US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991

Title:

New Directions for the North Atlantic Alliance

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from Secretary Baker's intervention at the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting, Copenhagen, Denmark Date: Jun 6, 19916/6/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, North America, E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: USSR (former), Germany Subject: NATO, CSCE [TEXT] When we last met in December, our discussions were over- shadowed by the danger of war with Iraq. Before I begin, I would like to say that I think we can be proud of the determination all of us demonstrated in joining together to defeat Saddam Hussein's aggression. The alliance played a vital role in Desert Storm and is doing the same as we cope with the humanitarian challenges of its aftermath. NATO helped build the Western political unity that was so instrumental in securing this decisive victory for the rule of law. The value of our continuing investments in common training, logistics, and infrastructure was reflected in the way our armed forces worked together, both in moving forces to the Gulf and prosecuting the war. We can draw upon the Gulf experience for the future--above all, the new reality that "non-traditional" challenges may directly threaten the vital interests of the alliance and its members. This was clearest with regard to the potential military threat that directly confronted Turkey, but it was true for others, too. The crisis in the Gulf, in short, showed our alliance shifting to cope with new realities and successfully meeting new challenges. Today, I want to focus on four issues that we will need to work on together in the months ahead as the alliance continues its adaptation.
Reshaping the Alliance
At the London summit, our leaders called for fundamental changes in the alliance--adaptations to meet the transformation of the Soviet Union, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and Western Europe's political structures. The call of the summit was to strengthen our trans-Atlantic partnership to meet the evolving challenges--political, economic, and military--of a post- Cold War world. NATO's strategy review is a principal mechanism for the alliance's adaptation. We are pleased with the progress that has been made and fully expect to reach final results in time for a November summit in Rome. Since the London summit, we have succeeded in defining the core security functions the alliance must continue to perform in the new Europe. We have made major progress in crafting a new NATO military strategy which lays out NATO's important roles in peace- time, in crisis, and, if necessary, in war. In anticipation of this new strategy, NATO's defense ministers agreed last week on new alliance force structures--fulfilling our London summit commitment to make NATO's forces more flexible, more mobile, and more multinational. And we are also witnessing a strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance through the development of a European security identity. These changes will renew the alliance--adapting it for decades to come. In this larger context, the United States fully supports the concept of European integration, as we always have. We stand ready to support the arrangements which you, our European allies, decide are needed to express a new European security and defense identity- -ones which can and must strengthen the alliance. There must be transparency in our discussions here and in the IGC [Inter- governmental Conference] forum and complementarity in our conclusions. The fundamental principle that should guide our efforts in each of these forums is that Europe's security is indivisible from that of the United States and Canada. The Gulf war is only the most recent test of how closely our security needs are linked. In this century, two "hot" wars and one Cold War have proven this. For these reasons, it is clear to us that one of our key goals must be to ensure that NATO remains the principal venue for our consultations and the forum for agreement on all policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the North Atlantic Treaty. We must, of course, maintain an effective integrated military structure. It is equally clear that any potential new structure must reinforce, not compete with, those of the alliance. We welcome the willingness of European allies to improve Europe's ability to protect vital interests and uphold the rule of law beyond Europe itself. And to minimize the potential for divisiveness within NATO, we encourage European allies to open their common defense policy deliberations to all European members of NATO.
NATO's Diplomatic Liaison--Guiding Principles
Parallel to these efforts, our leaders agreed in London that the alliance must respond to changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union by opening itself to more regular contacts with former adversaries. The mandate from London has found its most concrete expression in the establishment of diplomatic liaison missions with these countries. Our goal is to reach out to the Soviet Union and to the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe--to demonstrate NATO's genuine concern for their legitimate security interests, for the restructuring of their economies on market principles, and for the growth of freedom and democracy. NATO liaison, complementary to our activities in other forums, in particular CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], will help build the network of ties that will further integrate the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe with the West. This is a historic task, fully consistent with the alliance's fundamental mission. Let me also offer five principles that we believe can guide future liaison efforts. First, our liaison efforts should build trust by providing our former adversaries with a better understanding of NATO's nature, policy, and operations, as well as the political values that are its foundation. Second, liaison relationships should promote a better understanding of the security concerns and policies of the states involved. Third, liaison relationships should be especially active in areas where NATO and its members have specialized technical expertise for coping with common problems. Fourth, we should have flexibility to respond to evolving needs. Fifth, NATO liaison activities should complement the activities of the EC [European Community], the CSCE , the Council of Europe, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and the WEU [Western European Union]. These principles underpin many of the initiatives that [German Foreign Minister] Hans-Dietrich Genscher and I put forward during his recent visit to Washington. Quite simply, our initiatives aim to let the East Europeans and Soviets see the substance of what we have in mind. We want them to know we truly want to help their transformations. In particular, I believe we can help President Gorbachev and the course of reform in the Soviet Union if we also reach out to some of the traditionalists, to help them make the transition to a democratic, market-oriented society.
Building Toward Berlin
For 16 years, CSCE has fostered democratic values in Europe. Now, in CSCE as elsewhere, we need to anchor the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe's new democracies in a secure and stable environment. For the West, CSCE has always stood for respect for the fundamental human rights, openness, and freedoms that unite our countries as a community. That conception must continue to guide our approach to CSCE. We also must show that CSCE not only is a catalyst for change but can itself change to reflect the demands of an evolving Europe. The CSCE institutions we established at the Paris summit responded to these demands. The Office for Free Elections in Warsaw and the CSCE Secretariat in Prague strengthen CSCE's ability to foster the building of democracy and the specialized needs associated with stepped-up coordination at the political level among the signatory states. We want to enhance the functions of the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC). These include agreement to place Valletta's Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Mechanism in the center, an accelerated calendar of meetings for the center's Consultative Committee, agreement to a further military doctrine seminar, and agreement to examine how the center's communications might be used as a "hot line" for emergency contacts. Each of these is a small step in and of itself. But together they can, over time, start to make the CPC a more significant instrument to address the security needs of CSCE countries, especially the concerns of East European states and the interests of the Soviet Union. We view CSCE's political consultation process as a key element of an evolving CSCE. Our meetings in Berlin will be an important test of that process. The United States will be prepared to agree to a properly structured mechanism for holding emergency official-level meetings of the CSCE. I suggest that we also examine the possibilities that a fact- finding capability might bring to bear on CSCE as a means of strengthening its role in the peaceful settlement of disputes. I think we are agreed on the goal of utilizing the Berlin CSCE ministerial to reach agreement at 34 on the procedures to be followed for post-Helsinki security negotiations. If we are to do so, we need to take positions as an alliance on the key procedural questions. And even though process is important, it should not divert us from substance. We need to define more concretely our objectives for new security negotiations in Europe. We need to develop a new approach to conventional arms control in Europe that will help us to address the new security agenda that we face following implementation of the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] treaty, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and completion of the NATO strategy review. To spur this internal discussion, I would suggest that the post-Helsinki security discussions might focus us on the following tasks: -- Enhancing openness and deepening understanding about military activities in Europe by expanding regular dialogues on military forces, force plans, defense budgets, and military doctrine; -- Promoting stability and security in Europe by developing mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, including measures that may have the consensus of all CSCE participants but may not apply to all CSCE members; -- Developing measures to enhance transparency and predictability of military activity, with particular attention to the regeneration and sustainability of forces in Europe; and -- Strengthening and broadening participation in existing non-proliferation regimes by cooperating in the development of national policies to exercise restraint in the sale of conventional weapons, to halt the spread of chemical and biological weapons and missile technology, and to facilitate the conversion of defense industries. Such an approach would be consistent with our work on other arms control fronts. Here I would like to note the intense work we have begun already to finish the START treaty and prepare the ground for a Moscow summit. I would also like to stress the President's personal commitment to our Middle East non- proliferation initiative--a plan of action that will, we believe, enhance the security of states outside the Middle East as well.
Supporting Soviet Reform
Let me turn now to discuss a central question of the day--the revolution in the Soviet Union and the West's approach to it. I start with two distinct trends we've seen emerging in the Soviet Union over the last year, if not longer. First, we've seen a breakdown of the old sources of legitimacy. Politically, this breakdown is exemplified in the war of laws between the center and the republics. It is also reflected in the Communist Party's destruction as the sole center of authority in Soviet political culture. Economically, the legitimacy of the system was shattered as the command system was destroyed without being succeeded by the new rules of a full-fledged market economy. Together, the political problems of disunion and the economic problems of being caught between command and market systems have eroded popular support for Moscow's leadership. The leadership has had to recognize that its extraordinary role in dismantling the old system did not automatically confer public legitimacy for it in the new one. The second trend has, however, arisen out of this breakdown of established structures: we've seen the beginnings of a new pluralism and perhaps a new legitimacy in the Soviet Union. At the grassroots level, political and economic reform is emerging, despite mixed signals from above. This pluralism, in some cases fragmentation, is evident not only in national and republic politics, but in many social groups. For example, the military and the defense industrialists are far from unified in their views, containing both traditionalist and reformist elements. Last winter, the contradictions between these two trends clashed. Traditionalist, command-oriented views were ascendant in the late fall and early spring. But the traditionalist solutions to the problems of legitimacy failed. The political crackdown in the Baltics and the attempts to intimidate the democratic opposition in Moscow only brought more people into the streets, further diminishing the authorities' legitimacy. Economics by decree, currency confiscations, and attacks on alleged plots by foreign bankers failed to stem the economy's slide. Accordingly, the leadership's standing at home continued to slide. The miners' strike probably marked the greatest challenge to the regime's legitimacy, for it combined a political and economic challenge to Moscow with a frontal assault on the center's legitimacy. Paradoxically, however, it could turn out to be the beginning of a turnaround in Soviet politics. For out of the atmosphere of the miner's strike grew the April 23rd "one-plus-nine" agreement--possibly the first step toward resolution of the center-republic problem. The agreement itself notes next steps--a new union treaty, a new constitution, and then elections--which, if followed through, have the potential to establish a new political legitimacy in the Soviet Union. But this would still be just a legal structure. It would have to be complemented with organizational solutions, such as center- republic agreement on budgets and authority over questions such as property rights. It also must be matched by policy reforms. And these, too, are stirring. For example, new market economy programs are being explored by people like Yavlinsky. The success of these reformist policy ideas are, in turn, fundamentally dependent on continued political rapprochement within the Soviet Union. And, of course, the success of perestroika and President Gorbachev will depend on whether these new tendencies of the last 6 weeks can be continued. The United States is committed to supporting them. No one can peer into the future and assure us of success. But we believe that the Soviet Union is a country rich in natural resources and talented peoples, a country that could transform itself into a democratic and prosperous society. To tap this potential, the Soviets must move to embrace a real market economy with private property, incentives, established and respected laws on exchange, competition, a sound currency, and real prices. To establish the proper political context, both at home and abroad, the Soviets should also continue their efforts to build a state based on the rule of law and move to free and fair elections. Moscow needs to accommodate peacefully the Baltic's aspirations through dialogue and negotiations and complete a union treaty that will allow the republics the autonomy they desire. Moscow should continue its positive foreign policy orientation while ending the most clear-cut vestiges of the era of stagnation by eliminating support for regimes that pursue internal repression or external subversion. And the Soviets must accelerate their efforts at defense conversion while committing both to opening their defense budget and to reducing significantly the enormous share of GNP devoted to defense spending. The Soviets must find the will to open the way to a new future; they must start with self-help. If they do, we will support them. We can serve as a catalyst for both political and economic reform. Indeed, we are developing a package of supportive measures, which we hope to coordinate with you and others. But I don't honestly think we can catalyze Soviet reform through a big bang approach. We need to recognize that these changes will take work over a long time. As we work day by day, our effort is more likely to be a step-by-step process-- certainly one with a grand goal--but ever a realistic and workable approach. Above all, we need to engage this new and pluralistic Soviet society to support reform wherever it is found. That's why we need to strengthen the liaison relationships. Liaison is one way we can engage the Soviet military and defense sector to reduce mistrust and fear and foster mutual cooperation. We recognize the hard choices the Soviets need to make. Above all, we are aware how hard it will be to move toward a true market economy. But for our part, we do not intend to stand idly by if the Soviets come to grips with these questions of political and economic legitimacy. Perestroika could be the most important revolution of this century. All of us have a profound stake in its outcome. And NATO has a key role to play in bringing about a Europe and trans-Atlantic community that includes the Soviet Union and is truly whole and free. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991 Title:

New Directions for the North Atlantic Alliance

Description: Final communique issued following ministerial sessions of the NATO Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group in Brussels, Belgium, May 28-29, 1991 Date: May 29, 19915/29/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, North America, E/C Europe, Eurasia, MidEast/North Africa Country: USSR (former), Germany Subject: NATO, Arms Control, Military Affairs [TEXT] 1. The Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation met in Ministerial sessions in Brussels on 28th and 29th May 1991. 2. At last year's London Summit NATO's Heads of State and Government set a new course for the Alliance, aimed at adapting to the profoundly changed security environment and encouraging the continuation of the positive developments in Central and Eastern Europe. The new era has well and truly begun for Europe and for the Alliance. The process of dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including political and military contacts at all levels, has now been established and should continue to be expanded. The Allies will continue to promote co-operation on the basis of the principles set out in the Paris Charter. All these steps are helping to overcome the division of the past as we move towards our goal of a Europe whole and free. 3. The continuing withdrawals of the Soviet Forces to their territory and the recent decision by the member states of the Warsaw Pact formally to dissolve its military structure are important developments, which are further enhancing security and stability in Europe. We seek full implementation by all parties of the CFE Treaty, which would represent a major step forward. We appeal to the Soviet Union to find a way to resolve the remaining issues delaying ratification of the Treaty. 4. The new political situation and the much improved security environment in Europe have made an East-West conflict much more unlikely. Nevertheless uncertainties and risks remain. The Soviet Union is undergoing a difficult political evolution. We clearly have an interest in the success of the process of political and economic reform, not least because the Soviet Union continues to retain substantial nuclear and conventional capabilities. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are subject to considerable political, social, economic and ethnic pressures which could lead to crises jeopardizing overall stability in Europe. Moreover, as the Gulf war underlined, risks can also arise from elsewhere. The Alliance thus needs to continue to work to protect peace and freedom, and must preserve the strategic balance and maintain credible deterrence and an effective common defence to counter any threat to the territory of the Allies. 5. We warmly welcome the success of the international coalition forces in the recent Gulf War. We note with satisfaction the effectiveness of the prompt action taken by the Alliance in deploying naval and air forces to its Southern region to deter any possible attacks on its members. This included the first operational deployment in Alliance history of elements of the ACE Mobile Force. The Alliance's actions have once again demonstrated the overriding importance of political solidarity and our determination to fulfill the commitment to collective security stipulated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 6. We are adapting and transforming our collective defence arrangements as foreseen in the London Declaration. Our broad approach to Alliance security policy is reflected in its three mutually reinforcing elements of co-operation, dialogue and the maintenance of an effective collective defence capability. Arms control and disarmament policy plays an important role in pursuit of dialogue and in the co-operative approach to European security. We have noted with satisfaction that substantial progress has been made in the development of the new Alliance Strategic Concept, which is nearing completion. We look forward to the new Concept being approved later this year. The work done so far to reflect the changed security environment provides a sound basis for the continuing efforts to develop further the Alliance's defence policy and in particular to reshape our nuclear and conventional force posture through the collective defence planning process. 7. As the Alliance adapts to the new environment, the preservation of enduring principles, such as the indivisibility of our security and the need for sharing responsibilities, will remain important. These principles are reflected in the integrated military structure and collective defence arrangements which have maintained a credible deterrence and effective military capability over the past forty years. A continued presence of forces from North America in Europe is indispensable. 8. In our Defence Planning Committee meeting we continued the intensive consultations on the reviews many member countries are undertaking of their future national defence plans, and the consequences of these reviews for the common defence. We also considered recommendations developed by our Military Authorities for the future structure of NATO's forces. The new force structures will reflect the characteristics of flexibility, mobility and multinationality identified in the London Declaration. We noted with satisfaction that both the future national plans and the work done on the new NATO force structures will enable us to maintain a coherent and effective collective defence posture at lower overall force levels. 9. We have agreed the basis of a new force structure consisting of Main Defence Forces, Reaction Forces and Augmentation Forces, including multinational forces of all types: land, air and maritime. In particular we have agreed various national contributions to the multinational corps of Main Defence Forces for which detailed planning will now proceed. With regard to Reaction Forces, we have agreed that these should consist of immediate and rapid reaction forces, comprising contributions from most NATO nations and including national as well as multinational formations. As part of the rapid reaction forces, we have agreed the creation of a Rapid Reaction Corps for Allied Command Europe, under United Kingdom command with a multinational headquarters. These forces, together with our future air and maritime force structures, will provide the basis for the flexible deployment of a range of forces depending on the situation. In this context we have agreed the establishment of a multinational Reaction Force Planning Staff at SHAPE for development and coordination of plans for all Allied Command Europe Reaction Forces. A number of important aspects relating to the implementation of the new force structure now require examination, including the composition of multinational air and naval components and their command arrangements. We agreed that the necessary studies should be undertaken immediately. Finally, we have agreed that a study of NATO's command structure should be pursued as a matter of urgency with the aim of streamlining and adapting it to the new situation. 10. We have approved the 1991 Ministerial Guidance, which provides political guidance for Alliance defence planning activities, both national and collective, for the period up to 1998 and beyond. It will thus cover the period of transition during which the new Alliance Strategic Concept is to come into effect and its implementation will therefore need to take account of the new strategy as finally approved. The Guidance reflects our agreement on the need to maintain the effectiveness of our collective defence arrangements and thus to provide the level of resources necessary to ensure that our forces contributing to the new force structures are adequately manned, equipped, trained and exercised. Nevertheless, we agreed that a continued improvement in the security environment should permit reductions in the defence burden for most countries. However the adaptation and transformation of the forces in this period of transition will inevitably have financial consequences and for the majority of nations defence expenditure in real terms should not be expected to reduce substantially in the near term. In this context a more effective use of defence expenditures and an equitable sharing of the common defence burden remain key objectives. 11. We also reviewed the work being undertaken in a number of key areas of Alliance defence planning as part of the process of adaptation of our forces. These include crisis management, which will assume greater importance in future to reflect the range, variety and unpredictability of the risks facing the Alliance; reinforcement planning where, in addition to the continued vital importance of the transatlantic link, inter-regional reinforcement within Europe, involving both European and North American forces, will play an increasingly significant role; the Air Command and Control system; and infrastructure, armaments co-operation, as enhanced by the Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS), and logistics support arrangements. Although much of this work can only be concluded once the new Strategic Concept and the new force structures have been finally approved, good progress is being made. We received a briefing on military lessons of the Gulf conflict. We agreed that these should be carefully studied, and applied where appropriate. 12. In our Nuclear Planning Group meeting we discussed a broad range of nuclear related issues. We were briefed on the status of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and supported United States efforts to obtain a successful conclusion to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). We noted with satisfaction that the final elimination of United States and Soviet missiles declared in the INF Treaty has now been completed. We welcomed this milestone in our efforts to achieve a stable security environment at lower levels of armaments. In this context, we reviewed the status of Alliance consultations on an arms control framework for negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF). 13. Last year we initiated a fundamental review of the size and tasks of the Alliance's nuclear forces. It looks forward to reduced reliance on and substantial reductions of nuclear weapons. It also recognizes that for the foreseeable future nuclear weapons have an essential role in a strategy designed to preserve peace; and, as part of this, that there remains a need for sub-strategic forces to be based in Europe, with widespread participation in nuclear roles and policy formulation, and kept up-to-date where necessary. The review is well advanced and will be completed in conjunction with the new Alliance Strategic Concept. While seeking the lowest level of nuclear forces commensurate with Alliance security requirements, we are also investigating the measures necessary to ensure that those forces that remain continue to be effective, flexible and survivable, with the requisite communications capability. 14. Against the background of the Gulf War, we discussed the potential risk posed by proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and the need to consider complementary approaches to dealing with the problem, including export controls and missile defences. We welcomed a briefing by the United States concerning its concept for global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes. 15. The transformation of the Alliance has begun in an environment in which unprecedented opportunities exist to promote freedom, stability, the peaceful resolution of disputes and the growth of democracy throughout Europe. We welcome the intensified dialogue and cooperation with all countries of Central and Eastern Europe as a promising contribution to increased mutual understanding and trust. Building on the spirit of the Paris Charter, the CSCE process should play an increasingly constructive role and will complement the Alliance's efforts to achieve a more secure and stable European environment in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other nation or impose hegemony through the threat or use of force. To this end arms control and disarmament should also continue to make an important contribution. The efforts further to develop a European security identity and defence role should lead to a strengthened European pillar within the Alliance and thus not only serve the interests of European states but also enhance Atlantic solidarity by underlining the preparedness of the European allies to take a greater share of the responsibility for collective security. NATO will remain the essential forum for consultations among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty. 16. At our Autumn meetings we will consider the implementation of the new Alliance Strategic Concept and in particular the resulting nuclear and conventional force and command structures. The process of adapting to the needs of the new security environment is a challenging task. We have made a very good start. We remain determined to ensure that our common defences which have served us so well in the past will continue to do so in the future.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991 Title:

USSR Trade Waiver Extension

Description: Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Washington, DC Date: Jun 3, 19916/3/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Trade/Economics, Immigration [TEXT] The President submitted to the Congress his recommendation to extend the waiver authority granted under the Jackson-Vanik amendment (Section 402) to the 1974 Trade Act. In doing so, the President has determined that extension of the authority and of the waiver for the USSR granted in December 1990 will promote the objectives of the agreement--free emigration. The President made this decision in view of the fact that the Soviet government has substantially reduced barriers to emigration for Soviet citizens. Numbers of Soviets emigrating rose from 2,000 in 1986 to over 370,000 in 1990. The Administration believes that this positive trend will continue. The President's action will permit the Soviet Union to remain eligible for export credit guarantee programs of the Commodity Credit Corporation of the Department of Agriculture and of the Export-Import Bank. The waiver is for 1 year.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991 Title:

Signing of the Angolan Peace Accords

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks and US-Soviet Joint Statementat the Angola peace accords signing ceremony, Lisbon, Portugal Date: May 31, 19915/31/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola Subject: Democratization, International Law [TEXT]
Secretary Baker:
All Africa, and all the world, bear witness to what we do here today. This is a pivotal moment for the people of Angola and a promising moment for stability in southern Africa. Together, we meet to end a grievous and bloody civil war. But that is not all that we do. We also gather here to pledge our support as Angola begins the difficult process of healing and democratic nation-building. I warmly and most sincerely congratulate the Angolan parties and their leaders--Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi. You have shown courage and statesmanship in reaching this comprehensive, negotiated settlement. Once adversaries in war, you now stand together as partners in peace. In signing these binding accords, you have shown the world that peace can be established through dialogue and political will. And now, you have the opportunity to show the world that a multi-party democracy can be built where before there was only destruction and distrust. The United States has been proud to be counted among the nations who have helped bring about this day of peace-making. On behalf of President Bush and the American people, I would like to thank [Portuguese] Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and his government for their perseverance and commitment. To [Soviet] Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and his colleagues, I would like to express my thanks for their cooperation in resolving yet another issue that once deeply divided our countries but that now unites us in common purpose. I would also like to renew my deep appreciation to the United Nations and Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. Once again you have played a critical role in the achievement of peace. Those of us in the international community who have worked long and hard to reach this settlement know that implementation of these binding peace accords will not be easy. Time and again in the months and years ahead, the will of the Angolan people and their leaders will be severely tested. But we are here today to say that Angola shall not stand alone. For our part, the United States will do all we can to assist Angola's transition to democracy. For we are convinced that democracy offers Angola the best chance for enduring peace and well-being at home and for stability and prosperity in the region. We will support Angola's new multi-party system and help to ensure that the upcoming national elections are truly free and fair. Working through the Joint Commission, we will help provide the resources for voter education programs and for maximum popular participation in the election process. Moreover, the United States shall fully meet all our commitments as observers to these peace accords. We will open a liaison office in Luanda and participate actively in the work of the Joint Political Military Commission and of the commission which will verify the cease-fire. We will honor our obligation not to provide any lethal materiel to anyone in Angola, and we will closely monitor other countries to that same end. And we will continue our humanitarian assistance to all Angolans, for ultimately, it is the Angolan people who must build upon the peace that is achieved today. Finally, the United States looks forward to working with the international community in a common effort to help Angola meet the demanding challenges of reconciliation and democracy that lie ahead. And, as we Americans contemplate the daunting tasks now facing the Angolan people and their leaders, we shall recall with empathy and hope the healing words of President Abraham Lincoln, when he addressed the nation toward the close of our own bitter Civil War, "With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right." May that spirit--and the spirit of cooperation and good faith that has brought us here today--also bring to all of Angola a bright, prosperous, and democratic tomorrow.
US-Soviet Joint Statement May 31, 1991
Joint statement on US-Soviet cooperation on conflict resolution in Africa released at the signing of the Angolan peace accords, May 31, 1991. We have just witnessed here in Lisbon the settlement of the Angola conflict, which was achieved through negotiations under Portuguese stewardship. Last year's achievement of Namibian independence, the establishment of peace in Angola, and the intensification of peace- making activities in other parts of the continent have demonstrated that negotiations are replacing armed struggle as the principal political trend in Africa. The future of Africa largely depends on how quickly wars can be ended and new political structures developed to resolve and prevent conflict. The United States and Soviet Union express satisfaction with their increasing cooperation, which is aimed at assisting African countries in restoring peace in various regions of their continent. The US and USSR stand ready to work together with the international community and especially African countries and the OAU [Organization of African Unity] to resolve armed conflicts through political means. In this context, the UN has a valuable role to play in peace-making and peace-keeping, as it has demonstrated in Africa. Our two countries are determined to play a constructive role in ending conflicts in Africa, and will cooperate in promoting political resolution of disputes, strengthening democracy and economic development, combating hunger and disease, and enhancing environmental stability.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991 Title:

Vietnamese Asylum Seekers

Tutwiler Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Date: Jun 4, 19916/4/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Vietnam, United States, Hong Kong, United Kingdom Subject: Refugees, Immigration [TEXT] Senior officials of the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Hong Kong met in Washington on June 3-4, 1991, to discuss measures to deal with the sharply increasing number of Vietnamese asylum seekers arriving in Hong Kong in recent months. The international response to the situation of Vietnamese asylum seekers in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia is governed by the multilateral comprehensive plan of action (CPA), which is implemented by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These consultations were envisaged by the recent meeting of the CPA committee to explore measures that could encourage greatly accelerated rates of return to Vietnam of those determined not to be refugees. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Hong Kong remain committed to the CPA, especially first asylum and fair procedures to determine who is and who is not a refugee. The British and Hong Kong sides informed the United States that they intend as a matter of urgency to seek bilateral discussions with Vietnam. Within the context of the CPA and the US position on involuntary repatriation the United States does not object to these discussions. The UK-Vietnam bilateral discussions could consider the establishment of an internationally managed center on territory provided by Vietnam for those asylum seekers who are determined not to be refugees and who have not taken advantage of the existing voluntary return programs. These discussions will take place in close consultations with UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The United States and the United Kingdom will support efforts to expand access to the orderly departure program for safe emigration from Vietnam. The United States will also continue its policy of offering resettlement to up to 50% of the asylum seekers who are screened in as refugees. There will be no resettlement of those screened out. Cut-off dates will remain in force and will, in no circumstances, be changed to a later date.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991 Title:

Peace Accords in Angola

Date: May 31, 19915/31/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola Subject: Democratization, International Law [TEXT] Secretary Baker visited Lisbon on May 31 to represent the United States at the formal signing of the peace accords for Angola. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the Luanda government and President Jonas Savimbi of UNITA signed the accord, thereby ending the civil conflict in that country. The United States has served as an observer in the Portuguese mediated talks which produced the accords. Secretary Baker attended the signing to reaffirm our long- standing commitment to national reconciliation in Angola through a democratic political process.
Background
The Angolan civil war has raged since 1975 between the Luanda government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). It ravaged the countryside, causing considerable disruption of political and economic life. Since 1979, UNITA has effectively controlled the southeastern quarter of the country. The presence of Cuban and South African forces in Angola complicated the civil war. In 1988, the United States successfully mediated negotiations leading to the departure of these foreign forces from the country, as well as the independence of Namibia. Between April 1990 and May 1991, negotiations between the Luanda government and UNITA were conducted under the mediation of Portugal. The United States and the Soviet Union were official observers at these negotiations and played a facilitative role in helping the two parties reach the agreements which will be signed on May 31.
US Policy in Angola
US policy in Angola has long sought a negotiated settlement to the civil conflict, including free and fair elections in which UNITA and all other Angolan political parties are free to participate. A little more than a year ago, Secretary Baker met with President dos Santos in Windhoek during the Namibian independence celebrations. He assured him that US policy was aimed at promoting negotiations to achieve peace and stability, and he urged President dos Santos to accept negotiations leading to free and fair elections. President dos Santos accepted Secretary Baker's recommendation and asked the Portuguese government to mediate negotiations, at which the United States and the Soviet Union were official observers. The resulting negotiations progressed, but in December 1990 reached an impasse. During their meetings in Houston in December 1990, Secretary Baker and then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reviewed the status of the negotiations for a settlement in Angola. They expressed their continued support for the important role played by Portugal. To facilitate the negotiations, and to advance the achievement of peace and stability, they made a special effort to break the impasse. The United States and the Soviet Union co- sponsored a meeting in Washington with all parties on December 13. On the previous day, Secretary Baker met with the Angolan Foreign Minister, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met with President Savimbi of UNITA, demonstrating their determination to bring the two parties together. These meetings resulted in a document called the Washington Concepts Paper, which established a framework for an overall settlement. This intervention by Secretary Baker and the Soviet Foreign Minister demonstrated the overall success of US policy toward Angola and US-Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflicts.
The Peace Accords for Angola
On May 1, 1991, following weeks of intensive discussions in Lisbon, the parties reached agreement in substance on all issues related to a cease-fire and political settlement. At Estoril, high- level UNITA and Luanda government officials initialed agreements on a United Nations-monitored cease-fire and supplementary principles guiding a final settlement, including free and fair multi- party elections and the formation of new, politically neutral, national armed forces. On May 15, a de facto cease-fire began when the parties informed the Portuguese government of their acceptance of the agreements reached. A formal cease-fire will enter into force when the final agreements are signed by President dos Santos and UNITA President Savimbi on May 31.
US Role Under the Accords
Under the cease-fire agreements, the United States, as an observer to the JPMC and the JVMC, will support implementation of the agreements. It will open an office in Luanda, where the JPMC will be headquartered. This will not constitute establishment of diplomatic relations with the Luanda government. The United States will establish diplomatic relations with a government in Angola when one emerges from free and fair, internationally monitored elections. The accord binds both parties to avoid further importation of lethal materiel into Angola. The US and the USSR have stated their intent to comply with this provision. Non-lethal aid is specifically permitted.
UN Role
The UN will be asked to authorize the establishment of a mission of several hundred observers to assist in monitoring the cease-fire. They would begin to arrive in Angola as soon as the cease-fire agreements have been signed and will remain until the results of national elections have been proclaimed. Provisions of the Agreement Cease-Fire Agreement, which includes the formation of a Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (JVMC) to monitor cease-fire implementation. Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace, which includes the formation of a Joint Political and Military Commission (JPMC), with overarching responsibility for implementation of all aspects of the agreements. Washington Concepts Paper, which contains fundamental concepts underlying a framework for settlement. The "Estoril Accords," (named after the Portuguese town, near Lisbon, where they were negotiated), which include six annexes on: -- Free and fair multi-party elections between September and November 1992. -- Internal security (neutrality of the police force will be guaranteed by the presence of UN monitors). -- Structure and mandate of JPMC. -- Administrative structures for the UNITA-held areas. -- A definition of UNITA's political rights once the cease-fire is signed. -- The formation of a new, politically neutral, national armed forces.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991 Title:

Chronology: Angola--The Road to Peace

Date: May 31, 19915/31/91 Category: Chronologies Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola, USSR (former), Cuba, South Africa, United States, Portugal Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization, International Law [TEXT]
Chronology: 1975-1992
1974--After a military coup in Portugal, the former colonial power relinquishes sovereignty over colonies in Africa--including Angola. 1975--Cuba and the USSR intervene on the side of the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its conflict with the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA). South Africa sends troops and war materiel to help UNITA. The United States decries the involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Cuban troop strength in Angola reaches 10,000 by Angola's November 11 Independence Day. 1976--Cuban troop strength in Angola reaches 15,000. 1978--The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 435 calling for a cease-fire in the Namibian guerrilla war, UN-sponsored elections, and a Transition Assistance Group in Namibia. South Africa organizes Namibian elections, but they are boycotted by SWAPO and are not recognized internationally. 1981--Chester Crocker, the Reagan Administration's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, visits Angola to discuss Cuban troop withdrawal in the context of the implementation of Resolution 435. 1982--South Africa establishes a formal link between its willingness to accept Namibian independence and the arrangements for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. 1983--Angola's Interior Minister, Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues, discusses Angola and Namibia with Vice President Bush in Washington, DC. South Africa launches a major offensive against SWAPO guerrillas operating north of the Namibian border in Angola. 1984--Assistant Secretary Crocker meets with Angolans and South Africans in Lusaka, Zambia; the Lusaka accord details disengagement of Angolan and South African forces in southern Angola; the United States takes part in a Joint Monitoring Commission. -- Angola issues its Plataforma for the first time proposing a partial withdrawal of Cuban troops in the context of implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435. 1985--In response to continuing massive Soviet and Cuban assistance to the MPLA, Congress repeals the Clark amendment, which had precluded US assistance to any of the participants in the Angolan internal conflict. -- In an effort to bridge the gap between South African and Angolan positions on Cuban troop withdrawal, the United States tables its "synthesis" calling for total withdrawal of Cuban troops over a 2-year period. 1986--UNITA President Savimbi visits Washington, DC. The United States resumes assistance to UNITA after a 10-year hiatus. -- South Africa announces its readiness to implement Resolution 435 on August 1 if agreement is reached on Cuban troop withdrawal. Proposal expires on August 1 when there is no response from Angola. -- MPLA withdraws from active participation in negotiations in response to South African military incursions into Angola. 1987--US-Angola negotiations resume in April in Brazzaville with the assistance of Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso. -- US-Angolan contacts intensify through the remainder of the year in an effort to develop a proposal on Cuban troop withdrawal to serve as a basis for renewed negotiations with South Africa. 1988--In January, Cuban representatives for the first time participate in US-Angola negotiations as members of the Angolan delegation. -- In March, Angola and Cuba for the first time table a proposal on the total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. In the same month, Assistant Secretary Crocker meets with South African Foreign Minister Botha in Geneva to discuss resumption of the negotiations. -- In May, delegations from South Africa, Angola/Cuba, and the United States meet in London to launch intensive negotiations for a settlement. -- In July, at a meeting in New York, the parties agree to set general principles that would form the basis of a settlement. -- In August, the People's Republic of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa agree to a cease-fire in Angola that includes an eventual complete withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops and implementation of the UN plan for Namibia's independence. -- On December 13, the governments of the People's Republic of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa sign the protocol of Brazzaville in the Congo. The protocol recommends implementation of Resolution 435 on April 1, 1989, and creates the Joint Commission, which is composed of the signatories with the US and USSR as observers, "with the objective of facilitating the resolution of any dispute regarding the interpretation of the Tripartite Agreement." -- On December 22, in New York City, the People's Republic of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa sign the Tripartite Agreement committing the parties to begin implementation of Resolution 435 and withdrawal of Cuban troops on April 1, 1989. At the same ceremony, the People's Republic of Angola and Cuba sign a bilateral agreement setting a schedule for Cuban troop withdrawal, to be monitored by the unarmed UN Verification Mission for Angola. 1989--In early January, the People's Republic of Angola announces the first Cuban troop withdrawal ahead of schedule. Later that month, the Joint Commission meets for the first time to discuss the implementation process. -- In June, under the auspices of President Mobutu, President dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi meet at Gbadolite, Zaire before a summit of 22 African chiefs of state and agree on a ceasefire and national reconciliation. However, with no preparation, the ceasefire fails to take effect and fighting escalates. 1990--In late March, Secretary Baker meets with Angolan President dos Santos in Windhoek during Namibian independence celebrations, to assure him that US policy aims to promote negotiations to achieve peace and stability. He urges President dos Santos to accept negotiations leading to free and fair elections. President dos Santos accepts Secretary Baker's recommendation and subsequently invites the Portuguese government to mediate negotiations. -- In December, after progressing under Portuguese mediation, negotiations to end the civil conflict in Angola reach an impasse. -- Also in December, the Luanda government launched a major military offense against UNITA aimed at capturing the strategic center at Mavinga. After 6 months of bitter fighting, the offensive fails and government troops are forced to retreat to their base. -- On December 11, Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze issue a joint statement in Houston expressing continued support for the important role played by Portugal in mediating negotiations for a settlement in Angola, and indicating that they would take steps to facilitate these efforts. -- On December 12 in Washington, Secretary Baker meets with Angolan Foreign Minister Pedro Castro Van Dunem, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze meets with Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA. The ministers outline their concept of a settlement, including a cease-fire; free participation of UNITA and other political parties in a democratic political process; free and fair elections monitored by international neutral observers; and the termination of deliveries of all lethal materiel to Angola upon the entry into force of a cease-fire. These principles resulted in a document called the Washington Concepts Paper, establishing a framework for an overall settlement. -- On December 13, in Washington, the US and the Soviet Union co-sponsor a meeting of all the interested parties, with the aim of promoting the successful conclusion of the negotiations in Lisbon. 1991--On May 1, following weeks of intensive discussions in Portugal between the two Angolan parties negotiators reach agreement in substance on all issues under negotiation and the Peace Accords for Angola are initialed "ad referendum." -- On May 15, the two sides notify the Portuguese mediator that they agree to the documents constituting the peace accords. De facto cessation of hostilities begins. The UN is asked to authorize the establishment of a UN monitoring mission. -- On May 25, the Cubans complete final withdrawal of their troops from Angola 5 weeks ahead of schedule. -- On May 31, a formal cease-fire signing ceremony took place in Portugal, in which Angolan President dos Santos and UNITA President Savimbi signed on behalf of their respective sides. The formal cease-fire entered into force immediately upon signature. -- On June 15, UN observer groups are scheduled to assume responsibilities and joint teams representing the two sides to take up their duties. 1992--In September-November, internationally monitored, multiparty elections are scheduled to be held for the president and National Assembly in Angola.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991 Title:

Country Profile: Angola

Date: May 31, 19915/31/91 Category: Country Data Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola Subject: History, International Organizations, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Official Name: People's Republic of Angola
Geography
Area: 1,246,700 sq. km. (481,351 sq. mi.); about twice the size of Texas. Cities: Capital--Luanda (pop. 1 million). Other cities--Huambo (500,000). Terrain: Varied. Climate: Tropical to subtropical.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Angolan. Population (1989 est.): 1 million. Annual growth rate (1989 est.): 3.5%. Ethnic groups: Ovimbundu 37%, Kimbundu 25%, Bakongo 13%, Lunda- Chokwe 8%, Nganguela 6%. Religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant, traditional. Languages: Portuguese (official), various African languages. Education: Attendance--75%. Literacy--20%. Health: Infant mortality rate-- 161/1,000. Life expectancy--42 yrs. Work force: Agriculture--85%.
Government
Type: When it seized power by force upon independence from Portugal in 1975, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) imposed a Marxist regime on the country. Civil war between the Luanda government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has been waged throughout Angola since then until May 1991, when both parties reached agreement on a cease-fire and political settlement. This complex series of interlocking agreements, known as the Angola Peace Accords, provide for Angola's first multi-party elections, between September and November 1992. Concurrent with the accords, the Luanda government revised its constitution to move toward the establishment of a multi-party democracy. Independence: November 11, 1975. Branches: Executive--president, three ministers of state, Council of Ministers. Legislative--People's Assembly. Judicial--military and civilian courts. Administrative subdivisions: 18 provinces. Political party: Since independence, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party (MPLA-PT) has been the only political party allowed by law. However, on May 11, 1991, the Luanda government promulgated a new political parties law which provides for multiple parties in conformity with the revised constitution promulgated on the same day. Also, under the terms of the accords, UNITA will become a recognized political party on June 1, 1991. Suffrage: Universal adult. Flag: Two horizontal bars, red over black; centered, a yellow five- pointed star half encircled by a machine gear crossed by a machete.
Economy*
GDP (1989): $7 billion. Real growth rate (1989 est): 1%-2%. Natural resources: Petroleum, diamonds, iron, phosphate, copper, feldspar, gold, bauxite, uranium. Agriculture (about 20% of GNP): Products--cassava, maize, plantains, sweet potatoes, milk, millet, citrus, beans, potatoes, sugar, beef, palm oil, sisal, coffee. Industry (28% of GNP): Types--petroleum, mining, food processing, beer, tires, textiles. Trade (1989): Exports--$3 billion: petroleum, gas, coffee, diamonds. Partners--US, USSR, Cuba, Portugal, Brazil. Imports--$1 billion: foodstuffs, textiles, machinery, raw materials, consumer goods, tools, medical supplies, chemicals. Major suppliers--US, USSR, Portugal, Brazil, France. Economic aid received: Primarily from Western private and public sectors; mostly military but some economic aid from Eastern bloc.
International Affiliations
UN, Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Development Bank (ADB), Non-Aligned Movement, Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference, GATT (de facto), World Bank (IBRD), and International Monetary Fund (IMF). *Data for the period since independence was extremely limited due to the civil war.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991 Title:

Western Hemisphere Holds Unique Place for Freedom

Eagleburger Source: Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State Description: Address to the 21st General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), Santiago, Chile Date: Jun 3, 19916/3/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America, South America, Central America, Caribbean Subject: Arms Control, Democratization, Narcotics, OAS, Environment, Trade/Economics [TEXT] As the 500th anniversary of the European discovery of the Americas approaches, it is a fitting time to reflect on our hemisphere's unique place in the chronicle of human civilization, and to think about what it is that especially defines us, collectively, as Americans. We are the hemisphere which gave mankind a second chance. We are still, 5 centuries after Columbus, the New World, because we still believe that man can achieve a new beginning and invent himself anew, and that he is not a prisoner of fate or history. We are, in short, the hemisphere of freedom, where liberty and democracy were reborn in the modern era but on a universal scale unknown to the ancients. To be who we truly are, we must be free. To be shackled by tyranny or by oppressive ideologies is for us to be untrue to ourselves. We are Americans, all of us, because we are free. Thank you, Mr. President [Chilean Foreign Minister Enrique Silva Cimma], for being the host of this assembly. But thank you as well for what Chile has done to give back to this hemisphere its true identity. It was not long ago, however, that things were much different, and far bleaker, both in this hemisphere and beyond. When this organization last met in Santiago, three out of four citizens of the Americas lived under authoritarian rule, and state intervention undermined economic freedom and stifled growth in much of our region. At that time, too, 15 years ago, the Cold War was at its peak, posing a constant threat of global catastrophe, fueling regional conflicts, and polarizing international relations. The Cold War made it especially difficult for the nations of the Americas to cooperate, riven as we were by ideological differences and burdened as we were by undemocratic regimes of the left and the right, each of which constituted a betrayal of the New World's original promise. I will not deny that my own country bears its share of responsibility for having tended to view our hemispheric relationships through the sometimes distorting prism of the Cold War. I make no apology for the devotion, and the untold sacrifices, with which we confronted a single-minded foe and threat to freedom. Freedom's victory today in that struggle is redemption for many mistakes. But mistakes we made, the most serious being a failure at times to take our hemisphere on its own terms and to deal with its problems in their own right. We are, however, on the threshold of a new world order today, following the defeat of totalitarianism and the global ascendancy of democracy and the free enterprise system. World-wide, the hopes for a new order are founded on the unprecedented consensus against aggression which emerged during the Gulf crisis, and the potential which now exists for the United Nations to fulfill its role on behalf of international law and collective security. Here in the Americas, our hopes are founded on the almost complete emergence of history's first entirely democratic hemisphere, a development which will revolutionize inter-American relations by making cooperation among ourselves possible on a scale unimaginable only a few years ago. We in the United States are aware, however, that the new world order has occasioned apprehensions as well as hopes among our hemispheric neighbors. There are fears that the success of American arms in the Gulf will have dangerously swelled our pride, and that we will now see ourselves as the world's policeman, with license to intervene in other nations' affairs. There are also apprehensions of a wholly opposite nature, namely that the United States will neglect its Latin and Caribbean neighbors now that the Cold War is no longer there to check our isolationist tendencies. These fears are mutually contradictory; both are unfounded. I can tell you that it is the intention of the United States to continue to shoulder its global responsibilities. However, it should be understood that our ability to think globally and to act globally is important to all the world's democracies, especially as the world's economy becomes more and more interdependent. The fate of reform in Eastern Europe and the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait, for example, are issues which do affect the well-being of this hemisphere. Saddam Hussein demonstrated, moreover, that the breakdown of the Cold War-bloc system can, if we are not vigilant, lead to a proliferation of instabilities. If the United States does not attempt to deal with challenges to world stability, who will do so in its place?
Reorienting the US Relationship To the Western Hemisphere
But what I would like most to emphasize here today is that the radical transformations of the past few years have not been confined to the Soviet Union, to Eastern Europe, or to Latin America. In the United States, too, change is underway in the form of a seminal reorienting of our relationship to this hemisphere. There are objective factors at work here: our economic stake in the recovery of the Latin American market; our need for cooperation with the hemisphere to address transnational problems such as narcotics, pollution, immigration, and weapons proliferation. And our undeniable strategic interest in seeing the hemisphere's transition to democracy and free markets succeed. But objective factors alone cannot account for the truly revolutionary transformation in US policy toward our American neighbors. The fact is that we have a President in George Bush for whom creating a historic new partnership within the hemisphere is at the very top of his agenda for the United States as we seek to do our part to build the new world order. President Bush recognized that something fundamental had changed in the Americas and that the United States had to change accordingly. He understood that as our southern neighbors threw off their authoritarian legacy, so too did the United States have to throw away its Cold War prism and look at the hemisphere with new eyes. President Bush also listened to the hemisphere with new ears, meeting with this counterparts at San Jose in 1989 and at Cartagena in 1990. Both he and they discovered that the taboos, the reflexive reactions, and the stereotypical notions which burdened our relations for so long were suddenly irrelevant. They discovered that an astonishing political and economic consensus had taken hold throughout the hemisphere, permitting a historic breakthrough in Inter-American relations for whomever was bold enough to seize the occasion. President Bush did not let this opportunity pass. To those who worried that the United States would shift its attention and its energies away from this hemisphere in response to dramatic changes in Europe, he provided an answer when on June 27, 1990, he announced his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. He conceived his proposal as a historic offer of re-engagement, a permanent new relationship between this hemisphere and the United States. And he followed his initiative up with a visit to Brasilia, Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Caracas which marked a watershed in Inter-American relations. There is, quite simply, no equivalent to the EAI linking the US to any other part of the world. Any lingering doubts about President Bush's commitment to his long-term vision for the Americas ought to have been laid to rest last month when the Administration fought tooth and nail in the US Congress to retain fast-track negotiating authority. Let me assure you that the Administration will fight hard to achieve a free trade agreement with Mexico and that we will succeed in creating, along with Canada, the largest free market the world has ever seen. But that is only a beginning. President Bush foresees an entire American community of free trading nations, from Alaska to Argentina, which will set an example against the forces of protectionism. What we dream of is a community in which each nation builds on its strengths, discovers new competitive advantages, and reaps the benefits of competition in the world market place. The American republics stand poised as never before to create an unprecedented partnership of developed and developing nations to secure democracy, promote prosperity, and join together to confront the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. We have, after all, a precious tool at our disposal to promote our common aims in the form of our hemispheric body, the Organization of American States. Just as the United Nations is transforming itself into a capable instrument of collective action on a global scale, the OAS is emerging from a period of crisis to a time of renewed strength and leadership on issues such as democracy and drugs, the environment and economic reform. We have a great opportunity to exploit the hemisphere's political and economic consensus in order to achieve cooperative action in ways that have eluded us in the past.
Challenges
Our challenges are clear.
Democracy.
