US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991

Title:

Foreign Assistance Funding Request for FY 1992

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Statement as prepared for delivery before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Other Programs of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun 12, 19916/12/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Country: USSR (former) Subject: NATO, CSCE, Democratization, State Department [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, I am privileged to appear before this subcommittee to testify on behalf of our State Department funding proposal for fiscal year (FY) 1992. I would like to express my thanks for the efforts of this subcommittee in securing supplemental funding for the State Department. This was essential both to meet the costs we incurred in the Gulf crisis and to overcome the very difficult effects of sequestration on our tight operations budget. As you know, we are grateful for the critical efforts this subcommittee makes to ensure we have adequate resources to promote America's interests abroad. With your permission, I would like to have my written statement entered into the record. I also would like to offer a few brief opening observations on my recent trips to Copenhagen and Geneva. First, last week, NATO foreign ministers met in Copenhagen to advance NATO's political adaptation as we move from last July's London summit toward a November summit in Rome. In Copenhagen, the alliance agreed on the core security functions that will guide its work as we build a new Europe and a new Atlanticism. They represent our agreement on the purpose, nature, and fundamental tasks of NATO in the future. In short, we are meeting the promise of last July's London declaration: to adapt NATO to new realities, transforming our military strategy, and emphasizing NATO's political role as an alliance of shared values. Second, we advanced our work on many other fronts in Copenhagen, including the relationship of the emerging European security identity to NATO. While we welcome European discussions of a European security identity, we made progress toward ensuring that any such security identity would complement, not compete with, NATO. Third, we also made progress in advancing the alliance's relations with our former adversaries to the East. Our discussions concerning CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] will, I believe, foster a productive CSCE ministerial in Berlin next week and promote a Europe whole and free. I was pleased that many of the initiatives regarding NATO's liaison relationships that I proposed with [German] Foreign Minister Genscher have been adopted by the alliance. We believe the principles we have announced will make it clear to the Soviets and the Central and East Europeans that NATO is serious about reaching out to our former adversaries to build an atmosphere of trust and cooperation across Europe. We also are pleased with the alliance statement on Central and Eastern Europe. As these new democracies continue their difficult transitions to political and economic freedom, we hope this statement is another reminder to them that we, in the West, will continue to support them. Fourth, in my meeting in Geneva with [Soviet] Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, we had a substantive exchange on the remaining issues in START [strategic arms reductions talks] . We are agreed, I believe, that while the remaining issues are difficult, they can be solved through hard work on both sides. We have sent experts to Geneva to accelerate work on the more technical issues, and it is likely the Foreign Minister and I will meet again soon to maintain momentum toward a completed agreement. Fifth, on the question of support for Soviet reform, I told my colleagues in Copenhagen--as I have told several Soviet officials recently--that, in our view, perestroika is an opportunity for "new thinking" in many areas. Perestroika presents opportunities for new thinking not only in foreign policy, but also in defense policy, in economics, in politics, and in Center-Republic relations. Having begun this revolution, we hope that President Gorbachev will, as he said in Oslo, "stay the course" on perestroika. But, as he also said in Oslo, "perestroika has now entered its most dramatic phase." Now, more than ever before, it is crucial that the Soviet leadership seize the present opportunity to break with the old ways that have proven unworkable before. They must not miss this opportunity to begin to turn things around. The United States remains committed to supporting the success of both economic and political reform. No one can peer into the future and assure us that Soviet reform will succeed. But we believe that the Soviet Union is a country rich in natural resources and talented peoples, a country that could transform itself into a democratic and prosperous society. The impulse to transform the Soviet Union has been a Soviet choice. Perestroika is home-grown. It has been driven by the realization that change in the Soviet Union is essential to prevent deterioration and decay. And in this regard, perestroika, as President Gorbachev has made so abundantly clear, is about much more than economics. It is a full-fledged revolution--in politics, in Center-Republic relations, in foreign policy, and in defense policy. And in these areas, as much as in the economic sphere, perestroika should continue along the path of greatest political and economic freedom and international cooperation. Thus, to achieve Soviet goals, to fulfill the hopes of perestroika, and to tap the rich potential of the Soviet Union, it is in Soviet interests to embrace a real market economy with private property, incentives, laws on contracts, competition, a sound currency, and real prices. It is in Soviet interests to continue their efforts to build a state based on the rule of law and move to free and fair elections. It is in Soviet interests to accommodate peacefully the Baltics' aspirations through dialogue and negotiations and complete a union treaty that will allow the republics the autonomy they desire. It is in Soviet interests to continue a positive foreign policy orientation while ending the most clear-cut vestiges of the era of stagnation by eliminating support for regimes that pursue internal repression or external subversion. And it is in Soviet interests to accelerate their efforts at defense conversion while committing both to opening their defense budget and to reducing, significantly, the enormous share of GNP devoted to defense spending. In short, moving along the path of perestroika is, above all, in the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviets must find the will to open the way to a new future. And they must start by helping themselves. If they do, we will support them. We can serve as a catalyst for both political and economic reform. Indeed, we are developing a package of supportive measures, which we hope to coordinate with other Western governments. But we need to recognize that these changes will take effect over a long time. As we work day-by-day, our efforts are almost certain to be a step-by-step process--one with a grand goal but always with a realistic and workable approach. We recognize the hard choices the Soviets need to make. Above all, we are aware how hard it will be to move toward a true market economy. But for our part, we do not intend to stand idly by if the Soviets come to grips with these questions of political and economic legitimacy. Perestroika could be the most important revolution of this century. All of us have a profound stake in its outcome. In this regard, let me stress how important it is that we solve the Moscow Embassy problem. The fire has made a bad situation far worse. Quite simply, we are at the point where it is extremely difficult for our people in Moscow to do the job they have to do now, let alone the increased work load likely to be created if the Soviets move ahead with reform. With the naming of a new ambassador, it is time to put this issue behind us and make the US Embassy in Moscow worthy of the importance US-Soviet relations have in our foreign policy. The Administration would immediately proceed with whichever of the two preferred approaches--"tear down and rebuild" or "top hat"--the House and Senate can agree upon. But it is critical that the Congress find a way to reach agreement between House and Senate. Continued paralysis with respect to this issue is very much against the national interest. Before answering your questions, I would like to touch briefly on most-favored-nation (MFN) status for China. I would like to make one simple point: If we have learned anything in the last 2 years, it is that American engagement is essential to the promotion of democratic values. We agree, of course, that China must improve in the areas of human rights, non-proliferation, and trade-- and we will scrupulously implement existing laws that cover these areas. However, attempting to isolate a government by cutting off ties with its people is a counter-productive policy, and that is what China-specific MFN conditions would do. MFN is one essential element in keeping Chinese society open to the West, and maintaining it is the surest way to promote economic reform, and, ultimately, the growth of democratic values in that society.
FY 1992 Funding Request
To frame our overall funding request for international affairs activities for FY 1992, let me review five broad policy objectives, built around the five foreign policy challenges which I outlined to Congress last year. First, promoting and consolidating democratic values, including free and fair elections and respect for human rights. As the President noted in his State of the Union address, this fundamental American principle has stood as a beacon to peoples across the globe for more than 2 centuries. Second, promoting free market principles and strengthening US competitiveness. Sustainable economic development cannot be separated from the pursuit of sound, growth-oriented policies; together, these can promote US economic interests abroad. Third, promoting peace by helping to defuse regional conflicts, strengthening the security of our regional partners, and pursuing arms control and non-proliferation efforts. Fourth, protecting against transnational threats, especially to the environment and from narcotics and terrorism. Finally, meeting urgent humanitarian needs, through timely development assistance, food aid, disaster relief, and refugee assistance. Working with you in Congress and our global partners, we envision the use of five principal mechanisms to advance this agenda worldwide. One, more flexible and integrated bilateral assistance authorities. In authorization legislation which we recently submitted to Congress, we seek more flexible foreign assistance account structures and greater ability to transfer funds both within and among accounts to meet pressing, unexpected needs. Two, more creative use of multilateral mechanisms to advance our objectives, through the international financial institutions, and through the UN system, whose funding falls under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee. The United Nations has played a historic role in the Gulf crisis, one that is close to fulfilling the vision of its founders. The Security Council's 14 resolutions, which laid the basis for ending the crisis, symbolized the unity of the international community against Iraq's aggression and established the principle of collective security as a cornerstone of the post-Cold War era. At the same time, the humanitarian organizations of the UN system--together with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Organization for Migration--are coordinating a broad international effort to assist the hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons created by Iraqi aggression. The United States has a vital interest in strengthening this new, revitalized United Nations as