US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: "First Amendment" Freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks at the Gannett Foundation dinner, Rosslyn,
Virginia
Date: Jun 26, 19916/26/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Subject: Democratization, Media/Telecommunications
[TEXT]
I am especially pleased to be here tonight to join you in
championing First Amendment freedoms in Central and Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. For it is these fundamental rights that
must underpin the new, democratic Europe that we all seek to
establish.
On my trip to Berlin, Belgrade, and Tirana last week, I got a
vivid glimpse of the opportunities and risks the new Europe holds. I
certainly came back renewed in the conviction that America's
values and interests bridge the Atlantic. Our destiny remains
united with a Europe which is whole and free, stable and secure,
prosperous and open to the free flow of information.
In Berlin, at a ministerial meeting of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], we joined the other
signatory states in reaffirming that common aim. And we also
issued a collective statement with regard to the situation in
Yugoslavia that demonstrated unanimous support for human rights,
democracy, and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. My
subsequent discussions in Belgrade, with both federal and republic
leaders, found some common ground. But notwithstanding rhetorical
flourishes, I also found an air of unreality, an inability on the part
of several republic leaders to understand the dangerous
consequences of their actions.
I went to Yugoslavia because of our serious concerns about the
situation there and our strong desire to do all that we can to avert a
disaster. But our concerns were not allayed, and the likelihood of
more violence and bloodshed--and disintegration--is growing. It is
truly a powderkeg situation, one that is deteriorating even as I
speak.
We will continue to press upon federal and republic leaders
alike the importance of political dialogue and a negotiated solution.
But I would be less than candid if I did not also recognize that
events in Yugoslavia appear to have taken on a momentum of their
own as witnessed by the statements of independence by the
Republics of Croatia and Slovenia yesterday and by the incidents
today.
I want there to be no doubt about the US position: We support
the application of Helsinki principles and cooperative efforts
toward resolving political differences peacefully. We will not
reward unilateral actions that preempt dialogue or the possibility
of negotiated solutions, and we will strongly oppose intimidation or
the use of force. The United States continues to recognize and
support the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, including the borders
of its member republics. At the same time, we can support greater
autonomy and sovereignty for the republics--in other words a new
basis for unity in Yugoslavia--but only through peaceful means such
as negotiation and dialogue. We will continue to promote
democracy, market reform, and respect for the human rights of
every citizen in Yugoslavia. We are reviewing, along with the
countries of the European Community and other members of the
CSCE and the international community, what steps we ought now
take to promote dialogue and avoid greater violence in Yugoslavia.
Certainly no one in Yugoslavia--and no one in Europe--can
afford to repeat the tragic mistakes of the past.
This is especially so when the future can be so bright--when
freedom is on the march around the world--and when democratic
principles have never been so widely embraced. This new reality
came to life for me when I visited Albania last Saturday.
In that crowded square in Tirana, looking into the faces of the
people clamoring for freedom, for me the Fourth of July came early.
That spontaneous outpouring of genuine affection and support for
our delegation was very moving and made me extremely proud to be
an American. Our country and our example of freedom are clearly
symbols of hope to the Albanian people, who have had nothing to
hope for for so very long. These people were totally intoxicated
with freedom after more than 50 years of repression, isolation, and
the inability to express themselves. It was almost as if a long-
dormant volcano had erupted with the people shouting "Freedom,"
literally from the rooftops--freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly, freedom of worship. They were, in short, joyously
embracing the very human rights and fundamental freedoms that
this foundation has long defended here at home and that you are now
championing abroad.
And by the way, you are to be congratulated for re-naming this
foundation the Freedom Forum, because that's exactly what's
needed--a platform for First Amendment rights that is strong
enough to support free societies worldwide.
In February 1990, in a speech in Prague, I emphasized the need
to promote free media as a means of safeguarding newly won
liberties in Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union. And
tonight, strengthening independent media not only remains a matter
of major importance to us, it has become a matter of real urgency
to all who want to see democracy take hold.
In Prague, I quoted Thomas Jefferson on the political
philosophy of a free press. And, in my subsequent talks with the
democratically minded leaders of both government and opposition
throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, I have
never heard anyone disagree with the broad principles governing a
free media. But what I have been hearing is the urgent need for our
help in putting those principles into practice just as soon as
possible.
In Bulgaria and Romania, for example, opposition leaders have
told me of their desperate need for newsprint. In Romania alone, I
was told, they now have over 2,000 newspapers, and they
desperately need materials like newsprint. In Albania during the
elections, the democratic opposition did well in the cities but had
problems getting its message to the countryside because the
central government controls resources.
To emphasize the pressing nature of the need, tonight, I want
to draw upon the example of a successful publisher who was a
contemporary of Jefferson's. He was less concerned with First
Amendment theory than he was with its practice. It was only late
in life that he got involved in democracy-building and diplomacy.
Ben Franklin didn't think much of folks he called: "Great talkers,
little doers." He's a fine model for us all because he always
preferred deeds to words.
So, I'm urging you to put your energy and your money where my
mouth is--to put your funds into concrete programs that will give
independent journalists a solid start. I'm sure we agree that now is
the time when it really counts--when countries are still in the
early stages of forming new constitutions, revamping legal
systems, and building civil societies. In the long run, free media
can survive only in a democratic, free market environment. The key
is that we get in there and support independent voices now, until
they can support themselves. Otherwise, our help could come too
late.
Already, a great deal of good and helpful work identifying
needs has been done by Gannett, the US Information Agency, the
Board for International Broadcasting, the National Endowment for
Democracy, the Independent Media Fund, Freedom House, the Soros
Foundation, the New York Times Foundation, the Central and East
Europeans, and the Soviets themselves--as well as by many others.
Now, the time has come to work in very practical ways.
Of course, we Americans have no monopoly on experience, and
we cannot just transplant our own solutions. Undoubtedly, a
privatized media has worked well for us and can work for others,
too. But, I would argue that as we help the Central and East
Europeans and the Soviets establish independent media, we should
not concern ourselves too greatly whether the particular model of
independence they choose is the BBC, PBS, NBC, or C-Span--provided
independence means freedom from government or political control
and influence.
We also realize that groups like Freedom Forum do not want to
co-mingle funds with US government funded entities, even though
they operate independently. But we do think that creative
opportunities exist for working in parallel. So, in considering the
ways you can help, I urge you to give priority to those efforts that
can produce early and concrete results in four key areas:
First, resources:
Promising independent
projects already are operating on nothing but shoestrings and local
initiative. You can provide the means to keep them running at a
time when the transition from planned to market economies makes
equipment and supplies--such as newsprint, computers, satellite
dishes, fax machines, and desk-top publishing equipment--difficult
to obtain and expensive.
Second, investment:
You can encourage
Western investment that will help indigenous media establish
itself. You can also encourage investment to privatize existing
media.
Third, issues of control, press laws, and
access:
You can help reduce government control of the
media. Establishing the proper legal framework is one way to
tackle the problem. Another is by championing access rights for the
independent media where frequencies or scarce supplies such as
newsprint are dispensed or withheld by officials for political
reasons. The Independent Media Fund's backing of SOTI, the
Romanian Society for Creating an Independent Television Company,
in its uphill campaign for access to the airwaves, is one important
example.
Fourth and finally, training:
As one
independent Hungarian journalist so aptly put it: "We must learn
that facts are more important than ideologies. We have to learn to
dig out truth from underneath all the lies and corruption. We have
to learn to tolerate other views and understand that competitors
are not necessarily enemies."
I cannot emphasize enough, here, the concrete contributions
that we can make in the four main areas I have just highlighted.
The jamming towers, censorship laws, and the Berlin Wall itself
may be gone, but many serious barriers to the free flow of
information remain: authoritarian methods, entrenched old
structures, insular and intolerant attitudes.
Overcoming these barriers will require what President Bush
calls "the hard work of freedom." And we ought not to delude
ourselves or the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union: building democracy is a difficult task. It took
decades, if not centuries, in the United States and Western Europe.
And freedom's road is oftentimes a difficult one, and the people of
Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union need to know that,
too.
But they also need to know that we support them in their
quest for freedom. We cannot ensure their success. Only they can.
But we can lend a helping hand as they cross the new frontier --
the frontier called Freedom. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from remarks before a session of the Council
of Ministers' meeting of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Berlin, Germany
Date: Jun 19, 19916/19/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Subject: Trade/Economics, CSCE
[TEXT]
In our effort to build a Europe whole and free, the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe must help address the economic
needs of a new Europe, broadening and deepening economic
prosperity across the continent. This is an essential part of
building durable democratic institutions, a goal that all of us
endorsed at the Paris summit.
Accomplishing this goal does not necessarily require that
CSCE create new institutions or mechanisms. Rather, we should
seek to forge strong partnerships with those institutions that have
competence in the economic arena. The European Community, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, and others can help us meet the
challenges of economic transformation in Central and Eastern
Europe and in the Soviet Union.
In addition to ensuring that CSCE works closely with
multilateral institutions to meet our members' needs, each of us
individually must examine how we can contribute to a successful
economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe. I see three areas
in which individual contributions can be made.
First, we must open our markets to free trade. The economic
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
requires that these countries have access to regional and global
markets. In that context, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay
Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] is the most
important single step we can take. If we can focus on resolving a
set of core issues first--agriculture, services, government
procurement, intellectual property, and market access--we can
achieve the breakthrough which will lead to a comprehensive
agreement.
In addition to bringing about an early conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, we need to work to eliminate specific barriers to
exports from Central and Eastern Europe. Macroeconomic
stabilization is not enough. We need to cultivate the microeconomic
basis for prosperity, too. For it is a simple fact that the new
market democracies will not be able to draw foreign investment, to
privatize, to build competitive businesses that will create jobs if
they are not allowed to compete fairly for markets.
As part of this, it is essential that we open our markets to
those goods where reforming economies are most competitive.
