of the need
for orderly markets, if necessary through appropriately concerted
action in exchange markets.
(6) The Ministers and Governors noted that sustained
expansion in global trade is an important engine of growth,
including for countries throughout the world that are restructuring
their economies. In this regard, they accorded the highest priority
to a swift and successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round. In light
of the particularly difficult circumstances facing Eastern European
countries and the Soviet Union, consideration should be given to
measures which would enhance the trade prospects of these
countries.
(7) The Ministers and Governors welcomed the reform efforts
underway in the Eastern European countries. They noted the
economic situation in the Soviet Union and the need for sustained
economic reform. Success of these countries in their process of
transition and fundamental reform is in the interest both of these
countries and global economic growth.
(8) The Ministers and Governors also underscored that the
adoption of measures in their countries to promote economic
efficiency could provide an important spur to global economic
recovery and price stability. Such measures could also send a
strong and positive signal to reforming countries, implementing
their own reforms. They agreed on the need to review regulations
and structural policies with a view to improving the functioning of
their economies. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: International Terrorism
Date: Jul 8, 19917/8/91
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Subject: Terrorism
[TEXT]
International terrorism is a serious threat to the US and the world.
The US is a prime target because our policies, values, and culture
are directly opposed by many terrorist groups and because the US
has an extensive official and commercial presence overseas. Israel,
Western democracies, and moderate Arab governments are also
major targets. State sponsorship of terrorist activity has caused
great increases in both the number of attacks and the resulting
casualties. Since 1980, nearly 7,000 international terrorist
incidents have occurred worldwide, killing more than 5,000 people
and wounding 12,300 others. About 2,000 attacks were against
American targets. American casualties since 1980 have totaled
580 dead and 610 wounded.
Terrorist Activity in 1990
In 1990, international terrorism fell to its lowest level in 13
years, with only 455 attacks recorded. A large number (197) were
directed against American targets; most of these (130) occurred in
Latin America and consisted of low-level bombing attacks that
resulted in minor damage and few casualties. Ten American
citizens were killed and 34 wounded in terrorist attacks last year.
The citizens and property of 73 countries were targeted by
terrorists in 1990.
Terrorism and the Persian Gulf War
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait last August, Saddam Hussein
and other Iraqi officials repeatedly threatened to launch terrorist
attacks against coalition members in the event of war and
undertook actions consistent with these threats. In addition, a
number of Palestinian terrorist groups pledged their support for
Saddam Hussein and publicly threatened terrorist reprisals against
the West, Israel, and moderate Arab targets. The US added Iraq to
the list of state sponsors of terrorism in September. By the end of
1990, the US had evidence that Iraqi operatives were planning to
mount a major terrorist campaign.
In response to these threats, the US and 50 other nations
expelled, deported, arrested, or detained hundreds of suspected
Iraqi operatives, including Iraqi diplomats and embassy staff.
President Bush stated that Saddam Hussein would be held "directly
responsible" for any Iraqi-sponsored terrorism. Other terrorist
countries were warned of the consequences of mounting terrorist
attacks, and those countries in turn reined in those groups over
which they have influence. Security measures were enhanced at
embassies, military installations, and other possible targets;
airport security was increased worldwide to the highest level ever.
The disruption of Iraq's command and control infrastructure,
the deterrent effect of our warnings, and tighter security all
discouraged Iraqi terrorism. Iraq was linked to only a small number
of attacks or attempted attacks. Some 200 terrorist incidents
occurred during the Persian Gulf war, but most were perpetrated by
indigenous terrorist groups in Turkey, Greece, Peru, and Chile who
exploited the war to advance their own goals. The majority of these
attacks were sporadic, uncoordinated bombings that caused few
casualties and little property damage. About half of the attacks
were directed at American targets. No "spectacular" terrorist
attacks occurred during the war, and some planned attacks were
thwarted.
The level of international cooperation against the Iraqi
terrorist threat was unprecedented. Cooperation among law
enforcement and intelligence services in many countries increased
the effectiveness of counter-terrorist efforts.
