US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: From West to East
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Address to the Aspen Institute, Berlin, Germany
Date: Jun 18, 19916/18/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: NATO, Democratization, EC, OAS
[TEXT]
I am pleased to be back in Berlin. When I visited you in 1989, the
Wall had just become a gateway. When I returned in 1990, I took
part in negotiations to end the division of this city, this nation, this
continent. And now, in 1991, I have the honor of meeting in the
capital of a united Germany.
Yet as great as this progress has been, there is something else
of lasting vitality we have created here. Berlin is much more than a
city to Americans. Berlin is the birthplace of a special kinship
between Germans and Americans. It is here that Germans and
Americans, once adversaries, stood together. This is the place
where we suffered, shared, and strove for freedom.
We started the trans-Atlantic community here. And it is from
here that we must extend it.
When I spoke in Berlin in December 1989, I outlined our ideas
about the architecture of a New Europe and a New Atlanticism. We
have made notable advances in this architecture for a post-Cold War
era. Yet our vision must look beyond.
We must begin to extend the trans-Atlantic community to
Central and Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union. These are the
still incomplete pieces of our architecture. The revolutions of
freedom in Central and Eastern Europe need on-going support to
become lasting democracies. Perestroika needs our encouragement
to move further toward a free society and free markets.
Our objective is both a Europe whole and free and a Euro-
Atlantic community that extends east from Vancouver to
Vladivostok. President Bush spoke in Prague about a "new common
wealth of freedom. . . rest[ing] on shared principles. . . that
constitute our common values."
We are starting to build this larger Euro-Atlantic community
here, in the eastern Laender of Germany. America's commitment to
the unification of Germany did not end with the ratification of the
"Two-plus-Four" treaty. That's why I wanted to listen to some of
the people of the East myself today, to see their home with my own
eyes. That's why we have launched a comprehensive program to
extend America's hand to all Germans.
I have no doubt that before too long this part of Germany will
be one of the foremost engines in Europe. On that day, I believe
Americans and Germans will be standing on the shop floor together.
But we cannot rest with the integration of all of Germany.
The Atlantic Community: A Community of Values
To me, the trans-Atlantic relationship stands for certain
Enlightenment ideals of universal applicability. These values are
based upon the concept of individual political rights and economic
liberty rooted in European ideas of the 17th and 18th centuries and
first planted in the new American nation.
While these values were originally associated with Western
Europe and the United States, they transcend national borders.
Indeed, these ideals stand in sharp contrast to some later 19th
century views about the intrinsic qualities of societies and peoples,
based upon history and heredity, which could allegedly find their
highest expression in the state.
Ironically, perhaps, the narrow 19th century European
nationalism also gave way to another, and a very different,
rationalist and universalist ideology that would also transcend
national borders--Marxism. In the Soviet Union, Bolsheviks blended
this ideology with a Slavophile movement that was itself a reaction
against allegedly alien Western values. Stalin imposed this
ideology on half of Europe. Now its failures and destruction are
obvious to all.
As the shackles of this failed ideology have been lifted or
broken--in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union itself,
and elsewhere in the world--old 19th century nationalisms and
animosities have reemerged. These forces cast shadows over the
new democracies, particularly those seeking root in multi-ethnic
societies. They expose anxieties about political, economic, and
military security. They risk creating new divisions of Europe.
We need to offer an inspiration, even a goal, to these peoples
rediscovering new values upon which they can build pluralistic,
democratic, and free market societies. We need to picture their
place in the new architecture.
Our architecture needs to fulfill the long-established NATO
goal, from the 1967 Harmel report, of achieving "a just and lasting
peaceful order in Europe." To do so, our structures need to promote
Euro-Atlantic political and economic values, the ideals of the
Enlightenment. They need to establish the components of
cooperative security for a Europe whole and free, and we need to
demonstrate how integration can cope with new dangers from old
enmities.
The Devolution and Evolution of the European Nation-State
Perhaps the most striking phenomenon across all of Europe today is
the combined and simultaneous devolution and evolution of the
nation-state. While the nation-state remains by far the most
significant political unit, its political role is being increasingly
supplemented by both supranational and subnational units. In other
words, some of the nation-state's functions are being delegated
"upward" and others "downward."
In Western Europe, the process of evolution has been striking.
Over the past 40 years, West Europeans have transferred more and
more functions from the national to the supranational level. The
European Community has achieved history's most intense and
comprehensive voluntary evolution of governing authority above the
national level. The Atlantic alliance, for its part, may have
achieved the most fundamental intergovernmental cooperation, for
it is to NATO that Europeans as well as North Americans have
entrusted not merely their prosperity but their personal and
national existence.
In Western Europe, evolution has been accompanied by the
devolution of power to state and local governments, to regions that
sometimes cross national borders, and to the private sector.
In Central and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, devolution is
certainly the more prominent phenomenon. With the collapse of
communism, ethnicity has re-emerged as a powerful political force,
threatening to erect new divisions between countries and, even
more acutely, within multinational states.
Yet even in the East, there is a simultaneous process of
evolution underway. We are seeing the beginnings of a Europe of
regions that may well be overlapping. Cooperation among Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; the Pentagonale [Austria, Italy,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia]; and the exploration of
ties among northern states that rim the Baltic and of southern
states on the Black Sea are examples of early efforts. Similarly,
the "Nine-plus-One" accord within the Soviet Union is a first effort
to re-establish the legitimacy of that multinational state on the
basis of voluntary association among component parts.
Furthermore, the interests of these states in associating
themselves with Western institutions like the IMF [International
Monetary Fund], the EC [European Community], and the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] is also
evidence of this evolutionary tendency.
Evolution and devolution are not alternatives, but
complementary, and indeed interdependent developments. The
building of a Euro-Atlantic community can only be achieved on a
democratic basis if there is grassroots involvement in the process.
Thus, the architects of a united Europe have adopted the principle of
"subsidiarity," something like American "federalism"--that is, the
devolution of responsibility to the lowest level of government
capable of performing it effectively. By the same token, the
process of devolution in the East will lead to fragmentation and
conflict and ultimately threaten democracy if it is not accompanied
by the voluntary delegation of powers to national and even
supranational levels for basic matters such as defense, trade,
currency, and the protection of basic human rights--particularly
minority rights.
The United States is a nation of ideas, not of blood, birth, or
creed. Americans know that many levels of government can coexist
and cooperate effectively, and that one can thereby build a strong
nation out of diversity. Throughout the Euro-Atlantic community,
and, indeed, elsewhere around the globe, a fundamental challenge
for democracy is to encompass, to represent, but also to transcend,
ethnic ties on the basis of common--indeed universal--values.
The integration of Western Europe within the EC and NATO has
virtually transcended all the old territorial disputes, irredentist
claims, and ethnic grievances among and within its member states.
Euro-Atlantic integration has made it literally inconceivable that
localized disputes could become a source for serious conflict among
these states. The incentives for cooperation within these multi-
and supranational frameworks are overwhelmingly high in
comparison with the remaining areas of discord. If we are to
ensure comparable levels of peace and prosperity for Europe as a
whole, comparable structures should be introduced to shape and
develop interdependence among these countries.
In sum, in both East and West, the processes of evolution and
devolution need to be kept in constructive equilibrium. Only by
achieving balanced progress in both directions can the individual be
assured a voice in the management of an ever more interdependent
world.
Let me turn now to this architecture's essential structures--
NATO, the EC, and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe]. I will examine how they have developed since December
1989 and consider how they might contribute to a Euro-Atlantic
architecture extending from North America across Europe to the
Soviet Union.
NATO's New Missions
So far, NATO's adaptability has attested to its vitality. It is, in
fact, both a sturdy cornerstone and initiator of cooperative
structures of security for a Europe whole and free.
First and foremost, our London summit declaration paved the
way for the peaceful unification of a democratic Germany.
Next, our common resolve in the CFE [Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe] negotiations resulted in a landmark agreement
that will transform the military map of Europe. Within the past 2
weeks, the alliance's foreign ministers agreed on NATO's core
security functions in the new Europe. We agreed that the alliance
provides one of the indispensable foundations for a stable European
security environment. It serves as a trans-Atlantic forum for
allied consultations and coordination in fields of common concern.
It deters and defends against any threat of aggression against the
territory of any member state. And it preserves the strategic
balance within Europe.
We also agreed that the development of a European security
identity would further strengthen the alliance and enhance its
capabilities to fulfill these functions in the future, while
encouraging an even more prominent European role in the process.
The United States has pledged to support our European allies in the
development of this identity and work with them in expanding
cooperation between European and Atlantic institutions in the
defense and security fields.
The alliance's new agenda, especially its political role, is
evident as well in our plans to build partnerships with the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We have
proposed initiatives to intensify contacts among security officials,
military authorities, parliamentarians, leadership groups, and
scientific and environmental experts.
The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are
already committed to our shared values; now we must focus on the
practical relationships that will help promote and secure them.
These alliance contacts are also designed to draw the Soviet
Union toward the new architecture. If reform in an increasingly
pluralistic Soviet Union is going to succeed, we must reach out to
the Soviet military and defense industrialists, as well as to
reformers. We want them to know about NATO's strategy, doctrine,
and defensive nature. They may be able to draw from our experience
with civil-military relations. And we want to support efforts to
convert defense industries to civilian production that will benefit
the well-being of working men and women.
The EC: Continuing Support for an Eastern Agenda
The European Community's success at integration enables its
member nations to benefit from common policies, preserve
distinctive national attributes, and also devolve authority to local
governments closer to the people. The Community is now in the
midst of two intergovernmental conferences that will deepen its
political and economic integration. As I said in Berlin in 1989, this
was the goal supported by the United States of [Secretaries of State
George] Marshall and [Dean] Acheson. And we support it today.
Of course, we do so in the expectation that a European union
will assume a place as a responsible leader contributing to the
strengthening of structures of global, as well as continental,
interdependence. Our commonwealth of freedom must reach out
further, to Japan and Asia, to Latin America, to Africa.
It is in this global context that the EC's energetic
commitment to a successful Uruguay Round [of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations] looms large.
Unfortunately, EC agricultural policies have raised concern. While
we recognize the important role that the Common Agricultural
Policy played in Europe's integration, we hope that Europeans now
recognize that its continuation in its present form will injure
developing nations and the GATT system. It would be tragic for the
Community to send a signal of global insularity during the very year
that it was achieving new levels of European integration.
The strength of the Euro-Atlantic community depends on
cooperation between the Community and the United States keeping
pace with European integration and institutional development. Our
US-EC declaration, completed late last year, reflects a first step on
this path. Under Luxem-bourg's strong leadership, our contacts with
the Council presidency and the "Troika" have developed rapidly and
fruitfully. Similarly, we are opening new ties with the Commission
in areas such as energy, competition policy, and privacy.
It is my hope that as the Community makes decisions on its
own future, it will continue to develop the possibilities for
effective interaction with the United States and others as global
partners. The successful creation of a coherent internal structure
for the Community should also strengthen its capacity for effective
external relations and responsibilities.
In the near term, perhaps the EC's greatest external challenge
is to reach out to the East. The EC's very political and economic
success has already served as a magnet, drawing Eastern nations
toward democracy and market economies.
