US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991


The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: From West to East

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address to the Aspen Institute, Berlin, Germany Date: Jun 18, 19916/18/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: USSR (former) Subject: NATO, Democratization, EC, OAS [TEXT] I am pleased to be back in Berlin. When I visited you in 1989, the Wall had just become a gateway. When I returned in 1990, I took part in negotiations to end the division of this city, this nation, this continent. And now, in 1991, I have the honor of meeting in the capital of a united Germany. Yet as great as this progress has been, there is something else of lasting vitality we have created here. Berlin is much more than a city to Americans. Berlin is the birthplace of a special kinship between Germans and Americans. It is here that Germans and Americans, once adversaries, stood together. This is the place where we suffered, shared, and strove for freedom. We started the trans-Atlantic community here. And it is from here that we must extend it. When I spoke in Berlin in December 1989, I outlined our ideas about the architecture of a New Europe and a New Atlanticism. We have made notable advances in this architecture for a post-Cold War era. Yet our vision must look beyond. We must begin to extend the trans-Atlantic community to Central and Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union. These are the still incomplete pieces of our architecture. The revolutions of freedom in Central and Eastern Europe need on-going support to become lasting democracies. Perestroika needs our encouragement to move further toward a free society and free markets. Our objective is both a Europe whole and free and a Euro- Atlantic community that extends east from Vancouver to Vladivostok. President Bush spoke in Prague about a "new common wealth of freedom. . . rest[ing] on shared principles. . . that constitute our common values." We are starting to build this larger Euro-Atlantic community here, in the eastern Laender of Germany. America's commitment to the unification of Germany did not end with the ratification of the "Two-plus-Four" treaty. That's why I wanted to listen to some of the people of the East myself today, to see their home with my own eyes. That's why we have launched a comprehensive program to extend America's hand to all Germans. I have no doubt that before too long this part of Germany will be one of the foremost engines in Europe. On that day, I believe Americans and Germans will be standing on the shop floor together. But we cannot rest with the integration of all of Germany.
The Atlantic Community: A Community of Values
To me, the trans-Atlantic relationship stands for certain Enlightenment ideals of universal applicability. These values are based upon the concept of individual political rights and economic liberty rooted in European ideas of the 17th and 18th centuries and first planted in the new American nation. While these values were originally associated with Western Europe and the United States, they transcend national borders. Indeed, these ideals stand in sharp contrast to some later 19th century views about the intrinsic qualities of societies and peoples, based upon history and heredity, which could allegedly find their highest expression in the state. Ironically, perhaps, the narrow 19th century European nationalism also gave way to another, and a very different, rationalist and universalist ideology that would also transcend national borders--Marxism. In the Soviet Union, Bolsheviks blended this ideology with a Slavophile movement that was itself a reaction against allegedly alien Western values. Stalin imposed this ideology on half of Europe. Now its failures and destruction are obvious to all. As the shackles of this failed ideology have been lifted or broken--in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union itself, and elsewhere in the world--old 19th century nationalisms and animosities have reemerged. These forces cast shadows over the new democracies, particularly those seeking root in multi-ethnic societies. They expose anxieties about political, economic, and military security. They risk creating new divisions of Europe. We need to offer an inspiration, even a goal, to these peoples rediscovering new values upon which they can build pluralistic, democratic, and free market societies. We need to picture their place in the new architecture. Our architecture needs to fulfill the long-established NATO goal, from the 1967 Harmel report, of achieving "a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe." To do so, our structures need to promote Euro-Atlantic political and economic values, the ideals of the Enlightenment. They need to establish the components of cooperative security for a Europe whole and free, and we need to demonstrate how integration can cope with new dangers from old enmities.
The Devolution and Evolution of the European Nation-State
Perhaps the most striking phenomenon across all of Europe today is the combined and simultaneous devolution and evolution of the nation-state. While the nation-state remains by far the most significant political unit, its political role is being increasingly supplemented by both supranational and subnational units. In other words, some of the nation-state's functions are being delegated "upward" and others "downward." In Western Europe, the process of evolution has been striking. Over the past 40 years, West Europeans have transferred more and more functions from the national to the supranational level. The European Community has achieved history's most intense and comprehensive voluntary evolution of governing authority above the national level. The Atlantic alliance, for its part, may have achieved the most fundamental intergovernmental cooperation, for it is to NATO that Europeans as well as North Americans have entrusted not merely their prosperity but their personal and national existence. In Western Europe, evolution has been accompanied by the devolution of power to state and local governments, to regions that sometimes cross national borders, and to the private sector. In Central and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, devolution is certainly the more prominent phenomenon. With the collapse of communism, ethnicity has re-emerged as a powerful political force, threatening to erect new divisions between countries and, even more acutely, within multinational states. Yet even in the East, there is a simultaneous process of evolution underway. We are seeing the beginnings of a Europe of regions that may well be overlapping. Cooperation among Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; the Pentagonale [Austria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia]; and the exploration of ties among northern states that rim the Baltic and of southern states on the Black Sea are examples of early efforts. Similarly, the "Nine-plus-One" accord within the Soviet Union is a first effort to re-establish the legitimacy of that multinational state on the basis of voluntary association among component parts. Furthermore, the interests of these states in associating themselves with Western institutions like the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the EC [European Community], and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] is also evidence of this evolutionary tendency. Evolution and devolution are not alternatives, but complementary, and indeed interdependent developments. The building of a Euro-Atlantic community can only be achieved on a democratic basis if there is grassroots involvement in the process. Thus, the architects of a united Europe have adopted the principle of "subsidiarity," something like American "federalism"--that is, the devolution of responsibility to the lowest level of government capable of performing it effectively. By the same token, the process of devolution in the East will lead to fragmentation and conflict and ultimately threaten democracy if it is not accompanied by the voluntary delegation of powers to national and even supranational levels for basic matters such as defense, trade, currency, and the protection of basic human rights--particularly minority rights. The United States is a nation of ideas, not of blood, birth, or creed. Americans know that many levels of government can coexist and cooperate effectively, and that one can thereby build a strong nation out of diversity. Throughout the Euro-Atlantic community, and, indeed, elsewhere around the globe, a fundamental challenge for democracy is to encompass, to represent, but also to transcend, ethnic ties on the basis of common--indeed universal--values. The integration of Western Europe within the EC and NATO has virtually transcended all the old territorial disputes, irredentist claims, and ethnic grievances among and within its member states. Euro-Atlantic integration has made it literally inconceivable that localized disputes could become a source for serious conflict among these states. The incentives for cooperation within these multi- and supranational frameworks are overwhelmingly high in comparison with the remaining areas of discord. If we are to ensure comparable levels of peace and prosperity for Europe as a whole, comparable structures should be introduced to shape and develop interdependence among these countries. In sum, in both East and West, the processes of evolution and devolution need to be kept in constructive equilibrium. Only by achieving balanced progress in both directions can the individual be assured a voice in the management of an ever more interdependent world. Let me turn now to this architecture's essential structures-- NATO, the EC, and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. I will examine how they have developed since December 1989 and consider how they might contribute to a Euro-Atlantic architecture extending from North America across Europe to the Soviet Union.
NATO's New Missions
So far, NATO's adaptability has attested to its vitality. It is, in fact, both a sturdy cornerstone and initiator of cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free. First and foremost, our London summit declaration paved the way for the peaceful unification of a democratic Germany. Next, our common resolve in the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] negotiations resulted in a landmark agreement that will transform the military map of Europe. Within the past 2 weeks, the alliance's foreign ministers agreed on NATO's core security functions in the new Europe. We agreed that the alliance provides one of the indispensable foundations for a stable European security environment. It serves as a trans-Atlantic forum for allied consultations and coordination in fields of common concern. It deters and defends against any threat of aggression against the territory of any member state. And it preserves the strategic balance within Europe. We also agreed that the development of a European security identity would further strengthen the alliance and enhance its capabilities to fulfill these functions in the future, while encouraging an even more prominent European role in the process. The United States has pledged to support our European allies in the development of this identity and work with them in expanding cooperation between European and Atlantic institutions in the defense and security fields. The alliance's new agenda, especially its political role, is evident as well in our plans to build partnerships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We have proposed initiatives to intensify contacts among security officials, military authorities, parliamentarians, leadership groups, and scientific and environmental experts. The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are already committed to our shared values; now we must focus on the practical relationships that will help promote and secure them. These alliance contacts are also designed to draw the Soviet Union toward the new architecture. If reform in an increasingly pluralistic Soviet Union is going to succeed, we must reach out to the Soviet military and defense industrialists, as well as to reformers. We want them to know about NATO's strategy, doctrine, and defensive nature. They may be able to draw from our experience with civil-military relations. And we want to support efforts to convert defense industries to civilian production that will benefit the well-being of working men and women.
The EC: Continuing Support for an Eastern Agenda
The European Community's success at integration enables its member nations to benefit from common policies, preserve distinctive national attributes, and also devolve authority to local governments closer to the people. The Community is now in the midst of two intergovernmental conferences that will deepen its political and economic integration. As I said in Berlin in 1989, this was the goal supported by the United States of [Secretaries of State George] Marshall and [Dean] Acheson. And we support it today. Of course, we do so in the expectation that a European union will assume a place as a responsible leader contributing to the strengthening of structures of global, as well as continental, interdependence. Our commonwealth of freedom must reach out further, to Japan and Asia, to Latin America, to Africa. It is in this global context that the EC's energetic commitment to a successful Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations] looms large. Unfortunately, EC agricultural policies have raised concern. While we recognize the important role that the Common Agricultural Policy played in Europe's integration, we hope that Europeans now recognize that its continuation in its present form will injure developing nations and the GATT system. It would be tragic for the Community to send a signal of global insularity during the very year that it was achieving new levels of European integration. The strength of the Euro-Atlantic community depends on cooperation between the Community and the United States keeping pace with European integration and institutional development. Our US-EC declaration, completed late last year, reflects a first step on this path. Under Luxem-bourg's strong leadership, our contacts with the Council presidency and the "Troika" have developed rapidly and fruitfully. Similarly, we are opening new ties with the Commission in areas such as energy, competition policy, and privacy. It is my hope that as the Community makes decisions on its own future, it will continue to develop the possibilities for effective interaction with the United States and others as global partners. The successful creation of a coherent internal structure for the Community should also strengthen its capacity for effective external relations and responsibilities. In the near term, perhaps the EC's greatest external challenge is to reach out to the East. The EC's very political and economic success has already served as a magnet, drawing Eastern nations toward democracy and market economies. The Commission complemented this appeal through its coordinating role for the Group of 24 effort for the new market democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. We hope this is but the first of many steps to removing the economic barriers these countries face within Europe. The Community's intention to negotiate expanded association agreements, consistent with GATT, is another stage. It is a simple fact that the new market democracies will not be able to draw foreign investment, to privatize, to build competitive businesses that will create jobs if they are not allowed to compete fairly for markets. I am optimistic that the European Community will meet this challenge of extending the Euro-Atlantic community eastward. Whether by example, supportive policies, association, ties with other regional groups, or even--if some day Europeans so decide-- through further integration, the EC can help these market democracies establish a home in our larger community of common values.
Comprehensive Framework for a Euro-Atlantic Community
CSCE--the Helsinki process--remains the one group that brings together all the countries of Europe and North America on the basis of a common commitment to human rights and democratic principles. These rights and principles are the foundation for a Euro-Atlantic community already reaching beyond Berlin to the East. We need to build a practical record of success for CSCE, with appropriate capabilities in all three baskets in a mutually supportive fashion, and thus support the process of reform that will allow CSCE to become a true community of values. Tomorrow, CSCE foreign ministers will meet for the first time as the Council of Ministers established in the Charter of Paris. I hope that over the next 2 days my colleagues and I will be able to take additional steps to enrich CSCE along the lines of the proposals [German] Foreign Minister Genscher and I made in May. We should adopt a procedure for calling emergency meetings of CSCE officials at the sub-ministerial level. We can strengthen the Conflict Prevention Center, and I hope we can also develop procedures under which ministers could direct the establishment of fact-finding missions. We also need to entertain other ideas. [Soviet Foreign] Minister Bessmertnykh has made a proposal for a standing CSCE human rights body. This merits serious attention. It might be complemented by adding fact-finding missions as a fifth step in the Human Dimension Mechanism. I propose we consider co-invoking a specialized CSCE meeting on support for free media. We might also expand the mandate of the Office of Free Elections to become an Office of Democratic Institutions so that voting day will be matched by 364 other days of liberty in the year. In the economic area, I propose we establish new CSCE Chambers of Commerce in countries moving to market economies to organize and speak for the interests of private businesses. We might also organize a seminar on the social and financial implications of defense conversion and budget cuts. CSCE is also an appropriate forum to address the issues of migration within Europe. An experts' meeting could seek to develop humanitarian principles for handling massive immigration and refugees within the CSCE region and cooperative arrangements to anticipate and address the causes and benefits of such population movements. In sum, I envisage CSCE developing an agenda that can foster the sharing of ideas and cooperation on issues of common concern. That is a prerequisite to more complex integration. It is also important that we view CSCE as a framework--not a unitary body--for the Euro-Atlantic agenda. Indeed, as we extend the Euro-Atlantic architecture to the East, we need to be creative about employing multiple methods and institutions--including NATO, the EC, the OECD, the Council of Europe, and others--to address common concerns. Take the issue of security. We have in fact been developing arrangements for cooperative security to meet the needs of the newly emerging democracies and to engage a reformed Soviet Union. One, CSCE will contribute by creating the political, economic, and security conditions that may defuse conflict. CSCE will also have systems to warn of potential dangers, mechanisms to attempt to mediate them, and ways to engage others to help resolve them. In this way, the structure would help avoid the conditions and bias toward escalation that characterized Europe in August 1914. Two, NATO would provide a complementary role. A strong defensive alliance allows for lower levels of military forces and provides a foundation of stability within Europe as a whole. The arms control agenda pursued by NATO will augment this security. NATO's liaison missions will communicate the alliance's peaceful intentions, encourage civil-military relations, and contribute to a climate discouraging intimidation and aggression. Three, such other integrating institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community as the EC, the Council of Europe, and OECD are creating a network of political and economic support. This support both strengthens the new market democracies internally and signals to any would-be threat that these nations are part of a larger community with a stake in their success. Finally, it is also important to shape the future security agenda in Europe to meet changing challenges, including the special needs of the East. The time has come to set new goals, which go beyond the concept of balance, and begin to establish the basis for a real cooperative security. To this end, I propose a three-tier agenda for future CSCE activities in the arms control and security area. -- First, we need to institutionalize openness and transparency in our military affairs. We should intensify our efforts to reach an Open Skies treaty. We should establish a regular dialogue about military forces, budgets, defense plans, and doctrines. And to address the possible regeneration of forces within the Atlantic to the Urals region, we should consider measures that would provide early and clear indications of rebuilding efforts--not simply to avoid surprise but also to inhibit such moves. -- The second part of our agenda is conflict prevention. Such milestone measures as the CFE Treaty and the CSBMs [confidence- and security- building measures] agreement will all but eliminate the threat of a short-warning, massive war in Europe. But we also need to address more discrete localized problems within the CSCE area with the potential to lead to conflict between CSCE members. These might include new measures to address some of the security concerns of particular regions. They might include new measures to cope with the problems of the Balkans or other areas where stability could be at risk. Some of these measures could be along the lines of arms control and confidence-building measures. They might also involve a broader, political approach, such as supplying CSCE fact-finding, mediation, and peace-keeping capabilities when requested by nations immediately concerned. -- Third is the challenge of proliferation: stopping the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons--as well as the missiles that deliver them--and cooperating in the development of national policies to exercise restraint in the sale of conventional weapons. President Bush has called for a concentrated global effort to meet this challenge. We in the CSCE can contribute by building a partnership of responsibility and restraint. CSCE members are some of the most important arms suppliers in the world. As an offshoot of East-West confrontation, some CSCE economies have become heavily dependent on exporting weaponry. This is a problem we must address together to find innovative approaches to the problems of defense industry conversion. Taken as a set--the CFE Treaty and the manpower declarations being negotiated in CFE 1A; CSCE, including this new agenda for arms control; the continued vitality of NATO, including its liaison missions; the EC and other European institutions--we are building the basis for cooperative security in Europe.
Extending the Trans-Atlantic Community to the Soviet Union
Our greatest challenge will be to extend the trans-Atlantic community to the Soviet Union. While the new architecture can accomplish much short of that goal, it will be incomplete as long as the USSR hesitates outside. Perestroika is an opportunity for "new thinking" in many areas--not only in foreign policy, where we have achieved much together, but also in defense policy, economics, democratization, Center-Republic relations, and human rights. The revolution of perestroika has unleashed a new pluralism. The old political and economic structures have broken down, and it will take time to build new ones based on the popular will. The elections in Russia and elsewhere are a good start. We need to engage the diverse groups, reformer and traditionalist, recognizing that coalitions will form, break down, and form again. The transformation of the Soviet Union will inevitably have its ups and downs. It should be our on-going objective, however, to reassure and even buttress this home-grown Soviet effort. Perestroika is a Soviet concept and a Soviet objective, driven by the realization that change is essential to reverse stagnation and deterioration. It is in the interest of the Soviet peoples to embrace a real market economy, democracy, and the rule of law. It is in our interest to support them. I have spoken in recent weeks of the political, economic, nationalities, foreign, and defense policy context that could enable the Soviet Union to fulfill the hopes of perestroika. And I have spoken today of a number of ways that NATO, the EC, CSCE, and other Euro-Atlantic structures can serve as models for Soviet internal reform and international cooperation. Yet I also recognize that the United States, for reasons of history, has a special role to play in supporting the process of change in the Soviet Union. As the Soviets demonstrate the will to help themselves, to follow President Gorbachev's call in Oslo to "stay the course" on perestroika and the new thinking, then we can and should join them step-by-step. As I said last week before the US Senate, "[W]e can serve as a catalyst for political and economic reform. Indeed, we are developing a package of supportive measures, which we hope to coordinate with other Western governments." The complete package is, of course, for the President to announce. But as we have pointed out in recent weeks, elements could include a special association with the IMF and World Bank to help design and implement serious economic reforms; a public- private project to resolve impediments to private investment in energy development, which can earn hard currency and provide an example of a successful sector operating with property and contract rights; a mutual effort to invigorate the food distribution sector to produce improvements for consumers soon through the establishment of market incentives; work to support defense conversion; enhanced technical cooperation, including in the field of economic education; more open trade; and the additional $1.5 billion of credit guarantees the President authorized last week for the purchase of grains. I hope President Gorbachev now brings forward a new effort at serious market reform that will enable us to advance perestroika--to advance a Soviet agenda and Soviet goals. The door to the Euro-Atlantic community is open. But only the Soviets can decide to step over the threshold.
The Euro-Atlantic Outlook
A half century ago, it would have seemed impossible that an American Secretary of State would stand in Berlin, speaking to Germans and Americans, about the values of the Euro-Atlantic community. Particularly, that he would describe ideas about securing these values in the new market democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, extending them to a Soviet Union in the throes of reform, and indeed promoting these values in the world at large. But our predecessors have made the impossible, possible. Now it is the turn of our generation to draw out and then help sustain the Enlightenment spirit. To do so, we must be idealists and realists, setting a goal, and then adapting our successful, workable trans- Atlantic architecture to meet the new challenges of a post-Cold War era. It is most fitting that in Berlin, Freedom's City, we would chart this course. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

