US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991
Title: Foreign Assistance Funding Request for FY 1992
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Statement as prepared for delivery before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Other Programs
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jun 12, 19916/12/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: NATO, CSCE, Democratization, State Department
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, I am privileged to appear before this subcommittee to
testify on behalf of our State Department funding proposal for
fiscal year (FY) 1992. I would like to express my thanks for the
efforts of this subcommittee in securing supplemental funding for
the State Department. This was essential both to meet the costs
we incurred in the Gulf crisis and to overcome the very difficult
effects of sequestration on our tight operations budget. As you
know, we are grateful for the critical efforts this subcommittee
makes to ensure we have adequate resources to promote America's
interests abroad. With your permission, I would like to have my
written statement entered into the record. I also would like to
offer a few brief opening observations on my recent trips to
Copenhagen and Geneva.
First, last week, NATO foreign ministers met in Copenhagen to
advance NATO's political adaptation as we move from last July's
London summit toward a November summit in Rome. In Copenhagen,
the alliance agreed on the core security functions that will guide
its work as we build a new Europe and a new Atlanticism. They
represent our agreement on the purpose, nature, and fundamental
tasks of NATO in the future. In short, we are meeting the promise
of last July's London declaration: to adapt NATO to new realities,
transforming our military strategy, and emphasizing NATO's
political role as an alliance of shared values.
Second, we advanced our work on many other fronts in
Copenhagen, including the relationship of the emerging European
security identity to NATO. While we welcome European discussions
of a European security identity, we made progress toward ensuring
that any such security identity would complement, not compete
with, NATO.
Third, we also made progress in advancing the alliance's
relations with our former adversaries to the East. Our discussions
concerning CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]
will, I believe, foster a productive CSCE ministerial in Berlin next
week and promote a Europe whole and free.
I was pleased that many of the initiatives regarding NATO's
liaison relationships that I proposed with [German] Foreign Minister
Genscher have been adopted by the alliance. We believe the
principles we have announced will make it clear to the Soviets and
the Central and East Europeans that NATO is serious about reaching
out to our former adversaries to build an atmosphere of trust and
cooperation across Europe.
We also are pleased with the alliance statement on Central
and Eastern Europe. As these new democracies continue their
difficult transitions to political and economic freedom, we hope
this statement is another reminder to them that we, in the West,
will continue to support them.
Fourth, in my meeting in Geneva with [Soviet] Foreign Minister
Bessmertnykh, we had a substantive exchange on the remaining
issues in START [strategic arms reductions talks] . We are agreed, I
believe, that while the remaining issues are difficult, they can be
solved through hard work on both sides. We have sent experts to
Geneva to accelerate work on the more technical issues, and it is
likely the Foreign Minister and I will meet again soon to maintain
momentum toward a completed agreement.
Fifth, on the question of support for Soviet reform, I told my
colleagues in Copenhagen--as I have told several Soviet officials
recently--that, in our view, perestroika is an opportunity for "new
thinking" in many areas. Perestroika presents opportunities for new
thinking not only in foreign policy, but also in defense policy, in
economics, in politics, and in Center-Republic relations. Having
begun this revolution, we hope that President Gorbachev will, as he
said in Oslo, "stay the course" on perestroika.
But, as he also said in Oslo, "perestroika has now entered its
most dramatic phase." Now, more than ever before, it is crucial
that the Soviet leadership seize the present opportunity to break
with the old ways that have proven unworkable before. They must
not miss this opportunity to begin to turn things around.
The United States remains committed to supporting the
success of both economic and political reform. No one can peer into
the future and assure us that Soviet reform will succeed. But we
believe that the Soviet Union is a country rich in natural resources
and talented peoples, a country that could transform itself into a
democratic and prosperous society.
The impulse to transform the Soviet Union has been a Soviet
choice. Perestroika is home-grown. It has been driven by the
realization that change in the Soviet Union is essential to prevent
deterioration and decay. And in this regard, perestroika, as
President Gorbachev has made so abundantly clear, is about much
more than economics. It is a full-fledged revolution--in politics, in
Center-Republic relations, in foreign policy, and in defense policy.
And in these areas, as much as in the economic sphere, perestroika
should continue along the path of greatest political and economic
freedom and international cooperation.
Thus, to achieve Soviet goals, to fulfill the hopes of
perestroika, and to tap the rich potential of the Soviet Union, it is
in Soviet interests to embrace a real market economy with private
property, incentives, laws on contracts, competition, a sound
currency, and real prices. It is in Soviet interests to continue their
efforts to build a state based on the rule of law and move to free
and fair elections. It is in Soviet interests to accommodate
peacefully the Baltics' aspirations through dialogue and
negotiations and complete a union treaty that will allow the
republics the autonomy they desire. It is in Soviet interests to
continue a positive foreign policy orientation while ending the most
clear-cut vestiges of the era of stagnation by eliminating support
for regimes that pursue internal repression or external subversion.
And it is in Soviet interests to accelerate their efforts at defense
conversion while committing both to opening their defense budget
and to reducing, significantly, the enormous share of GNP devoted to
defense spending.
In short, moving along the path of perestroika is, above all, in
the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviets
must find the will to open the way to a new future. And they must
start by helping themselves.
If they do, we will support them. We can serve as a catalyst
for both political and economic reform. Indeed, we are developing a
package of supportive measures, which we hope to coordinate with
other Western governments.
But we need to recognize that these changes will take effect
over a long time. As we work day-by-day, our efforts are almost
certain to be a step-by-step process--one with a grand goal but
always with a realistic and workable approach.
We recognize the hard choices the Soviets need to make.
Above all, we are aware how hard it will be to move toward a true
market economy. But for our part, we do not intend to stand idly by
if the Soviets come to grips with these questions of political and
economic legitimacy. Perestroika could be the most important
revolution of this century. All of us have a profound stake in its
outcome.
In this regard, let me stress how important it is that we solve
the Moscow Embassy problem. The fire has made a bad situation far
worse. Quite simply, we are at the point where it is extremely
difficult for our people in Moscow to do the job they have to do now,
let alone the increased work load likely to be created if the Soviets
move ahead with reform. With the naming of a new ambassador, it
is time to put this issue behind us and make the US Embassy in
Moscow worthy of the importance US-Soviet relations have in our
foreign policy.
The Administration would immediately proceed with
whichever of the two preferred approaches--"tear down and rebuild"
or "top hat"--the House and Senate can agree upon. But it is critical
that the Congress find a way to reach agreement between House and
Senate. Continued paralysis with respect to this issue is very much
against the national interest.
Before answering your questions, I would like to touch briefly
on most-favored-nation (MFN) status for China. I would like to
make one simple point: If we have learned anything in the last 2
years, it is that American engagement is essential to the promotion
of democratic values. We agree, of course, that China must
improve in the areas of human rights, non-proliferation, and trade--
and we will scrupulously implement existing laws that cover these
areas. However, attempting to isolate a government by cutting off
ties with its people is a counter-productive policy, and that is what
China-specific MFN conditions would do. MFN is one essential
element in keeping Chinese society open to the West, and
maintaining it is the surest way to promote economic reform, and,
ultimately, the growth of democratic values in that society.
FY 1992 Funding Request
To frame our overall funding request for international affairs
activities for FY 1992, let me review five broad policy objectives,
built around the five foreign policy challenges which I outlined to
Congress last year.
First, promoting and consolidating democratic values,
including free and fair elections and respect for human rights. As
the President noted in his State of the Union address, this
fundamental American principle has stood as a beacon to peoples
across the globe for more than 2 centuries.
Second, promoting free market principles and strengthening
US competitiveness. Sustainable economic development cannot be
separated from the pursuit of sound, growth-oriented policies;
together, these can promote US economic interests abroad.
Third, promoting peace by helping to defuse regional conflicts,
strengthening the security of our regional partners, and pursuing
arms control and non-proliferation efforts.
Fourth, protecting against transnational threats, especially to
the environment and from narcotics and terrorism.
Finally, meeting urgent humanitarian needs, through timely
development assistance, food aid, disaster relief, and refugee
assistance.