Access to 90% of our markets is of limited value if the remaining
10% include those industries where Central and East Europeans have
a comparative advantage. This means in particular that we must
deal with restrictions on steel, textiles, and agricultural products.
For our part, the United States is committed to increasing
market access for the Central and East Europeans. The Trade
Enhancement Initiative announced by President Bush on March 20
sets out five areas where we are moving ahead to improve access.
A team of senior US officials recently visited the region to discuss
trade barriers and will recommend steps the United States can take
to open up its markets.
Second, individual CSCE countries can provide appropriate
direct financial assistance to the countries of the region to
accelerate their economic transition. We must continue to resist
the introduction of trade-distorting tied aid credits which can
interfere with movement toward free and open markets in the
region. Instead, financial assistance should promote the
development of vigorous, competitive private sectors.
A third area for individual contributions is redoubling efforts
in providing technical assistance to all sectors of these economies.
We have much to offer: from passing on agricultural and industrial
know-how, to training managers and accountants, to helping
parliaments and government agencies rewrite laws and regulations
to facilitate the growth of new private business. Both bilaterally
and multilaterally--including through future CSCE experts'
meetings--we should focus our efforts on targeting our assistance
to areas of greatest need and most direct effect.
That's why I've proposed a seminar on the social and financial
implications of defense conversion and budget cuts. If the
economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are to
transform themselves, they must shift the vast resources devoted
to military industries to civilian uses. In this endeavor, we in the
West can provide technical assistance and advice.
We might also consider the establishment of chambers of
commerce for reforming economies of the East, to help promote the
investment, trade, and private enterprise needed to bring about
transformation and sustainable growth. This will enhance the
weight of the private sector in the new democracies and create
networks for economic growth.
Through all of these methods, we can assist in the vital task
of strengthening the fabric of economic cooperation across the
CSCE community. But our efforts can only play a supporting role in
the ongoing transition. Self-help remains the essential
prerequisite to successful reform.
Real change must come from within the political and economic
systems of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, from
the sweeping away of barriers to economic activity, from the
development and codification of a framework for private business,
and from the implementation of sound macroeconomic policies that
are essential to economic growth.
These are all important areas for CSCE to address, as we seek
to build on last year's landmark Bonn conference. As a community,
we have a responsibility to the Soviet Union and the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe to help them complete their transitions.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: Albania: Progress Along Freedom's Road
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Address to the Albanian Assembly, Tirana, Albania
Date: Jun 22, 19916/22/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Albania
Subject: Democratization, CSCE
[TEXT]
For generations, your country-men and your relatives have been
coming to America and making remarkable contributions to our
national life. But the road between us must be a two-way road. So
when, in this chamber earlier this month, Dr. Sali Berisha invited
me to come to Albania, I came here as soon as I could. And now I am
honored to address this body.
With the recent reestablishment of diplomatic relations
between our two countries and with my own trip here today, I say to
the people of Albania: America is returning to you.
The United States has watched closely, and we have applauded
your progress along freedom's road. You have made the first great
breakthroughs to begin rejoining the community of nations after
long decades of cruel, self-imposed isolation. All Americans
welcome your first steps along this road, the democratic road that
so many nations across the globe now travel with you.
I have a very simple message for the members of this chamber
today and for the citizens of this country which now faces the
difficult challenge of national reconstruction: On freedom's road,
we must always move forward.
In this parliament, in this capital, and across this land, there
can only be forward movement toward establishing full democracy,
a market economy, and the rule of law. After so many years,
Albania cannot afford delay.
A vital part of the hard work necessary to build democracy
will have to take place in this chamber, in drafting the laws
necessary for a free market, for a constitutional system of
government, and for the safeguards of democracy and economic
freedom. Here is where you will do what President Bush calls "the
hard work of freedom."
Your new coalition government has drawn up an ambitious
economic program that will be essential to your national rebuilding
effort. The privatization of agriculture and industry, the decisive
opening of your country to foreign investment, and long-overdue
policies to allow a convertible currency, liberalized prices, and a
balanced national budget are essential in laying the groundwork for
Albania's eventual economic recovery.
But I must tell you what the other reforming countries of
Eastern Europe have already learned--the passage to prosperity is
painful and difficult. Your work will not be easy. It will require of
you and your people the patience and determination that Albanians
have already demonstrated in their long struggle for freedom. But
there is no other way to the future that Albanians want and deserve
for themselves and for their children.
In this parliament and in this capital, your constitution will
also be drafted to lay another crucial part of the foundation for a
new Albania. If this is to be an Albania where individuals can
determine their own futures, where the rights of every citizen--no
matter what ethnic or religious group--are fully protected, then
this constitutional drafting process must be open and democratic.
I am pleased that you have invited constitutional experts from
my country and from Europe to consult with you in this process.
And speaking as a lawyer, I can tell you that not only is the letter
of the law important, the spirit of the law, and the practice of that
law make the vital difference in the life and success of true
democracy governed by just laws and by just governors. So, I am
also glad that my government and many American private
organizations will be helping Albanians construct democracy,
markets, and a constitutional order.
I want to be very clear about something else: just as there is
no turning back on the road to a new Albania, there is no place along
that road for violence, no place for intimidation, no place for the
use of force. The watchwords of the new Europe--the Europe
Albania has just begun to rejoin with its membership in CSCE
[Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]--are respect for
human rights and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
I know that I speak for every American when I say to every
member of this chamber and every citizen of Albania: Let us see an
end to all fear in Albania. This is a new Albania, and you are
members of a new Europe.
You have joined the nations that have pledged to uphold the
high standards of CSCE--standards that govern a state's behavior
toward other nations and toward its own people. You have made a
solemn compact with Europe and with yourselves. Do not forsake it.
You are now an integral part of CSCE. I hope you will use the
privilege of your membership wisely and well. By your actions,
Albania can help shape the Helsinki process--its new institutions,
its decisions, its direction--for the greater good of Europe.
But without doubt, the Helsinki process will also shape you,
just as it has shaped the destinies of other signatory states, for
you have joined a process that has sought from its inception to
build a Europe whole and free.
As Albania's first step as a full CSCE member, I urge this
body, the Albanian government, and all democratic forces in this
country to cooperate fully with the upcoming mission of CSCE
rapporteurs.
CSCE can help guide nations once lost to repression, hostility,
and isolation toward respect for human rights, democratic
processes, free markets, and international cooperation. So, may it
guide this nation toward a brighter future, for the sake of the
Albanian people and for the sake of a new Europe.
And if I may, let me state clearly what the emerging
democracies of Europe have learned about putting an end to old
fears in order to build new futures. They know that it means
freeing all political prisoners, once and for all. They know that it
means full respect for religious and minority rights and for opening
the media to genuine pluralism. They know that it means
eliminating repressive security organs and bringing legitimate
police functions under democratic controls. They know that it
means depoliticizing and developing civilian control over the
military. They know that it means freeing the factories, farms, and
mines from political controls and mismanagement. They know that
it means instituting a fair and open judicial process, based on the
best traditions of law and justice.
They know that it means pursuing democratization at every
level of government and society. It means holding fully free and
fair elections at both the national and local level--elections that
include a fair campaign as well as equal allocation of state
resources, and fair media access to all parties. For these are the
challenges of your new freedom and the elements of lasting
legitimacy.
You and your neighbors have a unique chance to make your
history anew, transcending the history that led to dead ends and
conflict. While working peacefully for respect for the rights of
ethnic Albanians in the region, you must not be detoured by old
conflicts and ancient quarrels.
Here, as in America, democracy must be not only an ideal--it
must be a reality. In this endeavor, as long as you are true to these
principles, we will stand with you as we stood with you early in
this century, when President Woodrow Wilson championed your
cause. I am proud that my President and my country stand with you
now in the last decade of the 20th century, in support of a free and
independent Albania. For every part of this continent, just as every
citizen of this country, must be part of what President Bush calls "a
Europe whole and free."
In closing, let me say to you that is our hope from this day
forward the American and Albanian people will share these ideals:
open government, open media, an open economy, an open society.
These are the safeguards of freedoms. And freedom works. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: US Aid to Albania
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Date: Jun 22, 19916/22/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Albania
Subject: Development/Relief Aid,
Media/Telecommunications, Democratization
[TEXT]
During Secretary Baker's visit to Tirana, he informed the Albanian
government and political leaders that the United States is prepared
to provide Albania with approximately $6 million worth of
assistance in the following categories:
Humanitarian Assistance
-- Offer of 2,000 metric tons of US Department of Agriculture
powdered milk (worth approximately $3 million).
-- Supply of approximately $1.25 million in powdered milk
and packaged foods which will be donated to a private charitable
agency for distribution in Albania.
-- Delivery of basic medical equipment and medicines worth
$1 million.
-- Provision of Department of Defense excess medical and
food supplies from the Gulf.
-- Provision of $250,000 cash-in-kind donations to the
Albanian Red Cross, in response to an appeal from the League of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
Democratic Initiatives
The US welcomes the changes that have taken place recently in
Albania, in particular the establishment of the Government of
National Stability and the decision to hold new elections within the
year. As an acknowledgment of the progress made thus far, the US
is prepared to offer the following programs to support further
political and free market reforms in Albania:
-- The National Republican Institute and the National
Democratic Institute will begin implementing programs to support
democratic party development and civic education.
-- Additional funds are available for election monitoring in
the event of new multi-party elections.
-- The Central and Eastern European Law Initiative will send
a team to Albania to assist with the drafting of a new constitution.
Additional Assistance
The US Information Agency will offer various programs, including:
-- Visits by academic specialists in the field of educational
reform and management.
-- Participation in its international visitor and secondary
school curriculum specialists programs.
-- Media workshops for Albanian journalists.
-- One-year professional journalism scholarships at a US
university.
-- Allocation of $50,000 to include Albania in the "Books for
Democracy" initiative.
-- Provision of videocassette recorders and tapes on market
economies, democracies, the English language and culture.
-- Management workshops led by US experts.