The Commission complemented this appeal through its
coordinating role for the Group of 24 effort for the new market
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. We hope this is but the
first of many steps to removing the economic barriers these
countries face within Europe. The Community's intention to
negotiate expanded association agreements, consistent with GATT,
is another stage.
It is a simple fact that the new market democracies will not
be able to draw foreign investment, to privatize, to build
competitive businesses that will create jobs if they are not
allowed to compete fairly for markets.
I am optimistic that the European Community will meet this
challenge of extending the Euro-Atlantic community eastward.
Whether by example, supportive policies, association, ties with
other regional groups, or even--if some day Europeans so decide--
through further integration, the EC can help these market
democracies establish a home in our larger community of common
values.
Comprehensive Framework for a Euro-Atlantic Community
CSCE--the Helsinki process--remains the one group that brings
together all the countries of Europe and North America on the basis
of a common commitment to human rights and democratic
principles. These rights and principles are the foundation for a
Euro-Atlantic community already reaching beyond Berlin to the East.
We need to build a practical record of success for CSCE, with
appropriate capabilities in all three baskets in a mutually
supportive fashion, and thus support the process of reform that will
allow CSCE to become a true community of values.
Tomorrow, CSCE foreign ministers will meet for the first
time as the Council of Ministers established in the Charter of Paris.
I hope that over the next 2 days my colleagues and I will be able to
take additional steps to enrich CSCE along the lines of the proposals
[German] Foreign Minister Genscher and I made in May. We should
adopt a procedure for calling emergency meetings of CSCE officials
at the sub-ministerial level. We can strengthen the Conflict
Prevention Center, and I hope we can also develop procedures under
which ministers could direct the establishment of fact-finding
missions.
We also need to entertain other ideas. [Soviet Foreign]
Minister Bessmertnykh has made a proposal for a standing CSCE
human rights body. This merits serious attention. It might be
complemented by adding fact-finding missions as a fifth step in the
Human Dimension Mechanism.
I propose we consider co-invoking a specialized CSCE meeting
on support for free media. We might also expand the mandate of the
Office of Free Elections to become an Office of Democratic
Institutions so that voting day will be matched by 364 other days of
liberty in the year.
In the economic area, I propose we establish new CSCE
Chambers of Commerce in countries moving to market economies to
organize and speak for the interests of private businesses. We
might also organize a seminar on the social and financial
implications of defense conversion and budget cuts.
CSCE is also an appropriate forum to address the issues of
migration within Europe. An experts' meeting could seek to develop
humanitarian principles for handling massive immigration and
refugees within the CSCE region and cooperative arrangements to
anticipate and address the causes and benefits of such population
movements.
In sum, I envisage CSCE developing an agenda that can foster
the sharing of ideas and cooperation on issues of common concern.
That is a prerequisite to more complex integration.
It is also important that we view CSCE as a framework--not a
unitary body--for the Euro-Atlantic agenda. Indeed, as we extend
the Euro-Atlantic architecture to the East, we need to be creative
about employing multiple methods and institutions--including
NATO, the EC, the OECD, the Council of Europe, and others--to
address common concerns.
Take the issue of security. We have in fact been developing
arrangements for cooperative security to meet the needs of the
newly emerging democracies and to engage a reformed Soviet Union.
One, CSCE will contribute by creating the political, economic,
and security conditions that may defuse conflict. CSCE will also
have systems to warn of potential dangers, mechanisms to attempt
to mediate them, and ways to engage others to help resolve them.
In this way, the structure would help avoid the conditions and bias
toward escalation that characterized Europe in August 1914.
Two, NATO would provide a complementary role. A strong
defensive alliance allows for lower levels of military forces and
provides a foundation of stability within Europe as a whole. The
arms control agenda pursued by NATO will augment this security.
NATO's liaison missions will communicate the alliance's peaceful
intentions, encourage civil-military relations, and contribute to a
climate discouraging intimidation and aggression.
Three, such other integrating institutions of the Euro-Atlantic
community as the EC, the Council of Europe, and OECD are creating a
network of political and economic support. This support both
strengthens the new market democracies internally and signals to
any would-be threat that these nations are part of a larger
community with a stake in their success.
Finally, it is also important to shape the future security
agenda in Europe to meet changing challenges, including the special
needs of the East. The time has come to set new goals, which go
beyond the concept of balance, and begin to establish the basis for a
real cooperative security. To this end, I propose a three-tier agenda
for future CSCE activities in the arms control and security area.
-- First, we need to institutionalize openness and
transparency in our military affairs. We should intensify our
efforts to reach an Open Skies treaty. We should establish a regular
dialogue about military forces, budgets, defense plans, and doctrines.
And to address the possible regeneration of forces within the
Atlantic to the Urals region, we should consider measures that would
provide early and clear indications of rebuilding efforts--not simply
to avoid surprise but also to inhibit such moves.
-- The second part of our agenda is conflict prevention.
Such milestone measures as the CFE Treaty and the CSBMs [confidence-
and security- building measures] agreement will all but eliminate
the threat of a short-warning, massive war in Europe. But we also
need to address more discrete localized problems within the CSCE
area with the potential to lead to conflict between CSCE members.
These might include new measures to address some of the
security concerns of particular regions. They might include new
measures to cope with the problems of the Balkans or other areas
where stability could be at risk. Some of these measures could be
along the lines of arms control and confidence-building measures.
They might also involve a broader, political approach, such as
supplying CSCE fact-finding, mediation, and peace-keeping
capabilities when requested by nations immediately concerned.
-- Third is the challenge of proliferation: stopping the
spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons--as well as the
missiles that deliver them--and cooperating in the development of
national policies to exercise restraint in the sale of conventional
weapons. President Bush has called for a concentrated global effort
to meet this challenge. We in the CSCE can contribute by building a
partnership of responsibility and restraint.
CSCE members are some of the most important arms suppliers
in the world. As an offshoot of East-West confrontation, some CSCE
economies have become heavily dependent on exporting weaponry.
This is a problem we must address together to find innovative
approaches to the problems of defense industry conversion.
Taken as a set--the CFE Treaty and the manpower declarations
being negotiated in CFE 1A; CSCE, including this new agenda for
arms control; the continued vitality of NATO, including its liaison
missions; the EC and other European institutions--we are building
the basis for cooperative security in Europe.
Extending the Trans-Atlantic Community to the Soviet Union
Our greatest challenge will be to extend the trans-Atlantic
community to the Soviet Union. While the new architecture can
accomplish much short of that goal, it will be incomplete as long as
the USSR hesitates outside.
Perestroika is an opportunity for "new thinking" in many
areas--not only in foreign policy, where we have achieved much
together, but also in defense policy, economics, democratization,
Center-Republic relations, and human rights.
The revolution of perestroika has unleashed a new pluralism.
The old political and economic structures have broken down, and it
will take time to build new ones based on the popular will.
The elections in Russia and elsewhere are a good start. We
need to engage the diverse groups, reformer and traditionalist,
recognizing that coalitions will form, break down, and form again.
The transformation of the Soviet Union will inevitably have its ups
and downs.
It should be our on-going objective, however, to reassure and
even buttress this home-grown Soviet effort. Perestroika is a
Soviet concept and a Soviet objective, driven by the realization that
change is essential to reverse stagnation and deterioration. It is in
the interest of the Soviet peoples to embrace a real market
economy, democracy, and the rule of law. It is in our interest to
support them.
I have spoken in recent weeks of the political, economic,
nationalities, foreign, and defense policy context that could enable
the Soviet Union to fulfill the hopes of perestroika. And I have
spoken today of a number of ways that NATO, the EC, CSCE, and
other Euro-Atlantic structures can serve as models for Soviet
internal reform and international cooperation.
Yet I also recognize that the United States, for reasons of
history, has a special role to play in supporting the process of
change in the Soviet Union. As the Soviets demonstrate the will to
help themselves, to follow President Gorbachev's call in Oslo to
"stay the course" on perestroika and the new thinking, then we can
and should join them step-by-step.
As I said last week before the US Senate, "[W]e can serve as a
catalyst for political and economic reform. Indeed, we are
developing a package of supportive measures, which we hope to
coordinate with other Western governments."
The complete package is, of course, for the President to
announce. But as we have pointed out in recent weeks, elements
could include a special association with the IMF and World Bank to
help design and implement serious economic reforms; a public-
private project to resolve impediments to private investment in
energy development, which can earn hard currency and provide an
example of a successful sector operating with property and
contract rights; a mutual effort to invigorate the food distribution
sector to produce improvements for consumers soon through the
establishment of market incentives; work to support defense
conversion; enhanced technical cooperation, including in the field of
economic education; more open trade; and the additional $1.5 billion
of credit guarantees the President authorized last week for the
purchase of grains.
I hope President Gorbachev now brings forward a new effort
at serious market reform that will enable us to advance
perestroika--to advance a Soviet agenda and Soviet goals. The door
to the Euro-Atlantic community is open. But only the Soviets can
decide to step over the threshold.
The Euro-Atlantic Outlook
A half century ago, it would have seemed impossible that an
American Secretary of State would stand in Berlin, speaking to
Germans and Americans, about the values of the Euro-Atlantic
community. Particularly, that he would describe ideas about
securing these values in the new market democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe, extending them to a Soviet Union in the throes of
reform, and indeed promoting these values in the world at large.
But our predecessors have made the impossible, possible. Now it is
the turn of our generation to draw out and then help sustain the
Enlightenment spirit. To do so, we must be idealists and realists,
setting a goal, and then adapting our successful, workable trans-
Atlantic architecture to meet the new challenges of a post-Cold
War era.
It is most fitting that in Berlin, Freedom's City, we would
chart this course. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: Summary of the President's CSCE Annual Implementation
Report
Date: Jun 3, 19916/3/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Country: Czechoslovakia (former), Romania, Poland,
Yugoslavia (former), USSR (former)
Subject: Arms Control, CSCE, Democratization
[TEXT]
During the 1990-91 reporting year, the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) "lost" a member when East and
West Germany unified. At the same time, Albania was granted
observer status. Thirty-two European states plus Canada and the
United States are members since Albania became a full member on
June 19, 1991. Following is a summary of the President's Report of
the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, CSCE Annual Report,
April 1, 1990-March 1, 1991, which was submitted to Congress on
June 3, 1991. The text of the entire report will be available as a
Dispatch Supplement (Vol. 2, No. 3) .
Developments in the CSCE Process
Implementation of CSCE principles continued to improve in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union during the reporting period. Bulgaria
held its first multi-party election, introduced economic changes
aimed at the creation of a market economy, and virtually ceased
previous repressive measures, particularly against ethnic Turks.
The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic built on the achievements of
the Velvet Revolution, with laws to implement economic and
political reforms. Germany was unified. Hungary held democratic
elections and began drafting and passing legislation to help
democracy put down roots. In Poland, political groups competed
openly and democratically. Parliament asked President Lech Walesa
to call for parliamentary elections and began drafting a new
constitution based on democratic principles. The constitution will
likely be promulgated by the new parliament in late 1991. Despite
the country's hardships and a declining standard of living, the
government persisted in its economic reform efforts.