Summary of the President's CSCE Annual Implementation Report

Date: Jun 3, 19916/3/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe, E/C Europe Country: Czechoslovakia (former), Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia (former), USSR (former) Subject: Arms Control, CSCE, Democratization [TEXT] During the 1990-91 reporting year, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) "lost" a member when East and West Germany unified. At the same time, Albania was granted observer status. Thirty-two European states plus Canada and the United States are members since Albania became a full member on June 19, 1991. Following is a summary of the President's Report of the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, CSCE Annual Report, April 1, 1990-March 1, 1991, which was submitted to Congress on June 3, 1991. The text of the entire report will be available as a Dispatch Supplement (Vol. 2, No. 3) .
Developments in the CSCE Process
Implementation of CSCE principles continued to improve in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the reporting period. Bulgaria held its first multi-party election, introduced economic changes aimed at the creation of a market economy, and virtually ceased previous repressive measures, particularly against ethnic Turks. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic built on the achievements of the Velvet Revolution, with laws to implement economic and political reforms. Germany was unified. Hungary held democratic elections and began drafting and passing legislation to help democracy put down roots. In Poland, political groups competed openly and democratically. Parliament asked President Lech Walesa to call for parliamentary elections and began drafting a new constitution based on democratic principles. The constitution will likely be promulgated by the new parliament in late 1991. Despite the country's hardships and a declining standard of living, the government persisted in its economic reform efforts. Romania moved haltingly toward a more open society with the loosening of many controls, but the government's commitment to democracy and its willingness to tolerate opposition was still in question. In particular, the government used force against a June 1990 demonstration by miners and continued isolated beatings and other forms of harassment against the opposition. Yugoslavia, beset by internal divisions and human rights abuses in Kosovo and Croatia, nevertheless, attempted significant democratic and political reform at both the republic and federal levels. The Soviet Union took steps toward the withdrawal of its troops from Eastern and Central Europe. However, advances in human rights were offset by abuses in the Baltic states and elsewhere and the rolling back of some press freedoms. Economic reforms also remained problematic. The CSCE process underwent vast changes during the reporting period. The November 1990 Paris summit publicly recognized the end of the Cold War and, for the first time, created CSCE institutions. A busy schedule of experts meetings was augmented with two additional specialized meetings for 1991. A regular schedule of high-level political consultations among CSCE states was inaugurated. For the first time, the United States hosted a CSCE meeting--the October 1990 ministerial in New York. The Baltic states requested, but did not receive, observer status at CSCE meetings due to a lack of consensus on the part of the member states. Albania was granted observer status and sought, but did not receive, full membership, as CSCE states continued to look for a more consistent record of Albanian compliance with CSCE standards.
The Paris Summit
The highlight of CSCE activities for the reporting period was the November 19-21 Paris summit, the first CSCE meeting at the level of heads of state or government since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. President Bush led a US delegation of more than 30 senior government officials and congressional representatives, including Senator Claiborne Pell and US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Chairman, Representative Steny Hoyer and Commissioner Representative Don Ritter. The Paris summit included signature or endorsement of four major agreements: -- The Charter of Paris for a New Europe; -- The 1990 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures (CSBM); -- The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-- negotiated within the framework of the CSCE process by members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact); and -- The Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, in which the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact welcomed the historic changes in Europe and declared that they were no longer adversaries. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the 1990 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures established a secure foundation for relations among the CSCE participating states. The summit, in turn, reaffirmed CSCE principles and further enhanced the dignity of individuals and human rights. It also focused on expectations for the new Europe in the years ahead. President Bush welcomed the summit as proof that "a continent frozen in hostility for so long has become a continent of revolutionary change." Looking to the future, the President suggested that it was now time to "bring the CSCE down to earth, making it a part of everyday politics, building and drawing on its strength to address the new challenges." Stressing the importance of balance among the three baskets of the CSCE, he called for continued efforts in the areas of human rights, security, and economics, and drew attention to the modest, but significant, steps toward a new order which the new CSCE institutions represented. Other speakers shared the President's reinforcement of CSCE principles and his expectations for the new CSCE.
The Charter of Paris for a New Europe
Building upon the Helsinki Final Act, the charter creates the framework for a comprehensive European political dialogue. It is the embodiment of President Bush's commitment to "a Europe whole and free." The 10-page charter and its 14-page supplementary document embrace an extraordinary range of subjects. The charter is divided into three parts: "a new era of democracy, peace and unity," "guidelines for the future," and "new structures and institutions of the CSCE process." It calls for creation of a parliamentary assembly for CSCE. The supplementary document sets out the new institutional arrangements mandated by the charter: a political consultation process with a small administrative secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw. It also mandates two additional CSCE experts meetings: a seminar on democratic institutions (November 4-15, 1991 in Oslo), and a meeting on national minorities (July 1- 19, 1991 in Geneva). The Charter of Paris offers a powerful reaffirmation by the participating states of the original Helsinki principles. The US delegation to the Paris Summit Preparatory Committee, which negotiated the charter, led the effort to ensure that CSCE's traditional emphasis on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms enjoyed pride of place in the document. The United States led the effort to include the first commitment by all CSCE heads of state or government to democracy as "the only system of government of our nations." Building upon commitments undertaken at the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe to replace command economies with market systems, the United States advanced the concept of "economic liberty," which posits individuals exercising their free will in a democratic society as the "necessary basis for successful economic and social development." In arms control, the Charter of Paris took a historic step toward a new Europe. Building upon the CFE and CSBM negotiations, the participating states agreed to establish new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building by 1992. The talks will be open to all member states.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