If Albania takes concrete steps forward in political and free-
market reforms, the United States is prepared to offer further
increased technical assistance.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: US Concerns About the Future of Yugoslavia
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from remarks at the Federation Palace,
Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Date: Jun 21, 19916/21/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization
First, I want to thank the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and
the respective Republic leaders for meeting with us on what was
pretty short notice.
Let me say that we came to Yugoslavia because of our concern
about the "crisis" the Minister just referred to, really, our concern
about the dangers of a disintegration of this country. Instability
and break-up of Yugoslavia, we think, could have some very tragic
consequences, not only here, but more broadly, in Europe, as well.
We're obviously not alone in having these concerns. You heard
the Minister mention the 34 other countries of the CSCE [Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. They have all expressed,
along with us, our collective concern when we were at our meeting
in Berlin. My discussions with Yugoslavia's neighbors and with
members of the European Community also indicated the depths of
these concerns. And I have today conveyed these very serious
concerns about the future of this country in the meetings that I
have been privileged to have.
In all candor, ladies and gentlemen, what I heard today has not
allayed my concerns or our concerns. Nor, I suspect, will it allay
the concerns of others when we give them a readout of these
meetings.
Now having said that, I do have to say that we did see and find
some common ground here today.
First of all, everyone I spoke to stressed the fact that they
were prepared to continue a dialogue on the future of Yugoslavia.
Secondly, all of them indicated a wish to avoid violence and
all of them indicated strong opposition to any use of force.
Third, they all recognized the legitimate interest of the
international community, and, I think, welcomed its continued
effort to promote dialogue and promote a peaceful resolution of
these problems through negotiations.
In all of these meetings, I stressed the importance of
respecting human and minority rights, of continuing the process of
democratization, and of continuing a dialogue to create a new basis
for unity. In particular, I emphasized the need to move ahead on the
constitutional rotation of the federal presidency, as well as the
need to avoid unilateral acts that could preempt the negotiating
process.
As far as next steps are concerned, we will be consulting with
the European Community and with other interested members of the
international community. Based on these discussions today, I'm
very hopeful, that notwithstanding all of the difficulties, there is
some prospect for continued dialogue. There will certainly be
active efforts by the international community, including the United
States, to try and promote such a dialogue.
But in the end--as we all, I think, understand and recognize
and know--it's really going to be up to the people of Yugoslavia
whether or not these problems are overcome, whether or not they
are overcome peacefully and through negotiation and dialogue, as
they should be.
Question:
Mr. Baker, several of the presidents [of
the Yugoslav republics] mentioned that you made the point that,
should any of their republics break away, they cannot expect
American recognition for their independence or outside economic
help. Is that the case? What was your message in that regard?
Secretary Baker:
The message was that these
issues and problems should be resolved to the extent possible
through dialogue and should not be actions taken which would
preempt those negotiations and that dialogue.
I was asked the question this morning whether or not the
United States would recognize the forthcoming declaration of
independence by Slovenia, a declaration that is expected, I think, in
a day or so. I said that it would not be the policy of the United
States to recognize that declaration, because we want to see this
problem resolved through negotiation and through dialogue and not
through preemptive unilateral actions.
Now, having said that, I want to direct you back to my
statement where I said we believe, based on all of our discussions,
that everyone is interested in finding a way, through dialogue and
negotiation, to craft a new basis for unity of Yugoslavia, and to find
a way, through dialogue and negotiation, to see the devolution of
additional authority, responsibility, and sovereignty to the
republics of Yugoslavia. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: Fact Sheet: Secretary Baker Visits Yugoslavia and Albania
Date: Jun 22, 19916/22/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Albania, Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: Democratization, CSCE
[TEXT]
Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, visited Yugoslavia and
Albania, June 21-22, after attending the Council of Ministers
meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) in Berlin. Secretary Baker is the first Secretary of State to
visit Albania and the first to visit Yugoslavia since then-Secretary
George Shultz held talks in Belgrade in December 1985. The
political situation in those two countries were discussed at the
Berlin CSCE meeting. Yugoslavia is an original member of CSCE.
Albania was accepted as a full member during the Berlin session.
YUGOSLAVIA
US-Yugoslav Relations
The United States has had a long-standing, close, and friendly
relationship with Yugoslavia. During the Cold War era, the United
States firmly supported the unity, territorial integrity, and
independence of Yugoslavia. In the post-Cold War era, the United
States has strongly supported Yugoslavia's transition to democracy
and a free market. The United States has appealed for an end to
political and ethnic violence in Yugoslavia and for the resolution of
internal problems through peaceful dialogue.
Yugoslavia has long enjoyed most-favored-nation (MFN) trade
status with the United States and is the ninth-largest user of the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which gives duty-free
access for many exports to the United States.
President's CSCE Report on Yugoslavia
The following is taken from the President's report to Congress on
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe for the period April 1, 1990-
March 1, 1991:
During the reporting period, Yugoslavia suffered a deepening
political crisis significantly affecting its performance under the
Helsinki principles. In many parts of the country, there was a
significant broadening of the democratic process. At the same
time, rising ethnic tensions, most notably in Serbian-dominated
Kosovo, led to repression and violence. Overall, Yugoslavia's
adherence to Helsinki principles expanded during the reporting
period, but in Kosovo the reverse was true, leading fellow CSCE
states to invoke the Human Dimension Mechanism. The one-party
communist system that ruled Yugoslavia since World War II largely
disappeared in 1990. For the first time since before World War II,
Yugoslavia experienced multi-party elections in all six constituent
republics. Balloting procedures in most republics were generally
fair, but in Serbia, the ruling Communist party used its control of
the media and financial resources to the detriment of the opposition
parties. The federal government, under Prime Minister Ante
Markovic, attempted a sweeping program of political and economic
reforms. After initial progress, this program fell afoul of inter-
republican differences, which have, for example, blocked a number
of proposed amendments to the federal constitution intended to
eliminate remnants of the one-party system and allow multi-party
elections at the federal level.
Rising ethnic tensions and the persistence of old anti-
democratic structures in Yugoslavia reached the point where they
threatened the existence of a unified federal state. Conflict
deepened, especially in parts of Croatia and Bosnia. Ethnic conflict
in Kosovo between majority Albanians and Serbs, who consider the
province the "heart of Serbia," has led to massive violations of
human rights, including scores of deaths at the hands of police,
thousands of arrests for the expression of political opinions, and
the firing of tens of thousands for political strikes. Serbian/Croat
tension also reached dangerous levels.
The Yugoslav military is highly secretive and provides little
information about its activities to the Yugoslav government or
public, let alone the country's CSCE partners. As the Yugoslav crisis
deepened, the Yugoslav military played an increasingly assertive
political role, acting essentially outside the control of civilian
authorities and in an anti-democratic fashion.
ALBANIA
Recent Developments
Albania was the last of the Central and East European countries to
move away from communism. A 47-year reign of totalitarian and
isolationist rule by the communist party ended when the
government agreed in December 1990 to hold multi-party elections,
which took place on March 31, 1991. A new interim government was
formed in June. The new government includes representatives of
opposition parties and has pledged free and fair elections within
the year.
US-Albanian Relations
The United States strongly supports the movement toward
democratic and economic reform in Albania. Foreign Minister
Muhamet Kapllani and the Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs, Raymond Seitz, signed a memorandum of understanding at
the State Department on March 15, 1991, when diplomatic relations
between the two countries resumed. Diplomatic relations between
the two countries had ended in 1939, when Italy took over the
conduct of Albanian foreign affairs. In 1945, an informal US
mission was sent to Albania to study the possibility of establishing
relations with the ruling National Liberation Front (NLF), which had
been established with the support of Yugoslav communists.
However, the NLF refused to recognize the validity of pre-war
treaties and increasingly harassed the US mission. The American
team was withdrawn in November 1946. From 1946 until 1990,
when US and Albanian diplomats began a series of meetings that led
to the resumption of relations, no formal contacts had been made
between the two governments.
President's CSCE Report on Albania
The following is taken from the President's CSCE implementation
report covering the period April 1, 1990-March 1, 1991:
During the reporting period, Albania, which refused the
invitation to participate in CSCE in the early 1970s, requested and
was granted observer status. It is, therefore, significant that
Albania took some cautious but important steps toward
implementing the Helsinki principles, including the holding of
multi-party legislative elections on March 31, 1991--the first
since 1920. The electoral process fell short in several key areas of
CSCE standards for free and fair elections, including limited access
to the media for opposition parties, intimidation against opposition
party candidates and activists, and delayed issuance of election
results. Much remains to be done to ensure Albania's complete and
continuing observance of the Helsinki principles. During the
reporting period, the ruling Albanian Party of Labor (PLA) declared
its intent to depoliticize the army, security forces, and courts, and
took measures to decentralize the economy and reform the penal
code and electoral law. In December 1990, the Albanian leadership
announced that the formation of independent political organizations
would be permitted and that a number of political parties and
organizations would be allowed to register officially. Some of
these groups were also allowed to publish their own newspapers.
In the area of human rights, the Albanian government took some
initial steps to correct repressive practices of the past. In 1990,
Albanian authorities eased some restrictions on citizens' right to
travel abroad but at the same time reportedly shot asylum seekers.
Albania eased its persecution of religious activity, which resulted
in the celebration of some religious services without official
interference. Amendments to the penal code adopted in 1990
include the right to counsel, the right of appeal, and the right to a
speedy trial. The government also reestablished the Ministry of
Justice, which had been abolished in 1967, as part of a judicial
reform program. The government has published drafts for a new
constitution incorporating safeguards in principle of many basic
human rights, including freedom of religion, press, movement,
association, and the presumption of innocence. The new multi-party
legislature will begin debate on the constitution in late 1991. The
government stopped jamming foreign broadcasts, including those of
the Voice of America (VOA). The UN Secretary General visited
Albania in 1990 to discuss human rights, among other topics.