Romania moved haltingly toward a more open society with the
loosening of many controls, but the government's commitment to
democracy and its willingness to tolerate opposition was still in
question. In particular, the government used force against a June
1990 demonstration by miners and continued isolated beatings and
other forms of harassment against the opposition. Yugoslavia,
beset by internal divisions and human rights abuses in Kosovo and
Croatia, nevertheless, attempted significant democratic and
political reform at both the republic and federal levels. The Soviet
Union took steps toward the withdrawal of its troops from Eastern
and Central Europe. However, advances in human rights were offset
by abuses in the Baltic states and elsewhere and the rolling back of
some press freedoms. Economic reforms also remained problematic.
The CSCE process underwent vast changes during the reporting
period. The November 1990 Paris summit publicly recognized the
end of the Cold War and, for the first time, created CSCE
institutions. A busy schedule of experts meetings was augmented
with two additional specialized meetings for 1991. A regular
schedule of high-level political consultations among CSCE states
was inaugurated. For the first time, the United States hosted a
CSCE meeting--the October 1990 ministerial in New York. The
Baltic states requested, but did not receive, observer status at
CSCE meetings due to a lack of consensus on the part of the member
states. Albania was granted observer status and sought, but did not
receive, full membership, as CSCE states continued to look for a
more consistent record of Albanian compliance with CSCE
standards.
The Paris Summit
The highlight of CSCE activities for the reporting period was the
November 19-21 Paris summit, the first CSCE meeting at the level
of heads of state or government since the signing of the Helsinki
Final Act in 1975. President Bush led a US delegation of more than
30 senior government officials and congressional representatives,
including Senator Claiborne Pell and US Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe Chairman, Representative Steny Hoyer and
Commissioner Representative Don Ritter.
The Paris summit included signature or endorsement of four
major agreements:
-- The Charter of Paris for a New Europe;
-- The 1990 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures (CSBM);
-- The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE--
negotiated within the framework of the CSCE process by members
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact); and
-- The Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, in which the
members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact welcomed the historic
changes in Europe and declared that they were no longer
adversaries.
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the
1990 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures established a secure foundation for relations among the
CSCE participating states. The summit, in turn, reaffirmed CSCE
principles and further enhanced the dignity of individuals and human
rights. It also focused on expectations for the new Europe in the
years ahead.
President Bush welcomed the summit as proof that "a
continent frozen in hostility for so long has become a continent of
revolutionary change." Looking to the future, the President
suggested that it was now time to "bring the CSCE down to earth,
making it a part of everyday politics, building and drawing on its
strength to address the new challenges." Stressing the importance
of balance among the three baskets of the CSCE, he called for
continued efforts in the areas of human rights, security, and
economics, and drew attention to the modest, but significant, steps
toward a new order which the new CSCE institutions represented.
Other speakers shared the President's reinforcement of CSCE
principles and his expectations for the new CSCE.
The Charter of Paris for a New Europe
Building upon the Helsinki Final Act, the charter creates the
framework for a comprehensive European political dialogue. It is
the embodiment of President Bush's commitment to "a Europe whole
and free."
The 10-page charter and its 14-page supplementary document
embrace an extraordinary range of subjects. The charter is divided
into three parts: "a new era of democracy, peace and unity,"
"guidelines for the future," and "new structures and institutions of
the CSCE process." It calls for creation of a parliamentary
assembly for CSCE. The supplementary document sets out the new
institutional arrangements mandated by the charter: a political
consultation process with a small administrative secretariat in
Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an Office for
Free Elections in Warsaw. It also mandates two additional CSCE
experts meetings: a seminar on democratic institutions (November
4-15, 1991 in Oslo), and a meeting on national minorities (July 1-
19, 1991 in Geneva).
The Charter of Paris offers a powerful reaffirmation by the
participating states of the original Helsinki principles. The US
delegation to the Paris Summit Preparatory Committee, which
negotiated the charter, led the effort to ensure that CSCE's
traditional emphasis on respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms enjoyed pride of place in the document. The United States
led the effort to include the first commitment by all CSCE heads of
state or government to democracy as "the only system of
government of our nations." Building upon commitments undertaken
at the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe to
replace command economies with market systems, the United
States advanced the concept of "economic liberty," which posits
individuals exercising their free will in a democratic society as the
"necessary basis for successful economic and social development."
In arms control, the Charter of Paris took a historic step
toward a new Europe. Building upon the CFE and CSBM negotiations,
the participating states agreed to establish new negotiations on
disarmament and confidence- and security-building by 1992. The
talks will be open to all member states.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: Major Issues in START
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from remarks by Secretary Baker at the US
Ambassador's residence with Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr
Bessmertnykh, Berlin, Germany
Date: Jun 20, 19916/20/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia, North America
Country: USSR (former), United States
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
Let me say, with respect to START [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks], and with respect to the possibility of a summit between
President Bush and President Gorbachev, that I think we are right
where we were when we last met with respect to the question of a
summit. And that is, that both presidents would like to, I think,
have a summit in Moscow at the earliest possible opportunity. But
they would like to do so at a time that they could conclude the
strategic arms negotiation treaty. There are three issues--three
major issues that remain with respect to this treaty. These issues,
while they are very important in and of themselves, are also
important because they constitute part of a broader package of
agreements that have been entered into dating back to the
ministerial that was held in Houston, Texas, in December of last
year. These three issues are: the question of new types of
missiles, the question of downloading or removing the number of
warheads on missiles, and the question of telemetry encryption or
data denial. There has been a recent exchange of letters between
President Bush and President Gorbachev that has served to close the
gap substantially with respect to the question of the definition of
new types of missiles, somewhat with respect to the question of
downloading. And the technical experts continue to work in Geneva
with respect to the very, very complicated and technical issue of
data denial. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: US-Brazil: Roots of Friendship
Bush, Collor
Source: Presidents Bush and Collor
Description: Remarks upon Brazilian President Collor's arrival,
Washington, DC
Date: Jun 18, 19916/18/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: Brazil
Subject: Environment, Trade/Economics, Democratization
[TEXT]
President Bush.
It is my great honor to greet you,
Mr. President, one of Latin America's most dynamic statesmen.
The US-Brazilian friendship has spanned nearly 2 centuries.
Now an alliance built on fidelity--to democracy, healthy mutual
respect, and firm collective will--[is a] relationship [that] has
never been better. The most basic roots of our friendship lie in our
dedication to democracy, our allegiance to the power of individuals,
and the rule of law.
The nations of the Americas all struggled and gained
independence from the old ways of the Old World, and we built
nations of promise and renewal. One hundred and seventy- nine
years ago, the United States was proud to be the very first nation to
recognize the newly sovereign Brazil. And that year, your
predecessors achieved independence without bloodshed, traded
goods with the world, and began to integrate a vastly diverse
country. Today, President Collor, you represent the modern leader--
Brazil's first directly elected president in 29 years. We understand
the challenges you face, and we admire the vigor with which you are
dealing with them.
Across the spectrum, from trade and economic matters to
environmental issues, to concerns over nuclear proliferation, we
are determined to treat our common challenges as opportunities--
opportunities to improve life throughout this hemisphere.
Brazil, with its great natural wealth and resourceful people,
can make enormous contributions to the world economy and to
hemispheric prosperity. Along with the other nations of the
Americas, as a long-term goal, we aim to create the largest free-
trading partnership of sovereign states in the world.
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which I unveiled 1
year ago next week, can help make this goal a reality, and we are
already making great strides. I am pleased to announce that
tomorrow we will sign completed negotiations for a trade and
investment framework agreement with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay,
and Uruguay--the countries of the planned Southern Cone Common
Market--MERCOSUR. This agreement is a significant step toward
achieving our common goals, and we look forward to this new era of
enhanced cooperation.
America stands by your side as you tackle Brazil's most
pressing issues. When I visited Brazil last December and was
received so warmly by you, I saw the bold economic changes that
you were making. And I saw something else; I saw a bold, active
president, too. We all know that he's a tireless worker, but add to
that jogging, piloting fighters, jet skiing, and several other
activities. My kind of guy.
You've trimmed government and announced plans to reprivatize
enterprises, fight inflation, and liberalize trade. These are the keys
to growth and prosperity in Brazil.
As the 21st century draws near, we'll mark the 500th
anniversary of Columbus' discovery of the Americas and the arrival
of Cabral's Portuguese fleet in Brazil. Spectacular change
characterizes the half millennium. The New World is becoming
integrated in ways our forefathers would never have dreamed. And
our firm collective will can help ensure a future filled with
cooperation, not conflict.
Brazil knows well the importance of united efforts--aligning
with the allies in both World Wars, its brave expeditionary forces
playing a key role in World War II. A half-century later, Brazil
supported the UN resolutions and sanctions against Iraq despite
significant economic losses to Brazil. And that testifies not just
to your vision but to your courage; and, for this, we thank you, also.
On behalf of all Americans, I salute the shared ideals that
unite our nations and the lasting friendship between the people of
the United States and the people of Brazil.
It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the White House.
May God bless the Federative Republic of Brazil.
President Collor
. Mr. President, ladies and
gentlemen, relations with the United States of America are a
priority for Brazil. In my inaugural speech, I stated the need to
eliminate from our relationship the emphasis which, up to then, had
been placed on contentious trade issues. Such an emphasis used to
obscure the true sense of a partnership based on common values,
aspirations, and enterprises.
This first goal has been achieved. In a mutually satisfactory
way, Brazil has shown its earnestness and willingness to approach
the issues pending on the bilateral agenda. Today, the Brazil-US
agenda is clearly positive, and this is only a starting point for
continuous improvement in our relations.
Brazil and the United States are the two largest democracies
on the American continent. We place our most profound trust in
political and economic freedom as the only way to achieve the
individual and collective fulfillment of our citizens. We cannot
limit ourselves to solving circumstantial problems. The advances
that we make must be founded upon a wide-ranging political vision
and serve to reinforce a strong and lasting friendship.
It is in this spirit that we salute the initiative for the
Americas. Aside from its very important conceptual gains, such as
the linkage between foreign debt, trade, and investment, the
initiative is remarkable, above all, because of its vision of the
future, a future that we must build together.
Let us close the chapter on past trade disputes and past debt
problems. Let us join efforts to expand mutual trade, technological
cooperation, new credit, and investment flows. My idea of a truly
stable international partnership is based on two major assumptions:
The first is that [it] is up to every country to determine its own
destiny and to make the necessary sacrifices to achieve its national
goals.
The Federalist Papers, themselves, state that: provided there
be a free people and carefully managed finances, "foreign nations
will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke
our resentment."
Brazilian democracy has followed this lesson very closely.
Brazil is making enormous sacrifices and resolutely carrying out its
economic modernization project.
We have adopted an adjustment program that is comparable
only to the most rigorous and contemporary [in] world history. In
Brazil, the state will no longer be a producer of goods but, rather, a
promoter of collective well-being.
The second assumption for true partnership is a recognition of
the interdependence that exists among nations--a reality which
imposes upon all societies and their leaders the obligation to
ponder the international consequences of their actions. Brazil is
fully aware of this. We know that despite our present hardships,
our policies of liberalizing reform will not succeed without real
cooperation and positive responses on the part of the international
community regarding solutions to such problems as foreign debt,
removal of trade barriers, and access to advanced, clean
technologies.