Steps Announced at Economic Summits
The seven industrialized countries known as the G-7 [Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States] have
repeatedly issued joint statements on terrorism at their annual
economic summit meetings. The most important of these commit
the G-7 to sever air links with any country that refuses to
"prosecute or extradite" those responsible for attacks on civil
aviation (Venice, 1987) or for hijackings (Bonn, 1978). Other
statements have condemned hostage-taking, attacks on diplomatic
personnel and premises, and state-sponsored terrorism. The seven
have repeatedly expressed their resolve to improve air safety,
exchange terrorist information, work toward closer cooperation
among police and security agencies, and bring terrorists to justice.
US Policy
US counter-terrorism policy was initially developed in the 1970s,
and the three basic principles remain as valid today as they were
then.
First, the US makes no concessions to terrorists holding
official or private American citizens hostage. Specifically, we will
not pay ransom, release prisoners, or change our policies in
response to terrorist demands. At the same time, the US
Government will make every effort, including contact with the
captors or their representatives, to obtain the release of hostages
without making concessions. Making deals with terrorists only
encourages more terrorism.
Second, the US works with other countries to put pressure on
terrorist-supporting countries (such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria,
Cuba, and North Korea) to persuade them that such support is not
cost free. These nations help terrorists by providing training,
money, weapons, travel and identification documents, diplomatic
pouch privileges, safe houses, and refuge. The US, working with
friendly countries, seeks to isolate such countries by imposing
economic, political, diplomatic, and--if all else fails--military
pressures.
Third, the US cooperates with friendly nations in developing
practical measures to counter terrorism. These measures include:
-- Identifying the terrorists by name and learning their goals,
ideologies, sponsors, and areas of operation;
-- Tracking them, particularly when they cross borders, and
searching them for forged documents, weapons, and dangerous
materials; and
-- Apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing terrorists.
Although more needs to be done in these areas, we are beginning to see
results. More terrorists are being caught before they can carry out
their attacks, and more terrorists are being convicted and sentenced
to stiff prison terms. Importantly, more terrorists are serving their
full prison terms. As a result, the traditional terrorist tactic of
taking hostages in order to secure the release of convicted terrorists
from prison is increasingly ineffective. Laws covering prosecution,
exchange of evidence, and extradition are being improved and used more
frequently to punish terrorists.
The US offers anti-terrorism training assistance to
representatives of friendly governments trying to fight terrorism.
More than 11,000 police and security personnel from nearly 70
countries have received such training since the program started in
1984. We also are working to provide more protection for American
officials abroad and to make US embassies and facilities overseas
more secure.
Because most terrorism originates and is carried out abroad,
continued international cooperation is a key to future success in
countering the terrorist threat, and a high priority is being given to
improving this cooperation.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: Focus on Central and Eastern Europe Summary of Initiatives
Date: Jul 8, 19917/8/91
Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (former),
Poland
Subject: Trade/Economics, Media/Telecommunications,
International Law, Environment
[TEXT]
Citizens Democracy Corps
Bulgaria
. Ambassador Sol Polansky chaired the
Citizens Democracy Corps' first meeting of private voluntary
organizations wishing to assist in Bulgaria's transition to
democracy and free markets. Ted Achilles, the Democracy Corps'
representative in Bulgaria, reported on the dramatic changes in that
country during the past 6 months. The Democracy Corps will focus
its initial efforts on health care, agriculture, and privatization.
The Democracy Corps plans to hold these meetings on a
regular basis. For more information about the meetings or the
Citizens Democracy Corps, call 800-321-1945 or 202-872-0933.
Media Initiatives
International Media Fund.
The United States
Information Agency (USIA) has given the International Media Fund a
$5-million grant out of FY 1991 special assistance funding for
Eastern Europe. The grant was awarded to develop a diverse
independent media essential to the growth of democratic political
systems and pluralistic societies in Central and Eastern Europe.
The Fund will provide assistance through financial and equipment
grants to help support independent television and radio stations,
newspapers, and other periodicals. It also will provide technical
assistance in management, programming, marketing, technology, and
other aspects of media operating in a market-oriented environment.
