US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991
Title: New Directions for the North Atlantic Alliance
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from Secretary Baker's intervention at the
North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting, Copenhagen,
Denmark
Date: Jun 6, 19916/6/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, North America, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: USSR (former), Germany
Subject: NATO, CSCE
[TEXT]
When we last met in December, our discussions were over-
shadowed by the danger of war with Iraq. Before I begin, I would
like to say that I think we can be proud of the determination all of
us demonstrated in joining together to defeat Saddam Hussein's
aggression.
The alliance played a vital role in Desert Storm and is doing
the same as we cope with the humanitarian challenges of its
aftermath. NATO helped build the Western political unity that was
so instrumental in securing this decisive victory for the rule of
law. The value of our continuing investments in common training,
logistics, and infrastructure was reflected in the way our armed
forces worked together, both in moving forces to the Gulf and
prosecuting the war. We can draw upon the Gulf experience for the
future--above all, the new reality that "non-traditional" challenges
may directly threaten the vital interests of the alliance and its
members. This was clearest with regard to the potential military
threat that directly confronted Turkey, but it was true for others,
too.
The crisis in the Gulf, in short, showed our alliance shifting
to cope with new realities and successfully meeting new
challenges. Today, I want to focus on four issues that we will need
to work on together in the months ahead as the alliance continues
its adaptation.
Reshaping the Alliance
At the London summit, our leaders called for fundamental changes
in the alliance--adaptations to meet the transformation of the
Soviet Union, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,
and Western Europe's political structures. The call of the summit
was to strengthen our trans-Atlantic partnership to meet the
evolving challenges--political, economic, and military--of a post-
Cold War world.
NATO's strategy review is a principal mechanism for the
alliance's adaptation. We are pleased with the progress that has
been made and fully expect to reach final results in time for a
November summit in Rome.
Since the London summit, we have succeeded in defining the
core security functions the alliance must continue to perform in the
new Europe. We have made major progress in crafting a new NATO
military strategy which lays out NATO's important roles in peace-
time, in crisis, and, if necessary, in war.
In anticipation of this new strategy, NATO's defense ministers
agreed last week on new alliance force structures--fulfilling our
London summit commitment to make NATO's forces more flexible,
more mobile, and more multinational. And we are also witnessing a
strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance through the
development of a European security identity.
These changes will renew the alliance--adapting it for
decades to come.
In this larger context, the United States fully supports the
concept of European integration, as we always have. We stand ready
to support the arrangements which you, our European allies, decide
are needed to express a new European security and defense identity-
-ones which can and must strengthen the alliance. There must be
transparency in our discussions here and in the IGC [Inter-
governmental Conference] forum and complementarity in our
conclusions.
The fundamental principle that should guide our efforts in
each of these forums is that Europe's security is indivisible from
that of the United States and Canada. The Gulf war is only the most
recent test of how closely our security needs are linked. In this
century, two "hot" wars and one Cold War have proven this.
For these reasons, it is clear to us that one of our key goals
must be to ensure that NATO remains the principal venue for our
consultations and the forum for agreement on all policies bearing on
the security and defense commitments of its members under the
North Atlantic Treaty.
We must, of course, maintain an effective integrated military
structure. It is equally clear that any potential new structure must
reinforce, not compete with, those of the alliance.
We welcome the willingness of European allies to improve
Europe's ability to protect vital interests and uphold the rule of law
beyond Europe itself. And to minimize the potential for
divisiveness within NATO, we encourage European allies to open
their common defense policy deliberations to all European members
of NATO.
NATO's Diplomatic Liaison--Guiding Principles
Parallel to these efforts, our leaders agreed in London that the
alliance must respond to changes in Central and Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union by opening itself to more regular contacts with
former adversaries. The mandate from London has found its most
concrete expression in the establishment of diplomatic liaison
missions with these countries.
Our goal is to reach out to the Soviet Union and to the
emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe--to
demonstrate NATO's genuine concern for their legitimate security
interests, for the restructuring of their economies on market
principles, and for the growth of freedom and democracy. NATO
liaison, complementary to our activities in other forums, in
particular CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe],
will help build the network of ties that will further integrate the
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe with the West. This is
a historic task, fully consistent with the alliance's fundamental
mission.
Let me also offer five principles that we believe can guide
future liaison efforts.
First, our liaison efforts should build trust by providing our
former adversaries with a better understanding of NATO's nature,
policy, and operations, as well as the political values that are its
foundation.
Second, liaison relationships should promote a better
understanding of the security concerns and policies of the states
involved.
Third, liaison relationships should be especially active in
areas where NATO and its members have specialized technical
expertise for coping with common problems.
Fourth, we should have flexibility to respond to evolving
needs.
Fifth, NATO liaison activities should complement the
activities of the EC [European Community], the CSCE , the Council of
Europe, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development], and the WEU [Western European Union].
These principles underpin many of the initiatives that [German
Foreign Minister] Hans-Dietrich Genscher and I put forward during
his recent visit to Washington.
Quite simply, our initiatives aim to let the East Europeans and
Soviets see the substance of what we have in mind. We want them
to know we truly want to help their transformations. In particular,
I believe we can help President Gorbachev and the course of reform
in the Soviet Union if we also reach out to some of the
traditionalists, to help them make the transition to a democratic,
market-oriented society.
Building Toward Berlin
For 16 years, CSCE has fostered democratic values in Europe. Now,
in CSCE as elsewhere, we need to anchor the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe's new democracies in a secure and stable
environment.
For the West, CSCE has always stood for respect for the
fundamental human rights, openness, and freedoms that unite our
countries as a community. That conception must continue to guide
our approach to CSCE.
We also must show that CSCE not only is a catalyst for change
but can itself change to reflect the demands of an evolving Europe.
The CSCE institutions we established at the Paris summit
responded to these demands.
The Office for Free Elections in Warsaw and the CSCE
Secretariat in Prague strengthen CSCE's ability to foster the
building of democracy and the specialized needs associated with
stepped-up coordination at the political level among the signatory
states.
We want to enhance the functions of the Conflict Prevention
Center (CPC). These include agreement to place Valletta's Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes Mechanism in the center, an accelerated
calendar of meetings for the center's Consultative Committee,
agreement to a further military doctrine seminar, and agreement to
examine how the center's communications might be used as a "hot
line" for emergency contacts.
Each of these is a small step in and of itself. But together
they can, over time, start to make the CPC a more significant
instrument to address the security needs of CSCE countries,
especially the concerns of East European states and the interests of
the Soviet Union.
We view CSCE's political consultation process as a key
element of an evolving CSCE. Our meetings in Berlin will be an
important test of that process. The United States will be prepared
to agree to a properly structured mechanism for holding emergency
official-level meetings of the CSCE.
I suggest that we also examine the possibilities that a fact-
finding capability might bring to bear on CSCE as a means of
strengthening its role in the peaceful settlement of disputes.
I think we are agreed on the goal of utilizing the Berlin CSCE
ministerial to reach agreement at 34 on the procedures to be
followed for post-Helsinki security negotiations. If we are to do
so, we need to take positions as an alliance on the key procedural
questions.
And even though process is important, it should not divert us
from substance.
We need to define more concretely our objectives for new
security negotiations in Europe. We need to develop a new approach
to conventional arms control in Europe that will help us to address
the new security agenda that we face following implementation of
the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] treaty, the
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and completion of
the NATO strategy review.
To spur this internal discussion, I would suggest that the
post-Helsinki security discussions might focus us on the following
tasks:
-- Enhancing openness and deepening understanding about
military activities in Europe by expanding regular dialogues on
military forces, force plans, defense budgets, and military doctrine;
-- Promoting stability and security in Europe by developing
mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, including
measures that may have the consensus of all CSCE participants but
may not apply to all CSCE members;
-- Developing measures to enhance transparency and
predictability of military activity, with particular attention to the
regeneration and sustainability of forces in Europe; and
-- Strengthening and broadening participation in existing
non-proliferation regimes by cooperating in the development of
national policies to exercise restraint in the sale of conventional
weapons, to halt the spread of chemical and biological weapons and
missile technology, and to facilitate the conversion of defense
industries.
Such an approach would be consistent with our work on other
arms control fronts. Here I would like to note the intense work we
have begun already to finish the START treaty and prepare the
ground for a Moscow summit. I would also like to stress the
President's personal commitment to our Middle East non-
proliferation initiative--a plan of action that will, we believe,
enhance the security of states outside the Middle East as well.
Supporting Soviet Reform
Let me turn now to discuss a central question of the day--the
revolution in the Soviet Union and the West's approach to it.
I start with two distinct trends we've seen emerging in the
Soviet Union over the last year, if not longer.
First, we've seen a breakdown of the old sources of
legitimacy. Politically, this breakdown is exemplified in the war of
laws between the center and the republics. It is also reflected in
the Communist Party's destruction as the sole center of authority in
Soviet political culture. Economically, the legitimacy of the
system was shattered as the command system was destroyed
without being succeeded by the new rules of a full-fledged market
economy. Together, the political problems of disunion and the
economic problems of being caught between command and market
systems have eroded popular support for Moscow's leadership. The
leadership has had to recognize that its extraordinary role in
dismantling the old system did not automatically confer public
legitimacy for it in the new one.