Working with you in Congress and our global partners, we
envision the use of five principal mechanisms to advance this
agenda worldwide.
One, more flexible and integrated bilateral assistance
authorities. In authorization legislation which we recently
submitted to Congress, we seek more flexible foreign assistance
account structures and greater ability to transfer funds both within
and among accounts to meet pressing, unexpected needs.
Two, more creative use of multilateral mechanisms to
advance our objectives, through the international financial
institutions, and through the UN system, whose funding falls under
the jurisdiction of this subcommittee.
The United Nations has played a historic role in the Gulf
crisis, one that is close to fulfilling the vision of its founders. The
Security Council's 14 resolutions, which laid the basis for ending
the crisis, symbolized the unity of the international community
against Iraq's aggression and established the principle of collective
security as a cornerstone of the post-Cold War era.
At the same time, the humanitarian organizations of the UN
system--together with the International Committee of the Red
Cross and the International Organization for Migration--are
coordinating a broad international effort to assist the hundreds of
thousands of refugees and displaced persons created by Iraqi
aggression.
The United States has a vital interest in strengthening this
new, revitalized United Nations as a full partner in the building of a
post-Cold War world where peace, stability, and prosperity prevail.
Indeed, our FY 1992 funding request before this subcommittee plays
a major part in advancing this objective: we seek full funding for
all current UN activities as well as funding for the President's plan
to pay our arrearages.
Three, we foresee greater reliance on creative responsibility-
sharing as we strengthen our global partnerships, especially with
the European Community and its members and with Japan. As many
in Congress have noted, our own difficult budgetary situation makes
such efforts especially important for the advancement of a common
agenda with partners who share our values and interests.
No effort so well illustrates the collective response of the
world community to defend world peace as our successful efforts to
enlist worldwide support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm, and for the front-line states whose economies have been set
back by the effects of Saddam Hussein's aggression. Strong US
leadership and shared values and interests have been essential to
catalyze the broad worldwide response we have enjoyed.
Four, we envision more creative use of trade and investment
policies as vehicles to promote US interests in world economic
growth, as well as to enhance our own economic strength.
Finally, we will be challenged to pursue more vigorous US
diplomacy in support of our goals, as we seek your support for a
State Department budget that provides the resources and flexibility
to meet the broad range of diplomatic challenges which lie ahead.
I believe the Gulf crisis provides an especially timely
reminder of the State Department's role on the "front lines" in
protecting American citizens and defending American interests.
Home and abroad, our professional staff--both Foreign and Civil
Service--made valuable contributions to formulating and
implementing the President's policies. Let me cite just a few
examples.
-- Our embassy personnel stationed in Kuwait during the
initial months of the Iraqi occupation represented a powerful
symbol to the Kuwaiti people that we were not prepared to tolerate
the absorption of their country by a ravenous neighbor.
-- Effective US leadership in Washington, New York, and our
posts abroad helped mobilize broad international support for the
diplomatic isolation of Iraq, thereby contributing to the successful
revitalization of the principles of the UN system.
-- Our Consular Affairs staff in Washington logged long
hours, ably fielding inquiries from thousands of concerned relatives
and friends on behalf of US hostages in Iraq and alerting American
citizens to rapidly changing security conditions in the region.
-- Our Middle East missions--many operating with reduced
staffing--responded with professionalism to the extraordinary
flurry of official visits before, during, and after the war.
As you know, promoting US interests abroad is an increasingly
expensive responsibility, exacerbated by the demands on the
Department to expand operations to meet new political and
economic opportunities around the globe. Fluctuations in exchange
rates, higher rates of overseas inflation, and the continuing need to
enhance the security of our posts and personnel abroad further
magnify the problem. Today, we face a potential and worrisome
weakening of our foreign affairs infrastructure at a time when we
are being called upon to meet extraordinary and new challenges.
Since January 1989, we have placed a high priority on
strengthening our ability to manage scarce resources. I believe we
have made some important achievements over this period.
-- To better match national interests to available resources,
we are taking steps to better integrate policy planning with the
budget process.
-- To strengthen Foreign Service personnel management, we
have begun to implement key proposals made by the Thomas and
Bremer commissions.
-- To conserve personnel and financial resources, we have set
up a new center in Rosslyn, Virginia, to process the many thousands
of refugee and asylum applications from the Soviet Union, which can
serve as a model to meet future consular and immigration demands.
-- To strengthen our physical plant abroad, we have put into
place a professional property management system and begun
implementation of a 5-year integrated plan which addresses new
construction, rehabilitation, repair, and maintenance.
-- To enhance the cost-effectiveness of our security efforts,
we have begun to implement reforms to link our wide-ranging
efforts at over 250 posts abroad to country-specific threat
profiles.
-- To provide some of the resources to meet changing
requirements, we are adjusting staffing levels at different posts in
Europe. We also plan to close or downsize certain posts in Western
Europe and elsewhere, while opening new posts and adding
additional positions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.
This takes me to the specifics of our FY 1992 funding request
before this subcommittee.
For State Department operations and other accounts within
the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, we seek a total
appropriation request of $4.18 billion, up by $947 million from the
FY 1991 level. The bulk of this increase is concentrated in three
discrete items: Moscow Embassy, foreign buildings, and
international organizations.
US Embassy in Moscow
Two years ago I promised this subcommittee a prompt review of the
Moscow Embassy situation, with recommendations submitted in the
context of our FY 1991 budget. We complied with that commitment
last year, when we sought $270 million in funding to tear down the
existing incomplete new structure and rebuild it in place. Speaking
before this subcommittee last year, I said that we had spent a lot
of time looking and that the time to act was now.
Regretfully, it was impossible to secure congressional
endorsement of any single construction option in last year's budget
cycle. So I come before you again this year, in the wake of a serious
fire in the old chancery, to ask both Houses of Congress to get
together and welcome our new ambassador to Moscow with a
construction project to supervise. We are seeking $130 million in
FY 1992 funding as a downpayment on a multi-year contract to
complete the Moscow Embassy. And we ask that you give serious
consideration to the notion of erecting four secure floors onto the
current incompleted new office building--the so-called top hat
option.
Judge Webster and I have concluded that both top hat and the
previous tear-down option would allow all classified operations to
be housed in new space built by cleared American workers with
materials securely shipped from the United States. We also agree
fully that the top hat option, which was developed in close
cooperation with the intelligence community, would provide space
just as secure as in the tear-down option, while saving at least $65
million in total costs and shortening construction time by almost 1
year.
Let me stress that our prime goal remains obtaining early,
definitive congressional support, so that we can begin construction
without further delay on a secure building in Moscow.
Given the nature of our bilateral relationship with the Soviet
Union, I am most reluctant to ask our staff to remain in makeshift
quarters for another 5 years or more. And, clearly, the existing,
insecure, fire-damaged building is a totally unacceptable
alternative. Therefore, I urge your active support in this
subcommittee, in your caucuses, and on the Senate floor for actions
to make construction of a secure chancery in Moscow possible this
year. We have always welcomed your support on this issue, and I am
confident that you will help build an effective congressional
consensus this year for a secure option that can be built.
Foreign Buildings
Our remaining foreign buildings request of $440 million represents
an increase of $212 million over the amount appropriated in FY
1991. This marks the first installment of a 5-year, $2.35 billion
program to address our most urgent facility replacement priorities,
including embassies in Bangkok and Bogota. Our goal is to restore
the safety, security, and workability of our aging but valuable
inventory of overseas facilities.
The FY 1992 increase is almost entirely devoted to funding for
capital construction, construction security, and maintenance
programs which, in the current year, are relying on available no-
year appropriations.
We recognize that we must deploy wisely all resources
available to us for our building program. To this end we have made
major efforts over the past 2 years to:
-- Use our unobligated FBO [Foreign Buildings Operations]
balances on high priority programs;
-- Make the best possible use of the appreciated value in our
extensive real property holdings overseas; and
-- Ensure that all of our building programs are mutually
supportive by putting in place a comprehensive 5-year plan for
facility replacement, rehabilitation, repair, and maintenance
requirements.