For more information about the Fund, call its Executive
Director, Aurelius Fernandez, at 202-296-9787.
Poland
. Jerome Aumente, professor and
director of Rutgers University's Journalism Resource Center, is the
team leader of eight US media professionals who will be
professionals-in-residence at newspapers and radio and television
stations throughout Poland for 2 weeks this summer.
Grant Given
. Thanks to the interest of TV
commentator Bill Moyers, Professor Aumente has obtained a
$300,000 grant for Rutgers University from the Florence and John
Schumann Foundation for media training in Central and Eastern
Europe.
Central and East European Law Initiative
Bulgaria.
On May 7, a senior US federal judge, John
Fullam, arrived in Sofia to assist the American Bar Association's
Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI). Judge Fullam is
working with numerous Bulgarian organizations such as the
Constitutional Drafting Committee of the Grand National Assembly,
the Bulgarian Bar Association, Sofia University, the Ministry of
Justice, the Office of the President, the Office of the Prime
Minister, and various political parties. Similar visits by other legal
experts are scheduled for Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania.
At the request of the Secretary of the Bulgarian Grand
National Assembly, CEELI provided follow-up consultations June
18-23 with the Constitutional Drafting Committee concerning the
final draft of the new constitution.
Czechoslovakia.
The Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic has adopted a law establishing a Constitutional
Court. As follow-up to CEELI's two previous workshops in Prague on
criminal law revision and judicial restructuring, a CEELI delegation
will provide assistance to the federal Supreme Court on organizing
the Constitutional Court.
Romania.
A CEELI delegation visited
Bucharest May 13-17 to discuss Romania's draft constitution with
the Constitutional Drafting Committee and review the assistance
provided by three CEELI experts in November 1990.
For more information about CEELI or its programs, call its
Executive Director, Mark Ellis, at 202-331-2619.
Private Sector Support for Business Education
The North American Consortium for Free Market Study plans to send
several hundred Central and East Europeans to a specially designed,
1-year work-study program in market economics and management
offered at selected schools in Canada and the United States during
the next 5 years. The consortium comprises Canadian and US
corporations, foundations, governments, and schools. The first
students will arrive in September 1991.
The consortium was created by Edgar M. Bronfman, chairman
of Joseph E. Seagram ∧ Sons, Inc., in response to President Bush's
appeal that the private sector take a special role in helping with
the economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe. The
leaders of that region also have asked for help in sending their
people to schools in North America.
Seagram provided initial funding and help in finding members.
The consortium has raised several hundred thousand dollars from
such companies as Johnson ∧ Johnson, the Jefferson Smurfit
packaging group, Du Pont, Ralston Purina, Eli Lilly, and Merck, Sharp,
∧ Dohme.
Dr. Vartan Gregorian, president of Brown University, has
agreed to co-chair the consortium's advisory council with Edgar
Bronfman. The Institute of International Education (IIE) of New York
City, the managers of the Fulbright graduate student program, has
agreed to manage the consortium. IIE will select the students, pick
the participating schools, and handle all the consortium's
managerial needs.
For the 1991-92 school year, IIE has chosen the following
schools: the Katz School at the University of Pittsburgh, the
Kellogg School at Northwestern University, Illinois University at
Urbana/Champaign, McGill University in Montreal, and the University
of South Carolina. IIE will select students from Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland for the first year. Bulgaria, Romania, and
Yugoslavia will be added in the second year.
For more information about this effort, call James M.
Montgomery of Seagram at 202-638-7777.
US Opens Ports to Central and East European
Vessels
President Bush has opened all US ports to vessels from Central and
Eastern Europe, including 12 ports previously closed to such vessels
for national security reasons. The 12 ports are Charleston, South
Carolina; Groton and New London, Connecticut; Hampton Roads,
Virginia; Kings Bay, Georgia; Panama City, Pensacola, Port
Canaveral, and Port Saint Joe, Florida; Port Hueneme and San Diego,
California; and Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
White House Press Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said in a
statement issued on May 8 that the change represents "a major
revision" in US port access policy and "another step by the United
States in discarding Cold War restrictions." "This revision is the
result of a comprehensive inter-agency review and is designed to
stimulate commercial trade between the United States and the
region," Fitzwater said. "It was taken in recognition of the progress
these countries have made toward democracy and the rule of law."