The second trend has, however, arisen out of this breakdown
of established structures: we've seen the beginnings of a new
pluralism and perhaps a new legitimacy in the Soviet Union. At the
grassroots level, political and economic reform is emerging,
despite mixed signals from above. This pluralism, in some cases
fragmentation, is evident not only in national and republic politics,
but in many social groups. For example, the military and the
defense industrialists are far from unified in their views,
containing both traditionalist and reformist elements.
Last winter, the contradictions between these two trends
clashed. Traditionalist, command-oriented views were ascendant in
the late fall and early spring. But the traditionalist solutions to
the problems of legitimacy failed. The political crackdown in the
Baltics and the attempts to intimidate the democratic opposition in
Moscow only brought more people into the streets, further
diminishing the authorities' legitimacy.
Economics by decree, currency confiscations, and attacks on
alleged plots by foreign bankers failed to stem the economy's slide.
Accordingly, the leadership's standing at home continued to slide.
The miners' strike probably marked the greatest challenge to
the regime's legitimacy, for it combined a political and economic
challenge to Moscow with a frontal assault on the center's
legitimacy. Paradoxically, however, it could turn out to be the
beginning of a turnaround in Soviet politics.
For out of the atmosphere of the miner's strike grew the April
23rd "one-plus-nine" agreement--possibly the first step toward
resolution of the center-republic problem. The agreement itself
notes next steps--a new union treaty, a new constitution, and then
elections--which, if followed through, have the potential to
establish a new political legitimacy in the Soviet Union.
But this would still be just a legal structure. It would have to
be complemented with organizational solutions, such as center-
republic agreement on budgets and authority over questions such as
property rights.
It also must be matched by policy reforms. And these, too, are
stirring. For example, new market economy programs are being
explored by people like Yavlinsky. The success of these reformist
policy ideas are, in turn, fundamentally dependent on continued
political rapprochement within the Soviet Union. And, of course,
the success of perestroika and President Gorbachev will depend on
whether these new tendencies of the last 6 weeks can be continued.
The United States is committed to supporting them. No one
can peer into the future and assure us of success. But we believe
that the Soviet Union is a country rich in natural resources and
talented peoples, a country that could transform itself into a
democratic and prosperous society.
To tap this potential, the Soviets must move to embrace a real
market economy with private property, incentives, established and
respected laws on exchange, competition, a sound currency, and real
prices.
To establish the proper political context, both at home and
abroad, the Soviets should also continue their efforts to build a
state based on the rule of law and move to free and fair elections.
Moscow needs to accommodate peacefully the Baltic's
aspirations through dialogue and negotiations and complete a union
treaty that will allow the republics the autonomy they desire.
Moscow should continue its positive foreign policy orientation
while ending the most clear-cut vestiges of the era of stagnation by
eliminating support for regimes that pursue internal repression or
external subversion.
And the Soviets must accelerate their efforts at defense
conversion while committing both to opening their defense budget
and to reducing significantly the enormous share of GNP devoted to
defense spending.
The Soviets must find the will to open the way to a new
future; they must start with self-help.
If they do, we will support them. We can serve as a catalyst
for both political and economic reform. Indeed, we are developing a
package of supportive measures, which we hope to coordinate with
you and others. But I don't honestly think we can catalyze Soviet
reform through a big bang approach. We need to recognize that
these changes will take work over a long time. As we work day by
day, our effort is more likely to be a step-by-step process--
certainly one with a grand goal--but ever a realistic and workable
approach.
Above all, we need to engage this new and pluralistic Soviet
society to support reform wherever it is found. That's why we need
to strengthen the liaison relationships. Liaison is one way we can
engage the Soviet military and defense sector to reduce mistrust
and fear and foster mutual cooperation.
We recognize the hard choices the Soviets need to make.
Above all, we are aware how hard it will be to move toward a true
market economy. But for our part, we do not intend to stand idly by
if the Soviets come to grips with these questions of political and
economic legitimacy. Perestroika could be the most important
revolution of this century. All of us have a profound stake in its
outcome. And NATO has a key role to play in bringing about a Europe
and trans-Atlantic community that includes the Soviet Union and is
truly whole and free. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991
Title: New Directions for the North Atlantic Alliance
Description: Final communique issued following ministerial sessions
of the NATO Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning
Group in Brussels, Belgium, May 28-29, 1991
Date: May 29, 19915/29/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, North America, E/C Europe, Eurasia,
MidEast/North Africa
Country: USSR (former), Germany
Subject: NATO, Arms Control, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
1. The Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning
Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation met in Ministerial
sessions in Brussels on 28th and 29th May 1991.
2. At last year's London Summit NATO's Heads of State and
Government set a new course for the Alliance, aimed at adapting to
the profoundly changed security environment and encouraging the
continuation of the positive developments in Central and Eastern
Europe. The new era has well and truly begun for Europe and for the
Alliance. The process of dialogue with the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, including political and military contacts at all
levels, has now been established and should continue to be expanded.
The Allies will continue to promote co-operation on the basis of the
principles set out in the Paris Charter. All these steps are helping
to overcome the division of the past as we move towards our goal of
a Europe whole and free.
3. The continuing withdrawals of the Soviet Forces to their
territory and the recent decision by the member states of the
Warsaw Pact formally to dissolve its military structure are
important developments, which are further enhancing security and
stability in Europe. We seek full implementation by all parties of
the CFE Treaty, which would represent a major step forward. We
appeal to the Soviet Union to find a way to resolve the remaining
issues delaying ratification of the Treaty.
4. The new political situation and the much improved security
environment in Europe have made an East-West conflict much more
unlikely. Nevertheless uncertainties and risks remain. The Soviet
Union is undergoing a difficult political evolution. We clearly have
an interest in the success of the process of political and economic
reform, not least because the Soviet Union continues to retain
substantial nuclear and conventional capabilities. The countries of
Central and Eastern Europe are subject to considerable political,
social, economic and ethnic pressures which could lead to crises
jeopardizing overall stability in Europe. Moreover, as the Gulf war
underlined, risks can also arise from elsewhere. The Alliance thus
needs to continue to work to protect peace and freedom, and must
preserve the strategic balance and maintain credible deterrence and
an effective common defence to counter any threat to the territory
of the Allies.
5. We warmly welcome the success of the international
coalition forces in the recent Gulf War. We note with satisfaction
the effectiveness of the prompt action taken by the Alliance in
deploying naval and air forces to its Southern region to deter any
possible attacks on its members. This included the first
operational deployment in Alliance history of elements of the ACE
Mobile Force. The Alliance's actions have once again demonstrated
the overriding importance of political solidarity and our
determination to fulfill the commitment to collective security
stipulated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
6. We are adapting and transforming our collective defence
arrangements as foreseen in the London Declaration. Our broad
approach to Alliance security policy is reflected in its three
mutually reinforcing elements of co-operation, dialogue and the
maintenance of an effective collective defence capability. Arms
control and disarmament policy plays an important role in pursuit
of dialogue and in the co-operative approach to European security.
We have noted with satisfaction that substantial progress has been
made in the development of the new Alliance Strategic Concept,
which is nearing completion. We look forward to the new Concept
being approved later this year. The work done so far to reflect the
changed security environment provides a sound basis for the
continuing efforts to develop further the Alliance's defence policy
and in particular to reshape our nuclear and conventional force
posture through the collective defence planning process.
7. As the Alliance adapts to the new environment, the
preservation of enduring principles, such as the indivisibility of our
security and the need for sharing responsibilities, will remain
important. These principles are reflected in the integrated military
structure and collective defence arrangements which have
maintained a credible deterrence and effective military capability
over the past forty years. A continued presence of forces from
North America in Europe is indispensable.
8. In our Defence Planning Committee meeting we continued
the intensive consultations on the reviews many member countries
are undertaking of their future national defence plans, and the
consequences of these reviews for the common defence. We also
considered recommendations developed by our Military Authorities
for the future structure of NATO's forces. The new force structures
will reflect the characteristics of flexibility, mobility and
multinationality identified in the London Declaration. We noted
with satisfaction that both the future national plans and the work
done on the new NATO force structures will enable us to maintain a
coherent and effective collective defence posture at lower overall
force levels.
9. We have agreed the basis of a new force structure
consisting of Main Defence Forces, Reaction Forces and
Augmentation Forces, including multinational forces of all types:
land, air and maritime. In particular we have agreed various
national contributions to the multinational corps of Main Defence
Forces for which detailed planning will now proceed. With regard to
Reaction Forces, we have agreed that these should consist of
immediate and rapid reaction forces, comprising contributions from
most NATO nations and including national as well as multinational
formations. As part of the rapid reaction forces, we have agreed
the creation of a Rapid Reaction Corps for Allied Command Europe,
under United Kingdom command with a multinational headquarters.
These forces, together with our future air and maritime force
structures, will provide the basis for the flexible deployment of a
range of forces depending on the situation. In this context we have
agreed the establishment of a multinational Reaction Force Planning
Staff at SHAPE for development and coordination of plans for all
Allied Command Europe Reaction Forces. A number of important
aspects relating to the implementation of the new force structure
now require examination, including the composition of
multinational air and naval components and their command
arrangements. We agreed that the necessary studies should be
undertaken immediately. Finally, we have agreed that a study of
NATO's command structure should be pursued as a matter of urgency
with the aim of streamlining and adapting it to the new situation.
10. We have approved the 1991 Ministerial Guidance, which
provides political guidance for Alliance defence planning activities,
both national and collective, for the period up to 1998 and beyond.