Major Issues in START

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from remarks by Secretary Baker at the US Ambassador's residence with Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Berlin, Germany Date: Jun 20, 19916/20/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, North America Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Arms Control [TEXT] Let me say, with respect to START [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], and with respect to the possibility of a summit between President Bush and President Gorbachev, that I think we are right where we were when we last met with respect to the question of a summit. And that is, that both presidents would like to, I think, have a summit in Moscow at the earliest possible opportunity. But they would like to do so at a time that they could conclude the strategic arms negotiation treaty. There are three issues--three major issues that remain with respect to this treaty. These issues, while they are very important in and of themselves, are also important because they constitute part of a broader package of agreements that have been entered into dating back to the ministerial that was held in Houston, Texas, in December of last year. These three issues are: the question of new types of missiles, the question of downloading or removing the number of warheads on missiles, and the question of telemetry encryption or data denial. There has been a recent exchange of letters between President Bush and President Gorbachev that has served to close the gap substantially with respect to the question of the definition of new types of missiles, somewhat with respect to the question of downloading. And the technical experts continue to work in Geneva with respect to the very, very complicated and technical issue of data denial. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

US-Brazil: Roots of Friendship

Bush, Collor Source: Presidents Bush and Collor Description: Remarks upon Brazilian President Collor's arrival, Washington, DC Date: Jun 18, 19916/18/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Brazil Subject: Environment, Trade/Economics, Democratization [TEXT]
President Bush.
It is my great honor to greet you, Mr. President, one of Latin America's most dynamic statesmen. The US-Brazilian friendship has spanned nearly 2 centuries. Now an alliance built on fidelity--to democracy, healthy mutual respect, and firm collective will--[is a] relationship [that] has never been better. The most basic roots of our friendship lie in our dedication to democracy, our allegiance to the power of individuals, and the rule of law. The nations of the Americas all struggled and gained independence from the old ways of the Old World, and we built nations of promise and renewal. One hundred and seventy- nine years ago, the United States was proud to be the very first nation to recognize the newly sovereign Brazil. And that year, your predecessors achieved independence without bloodshed, traded goods with the world, and began to integrate a vastly diverse country. Today, President Collor, you represent the modern leader-- Brazil's first directly elected president in 29 years. We understand the challenges you face, and we admire the vigor with which you are dealing with them. Across the spectrum, from trade and economic matters to environmental issues, to concerns over nuclear proliferation, we are determined to treat our common challenges as opportunities-- opportunities to improve life throughout this hemisphere. Brazil, with its great natural wealth and resourceful people, can make enormous contributions to the world economy and to hemispheric prosperity. Along with the other nations of the Americas, as a long-term goal, we aim to create the largest free- trading partnership of sovereign states in the world. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which I unveiled 1 year ago next week, can help make this goal a reality, and we are already making great strides. I am pleased to announce that tomorrow we will sign completed negotiations for a trade and investment framework agreement with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay--the countries of the planned Southern Cone Common Market--MERCOSUR. This agreement is a significant step toward achieving our common goals, and we look forward to this new era of enhanced cooperation. America stands by your side as you tackle Brazil's most pressing issues. When I visited Brazil last December and was received so warmly by you, I saw the bold economic changes that you were making. And I saw something else; I saw a bold, active president, too. We all know that he's a tireless worker, but add to that jogging, piloting fighters, jet skiing, and several other activities. My kind of guy. You've trimmed government and announced plans to reprivatize enterprises, fight inflation, and liberalize trade. These are the keys to growth and prosperity in Brazil. As the 21st century draws near, we'll mark the 500th anniversary of Columbus' discovery of the Americas and the arrival of Cabral's Portuguese fleet in Brazil. Spectacular change characterizes the half millennium. The New World is becoming integrated in ways our forefathers would never have dreamed. And our firm collective will can help ensure a future filled with cooperation, not conflict. Brazil knows well the importance of united efforts--aligning with the allies in both World Wars, its brave expeditionary forces playing a key role in World War II. A half-century later, Brazil supported the UN resolutions and sanctions against Iraq despite significant economic losses to Brazil. And that testifies not just to your vision but to your courage; and, for this, we thank you, also. On behalf of all Americans, I salute the shared ideals that unite our nations and the lasting friendship between the people of the United States and the people of Brazil. It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the White House. May God bless the Federative Republic of Brazil.
President Collor
. Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, relations with the United States of America are a priority for Brazil. In my inaugural speech, I stated the need to eliminate from our relationship the emphasis which, up to then, had been placed on contentious trade issues. Such an emphasis used to obscure the true sense of a partnership based on common values, aspirations, and enterprises. This first goal has been achieved. In a mutually satisfactory way, Brazil has shown its earnestness and willingness to approach the issues pending on the bilateral agenda. Today, the Brazil-US agenda is clearly positive, and this is only a starting point for continuous improvement in our relations. Brazil and the United States are the two largest democracies on the American continent. We place our most profound trust in political and economic freedom as the only way to achieve the individual and collective fulfillment of our citizens. We cannot limit ourselves to solving circumstantial problems. The advances that we make must be founded upon a wide-ranging political vision and serve to reinforce a strong and lasting friendship. It is in this spirit that we salute the initiative for the Americas. Aside from its very important conceptual gains, such as the linkage between foreign debt, trade, and investment, the initiative is remarkable, above all, because of its vision of the future, a future that we must build together. Let us close the chapter on past trade disputes and past debt problems. Let us join efforts to expand mutual trade, technological cooperation, new credit, and investment flows. My idea of a truly stable international partnership is based on two major assumptions: The first is that [it] is up to every country to determine its own destiny and to make the necessary sacrifices to achieve its national goals. The Federalist Papers, themselves, state that: provided there be a free people and carefully managed finances, "foreign nations will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment." Brazilian democracy has followed this lesson very closely. Brazil is making enormous sacrifices and resolutely carrying out its economic modernization project. We have adopted an adjustment program that is comparable only to the most rigorous and contemporary [in] world history. In Brazil, the state will no longer be a producer of goods but, rather, a promoter of collective well-being. The second assumption for true partnership is a recognition of the interdependence that exists among nations--a reality which imposes upon all societies and their leaders the obligation to ponder the international consequences of their actions. Brazil is fully aware of this. We know that despite our present hardships, our policies of liberalizing reform will not succeed without real cooperation and positive responses on the part of the international community regarding solutions to such problems as foreign debt, removal of trade barriers, and access to advanced, clean technologies. Though we respect the legitimate values and interests of all peoples, we must insist on cooperation in the crusade we lead to achieve harmony between men and nature. This is precisely the challenge that stands before us as we approach the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development to be held in Rio de Janeiro: the search for a balance between man's seemingly infinite quest for progress and the finite limits of earth's resources. I look forward to our coming talks. I'm certain that our commitment to democracy and, believe me, my personal deep esteem for you will help us attain good results. We have before us a historic opportunity to create a new partnership between Brazil and the United States. Let us grasp it with determination and a sense of the future. May God help us to elevate our relations to the level warranted by the greatness of our two countries. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

