US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991


"First Amendment" Freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks at the Gannett Foundation dinner, Rosslyn, Virginia Date: Jun 26, 19916/26/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Subject: Democratization, Media/Telecommunications [TEXT] I am especially pleased to be here tonight to join you in championing First Amendment freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For it is these fundamental rights that must underpin the new, democratic Europe that we all seek to establish. On my trip to Berlin, Belgrade, and Tirana last week, I got a vivid glimpse of the opportunities and risks the new Europe holds. I certainly came back renewed in the conviction that America's values and interests bridge the Atlantic. Our destiny remains united with a Europe which is whole and free, stable and secure, prosperous and open to the free flow of information. In Berlin, at a ministerial meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], we joined the other signatory states in reaffirming that common aim. And we also issued a collective statement with regard to the situation in Yugoslavia that demonstrated unanimous support for human rights, democracy, and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. My subsequent discussions in Belgrade, with both federal and republic leaders, found some common ground. But notwithstanding rhetorical flourishes, I also found an air of unreality, an inability on the part of several republic leaders to understand the dangerous consequences of their actions. I went to Yugoslavia because of our serious concerns about the situation there and our strong desire to do all that we can to avert a disaster. But our concerns were not allayed, and the likelihood of more violence and bloodshed--and disintegration--is growing. It is truly a powderkeg situation, one that is deteriorating even as I speak. We will continue to press upon federal and republic leaders alike the importance of political dialogue and a negotiated solution. But I would be less than candid if I did not also recognize that events in Yugoslavia appear to have taken on a momentum of their own as witnessed by the statements of independence by the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia yesterday and by the incidents today. I want there to be no doubt about the US position: We support the application of Helsinki principles and cooperative efforts toward resolving political differences peacefully. We will not reward unilateral actions that preempt dialogue or the possibility of negotiated solutions, and we will strongly oppose intimidation or the use of force. The United States continues to recognize and support the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, including the borders of its member republics. At the same time, we can support greater autonomy and sovereignty for the republics--in other words a new basis for unity in Yugoslavia--but only through peaceful means such as negotiation and dialogue. We will continue to promote democracy, market reform, and respect for the human rights of every citizen in Yugoslavia. We are reviewing, along with the countries of the European Community and other members of the CSCE and the international community, what steps we ought now take to promote dialogue and avoid greater violence in Yugoslavia. Certainly no one in Yugoslavia--and no one in Europe--can afford to repeat the tragic mistakes of the past. This is especially so when the future can be so bright--when freedom is on the march around the world--and when democratic principles have never been so widely embraced. This new reality came to life for me when I visited Albania last Saturday. In that crowded square in Tirana, looking into the faces of the people clamoring for freedom, for me the Fourth of July came early. That spontaneous outpouring of genuine affection and support for our delegation was very moving and made me extremely proud to be an American. Our country and our example of freedom are clearly symbols of hope to the Albanian people, who have had nothing to hope for for so very long. These people were totally intoxicated with freedom after more than 50 years of repression, isolation, and the inability to express themselves. It was almost as if a long- dormant volcano had erupted with the people shouting "Freedom," literally from the rooftops--freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of worship. They were, in short, joyously embracing the very human rights and fundamental freedoms that this foundation has long defended here at home and that you are now championing abroad. And by the way, you are to be congratulated for re-naming this foundation the Freedom Forum, because that's exactly what's needed--a platform for First Amendment rights that is strong enough to support free societies worldwide. In February 1990, in a speech in Prague, I emphasized the need to promote free media as a means of safeguarding newly won liberties in Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union. And tonight, strengthening independent media not only remains a matter of major importance to us, it has become a matter of real urgency to all who want to see democracy take hold. In Prague, I quoted Thomas Jefferson on the political philosophy of a free press. And, in my subsequent talks with the democratically minded leaders of both government and opposition throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, I have never heard anyone disagree with the broad principles governing a free media. But what I have been hearing is the urgent need for our help in putting those principles into practice just as soon as possible. In Bulgaria and Romania, for example, opposition leaders have told me of their desperate need for newsprint. In Romania alone, I was told, they now have over 2,000 newspapers, and they desperately need materials like newsprint. In Albania during the elections, the democratic opposition did well in the cities but had problems getting its message to the countryside because the central government controls resources. To emphasize the pressing nature of the need, tonight, I want to draw upon the example of a successful publisher who was a contemporary of Jefferson's. He was less concerned with First Amendment theory than he was with its practice. It was only late in life that he got involved in democracy-building and diplomacy. Ben Franklin didn't think much of folks he called: "Great talkers, little doers." He's a fine model for us all because he always preferred deeds to words. So, I'm urging you to put your energy and your money where my mouth is--to put your funds into concrete programs that will give independent journalists a solid start. I'm sure we agree that now is the time when it really counts--when countries are still in the early stages of forming new constitutions, revamping legal systems, and building civil societies. In the long run, free media can survive only in a democratic, free market environment. The key is that we get in there and support independent voices now, until they can support themselves. Otherwise, our help could come too late. Already, a great deal of good and helpful work identifying needs has been done by Gannett, the US Information Agency, the Board for International Broadcasting, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Independent Media Fund, Freedom House, the Soros Foundation, the New York Times Foundation, the Central and East Europeans, and the Soviets themselves--as well as by many others. Now, the time has come to work in very practical ways. Of course, we Americans have no monopoly on experience, and we cannot just transplant our own solutions. Undoubtedly, a privatized media has worked well for us and can work for others, too. But, I would argue that as we help the Central and East Europeans and the Soviets establish independent media, we should not concern ourselves too greatly whether the particular model of independence they choose is the BBC, PBS, NBC, or C-Span--provided independence means freedom from government or political control and influence. We also realize that groups like Freedom Forum do not want to co-mingle funds with US government funded entities, even though they operate independently. But we do think that creative opportunities exist for working in parallel. So, in considering the ways you can help, I urge you to give priority to those efforts that can produce early and concrete results in four key areas:
First, resources:
Promising independent projects already are operating on nothing but shoestrings and local initiative. You can provide the means to keep them running at a time when the transition from planned to market economies makes equipment and supplies--such as newsprint, computers, satellite dishes, fax machines, and desk-top publishing equipment--difficult to obtain and expensive.
Second, investment:
You can encourage Western investment that will help indigenous media establish itself. You can also encourage investment to privatize existing media.
Third, issues of control, press laws, and access:
You can help reduce government control of the media. Establishing the proper legal framework is one way to tackle the problem. Another is by championing access rights for the independent media where frequencies or scarce supplies such as newsprint are dispensed or withheld by officials for political reasons. The Independent Media Fund's backing of SOTI, the Romanian Society for Creating an Independent Television Company, in its uphill campaign for access to the airwaves, is one important example.
Fourth and finally, training:
As one independent Hungarian journalist so aptly put it: "We must learn that facts are more important than ideologies. We have to learn to dig out truth from underneath all the lies and corruption. We have to learn to tolerate other views and understand that competitors are not necessarily enemies." I cannot emphasize enough, here, the concrete contributions that we can make in the four main areas I have just highlighted. The jamming towers, censorship laws, and the Berlin Wall itself may be gone, but many serious barriers to the free flow of information remain: authoritarian methods, entrenched old structures, insular and intolerant attitudes. Overcoming these barriers will require what President Bush calls "the hard work of freedom." And we ought not to delude ourselves or the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: building democracy is a difficult task. It took decades, if not centuries, in the United States and Western Europe. And freedom's road is oftentimes a difficult one, and the people of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union need to know that, too. But they also need to know that we support them in their quest for freedom. We cannot ensure their success. Only they can. But we can lend a helping hand as they cross the new frontier -- the frontier called Freedom. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from remarks before a session of the Council of Ministers' meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Berlin, Germany Date: Jun 19, 19916/19/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Subject: Trade/Economics, CSCE [TEXT] In our effort to build a Europe whole and free, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe must help address the economic needs of a new Europe, broadening and deepening economic prosperity across the continent. This is an essential part of building durable democratic institutions, a goal that all of us endorsed at the Paris summit. Accomplishing this goal does not necessarily require that CSCE create new institutions or mechanisms. Rather, we should seek to forge strong partnerships with those institutions that have competence in the economic arena. The European Community, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and others can help us meet the challenges of economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. In addition to ensuring that CSCE works closely with multilateral institutions to meet our members' needs, each of us individually must examine how we can contribute to a successful economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe. I see three areas in which individual contributions can be made. First, we must open our markets to free trade. The economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union requires that these countries have access to regional and global markets. In that context, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] is the most important single step we can take. If we can focus on resolving a set of core issues first--agriculture, services, government procurement, intellectual property, and market access--we can achieve the breakthrough which will lead to a comprehensive agreement. In addition to bringing about an early conclusion of the Uruguay Round, we need to work to eliminate specific barriers to exports from Central and Eastern Europe. Macroeconomic stabilization is not enough. We need to cultivate the microeconomic basis for prosperity, too. For it is a simple fact that the new market democracies will not be able to draw foreign investment, to privatize, to build competitive businesses that will create jobs if they are not allowed to compete fairly for markets. As part of this, it is essential that we open our markets to those goods where reforming economies are most competitive. Access to 90% of our markets is of limited value if the remaining 10% include those industries where Central and East Europeans have a comparative advantage. This means in particular that we must deal with restrictions on steel, textiles, and agricultural products. For our part, the United States is committed to increasing market access for the Central and East Europeans. The Trade Enhancement Initiative announced by President Bush on March 20 sets out five areas where we are moving ahead to improve access. A team of senior US officials recently visited the region to discuss trade barriers and will recommend steps the United States can take to open up its markets. Second, individual CSCE countries can provide appropriate direct financial assistance to the countries of the region to accelerate their economic transition. We must continue to resist the introduction of trade-distorting tied aid credits which can interfere with movement toward free and open markets in the region. Instead, financial assistance should promote the development of vigorous, competitive private sectors. A third area for individual contributions is redoubling efforts in providing technical assistance to all sectors of these economies. We have much to offer: from passing on agricultural and industrial know-how, to training managers and accountants, to helping parliaments and government agencies rewrite laws and regulations to facilitate the growth of new private business. Both bilaterally and multilaterally--including through future CSCE experts' meetings--we should focus our efforts on targeting our assistance to areas of greatest need and most direct effect. That's why I've proposed a seminar on the social and financial implications of defense conversion and budget cuts. If the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are to transform themselves, they must shift the vast resources devoted to military industries to civilian uses. In this endeavor, we in the West can provide technical assistance and advice. We might also consider the establishment of chambers of commerce for reforming economies of the East, to help promote the investment, trade, and private enterprise needed to bring about transformation and sustainable growth. This will enhance the weight of the private sector in the new democracies and create networks for economic growth. Through all of these methods, we can assist in the vital task of strengthening the fabric of economic cooperation across the CSCE community. But our efforts can only play a supporting role in the ongoing transition. Self-help remains the essential prerequisite to successful reform. Real change must come from within the political and economic systems of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, from the sweeping away of barriers to economic activity, from the development and codification of a framework for private business, and from the implementation of sound macroeconomic policies that are essential to economic growth. These are all important areas for CSCE to address, as we seek to build on last year's landmark Bonn conference. As a community, we have a responsibility to the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to help them complete their transitions. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