It will thus cover the period of transition during which the new
Alliance Strategic Concept is to come into effect and its
implementation will therefore need to take account of the new
strategy as finally approved. The Guidance reflects our agreement
on the need to maintain the effectiveness of our collective defence
arrangements and thus to provide the level of resources necessary
to ensure that our forces contributing to the new force structures
are adequately manned, equipped, trained and exercised.
Nevertheless, we agreed that a continued improvement in the
security environment should permit reductions in the defence
burden for most countries. However the adaptation and
transformation of the forces in this period of transition will
inevitably have financial consequences and for the majority of
nations defence expenditure in real terms should not be expected to
reduce substantially in the near term. In this context a more
effective use of defence expenditures and an equitable sharing of
the common defence burden remain key objectives.
11. We also reviewed the work being undertaken in a number
of key areas of Alliance defence planning as part of the process of
adaptation of our forces. These include crisis management, which
will assume greater importance in future to reflect the range,
variety and unpredictability of the risks facing the Alliance;
reinforcement planning where, in addition to the continued vital
importance of the transatlantic link, inter-regional reinforcement
within Europe, involving both European and North American forces,
will play an increasingly significant role; the Air Command and
Control system; and infrastructure, armaments co-operation, as
enhanced by the Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS),
and logistics support arrangements. Although much of this work
can only be concluded once the new Strategic Concept and the new
force structures have been finally approved, good progress is being
made. We received a briefing on military lessons of the Gulf
conflict. We agreed that these should be carefully studied, and
applied where appropriate.
12. In our Nuclear Planning Group meeting we discussed a
broad range of nuclear related issues. We were briefed on the
status of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and
the Soviet Union and supported United States efforts to obtain a
successful conclusion to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
(START). We noted with satisfaction that the final elimination of
United States and Soviet missiles declared in the INF Treaty has
now been completed. We welcomed this milestone in our efforts to
achieve a stable security environment at lower levels of
armaments. In this context, we reviewed the status of Alliance
consultations on an arms control framework for negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of
Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF).
13. Last year we initiated a fundamental review of the size
and tasks of the Alliance's nuclear forces. It looks forward to
reduced reliance on and substantial reductions of nuclear weapons.
It also recognizes that for the foreseeable future nuclear weapons
have an essential role in a strategy designed to preserve peace; and,
as part of this, that there remains a need for sub-strategic forces
to be based in Europe, with widespread participation in nuclear
roles and policy formulation, and kept up-to-date where necessary.
The review is well advanced and will be completed in conjunction
with the new Alliance Strategic Concept. While seeking the lowest
level of nuclear forces commensurate with Alliance security
requirements, we are also investigating the measures necessary to
ensure that those forces that remain continue to be effective,
flexible and survivable, with the requisite communications
capability.
14. Against the background of the Gulf War, we discussed the
potential risk posed by proliferation of ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction and the need to consider
complementary approaches to dealing with the problem, including
export controls and missile defences. We welcomed a briefing by
the United States concerning its concept for global protection
against limited ballistic missile strikes.
15. The transformation of the Alliance has begun in an
environment in which unprecedented opportunities exist to promote
freedom, stability, the peaceful resolution of disputes and the
growth of democracy throughout Europe. We welcome the
intensified dialogue and cooperation with all countries of Central
and Eastern Europe as a promising contribution to increased mutual
understanding and trust. Building on the spirit of the Paris Charter,
the CSCE process should play an increasingly constructive role and
will complement the Alliance's efforts to achieve a more secure and
stable European environment in which no country would be able to
intimidate or coerce any other nation or impose hegemony through
the threat or use of force. To this end arms control and
disarmament should also continue to make an important
contribution. The efforts further to develop a European security
identity and defence role should lead to a strengthened European
pillar within the Alliance and thus not only serve the interests of
European states but also enhance Atlantic solidarity by underlining
the preparedness of the European allies to take a greater share of
the responsibility for collective security. NATO will remain the
essential forum for consultations among the Allies and the forum
for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence
commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.
16. At our Autumn meetings we will consider the
implementation of the new Alliance Strategic Concept and in
particular the resulting nuclear and conventional force and
command structures. The process of adapting to the needs of the
new security environment is a challenging task. We have made a
very good start. We remain determined to ensure that our common
defences which have served us so well in the past will continue to
do so in the future.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991
Title: USSR Trade Waiver Extension
Description: Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Washington,
DC
Date: Jun 3, 19916/3/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Trade/Economics, Immigration
[TEXT]
The President submitted to the Congress his recommendation to
extend the waiver authority granted under the Jackson-Vanik
amendment (Section 402) to the 1974 Trade Act. In doing so, the
President has determined that extension of the authority and of the
waiver for the USSR granted in December 1990 will promote the
objectives of the agreement--free emigration.
The President made this decision in view of the fact that the
Soviet government has substantially reduced barriers to emigration
for Soviet citizens. Numbers of Soviets emigrating rose from 2,000
in 1986 to over 370,000 in 1990. The Administration believes that
this positive trend will continue.
The President's action will permit the Soviet Union to remain
eligible for export credit guarantee programs of the Commodity
Credit Corporation of the Department of Agriculture and of the
Export-Import Bank. The waiver is for 1 year.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991
Title: Signing of the Angolan Peace Accords
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks and US-Soviet Joint Statementat the Angola
peace accords signing ceremony, Lisbon, Portugal
Date: May 31, 19915/31/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Angola
Subject: Democratization, International Law
[TEXT]
Secretary Baker:
All Africa, and all the world, bear witness to what we do here
today. This is a pivotal moment for the people of Angola and a
promising moment for stability in southern Africa.
Together, we meet to end a grievous and bloody civil war. But
that is not all that we do. We also gather here to pledge our support
as Angola begins the difficult process of healing and democratic
nation-building.
I warmly and most sincerely congratulate the Angolan parties
and their leaders--Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi. You
have shown courage and statesmanship in reaching this
comprehensive, negotiated settlement.
Once adversaries in war, you now stand together as partners
in peace. In signing these binding accords, you have shown the
world that peace can be established through dialogue and political
will.
And now, you have the opportunity to show the world that a
multi-party democracy can be built where before there was only
destruction and distrust.
The United States has been proud to be counted among the
nations who have helped bring about this day of peace-making. On
behalf of President Bush and the American people, I would like to
thank [Portuguese] Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and his government
for their perseverance and commitment.
To [Soviet] Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and his colleagues,
I would like to express my thanks for their cooperation in resolving
yet another issue that once deeply divided our countries but that
now unites us in common purpose.
I would also like to renew my deep appreciation to the United
Nations and Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. Once again you have
played a critical role in the achievement of peace.
Those of us in the international community who have worked
long and hard to reach this settlement know that implementation of
these binding peace accords will not be easy. Time and again in the
months and years ahead, the will of the Angolan people and their
leaders will be severely tested.
But we are here today to say that Angola shall not stand alone.
For our part, the United States will do all we can to assist Angola's
transition to democracy. For we are convinced that democracy
offers Angola the best chance for enduring peace and well-being at
home and for stability and prosperity in the region.
We will support Angola's new multi-party system and help to
ensure that the upcoming national elections are truly free and fair.
Working through the Joint Commission, we will help provide the
resources for voter education programs and for maximum popular
participation in the election process.
Moreover, the United States shall fully meet all our
commitments as observers to these peace accords. We will open a
liaison office in Luanda and participate actively in the work of the
Joint Political Military Commission and of the commission which
will verify the cease-fire.
We will honor our obligation not to provide any lethal materiel
to anyone in Angola, and we will closely monitor other countries to
that same end.
And we will continue our humanitarian assistance to all
Angolans, for ultimately, it is the Angolan people who must build
upon the peace that is achieved today.
Finally, the United States looks forward to working with the
international community in a common effort to help Angola meet
the demanding challenges of reconciliation and democracy that lie
ahead.
And, as we Americans contemplate the daunting tasks now
facing the Angolan people and their leaders, we shall recall with
empathy and hope the healing words of President Abraham Lincoln,
when he addressed the nation toward the close of our own bitter
Civil War, "With malice toward none, with charity for all, with
firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right."
May that spirit--and the spirit of cooperation and good faith
that has brought us here today--also bring to all of Angola a bright,
prosperous, and democratic tomorrow.
US-Soviet Joint Statement May 31, 1991
Joint statement on US-Soviet cooperation on conflict resolution in
Africa released at the signing of the Angolan peace accords, May 31,
1991.
We have just witnessed here in Lisbon the settlement of the Angola
conflict, which was achieved through negotiations under Portuguese
stewardship.
Last year's achievement of Namibian independence, the
establishment of peace in Angola, and the intensification of peace-
making activities in other parts of the continent have demonstrated
that negotiations are replacing armed struggle as the principal
political trend in Africa. The future of Africa largely depends on
how quickly wars can be ended and new political structures
developed to resolve and prevent conflict.
The United States and Soviet Union express satisfaction with
their increasing cooperation, which is aimed at assisting African
countries in restoring peace in various regions of their continent.