President Collor's Visit To the United States

Date: Jun 17, 19916/17/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: North America Country: Brazil Subject: Environment, Trade/Economics, Democratization, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT] Brazilian President Collor visited the United States June 17-20, 1991. He last traveled to the US in September 1990 when he attended the opening of the UN General Assembly. The 1989 elections, which brought him to office, were the first direct presidential elections in Brazil in 29 years.
With more than 150 million people, Brazil is the largest nation in Latin America and the fifth largest in the world. More than two- thirds of the population live in urban areas. Though 76% of Brazilians are functionally literate, only 20% of those who begin public school complete the primary grades. Per capita income exceeds $2,400 per year, putting Brazil in the ranks of middle- income developing countries. There are wide disparities in income distribution, with only 2% of national income going to the lowest 20% of the population and 65% going to the upper 20%. Brasilia is the capital. Forests cover approximately one-half of Brazil's interior, which includes a major share of the Amazon Basin and the largest tropical rain forest in the world. Largely self-sufficient in food, Brazil is the world's leading exporter of coffee and orange juice concentrate; the second-largest exporter of cocoa and soybeans; and a major exporter of sugar, meat, and cotton.
Consolidation of Democracy
Major events in the transition to democracy included the return to civilian rule in 1985, promulgation of a new constitution in 1988, and the presidential election of 1989. More than 80 million voters went to the polls in November and December 1989 for elections that were both peaceful and free of irregularities. Congressional elections were held in October 1990 for all 503 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and one-third of the 81-member Senate. Many parties are represented in Congress, and party affiliations are highly fluid.
Economic, Trade, and Debt Issues
When President Collor assumed office, inflation exceeded 80% per month. He introduced a sweeping program of economic adjustment and reform, beginning with an attack on inflation through a sharp freeze on liquidity. He also announced plans to privatize state enterprises; eliminate the fiscal deficit; and dramatically reduce government intervention in the economy and foreign trade. In response, inflation dropped sharply at first but reappeared by mid- 1990. In early 1991, the government introduced a temporary wage/price freeze which is still largely in force. The government continues to work on detailed plans for the sale of state enterprises, reducing the federal work force, and new foreign trade regulations. Brazil enjoyed a foreign trade surplus of $11 billion in 1990 (down from $16.5 billion in 1989). The United States and other trading partners have objected to Brazilian import restrictions, including outright prohibition of imports, market reserves, and other non-tariff barriers. President Collor has largely eliminated these practices, and the United States has ended its trade actions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1988. Brazil is the largest developing-country debtor, owing $112 billion to external creditors. It has remained current in payments to international financial organizations, although not to other governments (including the United States). The government entered a de facto moratorium on payments to foreign commercial banks in September 1989; it began partial debt service this year and recently agreed on a schedule to repay $8 billion of arrears to the banks. The government plans talks with the International Monetary Fund on a debt-rescheduling agreement with the commercial banks.
Environmental Issues
International concern about the destruction of the Amazon rain forest was heightened by the December 1988 murder of environmentalist/labor leader Chico Mendes. In April 1989, the government began an environmental program called "Our Nature," designed to slow the destruction of the rain forest while seeking alternatives to develop the region. However, the government lacks the financial resources to implement this ambitious program. President Collor has shown a strong personal commitment to environmental protection. Burning of Amazon forests has decreased over the past year, partly as a result of his policy. Brazil will host the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development.
Foreign Policy Issues
President Collor has signaled his interest in shifting Brazilian foreign policy toward Europe and away from the Third World focus that has characterized it in the past. He has made improvement of relations with the United States a high priority. The resolution of trade differences with the United States during the early weeks of his term has done much to remove earlier points of friction in that relationship.
Nuclear Issues
The constitution prohibits non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but Brazil has an unsafeguarded nuclear-research-and-enrichment program conducted by the military. It is also committed to developing its own nuclear-powered submarine. Brazil has signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a hemispheric non- proliferation accord, but has not yet taken the final steps required to put the treaty into effect. Shortly after his inauguration, President Collor ordered a complete review of nuclear programs and policy. President Collor told the UN General Assembly in September 1990 that Brazil would not undertake any experiments involving nuclear explosions, even for peaceful purposes. In late November, he and President Menem of Argentina issued a Declaration of Common Nuclear Policy at Iguazu Falls calling for joint negotiation of a full-scope nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and for steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force. Negotiations with the IAEA have been underway since late winter. Brazil has a national space program aimed at developing and launching its own satellites.
US-Brazilian Relations
The United States was the first country to recognize Brazil's independence in 1822. During the 1950s and 1960s, Brazil received about $2.4 billion in US economic assistance. Due to Brazil's impressive economic development and its increased ability to obtain loans and technical assistance from private and multilateral sources, US assistance programs were phased out during the 1970s. The United States is Brazil's most important commercial partner and largest investor. US-Brazilian relations are cordial and cooperative, and the two countries' shared respect for democracy and commitment to economic liberalization has strengthened ties since the return of democratic government in the mid-1980s. President Collor's successful pre-inauguration visit to the United States in January 1990, visits by senior US officials to Brazil since he assumed office, and President Bush's visit to Brazil in December have contributed to an increased warmth in bilateral relations.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

US-Brazil Environmental Cooperation

Date: Jun 17, 19916/17/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: South America Country: Brazil Subject: Environment, Resource Management, Science/Technology, International Law [TEXT] The United States and Brazil have been cooperating successfully on environmental issues, with activities ranging from cooperative scientific research to technical assistance and institutional development. In addition, both countries have increasingly collaborated on issues involving global climate change. The US Agency for International Development (USAID)--along with other US federal agencies, US non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and Brazilian counterparts--has designed a multi-million dollar global climate change program addressing deforestation in the Amazon Basin. The program provides support to Brazilian institutions to develop technologies and policies that will promote continued economic development while protecting natural resources. Two memoranda of understanding will aid US and Brazilian agencies to collaborate on environmental issues. One was recently signed between the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Brazil's Secretariat of the Environment (SEMAM), and the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA). Another will be signed between the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service and IBAMA. The US Embassy in Brazil gives increasing priority to bilateral cooperation on the environment and promotes technical cooperation and joint science initiatives among agencies. The US Information Service (USIS) sponsors lectures by US experts in Brazil, facilitates the International Visitor Program, and distributes valuable information to various Brazilian audiences.
Global Climate Change
USAID is primarily responsible for the US global climate change initiative with Brazil. Initial implementation will involve about $15 million of USAID funds over a 5-year period. The program is intended to aid international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It supports Brazilian institutions in the development and dissemination of technologies and policies in order to promote continued economic development through sustainable management, rather than destruction, of Amazonian forest resources. It also focuses on improved energy efficiency and a reduction in fossil fuel use. Other US-Brazilian programs include: -- Improving the environmental impact assessment process for regulating timber harvesting and the establishment of pastures; -- Promoting the development of sustainable non-timber extractive-products industries; -- Promoting eco-tourism, wildlife research, and environmental education in the Amazon; -- Promoting the establishment and management of protected areas (such as, national parks, forest reserves, extractive reserves); -- Strengthening local NGOs and community groups to increase their abilities to influence policy and promote the sustainable use of forest resources; -- Providing support to SEMAM and IBAMA for strategic planning and policy development on forest management and conservation; -- Working with a timber company to develop a pilot sustainable forest management plan; -- Restoring agricultural productivity and forest viability to degraded Amazonian lands; -- Supporting the analysis of state and federal policies affecting the use of forest resources; -- Supporting research and dissemination of sustainable on- farm forestry practices; -- Supporting training and research on environmental economics; and -- Promoting training and the transfer of technologies to improve energy efficiency. In 1989, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated a long-term energy and carbon emissions case study for Brazil with the University of Sao Paulo. It also sponsored, with the Brazilian government, a workshop on tropical forestry and carbon emissions. Results of both projects were used by the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change in preparing its 1990 reports.
Forest Management
In addition to the forestry programs explicitly conducted as part of the USAID global climate change program, the USDA Forest Service, with USAID support, works with IBAMA on fire assessment projects that include: -- Establishing fire danger rating and zoning systems; -- Examining the physical and chemical properties of wild and prescribed burning; -- Studying the fire impacts on air, soil, and water; and -- Establishing a fire information system and a pilot project of prescribed burning in a national park. The Forest Service and IBAMA also plan projects on sustainable forest management research; restoration of degraded lands; fire and atmospheric research; and forest management.
Earth Science and Space Research
Brazil operates a LANDSAT ground station that covers most of South America. Brazilian and US scientists use LANDSAT data, along with airborne radar and aerial photography, for mapping remote areas of Brazil's interior as well as for agricultural, geological, and land use applications. The Brazil station has provided raw data to the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) for US-based research. The Forest Service is assigning a remote-sensing specialist to Brasilia to work with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and IBAMA on global forest assessment. NASA and Brazil's National Institute for Space Studies are cooperating on a project involving ozone sounding rockets in support of several NASA missions. In June 1990, the Brazilian National Space Commission (COBAE) and NASA signed a memorandum of understanding to continue atmospheric research, including research using balloons. Several Brazilian scientists are training in the United States at NASA and various US universities in earth sciences . NASA's major climate change research effort, the Earth Observing System Program (EOS), will survey Amazon eco-systems using data obtained from EOS sensors, climatological networks, and field studies. NASA also will work with its Brazilian counterparts to examine the seasonal enhancement of the ozone and troposphere over the Atlantic Ocean.
Biological Diversity
The Biological Dynamics of Forest Fragments project, located in the Amazon forest north of Manaus, is a large-scale ecological study to examine the relationship between the size of a forest reserve and the number of species that can live in it. The Smithsonian Institution and Brazil's Institute for Amazon Research conduct studies, with USAID support, to provide scientific data for conservation planning and forest regeneration in the Amazon and elsewhere. Working together, many US and Brazilian zoologists, entomologists, botanists, and biologists have gathered data on the systems and habitats of several species, providing valuable information on biological diversity. Such efforts have led to the re- establishment of the golden lion tamarin monkey in the wild. US- Brazilian researchers also have studied archeological, anthropological, and ethnographic characteristics of Amazonian society.
Environmental Management
The United States and Brazil have collaborated on long- and short- term projects in environmental management. Short-term assistance to Brazilian state and federal agencies includes projects on the management of marine and fresh-water pollution, hazardous wastes, and pesticides and toxic substances. EPA and IBAMA are trying to develop a training and technical assistance program to address Brazilian pollution problems, focusing on environmental impact assessments and providing information and limited technical assistance in pest management.
Environmental Law and Policy
The Environmental Law Institute, a US non-governmental environmental group, in partnership with the newly formed Brazilian Institute of Environmental Law and Policy is organizing the Rio International Conference on Environmental Law, to be held October 28-November 1, 1991. The conference will focus on the critical and rapidly evolving role played by environmental laws and policies in advancing pollution control and natural resource protection on the local, national, and international levels. The US Information Agency and other US and Brazilian government agencies are supporting this meeting through exchanges and preparatory meetings. EPA proposes to follow up this event through a cooperative program on development and implementation of environmental law with appropriate Brazilian agencies.
Wildlands and Wildlife Management
The Department of Interior, through the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service, provides training in wildlands and wildlife management to Brazilian institutions. More than 20 small grants for training projects have been supported. Specific projects include the establishment of a graduate wildlife management program at the Federal University of Minas Gerais, sponsored by the Fish and Wildlife Service; the Protected Area Management Course held in Sao Paulo, sponsored by the National Park Service; and US study tours. Environmental education projects funded by the Fish and Wildlife Service have produced information on reforestation, endangered species, and indigenous populations.
Technical Cooperation
EPA has designed a series of technical information packages to provide information on key environmental and public health issues, and to supply technical input to decisions regarding environmental policies pollution abatement and pollution prevention. Eleven packages on a variety of topics, such as risk assessment, safe pesticide disposal, and hazardous waste management, are expected to be available in English and Portuguese in late 1991. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

Trade and Investment in South America

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Washington, DC Date: Jun 19, 19916/19/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT]
Statement: Council on Trade and Investment
The United States today signed a framework agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay establishing a Council on Trade and Investment. The President, accompanied by Brazilian President Fernando Collor, participated in the Rose Garden ceremony. US Trade Representative Carla A. Hills signed for the United States. The other signatories were Argentine Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella, Brazilian Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek, Paraguayan Foreign Minister Alexis Frutos Vaesken, and Uruguayan Foreign Minister Hector Gros Espiell. The framework agreement is the first signed with a regional group since the President announced the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) on June 27, 1990. The United States has signed bilateral framework agreements with eight other countries of this hemisphere under the EAI. The objectives of this council, established by this framework agreement, are to monitor trade and investment relations, identify opportunities for expanding trade and investment through liberalization and other appropriate means, and negotiate implementing agreements. It will also seek to consult on specific trade and investment matters of interest to both parties and identify and work to remove impediments to trade and investment flows. Under the agreement, the five countries agreed to seek the cooperation of the private sector in matters related to the work of the council. In his remarks during the signing ceremony, the President praised the accord, noting that the proposal for a multilateral agreement had come from the four Latin American countries. He reaffirmed that the US goal is for a hemispheric free trade area stretching from Alaska in the North to Tierra del Fuego in the South, and promised that the United States would implement this agreement with the same spirit of cooperation and innovation that produced it in the first place. At President Collor's suggestion, the parties have agreed to refer to this agreement as "The Rose Garden Agreement."
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