Though we respect the legitimate values and interests of all
peoples, we must insist on cooperation in the crusade we lead to
achieve harmony between men and nature. This is precisely the
challenge that stands before us as we approach the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development to be held in Rio de
Janeiro: the search for a balance between man's seemingly infinite
quest for progress and the finite limits of earth's resources.
I look forward to our coming talks. I'm certain that our
commitment to democracy and, believe me, my personal deep
esteem for you will help us attain good results. We have before us a
historic opportunity to create a new partnership between Brazil and
the United States. Let us grasp it with determination and a sense of
the future.
May God help us to elevate our relations to the level
warranted by the greatness of our two countries. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: President Collor's Visit To the United States
Date: Jun 17, 19916/17/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: North America
Country: Brazil
Subject: Environment, Trade/Economics, Democratization,
Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
Brazilian President Collor visited the United States June 17-20,
1991. He last traveled to the US in September 1990 when he
attended the opening of the UN General Assembly. The 1989
elections, which brought him to office, were the first direct
presidential elections in Brazil in 29 years.
Background
With more than 150 million people, Brazil is the largest nation in
Latin America and the fifth largest in the world. More than two-
thirds of the population live in urban areas. Though 76% of
Brazilians are functionally literate, only 20% of those who begin
public school complete the primary grades. Per capita income
exceeds $2,400 per year, putting Brazil in the ranks of middle-
income developing countries. There are wide disparities in income
distribution, with only 2% of national income going to the lowest
20% of the population and 65% going to the upper 20%. Brasilia is
the capital.
Forests cover approximately one-half of Brazil's interior,
which includes a major share of the Amazon Basin and the largest
tropical rain forest in the world. Largely self-sufficient in food,
Brazil is the world's leading exporter of coffee and orange juice
concentrate; the second-largest exporter of cocoa and soybeans; and a
major exporter of sugar, meat, and cotton.
Consolidation of Democracy
Major events in the transition to democracy included the return to
civilian rule in 1985, promulgation of a new constitution in 1988,
and the presidential election of 1989. More than 80 million voters
went to the polls in November and December 1989 for elections that
were both peaceful and free of irregularities. Congressional
elections were held in October 1990 for all 503 seats in the
Chamber of Deputies and one-third of the 81-member Senate. Many
parties are represented in Congress, and party affiliations are
highly fluid.
Economic, Trade, and Debt Issues
When President Collor assumed office, inflation exceeded 80% per
month. He introduced a sweeping program of economic adjustment
and reform, beginning with an attack on inflation through a sharp
freeze on liquidity. He also announced plans to privatize state
enterprises; eliminate the fiscal deficit; and dramatically reduce
government intervention in the economy and foreign trade. In
response, inflation dropped sharply at first but reappeared by mid-
1990. In early 1991, the government introduced a temporary
wage/price freeze which is still largely in force. The government
continues to work on detailed plans for the sale of state
enterprises, reducing the federal work force, and new foreign trade
regulations.
Brazil enjoyed a foreign trade surplus of $11 billion in 1990
(down from $16.5 billion in 1989). The United States and other
trading partners have objected to Brazilian import restrictions,
including outright prohibition of imports, market reserves, and
other non-tariff barriers. President Collor has largely eliminated
these practices, and the United States has ended its trade actions
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1988.
Brazil is the largest developing-country debtor, owing $112
billion to external creditors. It has remained current in payments
to international financial organizations, although not to other
governments (including the United States). The government entered
a de facto moratorium on payments to foreign commercial banks in
September 1989; it began partial debt service this year and
recently agreed on a schedule to repay $8 billion of arrears to the
banks. The government plans talks with the International Monetary
Fund on a debt-rescheduling agreement with the commercial banks.
Environmental Issues
International concern about the destruction of the Amazon rain
forest was heightened by the December 1988 murder of
environmentalist/labor leader Chico Mendes. In April 1989, the
government began an environmental program called "Our Nature,"
designed to slow the destruction of the rain forest while seeking
alternatives to develop the region. However, the government lacks
the financial resources to implement this ambitious program.
President Collor has shown a strong personal commitment to
environmental protection. Burning of Amazon forests has decreased
over the past year, partly as a result of his policy. Brazil will host
the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development.
Foreign Policy Issues
President Collor has signaled his interest in shifting Brazilian
foreign policy toward Europe and away from the Third World focus
that has characterized it in the past. He has made improvement of
relations with the United States a high priority. The resolution of
trade differences with the United States during the early weeks of
his term has done much to remove earlier points of friction in that
relationship.
Nuclear Issues
The constitution prohibits non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but
Brazil has an unsafeguarded nuclear-research-and-enrichment
program conducted by the military. It is also committed to
developing its own nuclear-powered submarine. Brazil has signed
and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a hemispheric non-
proliferation accord, but has not yet taken the final steps required
to put the treaty into effect. Shortly after his inauguration,
President Collor ordered a complete review of nuclear programs and
policy. President Collor told the UN General Assembly in September
1990 that Brazil would not undertake any experiments involving
nuclear explosions, even for peaceful purposes. In late November,
he and President Menem of Argentina issued a Declaration of
Common Nuclear Policy at Iguazu Falls calling for joint negotiation
of a full-scope nuclear safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and for steps to bring the Treaty of
Tlatelolco into force. Negotiations with the IAEA have been
underway since late winter. Brazil has a national space program
aimed at developing and launching its own satellites.
US-Brazilian Relations
The United States was the first country to recognize Brazil's
independence in 1822. During the 1950s and 1960s, Brazil received
about $2.4 billion in US economic assistance. Due to Brazil's
impressive economic development and its increased ability to
obtain loans and technical assistance from private and multilateral
sources, US assistance programs were phased out during the 1970s.
The United States is Brazil's most important commercial
partner and largest investor. US-Brazilian relations are cordial and
cooperative, and the two countries' shared respect for democracy
and commitment to economic liberalization has strengthened ties
since the return of democratic government in the mid-1980s.
President Collor's successful pre-inauguration visit to the United
States in January 1990, visits by senior US officials to Brazil since
he assumed office, and President Bush's visit to Brazil in December
have contributed to an increased warmth in bilateral
relations.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: US-Brazil Environmental Cooperation
Date: Jun 17, 19916/17/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: South America
Country: Brazil
Subject: Environment, Resource Management,
Science/Technology, International Law
[TEXT]
The United States and Brazil have been cooperating successfully on
environmental issues, with activities ranging from cooperative
scientific research to technical assistance and institutional
development.
In addition, both countries have increasingly collaborated on
issues involving global climate change. The US Agency for
International Development (USAID)--along with other US federal
agencies, US non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and Brazilian
counterparts--has designed a multi-million dollar global climate
change program addressing deforestation in the Amazon Basin. The
program provides support to Brazilian institutions to develop
technologies and policies that will promote continued economic
development while protecting natural resources.
Two memoranda of understanding will aid US and Brazilian
agencies to collaborate on environmental issues. One was recently
signed between the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Brazil's Secretariat of the Environment (SEMAM), and the Brazilian
Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA).
Another will be signed between the US Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Forest Service and IBAMA.
The US Embassy in Brazil gives increasing priority to bilateral
cooperation on the environment and promotes technical cooperation
and joint science initiatives among agencies. The US Information
Service (USIS) sponsors lectures by US experts in Brazil, facilitates
the International Visitor Program, and distributes valuable
information to various Brazilian audiences.
Global Climate Change
USAID is primarily responsible for the US global climate change
initiative with Brazil. Initial implementation will involve about
$15 million of USAID funds over a 5-year period.
The program is intended to aid international efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. It supports Brazilian institutions in the
development and dissemination of technologies and policies in order
to promote continued economic development through sustainable
management, rather than destruction, of Amazonian forest
resources. It also focuses on improved energy efficiency and a
reduction in fossil fuel use. Other US-Brazilian programs include:
-- Improving the environmental impact assessment process
for regulating timber harvesting and the establishment of pastures;
-- Promoting the development of sustainable non-timber
extractive-products industries;
-- Promoting eco-tourism, wildlife research, and
environmental education in the Amazon;
-- Promoting the establishment and management of protected
areas (such as, national parks, forest reserves, extractive
reserves);
-- Strengthening local NGOs and community groups to
increase their abilities to influence policy and promote the
sustainable use of forest resources;
-- Providing support to SEMAM and IBAMA for strategic
planning and policy development on forest management and
conservation;
-- Working with a timber company to develop a pilot
sustainable forest management plan;
-- Restoring agricultural productivity and forest viability to
degraded Amazonian lands;
-- Supporting the analysis of state and federal policies
affecting the use of forest resources;
-- Supporting research and dissemination of sustainable on-
farm forestry practices;
-- Supporting training and research on environmental
economics; and
-- Promoting training and the transfer of technologies to
improve energy efficiency.
In 1989, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated
a long-term energy and carbon emissions case study for Brazil with
the University of Sao Paulo. It also sponsored, with the Brazilian
government, a workshop on tropical forestry and carbon emissions.
Results of both projects were used by the Inter-governmental Panel
on Climate Change in preparing its 1990 reports.
Forest Management
In addition to the forestry programs explicitly conducted as part of
the USAID global climate change program, the USDA Forest Service,
with USAID support, works with IBAMA on fire assessment projects
that include:
-- Establishing fire danger rating and zoning systems;
-- Examining the physical and chemical properties of wild
and prescribed burning;
-- Studying the fire impacts on air, soil, and water; and
-- Establishing a fire information system and a pilot project
of prescribed burning in a national park.
The Forest Service and IBAMA also plan projects on
sustainable forest management research; restoration of degraded
lands; fire and atmospheric research; and forest management.
Earth Science and Space Research
Brazil operates a LANDSAT ground station that covers most of South
America. Brazilian and US scientists use LANDSAT data, along with
airborne radar and aerial photography, for mapping remote areas of
Brazil's interior as well as for agricultural, geological, and land use
applications. The Brazil station has provided raw data to the
National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) for US-based
research. The Forest Service is assigning a remote-sensing
specialist to Brasilia to work with the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization and IBAMA on global forest assessment.
NASA and Brazil's National Institute for Space Studies are
cooperating on a project involving ozone sounding rockets in support
of several NASA missions. In June 1990, the Brazilian National
Space Commission (COBAE) and NASA signed a memorandum of
understanding to continue atmospheric research, including research
using balloons.
Several Brazilian scientists are training in the United States
at NASA and various US universities in earth sciences .
NASA's major climate change research effort, the Earth
Observing System Program (EOS), will survey Amazon eco-systems
using data obtained from EOS sensors, climatological networks, and
field studies. NASA also will work with its Brazilian counterparts
to examine the seasonal enhancement of the ozone and troposphere
over the Atlantic Ocean.
Biological Diversity
The Biological Dynamics of Forest Fragments project, located in the
Amazon forest north of Manaus, is a large-scale ecological study to
examine the relationship between the size of a forest reserve and
the number of species that can live in it. The Smithsonian
Institution and Brazil's Institute for Amazon Research conduct
studies, with USAID support, to provide scientific data for
conservation planning and forest regeneration in the Amazon and
elsewhere.
Working together, many US and Brazilian zoologists,
entomologists, botanists, and biologists have gathered data on the
systems and habitats of several species, providing valuable
information on biological diversity. Such efforts have led to the re-
establishment of the golden lion tamarin monkey in the wild. US-
Brazilian researchers also have studied archeological,
anthropological, and ethnographic characteristics of Amazonian
society.