International Organizations
The President has emphasized the urgency of restoring financial
viability to the United Nations and other international
organizations. After several years of effort on the part of Congress
and the Administration, we are pleased to report significant
movement toward budgetary and administrative reform within the
United Nations and its affiliated agencies. No one who has
witnessed the response of the UN Security Council to recent events
in the Persian Gulf could deny the importance to US interests of a
financially healthy UN system.
We remain absolutely committed to full funding for US
assessed contributions, to the extent permitted by law, and to
paying our prior year arrearages over the next 4 years. We
appreciate the full funding we received for FY 1991, which included
initial funding toward the necessary process of arrears clearance.
For FY 1992, we are requesting $750 million in budget authority to
meet our current assessments to international organizations, plus
an additional $371 million for arrears clearance, to be paid out over
the following 4 years. For international peace-keeping activities,
we are requesting $69 million to meet our full funding obligations,
plus $132 million for arrearages, which also would be paid out over
4 years.
Aside from those three initiatives, our core programs have
been held to minimum levels.
State Salaries and Expenses
For State Department salaries and expenses, we are requesting
$2.05 billion in budget authority for FY 1992, an increase of $179
million over the current year. This is the minimal level of
resources we need to fund our overseas and domestic operations.
Over two-thirds of this increase compensates for price increases
and exchange rate changes. The remainder will be used to support
several specific funding requirements.
-- Expanding further our diplomatic presence in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe ($25 million).
-- Responding to increased immigration processing
requirements necessitated by passage of the Immigration Act of
1990 ($24 million).
-- Strengthening our information and financial systems
($13.5 million).
Adequate funding of this basic operating account is essential
for meeting our day-to-day foreign policy responsibilities.
Public Diplomacy
Public diplomacy will be one of our most valuable tools as we seek
to encourage the worldwide tide of democracy and political
pluralism. For the valuable work of the US Information Agency and
the Board for International Broadcasting, we are requesting $1.3
billion in FY 1992 funding, up slightly from the prior year. Within
this level, a new emphasis will be placed on information and
cultural programs in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the
Islamic world.
Thank you again, for this opportunity to discuss our State
Department funding proposal for FY 1992. We look forward to
working with you to ensure we will continue to have adequate
resources to promote America's interests abroad. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991
Title: US-Soviet Grain Agreement
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jun 11, 19916/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
President Bush has informed President Gorbachev today that the
United States will meet the Soviet request for up to $1.5 billion in
credit guarantees toward the purchase of American agricultural
products. Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan will follow up
immediately with Soviet officials to work out the details of the
agreement.
The President's offer specifies US willingness to make the
credit guarantees available in three tranches over the next 9
months--$600 million this month, $500 million in October 1991,
and $400 million in February 1992. The President made this
decision after having received the views of the presidential
delegation he sent to the USSR in late May to study the grain
request and the food distribution system.
In addition to meeting the Soviet request for credit
guarantees, the President today also expressed to President
Gorbachev his continued interest in collaborating on a long-term
effort to improve the food distribution system in the USSR,
primarily through the introduction of market measures. The United
States is prepared to form a high-level team of government and
private experts to assist the Soviets in this effort.
In making this decision, the President took into consideration
the record of the Soviet government in meeting its official
obligations. The President's decision also followed assurances
from the Soviet government that the grains made available through
the credit guarantees would be fairly distributed among Soviet
republics and the Baltic states. The President's decision reflects
the Administration's desire to promote a continued positive
evolution in the US-Soviet relationship. In particular, we hope that
this assistance will help to stabilize the food situation in that
country. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991
Title: North Atlantic Council Meeting
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from remarks at news conference in Copenhagen,
Denmark
Date: Jun 7, 19916/7/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, North America, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: Germany, USSR (former)
Subject: NATO, CSCE
[TEXT]
Let me begin by thanking Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen and our
Danish hosts for their kind hospitality here in Copenhagen.
Last week, NATO's defense ministers made significant
progress in furthering the alliance's military adaptation. Our work
here complements that work and moves it forward by making
significant progress in advancing NATO's political adaptation as we
move from London to Rome.
First, the alliance has agreed on the core security functions
that will guide its work as we build a new Europe and a new
Atlanticism. They represent our agreement on the purpose, nature,
and fundamental tasks of NATO in the future. These core functions
show that we are meeting the promise of last July's London
Declaration: to adapt NATO to new realities. We are transforming
our military strategy. We are emphasizing NATO's political role as
an alliance of shared values.
Second, we have advanced our work on many fronts, including
the relationship of the emerging European security identity to NATO
as well as NATO's relations with CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe].
Third, I am pleased that many of the initiatives regarding
NATO's liaison relationships that I proposed with [German] Foreign
Minister Genscher have been adopted now by this alliance. We
believe that the principles we have announced will make it clear to
the Soviets and to the Central and East Europeans that NATO is
serious about reaching out to former adversaries to build an
atmosphere of trust and cooperation across Europe.
Fourth, on the question of support for Soviet reform, we have
had a very constructive exchange of ideas. I stressed in my
intervention which has been made public [see Dispatch, Vol. 2, No.
23], that in our view perestroika is an opportunity for "new
thinking" in many areas--of course in foreign policy, but also in
defense policy, in economics, in politics, and in Center-Republic
relations. Having begun this revolution, we believe that President
Gorbachev will, as he said in Oslo, "stay the course" on perestroika.
But, as he also said in Oslo, "perestroika has now entered its
most dramatic phase." Now, more than ever before, it is crucial
that the Soviet leadership seize the present opportunity to break
with old ways that have proved unworkable before.
In this endeavor, the Soviets obviously have to help
themselves, but we in the West can, and will help, also. The United
States will be working with our allies to do just that.
In sum, ladies and gentlemen, we have had an extraordinarily
productive meeting of the North Atlantic Council as we fulfill the
promise of the London Declaration and move solidly toward a fall
summit in Rome. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991
Title: North Atlantic Council Texts
Description: Texts released at the NAC ministerial meeting in
Copenhagen, Denmark
Date: Jun 7, 19916/7/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, North America, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: Germany, USSR (former)
Subject: NATO, CSCE
[TEXT]
FINAL COMMUNIQUE
At their Summit in London last July, our Heads of State and
Government committed our Alliance of free and democratic nations
to a process of adaptation commensurate with the changes that
have reshaped the face of Europe. The fundamental review that they
mandated of the Alliance's political and military strategy is being
carried out on all levels and is approaching completion. Our Heads
of State and Government will convene in Rome on [the] 7th and 8th
[of] November to bring this process to its conclusion.
The process initiated by the London Declaration is an
important contribution to enhancing stability and security within a
free Europe. Our efforts to ensure stability in peace and freedom
will recognize the political, economic, social and ecological
elements of security, along with the indispensable defence
dimension. The Alliance, the EC [European Community], the WEU
[Western European Union], the CSCE and the Council of Europe are
key institutions in this endeavour. We are guided by our ultimate
goal of establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in the whole
of Europe.
To this end, much has been achieved recently. Following the
entry into force of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect
to Germany, united Germany for the first time participates in a
meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level as a fully
sovereign member of this Alliance. As we noted in our statement
issued yesterday, the division of Europe has been overcome. In
fulfillment of the undertakings contained in the Charter of Paris
and the Joint Declaration of 22 states signed last November, which
now assume ever greater relevance, we are cooperating with the
Soviet Union and the other Central and Eastern European states more
closely than before. We will work to make the forthcoming meeting
of CSCE Foreign Ministers in Berlin a decisive new step in the
development of the CSCE process.
In adapting to the new era in Europe and in striving to develop
cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free, the
Alliance will continue to perform its enduring basic missions.
Today we have issued a separate statement setting out these core
security functions of the Alliance. They will provide an essential
basis from which the Allies will be able to take full advantage of
new opportunities in building the new Europe.