Albania, which is not a member of the CSCE, was granted
observer status at each of the CSCE meetings held in the reporting
period since June 1990. In October 1990, Albania hosted a
gathering of Balkan foreign ministers. On March 15, 1991, the
United States and Albania resumed relations. On March 20, 1991, an
official US delegation arrived in Tirana to lay the foundations for
this new relationship. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: US Support for Baltic Independence
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text of the President's Letter to Congress, Washington,
DC
Date: Jun 25, 19916/25/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization, History
[TEXT]
To the Congress of the United States:
In accordance with Public Law 101-309 (104 Stat. 265), I am
submitting to you this report on US Government actions in support
of the peaceful restoration of independence for the Baltic States.
In 1940, the Soviet Union forcibly occupied the independent
Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Following sham
elections, the three countries were incorporated into the USSR. The
United States has never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic
States into the USSR. The United States maintains diplomatic
relations with representatives of their last free governments and is
in close touch with the new democratically elected governments in
each of the three Baltic States.
The United States has consistently stood with the majority of
Balts who never lost hope that they would one day regain their
freedom. In the late 1980s, pro-democracy movements in the three
Baltic States emerged and began to grow in strength. Among the
most active were Sajudis in Lithuania, the Latvian Popular Front,
and the Estonian Popular Front and Estonian Citizens' Committees.
In largely free elections in early 1990, pro-democracy forces
gained a majority in all three legislatures and formed pro-
independence governments.
On March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian legislature proclaimed the
full and immediate restoration of Lithuanian independence. Eight
days later, on March 19, President Gorbachev declared the
Lithuanian proclamation invalid and insisted that the Lithuanians
restore the status quo that existed prior to March 11 and recognize
the supremacy of Soviet law. The Soviet government followed up
this decree with intimidating troop movements in Vilnius and later
an economic embargo on the supply of key products, including oil
and natural gas. Undeterred, Estonia and Latvia subsequently issued
their own proclamations espousing restoration of independence as
their goal following a transitional period.
In response to the Soviet embargo against Lithuania, I
conveyed to President Gorbachev my deepest concern and regret
over Soviet actions and urged him to begin a peaceful dialogue with
the Lithuanian government. Secretary Baker pressed the same
points in exchanges with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Finally, in
late June 1990, the Soviet government lifted its embargo when the
Lithuanian Supreme Council agreed to a formula whereby the
independence proclamation would be suspended during the course of
negotiations with Moscow on Lithuania's future.
Thereafter, Moscow and the three Baltic States began to inch
toward talks, but these broke off after only a few sessions with
each side accusing the other of being unwilling to negotiate in good
faith.
At the end of 1990, pro-Moscow forces in the three Baltic
States stepped up their pressure on the popularly elected
governments there. In January, pro-Moscow forces--including local
Communist Party members, Black Beret special Interior ministry
troops, and Soviet Army paratroops--attacked and occupied
communications and other facilities in Vilnius, Riga, and other
cities, leaving at least 21 dead.
In the wake of this Soviet pressure against the Baltic States,
our Government has undertaken a vigorous diplomatic effort
designed both to help avert future violent confrontations in the
Baltic States and to enable the Baltic peoples to realize their
legitimate but long-denied aspirations. We have held lengthy
exchanges with our NATO Allies, neutral countries, and Central
European democracies on this issue. We have succeeded in forging a
strong, common position among CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] signatories rejecting violence and
intimidation and calling for peaceful dialogue among the parties.
The United States currently supports giving the Baltic States
observer status at CSCE meetings and will support full membership
once these nations regain independent statehood.
Also this spring, the United States took a leading role in the
UN Human Rights Commission's (UNHRC) discussion of the January
violence in the Baltic States. The United States successfully
worked for consensus on the UNHRC Resolution calling on the Soviet
Union to review the January events and provide a full report to the
Commission.
In numerous contacts with Soviet President Gorbachev and
other Soviet officials since mid-January, both Secretary Baker and I
have repeatedly raised the matter of the Baltic States. There can
be no doubt that the Soviet leadership understands this issue's
importance to the United States and our unwavering support for the
cause of Baltic freedom. We have underscored the unacceptability
of the use of force and intimidation and the urgent need for dialogue
and negotiations with the freely elected representatives of the
Baltic States, which will lead to an outcome that respects Baltic
aspirations for self-determination. Each of the Baltic States began
negotiations with the Soviet Union on a broad range of issues in
April. We are following these talks closely and hope they will be
conducted in good faith, free of threats and intimidation by all
sides.
Secretary Baker and I have met with representatives of the
Baltic States on numerous occasions. I met with Lithuanian
President Landsbergis, Estonian Prime Minister Savisaar, and
Latvian Prime Minister Godmanis in May; with Estonian President
Ruutel in March; with President Landsbergis in December 1990;
Prime Minister Savissar in October 1990; Prime Minister Godmanis
in July 1990; and then-Prime Minister Prunskiene in May 1990.
Secretary Baker has met with the three Baltic permanent
representatives in Moscow and with the foreign ministers of all
three Baltic States in Washington, New York, and Paris. Our
Consulate General in Leningrad also maintains a nearly continuous
diplomatic presence in the Baltic States and is in close contact
with the governments there. We have used these and other contacts
with Baltic leaders to keep current on the state of affairs in the
Baltic States and to convey US support for the legitimate
aspirations of the Baltic peoples.
In addition, the Department of State maintains regular contact
with the Charges d'Affaires of the three Baltic diplomatic legations
accredited to the United States. The radio services of Radio Free
Europe and the Voice of America have also played an important role
in conveying and explaining US policy on the Baltic States.
The Administration has also attempted to express our support
for the Baltic people in new ways. Working through Project Hope,
we shipped medical aid directly to the Baltics on February 28 to
meet basic medical needs. We are now following up with a second
shipment of medical supplies this month. We provided US technical
help to Latvia after a chemical spill in the Daugava River in
November 1990. The Department of Agriculture began a program to
assist Lithuanian agriculture and support US agricultural sales
there by modernizing a feed grain mill. Visits by a number of
Members of Congress and Administration officials have also
underscored the American people's support for Baltic self-
determination.
These extensive contacts reflect our recognition of the fact
that these governments are democratically elected, represent the
will of the Baltic peoples, and deserve our support.
The United States has stood and will continue to stand in
solidarity with the Baltic peoples in their striving for freedom and
self-determination. Our intensified diplomatic efforts over the
past year have played a critical role in galvanizing global support
for the cause of the Baltic peoples and for a peaceful, negotiated
outcome that takes proper account of legitimate Baltic interests.
We strongly encourage the Soviet government and the three Baltic
governments to progress in talks begun in early April on the issues
that divide them. President Bush(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: US-ASEAN Relations
Kimmitt
Source: Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs
Description: Remarks at the 10th ASEAN-US Dialogue, Washington, DC
Date: Jun 20, 19916/20/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
Ambassador Vitthya--now Mr. Secretary--colleagues and friends,
I'm pleased to welcome you to Washington and to the Department of
State. The last meeting of the dialogue in Washington was during
the cold of February 1988. Thus, although as Dick Solomon
[Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] has noted
the weather is not as warm as in ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations], I'm glad that you can now be in our capital in
weather that should make you feel more at home than that that
greeted you in 1988.
I am particularly pleased to be addressing the dialogue in
view of Secretary Baker's long-standing interest in US relations
with Asia-Pacific countries and especially with ASEAN. My
personal interest in Southeast Asia was strongly reinforced during
my military service in Vietnam. At that time, many so-called
experts considered Southeast Asia to be chronically unstable, with
limited economic prospects. I have thus followed your progress
over the years with great interest and professional pleasure as you
proved the experts wrong. As Secretary Vitthya recalls, I meet
frequently with ASEAN ambassadors, individually and as a group,
and have always found those sessions valuable. The most recent
meeting was yesterday, with newly arrived Ambassador Bira, whom
we are most pleased to welcome to Washington.
Many dramatic events have taken place throughout the world
since the last dialogue meeting in Washington. Most recently, the
international community, in a strong demonstration of solidarity,
successfully resisted Iraqi aggression and freed a United Nations
member occupied by force. In the course of the crisis, the ASEAN
countries, in a variety of ways, demonstrated your dedication to the
principle of collective security and your recognition of the threat to
us all if Iraqi aggression had gone unchecked. I would particularly
compliment Malaysia's important contribution as a Security
Council member through December 1990.
Since 1988, we have also witnessed dramatic changes in the
economic systems of many countries, with the move away from
unproductive central planning and toward market-based economies.
I am convinced that ASEAN played a major role in bringing about
this change. Throughout ASEAN's near quarter century of history,
you have been one of the world's fastest growing regions and have
dramatically out-performed countries where the state directed the
economy. Your achievements have stood as an example to the world,
by showing that economic development is best served by policies
giving adequate scope to market forces.
Preserving Regional Stability
ASEAN is also a key factor in regional stability. And although we
have paid considerable attention to the Middle East and Persian Gulf
over the last year, we have not forgotten, as Secretary Baker has
frequently said, the future is in the Pacific. Thus consultations
such as these are very important as we address the problems and
opportunities of the Pacific. In the region, we appreciate ASEAN's
continued constructive role in the search for a comprehensive
political settlement for Cambodia. We hope Prince Sihanouk's
efforts to move the peace process forward will soon allow the
reconvening of the Paris conference and the implementation of a
comprehensive settlement agreement based on Resolution 668,
which was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council.
Although shaped by the Permanent Five, this proposal was also
prepared with input from ASEAN and others, and it now bears a
formal UN imprint. As we watch to see how this situation develops,
it will be important to maintain the unified front that has been such
a key element of the process. That unity is particularly important
between ASEAN and the US.
I would also like to commend ASEAN states for the
constructive role they have played in the continuing refugee crisis
in Southeast Asia. The world applauds the efforts you have made to
deal with the continuing flow of boat people generated by the
repressive policies of Vietnamese authorities. We urge all of you to
pursue humane policies, despite the frustrations and impatience
many of your people undoubtedly feel.