The US and USSR stand ready to work together with the
international community and especially African countries and the
OAU [Organization of African Unity] to resolve armed conflicts
through political means. In this context, the UN has a valuable role
to play in peace-making and peace-keeping, as it has demonstrated
in Africa. Our two countries are determined to play a constructive
role in ending conflicts in Africa, and will cooperate in promoting
political resolution of disputes, strengthening democracy and
economic development, combating hunger and disease, and enhancing
environmental stability.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991
Title: Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Tutwiler
Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Date: Jun 4, 19916/4/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Vietnam, United States, Hong Kong,
United Kingdom
Subject: Refugees, Immigration
[TEXT]
Senior officials of the governments of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Hong Kong met in Washington on June 3-4, 1991, to
discuss measures to deal with the sharply increasing number of
Vietnamese asylum seekers arriving in Hong Kong in recent months.
The international response to the situation of Vietnamese
asylum seekers in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia is governed by the
multilateral comprehensive plan of action (CPA), which is
implemented by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
These consultations were envisaged by the recent meeting of the
CPA committee to explore measures that could encourage greatly
accelerated rates of return to Vietnam of those determined not to
be refugees.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Hong Kong remain
committed to the CPA, especially first asylum and fair procedures
to determine who is and who is not a refugee.
The British and Hong Kong sides informed the United States
that they intend as a matter of urgency to seek bilateral
discussions with Vietnam. Within the context of the CPA and the US
position on involuntary repatriation the United States does not
object to these discussions.
The UK-Vietnam bilateral discussions could consider the
establishment of an internationally managed center on territory
provided by Vietnam for those asylum seekers who are determined
not to be refugees and who have not taken advantage of the existing
voluntary return programs. These discussions will take place in
close consultations with UNHCR and the International Organization
for Migration (IOM).
The United States and the United Kingdom will support efforts
to expand access to the orderly departure program for safe
emigration from Vietnam. The United States will also continue its
policy of offering resettlement to up to 50% of the asylum seekers
who are screened in as refugees. There will be no resettlement of
those screened out. Cut-off dates will remain in force and will,
in no circumstances, be changed to a later date.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991
Title: Peace Accords in Angola
Date: May 31, 19915/31/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Angola
Subject: Democratization, International Law
[TEXT]
Secretary Baker visited Lisbon on May 31 to represent the United
States at the formal signing of the peace accords for Angola.
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the Luanda government and
President Jonas Savimbi of UNITA signed the accord, thereby ending
the civil conflict in that country. The United States has served as
an observer in the Portuguese mediated talks which produced the
accords. Secretary Baker attended the signing to reaffirm our long-
standing commitment to national reconciliation in Angola through a
democratic political process.
Background
The Angolan civil war has raged since 1975 between the Luanda
government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA). It ravaged the countryside, causing considerable
disruption of political and economic life. Since 1979, UNITA has
effectively controlled the southeastern quarter of the country. The
presence of Cuban and South African forces in Angola complicated
the civil war. In 1988, the United States successfully mediated
negotiations leading to the departure of these foreign forces from
the country, as well as the independence of Namibia. Between April
1990 and May 1991, negotiations between the Luanda government
and UNITA were conducted under the mediation of Portugal. The
United States and the Soviet Union were official observers at these
negotiations and played a facilitative role in helping the two
parties reach the agreements which will be signed on May 31.
US Policy in Angola
US policy in Angola has long sought a negotiated settlement to the
civil conflict, including free and fair elections in which UNITA and
all other Angolan political parties are free to participate. A little
more than a year ago, Secretary Baker met with President dos
Santos in Windhoek during the Namibian independence celebrations.
He assured him that US policy was aimed at promoting negotiations
to achieve peace and stability, and he urged President dos Santos to
accept negotiations leading to free and fair elections. President
dos Santos accepted Secretary Baker's recommendation and asked
the Portuguese government to mediate negotiations, at which the
United States and the Soviet Union were official observers. The
resulting negotiations progressed, but in December 1990 reached an
impasse.
During their meetings in Houston in December 1990, Secretary
Baker and then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
reviewed the status of the negotiations for a settlement in Angola.
They expressed their continued support for the important role
played by Portugal. To facilitate the negotiations, and to advance
the achievement of peace and stability, they made a special effort
to break the impasse. The United States and the Soviet Union co-
sponsored a meeting in Washington with all parties on December 13.
On the previous day, Secretary Baker met with the Angolan Foreign
Minister, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met with President
Savimbi of UNITA, demonstrating their determination to bring the
two parties together. These meetings resulted in a document called
the Washington Concepts Paper, which established a framework for
an overall settlement. This intervention by Secretary Baker and the
Soviet Foreign Minister demonstrated the overall success of US
policy toward Angola and US-Soviet cooperation in resolving
regional conflicts.
The Peace Accords for Angola
On May 1, 1991, following weeks of intensive discussions in
Lisbon, the parties reached agreement in substance on all issues
related to a cease-fire and political settlement. At Estoril, high-
level UNITA and Luanda government officials initialed agreements
on a United Nations-monitored cease-fire and supplementary
principles guiding a final settlement, including free and fair multi-
party elections and the formation of new, politically neutral,
national armed forces.
On May 15, a de facto cease-fire began when the parties
informed the Portuguese government of their acceptance of the
agreements reached. A formal cease-fire will enter into force
when the final agreements are signed by President dos Santos and
UNITA President Savimbi on May 31.
US Role Under the Accords
Under the cease-fire agreements, the United States, as an observer
to the JPMC and the JVMC, will support implementation of the
agreements. It will open an office in Luanda, where the JPMC will
be headquartered. This will not constitute establishment of
diplomatic relations with the Luanda government. The United
States will establish diplomatic relations with a government in
Angola when one emerges from free and fair, internationally
monitored elections. The accord binds both parties to avoid further
importation of lethal materiel into Angola. The US and the USSR
have stated their intent to comply with this provision. Non-lethal
aid is specifically permitted.
UN Role
The UN will be asked to authorize the establishment of a mission of
several hundred observers to assist in monitoring the cease-fire.
They would begin to arrive in Angola as soon as the cease-fire
agreements have been signed and will remain until the results of
national elections have been proclaimed.
Provisions of the Agreement
Cease-Fire Agreement, which includes the formation of a
Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (JVMC) to monitor
cease-fire implementation.
Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace, which
includes the formation of a Joint Political and Military
Commission (JPMC), with overarching responsibility for
implementation of all aspects of the agreements.
Washington Concepts Paper, which contains fundamental
concepts underlying a framework for settlement.
The "Estoril Accords," (named after the Portuguese town, near
Lisbon, where they were negotiated), which include six annexes on:
-- Free and fair multi-party elections between September and
November 1992.
-- Internal security (neutrality of the police force will be
guaranteed by the presence of UN monitors).
-- Structure and mandate of JPMC.
-- Administrative structures for the UNITA-held areas.
-- A definition of UNITA's political rights once the cease-fire is
signed.
-- The formation of a new, politically neutral, national armed
forces.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991
Title: Chronology: Angola--The Road to Peace
Date: May 31, 19915/31/91
Category: Chronologies
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Angola, USSR (former), Cuba, South Africa,
United States, Portugal
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization,
International Law
[TEXT]
Chronology: 1975-1992
1974--After a military coup in Portugal, the former colonial power
relinquishes sovereignty over colonies in Africa--including Angola.
1975--Cuba and the USSR intervene on the side of the Marxist
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its
conflict with the Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) and the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA).
South Africa sends troops and war materiel to help UNITA. The
United States decries the involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba.
Cuban troop strength in Angola reaches 10,000 by Angola's
November 11 Independence Day.
1976--Cuban troop strength in Angola reaches 15,000.
1978--The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 435 calling for a
cease-fire in the Namibian guerrilla war, UN-sponsored elections,
and a Transition Assistance Group in Namibia. South Africa
organizes Namibian elections, but they are boycotted by SWAPO and
are not recognized internationally.
1981--Chester Crocker, the Reagan Administration's Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, visits Angola to discuss
Cuban troop withdrawal in the context of the implementation of
Resolution 435.
1982--South Africa establishes a formal link between its
willingness to accept Namibian independence and the arrangements
for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.
1983--Angola's Interior Minister, Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues,
discusses Angola and Namibia with Vice President Bush in
Washington, DC. South Africa launches a major offensive against
SWAPO guerrillas operating north of the Namibian border in Angola.
1984--Assistant Secretary Crocker meets with Angolans and South
Africans in Lusaka, Zambia; the Lusaka accord details
disengagement of Angolan and South African forces in southern
Angola; the United States takes part in a Joint Monitoring
Commission.
-- Angola issues its Plataforma for the first time proposing a
partial withdrawal of Cuban troops in the context of
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435.
1985--In response to continuing massive Soviet and Cuban
assistance to the MPLA, Congress repeals the Clark amendment,
which had precluded US assistance to any of the participants in the
Angolan internal conflict.
-- In an effort to bridge the gap between South African and
Angolan positions on Cuban troop withdrawal, the United States
tables its "synthesis" calling for total withdrawal of Cuban troops
over a 2-year period.
1986--UNITA President Savimbi visits Washington, DC. The United
States resumes assistance to UNITA after a 10-year hiatus.
-- South Africa announces its readiness to implement
Resolution 435 on August 1 if agreement is reached on Cuban troop
withdrawal. Proposal expires on August 1 when there is no
response from Angola.
-- MPLA withdraws from active participation in negotiations
in response to South African military incursions into Angola.
1987--US-Angola negotiations resume in April in Brazzaville with
the assistance of Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso.