Environmental Management
The United States and Brazil have collaborated on long- and short-
term projects in environmental management. Short-term
assistance to Brazilian state and federal agencies includes projects
on the management of marine and fresh-water pollution, hazardous
wastes, and pesticides and toxic substances. EPA and IBAMA are
trying to develop a training and technical assistance program to
address Brazilian pollution problems, focusing on environmental
impact assessments and providing information and limited
technical assistance in pest management.
Environmental Law and Policy
The Environmental Law Institute, a US non-governmental
environmental group, in partnership with the newly formed
Brazilian Institute of Environmental Law and Policy is organizing
the Rio International Conference on Environmental Law, to be held
October 28-November 1, 1991. The conference will focus on the
critical and rapidly evolving role played by environmental laws and
policies in advancing pollution control and natural resource
protection on the local, national, and international levels. The US
Information Agency and other US and Brazilian government agencies
are supporting this meeting through exchanges and preparatory
meetings. EPA proposes to follow up this event through a
cooperative program on development and implementation of
environmental law with appropriate Brazilian agencies.
Wildlands and Wildlife Management
The Department of Interior, through the US Fish and Wildlife Service
and the National Park Service, provides training in wildlands and
wildlife management to Brazilian institutions. More than 20 small
grants for training projects have been supported.
Specific projects include the establishment of a graduate
wildlife management program at the Federal University of Minas
Gerais, sponsored by the Fish and Wildlife Service; the Protected
Area Management Course held in Sao Paulo, sponsored by the
National Park Service; and US study tours. Environmental education
projects funded by the Fish and Wildlife Service have produced
information on reforestation, endangered species, and indigenous
populations.
Technical Cooperation
EPA has designed a series of technical information packages to
provide information on key environmental and public health issues,
and to supply technical input to decisions regarding environmental
policies pollution abatement and pollution prevention. Eleven
packages on a variety of topics, such as risk assessment, safe
pesticide disposal, and hazardous waste management, are expected
to be available in English and Portuguese in late 1991. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: Trade and Investment in South America
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jun 19, 19916/19/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Statement: Council on Trade and Investment
The United States today signed a framework agreement with
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay establishing a Council on
Trade and Investment. The President, accompanied by Brazilian
President Fernando Collor, participated in the Rose Garden
ceremony. US Trade Representative Carla A. Hills signed for the
United States. The other signatories were Argentine Foreign
Minister Guido Di Tella, Brazilian Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek,
Paraguayan Foreign Minister Alexis Frutos Vaesken, and Uruguayan
Foreign Minister Hector Gros Espiell.
The framework agreement is the first signed with a regional
group since the President announced the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative (EAI) on June 27, 1990. The United States has
signed bilateral framework agreements with eight other countries
of this hemisphere under the EAI.
The objectives of this council, established by this framework
agreement, are to monitor trade and investment relations, identify
opportunities for expanding trade and investment through
liberalization and other appropriate means, and negotiate implementing
agreements. It will also seek to consult on specific trade and
investment matters of interest to both parties and identify and work
to remove impediments to trade and investment flows. Under the
agreement, the five countries agreed to seek the cooperation of the
private sector in matters related to the work of the council.
In his remarks during the signing ceremony, the President
praised the accord, noting that the proposal for a multilateral
agreement had come from the four Latin American countries. He
reaffirmed that the US goal is for a hemispheric free trade area
stretching from Alaska in the North to Tierra del Fuego in the South,
and promised that the United States would implement this
agreement with the same spirit of cooperation and innovation that
produced it in the first place.
At President Collor's suggestion, the parties have agreed to
refer to this agreement as "The Rose Garden Agreement."
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: Trade and Investment in South America
Fitzwater
Description: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Washington, DC
Date: Jun 19, 19916/19/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: South America
Country: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay
Subject: Trade/Economics, International Law
[TEXT]
Agreement on Trade and Investment With Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay
The United States, on June 19, 1991, signed the Framework
Agreement on Trade and Investment with Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay, the countries now in the process of forming
the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) by the end of 1994.
The signing of a single agreement with these countries constitutes
an important step in implementing the trade component of the
President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI).
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
June 27 is the first anniversary of the President's announcement of
the EAI. In the past year, significant progress has been made in
implementing the trade pillar of the EAI.
The EAI is the result of a thorough review of US economic
policy toward Latin America. Its trade component seeks to create
new, equal, and reciprocal relationships with the other countries of
the Western Hemisphere. The EAI, which consists of three pillars
addressing trade, investment, and debt issues, responded to the
actions these nations have taken to promote democracy and
economic reform.
Trade Pillar
The EAI specifies two approaches to bring down trade barriers in
the hemisphere: a successful outcome to the Uruguay Round and a
"system of free trade" from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. The North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is the first step in the creation
of such a hemispheric market. The process of creating this market
will take a number of years because the commitment to open
markets completely and on a reciprocal basis involves many
complex issues.
Framework Agreements
The United States is moving forward to conclude framework
agreements on trade and investment with those countries and
groups of countries that wish to work toward freer trade in the
hemisphere. Framework agreements, in an of themselves, do not
bind the signatories to carry out specific trade liberalization
commitments. They are comprised of a declaration of trade and
investment principles, an agreement to consult on a regular basis,
and an initial agenda for consultation. Illustrative of the
enthusiasm for the President's initiative, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela have
signed framework agreements with the United States thus far.
Completion of a framework agreement with a country or group
of countries establishes a channel to explore various trade
liberalization options and promotes the EAI vision. It does not
imply that we will be proposing free trade negotiations with such
countries immediately.
While framework agreements have to date been undertaken on
a bilateral basis, countries joined in regional groups may also sign
agreements directly with the US under the President's initiative.
As noted by the President in his June 27, 1990 speech announcing
the EAI, ". . . The US stands ready to enter into free trade
agreements with other markets in Latin America and the Caribbean-
-particularly with groups of countries that have associated for the
purposes of trade liberalization."
The signing of a framework agreement with Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay marks the first framework agreement with a
regional group.
The Office of the United States Trade Representative is also
finalizing a similar agreement with the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM). By significantly reducing trade barriers among
themselves and expanding this liberalization to other countries,
these regional groupings enhance free trade principles that support
US objectives in the current GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] negotiations.
The remarkable progress on negotiating these agreements
with such a broad range of countries in the Americas testifies to
the commitment of so many nations in the Western Hemisphere to
economic reform, liberalization and democracy in recent years.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: Peace in El Salvador
Bush, Cristiani
Source: President Bush, President Alfredo Cristiani of El
Salvador
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jun 12, 19916/12/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: El Salvador
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization,
Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
President Bush:
Mr. President, with your
permission, let me just say that I was delighted to spend time
talking and working today with a close friend of the United States,
President Cristiani of El Salvador. In greeting one of your
predecessors, Dwight Eisenhower declared that "Friends and
countries are not measured by the extent of territory or the size of
their population. They are measured by their dedication to their
friends, to common values, priceless values that free men possess
above even life itself."
Thirty years later, those words still ring true. Through trying
circumstances, El Salvador holds fast to its democratic traditions.
Seven times in 10 years, your courageous countrymen have voted in
free and fair elections, proving to the world that, in Lincoln's
words, "The ballot is stronger than the bullet."
Mr. President, time and again you and the people of El Salvador
have proved your doubters to be wrong. Political rights have
flourished despite hardship and despite war, and your people enjoy
freedom of speech like never before. Exiles who once feared for
their lives have returned, come back home to campaign for office
and build parties.
You also have begun to lay liberty's cornerstone--the rule of
law. You've strengthened the judicial system. You've expanded
civilian authority over the police and military, and you've
committed yourself to dramatic reductions in armed forces. And
you've strengthened protections for human rights.
Soon, the trial of those accused in the 1989 Jesuit murders
will begin, and we know that you will press to see justice done in
the case of this despicable crime.
But as newly freed people around the globe are learning,
political freedom is connected to economic freedom. And here, too,
your nation has taken dramatic strides. When you freed exchange
rates, wiped out price controls, and clamped down on government
spending, your farmers, your workers, your investors responded
with a burst of creativity and growth. Inflation fell last year, and
exports rose by 17%. And, in spite of guerrilla attacks on economic
targets, your economy grew faster than it has since 1978--up 3.4%.
This progress cannot continue indefinitely unless peace
finally comes to El Salvador. Fortunately, you have led your people
toward peace and reconciliation. You extended the hand of
forgiveness in your inaugural address, and you told your country
that time for negotiations had come, and you offered to negotiate
without precondition. Throughout your country and the world,
people of good will agree that time for peace has come.
And now the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front]
guerrillas must show in word and deed that they want peace and its
natural counterpart, democracy. The guerrillas agreed to negotiate
a cease-fire for September of 1990; they showed no eagerness at
all to meet that deadline. Then they promised the foreign ministers
of the European Commission a cease-fire by May 30, but they were
not truly committed to that deadline either. The killing and
destruction, regrettably, continues.
So the world must ask: How many more Salvadorans must die
before the guerrillas understand that Salvadorans want peace and
freedom, not violence and war. I urge the guerrillas to return to the
negotiating table and stay there until a cease-fire is reached.
Mr. President, difficult steps lie ahead. But the world
understands your commitment to peace and democracy. The United
States and the international community fully support your efforts
for peace, and we will support sound peace accords in your brave
land.
We both serve at a time when freedom and democracy are
sweeping the globe. Here in the Americas we are building
something unprecedented in human history--the world's first
completely democratic hemisphere. Under your leadership, El
Salvador has taken a place in that democratic community, and
within your borders hope flourishes. People have gotten into the
spirit of national reconciliation: they now tolerate opposing views,
they support democratic institutions, and they have dedicated
themselves to preserving human rights. These ingredients cannot
help but produce peace. When they do, your people will remember
that your leadership made peace possible.
Mr. President, I salute you, sir, for your courage and your
leadership. You have my full confidence and support, the full
confidence and support of our entire administration. And Godspeed
you, and God bless your work on the road to peace for El Salvador.
We are delighted you came here, sir.
President Cristiani:
Mr. President, first of all, I
would like to not only thank [you for] your kind words that you have
just expressed, and I certainly receive them not personally, but in
the name of all Salvadorans.
As you have expressed, the people of El Salvador have
undergone quite a task. Hardship has been the name of the game in
El Salvador for the past 10-12 years. And the Salvadorans have
always shown in general that they want peace, that they want
democracy, and they want freedom. And the freedom of those who
want their rights respected is also something that is cherished by
all Salvadorans.
Let me just say that the appreciation of the people of El
Salvador, because they have found that--in this quest for peace,
freedom, and democracy--we have found a true partner in the United
States. And certainly under your leadership, Mr. President, this has
been increased to levels where we cannot but be grateful forever.
We believe that it has been with the support of the United
States and other friendly nations that El Salvador has been able to
overcome the hardships, and that, because of this support, it
certainly motivates us to continue to work even harder to achieve
what we all want to see in El Salvador--a truly peaceful society
living and progressing as any other country in the world is doing.
I would like to also thank you in the name of all our
delegations for the kindness that you have shown, and also the
support that we have received from your words, and that we go back
encouraged to even work harder in order to get peace for our people
as soon as possible.