1. A transformed Atlantic Alliance constitutes an essential
element in the new architecture of an undivided Europe; we are
agreed that the Alliance must have the flexibility to continue to
develop and evolve as the security situation dictates. An important
basis for this transformation is the agreement of all Allies to
enhance the role and responsibility of the European members. We
welcome efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the
process of European integration and recognise the significance of
the progress made by the countries of the European Community
towards the goal of political union, including the development of a
common foreign and security policy. These two positive processes
are mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security
identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the
European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and
effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.
2. We are agreed, in parallel with the emergence and
development of a European security identity and defence role, to
enhance the essential transatlantic link that the Alliance
guarantees and fully to maintain the strategic unity and
indivisibility of security of all our members. We will continue, in
particular, to ensure the Alliance's capability to fulfill its
essential functions. The Alliance is the essential forum for
consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on
policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of allies
under the Washington Treaty, as expressed in the statement on
NATO's Core Security Functions accompanying this communique. We
all agree that the military dispositions necessary to ensure the
collective defence of the Allies must be maintained. This applies in
particular to the integrated military structure for the Allied
countries that participate in it.
3. Recognising that it is for the European Allies concerned to
decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a
common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we
further agree that, as the two processes advance, we will develop
practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and
complementarity between the European security and defence
identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance.
There will be a need, in particular, to establish appropriate links
and consultation procedures between them in order to ensure that
the Allies that are not currently participating in the development of
a European identity in foreign security policy and defence should be
adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security.
4. Allies are convinced that arms control and confidence-
building measures will continue to shape and consolidate a new
cooperative order in Europe in which no country need harbour fears
for its security. The CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]
Treaty is the keystone for such a stable and lasting peace on the
continent. In our separate Statement yesterday, we expressed our
hope that a binding agreement can soon be reached to resolve the
problems which had arisen with respect to the Treaty, allowing it
to move forward to early ratification and entry into force and full
implementation. Once concluded, such an agreement will open the
way for us to make new proposals on military manpower in Europe
without delay in the CFE 1A negotiations now taking place in
Vienna. In the CSBM [confidence- and security-building measures]
negotiations, we will seek further to strengthen openness and
stability. Work within the Alliance is moving forward in
preparation for new negotiations on conventional arms in Europe,
open to all CSCE members, after the Helsinki CSCE Follow-Up
Meeting in 1992. We look forward to informal preparatory
consultations on this subject with CSCE partners in the Autumn.
5. The Allies attach high importance to the earliest possible
establishment of an Open Skies regime as an essential contribution
to transparency among all participants. We have recently made
fresh proposals to that end, and we call on all participants to join
us in a prompt resumption of productive negotiations.
6. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), Allies
support the United States' efforts to reach a final agreement that
will provide a framework for strategic stability into the next
century. Preparations among the Allies concerned are advancing on
an arms control framework for US-Soviet negotiations on the
reduction of their short-range nuclear forces.
7. Allies have worked for many years to advance progress in
the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament on a regional and
global basis. The Gulf crisis demonstrated what we have long
recognised: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and of missiles capable of delivering them, and excessive
transfers of conventional arms undermine international security
and increase the risk of armed conflict throughout the world. To
meet this challenge, we have renewed our commitment to the
earliest possible achievement of advances in the international
forums dealing with specific proliferation issues. We fully endorse
the goal of concluding a global, comprehensive and effectively
verifiable chemical weapons convention by mid-1992 and support
President's Bush's initiative of 13th May to that effect. We will
also seek in September 1991, at the Third Review Conference on the
Biological Weapons Convention, to strengthen that Convention and to
encourage further accessions to it. We will urgently pursue efforts
in the United Nations and elsewhere to address the problem of
excessive buildups of conventional arms by ensuring transparency
and restraint. Several of our leaders have recently proposed arms
control and non-proliferation initiatives, including for the Middle
East. These initiatives reflect our commitment to the goals
described above.
8. The Gulf conflict confirmed the importance of intra-
Alliance consultations and information-sharing, which helped to
reinforce political solidarity among Allies throughout the crisis.
The collective expression of support for the Ally facing a direct
threat demonstrated our resolve to stand by our commitments under
Article V of the Washington Treaty and helped to deter a further
expansion of hostilities. Although NATO itself was not involved in
the Gulf war, the long practice of cooperation, common procedures,
collective defence arrangements and infrastructure developed by
NATO provided valuable assistance to those Allies that chose to
make use of them in their respective efforts in support of the UN
Security Council Resolutions on the Gulf.
9. Looking to the future, we believe that just and lasting
solutions to the problems of the Gulf and the Middle East are
urgently needed. We thus support current efforts for comprehensive
negotiated settlements to the problems of that region.
10. The Gulf crisis underlined that, in an interdependent
world that is increasingly affected by technological advances, we
must be prepared to address other unpredictable developments that
are beyond the focus of traditional Alliance concerns, but that can
have direct implications for our security. Now more than ever,
worldwide developments which affect our security interests are
legitimate matters for consultation and, where appropriate,
coordination among us. We will thus increasingly need to address
broader issues and new global challenges. We will seek to do so in
our consultations and in the appropriate multilateral forums, in the
widest possible cooperation with other states.
11. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious
hospitality extended to us by Her Majesty the Queen and the
Government of Denmark.
NATO'S CORE SECURITY FUNCTION IN THE NEW EUROPE
The Purpose of the Alliance
1. NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty
and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the
freedom and security of all its members by political and military
means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and
the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the
establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This
Alliance objective remains unchanged.
The Nature of the Alliance
2. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security
of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It
is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its
members in support of their common interests.
3. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that
of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign
states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its
members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and
effect by NATO's daily work in both the political and military
spheres, ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own
national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges.
Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume
their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance
enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to
realize their essential national security objectives.
4. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members
of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or
in their national military capabilities relative to each other,
contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the
creation of conditions conducive to increased cooperation both
among Alliance members and with others. It is on this basis that
members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to
pursue the development of cooperative structures of security for a
Europe whole and free.
The Fundamental Tasks Of the Alliance
5. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security
policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the
maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and
to provide for effective defence; an overall capability to manage
successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the
pursuit of political efforts favouring dialogue with other nations
and the active search for a cooperative approach to European
security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.
6. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the
following fundamental security tasks:
I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a
stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of
democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution
of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or
coerce any European nation or impose hegemony through the threat
or use of force.
II. To serve, as provided for in Article IV of the North
Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations
on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible
developments posing risks for members' security, and for
appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common
concern.
III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression
against the territory of any NATO member state.
IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.
7. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE
also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective
responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a
European identity in security and defence will underline the
preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of
responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce
transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and
of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can
perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential
forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for
agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence
commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.
In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set
out above, member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as
well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the
Washington Treaty remain unchanged. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991
Title: President's Report on MFN Status for China
Description: Text of the President's Report to Congress Concerning
Extension of Waiver Authority for the People's Republic of
China, released by the White House
Date: May 29, 19915/29/91
Category: Reports
Region: East Asia
Country: China
Subject: Human Rights, Immigration, Travel,
Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Pursuant to Subsection 402 (d) (1) of the Trade Act of 1974
(hereinafter "the Act"), having determined that further extension of
the waiver authority granted by Subsection 402 (c) of the Act for
twelve months will substantially promote the objectives of Section
402, I have today determined that continuation of the waiver
currently applicable to China will also substantially promote the
objectives of Section 402 of the Act. My determination [No. 91-36]
is attached and is incorporated herein.
Freedom of Emigration Determination
China's relatively free emigration policies have continued during
the past twelve months. In FY 1990, 16,751 US immigrant visas
were issued in China. The US numerical limitation for immigrants
from China was fully met. The principal restraint on increased
emigration continues to be the capacity and willingness of other
nations to absorb Chinese immigrants, not Chinese policy. After
considering all the relevant information, I have concluded that
continuing the MFN waiver will preserve the gains already achieved
on freedom of emigration and encourage further progress.
Chinese Foreign Travel Policies
China continues to adhere to a relatively open foreign travel policy.