-- US-Angolan contacts intensify through the remainder of the
year in an effort to develop a proposal on Cuban troop withdrawal to
serve as a basis for renewed negotiations with South Africa.
1988--In January, Cuban representatives for the first time
participate in US-Angola negotiations as members of the Angolan
delegation.
-- In March, Angola and Cuba for the first time table a
proposal on the total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. In
the same month, Assistant Secretary Crocker meets with South
African Foreign Minister Botha in Geneva to discuss resumption of
the negotiations.
-- In May, delegations from South Africa, Angola/Cuba, and
the United States meet in London to launch intensive negotiations
for a settlement.
-- In July, at a meeting in New York, the parties agree to set
general principles that would form the basis of a settlement.
-- In August, the People's Republic of Angola, Cuba, and South
Africa agree to a cease-fire in Angola that includes an eventual
complete withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops and
implementation of the UN plan for Namibia's independence.
-- On December 13, the governments of the People's Republic
of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa sign the protocol of Brazzaville in
the Congo. The protocol recommends implementation of Resolution
435 on April 1, 1989, and creates the Joint Commission, which is
composed of the signatories with the US and USSR as observers,
"with the objective of facilitating the resolution of any dispute
regarding the interpretation of the Tripartite Agreement."
-- On December 22, in New York City, the People's Republic of
Angola, Cuba, and South Africa sign the Tripartite Agreement
committing the parties to begin implementation of Resolution 435
and withdrawal of Cuban troops on April 1, 1989. At the same
ceremony, the People's Republic of Angola and Cuba sign a bilateral
agreement setting a schedule for Cuban troop withdrawal, to be
monitored by the unarmed UN Verification Mission for Angola.
1989--In early January, the People's Republic of Angola announces
the first Cuban troop withdrawal ahead of schedule. Later that
month, the Joint Commission meets for the first time to discuss
the implementation process.
-- In June, under the auspices of President Mobutu, President
dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi meet at Gbadolite, Zaire before a
summit of 22 African chiefs of state and agree on a ceasefire and
national reconciliation. However, with no preparation, the
ceasefire fails to take effect and fighting escalates.
1990--In late March, Secretary Baker meets with Angolan President
dos Santos in Windhoek during Namibian independence celebrations,
to assure him that US policy aims to promote negotiations to
achieve peace and stability. He urges President dos Santos to
accept negotiations leading to free and fair elections. President
dos Santos accepts Secretary Baker's recommendation and
subsequently invites the Portuguese government to mediate
negotiations.
-- In December, after progressing under Portuguese mediation,
negotiations to end the civil conflict in Angola reach an impasse.
-- Also in December, the Luanda government launched a major
military offense against UNITA aimed at capturing the strategic
center at Mavinga. After 6 months of bitter fighting, the offensive
fails and government troops are forced to retreat to their base.
-- On December 11, Secretary of State Baker and Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze issue a joint statement in Houston
expressing continued support for the important role played by
Portugal in mediating negotiations for a settlement in Angola, and
indicating that they would take steps to facilitate these efforts.
-- On December 12 in Washington, Secretary Baker meets with
Angolan Foreign Minister Pedro Castro Van Dunem, and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze meets with Jonas Savimbi, President of
UNITA. The ministers outline their concept of a settlement,
including a cease-fire; free participation of UNITA and other
political parties in a democratic political process; free and fair
elections monitored by international neutral observers; and the
termination of deliveries of all lethal materiel to Angola upon the
entry into force of a cease-fire. These principles resulted in a
document called the Washington Concepts Paper, establishing a
framework for an overall settlement.
-- On December 13, in Washington, the US and the Soviet Union
co-sponsor a meeting of all the interested parties, with the aim of
promoting the successful conclusion of the negotiations in Lisbon.
1991--On May 1, following weeks of intensive discussions in
Portugal between the two Angolan parties negotiators reach
agreement in substance on all issues under negotiation and the
Peace Accords for Angola are initialed "ad referendum."
-- On May 15, the two sides notify the Portuguese mediator
that they agree to the documents constituting the peace accords. De
facto cessation of hostilities begins. The UN is asked to authorize
the establishment of a UN monitoring mission.
-- On May 25, the Cubans complete final withdrawal of their
troops from Angola 5 weeks ahead of schedule.
-- On May 31, a formal cease-fire signing ceremony took place
in Portugal, in which Angolan President dos Santos and UNITA
President Savimbi signed on behalf of their respective sides. The
formal cease-fire entered into force immediately upon signature.
-- On June 15, UN observer groups are scheduled to assume
responsibilities and joint teams representing the two sides to take
up their duties.
1992--In September-November, internationally monitored,
multiparty elections are scheduled to be held for the president and
National Assembly in Angola.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991
Title: Country Profile: Angola
Date: May 31, 19915/31/91
Category: Country Data
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Angola
Subject: History, International Organizations,
Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Official Name: People's Republic of Angola
Geography
Area: 1,246,700 sq. km. (481,351 sq. mi.); about twice the size of
Texas.
Cities: Capital--Luanda (pop. 1 million).
Other cities--Huambo (500,000).
Terrain: Varied.
Climate: Tropical to subtropical.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Angolan.
Population (1989 est.): 1 million.
Annual growth rate (1989 est.): 3.5%.
Ethnic groups: Ovimbundu 37%, Kimbundu 25%, Bakongo 13%, Lunda-
Chokwe 8%, Nganguela 6%.
Religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant, traditional.
Languages: Portuguese (official), various African languages.
Education: Attendance--75%. Literacy--20%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--
161/1,000. Life expectancy--42 yrs.
Work force: Agriculture--85%.
Government
Type: When it seized power by force upon independence from
Portugal in 1975, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) imposed a Marxist regime on the country. Civil war between
the Luanda government and the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) has been waged throughout Angola
since then until May 1991, when both parties reached agreement on
a cease-fire and political settlement. This complex series of
interlocking agreements, known as the Angola Peace Accords,
provide for Angola's first multi-party elections, between
September and November 1992. Concurrent with the accords, the
Luanda government revised its constitution to move toward the
establishment of a multi-party democracy.
Independence: November 11, 1975.
Branches: Executive--president, three ministers of state, Council of
Ministers. Legislative--People's Assembly. Judicial--military and
civilian courts.
Administrative subdivisions: 18 provinces.
Political party: Since independence, the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola-Labor Party (MPLA-PT) has been the only
political party allowed by law. However, on May 11, 1991, the
Luanda government promulgated a new political parties law which
provides for multiple parties in conformity with the revised
constitution promulgated on the same day. Also, under the terms of
the accords, UNITA will become a recognized political party on June
1, 1991.
Suffrage: Universal adult.
Flag: Two horizontal bars, red over black; centered, a yellow five-
pointed star half encircled by a machine gear crossed by a machete.
Economy*
GDP (1989): $7 billion.
Real growth rate (1989 est): 1%-2%.
Natural resources: Petroleum, diamonds, iron, phosphate, copper,
feldspar, gold, bauxite, uranium.
Agriculture (about 20% of GNP): Products--cassava, maize,
plantains, sweet potatoes, milk, millet, citrus, beans, potatoes,
sugar, beef, palm oil, sisal, coffee.
Industry (28% of GNP): Types--petroleum, mining, food processing,
beer, tires, textiles.
Trade (1989): Exports--$3 billion: petroleum, gas, coffee, diamonds.
Partners--US, USSR, Cuba, Portugal, Brazil. Imports--$1 billion:
foodstuffs, textiles, machinery, raw materials, consumer goods,
tools, medical supplies, chemicals. Major suppliers--US, USSR,
Portugal, Brazil, France.
Economic aid received: Primarily from Western private and public
sectors; mostly military but some economic aid from Eastern bloc.
International Affiliations
UN, Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Development Bank
(ADB), Non-Aligned Movement, Southern Africa Development
Coordination Conference, GATT (de facto), World Bank (IBRD), and
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
*Data for the period since independence was extremely limited due
to the civil war.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991
Title: Western Hemisphere Holds Unique Place for Freedom
Eagleburger
Source: Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of
State
Description: Address to the 21st General Assembly of the
Organization of American States (OAS), Santiago, Chile
Date: Jun 3, 19916/3/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America, South America, Central America,
Caribbean
Subject: Arms Control, Democratization, Narcotics, OAS,
Environment, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
As the 500th anniversary of the European discovery of the Americas
approaches, it is a fitting time to reflect on our hemisphere's
unique place in the chronicle of human civilization, and to think
about what it is that especially defines us, collectively, as
Americans.
We are the hemisphere which gave mankind a second chance.
We are still, 5 centuries after Columbus, the New World, because
we still believe that man can achieve a new beginning and invent
himself anew, and that he is not a prisoner of fate or history.
We are, in short, the hemisphere of freedom, where liberty and
democracy were reborn in the modern era but on a universal scale
unknown to the ancients. To be who we truly are, we must be free.
To be shackled by tyranny or by oppressive ideologies is for us to be
untrue to ourselves. We are Americans, all of us, because we are
free. Thank you, Mr. President [Chilean Foreign Minister Enrique
Silva Cimma], for being the host of this assembly. But thank you as
well for what Chile has done to give back to this hemisphere its
true identity.
It was not long ago, however, that things were much different,
and far bleaker, both in this hemisphere and beyond. When this
organization last met in Santiago, three out of four citizens of the
Americas lived under authoritarian rule, and state intervention
undermined economic freedom and stifled growth in much of our
region.