Albania: Progress Along Freedom's Road

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address to the Albanian Assembly, Tirana, Albania Date: Jun 22, 19916/22/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Albania Subject: Democratization, CSCE [TEXT] For generations, your country-men and your relatives have been coming to America and making remarkable contributions to our national life. But the road between us must be a two-way road. So when, in this chamber earlier this month, Dr. Sali Berisha invited me to come to Albania, I came here as soon as I could. And now I am honored to address this body. With the recent reestablishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries and with my own trip here today, I say to the people of Albania: America is returning to you. The United States has watched closely, and we have applauded your progress along freedom's road. You have made the first great breakthroughs to begin rejoining the community of nations after long decades of cruel, self-imposed isolation. All Americans welcome your first steps along this road, the democratic road that so many nations across the globe now travel with you. I have a very simple message for the members of this chamber today and for the citizens of this country which now faces the difficult challenge of national reconstruction: On freedom's road, we must always move forward. In this parliament, in this capital, and across this land, there can only be forward movement toward establishing full democracy, a market economy, and the rule of law. After so many years, Albania cannot afford delay. A vital part of the hard work necessary to build democracy will have to take place in this chamber, in drafting the laws necessary for a free market, for a constitutional system of government, and for the safeguards of democracy and economic freedom. Here is where you will do what President Bush calls "the hard work of freedom." Your new coalition government has drawn up an ambitious economic program that will be essential to your national rebuilding effort. The privatization of agriculture and industry, the decisive opening of your country to foreign investment, and long-overdue policies to allow a convertible currency, liberalized prices, and a balanced national budget are essential in laying the groundwork for Albania's eventual economic recovery. But I must tell you what the other reforming countries of Eastern Europe have already learned--the passage to prosperity is painful and difficult. Your work will not be easy. It will require of you and your people the patience and determination that Albanians have already demonstrated in their long struggle for freedom. But there is no other way to the future that Albanians want and deserve for themselves and for their children. In this parliament and in this capital, your constitution will also be drafted to lay another crucial part of the foundation for a new Albania. If this is to be an Albania where individuals can determine their own futures, where the rights of every citizen--no matter what ethnic or religious group--are fully protected, then this constitutional drafting process must be open and democratic. I am pleased that you have invited constitutional experts from my country and from Europe to consult with you in this process. And speaking as a lawyer, I can tell you that not only is the letter of the law important, the spirit of the law, and the practice of that law make the vital difference in the life and success of true democracy governed by just laws and by just governors. So, I am also glad that my government and many American private organizations will be helping Albanians construct democracy, markets, and a constitutional order. I want to be very clear about something else: just as there is no turning back on the road to a new Albania, there is no place along that road for violence, no place for intimidation, no place for the use of force. The watchwords of the new Europe--the Europe Albania has just begun to rejoin with its membership in CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]--are respect for human rights and the peaceful settlement of disputes. I know that I speak for every American when I say to every member of this chamber and every citizen of Albania: Let us see an end to all fear in Albania. This is a new Albania, and you are members of a new Europe. You have joined the nations that have pledged to uphold the high standards of CSCE--standards that govern a state's behavior toward other nations and toward its own people. You have made a solemn compact with Europe and with yourselves. Do not forsake it. You are now an integral part of CSCE. I hope you will use the privilege of your membership wisely and well. By your actions, Albania can help shape the Helsinki process--its new institutions, its decisions, its direction--for the greater good of Europe. But without doubt, the Helsinki process will also shape you, just as it has shaped the destinies of other signatory states, for you have joined a process that has sought from its inception to build a Europe whole and free. As Albania's first step as a full CSCE member, I urge this body, the Albanian government, and all democratic forces in this country to cooperate fully with the upcoming mission of CSCE rapporteurs. CSCE can help guide nations once lost to repression, hostility, and isolation toward respect for human rights, democratic processes, free markets, and international cooperation. So, may it guide this nation toward a brighter future, for the sake of the Albanian people and for the sake of a new Europe. And if I may, let me state clearly what the emerging democracies of Europe have learned about putting an end to old fears in order to build new futures. They know that it means freeing all political prisoners, once and for all. They know that it means full respect for religious and minority rights and for opening the media to genuine pluralism. They know that it means eliminating repressive security organs and bringing legitimate police functions under democratic controls. They know that it means depoliticizing and developing civilian control over the military. They know that it means freeing the factories, farms, and mines from political controls and mismanagement. They know that it means instituting a fair and open judicial process, based on the best traditions of law and justice. They know that it means pursuing democratization at every level of government and society. It means holding fully free and fair elections at both the national and local level--elections that include a fair campaign as well as equal allocation of state resources, and fair media access to all parties. For these are the challenges of your new freedom and the elements of lasting legitimacy. You and your neighbors have a unique chance to make your history anew, transcending the history that led to dead ends and conflict. While working peacefully for respect for the rights of ethnic Albanians in the region, you must not be detoured by old conflicts and ancient quarrels. Here, as in America, democracy must be not only an ideal--it must be a reality. In this endeavor, as long as you are true to these principles, we will stand with you as we stood with you early in this century, when President Woodrow Wilson championed your cause. I am proud that my President and my country stand with you now in the last decade of the 20th century, in support of a free and independent Albania. For every part of this continent, just as every citizen of this country, must be part of what President Bush calls "a Europe whole and free." In closing, let me say to you that is our hope from this day forward the American and Albanian people will share these ideals: open government, open media, an open economy, an open society. These are the safeguards of freedoms. And freedom works. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

US Aid to Albania

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Belgrade, Yugoslavia Date: Jun 22, 19916/22/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Albania Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Media/Telecommunications, Democratization [TEXT] During Secretary Baker's visit to Tirana, he informed the Albanian government and political leaders that the United States is prepared to provide Albania with approximately $6 million worth of assistance in the following categories:
Humanitarian Assistance
-- Offer of 2,000 metric tons of US Department of Agriculture powdered milk (worth approximately $3 million). -- Supply of approximately $1.25 million in powdered milk and packaged foods which will be donated to a private charitable agency for distribution in Albania. -- Delivery of basic medical equipment and medicines worth $1 million. -- Provision of Department of Defense excess medical and food supplies from the Gulf. -- Provision of $250,000 cash-in-kind donations to the Albanian Red Cross, in response to an appeal from the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
Democratic Initiatives
The US welcomes the changes that have taken place recently in Albania, in particular the establishment of the Government of National Stability and the decision to hold new elections within the year. As an acknowledgment of the progress made thus far, the US is prepared to offer the following programs to support further political and free market reforms in Albania: -- The National Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute will begin implementing programs to support democratic party development and civic education. -- Additional funds are available for election monitoring in the event of new multi-party elections. -- The Central and Eastern European Law Initiative will send a team to Albania to assist with the drafting of a new constitution.
Additional Assistance
The US Information Agency will offer various programs, including: -- Visits by academic specialists in the field of educational reform and management. -- Participation in its international visitor and secondary school curriculum specialists programs. -- Media workshops for Albanian journalists. -- One-year professional journalism scholarships at a US university. -- Allocation of $50,000 to include Albania in the "Books for Democracy" initiative. -- Provision of videocassette recorders and tapes on market economies, democracies, the English language and culture. -- Management workshops led by US experts. If Albania takes concrete steps forward in political and free- market reforms, the United States is prepared to offer further increased technical assistance.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