According to Chinese officials, issuance of passports for private
travel has increased more than threefold since 1986. US diplomatic
posts in China issued 60,687 non-immigrant visas in FY 1990. In FY
1990, 33,800 visas were issued worldwide to student and tourists
from China, a 19 percent increase over FY 1989 and an 84 percent
increase over FY 1988.
Chinese officials report that several thousand students have
returned from overseas for visits after June 1989 and have been
allowed to depart again under expedited procedures. We cannot
verify these figures, but we are not aware of any cases in which
Chinese living in the US who returned to China for visits after June
1989 were prevented from leaving again.
Foreign travel officially sponsored by the Chinese
Government, mainly involving businessmen and state-sponsored
scholars, continued to decline in FY 1990, this reflects the effects
of economic austerity measures and, in the case of scholars,
concern about extended delays in their return to China. In February
1990, China issued a new directive requiring recent college
graduates and fourth-year undergraduates to work for five years
before applying for overseas study, with some exceptions. The
directive most likely has forced some students to defer their plans
for overseas study, but its full impact is unclear since student visa
applications and issuances continue to increase. We are aware of a
small number of individuals who have had difficulty in obtaining
permission to travel abroad, apparently because of the political
activities of their relatives in the US. We have discussed these
cases with Chinese authorities, who have indicated a willingness to
address the issue.
Overall Human Rights Climate
In addition to the emigration considerations of Section 402, we are
continuing to monitor closely the overall human rights climate in
China and press our concerns vigorously at all levels of the Chinese
Government. Beijing has taken a number of steps on human rights
issues that we have urged since June 1989. No part of China is now
subject to martial law. The vast majority of those detained in the
wake of the 1989 demonstrations have been released. Over 1,000
prisoners were released since the beginning of 1990. Prominent
dissident Fang Lizhi and his family were permitted to leave China in
June 1990, and most relatives of Chinese citizens in the US who
sought to join them have been allowed to do so. Chinese diplomats
have ceased threatening Chinese students residing in the US.
Authorities in Tibet have avoided violence in quelling
demonstrations since March 1989. Foreign officials and journalists
are again able to visit the region, and even to tour the main prison
in Lhasa.
Beijing hosted an unprecedented visit by Assistant Secretary
[of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Richard]
Schifter in December 1990. The Chinese have agreed to receive
additional human rights delegations from the Congress, Australia
and France later this year. The Schifter visit inaugurated a more
formal human rights dialogue than we have ever had with China. In
recent weeks, Chinese officials have begun to respond to some of
our key questions on the status of cases against the detainees, the
judicial process, religious repression and family planning. They
have also provided assurances that China's prohibition on prison
exports would be enforced, and that no special restrictions would
be placed on people wishing to join dissident relatives abroad.
I nonetheless still have serious concerns about the human
rights situation in China. According to official Chinese figures, 813
persons have been convicted by courts in Beijing on charges
stemming from the 1989 protests, including 26 so far this year.
Most were charged with crimes against persons or property but
nearly 100 of these were tried for "counterrevolutionary crimes"
(e.g., instigation or organizing rebellious activities) that apparently
involved nothing other than nonviolent political actions. At least
scores if not more have been convicted elsewhere in China. Since
1989, others, probably including peaceful demonstrators, have been
sent to labor reeducation camps for up to three years after
administrative hearings. Freedom of expression, religion, the press,
and association remain tightly constrained. The Chinese continue to
jam the Mandarin language service of Voice of America.
In Tibet, participants in ongoing pro-independence activities
continue to be subject to legal prosecution. Several hundred
persons are currently incarcerated for what appear to be only
nonviolent political activities.
Impact of MFN on Other US Interests
The granting of MFN tariff status to China was a key element in the
normalization of our diplomatic relations and provided a framework
for a major expansion of our economic and commercial relations.
Maintaining non-discriminatory tariff status is fundamental for
strong bilateral trade relations with China. In 1990, bilateral trade
totaled $20 million, with Chinese exports of $15.2 billion and US
exports of $4.8 billion. The United States is China's largest export
market, absorbing 25 percent of China's total exports.
If MFN were withdrawn, China would reciprocate by applying
its own higher non-MFN tariffs to US products and possibly erect
other trade barriers as well. With US companies placed at a
disadvantage, competitors from Japan and Europe would quickly
move to replace US exports in our largest markets in China--grain,
aircraft and aerospace equipment, industrial machinery, steel
products, chemicals, fertilizers and computers. US joint ventures
in China would pay higher duties on imported components from the
US, and their exports to the US would be subject to non-MFN tariffs,
jeopardizing their continued operations. Loss of MFN would lead to
higher prices for US consumers of products made in China, including
toys, apparel and footwear.
Maintaining MFN is essential for promoting reform in China.
The opening of China and expansion of bilateral commercial
relations made possible by MFN have contributed significantly to
improving living standards, introducing progressive ideas and
further integrating China into the world community as it continues
its drive to modernize. With-drawing MFN would most hurt the
dynamic coastal provinces in China which have gone the farthest in
introducing market-oriented economic reforms. It would further
isolate those in China who look to the US for support in their effort
to liberalize Chinese society.
Withdrawing MFN would have a major impact on Hong Kong's
free enterprise economy, which depends heavily on US-China trade
and the health of export industries in South China. The economic
disruption which followed MFN withdrawal would further undermine
confidence in Hong Kong's future.
While US-China relations still cannot return to normal under
current circumstances, withdrawing China's MFN status would harm
vital US interests. On a variety of global and regional issues, China
has an important and sometimes crucial influence. As a permanent
member of the UN Security Council, China voted for twelve
resolutions on the Persian Gulf and abstained on two others,
enabling all to pass. China's cooperation is also important for other
US foreign policy objectives, such as seeking peace in Cambodia,
reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula, and restricting transfers
of nuclear, CBW [chemical and biological weapons] and missile
equipment and technology.
In summary, maintaining non-discriminatory trade status
gives China an incentive to stay engaged on issues of vital concern
to the US, including human rights, non-proliferation, global and
regional affairs and trade. I hope to work with the Congress to
achieve these shared objectives. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991
Title: CSCE--One of the Building Blocks of a New Europe
Quayle
Source: Vice President Quayle
Description: Remarks at the CSCE Symposium on Cultural Heritage,
Krakow, Poland
Date: Jun 6, 19916/6/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Country: Poland, Czechoslovakia (former), Hungary
Subject: CSCE
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, representatives of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, officials and citizens of Krakow: This is the
Quayle family's first visit to Poland, and we are pleased that it is a
visit to a free Poland. We look forward to revisiting free Poland
many times in the future.
I am especially honored to visit Krakow, one of the great
intellectual centers of Europe. Its former Archbishop is now the
Bishop of Rome and the Church Universal. It is not by chance that
Poland achieved independence when John Paul II resided in the Holy
See.
Poland's freedom and the growth of liberty throughout Central
and Eastern Europe are due in no small part to the CSCE. For a
generation, CSCE has been a beacon of hope to a troubled and divided
continent; it has served as an ongoing vigil, held by those who
enjoyed the blessings of freedom, on behalf of those who did not.
Now, with the Cold War behind us, CSCE offers new avenues of
cooperation. The United States will continue to play an active role
in CSCE. We fully support the CSCE process and its institutions.
CSCE is one of the building blocks of a new Europe. A Europe, as
President Bush has described it, whole and free.
My friends, as you know, there are dates that resonate down
through the centuries of European history. These dates mark
revolutions that have permanently transformed the lives of
generations of Europeans. After the revolution of 1789, Europe--
and, indeed, the world--were never the same again. Similarly, the
forces let loose in 1848 eventually reshaped the continent of
Europe.
Today's gathering provides an opportunity to reflect on yet
another major turning point in the history of Europe--the
revolutions of 1989-90.
The events of the last 2 years, like those of 1848 and 1789,
will shape the course of history. Communism, thank God, is
disappearing into the dust bin of history. Central and Eastern
Europe's nightmare of totalitarianism is over. Democracy's triumph
is at hand.
However, we cannot merely celebrate the revolutions of
1989--and the great courage and strength of the peoples of Europe
who made those events possible, we need to defend and build on
yesterday's victories.