At that time, too, 15 years ago, the Cold War was at its peak,
posing a constant threat of global catastrophe, fueling regional
conflicts, and polarizing international relations. The Cold War made
it especially difficult for the nations of the Americas to cooperate,
riven as we were by ideological differences and burdened as we
were by undemocratic regimes of the left and the right, each of
which constituted a betrayal of the New World's original promise.
I will not deny that my own country bears its share of
responsibility for having tended to view our hemispheric
relationships through the sometimes distorting prism of the Cold
War. I make no apology for the devotion, and the untold sacrifices,
with which we confronted a single-minded foe and threat to
freedom. Freedom's victory today in that struggle is redemption for
many mistakes. But mistakes we made, the most serious being a
failure at times to take our hemisphere on its own terms and to
deal with its problems in their own right.
We are, however, on the threshold of a new world order today,
following the defeat of totalitarianism and the global ascendancy of
democracy and the free enterprise system. World-wide, the hopes
for a new order are founded on the unprecedented consensus against
aggression which emerged during the Gulf crisis, and the potential
which now exists for the United Nations to fulfill its role on behalf
of international law and collective security. Here in the Americas,
our hopes are founded on the almost complete emergence of
history's first entirely democratic hemisphere, a development
which will revolutionize inter-American relations by making
cooperation among ourselves possible on a scale unimaginable only
a few years ago.
We in the United States are aware, however, that the new
world order has occasioned apprehensions as well as hopes among
our hemispheric neighbors. There are fears that the success of
American arms in the Gulf will have dangerously swelled our pride,
and that we will now see ourselves as the world's policeman, with
license to intervene in other nations' affairs. There are also
apprehensions of a wholly opposite nature, namely that the United
States will neglect its Latin and Caribbean neighbors now that the
Cold War is no longer there to check our isolationist tendencies.
These fears are mutually contradictory; both are unfounded. I
can tell you that it is the intention of the United States to continue
to shoulder its global responsibilities. However, it should be
understood that our ability to think globally and to act globally is
important to all the world's democracies, especially as the world's
economy becomes more and more interdependent. The fate of
reform in Eastern Europe and the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait, for
example, are issues which do affect the well-being of this
hemisphere. Saddam Hussein demonstrated, moreover, that the
breakdown of the Cold War-bloc system can, if we are not vigilant,
lead to a proliferation of instabilities. If the United States does
not attempt to deal with challenges to world stability, who will do
so in its place?
Reorienting the US Relationship To the Western
Hemisphere
But what I would like most to emphasize here today is that the
radical transformations of the past few years have not been
confined to the Soviet Union, to Eastern Europe, or to Latin America.
In the United States, too, change is underway in the form of a
seminal reorienting of our relationship to this hemisphere.
There are objective factors at work here: our economic stake
in the recovery of the Latin American market; our need for
cooperation with the hemisphere to address transnational problems
such as narcotics, pollution, immigration, and weapons
proliferation. And our undeniable strategic interest in seeing the
hemisphere's transition to democracy and free markets succeed.
But objective factors alone cannot account for the truly
revolutionary transformation in US policy toward our American
neighbors. The fact is that we have a President in George Bush for
whom creating a historic new partnership within the hemisphere is
at the very top of his agenda for the United States as we seek to do
our part to build the new world order.
President Bush recognized that something fundamental had
changed in the Americas and that the United States had to change
accordingly. He understood that as our southern neighbors threw off
their authoritarian legacy, so too did the United States have to
throw away its Cold War prism and look at the hemisphere with new
eyes. President Bush also listened to the hemisphere with new
ears, meeting with this counterparts at San Jose in 1989 and at
Cartagena in 1990. Both he and they discovered that the taboos, the
reflexive reactions, and the stereotypical notions which burdened
our relations for so long were suddenly irrelevant. They discovered
that an astonishing political and economic consensus had taken hold
throughout the hemisphere, permitting a historic breakthrough in
Inter-American relations for whomever was bold enough to seize
the occasion.
President Bush did not let this opportunity pass. To those who
worried that the United States would shift its attention and its
energies away from this hemisphere in response to dramatic
changes in Europe, he provided an answer when on June 27, 1990, he
announced his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. He conceived
his proposal as a historic offer of re-engagement, a permanent new
relationship between this hemisphere and the United States. And he
followed his initiative up with a visit to Brasilia, Montevideo,
Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Caracas which marked a watershed in
Inter-American relations.
There is, quite simply, no equivalent to the EAI linking the US
to any other part of the world.
Any lingering doubts about President Bush's commitment to
his long-term vision for the Americas ought to have been laid to
rest last month when the Administration fought tooth and nail in
the US Congress to retain fast-track negotiating authority. Let me
assure you that the Administration will fight hard to achieve a free
trade agreement with Mexico and that we will succeed in creating,
along with Canada, the largest free market the world has ever seen.
But that is only a beginning. President Bush foresees an
entire American community of free trading nations, from Alaska to
Argentina, which will set an example against the forces of
protectionism. What we dream of is a community in which each
nation builds on its strengths, discovers new competitive
advantages, and reaps the benefits of competition in the world
market place.
The American republics stand poised as never before to create
an unprecedented partnership of developed and developing nations to
secure democracy, promote prosperity, and join together to confront
the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. We have, after all, a
precious tool at our disposal to promote our common aims in the
form of our hemispheric body, the Organization of American States.
Just as the United Nations is transforming itself into a capable
instrument of collective action on a global scale, the OAS is
emerging from a period of crisis to a time of renewed strength and
leadership on issues such as democracy and drugs, the environment
and economic reform. We have a great opportunity to exploit the
hemisphere's political and economic consensus in order to achieve
cooperative action in ways that have eluded us in the past.
Challenges
Our challenges are clear.
Democracy.
First, we must consolidate
democracy and be prepared, where necessary, to defend democracy
against its enemies. Anyone plotting against an elected government
should know in advance: this hemisphere will not stand idly by if
democracy is assaulted, neither before nor after a crisis emerges.
This OAS must confront and isolate those who seek to thwart the
right of the people of the Americas to determine democratically
their own political destinies. We must build as well a new inter-
American community of democratic institutions and organizations
to defend human rights and strengthen the rule of law throughout
our hemisphere. Democracy is strong where democratic institutions
are strong--legislatures, judiciaries, trade unions, human rights
organizations, and the like. We must find new and creative ways to
strengthen these institutions throughout the Americas.
The OAS deserves enormous credit for its pioneering work in
advancing democracy in this hemisphere. In Nicaragua, the OAS not
only helped oversee the country's first free and fair elections but
stayed on when others departed to do the hard work of demobilizing
the Nicaraguan Resistance and guaranteeing its security. In El
Salvador, where others chose not to engage, the OAS deployed
throughout the country to ensure the security of the electoral
process and ward off guerrilla attacks, a bold move which has
helped bring that country a decisive step closer to peace. The OAS
also was in the lead during elections in Haiti, Panama, the
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Suriname.
There is one common denominator here--none of these
successes was guaranteed in advance. The OAS ventured where
others feared to tread.
Secretary General Baena Soares and every member state can
be proud that today the blue OAS election observer T-shirt is a
symbol throughout this hemisphere of free, fair, and peaceful
elections. The democracy unit created within the OAS also has
enormous potential to support democratic consolidation if we as
member states have the creativity and will to use it.
We must stand in solidarity as well with those governments
that continue to face the threat of violent assault on democracy--El
Salvador, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala. We must fully support the
courageous efforts of democratic governments to negotiate
political solutions to these conflicts, wherever possible through
dialogue and compromise. It is time--indeed, it is more than time-
-for those who wage revolution through violence to understand that
history has left them behind. Today, the authentic revolutionaries
of the Americas are those who are engaged in building democratic
institutions and a free market economy, the only effective
guarantors of human liberty.
Drug Trafficking
. We must also mobilize to
control the new threat to constitutional order posed by the drug-
trafficking cartels. Through violence and corruption, force and
threat, the narcotics traffickers undermine the institutions of
democracy. To stop them, we must implement the OAS' tough
standards on precursor chemicals. The Organization's preparation
of rigorous money-laundering standards is also important. We must
send a strong message to the narco-traffickers and terrorists that
their business is not welcome and that thousands in this
hemisphere did not die to build democracy only to see it corrupted
and destroyed by vicious, greedy men who think themselves above
the law.
Economics
. On the economic front, this
hemisphere has seen an intellectual revolution as far reaching as
the political revolution that has restored democracy from Argentina
to Nicaragua. No democratic nation in the Americas today is looking
inward, fearing trade and competition. No finance minister argues
that a state-dominated economy can produce growth and
opportunity. All across the Americas, the old barriers to trade and
investment are coming down, freeing the energies of entrepreneurs
and workers to invest and produce and trade and build.
No country has gone farther or faster or made more progress
in this economic revolution than our host nation. Indeed, Chile is
emerging as a model of democracy, national reconciliation, and
economic growth and opportunity for the entire world community.
The United States is not going to stand on the sidelines while
this economic revolution unfolds. President Bush's Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative is designed to make the US a full partner in
this vast undertaking. It is borne of a recognition that the fate of
democracy and the economic well-being of each and every citizen
are intimately connected. In fact, the free market system we
promote is not for the rich to get richer, but for all social classes
to know progress and prosperity.