US Concerns About the Future of Yugoslavia

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from remarks at the Federation Palace, Belgrade, Yugoslavia Date: Jun 21, 19916/21/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former) Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization First, I want to thank the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the respective Republic leaders for meeting with us on what was pretty short notice. Let me say that we came to Yugoslavia because of our concern about the "crisis" the Minister just referred to, really, our concern about the dangers of a disintegration of this country. Instability and break-up of Yugoslavia, we think, could have some very tragic consequences, not only here, but more broadly, in Europe, as well. We're obviously not alone in having these concerns. You heard the Minister mention the 34 other countries of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. They have all expressed, along with us, our collective concern when we were at our meeting in Berlin. My discussions with Yugoslavia's neighbors and with members of the European Community also indicated the depths of these concerns. And I have today conveyed these very serious concerns about the future of this country in the meetings that I have been privileged to have. In all candor, ladies and gentlemen, what I heard today has not allayed my concerns or our concerns. Nor, I suspect, will it allay the concerns of others when we give them a readout of these meetings. Now having said that, I do have to say that we did see and find some common ground here today. First of all, everyone I spoke to stressed the fact that they were prepared to continue a dialogue on the future of Yugoslavia. Secondly, all of them indicated a wish to avoid violence and all of them indicated strong opposition to any use of force. Third, they all recognized the legitimate interest of the international community, and, I think, welcomed its continued effort to promote dialogue and promote a peaceful resolution of these problems through negotiations. In all of these meetings, I stressed the importance of respecting human and minority rights, of continuing the process of democratization, and of continuing a dialogue to create a new basis for unity. In particular, I emphasized the need to move ahead on the constitutional rotation of the federal presidency, as well as the need to avoid unilateral acts that could preempt the negotiating process. As far as next steps are concerned, we will be consulting with the European Community and with other interested members of the international community. Based on these discussions today, I'm very hopeful, that notwithstanding all of the difficulties, there is some prospect for continued dialogue. There will certainly be active efforts by the international community, including the United States, to try and promote such a dialogue. But in the end--as we all, I think, understand and recognize and know--it's really going to be up to the people of Yugoslavia whether or not these problems are overcome, whether or not they are overcome peacefully and through negotiation and dialogue, as they should be.
Mr. Baker, several of the presidents [of the Yugoslav republics] mentioned that you made the point that, should any of their republics break away, they cannot expect American recognition for their independence or outside economic help. Is that the case? What was your message in that regard?
Secretary Baker:
The message was that these issues and problems should be resolved to the extent possible through dialogue and should not be actions taken which would preempt those negotiations and that dialogue. I was asked the question this morning whether or not the United States would recognize the forthcoming declaration of independence by Slovenia, a declaration that is expected, I think, in a day or so. I said that it would not be the policy of the United States to recognize that declaration, because we want to see this problem resolved through negotiation and through dialogue and not through preemptive unilateral actions. Now, having said that, I want to direct you back to my statement where I said we believe, based on all of our discussions, that everyone is interested in finding a way, through dialogue and negotiation, to craft a new basis for unity of Yugoslavia, and to find a way, through dialogue and negotiation, to see the devolution of additional authority, responsibility, and sovereignty to the republics of Yugoslavia. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

Fact Sheet: Secretary Baker Visits Yugoslavia and Albania

Date: Jun 22, 19916/22/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: E/C Europe Country: Albania, Yugoslavia (former) Subject: Democratization, CSCE [TEXT] Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, visited Yugoslavia and Albania, June 21-22, after attending the Council of Ministers meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Berlin. Secretary Baker is the first Secretary of State to visit Albania and the first to visit Yugoslavia since then-Secretary George Shultz held talks in Belgrade in December 1985. The political situation in those two countries were discussed at the Berlin CSCE meeting. Yugoslavia is an original member of CSCE. Albania was accepted as a full member during the Berlin session.
US-Yugoslav Relations
The United States has had a long-standing, close, and friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. During the Cold War era, the United States firmly supported the unity, territorial integrity, and independence of Yugoslavia. In the post-Cold War era, the United States has strongly supported Yugoslavia's transition to democracy and a free market. The United States has appealed for an end to political and ethnic violence in Yugoslavia and for the resolution of internal problems through peaceful dialogue. Yugoslavia has long enjoyed most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status with the United States and is the ninth-largest user of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which gives duty-free access for many exports to the United States.
President's CSCE Report on Yugoslavia
The following is taken from the President's report to Congress on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe for the period April 1, 1990- March 1, 1991: During the reporting period, Yugoslavia suffered a deepening political crisis significantly affecting its performance under the Helsinki principles. In many parts of the country, there was a significant broadening of the democratic process. At the same time, rising ethnic tensions, most notably in Serbian-dominated Kosovo, led to repression and violence. Overall, Yugoslavia's adherence to Helsinki principles expanded during the reporting period, but in Kosovo the reverse was true, leading fellow CSCE states to invoke the Human Dimension Mechanism. The one-party communist system that ruled Yugoslavia since World War II largely disappeared in 1990. For the first time since before World War II, Yugoslavia experienced multi-party elections in all six constituent republics. Balloting procedures in most republics were generally fair, but in Serbia, the ruling Communist party used its control of the media and financial resources to the detriment of the opposition parties. The federal government, under Prime Minister Ante Markovic, attempted a sweeping program of political and economic reforms. After initial progress, this program fell afoul of inter- republican differences, which have, for example, blocked a number of proposed amendments to the federal constitution intended to eliminate remnants of the one-party system and allow multi-party elections at the federal level. Rising ethnic tensions and the persistence of old anti- democratic structures in Yugoslavia reached the point where they threatened the existence of a unified federal state. Conflict deepened, especially in parts of Croatia and Bosnia. Ethnic conflict in Kosovo between majority Albanians and Serbs, who consider the province the "heart of Serbia," has led to massive violations of human rights, including scores of deaths at the hands of police, thousands of arrests for the expression of political opinions, and the firing of tens of thousands for political strikes. Serbian/Croat tension also reached dangerous levels. The Yugoslav military is highly secretive and provides little information about its activities to the Yugoslav government or public, let alone the country's CSCE partners. As the Yugoslav crisis deepened, the Yugoslav military played an increasingly assertive political role, acting essentially outside the control of civilian authorities and in an anti-democratic fashion.
Recent Developments
Albania was the last of the Central and East European countries to move away from communism. A 47-year reign of totalitarian and isolationist rule by the communist party ended when the government agreed in December 1990 to hold multi-party elections, which took place on March 31, 1991. A new interim government was formed in June. The new government includes representatives of opposition parties and has pledged free and fair elections within the year.
US-Albanian Relations
The United States strongly supports the movement toward democratic and economic reform in Albania. Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Raymond Seitz, signed a memorandum of understanding at the State Department on March 15, 1991, when diplomatic relations between the two countries resumed. Diplomatic relations between the two countries had ended in 1939, when Italy took over the conduct of Albanian foreign affairs. In 1945, an informal US mission was sent to Albania to study the possibility of establishing relations with the ruling National Liberation Front (NLF), which had been established with the support of Yugoslav communists. However, the NLF refused to recognize the validity of pre-war treaties and increasingly harassed the US mission. The American team was withdrawn in November 1946. From 1946 until 1990, when US and Albanian diplomats began a series of meetings that led to the resumption of relations, no formal contacts had been made between the two governments.
President's CSCE Report on Albania
The following is taken from the President's CSCE implementation report covering the period April 1, 1990-March 1, 1991: During the reporting period, Albania, which refused the invitation to participate in CSCE in the early 1970s, requested and was granted observer status. It is, therefore, significant that Albania took some cautious but important steps toward implementing the Helsinki principles, including the holding of multi-party legislative elections on March 31, 1991--the first since 1920. The electoral process fell short in several key areas of CSCE standards for free and fair elections, including limited access to the media for opposition parties, intimidation against opposition party candidates and activists, and delayed issuance of election results. Much remains to be done to ensure Albania's complete and continuing observance of the Helsinki principles. During the reporting period, the ruling Albanian Party of Labor (PLA) declared its intent to depoliticize the army, security forces, and courts, and took measures to decentralize the economy and reform the penal code and electoral law. In December 1990, the Albanian leadership announced that the formation of independent political organizations would be permitted and that a number of political parties and organizations would be allowed to register officially. Some of these groups were also allowed to publish their own newspapers. In the area of human rights, the Albanian government took some initial steps to correct repressive practices of the past. In 1990, Albanian authorities eased some restrictions on citizens' right to travel abroad but at the same time reportedly shot asylum seekers. Albania eased its persecution of religious activity, which resulted in the celebration of some religious services without official interference. Amendments to the penal code adopted in 1990 include the right to counsel, the right of appeal, and the right to a speedy trial. The government also reestablished the Ministry of Justice, which had been abolished in 1967, as part of a judicial reform program. The government has published drafts for a new constitution incorporating safeguards in principle of many basic human rights, including freedom of religion, press, movement, association, and the presumption of innocence. The new multi-party legislature will begin debate on the constitution in late 1991. The government stopped jamming foreign broadcasts, including those of the Voice of America (VOA). The UN Secretary General visited Albania in 1990 to discuss human rights, among other topics. Albania, which is not a member of the CSCE, was granted observer status at each of the CSCE meetings held in the reporting period since June 1990. In October 1990, Albania hosted a gathering of Balkan foreign ministers. On March 15, 1991, the United States and Albania resumed relations. On March 20, 1991, an official US delegation arrived in Tirana to lay the foundations for this new relationship. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