For our part, we will continue to support the Comprehensive
Plan of Action (CPA) through generous financial contributions and
the resettlement of those asylum seekers determined to be
refugees. I note that we plan to allocate $22 million to CPA-
related activities and to resettle more than 70,000 Indochinese
refugees and migrants this year. At the same time, within the
context of the CPA and continued US opposition to involuntary
repatriation, we are willing to examine proposals to accelerate the
return to Vietnam of those asylum seekers determined not to be
refugees.
With a settlement in Cambodia supported by Vietnam, and for
the US progress on the POW/MIA issue, we can proceed to normalize
US-Vietnam and US-Cambodian relations, economic growth can
advance, and the refugee problem will begin to abate.
Promoting Growth and Trade
The US-ASEAN economic relationship has further strengthened since
our last dialogue meeting in the US between 1988 and 1990. US-
ASEAN trade turnover increased more than 37%. We remain ASEAN's
largest export market, and ASEAN is our fifth largest export
market, after Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the EC [European
Community]. The dramatic expansion of US trade with East Asia in
the past decade is typified by the fact that the US now exports more
to Singapore than to Spain or Italy, more to Malaysia than to the
Soviet Union, more to Indonesia than to all of Eastern Europe put
together.
The US remains strongly committed to free and fair trade and
to the multilateral trading system. Our market remains the most
open of any developed economy, as your exporters well know. The
US buys about half of all developed country imports of developing
country manufactured exports. We have successfully resisted
strong protectionist pressures. Last year, President Bush vetoed a
major protectionist textile bill. He has made clear his intention to
go on resisting protectionism. Let me make clear that the North
American Free Trade Agreement will eliminate trade barriers
within North America without creating a single new barrier. It will
lead to a more prosperous North America, which will be a better
customer for all of ASEAN.
President Bush has also made clear that a successful outcome
of the Uruguay Round is the top trade priority of the US. To that
end, the executive branch worked hard to gain an extension of fast
track authority for trade negotiations. The multilateral trading
system and the seven previous GATT rounds have contributed to an
explosion of global commerce. World trade stood at only $60 billion
in 1950, and had increased to almost $4 trillion in 1990. This vast
increase of trade has fueled a spectacular surge of world economic
growth and unparalleled global prosperity.
Despite GATT's past successes, new issues have come to the
fore which GATT needs to address, such as services, investment,
and intellectual property. Old issues inadequately covered by GATT,
like agriculture, demand solution. After 5 years of intensive work
in the Uruguay Round, the world's trading countries must not fail in
their efforts to achieve a far-reaching agreement. We must all
redouble our efforts in the Uruguay Round if the world is to avoid
falling back into old protectionist habits and is to continue on the
prosperity track created by ever-expanding world trade.
Importance of Communication
ASEAN is a highly valued economic partner for us. As the US and
ASEAN have become more closely linked economically, US-ASEAN
consultations have taken on new importance. Today, as we open this
10th ASEAN-US dialogue, we begin a series of three major meetings
between us over the next 5 weeks, the others being the new Trade
and Investment Cooperation Committee on June 25-26 and the
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference on July 22-24. Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) provides scope for US-ASEAN
cooperation in that larger region, formed by enormous economic
flows within the Pacific Basin. The US strongly supports APEC,
whose commitment to a successful Uruguay Round and to economic
cooperation should further stimulate growth and trade in the region.
We have worked hard to ensure that ASEAN remains at the center of
APEC as a key player. Let me stress here that we strongly support
your efforts toward increased integration and cooperation within
ASEAN, while maintaining your outward-looking approach both
politically and economically.
These US-ASEAN discussions are important, given that the US
and ASEAN are key economic and political partners in the world's
most dynamic region, the Pacific Basin. I thus wish you all success
in your talks today and tomorrow. I hope they will also pave the
way for a productive outcome in the two other major meetings the
US and ASEAN are having in coming weeks, and in the years ahead.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: US-ASEAN Joint Statement
Description: Text of the joint press statement of the 10th US-ASEAN
Dialogue, Washington, DC
Date: Jun 21, 19916/21/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
1. The Tenth Meeting of the ASEAN-US Dialogue was held in
Washington, DC on June 20-21, 1991, in the Department of State.
2. President Bush, in a statement on June 20, extended his
personal greetings to the ASEAN delegations and said "The 10th
ASEAN-United States Dialogue underscores the importance with
which the United States views its economic and commercial ties
with ASEAN."
3. The Dialogue was attended by government and private
sector delegations from the ASEAN member countries and the United
States. Officials of the ASEAN secretariat also participated. The
meeting was co-chaired by Mr. Richard Solomon, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and leader of
the US delegation, and by Ambassador Vitthya Vejjajiva, Permanent
Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Thailand and leader of the Thai
delegation.
4. The private sectors of ASEAN and the US were represented
by the ASEAN-US Business Council, led by Mr. Razali Johari of
Brunei Darussalam and Mr. Robert Driscoll of the United States.
5. The Dialogue was opened by Mr. Robert Kimmitt, Under
Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State. In his
welcoming remarks, Under Secretary Kimmitt stressed the
importance the United States places on its relations with ASEAN,
and the need for continuing close cooperation on such issues of
common concern as Cambodia, Indochina refugees, the Uruguay
Round and APEC. He noted the remarkable economic growth of
ASEAN, which has served as an example for countries in other
regions of the world who seek rapid development on the basis of
open markets and an open global trading regime.
6. In his opening remarks, Permanent Secretary Vitthya
Vejjajiva, focussing on economic development, noted that ASEAN's
remarkable growth also provides opportunities for expanded
cooperation between the US and ASEAN in such areas as trade,
economic and development cooperation. In fostering close ASEAN-
US partnership, ASEAN looks to the US as a source of markets,
capital and technology. He also welcomed private sector
participation in the Dialogue, which will move ASEAN-US Dialogue
relations forward on the right path.
7. The Meeting emphasized the importance of an early and
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations. The continuing prosperity of the economies
of the ASEAN countries and the United States is dependent on a
strengthened multilateral trading system. The Meeting also agreed
that both sides should continue to take a firm position on
agriculture in the Uruguay Round with a view to achieving a
balanced package of results that will be meaningful and beneficial
to all.
8. In reviewing trade and economic relations between ASEAN
and the US in recent years, the Meeting took note of the rapid
expansion of ASEAN-US trade. The Meeting expressed hope that
investment cooperation between ASEAN and the US will similarly be
on a rising trend. The Meeting welcomed the forthcoming inaugural
Meeting of the ASEAN-US Trade and Investment Cooperation
Committee, June 24-25, which will monitor and review trade and
investment relations and identify opportunities for expanding trade
and investment as well as related transfer of technology and human
resource development and hold consultations thereon.
9. During the Meeting, representatives of the ASEAN and US
private sectors exchanged views on a number of trade, investment
and economic issues. The Meeting agreed that the Private
Investment and Trade Opportunities (PITO) Project, being
undertaken by USAID and the ASEAN-US private sectors, is a model
of government and private sector cooperation to promote trade and
investment. ASEAN industrial schemes such as the ASEAN
Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) and the ASEAN Brand to Brand
Complementation (BBC) were discussed. The Meeting was informed
that the equity rules allowing the maximum 60% foreign ownership
of the AIJV has now been extended for 3 more years to 31 December
1993. The Meeting also took note of improved investment climate
in ASEAN countries through the process of deregulation and
liberalization, especially in the financial and monetary sectors.
The Meeting further noted ASEAN willingness to consider products
in addition to automobiles in the BBC, and its interest generally in
attracting additional private sector investment from the United
States.
10. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics
Matters Melvyn Levitsky addressed delegates on the serious threat
to stability being posed by illegal narcotics. Increased Golden
Triangle heroin production is affecting Asian nations and
strengthened regional cooperation is necessary to combat the
problem. The US is prepared to increase its counter- narcotics
cooperation with ASEAN. The ASEAN delegates responded favorably
to the proposal, particularly in the areas of training, information
exchange and coordination. The Post Ministerial Conference in Kuala
Lumpur was suggested as another opportunity to discuss the
proposal for regional cooperation in detail. The Meeting was
informed that the ASEAN Secretariat could be one of the contact
points for the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters in the
State Department on such cooperation.
11. Mr. Joel Szabat, Executive Officer of the Environmental
Protection Agency briefed the Dialogue on EPA's policies and
approaches on environmental issues and offered opportunities for
environmental cooperation between ASEAN and the US.
12. Assistant Secretary Solomon discussed cooperation
between the United States and ASEAN on the Cambodian issue and
both sides reaffirmed their support for the efforts of the Paris
Conference Co-Chairmen to restore independence and peace to
Cambodia on the basis of the United Nations settlement framework,
as endorsed by Security Council Resolution 668. They agreed that
the recent initiatives of Prince Sihanouk, and the discussions
between the Cambodian parties and PICC co-chairmen, have opened
up new possibilities for momentum toward a political settlement.
13. The Meeting reviewed the progress made in the
implementation of the ASEAN-US Private Investment and Trade
Opportunities (PITO) project and in particular, the progress made in
the establishment of the ASEAN Growth Fund. This fund will be a
privately owned and managed investment company investing in
privately owned businesses operating in various business sectors
and industries in ASEAN. The Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) will support a portion of the capitalization of
the fund. In addition to PITO, another major aspect of ASEAN-US
development cooperation is human resource development. This
project seeks to upgrade management and professional skills in
ASEAN. Another aspect is the Environmental Improvement Project
(EIP) which is aimed at transferring US technology to improve the
economic and efficient use of ASEAN natural resources by domestic
industry. Both sides agreed to consult closely in designing the
project.
14. It was agreed that the 11th ASEAN-US Dialogue would be
held in Brunei Darussalam on a date to be mutually agreed upon.