Just let me end by saying also that we lived through your
endeavors in the Persian Gulf and that, from the Salvadoran people,
there is nothing but admiration as to your leadership. The way you
handled the situation in the Gulf war was something that should be
copied by anyone who wants to become a leader in their own
countries. We certainly can understand the difficulty of that
decision that you had to take when you had to send young people to
die for a cause, but a cause that was just and was right. And a
cause that we certainly respected, and not only respected but also
supported fully from our position in El Salvador. We certainly
would like to say that there is great admiration for yourself and for
the people of the United States for risking everything in order to
preserve the rights anywhere in the world. This is something that
also encourages [us] to move forward in this task.
Please let me just end, Mr. President--I know that you have
expressed once before that you do not like this to be remembered
very often--but also we would like to wish you a very happy
birthday. We hope that the difficulties that you just went by with
your health are certainly over and gone with. And we hope that you
can certainly say--we can certainly say--happy birthday for many,
many years more. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: Review of US-Salvadoran Talks
Aronson
Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs
Description: Excerpts from a news briefing in Washington, DC
Date: Jun 12, 19916/12/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: El Salvador
Subject: Democratization, Military Affairs,
Security Assistance and Sales, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
...I think, as the President made clear in his statement,
President Bush and this Administration have enormous respect for
President Cristiani's leadership in El Salvador. And, in fact, in his
opening remarks when he met with President Cristiani, the
President said just that, that the United States strongly supports
his government, that he respects President Cristiani "for what you
have done" and he has confidence in what he will do in the future.
President Cristiani then began the conversation by stating
that his overriding goal and chief priority was to end the conflict in
El Salvador and to move the process forward quickly so that the
negotiations can succeed and the remaining issues can be negotiated
and a verified cease-fire by the UN can be established. He
expressed concern that the FMLN seems to want to prolong the
negotiations.
President Cristiani then described for President Bush in some
detail what the two parties have already agreed to in the
negotiating process. He mentioned that the constitution has been
reformed to establish clear civilian authority by the elected
president over the armed forces, whereas under the constitution
previously, the armed forces had been seen as somewhat of an
autonomous institution. He said they have agreed already to
separate all of the security forces under the armed forces from
them and create a new national police force under civilian
authority.
President Cristiani said that the two sides have agreed that
the officer corps of the armed forces will be evaluated by a new
commission to determine which officers should continue and which
should not, with human rights as clearly one of the key criterion.
He said the two sides have already agreed that there will be a
substantial reduction in the size of the armed forces, and President
Cristiani said that that would allow El Salvador to devote more
resources for education and health and other social purposes.
He said that they've agreed on a comprehensive judicial
reform that would essentially depoliticize the selection of judges
in El Salvador. Now--under the constitutional reforms they agreed
to, two-thirds of the National Assembly will choose justices of the
supreme court and the attorney general. President Cristiani
explained to President Bush that that will require these judges be
chosen by consensus. Previously they were chosen by a majority
vote which would essentially allow the majority party in the
assembly to choose the judiciary. President Cristiani noted that
that reform would actually reduce the power of his own political
party, but he thought it was an important step in strengthening the
judicial process.
They also agreed on a constitutional amendment that would
mandate at least 6% of government expenditures that go to the
judicial system to strengthen its capacity to administer and
enforce the rule of law.
He described the electoral reforms that his government had
already agreed to, and again he noted that his party, the ARENA
[National Republic Alliance] party, had made political sacrifices to
make these possible. They increased the number of seats in the
National Assembly, thereby giving up their majority and allowing
small parties to participate. They also agreed to enlarge the size of
the Supreme Electoral Council to give some other parties a place on
it and to permit the president of the Supreme Electoral Council,
which oversees all the elections, the president of the council will
now be proposed by the Supreme Court and approved by the National
Assembly.
He said in the area of human rights that [the] FMLN and the
government had agreed to a comprehensive set of rules and
procedures. And the Security Council of the UN has voted, at the end
of last month, to send a team to oversee the implementation of this
agreement and to protect human rights.
He said that despite all of those far-reaching commitments,
reforms, and concessions the FMLN has responded by increasing
violence, not reducing violence, and by reneging on previous
agreements that the three remaining issues would be constitutional
reform, cease-fire, and armed forces. He said the FMLN had brought
up old issues, such as a demand that the entire armed forces be
dissolved, and saw that as evidence of obstructionism.
The two Presidents then had an extensive conversation about
the peace process, how we can move it forward, the role of the four
friends of the [UN] Secretary General--Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia,
and Spain--and the process itself.
They had a discussion of the Jesuit case. President Cristiani
explained that the trial is to go forward soon, but that private
attorneys who represent the Jesuit community in El Salvador have
petitioned the courts [to] extend the 8-day period--for different,
additional evidence--to 3 months; that has delayed the trial. And
the President expressed both his understanding that any judicial
system takes time, and his strong hope that the case will be
investigated fully and justice will be done, as he said in his
departure statement.
The President [Bush] praised the government of El Salvador for
the performance of the economy. He had an extensive conversation
with the President [Cristiani] and the Minister of Planning about the
free market reforms they've put in place and their record of
performance, which is the best in Central America.
The two presidents talked about where arms continue to come
from to the FMLN. President Cristiani confirmed his belief that a
view the United States has that Cuba continues to supply surface-
to-air missiles to the FMLN is correct, and that that is still a
source of violence and instability in El Salvador. Secretary Baker
mentioned some of our conversations with the Soviet Union on this
subject.
The two Presidents talked about the drug problem both in El
Salvador and Latin America. President Cristiani noted that they had
recently toughened their own drug laws. He expressed some concern
that some of the traffickers are moving into Central America as a
transit point. President Bush reiterated his belief and commitment
that we in the United States have to do more to reduce demand, but
he expressed some sense of positive motion and noted that we've
recently had some good figures on reduction of demand here in our
own country.
The two presidents talked about the North American Free
Trade Agreement that the United States, Canada, and Mexico are
negotiating. President Cristiani expressed his hope that this
agreement could extend south to Central America. President Bush
said he agreed that his long-range goal was a free trade agreement
throughout the hemisphere. He didn't want our initial commitment
to Mexico and Canada to be exclusive. He wanted no nation to be
disadvantaged by these opportunities, and all to have an opportunity
to participate.
The two presidents talked briefly about the Uruguay Round [of
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade--GATT]. El Salvador is a
member of the GATT now. President Cristiani talked about the
needs of his country for national reconstruction after a peace is
achieved to restore services to the rural areas--water, electricity-
-and provide opportunities for combatants. President Bush said
that we would like to help in such an effort. President Cristiani
also expressed strong interest in the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative [and] opportunities for investment loans from the IDB
[Inter-American Development Bank] for debt reduction. Again, the
President said that that is an area we also want to work with El
Salvador on. And they clearly--based on their economic
performance--would be prime candidates for benefits under the EAI.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: North American Free Trade Agreement
Date: Jun 24, 19916/24/91
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: North America
Country: Mexico, Canada, United States
Subject: Trade/Economics, Environment
[TEXT]
The United States and Mexico are embarking on free trade
negotiations that, in conjunction with the 1988 US-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, would create a North American market of more
than 360 million people and an annual economy of $6 trillion. The
negotiations were made possible by congressional action on May 23-
24, 1991, which granted the executive branch "fast track authority"
to negotiate trade agreements, including the proposed pact with
Mexico.
Fast track authority allows the executive branch to present
trade agreements to Congress for approval without the possibility
of amending the treaty. Amendments could undercut free trade
talks, because trading partners such as Mexico would have no way of
knowing what changes Congress might demand in agreements
already negotiated in good faith.
Despite the granting of fast track negotiating authority,
Congress remains an integral part of the process. President Bush is
committed to extensive consultations with Congress throughout the
negotiations. Such a process is in the best interests of US and
Mexican negotiators, as it helps ensure that Congress will approve
the treaty and implementing legislation that the President and
Congress have developed together.
The United States hopes to build upon the success of the US-
Canada free trade accord. Canada has asked to be part of the
negotiating process with Mexico, although the Canadian
government says that any potential negotiating difficulties between
Canada and Mexico will in no way affect US-Mexico talks.
Goals
The negotiations seek a broad agreement to eliminate restrictions
on the flow of goods, services, and investment:
-- Elimination (as far as possible) of non-tariff barriers on
goods and services;
-- Establishment of an open investment climate; and
-- Full protection of intellectual property rights (patents,
copyrights, and trademarks).
Expanded Trade With Mexico
Mexico is America's third largest trading partner, with bilateral
commerce of $52 billion in 1989 and $59 billion in 1990. NAFTA
would lead to expanded trade with Mexico and the creation of
additional jobs for US workers. It would give US exporters
unrestricted access to a Mexican market of 86 million people, which
may reach 100 million by the year 2000.
Mexico purchases more than two-thirds of its imports from
the United States. However, Mexico still has higher trade barriers
than the United States. Its average tariff duty is 10% compared
with 4% in the United States, and significant Mexican non-tariff
barriers remain. The United States has much to gain from the
elimination or reduction of these barriers under a trade agreement.
Traditional US competitive advantages--geographic, cultural, and
historic links--in this important market would be further enhanced
by NAFTA.
As the Mexican economy grows, a substantial part of the
increased income--as much as 15%--is spent on US goods and
services. Strong Mexican growth is expected because of President
Salinas' economic reforms. Mexico's middle class is increasing as a
percentage of the total population; this means more consumers for
American products.
The United States benefits from expanded trade. For each
additional $1 billion in real net exports, about 25,000 new US jobs
are created. Increased exports accounted for 88% of US economic
growth in 1989-90 and have helped the US economy expand out of
recessions in the past.
Investment Opportunities in Mexico
The United States is the source of 65% ($25 billion) of foreign
direct investment in Mexico. Therefore, the US government has a
strong interest in encouraging favorable conditions for new and
expanded investments in Mexico. US firms investing there tend to
use US suppliers and US designing and managerial talent. Overall US
and Mexican competitiveness in international markets, particularly
vis-a-vis Japan and the European Community, would be enhanced by
the opportunities offered by NAFTA.
In May 1989, President Salinas expanded foreign ownership (in
many cases up to as much as 100%) in sectors accounting for nearly
two-thirds of Mexico's economic output. He also streamlined the
approval process for foreign investments. A trade agreement would
further improve the investment climate for US firms in Mexico.
An open trade and investment climate will foster further
partnerships and alliances in industry, agriculture, and services.
These partnerships can take advantage of the complementary
strengths of the three North American economies. As a result, the
United States will be more competitive against third-country
products in North American markets and abroad, which, in turn,
translates into more jobs, investment, and economic growth in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico.
Benefits to the US Economy
A North American FTA will be good for American workers. It will
help the United States keep and create good jobs at good wages.
According to even the most conservative researchers, the United
States will have a net gain of at least 64,000 new jobs over 10
years.
The Bush Administration also has proposed solutions to two
major concerns among American workers: that their jobs could be
lost to Mexicans or that the products produced by their industries
be replaced in the US economy by Mexican imports. President Bush
has promised to work with Congress to develop a training and
readjustment program for US workers who may lose their jobs as a
result of a free trade agreement. In addition, US negotiators will
seek provisions in the trade agreement to permit the temporary
reimposition of duties and other trade restrictions if increases in
imports from Mexico are found to harm particular US industries.