I am here to tell you that the government and people of the
United States of America are committed to helping the people of
Central and Eastern Europe achieve their goals. We see your
democratic revolutions as affirming the principles underlying our
own national identity. As a nation of immigrants--so many from
this very region--the United States has always felt that our
freedom is enhanced by the advance of freedom elsewhere. For the
peoples of Central and Eastern Europe especially. Your long wait
was our long wait. Your freedom is our freedom. And your success
is our success.
As President Bush said in Prague last November, "We will not
fail you in this decisive moment." We want to help build on the
successes that the new democracies have already achieved--to help
overcome the legacy of the dictators and to encourage their
integration into the commonwealth of freedom.
Make no mistake about it. There have already been
monumental successes. But despite these successes, the region
faces major challenges. The old system was not kind to the peoples
of Central and Eastern Europe. It scarred their land and fouled their
water and air. Despite your energy and genius, it retarded the
development of modern industry.
The remains of the old system are still a burden. But your
resolve is strong; your course is set. You have been called upon to
create the future, to provide the models for other societies in
transition to democracy. You are blessed with an abundance of
skilled workers and talented entrepreneurs. This region's human
potential--long suppressed--is vast. But unrelenting reform is
needed to liberate the economic dynamism of the region and
encourage the creativity throttled by the command economy of the
past. Accordingly, our approach to supporting the transformation of
Eastern and Central Europe is to help liberate the industry of the
peoples of this region.
First, we are offering technical aid--to give the people the
tools to compete. But markets are more important than aid.
Therefore, we are working to facilitate greater trade with the
West.
At a time when East European trade with the USSR is
shrinking, the United States will open our markets as widely as
possible to Central and East European products. We urge the
European Community and the European Free Trade Association to
open their markets also.
Indeed, we are making market access for the Central and East
European economies a top priority of the G-7 [economic] summit in
London next month. The West has a responsibility to remove market
barriers, so that the people of this region can sell the products of
their liberated economies.
The third component of our approach is to promote Western
investment in the Central and East European economies.
That is why, in March, we announced a Private Sector
Development Initiative, which will provide some $45 million in
programs to encourage trade, investment, and joint ventures in
Central and Eastern Europe.
And that is why President Bush established Joint American
Enterprise Funds with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to
promote private investment. In addition, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) will lead its first investment
mission to Czechoslovakia in October--while in Sofia tomorrow, I
will sign the first OPIC agreement with the government of Bulgaria.
But while the United States and other Western nations help the
nations of Central and Eastern Europe make the transition to a free
market, we must continue to provide support in the field of
political institution-building.
Our friends in the region tell us that such help has been
absolutely critical. We must concentrate on strengthening
democracy at the grassroots. An independent labor force, a free
press, honest elections, and an independent judiciary--these are the
heart and soul of a democratic society. Our aim must be to help
such institutions take firm root and flourish. As the institutional
structures of democracy fall into place, we must nurture as well
the ethical and spiritual essence of a democratic society.
One of our Founding Fathers, James Madison, taught Americans
that freedom cannot be secured merely by what he called the
"parchment barriers" of constitutional and legal texts. Rather,
these texts must be given life by the virtues and habits of a people.
These virtues include tolerance of others; respect for the rule of
law; a willingness to compromise and to renounce violence; an
ability to rejoice in the achievements and successes of one's
neighbors; and the capacity to cherish and celebrate the cultural,
ethnic, and religious heritage of others. It is these values--the
very values of CSCE--that are prevailing throughout Central and
Eastern Europe.
All this constitutes a formidable agenda. The old system was
decayed, and so it crumbled swiftly. Creating a new order, in which
the people govern and are free to live productive lives, will not be
easy. But, it will happen.
We know that life in Central and Eastern Europe today is hard.
But it will improve--slowly at first, then with a quickening pace.
We know that your most abundant resource is the courage and
determination of your people. We admire the courage of the people
of Central and Eastern Europe in resisting dictatorship.
We admire your successful efforts to free yourselves. We
admire what you are doing today. We know that helping you is our
obligation and our interest. We are confident in your success, and I
pledge to you, as President Bush pledged--we will not let you down.
We will stand with you as you complete the transition from
the dark night of oppression and dictatorship to the bright future of
freedom and prosperity. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991
Title: Germany: Opening of Consulate General Leipzig
Tutwiler
Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jun 7, 19916/7/91
Region: Europe
Country: Germany
Subject: State Department
[TEXT]
The United States has opened its Consulate General in Leipzig
effective today. The consular district for the Leipzig Consulate
General encompasses the German states of Saxony and Thuringia.
Initially, the Consulate General will be staffed by three
Americans: Consul General Robert W. Becker, Consul Janet Garvey
and Consul Nicholas J. Dean, plus a locally engaged staff. An
America House cultural center, including a library, will be opened in
Leipzig by the US Information Service as soon as suitable space can
be found. As Branch Public Affairs Officer, Ms. Garvey will direct
the operations of the America House.
The Consulate General is responsible for developing political,
economic, commercial, and cultural ties and representing US
interests in Thuringia and Saxony. The Consulate General also will
respond to emergency needs of American citizens in the consular
district. Routine visa and passport requests, however, will be
handled from the US Embassy office in Berlin.
The Consulate General is discussing permanent office space
with the city of Leipzig and the government of Saxony. At present,
the Consulate General will operate from office space located in the
Consul General's residence and will not have public office hours.
The public can make appointments through the mail and via
telephone and telefax.
The Consulate General is located at Karl-Tauchnitz-Strasse
15#1510-7010 Leipzig. The telephone number is Leipzig 2114-293;
telefax number, Leipzig 2114-210. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991
Title: FY 1992 Security Assistance Request
Bartholomew
Source: Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary for
International Security Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Jun 11, 19916/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Central America,
South America, Subsaharan Africa, East Asia,
Southeast Asia, Europe
Country: Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Philippines
Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales,
Narcotics, State Department, NATO
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, both Congress and the Administration recognize that
our foreign aid program is one of the principal tools we have to
advance our interests and objectives abroad. Today, I want to
examine how the use of one set of our foreign assistance tools--the
security assistance accounts--contributes to our broad foreign
policy goals: to preserve and protect peace and stability among
nations and to promote democracy and development within them. In
particular, I want to discuss security assistance as it relates to
two other key elements in our national security web: the fostering
and maintenance of our alliances and the advancement of our arms
control and non-proliferation agendas.
Promoting and Maintaining Collective Self-Defense
Arrangements
Our efforts to promote and maintain collective self-defense
arrangements begin with NATO. NATO has been the bedrock of
Western security for nearly half a century. It is NATO that has
enabled the allies to win the Cold War; it is NATO that will remain
the keystone of European security for the long term.
Today, changes in and around Europe pose new security
problems that require a renewed Atlantic alliance. Fortunately, we
are no longer required to focus on a singular, direct threat. Indeed,
the alliance is pursuing cooperation with the Soviet Union and the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe on many fronts. NATO is
serving as one among several Western institutions which will
engage the Soviet Union more fully in the world community.
We are adapting NATO to a new security environment. An
example of how well NATO is evolving is provided by Desert Storm.
The vital role of the alliance in support of coalition efforts in the
[Persian] Gulf is clear. It was NATO's infrastructure bases,
communications facilities, and command and control systems,
which were so important in sustaining US forces in the Gulf.
Moreover, NATO political and security consultation helped ensure
unanimity in support of war aims.
The meeting of NATO defense ministers last month agreed on
important initiatives in NATO's military dimension, such as the
formation of a multi-national rapid reaction corps under European
command. And, beyond the purely military dimension, NATO retains
the initiative in arms control and other security negotiations, as
well as the broader political agenda. At the last foreign ministers'
meeting, NATO agreed on further steps in its liaison program with
the Soviet Union and the emerging democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe. It has taken a leading role in helping guide and
develop the CSCE process. It is a forum for consultation, decision,
and coordination on crises throughout Europe.