15. The Meeting was held in the spirit of cooperation and
cordiality that characterize the relations between ASEAN and the
United States.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: Current Situation in Afghanistan
Kelly
Source: John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington,
DC
Date: Jun 20, 19916/20/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South Asia
Country: Afghanistan
Subject: Military Affairs, Refugees, United Nations
[TEXT]
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the current situation in Afghanistan. It is now well over 2 years
since the Soviet withdrawal, and the conflict continues. The
Administration believes that the only lasting solution to the
conflict can be accomplished through a political settlement. This
can be best implemented through a political process that would lead
to a broad-based government able to oversee the restoration of civil
order, undertake the reconstruction of this war-ravaged country,
and allow the return of several million refugees to their homes.
Military activity was at relatively low levels through the past
winter but picked up somewhat in this spring with the tightening of
the siege on and ultimate fall of the eastern garrison town of
Khowst in late March. For the resistance, the victory at Khowst
gave a boost to morale. It was the only significant victory for the
mujahidin since the Soviets completed their withdrawal from
Afghanistan.
Some resistance leaders have been inspired by the victory at
Khowst to call publicly for further major military efforts, including
an attack on Kabul. The resistance is likely to continue its military
pressure on the regime. We, however, do not believe that the fall of
Khowst has shown that military victory is the path to a settlement
for either side. Khowst demonstrates that Najibullah, who was put
into power and maintained through Soviet support, cannot control
the country through force of arms.
On the political front, the Najibullah regime is seeking
international recognition and has had some success in broadening
its diplomatic relations. However, the regime has not picked up
significant internal support, in spite of constitutional amendments
nominally aimed at providing greater protection for civil liberties
and at liberalizing the economy and a change in name from the
People's Democratic Party to the Homeland Party. The regime has
used distribution of arms, economic aid, and financial payments to
buy off some opponents, claiming that this represented victories
for its policy of national reconciliation. However, the Kabul regime
has at best obtained only temporary truces with some local power
holders and has not altered the long-term political balance. The
vast majority of Afghans remain opposed to the rule of Najib's
party, whatever its name might be.
If the Kabul regime, with its narrow base of support, had been
forced to confront a unified opposition, we might have been closer
today to a settlement. This has not been the case. Within the
resistance, the Afghan interim government [AIG] has been plagued by
disarray as party leaders continued their rivalries. Most of the AIG
ministries have suspended operations and laid off their workers.
Divisions were deepened among resistance party leaders over
the Gulf war with radical leaders, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul
Rassul Sayyaf, condemning the efforts of the coalition to end Iraq's
aggression against Kuwait. Other resistance leaders--Pir Gailani,
Sebghatullah Mojadeddi, and Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi--
participated in an effort to send a group of mujahidin to aid in the
defense of Saudi Arabia, and publicly supported the coalition and
the UN Security Council resolutions.
The National Commanders' Shura (council) continues to try to
expand support from a broad range of commanders throughout the
country. It has also focused efforts on coordinating military
activities. Increased cooperation among commanders could extend
into administrative and political areas which would be an
encouraging development. Notwithstanding these developments, the
task of coming up with a coherent body which could administer the
country should the regime collapse is still a challenge for the
resistance.
Although hostilities continue in Afghanistan, the past year
has seen some progress on human rights. The ICRC [International
Committee of the Red Cross] has increased its activities, operating
in both regime and resistance-controlled areas. Last summer, a
delegation from Asia Watch traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to
evaluate the human rights situation. While the behavior of the
combatants on both sides leaves much to be desired, it appears that
they increasingly recognize that it is in their interests to abide by
international norms for behavior. For example, resistance
commanders gave the ICRC access to POWs [prisoners of war]
captured at Khowst. We have often discussed with the resistance
the importance that we and the international community place on
the need to refrain from human rights abuses.
Last summer, in response to a spontaneous return of refugees
from Baluchistan, the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees]
began a pilot project aimed at supporting those Afghans who sought
to return to their homes in Afghanistan. Each family which turned
in its refugee ration card received approximately 300 kilograms of
wheat and 3,000 Pakistani rupees to offset the transportation costs
of the return trip. To date, an estimated two-thirds of the
approximately 100,000 refugees who turned in their ration cards
under this program are thought to have returned to their homes in
eastern and southern Afghanistan. UNHCR continues planning for
repatriation, but large-scale return is hampered by the uncertain
security situation. Indeed, fighting at Khowst generated
approximately 10,000 new refugees.
While I mentioned earlier that some resistance leaders have
taken the fall of Khowst as an indication that a military victory is
possible, most Afghans have not. Many Afghans believe that, even
were a military victory possible, the price is greater destruction of
property and human suffering is too high to pay. Increasingly we
are told that they recognize that nothing other than a political
settlement will lead to peace. The contours of such a settlement,
however, are far from clear. Afghans have sharply differing views
on how a transition should occur. Outside powers will have a
difficult time if they try to dictate the form of a transition.
For its part, the United States is continuing its diplomatic
efforts to end this conflict. We have spent nearly 2 years in
discussions with the Soviets on the best way to end the fighting in
Afghanistan and to promote a political process that leads to a
government representative of Afghan aspirations. Last fall, we
attempted to persuade the Soviets to agree to a joint statement on
Afghanistan which would contribute to a resolution. There was a
broad measure of agreement on defining principles for a transition
process leading to a freely selected government. We also agreed
that the UN Secretary General should be encouraged to continue his
efforts to promote a political settlement.
However, we were unable to reach agreement with the Soviets
on a date certain for an arms cutoff. We continue to believe that
the best chance for a political settlement lies in working toward a
cutoff of US and Soviet lethal assistance. Our consultations with
the Soviets at the senior level have had that as the goal. Outside
help, such as from the Secretary General's special representative,
can be of critical importance.
We are staying in close touch with the Pakistani and Saudi
governments on the Afghan question. Recently, Pakistani Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif's government conducted a review of its
Afghan policy and concluded that Pakistan should push harder for a
political settlement through support for the United Nations. Since
then, Pakistan has consulted with the Soviets, Saudis, Iranians, and
others on Afghanistan. For their part, the Saudis remain actively
concerned about Afghanistan. They continue to share our goal of a
political solution. The establishment of diplomatic relations
between the Saudis and the Soviets is a good development which
could lead to a better dialogue on Afghanistan.
We welcome the Secretary General's May 21 statement in
which he outlines principles that would serve as a basis for a
political settlement in Afghanistan. These principles include the
recognition of the right of the Afghan people to determine their own
form of government, an intra-Afghan dialogue leading to a
transition mechanism to set up a broad-based government, and an
end to hostilities and arms supplies to all Afghan sides.
We commend the Secretary General and his special
representative for Afghanistan, Benon Sevan, who have with great
skill and perseverance sought to implement the General Assembly
resolutions on Afghanistan. We strongly support Mr. Sevan's
mission and look forward to continuing the work with the United
Nations and the international community to move from these
general principles to a political settlement in Afghanistan. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Tutwiler
Source: Statement by State Department Spokesman Margaret
Tutwiler
Description: Washington, Dc
Date: Jun 26, 19916/26/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations, Arms Control,
Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
The United States is deeply disturbed by the Iraqi regime's flouting
of its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 687.
That resolution obliges Iraq to facilitate and cooperate with
the UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), which are charged with implementing the
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of Iraq's nuclear
weapons capability. Iraq has unconditionally accepted Resolution
687.
Over this past weekend, however, Iraqi authorities denied a
Joint Special Commission/IAEA team entry into the Abu Gharaib
military complex. The team requested to visit this particular site
because of specific information about storage of nuclear-related
items there.
Inspection team members saw heavy moving equipment
(trucks, forklifts, cranes, etc.), moving into the site on the day they
were barred from entry and also observed urgent activity by work
crews.
Only after Iraq had several days to remove equipment and
material did Iraqi authorities finally permit an inspection team to
enter the site. That occurred today. The team found the site empty.
There is ample evidence from multiple sources that Iraq has
been conducting a covert nuclear weapons program that has included
activities to produce nuclear weapons material.
It has deceived the Special Commission and the IAEA on its
nuclear program. It has also underreported or not revealed details
on ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction as
required by Resolution 687.
The Chairman of the UN Special Commission, Rolf Ekeus,
briefed the permanent five members of the Security Council
yesterday on Iraq's obstructionism over the weekend.
The United States plans to brief the chairman of the UN
Special Commission, the Secretary General, and the 15 Security
Council permanent representatives on further evidence we have of
Iraqi attempts to conceal its nuclear weapons capabilities from the
IAEA/Special Commission.
We strongly urge the Security Council to put the Iraqi regime
on notice that this obstructionism must not happen again and that
Iraq must make available for inspection all--repeat all--equipment
and material connected with its nuclear weapons capabilities,
including items clandestinely removed from the site from which the
inspection team was barred and all other sites.
The Secretary said to the press this morning on the Hill that
we expect Iraq to comply with UN resolutions just like we expected
them to in the period from August to January 15. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: International Cooperation Counters Iraqi Terrorist Threats
Date: Jul 1, 19917/1/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Terrorism
[TEXT]
Background
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait last August, Saddam Hussein
called repeatedly for terrorist attacks against the United States
and other countries in the international coalition that opposed
Baghdad's aggression. Despite months of threats, the predicted
wave of terrorism failed to materialize.
The threat failed in large part because of the firm response by
the United States and its allies and the cooperation among them.
Long-standing US counter-terrorism policy, which shaped the
US response to the Iraqi threat, has three principal aspects:
First, the United States makes no concessions to terrorists
holding official or private US citizens hostage. The United States
will never pay ransom, release prisoners, or change its policies in
response to terrorist demands.
Second, the United States works with its allies and other
countries
to maintain pressure on terrorist-supporting countries such as Iraq
to convince them that their support of terrorist activity comes
with a heavy cost. The United States seeks to isolate terrorist-
supporting countries by imposing economic, political, diplomatic,
and military pressure.
Third, the United States cooperates with friendly countries in
developing measures to counter terrorism, such as identifying,
tracking, apprehending, prosecuting and punishing terrorists.
Throughout the crisis, other coalition governments
responded with similar determination to counter the Iraqi threat.