Trade and Investment in South America

Fitzwater Description: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC Date: Jun 19, 19916/19/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: South America Country: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay Subject: Trade/Economics, International Law [TEXT]
Agreement on Trade and Investment With Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
The United States, on June 19, 1991, signed the Framework Agreement on Trade and Investment with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the countries now in the process of forming the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) by the end of 1994. The signing of a single agreement with these countries constitutes an important step in implementing the trade component of the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI).
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
June 27 is the first anniversary of the President's announcement of the EAI. In the past year, significant progress has been made in implementing the trade pillar of the EAI. The EAI is the result of a thorough review of US economic policy toward Latin America. Its trade component seeks to create new, equal, and reciprocal relationships with the other countries of the Western Hemisphere. The EAI, which consists of three pillars addressing trade, investment, and debt issues, responded to the actions these nations have taken to promote democracy and economic reform.
Trade Pillar
The EAI specifies two approaches to bring down trade barriers in the hemisphere: a successful outcome to the Uruguay Round and a "system of free trade" from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is the first step in the creation of such a hemispheric market. The process of creating this market will take a number of years because the commitment to open markets completely and on a reciprocal basis involves many complex issues.
Framework Agreements
The United States is moving forward to conclude framework agreements on trade and investment with those countries and groups of countries that wish to work toward freer trade in the hemisphere. Framework agreements, in an of themselves, do not bind the signatories to carry out specific trade liberalization commitments. They are comprised of a declaration of trade and investment principles, an agreement to consult on a regular basis, and an initial agenda for consultation. Illustrative of the enthusiasm for the President's initiative, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela have signed framework agreements with the United States thus far. Completion of a framework agreement with a country or group of countries establishes a channel to explore various trade liberalization options and promotes the EAI vision. It does not imply that we will be proposing free trade negotiations with such countries immediately. While framework agreements have to date been undertaken on a bilateral basis, countries joined in regional groups may also sign agreements directly with the US under the President's initiative. As noted by the President in his June 27, 1990 speech announcing the EAI, ". . . The US stands ready to enter into free trade agreements with other markets in Latin America and the Caribbean- -particularly with groups of countries that have associated for the purposes of trade liberalization." The signing of a framework agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay marks the first framework agreement with a regional group. The Office of the United States Trade Representative is also finalizing a similar agreement with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). By significantly reducing trade barriers among themselves and expanding this liberalization to other countries, these regional groupings enhance free trade principles that support US objectives in the current GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations. The remarkable progress on negotiating these agreements with such a broad range of countries in the Americas testifies to the commitment of so many nations in the Western Hemisphere to economic reform, liberalization and democracy in recent years. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

Peace in El Salvador

Bush, Cristiani Source: President Bush, President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador Description: Washington, DC Date: Jun 12, 19916/12/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: El Salvador Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT]
President Bush:
Mr. President, with your permission, let me just say that I was delighted to spend time talking and working today with a close friend of the United States, President Cristiani of El Salvador. In greeting one of your predecessors, Dwight Eisenhower declared that "Friends and countries are not measured by the extent of territory or the size of their population. They are measured by their dedication to their friends, to common values, priceless values that free men possess above even life itself." Thirty years later, those words still ring true. Through trying circumstances, El Salvador holds fast to its democratic traditions. Seven times in 10 years, your courageous countrymen have voted in free and fair elections, proving to the world that, in Lincoln's words, "The ballot is stronger than the bullet." Mr. President, time and again you and the people of El Salvador have proved your doubters to be wrong. Political rights have flourished despite hardship and despite war, and your people enjoy freedom of speech like never before. Exiles who once feared for their lives have returned, come back home to campaign for office and build parties. You also have begun to lay liberty's cornerstone--the rule of law. You've strengthened the judicial system. You've expanded civilian authority over the police and military, and you've committed yourself to dramatic reductions in armed forces. And you've strengthened protections for human rights. Soon, the trial of those accused in the 1989 Jesuit murders will begin, and we know that you will press to see justice done in the case of this despicable crime. But as newly freed people around the globe are learning, political freedom is connected to economic freedom. And here, too, your nation has taken dramatic strides. When you freed exchange rates, wiped out price controls, and clamped down on government spending, your farmers, your workers, your investors responded with a burst of creativity and growth. Inflation fell last year, and exports rose by 17%. And, in spite of guerrilla attacks on economic targets, your economy grew faster than it has since 1978--up 3.4%. This progress cannot continue indefinitely unless peace finally comes to El Salvador. Fortunately, you have led your people toward peace and reconciliation. You extended the hand of forgiveness in your inaugural address, and you told your country that time for negotiations had come, and you offered to negotiate without precondition. Throughout your country and the world, people of good will agree that time for peace has come. And now the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] guerrillas must show in word and deed that they want peace and its natural counterpart, democracy. The guerrillas agreed to negotiate a cease-fire for September of 1990; they showed no eagerness at all to meet that deadline. Then they promised the foreign ministers of the European Commission a cease-fire by May 30, but they were not truly committed to that deadline either. The killing and destruction, regrettably, continues. So the world must ask: How many more Salvadorans must die before the guerrillas understand that Salvadorans want peace and freedom, not violence and war. I urge the guerrillas to return to the negotiating table and stay there until a cease-fire is reached. Mr. President, difficult steps lie ahead. But the world understands your commitment to peace and democracy. The United States and the international community fully support your efforts for peace, and we will support sound peace accords in your brave land. We both serve at a time when freedom and democracy are sweeping the globe. Here in the Americas we are building something unprecedented in human history--the world's first completely democratic hemisphere. Under your leadership, El Salvador has taken a place in that democratic community, and within your borders hope flourishes. People have gotten into the spirit of national reconciliation: they now tolerate opposing views, they support democratic institutions, and they have dedicated themselves to preserving human rights. These ingredients cannot help but produce peace. When they do, your people will remember that your leadership made peace possible. Mr. President, I salute you, sir, for your courage and your leadership. You have my full confidence and support, the full confidence and support of our entire administration. And Godspeed you, and God bless your work on the road to peace for El Salvador. We are delighted you came here, sir.
President Cristiani:
Mr. President, first of all, I would like to not only thank [you for] your kind words that you have just expressed, and I certainly receive them not personally, but in the name of all Salvadorans. As you have expressed, the people of El Salvador have undergone quite a task. Hardship has been the name of the game in El Salvador for the past 10-12 years. And the Salvadorans have always shown in general that they want peace, that they want democracy, and they want freedom. And the freedom of those who want their rights respected is also something that is cherished by all Salvadorans. Let me just say that the appreciation of the people of El Salvador, because they have found that--in this quest for peace, freedom, and democracy--we have found a true partner in the United States. And certainly under your leadership, Mr. President, this has been increased to levels where we cannot but be grateful forever. We believe that it has been with the support of the United States and other friendly nations that El Salvador has been able to overcome the hardships, and that, because of this support, it certainly motivates us to continue to work even harder to achieve what we all want to see in El Salvador--a truly peaceful society living and progressing as any other country in the world is doing. I would like to also thank you in the name of all our delegations for the kindness that you have shown, and also the support that we have received from your words, and that we go back encouraged to even work harder in order to get peace for our people as soon as possible. Just let me end by saying also that we lived through your endeavors in the Persian Gulf and that, from the Salvadoran people, there is nothing but admiration as to your leadership. The way you handled the situation in the Gulf war was something that should be copied by anyone who wants to become a leader in their own countries. We certainly can understand the difficulty of that decision that you had to take when you had to send young people to die for a cause, but a cause that was just and was right. And a cause that we certainly respected, and not only respected but also supported fully from our position in El Salvador. We certainly would like to say that there is great admiration for yourself and for the people of the United States for risking everything in order to preserve the rights anywhere in the world. This is something that also encourages [us] to move forward in this task. Please let me just end, Mr. President--I know that you have expressed once before that you do not like this to be remembered very often--but also we would like to wish you a very happy birthday. We hope that the difficulties that you just went by with your health are certainly over and gone with. And we hope that you can certainly say--we can certainly say--happy birthday for many, many years more. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

Review of US-Salvadoran Talks

Aronson Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs Description: Excerpts from a news briefing in Washington, DC Date: Jun 12, 19916/12/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America Country: El Salvador Subject: Democratization, Military Affairs, Security Assistance and Sales, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] ...I think, as the President made clear in his statement, President Bush and this Administration have enormous respect for President Cristiani's leadership in El Salvador. And, in fact, in his opening remarks when he met with President Cristiani, the President said just that, that the United States strongly supports his government, that he respects President Cristiani "for what you have done" and he has confidence in what he will do in the future. President Cristiani then began the conversation by stating that his overriding goal and chief priority was to end the conflict in El Salvador and to move the process forward quickly so that the negotiations can succeed and the remaining issues can be negotiated and a verified cease-fire by the UN can be established. He expressed concern that the FMLN seems to want to prolong the negotiations. President Cristiani then described for President Bush in some detail what the two parties have already agreed to in the negotiating process. He mentioned that the constitution has been reformed to establish clear civilian authority by the elected president over the armed forces, whereas under the constitution previously, the armed forces had been seen as somewhat of an autonomous institution. He said they have agreed already to separate all of the security forces under the armed forces from them and create a new national police force under civilian authority. President Cristiani said that the two sides have agreed that the officer corps of the armed forces will be evaluated by a new commission to determine which officers should continue and which should not, with human rights as clearly one of the key criterion. He said the two sides have already agreed that there will be a substantial reduction in the size of the armed forces, and President Cristiani said that that would allow El Salvador to devote more resources for education and health and other social purposes. He said that they've agreed on a comprehensive judicial reform that would essentially depoliticize the selection of judges in El Salvador. Now--under the constitutional reforms they agreed to, two-thirds of the National Assembly will choose justices of the supreme court and the attorney general. President Cristiani explained to President Bush that that will require these judges be chosen by consensus. Previously they were chosen by a majority vote which would essentially allow the majority party in the assembly to choose the judiciary. President Cristiani noted that that reform would actually reduce the power of his own political party, but he thought it was an important step in strengthening the judicial process. They also agreed on a constitutional amendment that would mandate at least 6% of government expenditures that go to the judicial system to strengthen its capacity to administer and enforce the rule of law. He described the electoral reforms that his government had already agreed to, and again he noted that his party, the ARENA [National Republic Alliance] party, had made political sacrifices to make these possible. They increased the number of seats in the National Assembly, thereby giving up their majority and allowing small parties to participate. They also agreed to enlarge the size of the Supreme Electoral Council to give some other parties a place on it and to permit the president of the Supreme Electoral Council, which oversees all the elections, the president of the council will now be proposed by the Supreme Court and approved by the National Assembly. He said in the area of human rights that [the] FMLN and the government had agreed to a comprehensive set of rules and procedures. And the Security Council of the UN has voted, at the end of last month, to send a team to oversee the implementation of this agreement and to protect human rights. He said that despite all of those far-reaching commitments, reforms, and concessions the FMLN has responded by increasing violence, not reducing violence, and by reneging on previous agreements that the three remaining issues would be constitutional reform, cease-fire, and armed forces. He said the FMLN had brought up old issues, such as a demand that the entire armed forces be dissolved, and saw that as evidence of obstructionism. The two Presidents then had an extensive conversation about the peace process, how we can move it forward, the role of the four friends of the [UN] Secretary General--Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Spain--and the process itself. They had a discussion of the Jesuit case. President Cristiani explained that the trial is to go forward soon, but that private attorneys who represent the Jesuit community in El Salvador have petitioned the courts [to] extend the 8-day period--for different, additional evidence--to 3 months; that has delayed the trial. And the President expressed both his understanding that any judicial system takes time, and his strong hope that the case will be investigated fully and justice will be done, as he said in his departure statement. The President [Bush] praised the government of El Salvador for the performance of the economy. He had an extensive conversation with the President [Cristiani] and the Minister of Planning about the free market reforms they've put in place and their record of performance, which is the best in Central America. The two presidents talked about where arms continue to come from to the FMLN. President Cristiani confirmed his belief that a view the United States has that Cuba continues to supply surface- to-air missiles to the FMLN is correct, and that that is still a source of violence and instability in El Salvador. Secretary Baker mentioned some of our conversations with the Soviet Union on this subject. The two Presidents talked about the drug problem both in El Salvador and Latin America. President Cristiani noted that they had recently toughened their own drug laws. He expressed some concern that some of the traffickers are moving into Central America as a transit point. President Bush reiterated his belief and commitment that we in the United States have to do more to reduce demand, but he expressed some sense of positive motion and noted that we've recently had some good figures on reduction of demand here in our own country. The two presidents talked about the North American Free Trade Agreement that the United States, Canada, and Mexico are negotiating. President Cristiani expressed his hope that this agreement could extend south to Central America. President Bush said he agreed that his long-range goal was a free trade agreement throughout the hemisphere. He didn't want our initial commitment to Mexico and Canada to be exclusive. He wanted no nation to be disadvantaged by these opportunities, and all to have an opportunity to participate. The two presidents talked briefly about the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade--GATT]. El Salvador is a member of the GATT now. President Cristiani talked about the needs of his country for national reconstruction after a peace is achieved to restore services to the rural areas--water, electricity- -and provide opportunities for combatants. President Bush said that we would like to help in such an effort. President Cristiani also expressed strong interest in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative [and] opportunities for investment loans from the IDB [Inter-American Development Bank] for debt reduction. Again, the President said that that is an area we also want to work with El Salvador on. And they clearly--based on their economic performance--would be prime candidates for benefits under the EAI. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