The role of security assistance here is clear. In order for
several of our allies to have the confidence and capability to make a
full contribution to the alliance, they need our help. Their
contributions to Desert Storm demonstrate the wisdom of our
policies. I will outline our proposal for aid to NATO and other
security partners later in my testimony.
Reducing Threats to US and International Security
The second element of our efforts to promote security and stability
abroad is the reduction of threats to our security and to that of
others. There are a number of ways we do this, but there are two
that I would like to discuss specifically: arms control and non-
proliferation.
We have made significant progress in the area of arms control
in these past few months. We believe that we have ironed out all
remaining difficulties in the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe] Treaty, and we hope to be able to say the same soon for
START [strategic arms reductions talks]. Throughout, though, we
have been guided by two realities. First, arms control is a means to
advance our security interest, not an end in itself. Second, arms
control takes time. Recall that it has taken us almost two decades
to achieve agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in
Europe.
Non-proliferation is a global problem that the Administration
has been attacking on a global basis; indeed, in just a few days, I am
making a trip to China that will focus on advancing our non-
proliferation objectives. I hope soon to travel to South Asia to
advance those same objectives. The presidential initiative
announced May 13, under which we have proposed to destroy our
entire stock of chemical weapons, has set the stage for achieving a
global treaty banning chemical weapons within a year. In the
Australia Group, US leadership has produced a breakthrough in
worldwide control of exports of chemical weapons and precursors
and chemical weapons-related dual-use equipment. And in missile
non-proliferation, US activism in the recent past has promoted the
expansion of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) from 7
to 16 countries.
But while our overall non-proliferation concern is global, we
intend to make a special effort in the Middle East, under the
President's initiative on Middle East arms control. The Gulf war has
heightened not only our concern, but the world's concern over the
global impact of instability in the Middle East, and it highlighted
the need to move forward expeditiously. The initiative is
comprehensive, as you know. It contains proposals on missiles,
nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, Iraq-
specific measures, and conventional arms.
Security assistance will play a key role here as well, in
assuring that friends are confident enough in their own ability to
defend themselves that they will accept the kinds of limits we are
exploring under the President's arms control initiative. Security
assistance in conjunction with non-proliferation and arms control
measures allows us to assure stable balances that reduce tensions
and the threat of war.
Helping Our Friends Defend Themselves
As we seek to persuade friends to take difficult steps toward non-
proliferation and arms control, we must ensure that they can defend
themselves against threats, both internal and external. There are a
number of different threats with which our friends may be
concerned, and those threats vary on a regional basis. Addressing
those threats calls for different discriminate responses.
For many, the threat is the familiar one: state-to-state
violence, brought on by any one of the number of factors that can
lead to war.
Some of our friends face purely internal threats, brought on by
political and economic inequalities that have persisted over time,
economic mismanagement, subversion, or natural disaster. Here our
response is clear: We must promote and consolidate democratic
values, promote free market principles, encourage full respect for
human rights, and meet urgent humanitarian needs.
Other friends face new, transnational threats--drug-
trafficking and environmental degradation, in particular. These
threats, too, must be met in the most appropriate fashion.
Indeed, some of our friends even face anachronistic Marxist
revolutions, led by those who have not yet recognized the
ideological bankruptcy of communism.
Where these threats can be met adequately with economic
assistance, that is our clear preference. But, in many cases, they
cannot. The reality is that, for the foreseeable future, assuring
stability--and enabling our friends to protect themselves--will
require that we continue to provide arms and related services and
training when and where appropriate.
It is this logic that underlines the Administration's position
on arms sales in the President's proposal on arms control in the
Middle East. What we hope to prevent is one country's arming itself
beyond legitimate self-defense needs and creating destabilizing
military balances in a volatile region. Previously, there has been no
multilateral system to monitor these types of build-ups. There
were no international guidelines. No agreement exists among the
nations that provide weapons to the region to allow transfers to be
challenged as destabilizing.
I know that some would have us go further than this proposal.
We might if this proposed regime can be achieved. The truth is
however, that this proposal will be tough for many of the other
suppliers to accept. Based upon our preliminary discussions with
them, we know that they have problems with transparency and other
aspects of the regime. What we propose to do now is what politics-
-in "the art of the possible"--permits. We do not seek a regime that
halts arms transfers, but we have proposed one that will seek to
ensure that sales that do take place are responsible.
FY 1992 Request
I've told you that security assistance is an important tool for
advancing our security interests; now let me demonstrate how our
FY 1992 request is the right fit. Rather than "business as usual,"
we see this request as a blend of continuing priorities and new
initiatives, a key vehicle for advancing our security interests. In
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), we are requesting $4.65 billion in
budget authority to enable us to support a program level of $4.92
billion, an increase of some $215 million over program levels
enacted in FY 1991. In Economic Support Funds (ESF), we are
requesting $3.24 billion in budget authority, supporting a program
of the same size; our ESF request represents an increase of $96
million over the ESF level provided in the FY 1991 appropriations
bill. Measured against prior-year request levels, our ESF and FMF
requests are smaller--both in absolute terms and as a percentage of
the budget and of GNP.
We believe that this request, if funded, would be money well-
spent. One of my principal messages today is that--while we are
responding to the changes in the world around us--the security
assistance "system" isn't broken. Rather, the system of
international security relationships that we have forged over time
is fundamentally sound and supportive of vital US interests, as
Desert Storm clearly demonstrates. We need now to build on this
success. Let me talk about our regional programs to show you why
this is the case.
Near East and South Asia ($5.51 billion)
The success of our international security relationships as well as
the continuing needs are especially evident in the Near East and
South Asia regions.
In the Gulf war, Israel pursued a policy of restraint based on
strength--military strength and the strength derived from strong
US-Israeli security relations. We remain unshakeably committed to
Israel's security, a commitment that we demonstrated with the
deployment of US Patriot missile systems and US crews in the
recent crisis. We are also committed to ensuring that Israel
maintains its qualitative edge, built upon superiority in advanced
weapons, as well as in command, control, communications, and
intelligence systems. Earlier this year, we requested, and Congress
provided, $650 million in supplemental Economic Support Funds to
deflect the additional costs which Israel incurred as the result on
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
Most recently, our commitment to Israel was reflected in
Secretary [of Defense Richard] Cheney's agreement to provide 15 F-
15 aircraft under the $700 million drawdown authority authorized
by the Congress, as well as a continued partnership in the ARROW
program. Our request for $1.8 billion in FY 1992 FMF grant financing
and $1.2 billion in ESF further underlines that commitment.
Egypt played a crucial role in mobilizing and maintaining
support for the coalition. Over two divisions of Egyptian troops
fought hard for the liberation of Kuwait. We expect that a
moderate, stable Egypt with firm links to the West, with modern,
well-equipped defense forces, and with stronger ties to the Gulf
states, will continue to be a key partner in the region as we work to
achieve a broader Arab-Israeli peace and to bolster moderate forces
in the volatile Middle East. Our request for $1.3 billion in FMF and
$815 million in ESF will provide vital support to those goals.
We are requesting security assistance for several other
friends in the region whose help was critical to the success of
Desert Storm, and whom we expect to be positive forces for
stability in the post-crisis environment. In particular, I cite
Morocco ($40 million FMF, $12 million ESF), whose forces deployed
to Saudi Arabia along with our own; and Oman ($5 million FMF, $15
million ESF), where a decade-old security relationship proved its
value.
As a result of developments associated with the Persian Gulf
crisis, as well as our own budgetary limitations, we have reduced
our requests for Jordan ($25 million FMF, $30 million ESF) and
Tunisia ($10 million FMF, $3 million ESF).
We also request a total of $214 million in security assistance
for Pakistan. We have terminated aid to Pakistan since the
President has not certified that Pakistan has met the requirements
of the Pressler Amendment. However, we have not, and will not,
cease in our efforts to convince the government of Pakistan that it
can assure its national security through conventional means of
defense. Our ability to make that effort credible rests on our being
able to renew a security assistance relationship once Pakistan has
met the requirements imposed by US law and policy. We, therefore,
request that the Congress provide adequate levels of security
assistance--both FMF and ESF--to assure that the President has the
resources to advance this vital element of our non-proliferation
policy.