Iraq Prepares Terrorist Campaign
In the period between its invasion of Kuwait and January 1991, Iraq
trained terrorists and prepared operations against coalition
interests. Baghdad held several hundred citizens of coalition states
hostage as human shields at strategic sites across Iraq and
detained thousands of other third- country nationals against their
will. Iraq also expanded its ties to international terrorist groups.
Saddam Hussein invited some of the world's most dangerous and
notorious terrorists to Baghdad, where many of these groups set up
or re-established offices.
Iraqi authorities apparently had three basic objectives in
mind when they threatened to open a "second front" of terrorist
attacks against members of the international coalition:
-- To weaken the coalition members' resolve by taking
hostages and making threats;
-- To undermine or topple the leaders of Arab governments
who opposed Iraq;
-- To win support for their bid for leadership of the Arab
world.
The World Responds
Because Iraq and the groups pledging to act in support of Saddam
Hussein had carried out attacks before, the United States and other
coalition members took Saddam's threats seriously and responded in
a firm and swift manner.
The United States returned Iraq to its list of state sponsors
of terrorism. Iraq, and its sympathizers were warned against
holding hostages and promoting terrorist violence. On September
21, President Bush said that Saddam Hussein would be held directly
responsible for any terrorist attack on coalition interests.
The United States worked with NATO allies and others to send
clear messages to Iraq, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
and other Palestinian groups warning of the consequences should
they commit terrorist acts. The United States also urged Syria to
use its influence with terrorist groups based within its borders to
prevent terrorist attacks.
The coalition united to enforce the UN mandates was equally
unified in its response to the threat of terrorism. UN Security
Council Resolutions 667 and 674 condemned Iraq's abduction of
foreigners and demanded an immediate end to hostage-taking. Other
governments also vowed to hold Iraq responsible for terrorist
attacks carried out on its behalf.
Iraq had a history of using its embassies, cultural and trade
offices, and airline facilities to provide money, weapons, and
logistical support to terrorist teams. Many governments expelled
Iraqi diplomatic and intelligence personnel to reduce the threat
posed by this network of support. More than 200 Iraqi diplomats
and intelligence and embassy staff were expelled from countries
around the world. In addition, more than 500 students, business
people, and tourists with connections to the Iraqi government or to
radical political groups were expelled, arrested, or kept under close
surveillance.
Many countries alerted their citizens to the threat posed by
possible Iraqi-sponsored terrorism. Such announcements raised
public consciousness about terrorism and helped promote greater
cooperation between the public and law enforcement agencies. The
Department of State issued numerous travel advisories and public
announcements on Iraqi-sponsored terrorism beginning in August
and continuing throughout the war.
Many countries upgraded security at facilities likely to be
terrorist targets. Airports and the airlines of coalition states were
a special concern. Special aviation security measures were
implemented in stages as the January 15 deadline for Iraq to
withdraw from Kuwait approached. The cooperation of airlines and
airports throughout the world made a major contribution to
protecting those who traveled and deterring terrorists. Finally,
government offices, military facilities, and embassies of the US
and some other coalition members were "hardened" and non-
essential personnel withdrawn from some countries. Private firms
also reduced their exposure in several places.
Although the total number of terrorist incidents during the
Gulf crisis was three times the rate during the comparable period in
1990, Iraq was linked directly to only a small number of attacks
worldwide. Many of the targets were banks or commercial
facilities belonging to members of the coalition, and most of the
attacks caused only limited property damage.
Why Saddam's Terror Campaign Failed
The success in thwarting Iraqi-sponsored terrorism is an example
of the effectiveness of US counter-terrorism policy and
international cooperation against a common peril.
Preemptive action such as the expulsion of Iraqi diplomats
and intelligence operatives and enhanced
security countermeasures were key aspects of the counter-
terrorism campaign. Cooperation among law enforcement and
intelligence services in many different nations increased the
effectiveness of counter-terrorist efforts. The pressure that the
United States and other countries placed on governments that
provide support to terrorist groups proved effective. The public, by
accepting and cooperating with the additional security measures,
and by heeding travel advisories, increased the effectiveness of law
enforcement efforts.
Three other factors played an important role:
-- Military operations disrupted the "command and control"
links between Baghdad and the terrorist networks it had
established;
-- Radical groups that had planned to undertake terrorist
operations in support of Iraq were deterred by the failure of Saddam
Hussein's attempt to draw Israel into the war; and
-- The rapid coalition advance into Iraq, which sealed Iraq's
overwhelming defeat.
The United States and its allies have continued their counter-
terrorism efforts against Iraq. On April 3, the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 687, which "requires a commitment from Iraq
that it will not commit or support acts of terrorism or terrorist
organizations."
On June 11, the Iraqi government filed a statement with the
UN purporting to renounce terrorism. The United States, in
cooperation with other UN members, will monitor's Iraq's
performance.
Saddam's Threats
January 18--Baghdad radio broadcast a speech by Saddam Hussein in
which he called for Muslims worldwide to strike US interests.
January 20--Saddam called upon all Muslims to rise up in jihad
(holy war). He implied (incorrectly) that, if arrested, terrorists
would be treated in accordance with international conventions on
the treatment of prisoners of war.
January 30--Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council authorized
payments to relatives of Arabs and Muslims killed while attacking
Western targets.
February 19--Saddam called on "all free people to strike at the
center of the US and other coalition interests." (###)
Terrorism During the War
More than 200 terrorist incidents occurred between mid-January
and the end of February 1991. Most incidents appear to have been
undertaken by individuals or groups sympathetic to Iraq or hostile
to the United States and its coalition partners.
About one-fifth of the attacks were by indigenous terrorist
groups, which asserted that the attacks were related to the Gulf
crisis. Dev Sol in Turkey, 17 November in Greece, the Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement in Peru, and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic
Front in Chile were responsible for more than 40 such incidents.
Western, Saudi, and Kuwaiti banks were bombed in Lebanon. No
international terrorist acts were committed in the United States
during the crisis.
Six people were killed by terrorist attacks between mid-
January and February 1991. One of them was an American, Bobbie
Mozelle, an employee of a US Defense Department contractor. He
was killed in Turkey in an attack by Dev Sol.
In Manila, one Iraqi died and another was seriously injured
when the bomb they had assembled exploded before they reached
their target, the US Cultural Center;
In Jakarta, a bomb made with 24 sticks of dynamite and
placed near the US Ambassador's residence was found and safely
detonated.
Elsewhere in Asia, plots to attack official and public
facilities connected to coalition interests were discovered and
thwarted and Iraqi diplomats expelled. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 26, July 1, 1991
Title: US Export Controls in a Changing Global Environment
Wendt
Source: Ambassador Allan Wendt, Senior Representative for
Strategic Technology Policy
Description: Address before a National Academy of Sciences
symposium, Irvine, California
Date: Jun 11, 19916/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Subject: Arms Control, International Organizations,
Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
No series of events in recent years has captured the interests and
hopes of the world like those that led to Eastern Europe throwing
off the oppressive mantle of communism and beginning the long and
difficult voyage toward democracy and market-based economies.
Glasnost and perestroika are changing the Soviet Union, as well. As
a result, there has been a significant liberalization of export
controls, notably at the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls] High Level Meeting in June 1990 and
again at the High Level Meeting of May 23 this year where
agreement was reached on a new, shortened core list of truly
strategic equipment and technology. The core list is scheduled to
go into effect on September 1 of this year.
Yet, the world still faces daunting challenges that preclude the
complete elimination of export controls. Soviet repression of the
Baltics demonstrates the need for caution in relaxing export
controls to the Soviet Union. Moreover, even with recent
reductions, Soviet military spending just last fall was higher than
when Mr. Gorbachev came to power. The Soviet ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile] force is being upgraded,
including continued deployment of the SS-24 silo- and rail-based
ICBM, the SS-25 road-mobile ICBM, and a new 10-warhead version
of the SS-18 (with greater yield and accuracy). Bear H and
Blackjack bombers are being deployed with longer range cruise
missiles, and qualitative improvements are being made to the
Delta-IV and Typhoon ballistic missile submarines, respectively
carrying 16 and 20 nuclear missiles. On the strategic defensive
side, the Soviets have upgraded their dual-layered Moscow ABM
[anti-ballistic missile] system and maintain an anti-satellite
capability. Research on even more advanced systems such as lasers
underscores strong Soviet interest in military uses of space.
Even more troubling is that the Soviet military modernization
is occurring during a period of great political unpredictability. No
one is certain whether the political and economic reform initiated
by Gorbachev will continue or be successful; nor can we know how
long Gorbachev will retain control or the type of regime that might
follow. In these circumstances export controls clearly constitute
an essential form of insurance against something going wrong.
Our concerns are not confined to the Soviet Union. China's
policy on missile and nuclear proliferation also calls for caution
and continuing attention. Also, events in the Persian Gulf
underscore the need for effective national and multilateral controls
on goods and technologies that can contribute to the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.
In response to growing concerns over proliferation of such
weapons, the Administration launched the Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative (EPCI) aimed at improving our ability to control
dual-use goods and technologies useful for the production of
chemical and biological weapons and missiles. Significant progress
was made at the May meeting of the 20-country Australia Group,
which is involved in controlling equipment and materials used in the
production of chemical and biological weapons and in developing a
list of dual-use equipment that should be controlled. The Australia
Group list is patterned largely after the President's enhanced
proliferation control initiative. Once again, US leadership has
galvanized action within the world community.
Similarly, the US initiative to gain multilateral agreement to
control dual-use goods and technology used in nuclear weapons
production has gained increased acceptance. Continuing discussions
with key suppliers of such equipment has revealed a growing
consensus on the need to establish a multilateral framework to
prevent exports that might aid proliferant countries in developing
nuclear weapons capabilities.
Partly in response to events in the Persian Gulf, several new
countries have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. The
image of civilians donning gas masks in anticipation of a chemical
weapons attack via ballistic missiles during the Persian Gulf war
brought home with renewed forcefulness the need to prevent the
acquisition of such missile systems by unstable regimes.