US Support for Baltic Independence

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text of the President's Letter to Congress, Washington, DC Date: Jun 25, 19916/25/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, USSR (former) Subject: Democratization, History [TEXT]
To the Congress of the United States:
In accordance with Public Law 101-309 (104 Stat. 265), I am submitting to you this report on US Government actions in support of the peaceful restoration of independence for the Baltic States. In 1940, the Soviet Union forcibly occupied the independent Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Following sham elections, the three countries were incorporated into the USSR. The United States has never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR. The United States maintains diplomatic relations with representatives of their last free governments and is in close touch with the new democratically elected governments in each of the three Baltic States. The United States has consistently stood with the majority of Balts who never lost hope that they would one day regain their freedom. In the late 1980s, pro-democracy movements in the three Baltic States emerged and began to grow in strength. Among the most active were Sajudis in Lithuania, the Latvian Popular Front, and the Estonian Popular Front and Estonian Citizens' Committees. In largely free elections in early 1990, pro-democracy forces gained a majority in all three legislatures and formed pro- independence governments. On March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian legislature proclaimed the full and immediate restoration of Lithuanian independence. Eight days later, on March 19, President Gorbachev declared the Lithuanian proclamation invalid and insisted that the Lithuanians restore the status quo that existed prior to March 11 and recognize the supremacy of Soviet law. The Soviet government followed up this decree with intimidating troop movements in Vilnius and later an economic embargo on the supply of key products, including oil and natural gas. Undeterred, Estonia and Latvia subsequently issued their own proclamations espousing restoration of independence as their goal following a transitional period. In response to the Soviet embargo against Lithuania, I conveyed to President Gorbachev my deepest concern and regret over Soviet actions and urged him to begin a peaceful dialogue with the Lithuanian government. Secretary Baker pressed the same points in exchanges with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Finally, in late June 1990, the Soviet government lifted its embargo when the Lithuanian Supreme Council agreed to a formula whereby the independence proclamation would be suspended during the course of negotiations with Moscow on Lithuania's future. Thereafter, Moscow and the three Baltic States began to inch toward talks, but these broke off after only a few sessions with each side accusing the other of being unwilling to negotiate in good faith. At the end of 1990, pro-Moscow forces in the three Baltic States stepped up their pressure on the popularly elected governments there. In January, pro-Moscow forces--including local Communist Party members, Black Beret special Interior ministry troops, and Soviet Army paratroops--attacked and occupied communications and other facilities in Vilnius, Riga, and other cities, leaving at least 21 dead. In the wake of this Soviet pressure against the Baltic States, our Government has undertaken a vigorous diplomatic effort designed both to help avert future violent confrontations in the Baltic States and to enable the Baltic peoples to realize their legitimate but long-denied aspirations. We have held lengthy exchanges with our NATO Allies, neutral countries, and Central European democracies on this issue. We have succeeded in forging a strong, common position among CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] signatories rejecting violence and intimidation and calling for peaceful dialogue among the parties. The United States currently supports giving the Baltic States observer status at CSCE meetings and will support full membership once these nations regain independent statehood. Also this spring, the United States took a leading role in the UN Human Rights Commission's (UNHRC) discussion of the January violence in the Baltic States. The United States successfully worked for consensus on the UNHRC Resolution calling on the Soviet Union to review the January events and provide a full report to the Commission. In numerous contacts with Soviet President Gorbachev and other Soviet officials since mid-January, both Secretary Baker and I have repeatedly raised the matter of the Baltic States. There can be no doubt that the Soviet leadership understands this issue's importance to the United States and our unwavering support for the cause of Baltic freedom. We have underscored the unacceptability of the use of force and intimidation and the urgent need for dialogue and negotiations with the freely elected representatives of the Baltic States, which will lead to an outcome that respects Baltic aspirations for self-determination. Each of the Baltic States began negotiations with the Soviet Union on a broad range of issues in April. We are following these talks closely and hope they will be conducted in good faith, free of threats and intimidation by all sides. Secretary Baker and I have met with representatives of the Baltic States on numerous occasions. I met with Lithuanian President Landsbergis, Estonian Prime Minister Savisaar, and Latvian Prime Minister Godmanis in May; with Estonian President Ruutel in March; with President Landsbergis in December 1990; Prime Minister Savissar in October 1990; Prime Minister Godmanis in July 1990; and then-Prime Minister Prunskiene in May 1990. Secretary Baker has met with the three Baltic permanent representatives in Moscow and with the foreign ministers of all three Baltic States in Washington, New York, and Paris. Our Consulate General in Leningrad also maintains a nearly continuous diplomatic presence in the Baltic States and is in close contact with the governments there. We have used these and other contacts with Baltic leaders to keep current on the state of affairs in the Baltic States and to convey US support for the legitimate aspirations of the Baltic peoples. In addition, the Department of State maintains regular contact with the Charges d'Affaires of the three Baltic diplomatic legations accredited to the United States. The radio services of Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America have also played an important role in conveying and explaining US policy on the Baltic States. The Administration has also attempted to express our support for the Baltic people in new ways. Working through Project Hope, we shipped medical aid directly to the Baltics on February 28 to meet basic medical needs. We are now following up with a second shipment of medical supplies this month. We provided US technical help to Latvia after a chemical spill in the Daugava River in November 1990. The Department of Agriculture began a program to assist Lithuanian agriculture and support US agricultural sales there by modernizing a feed grain mill. Visits by a number of Members of Congress and Administration officials have also underscored the American people's support for Baltic self- determination. These extensive contacts reflect our recognition of the fact that these governments are democratically elected, represent the will of the Baltic peoples, and deserve our support. The United States has stood and will continue to stand in solidarity with the Baltic peoples in their striving for freedom and self-determination. Our intensified diplomatic efforts over the past year have played a critical role in galvanizing global support for the cause of the Baltic peoples and for a peaceful, negotiated outcome that takes proper account of legitimate Baltic interests. We strongly encourage the Soviet government and the three Baltic governments to progress in talks begun in early April on the issues that divide them. President Bush(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