US negotiators also are being instructed to write strict "rules
of origin" requirements into a trade agreement so that third
countries are unable to capitalize unfairly on an agreement with
Mexico by sending products through Mexico to the United States
with only minimal assembly in Mexico.
Aside from the trade talks, American workers also will
benefit from increased US-Mexico cooperation in areas such as
occupational health and safety, child labor, and labor statistics.
Benefits to the Environment
A North American free trade agreement will strengthen
environmental preservation efforts on both sides of the border.
During the negotiations with Mexico, the United States will insist
on its right to:
-- Exclude any products that fail to meet US health or safety
requirements;
-- Impose stringent pesticide, energy conservation, toxic
waste, and health and safety standards; and
-- Strictly respect international treaties on such
environmental issues as wildlife protection and preservation of the
earth's ozone layer
The United States expects no major difficulties in
environmental negotiations with Mexico. President Salinas has
made it clear that his country will avoid becoming a "pollution
haven" for American companies that may seek to avoid US
environmental laws. Mexico has underscored this pledge with:
-- A 1988 comprehensive environmental law that is similar
to US law; and
-- An eightfold increase in the budget of Mexico's ministry of
environmental affairs (SEDUE) over the last 2 years.
The United States will seek a commitment to work together
with Mexico to enhance and enforce the environmental, health, and
safety standards of products. Full public and scientific scrutiny of
any changes to standards will be provided before they are
implemented. Consultations also will be held on better enforcement
capability, inspection training, monitoring, and verification.
The US government will pursue expanded US-Mexico
environmental cooperation in parallel with the NAFTA negotiations.
The two countries will implement an integrated border
environmental plan to address air and water pollution, hazardous
wastes, chemical spills, pesticides, and enforcement. US and
Mexican officials will discuss, among other things, expanded
cooperative enforcement activities, such as coordinated targeting
of environmental violators. The public will be provided an
opportunity to submit data on alleged non-compliance of standards
and regulations.
A Cornerstone for Greater Hemispheric Cooperation
The United States is a close neighbor and friend of Canada and
Mexico. NAFTA will provide a unique opportunity to draw North
America closer by building a foundation for even stronger
cooperation, cohesion, and growth. A trade agreement will give
economic and political impetus to US efforts to address other
pressing North American problems. NAFTA will help forge a US-
Mexican partnership that could lead to closer cooperation on other
foreign policy issues.
A North American FTA also is important as the cornerstone of
a comprehensive Western Hemisphere policy. It would send a
strong, encouraging signal throughout Latin America to a new
generation of leaders pledged to democracy, market economics, and
growth. Also, NAFTA would give further substance to President
Bush's long-range vision of a hemisphere-wide system of free trade.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: US Trade with China
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Fact Sheet and Statement released by the Office of the
White House Press Press Secretary, Los Angeles, California
Date: Jun 16, 19916/16/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: East Asia
Country: China
Subject: Trade/Economics, Arms Control
[TEXT]
Export of High Performance Computers
The United States has serious national security concerns regarding
the shipment of high performance computers to the People's
Republic of China (PRC). These concerns are based on several
factors:
-- The aggregate threat of significant technology transfer
that occurs when researchers develop experience in operating the
computers and customizing software.
-- The potential diversion to military use of technology
acquired in this fashion.
-- The key role that computers play in the management of
high-technology military systems and the resulting enhancement of
the capabilities of such weapons or missiles as demonstrated in
Operation Desert Storm.
These concerns are heightened by the risk that the PRC may
transfer advanced weapons-related technology to other countries,
as in the case of ballistic missile transfers.
Exports of computers to certain countries, including the
People's Republic of China are controlled multilaterally by the
United States and its partners in the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). Over the past year, these
controls have been liberalized significantly. However, high-
performance computers that are critical to the effectiveness of
military systems remain tightly controlled and require the approval
of the 17 COCOM members prior to the issuance of an export license.
Because of the threat to regional stability resulting from
ballistic missile proliferation by the PRC, and the resulting threat
to US national security interests, the President has decided to limit
licensing the export of computers exceeding a composite
theoretical performance of 41 million theoretical operations per
second. Export licenses for computers above that level will occur
only after extensive review to ensure that the proposed sale poses
no threat to national security. Our concerns in this regard are being
communicated directly to other governments that are members of
COCOM and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Satellite Launches on PRC Missiles
Licenses to Chinese entities of US technology for satellites, their
components and associated technologies have been suspended under
Section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY
1991-92. Under the law, the President may waive these
suspensions if he reports to Congress that it is in the national
interest of the United States to do so.
The President has decided that PRC actions related to the
proliferation of missiles make it inappropriate for the United
States to approve any further export licenses for commercial
satellite launches at this time. This action does not affect the
recent decision to allow the launch of the Swedish satellite known
as Freja nor the reaffirmation of the approval to launch the
Australian Aussat satellites.
Missile Proliferation Sanctions. US concerns related to
weapons proliferation resulted in legislation that requires the
imposition of sanctions on companies that engage in certain missile
proliferation activities. We have evidence that two Chinese
entities have transferred missile technology to Pakistan. The
entities in this case are the China Precision Machinery Import-
Export Corporation and China Great Wall Industry Corporation.
Accordingly, we are taking appropriate legal steps with respect to
imposing sanctions on these firms.
We have expressed urgent concern to the Chinese Government
about exports of missile technology. Under Secretary of State
[Reginald] Bartholomew will discuss these concerns in detail during
his meetings in China June 17-19.
Trade Restrictions Announced
(Statement released by White House Press Secretary Marlin
Fitzwater, Los Angeles, California, June 16, 1991)
The President has implemented his decision announced on May 27,
1991, to impose constraints on high technology trade with the
People's Republic of China as a result of actions by entities in the
PRC to transfer missile technology to other countries. The
President decided that the significant risks to US security
interests posed by these missile transfers require the imposition of
limits on the sale of high performance computers. In addition, the
President will not waive sanctions that prohibit the transfer of US
technology for satellites launched on Chinese rockets. Finally, we
are taking steps to impose sanctions on certain firms in the PRC
that have contributed to missile proliferation. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: Political Crisis in Ethiopia
Cohen
Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jun 18, 19916/18/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Ethiopia
Subject: Democratization, Development/Relief Aid,
Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
recent political developments in Ethiopia. In the space of one
remarkable week in May, Sub-Saharan Africa's second most populus
country experienced a watershed in its history. A dictatorship that
had lasted 14 years was overthrown. Organized fighting stopped for
the first time in 30 years.
These events leave Ethiopia poised at a historic crossroads.
In order to discuss where the future leads, I would like to briefly
review the events that have brought us to this point.
The signs of denouement came in 1988. Already at that time,
Ethiopia's economy had been drained by the Mengistu regime's failed
Marxist policies and by its costly separate wars against the
Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgents. Repeated droughts and internal
disruption left millions of people dependent on international charity
for survival. And the Soviets had started to make it clear that they
were unwilling to continue funding endless conflict.
In the spring of 1988, and again in 1989, the Mengistu regime
suffered a series of devastating military defeats at the hands of
the insurgents. By 1989, all of the Province of Tigray, as well as
most of Eritrea was, irretrievably, in rebel hands. In May 1989,
there was an attempted coup that demonstrated the depth of
unhappiness with the regime.
Addis Ababa's response was to undertake a series of political
acts that gave the appearance of change and progress, without
committing to real reforms. The government also accepted former
President [Jimmy] Carter's offer to serve as a mediator in the
Eritrean conflict. But at the table, government negotiators showed
little flexibility and offered no significant concessions. They
allowed the talks to founder on procedural issues. Negotiations
with the Tigrayans under Italian auspices, likewise, never emerged
from procedural questions.
Through all of this period, the United States used its channels
of communication to all parties for the purpose of lending our
support to reconciliation. We stressed to all sides that there was
no military solution to Ethiopia's problems--that only a negotiated
political solution would bring a durable peace. The Soviets joined
us in that approach.
In the summer of 1990, at the request of both Addis and the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the United States began to
explore whether there was a substantive basis for further talks
between the government and the Eritreans. We chaired two
meetings, which, at least, had the merit of getting into matters of
substance. But both sides put familiar positions on the table
concerning federalism and self-determination. Neither showed a
disposition to advance.
As the second round of talks was taking place, events on the
ground took over. In February of this year, a series of new
offensives by the Eritrean People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) removed three more provinces from government control, and
the front began to close in on Addis itself. Mengistu's government
clearly was powerless to reverse the encroaching tide, or even hold
it off more than briefly. The question was no longer whether the
government would survive but whether there [would] be a bloody
battle for the capital before the regime changed.
The government admitted as much in an April statement that
called for a round-table on "transitional arrangements," while at
the same time appealing for new mobilization against the enemy.
Government officials urged the United States to help
facilitate a peaceful transition. They affirmed a keen desire to
include rebel groups and others in a restructured regime.
The United States agreed with this goal and, after meeting
with the EPLF and EPRDF rebel groups in Khartoum, invited the
government and the groups to a meeting in London to help bring
about the peaceful transition that all sides claimed to want. Our
goal was to replace war with peace and find a path forward to a
more broadly based and democratic political system. We sought a
transitional mechanism that could produce an interim government
made up of all Ethiopian parties.
Events in late May quickened. On May 21, Mengistu fled
Ethiopia, and a final unraveling began. By May 27, the day before the
London meeting formally was to begin, the Ethiopian government's
forces had lost their ability to offer any organized opposition, and
the only thing keeping the EPRDF out of the capital was the
insurgents' own decision to hold back while the London talks were
going on.
On the 27th, acting President Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan told us the
Ethiopian army had virtually disintegrated and that he and senior
government officials were extremely concerned about their ability
to provide for law and order. The acting president said that the
government intended to broadcast a call for a unilateral cease-fire
and an appeal to the citizens of Addis to accept the EPRDF when
they entered the capital.
The EPRDF decided to move into the city that night. The
United States strongly agreed with that decision, because the EPRDF
was now left as the only disciplined force capable of keeping order
in the capital. At that point, the Addis regime effectively ceased to
exist, and their delegation in London dropped out of the talks.
The final part of the London meeting began with the United
States no longer in a mediation role between the government and
the insurgents but in a de facto advisory role for the three
opposition groups about to inherit all military and political power.
Our London meeting, thus, ended without the appointment of a
transitional government as we had envisaged. But it ended with
something perhaps even better. The insurgent groups, themselves,
argued that a transitional government was not possible until more
political factions were present and participating. In a joint
statement, they, themselves, called for a meeting of a wider range
of political parties and interests, to establish a broadly based
transitional government. This meeting is due to be held not later
than July 1 [1991].
So, despite the changed circumstances in which it was held,
we really think the London meeting accomplished a great deal.
First, the Mengistu regime, doomed by its own misguided
policies, is gone but without the pitched battle for Addis that some
had feared.
Second, there is an interim administration in place that is
temporary and solicitous of wider membership and political
participation. It seeks Western help in forming a true transitional
government.