Ships from Central and East European countries now may enter any
US port with 24-hours notice.
Bulgaria
The US-Bulgarian Bilateral Trade Treaty was signed in Washington,
DC, on April 22, 1991. Once approved by Congress and the Bulgarian
parliament, the trade agreement will extend most-favored-nation
treatment to Bulgarian exports to the United States.
On June 5, President Bush declared that Bulgaria was eligible
for US Export-Import Bank assistance. The President's declaration
will permit the Export-Import Bank to extend credit facilities to
Bulgaria once that country meets the bank's credit-worthiness
criteria. Bulgaria, however, had not met those criteria as of June
15.
Czechoslovakia
Environmental Exhibit. USIA sponsored an exhibit, "Environmental
Action in America," that drew large crowds while it was in Prague
May 15-June 6. The exhibit highlighted efforts to solve
environmental problems shared by the United States and Central and
East European countries. The multimedia presentation was
supplemented by lectures, workshops, and factory visits, plus a
resource center with 400 books and an Environmental Protection
Agency-supplied data base. The crowds saw the case studies in the
exhibit, Cleveland's cleanup of the Cuyahoga River and Los Angeles'
attack on air pollution, as having special relevance for
Czechoslovakia, which is environmentally damaged after four
decades of communist rule.
John Deere Family Contributes. USIA gave Iowa State
University a grant in 1990 for an exchange of students with
Czechoslovakia. The successful 5-week agriculture and
agribusiness exchange came to the attention of a member of the
John Deere family, of tractor fame, which made a $100,000
donation to Iowa State University to enable six Czech students to
pursue Master of Science degrees in agriculture at that university
beginning in September.
Hungary
Hungarian judges participating in a USIA exchange project formed a
"Hungarian National Judicial Foundation" dedicated to ongoing
training of judges and to the establishment and maintenance of
links with US organizations that serve the legal profession. The
judges hope to "foster high standards of scholarly achievement and
administrative efficiency."
Poland
In response to the February 27 White House Conference on
Management Training, South Dakota Governor George Mickelson
signed an agreement in Warsaw in late April between the University
of South Dakota and the University of Warsaw that provides for an
academic exchange program, which will begin this fall.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 27, July 8, 1991
Title: Current Treaty Actions
Date: Jul 8, 19917/8/91
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Country: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia,
Egypt, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, South Korea,
Malaysia, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Philippines,
United Kingdom, Zimbabwe
Subject: Narcotics, Trade/Economics,
Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control, Immigration,
Science/Technology, International Law,
Environment, Media/Telecommunications,
Resource Management, United Nations
[TEXT]
Multilateral
Agriculture
International agreement for the creation at Paris of an
international office for epizootics, with annex. Done at Paris Jan.
25, 1924. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1925; for the US July 29,
1975. TIAS 8141.
Accession Deposited: Bhutan, Dec. 14, 1990.
International plant protection convention. Done at Rome Dec. 6,
1951. Entered into force Apr. 3, 1952. TIAS 7465.
Adherence Deposited: Yemen, Dec. 20, 1990.
Atomic Energy
Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 11, 1990, regarding
protection of information transferred into the US in connection
with the initial phase of a project for the establishment of a
uranium enrichment installation in the US based upon the gas
centrifuge enrichment process developed within the three European
countries (Fed. Rep. of Germany, Netherlands, UK). Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 5 and 9, 1991. Entered into
force provisionally Apr. 11, 1991; enters into force definitively
upon receipt by the US of the last notification from the three
governments of the completion of their constitutional requirements.
Parties: Germany, Fed. Rep., Netherlands, UK, US.
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and
stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on
their destruction. Done at Washington, London and Moscow Apr. 10,
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975.