US-ASEAN Relations

Kimmitt Source: Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Description: Remarks at the 10th ASEAN-US Dialogue, Washington, DC Date: Jun 20, 19916/20/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] Ambassador Vitthya--now Mr. Secretary--colleagues and friends, I'm pleased to welcome you to Washington and to the Department of State. The last meeting of the dialogue in Washington was during the cold of February 1988. Thus, although as Dick Solomon [Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] has noted the weather is not as warm as in ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], I'm glad that you can now be in our capital in weather that should make you feel more at home than that that greeted you in 1988. I am particularly pleased to be addressing the dialogue in view of Secretary Baker's long-standing interest in US relations with Asia-Pacific countries and especially with ASEAN. My personal interest in Southeast Asia was strongly reinforced during my military service in Vietnam. At that time, many so-called experts considered Southeast Asia to be chronically unstable, with limited economic prospects. I have thus followed your progress over the years with great interest and professional pleasure as you proved the experts wrong. As Secretary Vitthya recalls, I meet frequently with ASEAN ambassadors, individually and as a group, and have always found those sessions valuable. The most recent meeting was yesterday, with newly arrived Ambassador Bira, whom we are most pleased to welcome to Washington. Many dramatic events have taken place throughout the world since the last dialogue meeting in Washington. Most recently, the international community, in a strong demonstration of solidarity, successfully resisted Iraqi aggression and freed a United Nations member occupied by force. In the course of the crisis, the ASEAN countries, in a variety of ways, demonstrated your dedication to the principle of collective security and your recognition of the threat to us all if Iraqi aggression had gone unchecked. I would particularly compliment Malaysia's important contribution as a Security Council member through December 1990. Since 1988, we have also witnessed dramatic changes in the economic systems of many countries, with the move away from unproductive central planning and toward market-based economies. I am convinced that ASEAN played a major role in bringing about this change. Throughout ASEAN's near quarter century of history, you have been one of the world's fastest growing regions and have dramatically out-performed countries where the state directed the economy. Your achievements have stood as an example to the world, by showing that economic development is best served by policies giving adequate scope to market forces.
Preserving Regional Stability
ASEAN is also a key factor in regional stability. And although we have paid considerable attention to the Middle East and Persian Gulf over the last year, we have not forgotten, as Secretary Baker has frequently said, the future is in the Pacific. Thus consultations such as these are very important as we address the problems and opportunities of the Pacific. In the region, we appreciate ASEAN's continued constructive role in the search for a comprehensive political settlement for Cambodia. We hope Prince Sihanouk's efforts to move the peace process forward will soon allow the reconvening of the Paris conference and the implementation of a comprehensive settlement agreement based on Resolution 668, which was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council. Although shaped by the Permanent Five, this proposal was also prepared with input from ASEAN and others, and it now bears a formal UN imprint. As we watch to see how this situation develops, it will be important to maintain the unified front that has been such a key element of the process. That unity is particularly important between ASEAN and the US. I would also like to commend ASEAN states for the constructive role they have played in the continuing refugee crisis in Southeast Asia. The world applauds the efforts you have made to deal with the continuing flow of boat people generated by the repressive policies of Vietnamese authorities. We urge all of you to pursue humane policies, despite the frustrations and impatience many of your people undoubtedly feel. For our part, we will continue to support the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) through generous financial contributions and the resettlement of those asylum seekers determined to be refugees. I note that we plan to allocate $22 million to CPA- related activities and to resettle more than 70,000 Indochinese refugees and migrants this year. At the same time, within the context of the CPA and continued US opposition to involuntary repatriation, we are willing to examine proposals to accelerate the return to Vietnam of those asylum seekers determined not to be refugees. With a settlement in Cambodia supported by Vietnam, and for the US progress on the POW/MIA issue, we can proceed to normalize US-Vietnam and US-Cambodian relations, economic growth can advance, and the refugee problem will begin to abate.
Promoting Growth and Trade
The US-ASEAN economic relationship has further strengthened since our last dialogue meeting in the US between 1988 and 1990. US- ASEAN trade turnover increased more than 37%. We remain ASEAN's largest export market, and ASEAN is our fifth largest export market, after Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the EC [European Community]. The dramatic expansion of US trade with East Asia in the past decade is typified by the fact that the US now exports more to Singapore than to Spain or Italy, more to Malaysia than to the Soviet Union, more to Indonesia than to all of Eastern Europe put together. The US remains strongly committed to free and fair trade and to the multilateral trading system. Our market remains the most open of any developed economy, as your exporters well know. The US buys about half of all developed country imports of developing country manufactured exports. We have successfully resisted strong protectionist pressures. Last year, President Bush vetoed a major protectionist textile bill. He has made clear his intention to go on resisting protectionism. Let me make clear that the North American Free Trade Agreement will eliminate trade barriers within North America without creating a single new barrier. It will lead to a more prosperous North America, which will be a better customer for all of ASEAN. President Bush has also made clear that a successful outcome of the Uruguay Round is the top trade priority of the US. To that end, the executive branch worked hard to gain an extension of fast track authority for trade negotiations. The multilateral trading system and the seven previous GATT rounds have contributed to an explosion of global commerce. World trade stood at only $60 billion in 1950, and had increased to almost $4 trillion in 1990. This vast increase of trade has fueled a spectacular surge of world economic growth and unparalleled global prosperity. Despite GATT's past successes, new issues have come to the fore which GATT needs to address, such as services, investment, and intellectual property. Old issues inadequately covered by GATT, like agriculture, demand solution. After 5 years of intensive work in the Uruguay Round, the world's trading countries must not fail in their efforts to achieve a far-reaching agreement. We must all redouble our efforts in the Uruguay Round if the world is to avoid falling back into old protectionist habits and is to continue on the prosperity track created by ever-expanding world trade.
Importance of Communication
ASEAN is a highly valued economic partner for us. As the US and ASEAN have become more closely linked economically, US-ASEAN consultations have taken on new importance. Today, as we open this 10th ASEAN-US dialogue, we begin a series of three major meetings between us over the next 5 weeks, the others being the new Trade and Investment Cooperation Committee on June 25-26 and the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference on July 22-24. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) provides scope for US-ASEAN cooperation in that larger region, formed by enormous economic flows within the Pacific Basin. The US strongly supports APEC, whose commitment to a successful Uruguay Round and to economic cooperation should further stimulate growth and trade in the region. We have worked hard to ensure that ASEAN remains at the center of APEC as a key player. Let me stress here that we strongly support your efforts toward increased integration and cooperation within ASEAN, while maintaining your outward-looking approach both politically and economically. These US-ASEAN discussions are important, given that the US and ASEAN are key economic and political partners in the world's most dynamic region, the Pacific Basin. I thus wish you all success in your talks today and tomorrow. I hope they will also pave the way for a productive outcome in the two other major meetings the US and ASEAN are having in coming weeks, and in the years ahead. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

US-ASEAN Joint Statement

Description: Text of the joint press statement of the 10th US-ASEAN Dialogue, Washington, DC Date: Jun 21, 19916/21/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] 1. The Tenth Meeting of the ASEAN-US Dialogue was held in Washington, DC on June 20-21, 1991, in the Department of State. 2. President Bush, in a statement on June 20, extended his personal greetings to the ASEAN delegations and said "The 10th ASEAN-United States Dialogue underscores the importance with which the United States views its economic and commercial ties with ASEAN." 3. The Dialogue was attended by government and private sector delegations from the ASEAN member countries and the United States. Officials of the ASEAN secretariat also participated. The meeting was co-chaired by Mr. Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and leader of the US delegation, and by Ambassador Vitthya Vejjajiva, Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Thailand and leader of the Thai delegation. 4. The private sectors of ASEAN and the US were represented by the ASEAN-US Business Council, led by Mr. Razali Johari of Brunei Darussalam and Mr. Robert Driscoll of the United States. 5. The Dialogue was opened by Mr. Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State. In his welcoming remarks, Under Secretary Kimmitt stressed the importance the United States places on its relations with ASEAN, and the need for continuing close cooperation on such issues of common concern as Cambodia, Indochina refugees, the Uruguay Round and APEC. He noted the remarkable economic growth of ASEAN, which has served as an example for countries in other regions of the world who seek rapid development on the basis of open markets and an open global trading regime. 6. In his opening remarks, Permanent Secretary Vitthya Vejjajiva, focussing on economic development, noted that ASEAN's remarkable growth also provides opportunities for expanded cooperation between the US and ASEAN in such areas as trade, economic and development cooperation. In fostering close ASEAN- US partnership, ASEAN looks to the US as a source of markets, capital and technology. He also welcomed private sector participation in the Dialogue, which will move ASEAN-US Dialogue relations forward on the right path. 7. The Meeting emphasized the importance of an early and successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The continuing prosperity of the economies of the ASEAN countries and the United States is dependent on a strengthened multilateral trading system. The Meeting also agreed that both sides should continue to take a firm position on agriculture in the Uruguay Round with a view to achieving a balanced package of results that will be meaningful and beneficial to all. 8. In reviewing trade and economic relations between ASEAN and the US in recent years, the Meeting took note of the rapid expansion of ASEAN-US trade. The Meeting expressed hope that investment cooperation between ASEAN and the US will similarly be on a rising trend. The Meeting welcomed the forthcoming inaugural Meeting of the ASEAN-US Trade and Investment Cooperation Committee, June 24-25, which will monitor and review trade and investment relations and identify opportunities for expanding trade and investment as well as related transfer of technology and human resource development and hold consultations thereon. 9. During the Meeting, representatives of the ASEAN and US private sectors exchanged views on a number of trade, investment and economic issues. The Meeting agreed that the Private Investment and Trade Opportunities (PITO) Project, being undertaken by USAID and the ASEAN-US private sectors, is a model of government and private sector cooperation to promote trade and investment. ASEAN industrial schemes such as the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) and the ASEAN Brand to Brand Complementation (BBC) were discussed. The Meeting was informed that the equity rules allowing the maximum 60% foreign ownership of the AIJV has now been extended for 3 more years to 31 December 1993. The Meeting also took note of improved investment climate in ASEAN countries through the process of deregulation and liberalization, especially in the financial and monetary sectors. The Meeting further noted ASEAN willingness to consider products in addition to automobiles in the BBC, and its interest generally in attracting additional private sector investment from the United States. 10. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters Melvyn Levitsky addressed delegates on the serious threat to stability being posed by illegal narcotics. Increased Golden Triangle heroin production is affecting Asian nations and strengthened regional cooperation is necessary to combat the problem. The US is prepared to increase its counter- narcotics cooperation with ASEAN. The ASEAN delegates responded favorably to the proposal, particularly in the areas of training, information exchange and coordination. The Post Ministerial Conference in Kuala Lumpur was suggested as another opportunity to discuss the proposal for regional cooperation in detail. The Meeting was informed that the ASEAN Secretariat could be one of the contact points for the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters in the State Department on such cooperation. 11. Mr. Joel Szabat, Executive Officer of the Environmental Protection Agency briefed the Dialogue on EPA's policies and approaches on environmental issues and offered opportunities for environmental cooperation between ASEAN and the US. 12. Assistant Secretary Solomon discussed cooperation between the United States and ASEAN on the Cambodian issue and both sides reaffirmed their support for the efforts of the Paris Conference Co-Chairmen to restore independence and peace to Cambodia on the basis of the United Nations settlement framework, as endorsed by Security Council Resolution 668. They agreed that the recent initiatives of Prince Sihanouk, and the discussions between the Cambodian parties and PICC co-chairmen, have opened up new possibilities for momentum toward a political settlement. 13. The Meeting reviewed the progress made in the implementation of the ASEAN-US Private Investment and Trade Opportunities (PITO) project and in particular, the progress made in the establishment of the ASEAN Growth Fund. This fund will be a privately owned and managed investment company investing in privately owned businesses operating in various business sectors and industries in ASEAN. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) will support a portion of the capitalization of the fund. In addition to PITO, another major aspect of ASEAN-US development cooperation is human resource development. This project seeks to upgrade management and professional skills in ASEAN. Another aspect is the Environmental Improvement Project (EIP) which is aimed at transferring US technology to improve the economic and efficient use of ASEAN natural resources by domestic industry. Both sides agreed to consult closely in designing the project. 14. It was agreed that the 11th ASEAN-US Dialogue would be held in Brunei Darussalam on a date to be mutually agreed upon. 15. The Meeting was held in the spirit of cooperation and cordiality that characterize the relations between ASEAN and the United States.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