a full partner in the building of a post-Cold War world where peace, stability, and prosperity prevail. Indeed, our FY 1992 funding request before this subcommittee plays a major part in advancing this objective: we seek full funding for all current UN activities as well as funding for the President's plan to pay our arrearages. Three, we foresee greater reliance on creative responsibility- sharing as we strengthen our global partnerships, especially with the European Community and its members and with Japan. As many in Congress have noted, our own difficult budgetary situation makes such efforts especially important for the advancement of a common agenda with partners who share our values and interests. No effort so well illustrates the collective response of the world community to defend world peace as our successful efforts to enlist worldwide support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and for the front-line states whose economies have been set back by the effects of Saddam Hussein's aggression. Strong US leadership and shared values and interests have been essential to catalyze the broad worldwide response we have enjoyed. Four, we envision more creative use of trade and investment policies as vehicles to promote US interests in world economic growth, as well as to enhance our own economic strength. Finally, we will be challenged to pursue more vigorous US diplomacy in support of our goals, as we seek your support for a State Department budget that provides the resources and flexibility to meet the broad range of diplomatic challenges which lie ahead. I believe the Gulf crisis provides an especially timely reminder of the State Department's role on the "front lines" in protecting American citizens and defending American interests. Home and abroad, our professional staff--both Foreign and Civil Service--made valuable contributions to formulating and implementing the President's policies. Let me cite just a few examples. -- Our embassy personnel stationed in Kuwait during the initial months of the Iraqi occupation represented a powerful symbol to the Kuwaiti people that we were not prepared to tolerate the absorption of their country by a ravenous neighbor. -- Effective US leadership in Washington, New York, and our posts abroad helped mobilize broad international support for the diplomatic isolation of Iraq, thereby contributing to the successful revitalization of the principles of the UN system. -- Our Consular Affairs staff in Washington logged long hours, ably fielding inquiries from thousands of concerned relatives and friends on behalf of US hostages in Iraq and alerting American citizens to rapidly changing security conditions in the region. -- Our Middle East missions--many operating with reduced staffing--responded with professionalism to the extraordinary flurry of official visits before, during, and after the war. As you know, promoting US interests abroad is an increasingly expensive responsibility, exacerbated by the demands on the Department to expand operations to meet new political and economic opportunities around the globe. Fluctuations in exchange rates, higher rates of overseas inflation, and the continuing need to enhance the security of our posts and personnel abroad further magnify the problem. Today, we face a potential and worrisome weakening of our foreign affairs infrastructure at a time when we are being called upon to meet extraordinary and new challenges. Since January 1989, we have placed a high priority on strengthening our ability to manage scarce resources. I believe we have made some important achievements over this period. -- To better match national interests to available resources, we are taking steps to better integrate policy planning with the budget process. -- To strengthen Foreign Service personnel management, we have begun to implement key proposals made by the Thomas and Bremer commissions. -- To conserve personnel and financial resources, we have set up a new center in Rosslyn, Virginia, to process the many thousands of refugee and asylum applications from the Soviet Union, which can serve as a model to meet future consular and immigration demands. -- To strengthen our physical plant abroad, we have put into place a professional property management system and begun implementation of a 5-year integrated plan which addresses new construction, rehabilitation, repair, and maintenance. -- To enhance the cost-effectiveness of our security efforts, we have begun to implement reforms to link our wide-ranging efforts at over 250 posts abroad to country-specific threat profiles. -- To provide some of the resources to meet changing requirements, we are adjusting staffing levels at different posts in Europe. We also plan to close or downsize certain posts in Western Europe and elsewhere, while opening new posts and adding additional positions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This takes me to the specifics of our FY 1992 funding request before this subcommittee. For State Department operations and other accounts within the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, we seek a total appropriation request of $4.18 billion, up by $947 million from the FY 1991 level. The bulk of this increase is concentrated in three discrete items: Moscow Embassy, foreign buildings, and international organizations.
US Embassy in Moscow
Two years ago I promised this subcommittee a prompt review of the Moscow Embassy situation, with recommendations submitted in the context of our FY 1991 budget. We complied with that commitment last year, when we sought $270 million in funding to tear down the existing incomplete new structure and rebuild it in place. Speaking before this subcommittee last year, I said that we had spent a lot of time looking and that the time to act was now. Regretfully, it was impossible to secure congressional endorsement of any single construction option in last year's budget cycle. So I come before you again this year, in the wake of a serious fire in the old chancery, to ask both Houses of Congress to get together and welcome our new ambassador to Moscow with a construction project to supervise. We are seeking $130 million in FY 1992 funding as a downpayment on a multi-year contract to complete the Moscow Embassy. And we ask that you give serious consideration to the notion of erecting four secure floors onto the current incompleted new office building--the so-called top hat option. Judge Webster and I have concluded that both top hat and the previous tear-down option would allow all classified operations to be housed in new space built by cleared American workers with materials securely shipped from the United States. We also agree fully that the top hat option, which was developed in close cooperation with the intelligence community, would provide space just as secure as in the tear-down option, while saving at least $65 million in total costs and shortening construction time by almost 1 year. Let me stress that our prime goal remains obtaining early, definitive congressional support, so that we can begin construction without further delay on a secure building in Moscow. Given the nature of our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union, I am most reluctant to ask our staff to remain in makeshift quarters for another 5 years or more. And, clearly, the existing, insecure, fire-damaged building is a totally unacceptable alternative. Therefore, I urge your active support in this subcommittee, in your caucuses, and on the Senate floor for actions to make construction of a secure chancery in Moscow possible this year. We have always welcomed your support on this issue, and I am confident that you will help build an effective congressional consensus this year for a secure option that can be built.
Foreign Buildings
Our remaining foreign buildings request of $440 million represents an increase of $212 million over the amount appropriated in FY 1991. This marks the first installment of a 5-year, $2.35 billion program to address our most urgent facility replacement priorities, including embassies in Bangkok and Bogota. Our goal is to restore the safety, security, and workability of our aging but valuable inventory of overseas facilities. The FY 1992 increase is almost entirely devoted to funding for capital construction, construction security, and maintenance programs which, in the current year, are relying on available no- year appropriations. We recognize that we must deploy wisely all resources available to us for our building program. To this end we have made major efforts over the past 2 years to: -- Use our unobligated FBO [Foreign Buildings Operations] balances on high priority programs; -- Make the best possible use of the appreciated value in our extensive real property holdings overseas; and -- Ensure that all of our building programs are mutually supportive by putting in place a comprehensive 5-year plan for facility replacement, rehabilitation, repair, and maintenance requirements.
International Organizations
The President has emphasized the urgency of restoring financial viability to the United Nations and other international organizations. After several years of effort on the part of Congress and the Administration, we are pleased to report significant movement toward budgetary and administrative reform within the United Nations and its affiliated agencies. No one who has witnessed the response of the UN Security Council to recent events in the Persian Gulf could deny the importance to US interests of a financially healthy UN system. We remain absolutely committed to full funding for US assessed contributions, to the extent permitted by law, and to paying our prior year arrearages over the next 4 years. We appreciate the full funding we received for FY 1991, which included initial funding toward the necessary process of arrears clearance. For FY 1992, we are requesting $750 million in budget authority to meet our current assessments to international organizations, plus an additional $371 million for arrears clearance, to be paid out over the following 4 years. For international peace-keeping activities, we are requesting $69 million to meet our full funding obligations, plus $132 million for arrearages, which also would be paid out over 4 years. Aside from those three initiatives, our core programs have been held to minimum levels.
State Salaries and Expenses
For State Department salaries and expenses, we are requesting $2.05 billion in budget authority for FY 1992, an increase of $179 million over the current year. This is the minimal level of resources we need to fund our overseas and domestic operations. Over two-thirds of this increase compensates for price increases and exchange rate changes. The remainder will be used to support several specific funding requirements. -- Expanding further our diplomatic presence in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ($25 million). -- Responding to increased immigration processing requirements necessitated by passage of the Immigration Act of 1990 ($24 million). -- Strengthening our information and financial systems ($13.5 million). Adequate funding of this basic operating account is essential for meeting our day-to-day foreign policy responsibilities.
Public Diplomacy
Public diplomacy will be one of our most valuable tools as we seek to encourage the worldwide tide of democracy and political pluralism. For the valuable work of the US Information Agency and the Board for International Broadcasting, we are requesting $1.3 billion in FY 1992 funding, up slightly from the prior year. Within this level, a new emphasis will be placed on information and cultural programs in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Islamic world. Thank you again, for this opportunity to discuss our State Department funding proposal for FY 1992. We look forward to working with you to ensure we will continue to have adequate resources to promote America's interests abroad. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991 Title:

US-Soviet Grain Agreement

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Washington, DC Date: Jun 11, 19916/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] President Bush has informed President Gorbachev today that the United States will meet the Soviet request for up to $1.5 billion in credit guarantees toward the purchase of American agricultural products. Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan will follow up immediately with Soviet officials to work out the details of the agreement. The President's offer specifies US willingness to make the credit guarantees available in three tranches over the next 9 months--$600 million this month, $500 million in October 1991, and $400 million in February 1992. The President made this decision after having received the views of the presidential delegation he sent to the USSR in late May to study the grain request and the food distribution system. In addition to meeting the Soviet request for credit guarantees, the President today also expressed to President Gorbachev his continued interest in collaborating on a long-term effort to improve the food distribution system in the USSR, primarily through the introduction of market measures. The United States is prepared to form a high-level team of government and private experts to assist the Soviets in this effort. In making this decision, the President took into consideration the record of the Soviet government in meeting its official obligations. The President's decision also followed assurances from the Soviet government that the grains made available through the credit guarantees would be fairly distributed among Soviet republics and the Baltic states. The President's decision reflects the Administration's desire to promote a continued positive evolution in the US-Soviet relationship. In particular, we hope that this assistance will help to stabilize the food situation in that country. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991 Title:

North Atlantic Council Meeting

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from remarks at news conference in Copenhagen, Denmark Date: Jun 7, 19916/7/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, North America, E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: Germany, USSR (former) Subject: NATO, CSCE [TEXT] Let me begin by thanking Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen and our Danish hosts for their kind hospitality here in Copenhagen. Last week, NATO's defense ministers made significant progress in furthering the alliance's military adaptation. Our work here complements that work and moves it forward by making significant progress in advancing NATO's political adaptation as we move from London to Rome. First, the alliance has agreed on the core security functions that will guide its work as we build a new Europe and a new Atlanticism. They represent our agreement on the purpose, nature, and fundamental tasks of NATO in the future. These core functions show that we are meeting the promise of last July's London Declaration: to adapt NATO to new realities. We are transforming our military strategy. We are emphasizing NATO's political role as an alliance of shared values. Second, we have advanced our work on many fronts, including the relationship of the emerging European security identity to NATO as well as NATO's relations with CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. Third, I am pleased that many of the initiatives regarding NATO's liaison relationships that I proposed with [German] Foreign Minister Genscher have been adopted now by this alliance. We believe that the principles we have announced will make it clear to the Soviets and to the Central and East Europeans that NATO is serious about reaching out to former adversaries to build an atmosphere of trust and cooperation across Europe. Fourth, on the question of support for Soviet reform, we have had a very constructive exchange of ideas. I stressed in my intervention which has been made public [see Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 23], that in our view perestroika is an opportunity for "new thinking" in many areas--of course in foreign policy, but also in defense policy, in economics, in politics, and in Center-Republic relations. Having begun this revolution, we believe that President Gorbachev will, as he said in Oslo, "stay the course" on perestroika. But, as he also said in Oslo, "perestroika has now entered its most dramatic phase." Now, more than ever before, it is crucial that the Soviet leadership seize the present opportunity to break with old ways that have proved unworkable before. In this endeavor, the Soviets obviously have to help themselves, but we in the West can, and will help, also. The United States will be working with our allies to do just that. In sum, ladies and gentlemen, we have had an extraordinarily productive meeting of the North Atlantic Council as we fulfill the promise of the London Declaration and move solidly toward a fall summit in Rome. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991 Title:

North Atlantic Council Texts

Description: Texts released at the NAC ministerial meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark Date: Jun 7, 19916/7/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, North America, E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: Germany, USSR (former) Subject: NATO, CSCE [TEXT]
FINAL COMMUNIQUE
At their Summit in London last July, our Heads of State and Government committed our Alliance of free and democratic nations to a process of adaptation commensurate with the changes that have reshaped the face of Europe. The fundamental review that they mandated of the Alliance's political and military strategy is being carried out on all levels and is approaching completion. Our Heads of State and Government will convene in Rome on [the] 7th and 8th [of] November to bring this process to its conclusion. The process initiated by the London Declaration is an important contribution to enhancing stability and security within a free Europe. Our efforts to ensure stability in peace and freedom will recognize the political, economic, social and ecological elements of security, along with the indispensable defence dimension. The Alliance, the EC [European Community], the WEU [Western European Union], the CSCE and the Council of Europe are key institutions in this endeavour. We are guided by our ultimate goal of establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in the whole of Europe. To this end, much has been achieved recently. Following the entry into force of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, united Germany for the first time participates in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level as a fully sovereign member of this Alliance. As we noted in our statement issued yesterday, the division of Europe has been overcome. In fulfillment of the undertakings contained in the Charter of Paris and the Joint Declaration of 22 states signed last November, which now assume ever greater relevance, we are cooperating with the Soviet Union and the other Central and Eastern European states more closely than before. We will work to make the forthcoming meeting of CSCE Foreign Ministers in Berlin a decisive new step in the development of the CSCE process. In adapting to the new era in Europe and in striving to develop cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free, the Alliance will continue to perform its enduring basic missions. Today we have issued a separate statement setting out these core security functions of the Alliance. They will provide an essential basis from which the Allies will be able to take full advantage of new opportunities in building the new Europe. 1. A transformed Atlantic Alliance constitutes an essential element in the new architecture of an undivided Europe; we are agreed that the Alliance must have the flexibility to continue to develop and evolve as the security situation dictates. An important basis for this transformation is the agreement of all Allies to enhance the role and responsibility of the European members. We welcome efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognise the significance of the progress made by the countries of the European Community towards the goal of political union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy. These two positive processes are mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. 2. We are agreed, in parallel with the emergence and development of a European security identity and defence role, to enhance the essential transatlantic link that the Alliance guarantees and fully to maintain the strategic unity and indivisibility of security of all our members. We will continue, in particular, to ensure the Alliance's capability to fulfill its essential functions. The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of allies under the Washington Treaty, as expressed in the statement on NATO's Core Security Functions accompanying this communique. We all agree that the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of the Allies must be maintained. This applies in particular to the integrated military structure for the Allied countries that participate in it. 3. Recognising that it is for the European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we further agree that, as the two processes advance, we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance. There will be a need, in particular, to establish appropriate links and consultation procedures between them in order to ensure that the Allies that are not currently participating in the development of a European identity in foreign security policy and defence should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security. 4. Allies are convinced that arms control and confidence- building measures will continue to shape and consolidate a new cooperative order in Europe in which no country need harbour fears for its security. The CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty is the keystone for such a stable and lasting peace on the continent. In our separate Statement yesterday, we expressed our hope that a binding agreement can soon be reached to resolve the problems which had arisen with respect to the Treaty, allowing it to move forward to early ratification and entry into force and full implementation. Once concluded, such an agreement will open the way for us to make new proposals on military manpower in Europe without delay in the CFE 1A negotiations now taking place in Vienna. In the CSBM [confidence- and security-building measures] negotiations, we will seek further to strengthen openness and stability. Work within the Alliance is moving forward in preparation for new negotiations on conventional arms in Europe, open to all CSCE members, after the Helsinki CSCE Follow-Up Meeting in 1992. We look forward to informal preparatory consultations on this subject with CSCE partners in the Autumn. 5. The Allies attach high importance to the earliest possible establishment of an Open Skies regime as an essential contribution to transparency among all participants. We have recently made fresh proposals to that end, and we call on all participants to join us in a prompt resumption of productive negotiations. 6. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), Allies support the United States' efforts to reach a final agreement that will provide a framework for strategic stability into the next century. Preparations among the Allies concerned are advancing on an arms control framework for US-Soviet negotiations on the reduction of their short-range nuclear forces. 7. Allies have worked for many years to advance progress in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament on a regional and global basis. The Gulf crisis demonstrated what we have long recognised: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of missiles capable of delivering them, and excessive transfers of conventional arms undermine international security and increase the risk of armed conflict throughout the world. To meet this challenge, we have renewed our commitment to the earliest possible achievement of advances in the international forums dealing with specific proliferation issues. We fully endorse the goal of concluding a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention by mid-1992 and support President's Bush's initiative of 13th May to that effect. We will also seek in September 1991, at the Third Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention, to strengthen that Convention and to encourage further accessions to it. We will urgently pursue efforts in the United Nations and elsewhere to address the problem of excessive buildups of conventional arms by ensuring transparency and restraint. Several of our leaders have recently proposed arms control and non-proliferation initiatives, including for the Middle East. These initiatives reflect our commitment to the goals described above. 8. The Gulf conflict confirmed the importance of intra- Alliance consultations and information-sharing, which helped to reinforce political solidarity among Allies throughout the crisis. The collective expression of support for the Ally facing a direct threat demonstrated our resolve to stand by our commitments under Article V of the Washington Treaty and helped to deter a further expansion of hostilities. Although NATO itself was not involved in the Gulf war, the long practice of cooperation, common procedures, collective defence arrangements and infrastructure developed by NATO provided valuable assistance to those Allies that chose to make use of them in their respective efforts in support of the UN Security Council Resolutions on the Gulf. 9. Looking to the future, we believe that just and lasting solutions to the problems of the Gulf and the Middle East are urgently needed. We thus support current efforts for comprehensive negotiated settlements to the problems of that region. 10. The Gulf crisis underlined that, in an interdependent world that is increasingly affected by technological advances, we must be prepared to address other unpredictable developments that are beyond the focus of traditional Alliance concerns, but that can have direct implications for our security. Now more than ever, worldwide developments which affect our security interests are legitimate matters for consultation and, where appropriate, coordination among us. We will thus increasingly need to address broader issues and new global challenges. We will seek to do so in our consultations and in the appropriate multilateral forums, in the widest possible cooperation with other states. 11. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by Her Majesty the Queen and the Government of Denmark.
NATO'S CORE SECURITY FUNCTION IN THE NEW EUROPE
The Purpose of the Alliance
1. NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.
The Nature of the Alliance
2. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests. 3. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's daily work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to realize their essential national security objectives. 4. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased cooperation both among Alliance members and with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to pursue the development of cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.
The Fundamental Tasks Of the Alliance
5. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defence; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favouring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament. 6. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks: I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or impose hegemony through the threat or use of force. II. To serve, as provided for in Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state. IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe. 7. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991 Title:

President's Report on MFN Status for China

Description: Text of the President's Report to Congress Concerning Extension of Waiver Authority for the People's Republic of China, released by the White House Date: May 29, 19915/29/91 Category: Reports Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Human Rights, Immigration, Travel, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Pursuant to Subsection 402 (d) (1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter "the Act"), having determined that further extension of the waiver authority granted by Subsection 402 (c) of the Act for twelve months will substantially promote the objectives of Section 402, I have today determined that continuation of the waiver currently applicable to China will also substantially promote the objectives of Section 402 of the Act. My determination [No. 91-36] is attached and is incorporated herein.
Freedom of Emigration Determination
China's relatively free emigration policies have continued during the past twelve months. In FY 1990, 16,751 US immigrant visas were issued in China. The US numerical limitation for immigrants from China was fully met. The principal restraint on increased emigration continues to be the capacity and willingness of other nations to absorb Chinese immigrants, not Chinese policy. After considering all the relevant information, I have concluded that continuing the MFN waiver will preserve the gains already achieved on freedom of emigration and encourage further progress.
Chinese Foreign Travel Policies
China continues to adhere to a relatively open foreign travel policy. According to Chinese officials, issuance of passports for private travel has increased more than threefold since 1986. US diplomatic posts in China issued 60,687 non-immigrant visas in FY 1990. In FY 1990, 33,800 visas were issued worldwide to student and tourists from China, a 19 percent increase over FY 1989 and an 84 percent increase over FY 1988. Chinese officials report that several thousand students have returned from overseas for visits after June 1989 and have been allowed to depart again under expedited procedures. We cannot verify these figures, but we are not aware of any cases in which Chinese living in the US who returned to China for visits after June 1989 were prevented from leaving again. Foreign travel officially sponsored by the Chinese Government, mainly involving businessmen and state-sponsored scholars, continued to decline in FY 1990, this reflects the effects of economic austerity measures and, in the case of scholars, concern about extended delays in their return to China. In February 1990, China issued a new directive requiring recent college graduates and fourth-year undergraduates to work for five years before applying for overseas study, with some exceptions. The directive most likely has forced some students to defer their plans for overseas study, but its full impact is unclear since student visa applications and issuances continue to increase. We are aware of a small number of individuals who have had difficulty in obtaining permission to travel abroad, apparently because of the political activities of their relatives in the US. We have discussed these cases with Chinese authorities, who have indicated a willingness to address the issue.
Overall Human Rights Climate
In addition to the emigration considerations of Section 402, we are continuing to monitor closely the overall human rights climate in China and press our concerns vigorously at all levels of the Chinese Government. Beijing has taken a number of steps on human rights issues that we have urged since June 1989. No part of China is now subject to martial law. The vast majority of those detained in the wake of the 1989 demonstrations have been released. Over 1,000 prisoners were released since the beginning of 1990. Prominent dissident Fang Lizhi and his family were permitted to leave China in June 1990, and most relatives of Chinese citizens in the US who sought to join them have been allowed to do so. Chinese diplomats have ceased threatening Chinese students residing in the US. Authorities in Tibet have avoided violence in quelling demonstrations since March 1989. Foreign officials and journalists are again able to visit the region, and even to tour the main prison in Lhasa. Beijing hosted an unprecedented visit by Assistant Secretary [of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Richard] Schifter in December 1990. The Chinese have agreed to receive additional human rights delegations from the Congress, Australia and France later this year. The Schifter visit inaugurated a more formal human rights dialogue than we have ever had with China. In recent weeks, Chinese officials have begun to respond to some of our key questions on the status of cases against the detainees, the judicial process, religious repression and family planning. They have also provided assurances that China's prohibition on prison exports would be enforced, and that no special restrictions would be placed on people wishing to join dissident relatives abroad. I nonetheless still have serious concerns about the human rights situation in China. According to official Chinese figures, 813 persons have been convicted by courts in Beijing on charges stemming from the 1989 protests, including 26 so far this year. Most were charged with crimes against persons or property but nearly 100 of these were tried for "counterrevolutionary crimes" (e.g., instigation or organizing rebellious activities) that apparently involved nothing other than nonviolent political actions. At least scores if not more have been convicted elsewhere in China. Since 1989, others, probably including peaceful demonstrators, have been sent to labor reeducation camps for up to three years after administrative hearings. Freedom of expression, religion, the press, and association remain tightly constrained. The Chinese continue to jam the Mandarin language service of Voice of America. In Tibet, participants in ongoing pro-independence activities continue to be subject to legal prosecution. Several hundred persons are currently incarcerated for what appear to be only nonviolent political activities.
Impact of MFN on Other US Interests
The granting of MFN tariff status to China was a key element in the normalization of our diplomatic relations and provided a framework for a major expansion of our economic and commercial relations. Maintaining non-discriminatory tariff status is fundamental for strong bilateral trade relations with China. In 1990, bilateral trade totaled $20 million, with Chinese exports of $15.2 billion and US exports of $4.8 billion. The United States is China's largest export market, absorbing 25 percent of China's total exports. If MFN were withdrawn, China would reciprocate by applying its own higher non-MFN tariffs to US products and possibly erect other trade barriers as well. With US companies placed at a disadvantage, competitors from Japan and Europe would quickly move to replace US exports in our largest markets in China--grain, aircraft and aerospace equipment, industrial machinery, steel products, chemicals, fertilizers and computers. US joint ventures in China would pay higher duties on imported components from the US, and their exports to the US would be subject to non-MFN tariffs, jeopardizing their continued operations. Loss of MFN would lead to higher prices for US consumers of products made in China, including toys, apparel and footwear. Maintaining MFN is essential for promoting reform in China. The opening of China and expansion of bilateral commercial relations made possible by MFN have contributed significantly to improving living standards, introducing progressive ideas and further integrating China into the world community as it continues its drive to modernize. With-drawing MFN would most hurt the dynamic coastal provinces in China which have gone the farthest in introducing market-oriented economic reforms. It would further isolate those in China who look to the US for support in their effort to liberalize Chinese society. Withdrawing MFN would have a major impact on Hong Kong's free enterprise economy, which depends heavily on US-China trade and the health of export industries in South China. The economic disruption which followed MFN withdrawal would further undermine confidence in Hong Kong's future. While US-China relations still cannot return to normal under current circumstances, withdrawing China's MFN status would harm vital US interests. On a variety of global and regional issues, China has an important and sometimes crucial influence. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China voted for twelve resolutions on the Persian Gulf and abstained on two others, enabling all to pass. China's cooperation is also important for other US foreign policy objectives, such as seeking peace in Cambodia, reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula, and restricting transfers of nuclear, CBW [chemical and biological weapons] and missile equipment and technology. In summary, maintaining non-discriminatory trade status gives China an incentive to stay engaged on issues of vital concern to the US, including human rights, non-proliferation, global and regional affairs and trade. I hope to work with the Congress to achieve these shared objectives. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991 Title:

CSCE--One of the Building Blocks of a New Europe

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Remarks at the CSCE Symposium on Cultural Heritage, Krakow, Poland Date: Jun 6, 19916/6/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe Country: Poland, Czechoslovakia (former), Hungary Subject: CSCE [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, representatives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, officials and citizens of Krakow: This is the Quayle family's first visit to Poland, and we are pleased that it is a visit to a free Poland. We look forward to revisiting free Poland many times in the future. I am especially honored to visit Krakow, one of the great intellectual centers of Europe. Its former Archbishop is now the Bishop of Rome and the Church Universal. It is not by chance that Poland achieved independence when John Paul II resided in the Holy See. Poland's freedom and the growth of liberty throughout Central and Eastern Europe are due in no small part to the CSCE. For a generation, CSCE has been a beacon of hope to a troubled and divided continent; it has served as an ongoing vigil, held by those who enjoyed the blessings of freedom, on behalf of those who did not. Now, with the Cold War behind us, CSCE offers new avenues of cooperation. The United States will continue to play an active role in CSCE. We fully support the CSCE process and its institutions. CSCE is one of the building blocks of a new Europe. A Europe, as President Bush has described it, whole and free. My friends, as you know, there are dates that resonate down through the centuries of European history. These dates mark revolutions that have permanently transformed the lives of generations of Europeans. After the revolution of 1789, Europe-- and, indeed, the world--were never the same again. Similarly, the forces let loose in 1848 eventually reshaped the continent of Europe. Today's gathering provides an opportunity to reflect on yet another major turning point in the history of Europe--the revolutions of 1989-90. The events of the last 2 years, like those of 1848 and 1789, will shape the course of history. Communism, thank God, is disappearing into the dust bin of history. Central and Eastern Europe's nightmare of totalitarianism is over. Democracy's triumph is at hand. However, we cannot merely celebrate the revolutions of 1989--and the great courage and strength of the peoples of Europe who made those events possible, we need to defend and build on yesterday's victories. I am here to tell you that the government and people of the United States of America are committed to helping the people of Central and Eastern Europe achieve their goals. We see your democratic revolutions as affirming the principles underlying our own national identity. As a nation of immigrants--so many from this very region--the United States has always felt that our freedom is enhanced by the advance of freedom elsewhere. For the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe especially. Your long wait was our long wait. Your freedom is our freedom. And your success is our success. As President Bush said in Prague last November, "We will not fail you in this decisive moment." We want to help build on the successes that the new democracies have already achieved--to help overcome the legacy of the dictators and to encourage their integration into the commonwealth of freedom. Make no mistake about it. There have already been monumental successes. But despite these successes, the region faces major challenges. The old system was not kind to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. It scarred their land and fouled their water and air. Despite your energy and genius, it retarded the development of modern industry. The remains of the old system are still a burden. But your resolve is strong; your course is set. You have been called upon to create the future, to provide the models for other societies in transition to democracy. You are blessed with an abundance of skilled workers and talented entrepreneurs. This region's human potential--long suppressed--is vast. But unrelenting reform is needed to liberate the economic dynamism of the region and encourage the creativity throttled by the command economy of the past. Accordingly, our approach to supporting the transformation of Eastern and Central Europe is to help liberate the industry of the peoples of this region. First, we are offering technical aid--to give the people the tools to compete. But markets are more important than aid. Therefore, we are working to facilitate greater trade with the West. At a time when East European trade with the USSR is shrinking, the United States will open our markets as widely as possible to Central and East European products. We urge the European Community and the European Free Trade Association to open their markets also. Indeed, we are making market access for the Central and East European economies a top priority of the G-7 [economic] summit in London next month. The West has a responsibility to remove market barriers, so that the people of this region can sell the products of their liberated economies. The third component of our approach is to promote Western investment in the Central and East European economies. That is why, in March, we announced a Private Sector Development Initiative, which will provide some $45 million in programs to encourage trade, investment, and joint ventures in Central and Eastern Europe. And that is why President Bush established Joint American Enterprise Funds with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to promote private investment. In addition, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) will lead its first investment mission to Czechoslovakia in October--while in Sofia tomorrow, I will sign the first OPIC agreement with the government of Bulgaria. But while the United States and other Western nations help the nations of Central and Eastern Europe make the transition to a free market, we must continue to provide support in the field of political institution-building. Our friends in the region tell us that such help has been absolutely critical. We must concentrate on strengthening democracy at the grassroots. An independent labor force, a free press, honest elections, and an independent judiciary--these are the heart and soul of a democratic society. Our aim must be to help such institutions take firm root and flourish. As the institutional structures of democracy fall into place, we must nurture as well the ethical and spiritual essence of a democratic society. One of our Founding Fathers, James Madison, taught Americans that freedom cannot be secured merely by what he called the "parchment barriers" of constitutional and legal texts. Rather, these texts must be given life by the virtues and habits of a people. These virtues include tolerance of others; respect for the rule of law; a willingness to compromise and to renounce violence; an ability to rejoice in the achievements and successes of one's neighbors; and the capacity to cherish and celebrate the cultural, ethnic, and religious heritage of others. It is these values--the very values of CSCE--that are prevailing throughout Central and Eastern Europe. All this constitutes a formidable agenda. The old system was decayed, and so it crumbled swiftly. Creating a new order, in which the people govern and are free to live productive lives, will not be easy. But, it will happen. We know that life in Central and Eastern Europe today is hard. But it will improve--slowly at first, then with a quickening pace. We know that your most abundant resource is the courage and determination of your people. We admire the courage of the people of Central and Eastern Europe in resisting dictatorship. We admire your successful efforts to free yourselves. We admire what you are doing today. We know that helping you is our obligation and our interest. We are confident in your success, and I pledge to you, as President Bush pledged--we will not let you down. We will stand with you as you complete the transition from the dark night of oppression and dictatorship to the bright future of freedom and prosperity. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991 Title:

Germany: Opening of Consulate General Leipzig

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: Jun 7, 19916/7/91 Region: Europe Country: Germany Subject: State Department [TEXT] The United States has opened its Consulate General in Leipzig effective today. The consular district for the Leipzig Consulate General encompasses the German states of Saxony and Thuringia. Initially, the Consulate General will be staffed by three Americans: Consul General Robert W. Becker, Consul Janet Garvey and Consul Nicholas J. Dean, plus a locally engaged staff. An America House cultural center, including a library, will be opened in Leipzig by the US Information Service as soon as suitable space can be found. As Branch Public Affairs Officer, Ms. Garvey will direct the operations of the America House. The Consulate General is responsible for developing political, economic, commercial, and cultural ties and representing US interests in Thuringia and Saxony. The Consulate General also will respond to emergency needs of American citizens in the consular district. Routine visa and passport requests, however, will be handled from the US Embassy office in Berlin. The Consulate General is discussing permanent office space with the city of Leipzig and the government of Saxony. At present, the Consulate General will operate from office space located in the Consul General's residence and will not have public office hours. The public can make appointments through the mail and via telephone and telefax. The Consulate General is located at Karl-Tauchnitz-Strasse 15#1510-7010 Leipzig. The telephone number is Leipzig 2114-293; telefax number, Leipzig 2114-210. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991 Title:

FY 1992 Security Assistance Request

Bartholomew Source: Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary for International Security Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun 11, 19916/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Central America, South America, Subsaharan Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe Country: Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Philippines Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales, Narcotics, State Department, NATO [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, both Congress and the Administration recognize that our foreign aid program is one of the principal tools we have to advance our interests and objectives abroad. Today, I want to examine how the use of one set of our foreign assistance tools--the security assistance accounts--contributes to our broad foreign policy goals: to preserve and protect peace and stability among nations and to promote democracy and development within them. In particular, I want to discuss security assistance as it relates to two other key elements in our national security web: the fostering and maintenance of our alliances and the advancement of our arms control and non-proliferation agendas.
Promoting and Maintaining Collective Self-Defense Arrangements
Our efforts to promote and maintain collective self-defense arrangements begin with NATO. NATO has been the bedrock of Western security for nearly half a century. It is NATO that has enabled the allies to win the Cold War; it is NATO that will remain the keystone of European security for the long term. Today, changes in and around Europe pose new security problems that require a renewed Atlantic alliance. Fortunately, we are no longer required to focus on a singular, direct threat. Indeed, the alliance is pursuing cooperation with the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on many fronts. NATO is serving as one among several Western institutions which will engage the Soviet Union more fully in the world community. We are adapting NATO to a new security environment. An example of how well NATO is evolving is provided by Desert Storm. The vital role of the alliance in support of coalition efforts in the [Persian] Gulf is clear. It was NATO's infrastructure bases, communications facilities, and command and control systems, which were so important in sustaining US forces in the Gulf. Moreover, NATO political and security consultation helped ensure unanimity in support of war aims. The meeting of NATO defense ministers last month agreed on important initiatives in NATO's military dimension, such as the formation of a multi-national rapid reaction corps under European command. And, beyond the purely military dimension, NATO retains the initiative in arms control and other security negotiations, as well as the broader political agenda. At the last foreign ministers' meeting, NATO agreed on further steps in its liaison program with the Soviet Union and the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. It has taken a leading role in helping guide and develop the CSCE process. It is a forum for consultation, decision, and coordination on crises throughout Europe. The role of security assistance here is clear. In order for several of our allies to have the confidence and capability to make a full contribution to the alliance, they need our help. Their contributions to Desert Storm demonstrate the wisdom of our policies. I will outline our proposal for aid to NATO and other security partners later in my testimony.
Reducing Threats to US and International Security
The second element of our efforts to promote security and stability abroad is the reduction of threats to our security and to that of others. There are a number of ways we do this, but there are two that I would like to discuss specifically: arms control and non- proliferation. We have made significant progress in the area of arms control in these past few months. We believe that we have ironed out all remaining difficulties in the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, and we hope to be able to say the same soon for START [strategic arms reductions talks]. Throughout, though, we have been guided by two realities. First, arms control is a means to advance our security interest, not an end in itself. Second, arms control takes time. Recall that it has taken us almost two decades to achieve agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. Non-proliferation is a global problem that the Administration has been attacking on a global basis; indeed, in just a few days, I am making a trip to China that will focus on advancing our non- proliferation objectives. I hope soon to travel to South Asia to advance those same objectives. The presidential initiative announced May 13, under which we have proposed to destroy our entire stock of chemical weapons, has set the stage for achieving a global treaty banning chemical weapons within a year. In the Australia Group, US leadership has produced a breakthrough in worldwide control of exports of chemical weapons and precursors and chemical weapons-related dual-use equipment. And in missile non-proliferation, US activism in the recent past has promoted the expansion of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) from 7 to 16 countries. But while our overall non-proliferation concern is global, we intend to make a special effort in the Middle East, under the President's initiative on Middle East arms control. The Gulf war has heightened not only our concern, but the world's concern over the global impact of instability in the Middle East, and it highlighted the need to move forward expeditiously. The initiative is comprehensive, as you know. It contains proposals on missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, Iraq- specific measures, and conventional arms. Security assistance will play a key role here as well, in assuring that friends are confident enough in their own ability to defend themselves that they will accept the kinds of limits we are exploring under the President's arms control initiative. Security assistance in conjunction with non-proliferation and arms control measures allows us to assure stable balances that reduce tensions and the threat of war.
Helping Our Friends Defend Themselves
As we seek to persuade friends to take difficult steps toward non- proliferation and arms control, we must ensure that they can defend themselves against threats, both internal and external. There are a number of different threats with which our friends may be concerned, and those threats vary on a regional basis. Addressing those threats calls for different discriminate responses. For many, the threat is the familiar one: state-to-state violence, brought on by any one of the number of factors that can lead to war. Some of our friends face purely internal threats, brought on by political and economic inequalities that have persisted over time, economic mismanagement, subversion, or natural disaster. Here our response is clear: We must promote and consolidate democratic values, promote free market principles, encourage full respect for human rights, and meet urgent humanitarian needs. Other friends face new, transnational threats--drug- trafficking and environmental degradation, in particular. These threats, too, must be met in the most appropriate fashion. Indeed, some of our friends even face anachronistic Marxist revolutions, led by those who have not yet recognized the ideological bankruptcy of communism. Where these threats can be met adequately with economic assistance, that is our clear preference. But, in many cases, they cannot. The reality is that, for the foreseeable future, assuring stability--and enabling our friends to protect themselves--will require that we continue to provide arms and related services and training when and where appropriate. It is this logic that underlines the Administration's position on arms sales in the President's proposal on arms control in the Middle East. What we hope to prevent is one country's arming itself beyond legitimate self-defense needs and creating destabilizing military balances in a volatile region. Previously, there has been no multilateral system to monitor these types of build-ups. There were no international guidelines. No agreement exists among the nations that provide weapons to the region to allow transfers to be challenged as destabilizing. I know that some would have us go further than this proposal. We might if this proposed regime can be achieved. The truth is however, that this proposal will be tough for many of the other suppliers to accept. Based upon our preliminary discussions with them, we know that they have problems with transparency and other aspects of the regime. What we propose to do now is what politics- -in "the art of the possible"--permits. We do not seek a regime that halts arms transfers, but we have proposed one that will seek to ensure that sales that do take place are responsible.
FY 1992 Request
I've told you that security assistance is an important tool for advancing our security interests; now let me demonstrate how our FY 1992 request is the right fit. Rather than "business as usual," we see this request as a blend of continuing priorities and new initiatives, a key vehicle for advancing our security interests. In Foreign Military Financing (FMF), we are requesting $4.65 billion in budget authority to enable us to support a program level of $4.92 billion, an increase of some $215 million over program levels enacted in FY 1991. In Economic Support Funds (ESF), we are requesting $3.24 billion in budget authority, supporting a program of the same size; our ESF request represents an increase of $96 million over the ESF level provided in the FY 1991 appropriations bill. Measured against prior-year request levels, our ESF and FMF requests are smaller--both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the budget and of GNP. We believe that this request, if funded, would be money well- spent. One of my principal messages today is that--while we are responding to the changes in the world around us--the security assistance "system" isn't broken. Rather, the system of international security relationships that we have forged over time is fundamentally sound and supportive of vital US interests, as Desert Storm clearly demonstrates. We need now to build on this success. Let me talk about our regional programs to show you why this is the case.
Near East and South Asia ($5.51 billion)
The success of our international security relationships as well as the continuing needs are especially evident in the Near East and South Asia regions. In the Gulf war, Israel pursued a policy of restraint based on strength--military strength and the strength derived from strong US-Israeli security relations. We remain unshakeably committed to Israel's security, a commitment that we demonstrated with the deployment of US Patriot missile systems and US crews in the recent crisis. We are also committed to ensuring that Israel maintains its qualitative edge, built upon superiority in advanced weapons, as well as in command, control, communications, and intelligence systems. Earlier this year, we requested, and Congress provided, $650 million in supplemental Economic Support Funds to deflect the additional costs which Israel incurred as the result on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Most recently, our commitment to Israel was reflected in Secretary [of Defense Richard] Cheney's agreement to provide 15 F- 15 aircraft under the $700 million drawdown authority authorized by the Congress, as well as a continued partnership in the ARROW program. Our request for $1.8 billion in FY 1992 FMF grant financing and $1.2 billion in ESF further underlines that commitment. Egypt played a crucial role in mobilizing and maintaining support for the coalition. Over two divisions of Egyptian troops fought hard for the liberation of Kuwait. We expect that a moderate, stable Egypt with firm links to the West, with modern, well-equipped defense forces, and with stronger ties to the Gulf states, will continue to be a key partner in the region as we work to achieve a broader Arab-Israeli peace and to bolster moderate forces in the volatile Middle East. Our request for $1.3 billion in FMF and $815 million in ESF will provide vital support to those goals. We are requesting security assistance for several other friends in the region whose help was critical to the success of Desert Storm, and whom we expect to be positive forces for stability in the post-crisis environment. In particular, I cite Morocco ($40 million FMF, $12 million ESF), whose forces deployed to Saudi Arabia along with our own; and Oman ($5 million FMF, $15 million ESF), where a decade-old security relationship proved its value. As a result of developments associated with the Persian Gulf crisis, as well as our own budgetary limitations, we have reduced our requests for Jordan ($25 million FMF, $30 million ESF) and Tunisia ($10 million FMF, $3 million ESF). We also request a total of $214 million in security assistance for Pakistan. We have terminated aid to Pakistan since the President has not certified that Pakistan has met the requirements of the Pressler Amendment. However, we have not, and will not, cease in our efforts to convince the government of Pakistan that it can assure its national security through conventional means of defense. Our ability to make that effort credible rests on our being able to renew a security assistance relationship once Pakistan has met the requirements imposed by US law and policy. We, therefore, request that the Congress provide adequate levels of security assistance--both FMF and ESF--to assure that the President has the resources to advance this vital element of our non-proliferation policy.
Europe ($1.21 billion)
The Gulf crisis again underscored the long-term, strategic importance of Turkey in two theaters--Europe and the Middle East. Throughout the crisis, Turkey was vital to the success of coalition efforts. Turkey was among the first to take concrete, and costly, actions to enforce sanctions against Iraq. Its shutting down of Iraq's oil pipeline was as important to the isolation of Iraq as the naval blockade. The presence of Turkey's armed forces, deployed along its border with Iraq, effectively pinned down 10 Iraqi divisions. Turkey provided key bases from which US forces were able to carry out attacks on Iraqi military facilities. These and other supportive Turkish actions saved many American lives. But these were not easy steps for a nation living in that neighborhood, and there can be no doubt that, by their courageous actions, the Turks incurred additional short- and long-term military risks. Turkey estimates that its support in enforcing the sanctions regime will cost it roughly $6 billion, and the costs of deploying over 100,000 troops to the border have been put by Turkey at $300 million for 1990 alone. We were able to provide Turkey with $200 million in supplementary ESF in FY 1991 to defer a part of these additional costs, and others have made substantial payments and pledges as well, but Turkey's net loss remains substantial. Our security assistance effort ($625 million FMF, $75 million ESF) is designed to assist the Turks in continuing the multi-year program to modernize their air defense forces, and also in offsetting part of their military costs and economic losses, thereby deepening our relationship with this key partner for regional stability. Programs in Greece ($350 million) and Portugal ($165 million in combined ESF and FMF) are important as well. We have a continuing interest in assisting Greece with the modernization of its military to support fulfillment of its NATO roles. Greece is a democratic state which can serve as a force for stability in the Balkans. Our program in Portugal supports that country's multi- year force modernization effort which focuses on air/sea defense of the North Atlantic sea lanes and on access to the Mediterranean Sea. Both these countries made important contributions during the Gulf crisis. Greece accepted deployment of logistics aircraft and furnished other assistance which greatly facilitated our operation. Likewise, Portuguese permission to use Lajes Air Base proved to be very valuable to the success of Desert Storm.
American Republics ($980 million)
There are two major elements in our security assistance programs in the American Republics: support for the President's Andean counter-narcotics strategy and support for peace and economic development in Central America. As the President said in his State of the Union address, the war on drugs remains a national priority. To that end, in addition to a request for $171.5 million for the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, we are requesting $412 million in FMF and ESF for Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to help these democracies confront narcotics trafficking and develop their fragile economies. Our efforts, to date, have borne fruit: there have been significant improvements in counter-narcotics cooperation; coca cultivation has declined for the first time; trafficking organizations have seen their operations disrupted; and we have seen a corresponding drop in domestic cocaine use. In Central America, much of our effort remains focused on war-torn El Salvador ($120 million ESF, $85 million FMF), where the reliability of our aid continues to be the element most likely to bring the conflict to a negotiated solution. Our economic assistance remains critical to the development of a comprehensive economic program to reform interest rates, narrow fiscal deficits, provide incentives for investment, and provide balance-of-payment support, just as it is in Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. These assistance programs complement the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), and its key trade, investment, and debt proposals. While EAI is beyond the scope of my responsibilities, I hope this subcommittee will reverse action in the House which drastically cut back on our EAI request.
Africa ($52 million)
In Africa, our security assistance is requested for countries that have been our close partners and for support of new movement toward democracy. For the Development Fund for Africa, our principal vehicle for overall assistance, we seek $800 million promote broad and sustainable economic growth. I want to highlight a new regional program in our ESF proposal which would provide feasibility in assisting African countries in making the transition to democracy. We also seek to expand our regional approach to military assistance to enable timely assistance in resolving Africa's devastating internal conflicts. East Asia and Pacific ($343 million) Our clear emphasis in the East Asia and Pacific region is the Philippines ($320 million in combined ESF and FMF). A stable, democratic, and prosperous Philippines with friendly ties to, and continued close security cooperation with, the United States is essential to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia, as well as to broad US strategic interests in Asia. Here again, our access provided important support for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As you know, negotiations continue with regard to the continued use of facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic [Bay] Naval Base. We anticipate a successful conclusion. Assuring access to these facilities is just one aspect of a very important relationship.
IMET ($52.5 million)
Last, but not least, let me add a word about the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET is a low-cost foreign policy and national security instrument that is recognized as one of the most effective components of US security assistance. It provides valuable training for individual participants from foreign countries, and it promotes a greater understanding of the US military and civilian control thereof, American culture and values, and respect for individual freedoms. And under an initiative promoted by this subcommittee, we are now sending civilian employees of defense ministries to US schools to better promote the idea of civilian control of the military. IMET is a bargain at the $52.5 million that we have requested for FY 1992 and should not be underestimated in its value as a very important element of our security assistance program. We are faced with a number of difficult, but not impossible, challenges as we attempt to ensure security and stability abroad. Our international cooperation programs will play an important part in our efforts. We believe that we have a very good package in place and that the Administration's programs and requests make the proper adaptations for a changing world. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 24, June 17, 1991 Title:

UN Security Council Resolution 692 On the Liability of Iraq

Date: May 20, 19915/20/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Resolution 692 (May 20, 1991) The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991 and 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, concerning the liability of Iraq, without prejudice to its debts and obligations arising prior to 2 August 1990, for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Taking note of the Secretary-General's report of 2 May 1991 (S/22559), submitted in accordance with paragraph 19 of resolution 687 (1991), Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report of 2 May 1991; 2. Welcomes the fact that the Secretary-General will now undertake the appropriate consultations requested by paragraph 19 of resolution 687 (1991) so that he will be in a position to recommend to the Security Council for decision as soon as possible the figure which the level of Iraq's contribution to the Fund will not exceed; 3. Decides to establish the Fund and the Commission referred to in paragraph 18 of resolution 687 (1991) in accordance with section I of the Secretary-General's report, and that the Governing Council will be located at the United Nations Office at Geneva and that the Governing council may decide whether some of the activities of the Commission should be carried out elsewhere; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to take the actions necessary to implement paragraphs 2 and 3 above in consultation with the members of the Governing Council; 5. Directs the Governing Council to proceed in an expeditious manner to implement the provisions of section E of resolution 687 (1991), taking into account the recommendations in section II of the Secretary-General's report; 6. Decides that the requirement for Iraqi contributions will apply in the manner to be prescribed by the Governing Council with respect to all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq after 2 April 1991 as well as such petroleum and petroleum products exported earlier but not delivered or not paid for as a specific result of the prohibitions contained in Security Council resolution 661 (1990); 7. Requests the Governing Council to report as soon as possible on the actions it has taken with regard to the mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the Fund and the arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the Fund, so that the Security Council can give its approval in accordance with paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991); 8. Requests that all States and international organizations cooperate with the decisions of the Governing Council taken pursuant to paragraph 5 of the present resolution, and also requests that the Governing Council keep the Security Council informed on this matter; 9. Decides that, if the Governing Council notifies the Security Council that Iraq has failed to carry out decisions of the Governing Council taken pursuant to paragraph 5 of the present resolution, the Security Council intends to retain or to take action to reimpose the prohibition against the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq and financial transactions related thereto; 10. Decides also to remain seized of this matter and that the Governing Council will submit periodic reports to the Secretary- General and the Security Council. VOTE: 14 for, 0 against, 1 abstention (Cuba).(###)