In November 1990, President Bush called for efforts to
improve the multilateral application of export controls on high
performance computers. Based on that initiative, the United States
and Japan on June 6 concluded consultations on super-computer
export controls. The main goal of the US-Japan consultations was
to maintain controls on exports of supercomputers to destinations
of concern while reducing the licensing burdens on exports to
reliable destinations. For exports to countries that pose a national
security or proliferation concern, such as countries that have not
signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, strict safeguards
against misuse are required. Depending on the destination and
circum- stances of a particular export, some applications may be
denied. In addition, a definition of supercomputers was established
as "any computer with a CTP (composite theoretical performance)
equal to or greater than 195 million theoretical operations per
second (MTOPS)."
The policy dilemma facing the Administration is to find a
balance between excessive controls that would impede legitimate
export trade and those controls which the US and other major world
suppliers find necessary to support common security objectives.
Inherent in striking this balance is the need to adjust our export
control system to the new realities in formerly communist
countries and to devise effective multilateral controls to address
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Nowhere is this balancing act more delicate than in COCOM,
and nowhere has US leadership been more visible. As a result of
decisions taken at the COCOM High Level Meeting on May 23, we
have lived up to the President's promise to develop a new core list
of truly critical goods and technologies. One key to the success of
the core list process was the full participation of US industry in
the development of US core list proposals.
Some may question why greater liberalization was not
achieved in certain areas, for example, computers, and machine
tools. The answer is complex, but I can assure you that the US core
list proposals were subjected to the most intense and broadest
technical review of any COCOM proposals in recent memory by all
concerned US agencies, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the
Pentagon. At the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US
adopted a new measure of military criticality--the degree to which
acquisition of a good or technology by the Soviets would result in
the closing of a critical technological gap. A good example is the
night-vision device which, as we learned from the Persian Gulf war,
played a critical role in the coalition victory.
As part of our core list review, we thoroughly reviewed
foreign availability of everything from avionics to laser systems.
Wherever we found wide availability outside COCOM, we readily
agreed to decontrol such commodities. Further, where we found
Soviet capabilities equal to or better than previous control levels,
we also sought decontrol. But, where dual-use goods or
technologies are unique to COCOM suppliers, and are of gap-closing
strategic significance, we pressed the allies to retain controls.
General features of the new core list include greater
specificity in the description of controlled items, alignment of
control parameters with current industry technical standards,
decontrol of readily available "off-the-shelf" items, and improved
harmonization with the customs tariffs system.
In the case of computers, we determined that there was no
real foreign availability outside COCOM for computers above a CTP
of 23. Similarly, we found no foreign availability for machine tools
with accuracies greater than 6 microns. As a result, the COCOM
control limit was placed just below those levels. I note that the
control parameter for computers was changed from PDR (processing
data rate) to CTP because CTP is a more accurate measure of a
computer's capability.
Agreement on the core list will result in substantial
relaxation of controls on computers and related equipment. Nearly
all personal computers and minicomputers will be decontrolled,
along with their normal complement of related peripherals. We will
remove from control nearly all peripheral equipment, other than
high-speed disk drives, very high- performance graphics, and signal
processing equipment.
Controls over standard integrated circuits have also been
greatly reduced. All DRAM memory chips are decontrolled as are
most standard 32-bit microprocessors used in personal computers.
Controls on integrated circuit manufacturing equipment and silicon
materials are likewise liberalized. Finally, all civil television
recorders which meet certain international standards are
decontrolled.
As a final note regarding our COCOM controls, I would like to
address the issue of telecommunications systems and technology.
The technical and policy experts have worked long and hard to find
ways that will allow US companies, as well as our allies, to install
modern phone systems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We
risk serious compromise of our security interests, however, if we
export to the USSR for internal use top-of-the-line
telecommunications equipment and technologies. Until the
situation in the Soviet Union settles into a more predictable and
promising pattern, we simply must hold the line on approvals to
ship high-speed microwave and fiber-optics systems that could
dramatically enhance Soviet strategic capabilities while greatly
diminishing our intelligence gathering capabilities.
There is also good news on telecommunications. Controls
have been relaxed to permit digital switching and allow the Soviets
to build public digital voice and data networks with features and
functionality equivalent to those installed in the West right now.
The Soviets will be able to acquire such services as facsimile,
cellular telephone, electronic mail, and voice mail with all the
features currently enjoyed by users in the West.
With regard to international links, COCOM agreed to allow 156
megabit/64 qam (quadrature amplitude modulation) microwave
systems to be exported at national discretion to any country for use
in connection with international gateways. In the same vein,
agreement was reached to permit the export under the favorable
consideration procedure (which means presumption of approval) of
fiber-optic lines to any country up to its international border at
565 megabits (mbps)/1550 nanometers laser wave length for
international traffic.
Taken together, these changes will allow vast improvement in
communications between the USSR and the West, thus fostering
growth in business as well as personal ties, and also permit the
Soviet Union to acquire a telecommunications system comparable to
Western standards of the early-to-middle-1980s.
For all destinations but the Soviet Union and North Korea, the
core list will also allow the export, again under the favorable
consideration procedure, of microwave links at 156 mbps/64 qam
for internal use (that is, not restricted to international traffic)
and, at national discretion, fiber-optic links at 45 mbps/1370
nanometers.
Finally, in a major liberalization for Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia, COCOM countries agreed that all
telecommunications equipment except encryption devices can be
exported at national discretion.
We believe that these liberalizations are consistent with our
shared interests, while allowing for significant commercial
activities.
The COCOM partners also discussed the question of removing
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia from the list of proscribed
destinations. We determined that decisive progress in this vein
would depend upon these countries enforcing controls as effectively
as do member countries, both on goods imported from member
countries and on indigenously produced goods. In addition, each
country must have a sound legal basis for implementing its export
control system in order for it to be removed from the proscribed
destination list. For the time being, Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia will be subject to a "special procedure" that
establishes a presumption of approval for all but the most sensitive
equipment to those three countries. The message that we are
sending is that the US and its COCOM allies are committed to aiding
these three countries in their efforts to modernize their economies
through transformation to a market-based system.
Relaxation of export controls cannot be achieved without a
concomitant effort to improve levels of enforcement. These are the
higher fences that must be built around fewer goods. At the High
Level Meeting it was agreed that the Common Standard Level of
Effective Protection would enter into force by January 1, 1992. The
common standard establishes the criteria for an effective
enforcement regime for controlling goods and technologies against
diversion to unauthorized uses and destinations. Application of the
common standard will permit further progress in easing East-West
licensing by allowing additional items to be included in the intra-
COCOM license-free-trade zone.
Rapid technological advances that make equipment obsolete in
only a few years and the emergence of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction as a key issue were important factors in our
thinking relative to redefining the COCOM core list. But President
Bush and senior advisers in the Administration also recognized that
export controls have a critical bearing on our economic security. If
supplier countries do not apply and enforce controls in an even
manner, then those controls not only are ineffective but also
adversely affect our balance of trade and economic
competitiveness. Such a potential threat to our economic
security is just as much a national security matter as more
traditional concerns about strategic arms balance, regional
conflicts, or weapons development.
The National Academy of Sciences' recently released study
"Finding Common Ground" concluded that export controls should not
be discarded in the glow of the moment but neither should we return
to the rigidity of the past. The initiatives taken by the
Administration in the areas of non-proliferation of COCOM have, I
believe, met that challenge. While perhaps not meeting the
expectations of all interested parties, the changes announced at the
recent COCOM High Level Meeting are a major step forward in
finding the balance between increased trade and maintaining a
strong national security posture. We want to adjust our export
control system to the new realities in formerly communist
countries and changes in the Soviet Union. At the same time, we
want to do so in a way, and at a pace, that continues to safeguard
our national security against both old and new dangers.
Where do we go next? Now that the core list exercise is
completed, I believe industry needs to know what kind of export
control system to expect. I cannot give you a detailed guide, but I
can share some insight into the Administration's thinking.
The core list does not establish a red line. We will continue
to approve the export of items on the core list if they are
demonstrably for civilian end use and are suited therefor. We and
our COCOM allies in 1990 approved almost 1,600 licenses, worth
about $1.7 billion for civilian end-users in the Soviet Union. For
example, we approved the export of high-speed computers for
Soviet nuclear power plant safety as well as the sale of the most
modern commercial aircraft available on the market today. Further,
the President made a commitment to the Soviets, as well as to
industry, that we would consider favorably shipments of goods and
technology that would upgrade the Soviet energy production sector,
particularly oil and gas exploration and development. Over the past
year, we have approved approximately 95% of all general exceptions
cases, and even greater percentages have been approved for Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Under the new "special procedure,"
there will be a presumption of approval for most exports to those
three countries. Clearly, the ability to export does not rest entirely
on the question of whether or not an item is controlled.
The Soviet market is not the only potential new arena for
business. Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, in particular, are
moving toward full integration into the Western economic system.
Surprising as it may seem, it is the US that has taken the lead in
pressing for major liberalization of the controls on exports to these
countries.
COCOM remains an effective and important instrument of
national security because we have been able to adapt it to changing
circumstances. We will continue to do so, for we recognize we can
do no less and retain support from our allies and from industry. In
completing the core list, we have created a new international
industrial list that controls only the most critical goods and
technologies needed to maintain the existing technological lead
between Western and Soviet-based military systems, a lead which
was clearly visible during Operation Desert Storm. The Department
of Commerce estimates that the new list represents a 65%
reduction in the number of controlled goods over the pre-June 1990
control list. We estimate that there will be a 70% reduction in
license applications for computer exports alone.
The future is full of both promise and risk. Changes in Eastern
Europe and, we hope, in the Soviet Union hold the promise for
further liberalization of export controls and additional business
opportunities for US firms. We remain committed to striking a
balance between national security and removal of barriers to trade.
We intend to rely on the history of COCOM and on the cooperation of
industry, our allies, and partners in finding that balance. (###)