Current Situation in Afghanistan

Kelly Source: John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun 20, 19916/20/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South Asia Country: Afghanistan Subject: Military Affairs, Refugees, United Nations [TEXT] I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the current situation in Afghanistan. It is now well over 2 years since the Soviet withdrawal, and the conflict continues. The Administration believes that the only lasting solution to the conflict can be accomplished through a political settlement. This can be best implemented through a political process that would lead to a broad-based government able to oversee the restoration of civil order, undertake the reconstruction of this war-ravaged country, and allow the return of several million refugees to their homes. Military activity was at relatively low levels through the past winter but picked up somewhat in this spring with the tightening of the siege on and ultimate fall of the eastern garrison town of Khowst in late March. For the resistance, the victory at Khowst gave a boost to morale. It was the only significant victory for the mujahidin since the Soviets completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some resistance leaders have been inspired by the victory at Khowst to call publicly for further major military efforts, including an attack on Kabul. The resistance is likely to continue its military pressure on the regime. We, however, do not believe that the fall of Khowst has shown that military victory is the path to a settlement for either side. Khowst demonstrates that Najibullah, who was put into power and maintained through Soviet support, cannot control the country through force of arms. On the political front, the Najibullah regime is seeking international recognition and has had some success in broadening its diplomatic relations. However, the regime has not picked up significant internal support, in spite of constitutional amendments nominally aimed at providing greater protection for civil liberties and at liberalizing the economy and a change in name from the People's Democratic Party to the Homeland Party. The regime has used distribution of arms, economic aid, and financial payments to buy off some opponents, claiming that this represented victories for its policy of national reconciliation. However, the Kabul regime has at best obtained only temporary truces with some local power holders and has not altered the long-term political balance. The vast majority of Afghans remain opposed to the rule of Najib's party, whatever its name might be. If the Kabul regime, with its narrow base of support, had been forced to confront a unified opposition, we might have been closer today to a settlement. This has not been the case. Within the resistance, the Afghan interim government [AIG] has been plagued by disarray as party leaders continued their rivalries. Most of the AIG ministries have suspended operations and laid off their workers. Divisions were deepened among resistance party leaders over the Gulf war with radical leaders, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rassul Sayyaf, condemning the efforts of the coalition to end Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. Other resistance leaders--Pir Gailani, Sebghatullah Mojadeddi, and Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi-- participated in an effort to send a group of mujahidin to aid in the defense of Saudi Arabia, and publicly supported the coalition and the UN Security Council resolutions. The National Commanders' Shura (council) continues to try to expand support from a broad range of commanders throughout the country. It has also focused efforts on coordinating military activities. Increased cooperation among commanders could extend into administrative and political areas which would be an encouraging development. Notwithstanding these developments, the task of coming up with a coherent body which could administer the country should the regime collapse is still a challenge for the resistance. Although hostilities continue in Afghanistan, the past year has seen some progress on human rights. The ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] has increased its activities, operating in both regime and resistance-controlled areas. Last summer, a delegation from Asia Watch traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to evaluate the human rights situation. While the behavior of the combatants on both sides leaves much to be desired, it appears that they increasingly recognize that it is in their interests to abide by international norms for behavior. For example, resistance commanders gave the ICRC access to POWs [prisoners of war] captured at Khowst. We have often discussed with the resistance the importance that we and the international community place on the need to refrain from human rights abuses. Last summer, in response to a spontaneous return of refugees from Baluchistan, the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] began a pilot project aimed at supporting those Afghans who sought to return to their homes in Afghanistan. Each family which turned in its refugee ration card received approximately 300 kilograms of wheat and 3,000 Pakistani rupees to offset the transportation costs of the return trip. To date, an estimated two-thirds of the approximately 100,000 refugees who turned in their ration cards under this program are thought to have returned to their homes in eastern and southern Afghanistan. UNHCR continues planning for repatriation, but large-scale return is hampered by the uncertain security situation. Indeed, fighting at Khowst generated approximately 10,000 new refugees. While I mentioned earlier that some resistance leaders have taken the fall of Khowst as an indication that a military victory is possible, most Afghans have not. Many Afghans believe that, even were a military victory possible, the price is greater destruction of property and human suffering is too high to pay. Increasingly we are told that they recognize that nothing other than a political settlement will lead to peace. The contours of such a settlement, however, are far from clear. Afghans have sharply differing views on how a transition should occur. Outside powers will have a difficult time if they try to dictate the form of a transition. For its part, the United States is continuing its diplomatic efforts to end this conflict. We have spent nearly 2 years in discussions with the Soviets on the best way to end the fighting in Afghanistan and to promote a political process that leads to a government representative of Afghan aspirations. Last fall, we attempted to persuade the Soviets to agree to a joint statement on Afghanistan which would contribute to a resolution. There was a broad measure of agreement on defining principles for a transition process leading to a freely selected government. We also agreed that the UN Secretary General should be encouraged to continue his efforts to promote a political settlement. However, we were unable to reach agreement with the Soviets on a date certain for an arms cutoff. We continue to believe that the best chance for a political settlement lies in working toward a cutoff of US and Soviet lethal assistance. Our consultations with the Soviets at the senior level have had that as the goal. Outside help, such as from the Secretary General's special representative, can be of critical importance. We are staying in close touch with the Pakistani and Saudi governments on the Afghan question. Recently, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government conducted a review of its Afghan policy and concluded that Pakistan should push harder for a political settlement through support for the United Nations. Since then, Pakistan has consulted with the Soviets, Saudis, Iranians, and others on Afghanistan. For their part, the Saudis remain actively concerned about Afghanistan. They continue to share our goal of a political solution. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Saudis and the Soviets is a good development which could lead to a better dialogue on Afghanistan. We welcome the Secretary General's May 21 statement in which he outlines principles that would serve as a basis for a political settlement in Afghanistan. These principles include the recognition of the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government, an intra-Afghan dialogue leading to a transition mechanism to set up a broad-based government, and an end to hostilities and arms supplies to all Afghan sides. We commend the Secretary General and his special representative for Afghanistan, Benon Sevan, who have with great skill and perseverance sought to implement the General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan. We strongly support Mr. Sevan's mission and look forward to continuing the work with the United Nations and the international community to move from these general principles to a political settlement in Afghanistan. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction

Tutwiler Source: Statement by State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, Dc Date: Jun 26, 19916/26/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations, Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] The United States is deeply disturbed by the Iraqi regime's flouting of its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 687. That resolution obliges Iraq to facilitate and cooperate with the UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which are charged with implementing the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. Iraq has unconditionally accepted Resolution 687. Over this past weekend, however, Iraqi authorities denied a Joint Special Commission/IAEA team entry into the Abu Gharaib military complex. The team requested to visit this particular site because of specific information about storage of nuclear-related items there. Inspection team members saw heavy moving equipment (trucks, forklifts, cranes, etc.), moving into the site on the day they were barred from entry and also observed urgent activity by work crews. Only after Iraq had several days to remove equipment and material did Iraqi authorities finally permit an inspection team to enter the site. That occurred today. The team found the site empty. There is ample evidence from multiple sources that Iraq has been conducting a covert nuclear weapons program that has included activities to produce nuclear weapons material. It has deceived the Special Commission and the IAEA on its nuclear program. It has also underreported or not revealed details on ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction as required by Resolution 687. The Chairman of the UN Special Commission, Rolf Ekeus, briefed the permanent five members of the Security Council yesterday on Iraq's obstructionism over the weekend. The United States plans to brief the chairman of the UN Special Commission, the Secretary General, and the 15 Security Council permanent representatives on further evidence we have of Iraqi attempts to conceal its nuclear weapons capabilities from the IAEA/Special Commission. We strongly urge the Security Council to put the Iraqi regime on notice that this obstructionism must not happen again and that Iraq must make available for inspection all--repeat all--equipment and material connected with its nuclear weapons capabilities, including items clandestinely removed from the site from which the inspection team was barred and all other sites. The Secretary said to the press this morning on the Hill that we expect Iraq to comply with UN resolutions just like we expected them to in the period from August to January 15. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