North American Free Trade Agreement

Date: Jun 24, 19916/24/91 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: North America Country: Mexico, Canada, United States Subject: Trade/Economics, Environment [TEXT] The United States and Mexico are embarking on free trade negotiations that, in conjunction with the 1988 US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, would create a North American market of more than 360 million people and an annual economy of $6 trillion. The negotiations were made possible by congressional action on May 23- 24, 1991, which granted the executive branch "fast track authority" to negotiate trade agreements, including the proposed pact with Mexico. Fast track authority allows the executive branch to present trade agreements to Congress for approval without the possibility of amending the treaty. Amendments could undercut free trade talks, because trading partners such as Mexico would have no way of knowing what changes Congress might demand in agreements already negotiated in good faith. Despite the granting of fast track negotiating authority, Congress remains an integral part of the process. President Bush is committed to extensive consultations with Congress throughout the negotiations. Such a process is in the best interests of US and Mexican negotiators, as it helps ensure that Congress will approve the treaty and implementing legislation that the President and Congress have developed together. The United States hopes to build upon the success of the US- Canada free trade accord. Canada has asked to be part of the negotiating process with Mexico, although the Canadian government says that any potential negotiating difficulties between Canada and Mexico will in no way affect US-Mexico talks.
The negotiations seek a broad agreement to eliminate restrictions on the flow of goods, services, and investment: -- Elimination (as far as possible) of non-tariff barriers on goods and services; -- Establishment of an open investment climate; and -- Full protection of intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights, and trademarks).
Expanded Trade With Mexico
Mexico is America's third largest trading partner, with bilateral commerce of $52 billion in 1989 and $59 billion in 1990. NAFTA would lead to expanded trade with Mexico and the creation of additional jobs for US workers. It would give US exporters unrestricted access to a Mexican market of 86 million people, which may reach 100 million by the year 2000. Mexico purchases more than two-thirds of its imports from the United States. However, Mexico still has higher trade barriers than the United States. Its average tariff duty is 10% compared with 4% in the United States, and significant Mexican non-tariff barriers remain. The United States has much to gain from the elimination or reduction of these barriers under a trade agreement. Traditional US competitive advantages--geographic, cultural, and historic links--in this important market would be further enhanced by NAFTA. As the Mexican economy grows, a substantial part of the increased income--as much as 15%--is spent on US goods and services. Strong Mexican growth is expected because of President Salinas' economic reforms. Mexico's middle class is increasing as a percentage of the total population; this means more consumers for American products. The United States benefits from expanded trade. For each additional $1 billion in real net exports, about 25,000 new US jobs are created. Increased exports accounted for 88% of US economic growth in 1989-90 and have helped the US economy expand out of recessions in the past.
Investment Opportunities in Mexico
The United States is the source of 65% ($25 billion) of foreign direct investment in Mexico. Therefore, the US government has a strong interest in encouraging favorable conditions for new and expanded investments in Mexico. US firms investing there tend to use US suppliers and US designing and managerial talent. Overall US and Mexican competitiveness in international markets, particularly vis-a-vis Japan and the European Community, would be enhanced by the opportunities offered by NAFTA. In May 1989, President Salinas expanded foreign ownership (in many cases up to as much as 100%) in sectors accounting for nearly two-thirds of Mexico's economic output. He also streamlined the approval process for foreign investments. A trade agreement would further improve the investment climate for US firms in Mexico. An open trade and investment climate will foster further partnerships and alliances in industry, agriculture, and services. These partnerships can take advantage of the complementary strengths of the three North American economies. As a result, the United States will be more competitive against third-country products in North American markets and abroad, which, in turn, translates into more jobs, investment, and economic growth in the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
Benefits to the US Economy
A North American FTA will be good for American workers. It will help the United States keep and create good jobs at good wages. According to even the most conservative researchers, the United States will have a net gain of at least 64,000 new jobs over 10 years. The Bush Administration also has proposed solutions to two major concerns among American workers: that their jobs could be lost to Mexicans or that the products produced by their industries be replaced in the US economy by Mexican imports. President Bush has promised to work with Congress to develop a training and readjustment program for US workers who may lose their jobs as a result of a free trade agreement. In addition, US negotiators will seek provisions in the trade agreement to permit the temporary reimposition of duties and other trade restrictions if increases in imports from Mexico are found to harm particular US industries. US negotiators also are being instructed to write strict "rules of origin" requirements into a trade agreement so that third countries are unable to capitalize unfairly on an agreement with Mexico by sending products through Mexico to the United States with only minimal assembly in Mexico. Aside from the trade talks, American workers also will benefit from increased US-Mexico cooperation in areas such as occupational health and safety, child labor, and labor statistics.
Benefits to the Environment
A North American free trade agreement will strengthen environmental preservation efforts on both sides of the border. During the negotiations with Mexico, the United States will insist on its right to: -- Exclude any products that fail to meet US health or safety requirements; -- Impose stringent pesticide, energy conservation, toxic waste, and health and safety standards; and -- Strictly respect international treaties on such environmental issues as wildlife protection and preservation of the earth's ozone layer The United States expects no major difficulties in environmental negotiations with Mexico. President Salinas has made it clear that his country will avoid becoming a "pollution haven" for American companies that may seek to avoid US environmental laws. Mexico has underscored this pledge with: -- A 1988 comprehensive environmental law that is similar to US law; and -- An eightfold increase in the budget of Mexico's ministry of environmental affairs (SEDUE) over the last 2 years. The United States will seek a commitment to work together with Mexico to enhance and enforce the environmental, health, and safety standards of products. Full public and scientific scrutiny of any changes to standards will be provided before they are implemented. Consultations also will be held on better enforcement capability, inspection training, monitoring, and verification. The US government will pursue expanded US-Mexico environmental cooperation in parallel with the NAFTA negotiations. The two countries will implement an integrated border environmental plan to address air and water pollution, hazardous wastes, chemical spills, pesticides, and enforcement. US and Mexican officials will discuss, among other things, expanded cooperative enforcement activities, such as coordinated targeting of environmental violators. The public will be provided an opportunity to submit data on alleged non-compliance of standards and regulations.
A Cornerstone for Greater Hemispheric Cooperation
The United States is a close neighbor and friend of Canada and Mexico. NAFTA will provide a unique opportunity to draw North America closer by building a foundation for even stronger cooperation, cohesion, and growth. A trade agreement will give economic and political impetus to US efforts to address other pressing North American problems. NAFTA will help forge a US- Mexican partnership that could lead to closer cooperation on other foreign policy issues. A North American FTA also is important as the cornerstone of a comprehensive Western Hemisphere policy. It would send a strong, encouraging signal throughout Latin America to a new generation of leaders pledged to democracy, market economics, and growth. Also, NAFTA would give further substance to President Bush's long-range vision of a hemisphere-wide system of free trade. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

US Trade with China

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Fact Sheet and Statement released by the Office of the White House Press Press Secretary, Los Angeles, California Date: Jun 16, 19916/16/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Trade/Economics, Arms Control [TEXT]
Export of High Performance Computers
The United States has serious national security concerns regarding the shipment of high performance computers to the People's Republic of China (PRC). These concerns are based on several factors: -- The aggregate threat of significant technology transfer that occurs when researchers develop experience in operating the computers and customizing software. -- The potential diversion to military use of technology acquired in this fashion. -- The key role that computers play in the management of high-technology military systems and the resulting enhancement of the capabilities of such weapons or missiles as demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm. These concerns are heightened by the risk that the PRC may transfer advanced weapons-related technology to other countries, as in the case of ballistic missile transfers. Exports of computers to certain countries, including the People's Republic of China are controlled multilaterally by the United States and its partners in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). Over the past year, these controls have been liberalized significantly. However, high- performance computers that are critical to the effectiveness of military systems remain tightly controlled and require the approval of the 17 COCOM members prior to the issuance of an export license. Because of the threat to regional stability resulting from ballistic missile proliferation by the PRC, and the resulting threat to US national security interests, the President has decided to limit licensing the export of computers exceeding a composite theoretical performance of 41 million theoretical operations per second. Export licenses for computers above that level will occur only after extensive review to ensure that the proposed sale poses no threat to national security. Our concerns in this regard are being communicated directly to other governments that are members of COCOM and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Satellite Launches on PRC Missiles
Licenses to Chinese entities of US technology for satellites, their components and associated technologies have been suspended under Section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1991-92. Under the law, the President may waive these suspensions if he reports to Congress that it is in the national interest of the United States to do so. The President has decided that PRC actions related to the proliferation of missiles make it inappropriate for the United States to approve any further export licenses for commercial satellite launches at this time. This action does not affect the recent decision to allow the launch of the Swedish satellite known as Freja nor the reaffirmation of the approval to launch the Australian Aussat satellites. Missile Proliferation Sanctions. US concerns related to weapons proliferation resulted in legislation that requires the imposition of sanctions on companies that engage in certain missile proliferation activities. We have evidence that two Chinese entities have transferred missile technology to Pakistan. The entities in this case are the China Precision Machinery Import- Export Corporation and China Great Wall Industry Corporation. Accordingly, we are taking appropriate legal steps with respect to imposing sanctions on these firms. We have expressed urgent concern to the Chinese Government about exports of missile technology. Under Secretary of State [Reginald] Bartholomew will discuss these concerns in detail during his meetings in China June 17-19.
Trade Restrictions Announced
(Statement released by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Los Angeles, California, June 16, 1991) The President has implemented his decision announced on May 27, 1991, to impose constraints on high technology trade with the People's Republic of China as a result of actions by entities in the PRC to transfer missile technology to other countries. The President decided that the significant risks to US security interests posed by these missile transfers require the imposition of limits on the sale of high performance computers. In addition, the President will not waive sanctions that prohibit the transfer of US technology for satellites launched on Chinese rockets. Finally, we are taking steps to impose sanctions on certain firms in the PRC that have contributed to missile proliferation. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