Third, and most important, in this fragile transitional stage in
Ethiopia, the juridical issue of Eritrea's future did not really arise
among the parties in London. A provisional administration is
installed in Asmara, as it would have been whatever happened in
London. But there is general, if tacit, agreement that the long-
sought referendum and the final determination of Eritrea's status
can await a more stable situation emerging in Addis. We welcome
this disposition of the key parties toward realism. We have long
believed that the issue of Eritrea's judicial status needs both time
and an atmosphere of peace before it is approached. Forcing an
early resolution of this matter is a recipe for disarray and discord.
Thus, another significant achievement of the London [meeting] was
its demonstration of realism. We hope this spirit continues to
prevail next month at the Addis meeting. We are working toward
that end.
The EPRDF has proceeded to establish an interim
administration in Addis, which is working with the existing civil
service to re-establish essential services and has assured the donor
community that relief will be given first priority. The group in
Addis has made reassuring public statements about its
commitments to democracy. It seems to be extending its hand to
other political groups inside and outside Ethiopia.
We have already seen one dramatic benefit from the departure
of Mengistu: the humanitarian problem of Ethiopian Jewish
emigration, which has lasted for generations and which had been the
subject of intense diplomatic activity in recent years, was resolved
literally overnight, as a fleet of Israeli aircraft carried more than
14,000 people across the Red Sea in a heart-warming echo of the
great exodus that took place so long ago. We hope to see equal
benefits in other areas: conflict has been the chief cause of food
insecurity in Ethiopia, and, now that the fighting has ended, we hope
to be able to send food directly to the needy, without cumbersome
negotiation of safe-passage arrangements for crossing lines of
battle.
We have cautioned the interim administration that future
cooperation from the United States depends on their holding to their
announced commitment to human rights, democracy, and due process
for all.
A generation of conflict in Eritrea, and 17 years of
internecine warfare following the 1974 overthrow of the emperor,
have left deep bitterness and divisions among the many ethnic and
political factions. Our objective for the Addis meeting is to see a
stable coalition emerge, one that can lead Ethiopia into free
elections and establish the groundwork for a democratic
constitution and form of government. Our greatest challenge will
be to convince the people of Ethiopia that, after years of war and a
mentality geared to conflict, they can
now dare to look at the future with a positive outlook. Ethiopians
must be able to look on themselves as capable of building a nation,
one that can live in peace with itself.
One thing is clear: Ethiopia's future lies in the hands of
Ethiopians. We can and will press, cajole, and push in the direction
of democracy and reconciliation, but it is up to the Ethiopians,
themselves, to show the willingness to work together if there
is to be peace and democracy in Ethiopia. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: US-Pakistan Relations
Tutwiler
Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jun 14, 19916/14/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Pakistan
Subject: Democratization, Narcotics, Arms Control
[TEXT]
Pakistan is an old and valued friend of the United States. We share
strong common values and interests, and the US has, since 1974,
been a supporter of Pakistani independence and territorial integrity.
We have worked with Pakistan to promote regional peace and
security, including the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The visit of Pakistan Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad this
week was a constructive contribution to this long-term
relationship between our two countries. Both sides underscored the
importance they attached to the bilateral relationship and their
common interest in a strong, stable, and democratic Pakistan, as
well as in regional security. In this context they affirmed their
desire for an early political settlement of the Afghan conflict based
on self-determination for the Afghan people. They also agreed on
the importance of continued efforts to improve relations between
Pakistan and India.
Both sides agreed upon the need to work together to control
illicit narcotics trafficking. The two sides discussed Pakistan's
recent economic reforms, which we find impressive. The Pakistani
delegation presented the recent proposals of Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a
balanced regional reduction of conventional weapons, which the US
found constructive. We discussed the concept of holding
consultations among the United States, the Soviet Union, China,
Pakistan, and India, a concept we support. The talks also continued
the dialogue between Pakistan and the United States on nuclear
issues. Discussions were forthright and cordial, reflecting the
long-standing friendship between the two countries and the mutual
desire to resolve outstanding differences.
In the Administration, Chairman Sajjad met with the Vice
President, Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney,
National Security Adviser Scowcroft, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Kimmitt, and Under Secretary of State for
International Security Affairs Bartholomew. He also had a number
of meetings with Members of Congress. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991
Title: Recent Developments in the Middle East
Kelly
Source: John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Jun 17, 19916/17/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon
Subject: Military Affairs, Mideast Peace Process,
United Nations, Terrorism, Security Assistance and Sales,
Democratization
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to
appear before the committee today. In these opening remarks I will
discuss some of the major developments which have occurred
recently in the Middle East and our efforts to help bring peace and
stability to the region.
Peace Process
In the period since the end of the Gulf war, the Secretary of State
has made four trips to the Middle East. I was privileged to
accompany him. A prime purpose of these trips was to explore
whether new opportunities existed to break down long-standing
barriers and open new avenues for progress toward peace between
Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and the Arab states.
Throughout this effort, we have made clear that our objective is a
comprehensive peace achieved through direct negotiations based on
UN Security Council [UNSC] Resolutions 242 and 338.
In our contacts in the region, we have found a significant
amount of agreement among the parties on the key elements of the
approach we advocate.
We found general acceptance of the idea of a conference, co-
sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, which would
lead directly to bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab
and Palestinian neighbors and to multilateral negotiations on
regional issues. The conference would not have the authority to
impose its views on the parties and would not interfere with
negotiations.
We also found a general acceptance of a two-track approach:
Israel and the Arab states would conduct negotiations on one track,
and Israel and Palestinians from the occupied territories would
conduct negotiations on a parallel track. We found agreement among
the parties that negotiations on the occupied territories would
proceed in phases, with negotiations on permanent status following
talks on interim self-government. We found agreement that
Palestinian representatives should come from persons living in the
occupied territories who accept the two-track, phased approach and
who are committed to living in peace with Israel. We found
agreement that this process would be rooted in UNSC Resolutions
242 and 338.
There still remain a number of issues on which agreement has
not yet been reached, primarily related to the UN role and the
ability of the conference to reconvene. The Administration believes
the UN should have a role at the conference. A role for the UN
should pose no problem, since this is a conference that cannot
impose its preferences and cannot be a court of appeal. Indeed, the
ability of any party to prevent any meeting it does not want ensures
that there is no way to evade negotiations. The compromise
formulas proposed by the United States are designed to help launch
a conference that will lead to direct negotiations and that will
break the taboos that have prevented face-to-face negotiations
between Israelis and Palestinians and between Israel and the Arab
states.
We were heartened by the decision of the Gulf Cooperation
Council to send its Secretary General as an observer, and the
decision of the GCC states--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar,
Oman, and the UAE [United Arab Emirates]--to agree to participate
in the multilateral negotiations with Israel on matters that are
relevant to them. We also believe the conference should be able to
reconvene, if all parties agree, to hear reports from the bilateral
and multilateral negotiating groups.
We believe it should be possible to bridge the remaining
differences if the parties involved demonstrate the political will to
move toward resolution of Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian
disputes. The United States remains committed to this effort to
advance the peace process. We cannot force the parties to act.
They must demonstrate the political will to take positive action to
advance the peace process; if they do, they will find the United
States is a partner in the quest for peace.
Iraq and Kuwait
Developments in the northern Gulf continue to be dominated by the
consequences of the Gulf war and its aftermath.
US policy toward Iraq was reiterated by the Secretary in his
testimony of May 22 [See Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 21]. We respect Iraq's
territorial integrity and sovereignty and do not wish to see Iraq
fragmented as a state. We have no quarrel with the people of Iraq.
Saddam Hussein is a pariah who will, if given the opportunity,
reconsolidate his dictatorship and military machine, further
brutalize the Iraqi populace, and threaten our allies in the region.
The need for continued vigilance is underlined by recent ambiguous
statements by the Iraqi leadership on Kuwaiti sovereignty. For
example, in an interview published on May 28, Iraqi Vice President
Ramadan told an Egyptian newspaper that in February, "We said that
Kuwait was Iraqi. We still say that even today." On June 3, the
Iraqi information minister said that the statement attributed to
Ramadan was inaccurate and taken out of context.
As the Secretary stated on May 22, "We intend to continue to
act with others to isolate Saddam Hussein's regime. That means we
will never normalize relations with Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein
remains in power." With regard to UN sanctions on Iraq, the
President stated on May 20, "At this juncture . . . we do not want to
lift these sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein is in power."
The UN sanctions and reparations provisions are subject to
periodic review every 60 days. This review, in particular, is to take
into account Iraqi policies and practices and its record of
compliance with all the provisions of Resolution 687 and other
relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Once Saddam Hussein is
gone, we will be able rapidly to lighten the burden on the Iraqi
people.
In response to the massive outflow of refugees fleeing
Saddam Hussein's repression, the United States on
April 7 launched "Operation Provide Comfort" which, together with
similar efforts by many of our coalition partners and allies, saved
the lives of uncounted numbers of Kurdish refugees. The initial
aims of "Operation Provide Comfort" have largely been met. These
include supply of food and shelter to remote mountain camps,
construction of transit camps, and the establishment of conditions
to facilitate the safe return of refugees to their homes in northern
Iraq.
We do not intend to maintain US troops in northern Iraq any
longer than necessary. But we are not indifferent to the fate of the
Kurds or of the rest of the oppressed people of Iraq. We are working
closely with our allies and with UN agencies to ensure a transition
to a protection and assistance effort under the auspices of the
United Nations. We are encouraging the UN to move quickly under
the authority of UNSC Resolution 688 to provide an effective
international presence to monitor the continued safety of refugees
who have returned to Iraq. The United Nations already has begun a
UN guard program to provide the confidence the refugees need to
return to their homes. We are providing significant assistance to
this program and are encouraging other states to do the same. The
UN assumed administrative authority for the relief operation on
June 7. We expect US forces to withdraw from Iraq as their mission
in the relief operation is completed.
An extensive UN presence is mandated by UNSC Resolution
688, which requires Iraq to provide access to those in need of
assistance in all parts of Iraq. Behind UNSC Resolution 688 are the
enforcement provisions of Resolution 687 dealing with conditions
to alleviate sanctions and reparations; the Iraqi government knows
that the international community, in monitoring Iraq's compliance
with UNSC Resolution 688, will take into account its treatment of
Iraqi citizens.
Additionally, we are keeping in close touch with our friends
and coalition partners and are keeping the situation inside Iraq
under constant review. We retain the capability to act in support of
regional peace and stability and, more specifically, in support of
the UN and its continuing role in providing assistance to vulnerable
groups inside Iraq.
We also will continue vigorously to encourage the United
Nations to implement the provisions of UNSC Resolution 687 which
call for international supervision of the destruction of Iraq's
remaining weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with
ranges over 150 kilometers and for a continuing embargo on
military equipment.
Kuwait continues to suffer the consequences of Saddam
Hussein's aggression. More than one-quarter of the oil fires have
been extinguished, but a major task remains to put them all out.
The country's economic infrastructure is in shambles, and its
political institutions are only slowly being re-established.
The Amir and the Crown Prince have pledged their
commitment to Kuwait's 1962 constitution, which provides for a
parliament. On June 2, the Amir announced that parliamentary
elections will be held in October of next year. The National Council
will be reconvened next month [July] to begin preparations for this
election.
Both publicly and in our private discussions with the
Kuwaitis, we have stressed human rights. As Secretary Baker said
o