Meanwhile, the hemisphere is busy organizing itself for the
revolutionary changes to come. Already we see the countries of the
Southern Cone lowering barriers and preparing for a common
market. Already we see the Andean nations liberalizing trade with
each other and looking outward. Already we see CARICOM [Caribbean
Common Market] creating a new vision of economic integration, and
Central America joining GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade], liberalizing trade, and exploring a common market. This
democratic hemisphere we are building can also be the first to
strike down the barriers to trade that have divided our nations and
strait jacketed our peoples and economies. We are close to
unleashing the productive energies of 600 million citizens
throughout the Americas.
The government of Japan has committed to invest in the new
Multilateral Investment Fund to be created in the Inter-American
Development Bank under the EAI. So, too, have key committees in
the US Congress. We hope that Europe will join us in this
Multilateral Investment Fund. We are moving as well on debt.
Congress has given the President authority to reduce PL 480 debt
under the EAI. And we have asked Congress to grant to the
President this year authority to deal with additional categories of
government to government debt. I can assure you we will fight hard
to obtain that authority from the Congress.
Environment
. As we move forward to a new
vision of free and open trade, we must also ensure that development
does not destroy the common heritage of this hemisphere of rain
forest, clean air, water, and wildlife.
The United States, like many countries which developed
rapidly, often sacrificed its environment in the name of economic
growth. But we have learned through that experience that growth
and the preservation of the environment must be balanced more
creatively. We are prepared, through the EAI, to turn debt into a
mechanism to preserve the environment. Let us do our duty to
coming generations of Americans and leave to them a precious
natural heritage which is whole and clean and alive.
Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Finally, we in the Americas have an opportunity to create a new
partnership of democracies confronting the global challenges of the
post-Cold War era.
We have seen in the actions of Iraq the emerging symbol of
new threats to peace that the world community may confront in the
future. Fifty years ago, it took a great power like Germany to
disturb the peace of the world; but today, a small regional power
like Iraq with access to advanced weaponry and unlimited wealth
can threaten the international order.
The Canadian initiative at this year's assembly reminds us
that we must learn the lessons of the Persian Gulf and prevent the
spread of weapons of mass destruction anywhere in the world. We
must move forward together, with equal commitment, to control the
transfer of chemical and biological weapons.
The United States is prepared to play its part. President Bush,
for example, recently announced our willingness to destroy all US
chemical weapon stocks. We also are prepared to assist those
nations who adopt export controls on missile, chemical, and
biological weapons to obtain the technology necessary for advanced
economic growth.
This democratic hemisphere we are building can also become
the first hemisphere that has committed itself north to south to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Already, Brazil and
Argentina have committed to adopt full scope safeguards on their
nuclear programs and to bring into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
We hope others will follow suit. When they do, every nation in the
Americas, except for Cuba, will become a signatory to that treaty.
Let the Americas send a message throughout the rest of the globe:
We did not struggle and sacrifice to end the old threats posed by the
Cold War only to permit the new threat of burgeoning nuclear
weapons to endanger our children's security.
None of us underestimates the magnitude of the challenges
still awaiting us--poverty, over-population, under-development,
insurgencies, and narco-trafficking--nor can we forget the human
suffering which lies behind each of these enduring blights on our
hemispheric landscape.
Conclusion
In the face of these daunting challenges, I would like to leave this
General Assembly with two thoughts. First, I would remind my
fellow delegates that we have achieved the impossible and the
unthinkable over the last few years. Look around at the democratic
representatives who could not possibly have attended this assembly
2 years ago. Think about the guerrilla groups now seeking to enter
the legal and democratic mainstream, or the drug traffickers
negotiating their terms of surrender. Consider that some countries
have resumed economic growth against all odds, and that the war in
Nicaragua is over.
Our conclusion must be that this hemisphere has remained
true to its New World destiny. It is yet possible to reshape the
future as our forefathers believed.
My second and final thought is that we ought to realize and to
appreciate how lucky we are on this day in June, in Santiago, late in
the 20th century. The last 100 years and more have seen too much
pointless strife among ourselves, strife which has thwarted the
dreams of millions. This noble experiment in hemispheric
cooperation, the Organization of American States, has often paid
the price of our differences in terms of paralysis and wasted
opportunities.
But today, in 1991, we have the opportunity to redeem
ourselves. We are now what we were meant to be from the very
beginning: democratic and free. We have learned a painful but
necessary lesson--that without freedom we cannot prosper.
Now, we must summon every ounce of our collective strength
to make freedom work and to make freedom prosper. If we choose
instead to divert our energies to revisiting the struggles over
principle and ideology which have divided us for so much of this
century, then we will have demonstrated to our peoples, and to the
world, that we are incapable of learning from history. Fate may not
again smile on us for a long, long time the way she has in 1991. Let
us do as the Romans urged--carpe diem. Let us seize the
opportunity, united democratically as we are, to cooperate here in
the OAS, and among ourselves, as if the fate of our hemisphere
depended on it . For it truly does. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991
Title: 1991 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report:
Overview
Date: Jun 10, 19916/10/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Country: Pakistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Suriname, Mexico,
Peru, Belize, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala,
Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Bahamas, Burma,
Thailand, Laos
Subject: Narcotics
[TEXT]
Overview of the 1991 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report (covering 1990) prepared by the Bureau of International
Narcotics Matters (INM) in consultation with other offices and
agencies of the US Government. The entire report is available from
the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC 20402-9325, Tel. 202-783-3238 (Stock# 044-
000-020305-9, $19).
The year 1990 was encouraging for international narcotics control
efforts. For the first time in a decade, coca cultivation and opium
production did not increase. Total coca cultivation did not increase
overall and actually decreased in Bolivia and Colombia. Opium
production, which also had been on the rise, dropped 10% in 1990.
While weather played a part in this decline, law enforcement and
crop control programs were the determining factors in all countries
except Burma.
In addition, several key countries--especially Colombia,
Bolivia, and Mexico--greatly improved their counter-narcotics and
law enforcement performance. These governments expanded their
cooperative efforts with the United States, resulting in increased
harassment and disruption of cocaine-trafficking organizations and
a parallel reduction in their ability to do business. In general,
arrests of traffickers and seizures of illegal drugs--particularly
cocaine--increased worldwide, and there was greater attention
devoted to money laundering and precursor chemical control.
Through the combined action of concerned governments and
international organizations, important advances in global
cooperation in the drug war were made.
Despite these gains, much work remains to be done. Drug
abuse continues to rise, providing new markets for the traffickers.
In some countries, serious problems with corruption, law
enforcement ineffectiveness, and a lack of political will to
confront the drug trade remain. The traffickers continue to be
strong, rich, and adaptable to changing circumstances.
International efforts against illegal drugs must not waiver.
Cocaine
Cocaine and its lethal derivative "crack" pose the greatest drug
threat to the United States today. Despite reports that occasional
cocaine use has declined in some segments of American society, the
ready availability of cocaine and crack requires the US government
to continue international efforts to sever the cocaine grower-to-
user chain.
The leveling off in coca cultivation is an important step in the
right direction. Much of the credit must go to active in-country law
enforcement and crop control programs. The United States believes
that another major contributing factor was the commitment of the
Andean governments at the Cartagena summit in February 1990 to
mount a regional attack on drug trafficking.
In 1990, these governments presented the South American
cocaine trade with its greatest challenge. With US counter-
narcotics assistance, Colombia and Bolivia moved energetically
against traffickers, refiners, and growers, and Colombia's war on
the Medellin Cartel substantially raised the cartel's expenses and
kept cartel chief Pablo Escobar Gaviria on the run. Colombian
forces destroyed a major trafficking hub where more than 20
metric tons (mt) of cocaine products were found. By year's end,
Colombian authorities had seized and destroyed nearly 53 mt of
refined coca products--one-third more than in 1989.
Colombia's offensive against trafficking organizations paid
dividends elsewhere by helping to depress the market for coca leaf
from the other Andean producers. Parallel measures by the Bolivian
government further reduced the price of coca leaf, thereby
encouraging record numbers of Bolivian growers to participate in
the government's voluntary eradication program. As a result, the
Bolivian government eliminated 8,000 hectares of coca, producing a
net decrease in the Bolivian coca crop for the first time. Bolivian
authorities also destroyed the "Meco" Dominguez organization, one
of the country's most powerful trafficking syndicates.
Regrettably, in Peru, insurgent violence, corruption, and a
change of government did not permit the same level of success.
However, the output of the world's largest coca crop did remain
static for the first time. In addition, Peruvian authorities helped
curb future growth by destroying the equivalent of 14,000 hectares
of coca seedbeds.
In Mexico, the Salinas government intensified its campaign
against corruption and trafficking. Authorities jailed four of the
six most-wanted traffickers in 1990 and dismissed scores of
officials for drug-related corruption. Mexico also tightened its
interdiction procedures. Working with the United States, the
government of Mexico established a Northern Border Response Force
(NBRF) which seized more than half (29 mt) of all the cocaine
captured in Mexico in 1990. In addition, Mexican authorities
eradicated record numbers of opium poppy and cannabis fields,
contributing to the first net decreases in both crops.
Central American countries faced a greater flow of cocaine
during the year, as trafficking organizations expanded and
diversified their smuggling routes through the region. While the
United States provided some assistance, several countries took
independent initiatives. The government of Belize enacted a
comprehensive anti-drug law which permits asset seizure. The
governments of Costa Rica and Honduras joined the Caribbean Basin
Radar Network (CBRN), while Guatemala, with US assistance,
continued its intensive aerial poppy field spraying program.