Political Crisis in Ethiopia

Cohen Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun 18, 19916/18/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Ethiopia Subject: Democratization, Development/Relief Aid, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the recent political developments in Ethiopia. In the space of one remarkable week in May, Sub-Saharan Africa's second most populus country experienced a watershed in its history. A dictatorship that had lasted 14 years was overthrown. Organized fighting stopped for the first time in 30 years. These events leave Ethiopia poised at a historic crossroads. In order to discuss where the future leads, I would like to briefly review the events that have brought us to this point. The signs of denouement came in 1988. Already at that time, Ethiopia's economy had been drained by the Mengistu regime's failed Marxist policies and by its costly separate wars against the Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgents. Repeated droughts and internal disruption left millions of people dependent on international charity for survival. And the Soviets had started to make it clear that they were unwilling to continue funding endless conflict. In the spring of 1988, and again in 1989, the Mengistu regime suffered a series of devastating military defeats at the hands of the insurgents. By 1989, all of the Province of Tigray, as well as most of Eritrea was, irretrievably, in rebel hands. In May 1989, there was an attempted coup that demonstrated the depth of unhappiness with the regime. Addis Ababa's response was to undertake a series of political acts that gave the appearance of change and progress, without committing to real reforms. The government also accepted former President [Jimmy] Carter's offer to serve as a mediator in the Eritrean conflict. But at the table, government negotiators showed little flexibility and offered no significant concessions. They allowed the talks to founder on procedural issues. Negotiations with the Tigrayans under Italian auspices, likewise, never emerged from procedural questions. Through all of this period, the United States used its channels of communication to all parties for the purpose of lending our support to reconciliation. We stressed to all sides that there was no military solution to Ethiopia's problems--that only a negotiated political solution would bring a durable peace. The Soviets joined us in that approach. In the summer of 1990, at the request of both Addis and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the United States began to explore whether there was a substantive basis for further talks between the government and the Eritreans. We chaired two meetings, which, at least, had the merit of getting into matters of substance. But both sides put familiar positions on the table concerning federalism and self-determination. Neither showed a disposition to advance. As the second round of talks was taking place, events on the ground took over. In February of this year, a series of new offensives by the Eritrean People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) removed three more provinces from government control, and the front began to close in on Addis itself. Mengistu's government clearly was powerless to reverse the encroaching tide, or even hold it off more than briefly. The question was no longer whether the government would survive but whether there [would] be a bloody battle for the capital before the regime changed. The government admitted as much in an April statement that called for a round-table on "transitional arrangements," while at the same time appealing for new mobilization against the enemy. Government officials urged the United States to help facilitate a peaceful transition. They affirmed a keen desire to include rebel groups and others in a restructured regime. The United States agreed with this goal and, after meeting with the EPLF and EPRDF rebel groups in Khartoum, invited the government and the groups to a meeting in London to help bring about the peaceful transition that all sides claimed to want. Our goal was to replace war with peace and find a path forward to a more broadly based and democratic political system. We sought a transitional mechanism that could produce an interim government made up of all Ethiopian parties. Events in late May quickened. On May 21, Mengistu fled Ethiopia, and a final unraveling began. By May 27, the day before the London meeting formally was to begin, the Ethiopian government's forces had lost their ability to offer any organized opposition, and the only thing keeping the EPRDF out of the capital was the insurgents' own decision to hold back while the London talks were going on. On the 27th, acting President Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan told us the Ethiopian army had virtually disintegrated and that he and senior government officials were extremely concerned about their ability to provide for law and order. The acting president said that the government intended to broadcast a call for a unilateral cease-fire and an appeal to the citizens of Addis to accept the EPRDF when they entered the capital. The EPRDF decided to move into the city that night. The United States strongly agreed with that decision, because the EPRDF was now left as the only disciplined force capable of keeping order in the capital. At that point, the Addis regime effectively ceased to exist, and their delegation in London dropped out of the talks. The final part of the London meeting began with the United States no longer in a mediation role between the government and the insurgents but in a de facto advisory role for the three opposition groups about to inherit all military and political power. Our London meeting, thus, ended without the appointment of a transitional government as we had envisaged. But it ended with something perhaps even better. The insurgent groups, themselves, argued that a transitional government was not possible until more political factions were present and participating. In a joint statement, they, themselves, called for a meeting of a wider range of political parties and interests, to establish a broadly based transitional government. This meeting is due to be held not later than July 1 [1991]. So, despite the changed circumstances in which it was held, we really think the London meeting accomplished a great deal. First, the Mengistu regime, doomed by its own misguided policies, is gone but without the pitched battle for Addis that some had feared. Second, there is an interim administration in place that is temporary and solicitous of wider membership and political participation. It seeks Western help in forming a true transitional government. Third, and most important, in this fragile transitional stage in Ethiopia, the juridical issue of Eritrea's future did not really arise among the parties in London. A provisional administration is installed in Asmara, as it would have been whatever happened in London. But there is general, if tacit, agreement that the long- sought referendum and the final determination of Eritrea's status can await a more stable situation emerging in Addis. We welcome this disposition of the key parties toward realism. We have long believed that the issue of Eritrea's judicial status needs both time and an atmosphere of peace before it is approached. Forcing an early resolution of this matter is a recipe for disarray and discord. Thus, another significant achievement of the London [meeting] was its demonstration of realism. We hope this spirit continues to prevail next month at the Addis meeting. We are working toward that end. The EPRDF has proceeded to establish an interim administration in Addis, which is working with the existing civil service to re-establish essential services and has assured the donor community that relief will be given first priority. The group in Addis has made reassuring public statements about its commitments to democracy. It seems to be extending its hand to other political groups inside and outside Ethiopia. We have already seen one dramatic benefit from the departure of Mengistu: the humanitarian problem of Ethiopian Jewish emigration, which has lasted for generations and which had been the subject of intense diplomatic activity in recent years, was resolved literally overnight, as a fleet of Israeli aircraft carried more than 14,000 people across the Red Sea in a heart-warming echo of the great exodus that took place so long ago. We hope to see equal benefits in other areas: conflict has been the chief cause of food insecurity in Ethiopia, and, now that the fighting has ended, we hope to be able to send food directly to the needy, without cumbersome negotiation of safe-passage arrangements for crossing lines of battle. We have cautioned the interim administration that future cooperation from the United States depends on their holding to their announced commitment to human rights, democracy, and due process for all. A generation of conflict in Eritrea, and 17 years of internecine warfare following the 1974 overthrow of the emperor, have left deep bitterness and divisions among the many ethnic and political factions. Our objective for the Addis meeting is to see a stable coalition emerge, one that can lead Ethiopia into free elections and establish the groundwork for a democratic constitution and form of government. Our greatest challenge will be to convince the people of Ethiopia that, after years of war and a mentality geared to conflict, they can now dare to look at the future with a positive outlook. Ethiopians must be able to look on themselves as capable of building a nation, one that can live in peace with itself. One thing is clear: Ethiopia's future lies in the hands of Ethiopians. We can and will press, cajole, and push in the direction of democracy and reconciliation, but it is up to the Ethiopians, themselves, to show the willingness to work together if there is to be peace and democracy in Ethiopia. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

US-Pakistan Relations

Tutwiler Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: Jun 14, 19916/14/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Pakistan Subject: Democratization, Narcotics, Arms Control [TEXT] Pakistan is an old and valued friend of the United States. We share strong common values and interests, and the US has, since 1974, been a supporter of Pakistani independence and territorial integrity. We have worked with Pakistan to promote regional peace and security, including the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The visit of Pakistan Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad this week was a constructive contribution to this long-term relationship between our two countries. Both sides underscored the importance they attached to the bilateral relationship and their common interest in a strong, stable, and democratic Pakistan, as well as in regional security. In this context they affirmed their desire for an early political settlement of the Afghan conflict based on self-determination for the Afghan people. They also agreed on the importance of continued efforts to improve relations between Pakistan and India. Both sides agreed upon the need to work together to control illicit narcotics trafficking. The two sides discussed Pakistan's recent economic reforms, which we find impressive. The Pakistani delegation presented the recent proposals of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a balanced regional reduction of conventional weapons, which the US found constructive. We discussed the concept of holding consultations among the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and India, a concept we support. The talks also continued the dialogue between Pakistan and the United States on nuclear issues. Discussions were forthright and cordial, reflecting the long-standing friendship between the two countries and the mutual desire to resolve outstanding differences. In the Administration, Chairman Sajjad met with the Vice President, Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney, National Security Adviser Scowcroft, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Kimmitt, and Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Bartholomew. He also had a number of meetings with Members of Congress. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