Accession deposited: Brunei, Jan. 31, 1991.
Consular
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24,
1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the US Dec. 24, 1969.
TIAS 6820.
Accessions deposited: Angola, Nov. 21, 1990; Maldives, Jan. 21,
1991.
Customs
Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex.
Done at Brussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1952; for
the US Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.
Accession deposited: Burma, Mar. 25, 1991.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Protocol for the accession of El Salvador to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Dec. 13, 1990.
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Apr. 22, 1991.
Entry into force: May 22, 1991.
Intellectual Property
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.
Entry into force: Apr. 26, 1970; for the US Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS
6932.
Amendment to the convention of July 14, 1967, establishing the
World Intellectual Property Organization. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 2,
1979.
Entered into force June 1, 1984.
Accession deposited: San Marino, Mar. 26, 1991.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction.
Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980.
Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the US July 1, 1988. [Senate]
Treaty Doc. 99-11.
Ratification deposited: Argentina, Mar. 19, 1991.1
Accession deposited: New Zealand, May 31, 1991.2
Law
Statute of The Hague conference on private international law.
Done at The Hague Oct. 9-31, 1951.
Entry into force July 15, 1955; for the US Oct. 15, 1964. TIAS 5710.
Acceptance deposited: Romania, Apr. 10, 1991.
Marine Science
Convention for a North Pacific Marine Science Organization (PICES).
Done at Ottawa Dec. 12, 1990. Enters into force 60 days after the
date on which three of the signatory states have deposited
instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval.
Signature: US, May 28, 1991.
Marriage
Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage and
registration of marriages. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1962. Entered
into force Dec. 9, 1964.3
Accession deposited: Mongolia, June 6, 1991.
Narcotics
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21,
1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the US
July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725.
Ratification deposited: Japan, Aug. 31, 1990.
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Oct. 11, 19904; Luxembourg, Feb.
7, 1991; Singapore, Sept. 17, 1990.
UN convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna
Dec. 20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990.
Accessions deposited: Grenada, Dec. 10, 1990; Sri Lanka, June 6,
1991; Burma, June 11, 1991.
Ratifications deposited: Yugoslavia, Jan. 3, 1991; Costa Rica, Feb.
8, 1991; Guatemala, Feb. 28, 1991.
Nuclear Weapons-- Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force
Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Accessions deposited: Zambia, May 15, 1991; Tanzania, June 7,
1991.
Oil Pollution
International convention on oil pollution preparedness, response,
and cooperation, 1990. Done at London Nov. 30, 1990. Enters into
force 12 months after the date on which not less than 15 states
have signed without reservation as to ratification, acceptance, or
approval or have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval, or accession.
Signatures: US, Argentina, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Denmark, Ecuador,
Egypt, Germany, Fed. Rep., Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Iceland, Lebanon,
Philippines, Uruguay, Nov. 30, 1990; Finland, Apr. 23, 19915;
Morocco, Feb. 20, 19915; Sweden, Apr. 3, 19915; Venezuela, May 20,
19915.
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington
June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733.
Amendment to the patent cooperation treaty. Adopted
Oct. 2, 1979. Entered into force May 3, 1984.
Accessions deposited: Czechoslovakia, Mar. 20, 1991; Guinea and
Mongolia, Feb. 27, 1991.
Rubber
International natural rubber agreement, 1987, with annexes. Done
at Geneva Mar. 20, 1987. Entered into force provisionally Dec. 29,
1988; definitively Apr. 3, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-9.
Ratification deposited: Greece, Mar. 12, 1991.
Satellite Communications Systems
Convention on the international maritime satellite organization
(INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976.
Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
Accessions deposited: Iceland, Mar. 26, 1991; Malta, Jan. 11, 1991.
Operating agreement on the international maritime satellite
organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976.
Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
Signatures: Iceland, Mar. 26, 1991; Malta, Jan. 11, 1991.
Trade
UN Convention on Contracts for the international sale of goods.
Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262]
Accessions deposited: Canada, Apr. 23, 1991; Romania, May 22,
1991.