International Cooperation Counters Iraqi Terrorist Threats

Date: Jul 1, 19917/1/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Terrorism [TEXT]
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait last August, Saddam Hussein called repeatedly for terrorist attacks against the United States and other countries in the international coalition that opposed Baghdad's aggression. Despite months of threats, the predicted wave of terrorism failed to materialize. The threat failed in large part because of the firm response by the United States and its allies and the cooperation among them. Long-standing US counter-terrorism policy, which shaped the US response to the Iraqi threat, has three principal aspects: First, the United States makes no concessions to terrorists holding official or private US citizens hostage. The United States will never pay ransom, release prisoners, or change its policies in response to terrorist demands. Second, the United States works with its allies and other countries to maintain pressure on terrorist-supporting countries such as Iraq to convince them that their support of terrorist activity comes with a heavy cost. The United States seeks to isolate terrorist- supporting countries by imposing economic, political, diplomatic, and military pressure. Third, the United States cooperates with friendly countries in developing measures to counter terrorism, such as identifying, tracking, apprehending, prosecuting and punishing terrorists. Throughout the crisis, other coalition governments responded with similar determination to counter the Iraqi threat.
Iraq Prepares Terrorist Campaign
In the period between its invasion of Kuwait and January 1991, Iraq trained terrorists and prepared operations against coalition interests. Baghdad held several hundred citizens of coalition states hostage as human shields at strategic sites across Iraq and detained thousands of other third- country nationals against their will. Iraq also expanded its ties to international terrorist groups. Saddam Hussein invited some of the world's most dangerous and notorious terrorists to Baghdad, where many of these groups set up or re-established offices. Iraqi authorities apparently had three basic objectives in mind when they threatened to open a "second front" of terrorist attacks against members of the international coalition: -- To weaken the coalition members' resolve by taking hostages and making threats; -- To undermine or topple the leaders of Arab governments who opposed Iraq; -- To win support for their bid for leadership of the Arab world.
The World Responds
Because Iraq and the groups pledging to act in support of Saddam Hussein had carried out attacks before, the United States and other coalition members took Saddam's threats seriously and responded in a firm and swift manner. The United States returned Iraq to its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Iraq, and its sympathizers were warned against holding hostages and promoting terrorist violence. On September 21, President Bush said that Saddam Hussein would be held directly responsible for any terrorist attack on coalition interests. The United States worked with NATO allies and others to send clear messages to Iraq, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and other Palestinian groups warning of the consequences should they commit terrorist acts. The United States also urged Syria to use its influence with terrorist groups based within its borders to prevent terrorist attacks. The coalition united to enforce the UN mandates was equally unified in its response to the threat of terrorism. UN Security Council Resolutions 667 and 674 condemned Iraq's abduction of foreigners and demanded an immediate end to hostage-taking. Other governments also vowed to hold Iraq responsible for terrorist attacks carried out on its behalf. Iraq had a history of using its embassies, cultural and trade offices, and airline facilities to provide money, weapons, and logistical support to terrorist teams. Many governments expelled Iraqi diplomatic and intelligence personnel to reduce the threat posed by this network of support. More than 200 Iraqi diplomats and intelligence and embassy staff were expelled from countries around the world. In addition, more than 500 students, business people, and tourists with connections to the Iraqi government or to radical political groups were expelled, arrested, or kept under close surveillance. Many countries alerted their citizens to the threat posed by possible Iraqi-sponsored terrorism. Such announcements raised public consciousness about terrorism and helped promote greater cooperation between the public and law enforcement agencies. The Department of State issued numerous travel advisories and public announcements on Iraqi-sponsored terrorism beginning in August and continuing throughout the war. Many countries upgraded security at facilities likely to be terrorist targets. Airports and the airlines of coalition states were a special concern. Special aviation security measures were implemented in stages as the January 15 deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait approached. The cooperation of airlines and airports throughout the world made a major contribution to protecting those who traveled and deterring terrorists. Finally, government offices, military facilities, and embassies of the US and some other coalition members were "hardened" and non- essential personnel withdrawn from some countries. Private firms also reduced their exposure in several places. Although the total number of terrorist incidents during the Gulf crisis was three times the rate during the comparable period in 1990, Iraq was linked directly to only a small number of attacks worldwide. Many of the targets were banks or commercial facilities belonging to members of the coalition, and most of the attacks caused only limited property damage.
Why Saddam's Terror Campaign Failed
The success in thwarting Iraqi-sponsored terrorism is an example of the effectiveness of US counter-terrorism policy and international cooperation against a common peril. Preemptive action such as the expulsion of Iraqi diplomats and intelligence operatives and enhanced security countermeasures were key aspects of the counter- terrorism campaign. Cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence services in many different nations increased the effectiveness of counter-terrorist efforts. The pressure that the United States and other countries placed on governments that provide support to terrorist groups proved effective. The public, by accepting and cooperating with the additional security measures, and by heeding travel advisories, increased the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts. Three other factors played an important role: -- Military operations disrupted the "command and control" links between Baghdad and the terrorist networks it had established; -- Radical groups that had planned to undertake terrorist operations in support of Iraq were deterred by the failure of Saddam Hussein's attempt to draw Israel into the war; and -- The rapid coalition advance into Iraq, which sealed Iraq's overwhelming defeat. The United States and its allies have continued their counter- terrorism efforts against Iraq. On April 3, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which "requires a commitment from Iraq that it will not commit or support acts of terrorism or terrorist organizations." On June 11, the Iraqi government filed a statement with the UN purporting to renounce terrorism. The United States, in cooperation with other UN members, will monitor's Iraq's performance.
Saddam's Threats
January 18--Baghdad radio broadcast a speech by Saddam Hussein in which he called for Muslims worldwide to strike US interests. January 20--Saddam called upon all Muslims to rise up in jihad (holy war). He implied (incorrectly) that, if arrested, terrorists would be treated in accordance with international conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war. January 30--Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council authorized payments to relatives of Arabs and Muslims killed while attacking Western targets. February 19--Saddam called on "all free people to strike at the center of the US and other coalition interests." (###)
Terrorism During the War
More than 200 terrorist incidents occurred between mid-January and the end of February 1991. Most incidents appear to have been undertaken by individuals or groups sympathetic to Iraq or hostile to the United States and its coalition partners. About one-fifth of the attacks were by indigenous terrorist groups, which asserted that the attacks were related to the Gulf crisis. Dev Sol in Turkey, 17 November in Greece, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement in Peru, and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front in Chile were responsible for more than 40 such incidents. Western, Saudi, and Kuwaiti banks were bombed in Lebanon. No international terrorist acts were committed in the United States during the crisis. Six people were killed by terrorist attacks between mid- January and February 1991. One of them was an American, Bobbie Mozelle, an employee of a US Defense Department contractor. He was killed in Turkey in an attack by Dev Sol. In Manila, one Iraqi died and another was seriously injured when the bomb they had assembled exploded before they reached their target, the US Cultural Center; In Jakarta, a bomb made with 24 sticks of dynamite and placed near the US Ambassador's residence was found and safely detonated. Elsewhere in Asia, plots to attack official and public facilities connected to coalition interests were discovered and thwarted and Iraqi diplomats expelled. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991 Title:

US Export Controls in a Changing Global Environment

Wendt Source: Ambassador Allan Wendt, Senior Representative for Strategic Technology Policy Description: Address before a National Academy of Sciences symposium, Irvine, California Date: Jun 11, 19916/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Subject: Arms Control, International Organizations, Trade/Economics [TEXT] No series of events in recent years has captured the interests and hopes of the world like those that led to Eastern Europe throwing off the oppressive mantle of communism and beginning the long and difficult voyage toward democracy and market-based economies. Glasnost and perestroika are changing the Soviet Union, as well. As a result, there has been a significant liberalization of export controls, notably at the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] High Level Meeting in June 1990 and again at the High Level Meeting of May 23 this year where agreement was reached on a new, shortened core list of truly strategic equipment and technology. The core list is scheduled to go into effect on September 1 of this year. Yet, the world still faces daunting challenges that preclude the complete elimination of export controls. Soviet repression of the Baltics demonstrates the need for caution in relaxing export controls to the Soviet Union. Moreover, even with recent reductions, Soviet military spending just last fall was higher than when Mr. Gorbachev came to power. The Soviet ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] force is being upgraded, including continued deployment of the SS-24 silo- and rail-based ICBM, the SS-25 road-mobile ICBM, and a new 10-warhead version of the SS-18 (with greater yield and accuracy). Bear H and Blackjack bombers are being deployed with longer range cruise missiles, and qualitative improvements are being made to the Delta-IV and Typhoon ballistic missile submarines, respectively carrying 16 and 20 nuclear missiles. On the strategic defensive side, the Soviets have upgraded their dual-layered Moscow ABM [anti-ballistic missile] system and maintain an anti-satellite capability. Research on even more advanced systems such as lasers underscores strong Soviet interest in military uses of space. Even more troubling is that the Soviet military modernization is occurring during a period of great political unpredictability. No one is certain whether the political and economic reform initiated by Gorbachev will continue or be successful; nor can we know how long Gorbachev will retain control or the type of regime that might follow. In these circumstances export controls clearly constitute an essential form of insurance against something going wrong. Our concerns are not confined to the Soviet Union. China's policy on missile and nuclear proliferation also calls for caution and continuing attention. Also, events in the Persian Gulf underscore the need for effective national and multilateral controls on goods and technologies that can contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In response to growing concerns over proliferation of such weapons, the Administration launched the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) aimed at improving our ability to control dual-use goods and technologies useful for the production of chemical and biological weapons and missiles. Significant progress was made at the May meeting of the 20-country Australia Group, which is involved in controlling equipment and materials used in the production of chemical and biological weapons and in developing a list of dual-use equipment that should be controlled. The Australia Group list is patterned largely after the President's enhanced proliferation control initiative. Once again, US leadership has galvanized action within the world community. Similarly, the US initiative to gain multilateral agreement to control dual-use goods and technology used in nuclear weapons production has gained increased acceptance. Continuing discussions with key suppliers of such equipment has revealed a growing consensus on the need to establish a multilateral framework to prevent exports that might aid proliferant countries in developing nuclear weapons capabilities. Partly in response to events in the Persian Gulf, several new countries have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. The image of civilians donning gas masks in anticipation of a chemical weapons attack via ballistic missiles during the Persian Gulf war brought home with renewed forcefulness the need to prevent the acquisition of such missile systems by unstable regimes. In November 1990, President Bush called for efforts to improve the multilateral application of export controls on high performance computers. Based on that initiative, the United States and Japan on June 6 concluded consultations on super-computer export controls. The main goal of the US-Japan consultations was to maintain controls on exports of supercomputers to destinations of concern while reducing the licensing burdens on exports to reliable destinations. For exports to countries that pose a national security or proliferation concern, such as countries that have not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, strict safeguards against misuse are required. Depending on the destination and circum- stances of a particular export, some applications may be denied. In addition, a definition of supercomputers was established as "any computer with a CTP (composite theoretical performance) equal to or greater than 195 million theoretical operations per second (MTOPS)." The policy dilemma facing the Administration is to find a balance between excessive controls that would impede legitimate export trade and those controls which the US and other major world suppliers find necessary to support common security objectives. Inherent in striking this balance is the need to adjust our export control system to the new realities in formerly communist countries and to devise effective multilateral controls to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nowhere is this balancing act more delicate than in COCOM, and nowhere has US leadership been more visible. As a result of decisions taken at the COCOM High Level Meeting on May 23, we have lived up to the President's promise to develop a new core list of truly critical goods and technologies. One key to the success of the core list process was the full participation of US industry in the development of US core list proposals. Some may question why greater liberalization was not achieved in certain areas, for example, computers, and machine tools. The answer is complex, but I can assure you that the US core list proposals were subjected to the most intense and broadest technical review of any COCOM proposals in recent memory by all concerned US agencies, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. At the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US adopted a new measure of military criticality--the degree to which acquisition of a good or technology by the Soviets would result in the closing of a critical technological gap. A good example is the night-vision device which, as we learned from the Persian Gulf war, played a critical role in the coalition victory. As part of our core list review, we thoroughly reviewed foreign availability of everything from avionics to laser systems. Wherever we found wide availability outside COCOM, we readily agreed to decontrol such commodities. Further, where we found Soviet capabilities equal to or better than previous control levels, we also sought decontrol. But, where dual-use goods or technologies are unique to COCOM suppliers, and are of gap-closing strategic significance, we pressed the allies to retain controls. General features of the new core list include greater specificity in the description of controlled items, alignment of control parameters with current industry technical standards, decontrol of readily available "off-the-shelf" items, and improved harmonization with the customs tariffs system. In the case of computers, we determined that there was no real foreign availability outside COCOM for computers above a CTP of 23. Similarly, we found no foreign availability for machine tools with accuracies greater than 6 microns. As a result, the COCOM control limit was placed just below those levels. I note that the control parameter for computers was changed from PDR (processing data rate) to CTP because CTP is a more accurate measure of a computer's capability. Agreement on the core list will result in substantial relaxation of controls on computers and related equipment. Nearly all personal computers and minicomputers will be decontrolled, along with their normal complement of related peripherals. We will remove from control nearly all peripheral equipment, other than high-speed disk drives, very high- performance graphics, and signal processing equipment. Controls over standard integrated circuits have also been greatly reduced. All DRAM memory chips are decontrolled as are most standard 32-bit microprocessors used in personal computers. Controls on integrated circuit manufacturing equipment and silicon materials are likewise liberalized. Finally, all civil television recorders which meet certain international standards are decontrolled. As a final note regarding our COCOM controls, I would like to address the issue of telecommunications systems and technology. The technical and policy experts have worked long and hard to find ways that will allow US companies, as well as our allies, to install modern phone systems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We risk serious compromise of our security interests, however, if we export to the USSR for internal use top-of-the-line telecommunications equipment and technologies. Until the situation in the Soviet Union settles into a more predictable and promising pattern, we simply must hold the line on approvals to ship high-speed microwave and fiber-optics systems that could dramatically enhance Soviet strategic capabilities while greatly diminishing our intelligence gathering capabilities. There is also good news on telecommunications. Controls have been relaxed to permit digital switching and allow the Soviets to build public digital voice and data networks with features and functionality equivalent to those installed in the West right now. The Soviets will be able to acquire such services as facsimile, cellular telephone, electronic mail, and voice mail with all the features currently enjoyed by users in the West. With regard to international links, COCOM agreed to allow 156 megabit/64 qam (quadrature amplitude modulation) microwave systems to be exported at national discretion to any country for use in connection with international gateways. In the same vein, agreement was reached to permit the export under the favorable consideration procedure (which means presumption of approval) of fiber-optic lines to any country up to its international border at 565 megabits (mbps)/1550 nanometers laser wave length for international traffic. Taken together, these changes will allow vast improvement in communications between the USSR and the West, thus fostering growth in business as well as personal ties, and also permit the Soviet Union to acquire a telecommunications system comparable to Western standards of the early-to-middle-1980s. For all destinations but the Soviet Union and North Korea, the core list will also allow the export, again under the favorable consideration procedure, of microwave links at 156 mbps/64 qam for internal use (that is, not restricted to international traffic) and, at national discretion, fiber-optic links at 45 mbps/1370 nanometers. Finally, in a major liberalization for Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, COCOM countries agreed that all telecommunications equipment except encryption devices can be exported at national discretion. We believe that these liberalizations are consistent with our shared interests, while allowing for significant commercial activities. The COCOM partners also discussed the question of removing Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia from the list of proscribed destinations. We determined that decisive progress in this vein would depend upon these countries enforcing controls as effectively as do member countries, both on goods imported from member countries and on indigenously produced goods. In addition, each country must have a sound legal basis for implementing its export control system in order for it to be removed from the proscribed destination list. For the time being, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia will be subject to a "special procedure" that establishes a presumption of approval for all but the most sensitive equipment to those three countries. The message that we are sending is that the US and its COCOM allies are committed to aiding these three countries in their efforts to modernize their economies through transformation to a market-based system. Relaxation of export controls cannot be achieved without a concomitant effort to improve levels of enforcement. These are the higher fences that must be built around fewer goods. At the High Level Meeting it was agreed that the Common Standard Level of Effective Protection would enter into force by January 1, 1992. The common standard establishes the criteria for an effective enforcement regime for controlling goods and technologies against diversion to unauthorized uses and destinations. Application of the common standard will permit further progress in easing East-West licensing by allowing additional items to be included in the intra- COCOM license-free-trade zone. Rapid technological advances that make equipment obsolete in only a few years and the emergence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a key issue were important factors in our thinking relative to redefining the COCOM core list. But President Bush and senior advisers in the Administration also recognized that export controls have a critical bearing on our economic security. If supplier countries do not apply and enforce controls in an even manner, then those controls not only are ineffective but also adversely affect our balance of trade and economic competitiveness. Such a potential threat to our economic security is just as much a national security matter as more traditional concerns about strategic arms balance, regional conflicts, or weapons development. The National Academy of Sciences' recently released study "Finding Common Ground" concluded that export controls should not be discarded in the glow of the moment but neither should we return to the rigidity of the past. The initiatives taken by the Administration in the areas of non-proliferation of COCOM have, I believe, met that challenge. While perhaps not meeting the expectations of all interested parties, the changes announced at the recent COCOM High Level Meeting are a major step forward in finding the balance between increased trade and maintaining a strong national security posture. We want to adjust our export control system to the new realities in formerly communist countries and changes in the Soviet Union. At the same time, we want to do so in a way, and at a pace, that continues to safeguard our national security against both old and new dangers. Where do we go next? Now that the core list exercise is completed, I believe industry needs to know what kind of export control system to expect. I cannot give you a detailed guide, but I can share some insight into the Administration's thinking. The core list does not establish a red line. We will continue to approve the export of items on the core list if they are demonstrably for civilian end use and are suited therefor. We and our COCOM allies in 1990 approved almost 1,600 licenses, worth about $1.7 billion for civilian end-users in the Soviet Union. For example, we approved the export of high-speed computers for Soviet nuclear power plant safety as well as the sale of the most modern commercial aircraft available on the market today. Further, the President made a commitment to the Soviets, as well as to industry, that we would consider favorably shipments of goods and technology that would upgrade the Soviet energy production sector, particularly oil and gas exploration and development. Over the past year, we have approved approximately 95% of all general exceptions cases, and even greater percentages have been approved for Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Under the new "special procedure," there will be a presumption of approval for most exports to those three countries. Clearly, the ability to export does not rest entirely on the question of whether or not an item is controlled. The Soviet market is not the only potential new arena for business. Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, in particular, are moving toward full integration into the Western economic system. Surprising as it may seem, it is the US that has taken the lead in pressing for major liberalization of the controls on exports to these countries. COCOM remains an effective and important instrument of national security because we have been able to adapt it to changing circumstances. We will continue to do so, for we recognize we can do no less and retain support from our allies and from industry. In completing the core list, we have created a new international industrial list that controls only the most critical goods and technologies needed to maintain the existing technological lead between Western and Soviet-based military systems, a lead which was clearly visible during Operation Desert Storm. The Department of Commerce estimates that the new list represents a 65% reduction in the number of controlled goods over the pre-June 1990 control list. We estimate that there will be a 70% reduction in license applications for computer exports alone. The future is full of both promise and risk. Changes in Eastern Europe and, we hope, in the Soviet Union hold the promise for further liberalization of export controls and additional business opportunities for US firms. We remain committed to striking a balance between national security and removal of barriers to trade. We intend to rely on the history of COCOM and on the cooperation of industry, our allies, and partners in finding that balance. (###)