Recent Developments in the Middle East

Kelly Source: John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun 17, 19916/17/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon Subject: Military Affairs, Mideast Peace Process, United Nations, Terrorism, Security Assistance and Sales, Democratization [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before the committee today. In these opening remarks I will discuss some of the major developments which have occurred recently in the Middle East and our efforts to help bring peace and stability to the region.
Peace Process
In the period since the end of the Gulf war, the Secretary of State has made four trips to the Middle East. I was privileged to accompany him. A prime purpose of these trips was to explore whether new opportunities existed to break down long-standing barriers and open new avenues for progress toward peace between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and the Arab states. Throughout this effort, we have made clear that our objective is a comprehensive peace achieved through direct negotiations based on UN Security Council [UNSC] Resolutions 242 and 338. In our contacts in the region, we have found a significant amount of agreement among the parties on the key elements of the approach we advocate. We found general acceptance of the idea of a conference, co- sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, which would lead directly to bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab and Palestinian neighbors and to multilateral negotiations on regional issues. The conference would not have the authority to impose its views on the parties and would not interfere with negotiations. We also found a general acceptance of a two-track approach: Israel and the Arab states would conduct negotiations on one track, and Israel and Palestinians from the occupied territories would conduct negotiations on a parallel track. We found agreement among the parties that negotiations on the occupied territories would proceed in phases, with negotiations on permanent status following talks on interim self-government. We found agreement that Palestinian representatives should come from persons living in the occupied territories who accept the two-track, phased approach and who are committed to living in peace with Israel. We found agreement that this process would be rooted in UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. There still remain a number of issues on which agreement has not yet been reached, primarily related to the UN role and the ability of the conference to reconvene. The Administration believes the UN should have a role at the conference. A role for the UN should pose no problem, since this is a conference that cannot impose its preferences and cannot be a court of appeal. Indeed, the ability of any party to prevent any meeting it does not want ensures that there is no way to evade negotiations. The compromise formulas proposed by the United States are designed to help launch a conference that will lead to direct negotiations and that will break the taboos that have prevented face-to-face negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians and between Israel and the Arab states. We were heartened by the decision of the Gulf Cooperation Council to send its Secretary General as an observer, and the decision of the GCC states--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE [United Arab Emirates]--to agree to participate in the multilateral negotiations with Israel on matters that are relevant to them. We also believe the conference should be able to reconvene, if all parties agree, to hear reports from the bilateral and multilateral negotiating groups. We believe it should be possible to bridge the remaining differences if the parties involved demonstrate the political will to move toward resolution of Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian disputes. The United States remains committed to this effort to advance the peace process. We cannot force the parties to act. They must demonstrate the political will to take positive action to advance the peace process; if they do, they will find the United States is a partner in the quest for peace.
Iraq and Kuwait
Developments in the northern Gulf continue to be dominated by the consequences of the Gulf war and its aftermath. US policy toward Iraq was reiterated by the Secretary in his testimony of May 22 [See Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 21]. We respect Iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty and do not wish to see Iraq fragmented as a state. We have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. Saddam Hussein is a pariah who will, if given the opportunity, reconsolidate his dictatorship and military machine, further brutalize the Iraqi populace, and threaten our allies in the region. The need for continued vigilance is underlined by recent ambiguous statements by the Iraqi leadership on Kuwaiti sovereignty. For example, in an interview published on May 28, Iraqi Vice President Ramadan told an Egyptian newspaper that in February, "We said that Kuwait was Iraqi. We still say that even today." On June 3, the Iraqi information minister said that the statement attributed to Ramadan was inaccurate and taken out of context. As the Secretary stated on May 22, "We intend to continue to act with others to isolate Saddam Hussein's regime. That means we will never normalize relations with Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power." With regard to UN sanctions on Iraq, the President stated on May 20, "At this juncture . . . we do not want to lift these sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein is in power." The UN sanctions and reparations provisions are subject to periodic review every 60 days. This review, in particular, is to take into account Iraqi policies and practices and its record of compliance with all the provisions of Resolution 687 and other relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Once Saddam Hussein is gone, we will be able rapidly to lighten the burden on the Iraqi people. In response to the massive outflow of refugees fleeing Saddam Hussein's repression, the United States on April 7 launched "Operation Provide Comfort" which, together with similar efforts by many of our coalition partners and allies, saved the lives of uncounted numbers of Kurdish refugees. The initial aims of "Operation Provide Comfort" have largely been met. These include supply of food and shelter to remote mountain camps, construction of transit camps, and the establishment of conditions to facilitate the safe return of refugees to their homes in northern Iraq. We do not intend to maintain US troops in northern Iraq any longer than necessary. But we are not indifferent to the fate of the Kurds or of the rest of the oppressed people of Iraq. We are working closely with our allies and with UN agencies to ensure a transition to a protection and assistance effort under the auspices of the United Nations. We are encouraging the UN to move quickly under the authority of UNSC Resolution 688 to provide an effective international presence to monitor the continued safety of refugees who have returned to Iraq. The United Nations already has begun a UN guard program to provide the confidence the refugees need to return to their homes. We are providing significant assistance to this program and are encouraging other states to do the same. The UN assumed administrative authority for the relief operation on June 7. We expect US forces to withdraw from Iraq as their mission in the relief operation is completed. An extensive UN presence is mandated by UNSC Resolution 688, which requires Iraq to provide access to those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq. Behind UNSC Resolution 688 are the enforcement provisions of Resolution 687 dealing with conditions to alleviate sanctions and reparations; the Iraqi government knows that the international community, in monitoring Iraq's compliance with UNSC Resolution 688, will take into account its treatment of Iraqi citizens. Additionally, we are keeping in close touch with our friends and coalition partners and are keeping the situation inside Iraq under constant review. We retain the capability to act in support of regional peace and stability and, more specifically, in support of the UN and its continuing role in providing assistance to vulnerable groups inside Iraq. We also will continue vigorously to encourage the United Nations to implement the provisions of UNSC Resolution 687 which call for international supervision of the destruction of Iraq's remaining weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges over 150 kilometers and for a continuing embargo on military equipment. Kuwait continues to suffer the consequences of Saddam Hussein's aggression. More than one-quarter of the oil fires have been extinguished, but a major task remains to put them all out. The country's economic infrastructure is in shambles, and its political institutions are only slowly being re-established. The Amir and the Crown Prince have pledged their commitment to Kuwait's 1962 constitution, which provides for a parliament. On June 2, the Amir announced that parliamentary elections will be held in October of next year. The National Council will be reconvened next month [July] to begin preparations for this election. Both publicly and in our private discussions with the Kuwaitis, we have stressed human rights. As Secretary Baker said on April 22, "The ability of the United States to support Kuwait politically and from a security standpoint . . . would be enhanced if they evidence full respect and commitment to the preservation of human rights." Senior Administration officials, including the President, have raised human rights abuses with the Kuwaiti government, which is taking action to stop them. The situation today is improved, although some abuses continue. Regular police now are patrolling the streets. The Crown Prince has issued a stern warning to the police and security services that human rights violations will not be tolerated. Recent reports of the deportation of non-Iraqis into Iraq and the manner in which they were carried out raise humanitarian concerns. We are raising this matter with the Kuwaiti government. The first session of collaborator trials in Kuwait were marked by flaws regarding the insufficiency of time to prepare defenses and the inability of some defendants to consult with their lawyers prior to trial. There has been improvement since that first session. Trials have been deferred to allow adequate time for defense preparations, and some cases have been dismissed for lack of evidence. We will continue to stress to the government of Kuwait that all trials must be fair and that all those accused of crimes must be afforded due process in accord with international human rights standards.
Turning to Lebanon, I would like to report [that] some progress continues to be made in ending the violence of the past 15 years. The Lebanese army has deployed into the areas surrounding Beirut previously held by Christian, Druze, and Shia militias. These militias have turned weapons over to the Lebanese army or shipped them elsewhere. The government plans for the army to move into the south and the rest of the country and to disarm all militias by September 30. US policy continues to be based on support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon; the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces; and the disbanding of all militias. We continue to believe that the full implementation of the Taif agreement provides the best opportunity to reach these goals. We have consistently told the Syrians that we expect them to live up to the letter and spirit of the Taif agreement and to help promote Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. On May 22, Lebanon and Syria signed a treaty which defines their bilateral relations. On June 6 the Lebanese cabinet named 40 new and replacement deputies to the Lebanese parliament. Both of these actions were called for in the Taif agreement. We have made it clear, both publicly and in our discussions with the Lebanese and Syrians, that our measure of the treaty will be whether its implementation is consistent with Lebanese independence and sovereignty and with the Taif agreement. We will be closely following the treaty's implementation.
Regional Stability
Arms Control. The Administration's commitment to the stability of the Middle East was underscored by the President in his May 29 speech at the Air Force Academy in which he announced an initiative aimed at "halting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons in the Middle East . . . while supporting the legitimate need of every state to defend itself." The President's initiative is a series of proposals intended to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as well as the missiles that can deliver them and to restrain any destabilizing conventional arms buildup in the region. The initiative builds on existing mechanisms to control weapons of mass destruction. It calls on all states in the region to implement a verifiable ban on production or acquisition of weapons- usable nuclear material and to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The initiative calls on all states in the region to become partners in the global chemical weapons convention and calls for strengthening of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. The initiative also proposes a freeze and eventual destruction of surface-to-surface missiles by the states in the region. The initiative calls for the five major supplier nations to meet to develop guidelines for restraint on destabilizing transfers of conventional arms as well as weapons of mass destruction and related technology. The French have agreed to host the first meeting of this group in July. Security Cooperation. The Middle East arms control initiative does not prohibit sales of conventional weapons to the Middle East nor does it call for a moratorium on such sales. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait graphically demonstrated that the states in the region have very real and very legitimate concerns about their ability to defend themselves. We thus will continue to meet the legitimate security requirements of our friends in the Middle East. Regional stability also will be enhanced by a continuing defense relationship between the United States and the Gulf states. We do not intend to maintain a permanent ground combat force in the area, but we will continue to maintain an enhanced naval presence in the Gulf and will have a rotational air presence in the region. We now are discussing with a number of Gulf states what type of cooperative arrangements will best enable the United States to contribute to regional security and stability by helping to deter future aggression and confronting it if necessary. This would include increased training and exercises with our friends in the area. Such arrangements also would involve the pre-positioning of US military equipment and access to military facilities for US forces in emergencies and for exercises. Responsibility for security in the Gulf ultimately rests with those nations most directly involved--the Gulf states themselves. We, therefore, are encouraging close defense cooperation among the states of the region. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991 Title:

UN Security Council Resolutions 699 and 700 on Iraq

Date: Jun 17, 19916/17/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT]
Resolution 699 (June 17, 1991)
The Security Council, Recalling its resolution 687 (1991), Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 17 May 1991 (S/22614), submitted to it in pursuance of paragraph 9(b) of resolution 687 (1991), Also taking note of the Secretary-General's note of 17 May 1991 (S/22615), transmitting to the Council the letter addressed to him under paragraph 13 of the resolution by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 1. Approves the plan contained in the report of the Secretary- General; 2. Confirms that the Special Commission and the IAEA have the authority to conduct activities under section C of resolution 687 (1991), for the purpose of the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 12 of that resolution, after the 45-day period following the approval of this plan until such activities have been completed; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council progress reports on the implementation of the plan referred to in paragraph 1 every six months after the adoption of this resolution; 4. Decides to encourage the maximum assistance, in cash and in kind, from all Member States to ensure that activities under section C of resolution 687 (1991) are undertaken effectively and expeditiously; further decides, however, that the Government of Iraq shall be liable for the full costs of carrying out the tasks authorized by section C; and requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council within 30 days for approval recommendations as to the most effective means by which Iraq's obligations in this respect may be fulfilled. VOTE: Unanimous 15-0.
Resolution 700 (June 17, 1991)
The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990 and 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, Taking note of the Secretary-General's report of 2 June 1991 (S/22660) submitted pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 687 (1991), Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report of 2 June 1991 (S/22660); 2. Approves the Guidelines to Facilitate Full International Implementation of paragraphs 24, 25, and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), annexed to the report of the Secretary- General (S/22660); 3. Reiterates its call upon all States and international organizations to act in a manner consistent with the Guidelines; 4. Requests all States, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Guidelines, to report to the Secretary-General within 45 days on the measures they have instituted for meeting the obligations set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991); 5. Entrusts the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait with the responsibility, under the Guidelines, for monitoring the prohibitions against the sale or supply of arms to Iraq and related sanctions established in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991); 6. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to review the Guidelines at the same time as it reviews paragraphs 22, 23, 24, and 25 of resolution 687 (1991) as set out in paragraph 28 thereof. VOTE: Unanimous 15-0. (###)