World Health Organization
Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York
July 22, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the United
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptance deposited: Marshall Islands, June 5, 1991.
[TEXT]
Bilateral
Argentina
Agreement concerning trade in women's and girls' wool trousers,
with attachment. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires
May 14 and 31, 1991.
Entered into force May 31, 1991.
Brazil
Mutual cooperation agreement for reducing demand, preventing
illicit use, and combating illicit production and traffic of drugs.
Signed at Brasilia Sept. 3, 1986.
Entry into force: June 13, 1991.
Canada
Agreement extending the agreement of Mar. 11, 1981, as extended
(TIAS 10111), regarding the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
Apr. 30, 1991.
Entered into force Apr. 30, 1991; effective May 12, 1991.
China
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Feb. 2, 1988,
as amended, concerning trade in textiles and textile products.
Effected by exchange of letters at Beijing Apr. 23 and 24, 1991.
Entered into force Apr. 24, 1991.
Colombia
Cooperative agreement to prevent, control, and eradicate foot-and-
mouth disease. Signed at Washington Feb. 25, 1991. Enters into
force upon an exchange of notes confirming its provisions.
Egypt
Memorandum of understanding concerning a cooperative project for
the development of a display subprogram for the E-2C L-304
mission computer. Signed at Washington and Cairo May 6
and 15, 1991. Entered into force May 15, 1991.
Italy
Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of Dec. 5,
1985, as extended, concerning energy research and development
cooperation. Signed at Rome May 28, 1991. Entered into force May
28, 1991.
Jamaica
Extradition treaty. Signed at Kingston June 14, 1983.
Ratifications exchanged: June 7, 1991.
Entry into force: July 7, 1991.
Japan
Agreement in the field of liquid metal-cooled fast breeder reactors.
Signed at Washington Jan. 11, 1991. Entered into force Jan. 11,
1991; effective July 31, 1990.
Korea
Visa arrangement concerning trade in textiles and textile products,
with annexes. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Apr. 8
and 10, 1991.
Entered into force Apr. 10, 1991.
Malaysia
Agreement concerning a military education exchange program.
Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Kuala Lumpur May
16 and 29, 1991. Entered into force May 29, 1991.
Morocco
Treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of
investments, with protocol. Signed at Washington July 22, 1985.
[Senate] Treaty Doc.99-18.
Ratifications exchanged: Apr. 29, 1991.
Entry into force: May 29, 1991.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Memorandum of understanding concerning the interconnection of the
NICS TARE and the US AUTODIN network, with annex. Signed at
Brussels and Washington Apr. 26 and May 31, 1991.
Entered into force May 31, 1991.
Panama
Treaty concerning the treatment and protection of investments,
with annex and agreed minutes. Signed at Washington Oct. 27, 1982.
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-14.
Ratifications exchanged: Apr. 30, 1991.
Entry into force: May 30, 1991.
Peru
Agreement amending the visa arrangement of July 17 and Aug. 22,
1985, regarding trade in textiles. Effected by exchange of letters
at Lima Feb. 19 and 28, 1991. Entered into force Feb. 28, 1991.
Philippines
Agreement regarding the relinquishment of certain areas at the San
Miguel Naval Communications Station, Province of Zambales and the
US Navy transmitter site at Capas, Province of Tarlac, with maps.
Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Jan. 31 and May 13, 1991.
Entered into force May 13, 1991.
Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 4, 1987, relating to
trade in textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of
notes at Manila Dec. 28, 1990 and Feb. 26, 1991. Entered into force
Feb. 26, 1991.
United Kingdom
Agreement extending application of the treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom of July 3, 1986, concerning the
Cayman Islands relating to mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters, to Montserrat. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Apr. 26, 1991. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1991.
Zimbabwe
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program
in Zimbabwe. Signed at Harare Mar. 18, 1991. Entered into force
Mar. 18, 1991.
1 With designation.
2 With declaration(s).
3 Not in force for the US.
4 With reservation.
5 Subject to ratification.(###)