Europe ($1.21 billion)
The Gulf crisis again underscored the long-term, strategic
importance of Turkey in two theaters--Europe and the Middle East.
Throughout the crisis, Turkey was vital to the success of coalition
efforts. Turkey was among the first to take concrete, and costly,
actions to enforce sanctions against Iraq. Its shutting down of
Iraq's oil pipeline was as important to the isolation of Iraq as the
naval blockade. The presence of Turkey's armed forces, deployed
along its border with Iraq, effectively pinned down 10 Iraqi
divisions. Turkey provided key bases from which US forces were
able to carry out attacks on Iraqi military facilities. These and
other supportive Turkish actions saved many American lives.
But these were not easy steps for a nation living in that
neighborhood, and there can be no doubt that, by their courageous
actions, the Turks incurred additional short- and long-term military
risks. Turkey estimates that its support in enforcing the sanctions
regime will cost it roughly $6 billion, and the costs of deploying
over 100,000 troops to the border have been put by Turkey at $300
million for 1990 alone. We were able to provide Turkey with $200
million in supplementary ESF in FY 1991 to defer a part of these
additional costs, and others have made substantial payments and
pledges as well, but Turkey's net loss remains substantial. Our
security assistance effort ($625 million FMF, $75 million ESF) is
designed to assist the Turks in continuing the multi-year program
to modernize their air defense forces, and also in offsetting part of
their military costs and economic losses, thereby deepening our
relationship with this key partner for regional stability.
Programs in Greece ($350 million) and Portugal ($165 million
in combined ESF and FMF) are important as well. We have a
continuing interest in assisting Greece with the modernization of
its military to support fulfillment of its NATO roles. Greece is a
democratic state which can serve as a force for stability in the
Balkans. Our program in Portugal supports that country's multi-
year force modernization effort which focuses on air/sea defense
of the North Atlantic sea lanes and on access to the Mediterranean
Sea. Both these countries made important contributions during the
Gulf crisis. Greece accepted deployment of logistics aircraft and
furnished other assistance which greatly facilitated our operation.
Likewise, Portuguese permission to use Lajes Air Base proved to be
very valuable to the success of Desert Storm.
American Republics ($980 million)
There are two major elements in our security assistance programs
in the American Republics: support for the President's Andean
counter-narcotics strategy and support for peace and economic
development in Central America.
As the President said in his State of the Union address, the
war on drugs remains a national priority. To that end, in addition to
a request for $171.5 million for the Bureau of International
Narcotics Matters, we are requesting $412 million in FMF and ESF
for Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to help these democracies confront
narcotics trafficking and develop their fragile economies. Our
efforts, to date, have borne fruit: there have been significant
improvements in counter-narcotics cooperation; coca cultivation
has declined for the first time; trafficking organizations have seen
their operations disrupted; and we have seen a corresponding drop in
domestic cocaine use.
In Central America, much of our effort remains focused on
war-torn El Salvador ($120 million ESF, $85 million FMF), where the
reliability of our aid continues to be the element most likely to
bring the conflict to a negotiated solution. Our economic assistance
remains critical to the development of a comprehensive economic
program to reform interest rates, narrow fiscal deficits, provide
incentives for investment, and provide balance-of-payment support,
just as it is in Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica.
These assistance programs complement the President's Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative (EAI), and its key trade, investment, and
debt proposals. While EAI is beyond the scope of my
responsibilities, I hope this subcommittee will reverse action in
the House which drastically cut back on our EAI request.
Africa ($52 million)
In Africa, our security assistance is requested for countries that
have been our close partners and for support of new movement
toward democracy. For the Development Fund for Africa, our
principal vehicle for overall assistance, we seek $800 million
promote broad and sustainable economic growth. I want to highlight
a new regional program in our ESF proposal which would provide
feasibility in assisting African countries in making the transition
to democracy. We also seek to expand our regional approach to
military assistance to enable timely assistance in resolving
Africa's devastating internal conflicts.
East Asia and Pacific ($343 million)
Our clear emphasis in the East Asia and Pacific region is the
Philippines ($320 million in combined ESF and FMF). A stable,
democratic, and prosperous Philippines with friendly ties to, and
continued close security cooperation with, the United States is
essential to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia, as well as to
broad US strategic interests in Asia. Here again, our access
provided important support for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As
you know, negotiations continue with regard to the continued use of
facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic [Bay] Naval Base. We
anticipate a successful conclusion. Assuring access to these
facilities is just one aspect of a very important relationship.
IMET ($52.5 million)
Last, but not least, let me add a word about the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET is a low-cost
foreign policy and national security instrument that is recognized
as one of the most effective components of US security assistance.
It provides valuable training for individual participants from
foreign countries, and it promotes a greater understanding of the US
military and civilian control thereof, American culture and values,
and respect for individual freedoms. And under an initiative
promoted by this subcommittee, we are now sending civilian
employees of defense ministries to US schools to better promote
the idea of civilian control of the military. IMET is a bargain at the
$52.5 million that we have requested for FY 1992 and should not be
underestimated in its value as a very important element of our
security assistance program.
We are faced with a number of difficult, but not impossible,
challenges as we attempt to ensure security and stability abroad.
Our international cooperation programs will play an important part
in our efforts. We believe that we have a very good package in place
and that the Administration's programs and requests make the
proper adaptations for a changing world. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991
Title: UN Security Council Resolution 692 On the Liability of Iraq
Date: May 20, 19915/20/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
Resolution 692 (May 20, 1991)
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 686
(1991) of 2 March 1991 and 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, concerning
the liability of Iraq, without prejudice to its debts and obligations
arising prior to 2 August 1990, for any direct loss, damage,
including environmental damage and the depletion of natural
resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and
corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation
of Kuwait,
Taking note of the Secretary-General's report of 2 May 1991
(S/22559), submitted in accordance with paragraph 19 of resolution
687 (1991),
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his
report of 2 May 1991;
2. Welcomes the fact that the Secretary-General will now
undertake the appropriate consultations requested by paragraph 19
of resolution 687 (1991) so that he will be in a position to
recommend to the Security Council for decision as soon as possible
the figure which the level of Iraq's contribution to the Fund will not
exceed;
3. Decides to establish the Fund and the Commission referred
to in paragraph 18 of resolution 687 (1991) in accordance with
section I of the Secretary-General's report, and that the Governing
Council will be located at the United Nations Office at Geneva and
that the Governing council may decide whether some of the
activities of the Commission should be carried out elsewhere;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to take the actions
necessary to implement paragraphs 2 and 3 above in consultation
with the members of the Governing Council;
5. Directs the Governing Council to proceed in an expeditious
manner to implement the provisions of section E of resolution 687
(1991), taking into account the recommendations in section II of the
Secretary-General's report;
6. Decides that the requirement for Iraqi contributions will
apply in the manner to be prescribed by the Governing Council with
respect to all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products exported from
Iraq after 2 April 1991 as well as such petroleum and petroleum
products exported earlier but not delivered or not paid for as a
specific result of the prohibitions contained in Security Council
resolution 661 (1990);
7. Requests the Governing Council to report as soon as
possible on the actions it has taken with regard to the mechanisms
for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the
Fund and the arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to
the Fund, so that the Security Council can give its approval in
accordance with paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991);
8. Requests that all States and international organizations
cooperate with the decisions of the Governing Council taken
pursuant to paragraph 5 of the present resolution, and also requests
that the Governing Council keep the Security Council informed on
this matter;
9. Decides that, if the Governing Council notifies the Security
Council that Iraq has failed to carry out decisions of the Governing
Council taken pursuant to paragraph 5 of the present resolution, the
Security Council intends to retain or to take action to reimpose the
prohibition against the import of petroleum and petroleum products
originating in Iraq and financial transactions related thereto;
10. Decides also to remain seized of this matter and that the
Governing Council will submit periodic reports to the Secretary-
General and the Security Council.
VOTE: 14 for, 0 against, 1 abstention (Cuba).(###)