In the Caribbean, countries which lie along transit routes took
steps to counter increased trafficking activity. The CBRN station in
the Dominican Republic became operational in July, as the
government enhanced the capability of the joint information
coordination center (JICC) and increased its naval interdiction
patrols. Jamaica unilaterally strengthened security at its ports and
airports.
The Bahamas and most of the other Caribbean countries
seized important quantities of cocaine, along with other tangible
assets such as vehicles, planes, boats, and cash. An exception is
Suriname, which appears to be becoming a significant transit point
for cocaine bound for the United States and Europe.
Opium and Heroin
Although attention has been focused on highly addictive crack
cocaine, heroin remains a serious threat to American society.
Unlike crack which rapidly destroys its addicts, heroin is an
extremely addictive drug which can be used over long periods of
time. Heroin could become the focus of international trafficking
organizations targeting the United States as cocaine use declines
among the American population since it also generates greater
profits per kilo.
International opium and heroin control efforts have produced
mixed results at best. Although total opium production dropped 10%
in 1990, the opium in Burma alone could supply much of the world's
heroin demand. In Southwest Asia, where local demand for heroin is
on the rise, there have been inconsistencies in government anti-
narcotics efforts.
Pakistan tightened enforcement of the poppy cultivation ban
in areas under its control but was less effective in destroying
trafficking organizations and heroin laboratories. For example, the
Pakistan Frontier Corps broke a world record in October by seizing
more than 2 mt of heroin in Baluchistan, but--the United States
believes--did not conduct any follow-up investigation of suspected
traffickers. The large quantities of opium entering the region from
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Burma has strained enforcement
capabilities in India, which also faces the dual problem of
controlling illegal opium production and diversion from its legal
crop.
In the "Golden Triangle" area of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, the
10% decline in Burmese opium production was, unfortunately, the
result of weather conditions rather than active government
intervention. Although Thailand established senior anti-narcotics
positions, the Thais arrested only one major trafficker--in contrast
to seven the previous year. A lower court cleared a major
international trafficker charged with trafficking heroin to the
United States.
Cooperation between the United States and Laos has improved,
but more active law enforcement steps are needed. Both Laos and
Burma have linked opium poppy eradication programs to the
institution of rural development and crop substitution programs--a
slow process at best. The US government believes that in Laos and
Burma some government officials actively encourage and facilitate
opium trafficking. It is clear that until the government of Burma, in
particular, takes more aggressive measures against drug
trafficking, the supply of available heroin will grow.
Next Steps
After more than a decade of activity, the international narcotics
control effort now is beginning to make important headway against
great odds. Halting the spread of the coca crop, improving regional
cooperation, and dramatically increasing the quantities of drugs
seized are laudable accomplishments but are only the first
encouraging signs in a continuing struggle. The principal force
driving these advances is the realization of governments in drug-
affected countries that their own national security interests have
put them on an inevitable collision course with the drug trade.
The 1980s amply demonstrated that, left unchecked, the drug
trade will grow exponentially. Drug addiction has become a new
scourge of the developing world, adding another dimension of
misery to countries with grave economic and social problems.
While the use of certain drugs may be on the wane in the United
States, addict populations are multiplying in less developed
countries such as the Andean nations, Pakistan, India, and Iran.
Since no responsible government can ignore the potential
consequences of weakened societies and correspondingly
strengthened criminal organizations, more countries are likely to
enter the struggle against drugs every year.
Despite the improved performance of individual governments,
there is no room for complacency. Reverses in the cocaine trade are
likely to be ephemeral without a persistent offensive by all
countries. Trafficking organizations are well entrenched and
capable of absorbing considerable losses, and their power to
intimidate and undermine governments remains formidable. Their
resources range from the ability to mount campaigns of violence to
the potential for purchasing influence and protection at nearly
every level of government. Until the traffickers and their cartels
are stripped of this power, drug traffickers will remain strong.
While the United States will contribute counter-narcotics
assistance, each affected government must intensify its attacks on
all facets of the drug trade by:
-- Pursuing criminal cartels and trafficking organizations
relentlessly;
-- Putting pressure on growers to abandon coca production,
as well as providing them with incentives and alternatives;
-- Determining the level of effort against growers,
traffickers, and insurgents linked to the drug trade based on
national interest--not foreign assistance;
-- Identifying, prosecuting, and punishing corruption when it
taints cabinet-level officials and senior military and law
enforcement officers; and
-- Undertaking and implementing essential judicial reform to
ensure that any gains in law enforcement are not undone by a weak
judiciary.
While global drug traffickers may be formidable, they are by
no means invincible. The drug trade can only survive by corrupting
and isolating the countries on which it depends for survival. Over
time, it cannot withstand a concerted and protracted
offensive. If the international community continues the
commitment and cooperation shown in 1990, it should be possible
to weaken the international drug trade to a point where it would no
longer pose a serious threat to the world community.
US International Narcotics Control Funding, FY 1992 ($
thousands)
Country FY 1990 FY 1991 FY 1992
Program Enacted Estimate Request
Latin America
The Bahamas
1,520(A) 1,200 1,200
Bolivia 15,700(B) 15,700 15,700
Brazil 1,900 2,500 3,500
Colombia 20,000(B) 20,000 20,000
Ecuador 1,400 1,500 3,000
Jamaica 1,000 1,400 1,500
Mexico 15,000 18,300 26,000
Peru 10,000 19,000 0(C)
Venezuela 1,000 1,000 2,000
Latin America Regional
4,480 6,000 27,000(C)
Subtotal 72,000 86,600 99,900
East Asia
Laos 575 500(D) 2,000
Thailand 3,500 4,000 5,000
Subtotal 4,075 4,500 7,000
Southwest Asia
Pakistan 5,000 7,500 7,500
Turkey 400 350 400
Asia/Africa/Europe Regional
325 800 2,000
Subtotal 5,725 8,650 9,900
InterregionalAviation Support
32,700 33,450 37,800
Total Country Programs
114,500 133,200 154,600
Other Programs
International Organizations
3,100 4,800 4,600
Training/Demand Reduction/Public Awareness
6,200 7,000 7,000
Program Support and Development
5,740 5,000 5,300
[TEXT]
GRAND TOTAL
$129,540 $150,000(E) $171,500
Notes:
A Reflected in the Latin American regional budget for FY 1990.
B Includes $16.5 million 610 transfer from Security Assistance to
INM to support the Andean Strategy (Bolivia $6.5 million, Colombia
$10 million.
C Funds for assistance to Peru are not included as a separate
country program in the FY 1992 budget request. Instead, $19
million designated for Peru has been included in the Latin American
regional account and may be programmed for Peru on condition of a
satisfactory counter-narcotics program.
D Reprogramming to increase FY 1991 funding for programs in Laos
is under consideration.
E Does not reflect reduction of $2.85 million pursuant to PL 101-
508(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991
Title: Current Treaty Actions
Date: Jun 10, 19916/10/91
Region: Subsaharan Africa, North America,
Central America, Europe, South America
Country: Ghana, Mexico, Nicaragua, United Kingdom,
Uruguay
Subject: International Law, Science/Technology,
Human Rights, Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
Multilateral
Aviation
Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at
airports serving international civil aviation, supplementary to the
convention of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS 7570).
Done at Montreal Feb. 24, 1988. Entered into force Aug. 6, 1989.1
Ratification deposited: Spain,
May 9, 1991.
Labor
Convention No. 105 concerning
the abolition of forced labor.
Adopted at Geneva June 25, 1957. Entered into force Jan. 17,
1959.1
Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 14, 1991.2
Red Cross
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949
(TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of
victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes.
Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.1
Senate Treaty Doc. 100-2.
Ratifications deposited: Germany, Fed. Rep., Feb. 14, 1991.3; Chile,
Apr. 24, 1991.3
Accessions deposited: Djibouti,
Apr. 8, 1991; Uganda, Mar. 13, 1991.
Bilateral
Ghana
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official
government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Accra
July 28, 1989 and Apr. 17, 1991. Entered into force Apr. 17, 1991.
Mexico
Treaty on cooperation for mutual legal assistance. Signed at
Mexico Dec. 9, 1987. Senate Treaty Doc. 100-13.
Ratifications exchanged: May 3, 1991.
Entered into force: May 3, 1991.
Nicaragua
Grant agreement for economic stabilization and recovery program
III. Signed at Managua May 8, 1991. Entered into force May 8, 1991.
Singapore
Memorandum of understanding concerning configuration of tactical
command, control and communications standards, with annexes.
Signed at Camp Smith, Hawaii Feb. 22, 1991.
Entered into force Feb. 22, 1991.
United Kingdom
Amendment 3 to the memorandum of understanding of Oct. 5 and 11,
1984, as amended, concerning the provision of mutual logistic
support, supplies and services. Signed at London and Stuttgart-
Vaihingen Mar. 12 and Apr. 2, 1991. Entered into force Apr. 2, 1991.
Uruguay
Treaty on mutual legal assistance
in criminal matters. Signed
at Montevideo May 6, 1991. Enters into force upon the exchange of
instruments of ratification.
1 Not in force for the US
2 With understandings.
3 With declaration(s) to Protocol I.(###)