First, we must consolidate democracy and be prepared, where necessary, to defend democracy against its enemies. Anyone plotting against an elected government should know in advance: this hemisphere will not stand idly by if democracy is assaulted, neither before nor after a crisis emerges. This OAS must confront and isolate those who seek to thwart the right of the people of the Americas to determine democratically their own political destinies. We must build as well a new inter- American community of democratic institutions and organizations to defend human rights and strengthen the rule of law throughout our hemisphere. Democracy is strong where democratic institutions are strong--legislatures, judiciaries, trade unions, human rights organizations, and the like. We must find new and creative ways to strengthen these institutions throughout the Americas. The OAS deserves enormous credit for its pioneering work in advancing democracy in this hemisphere. In Nicaragua, the OAS not only helped oversee the country's first free and fair elections but stayed on when others departed to do the hard work of demobilizing the Nicaraguan Resistance and guaranteeing its security. In El Salvador, where others chose not to engage, the OAS deployed throughout the country to ensure the security of the electoral process and ward off guerrilla attacks, a bold move which has helped bring that country a decisive step closer to peace. The OAS also was in the lead during elections in Haiti, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Suriname. There is one common denominator here--none of these successes was guaranteed in advance. The OAS ventured where others feared to tread. Secretary General Baena Soares and every member state can be proud that today the blue OAS election observer T-shirt is a symbol throughout this hemisphere of free, fair, and peaceful elections. The democracy unit created within the OAS also has enormous potential to support democratic consolidation if we as member states have the creativity and will to use it. We must stand in solidarity as well with those governments that continue to face the threat of violent assault on democracy--El Salvador, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala. We must fully support the courageous efforts of democratic governments to negotiate political solutions to these conflicts, wherever possible through dialogue and compromise. It is time--indeed, it is more than time- -for those who wage revolution through violence to understand that history has left them behind. Today, the authentic revolutionaries of the Americas are those who are engaged in building democratic institutions and a free market economy, the only effective guarantors of human liberty.
Drug Trafficking
. We must also mobilize to control the new threat to constitutional order posed by the drug- trafficking cartels. Through violence and corruption, force and threat, the narcotics traffickers undermine the institutions of democracy. To stop them, we must implement the OAS' tough standards on precursor chemicals. The Organization's preparation of rigorous money-laundering standards is also important. We must send a strong message to the narco-traffickers and terrorists that their business is not welcome and that thousands in this hemisphere did not die to build democracy only to see it corrupted and destroyed by vicious, greedy men who think themselves above the law.
Economics
. On the economic front, this hemisphere has seen an intellectual revolution as far reaching as the political revolution that has restored democracy from Argentina to Nicaragua. No democratic nation in the Americas today is looking inward, fearing trade and competition. No finance minister argues that a state-dominated economy can produce growth and opportunity. All across the Americas, the old barriers to trade and investment are coming down, freeing the energies of entrepreneurs and workers to invest and produce and trade and build. No country has gone farther or faster or made more progress in this economic revolution than our host nation. Indeed, Chile is emerging as a model of democracy, national reconciliation, and economic growth and opportunity for the entire world community. The United States is not going to stand on the sidelines while this economic revolution unfolds. President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is designed to make the US a full partner in this vast undertaking. It is borne of a recognition that the fate of democracy and the economic well-being of each and every citizen are intimately connected. In fact, the free market system we promote is not for the rich to get richer, but for all social classes to know progress and prosperity. Meanwhile, the hemisphere is busy organizing itself for the revolutionary changes to come. Already we see the countries of the Southern Cone lowering barriers and preparing for a common market. Already we see the Andean nations liberalizing trade with each other and looking outward. Already we see CARICOM [Caribbean Common Market] creating a new vision of economic integration, and Central America joining GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], liberalizing trade, and exploring a common market. This democratic hemisphere we are building can also be the first to strike down the barriers to trade that have divided our nations and strait jacketed our peoples and economies. We are close to unleashing the productive energies of 600 million citizens throughout the Americas. The government of Japan has committed to invest in the new Multilateral Investment Fund to be created in the Inter-American Development Bank under the EAI. So, too, have key committees in the US Congress. We hope that Europe will join us in this Multilateral Investment Fund. We are moving as well on debt. Congress has given the President authority to reduce PL 480 debt under the EAI. And we have asked Congress to grant to the President this year authority to deal with additional categories of government to government debt. I can assure you we will fight hard to obtain that authority from the Congress.
Environment
. As we move forward to a new vision of free and open trade, we must also ensure that development does not destroy the common heritage of this hemisphere of rain forest, clean air, water, and wildlife. The United States, like many countries which developed rapidly, often sacrificed its environment in the name of economic growth. But we have learned through that experience that growth and the preservation of the environment must be balanced more creatively. We are prepared, through the EAI, to turn debt into a mechanism to preserve the environment. Let us do our duty to coming generations of Americans and leave to them a precious natural heritage which is whole and clean and alive.
Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Finally, we in the Americas have an opportunity to create a new partnership of democracies confronting the global challenges of the post-Cold War era. We have seen in the actions of Iraq the emerging symbol of new threats to peace that the world community may confront in the future. Fifty years ago, it took a great power like Germany to disturb the peace of the world; but today, a small regional power like Iraq with access to advanced weaponry and unlimited wealth can threaten the international order. The Canadian initiative at this year's assembly reminds us that we must learn the lessons of the Persian Gulf and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction anywhere in the world. We must move forward together, with equal commitment, to control the transfer of chemical and biological weapons. The United States is prepared to play its part. President Bush, for example, recently announced our willingness to destroy all US chemical weapon stocks. We also are prepared to assist those nations who adopt export controls on missile, chemical, and biological weapons to obtain the technology necessary for advanced economic growth. This democratic hemisphere we are building can also become the first hemisphere that has committed itself north to south to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Already, Brazil and Argentina have committed to adopt full scope safeguards on their nuclear programs and to bring into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We hope others will follow suit. When they do, every nation in the Americas, except for Cuba, will become a signatory to that treaty. Let the Americas send a message throughout the rest of the globe: We did not struggle and sacrifice to end the old threats posed by the Cold War only to permit the new threat of burgeoning nuclear weapons to endanger our children's security. None of us underestimates the magnitude of the challenges still awaiting us--poverty, over-population, under-development, insurgencies, and narco-trafficking--nor can we forget the human suffering which lies behind each of these enduring blights on our hemispheric landscape.
Conclusion
In the face of these daunting challenges, I would like to leave this General Assembly with two thoughts. First, I would remind my fellow delegates that we have achieved the impossible and the unthinkable over the last few years. Look around at the democratic representatives who could not possibly have attended this assembly 2 years ago. Think about the guerrilla groups now seeking to enter the legal and democratic mainstream, or the drug traffickers negotiating their terms of surrender. Consider that some countries have resumed economic growth against all odds, and that the war in Nicaragua is over. Our conclusion must be that this hemisphere has remained true to its New World destiny. It is yet possible to reshape the future as our forefathers believed. My second and final thought is that we ought to realize and to appreciate how lucky we are on this day in June, in Santiago, late in the 20th century. The last 100 years and more have seen too much pointless strife among ourselves, strife which has thwarted the dreams of millions. This noble experiment in hemispheric cooperation, the Organization of American States, has often paid the price of our differences in terms of paralysis and wasted opportunities. But today, in 1991, we have the opportunity to redeem ourselves. We are now what we were meant to be from the very beginning: democratic and free. We have learned a painful but necessary lesson--that without freedom we cannot prosper. Now, we must summon every ounce of our collective strength to make freedom work and to make freedom prosper. If we choose instead to divert our energies to revisiting the struggles over principle and ideology which have divided us for so much of this century, then we will have demonstrated to our peoples, and to the world, that we are incapable of learning from history. Fate may not again smile on us for a long, long time the way she has in 1991. Let us do as the Romans urged--carpe diem. Let us seize the opportunity, united democratically as we are, to cooperate here in the OAS, and among ourselves, as if the fate of our hemisphere depended on it . For it truly does. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991 Title:

1991 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Overview

Date: Jun 10, 19916/10/91 Category: Fact Sheets Country: Pakistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Suriname, Mexico, Peru, Belize, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Bahamas, Burma, Thailand, Laos Subject: Narcotics [TEXT] Overview of the 1991 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (covering 1990) prepared by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) in consultation with other offices and agencies of the US Government. The entire report is available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325, Tel. 202-783-3238 (Stock# 044- 000-020305-9, $19). The year 1990 was encouraging for international narcotics control efforts. For the first time in a decade, coca cultivation and opium production did not increase. Total coca cultivation did not increase overall and actually decreased in Bolivia and Colombia. Opium production, which also had been on the rise, dropped 10% in 1990. While weather played a part in this decline, law enforcement and crop control programs were the determining factors in all countries except Burma. In addition, several key countries--especially Colombia, Bolivia, and Mexico--greatly improved their counter-narcotics and law enforcement performance. These governments expanded their cooperative efforts with the United States, resulting in increased harassment and disruption of cocaine-trafficking organizations and a parallel reduction in their ability to do business. In general, arrests of traffickers and seizures of illegal drugs--particularly cocaine--increased worldwide, and there was greater attention devoted to money laundering and precursor chemical control. Through the combined action of concerned governments and international organizations, important advances in global cooperation in the drug war were made. Despite these gains, much work remains to be done. Drug abuse continues to rise, providing new markets for the traffickers. In some countries, serious problems with corruption, law enforcement ineffectiveness, and a lack of political will to confront the drug trade remain. The traffickers continue to be strong, rich, and adaptable to changing circumstances. International efforts against illegal drugs must not waiver.
Cocaine
Cocaine and its lethal derivative "crack" pose the greatest drug threat to the United States today. Despite reports that occasional cocaine use has declined in some segments of American society, the ready availability of cocaine and crack requires the US government to continue international efforts to sever the cocaine grower-to- user chain. The leveling off in coca cultivation is an important step in the right direction. Much of the credit must go to active in-country law enforcement and crop control programs. The United States believes that another major contributing factor was the commitment of the Andean governments at the Cartagena summit in February 1990 to mount a regional attack on drug trafficking. In 1990, these governments presented the South American cocaine trade with its greatest challenge. With US counter- narcotics assistance, Colombia and Bolivia moved energetically against traffickers, refiners, and growers, and Colombia's war on the Medellin Cartel substantially raised the cartel's expenses and kept cartel chief Pablo Escobar Gaviria on the run. Colombian forces destroyed a major trafficking hub where more than 20 metric tons (mt) of cocaine products were found. By year's end, Colombian authorities had seized and destroyed nearly 53 mt of refined coca products--one-third more than in 1989. Colombia's offensive against trafficking organizations paid dividends elsewhere by helping to depress the market for coca leaf from the other Andean producers. Parallel measures by the Bolivian government further reduced the price of coca leaf, thereby encouraging record numbers of Bolivian growers to participate in the government's voluntary eradication program. As a result, the Bolivian government eliminated 8,000 hectares of coca, producing a net decrease in the Bolivian coca crop for the first time. Bolivian authorities also destroyed the "Meco" Dominguez organization, one of the country's most powerful trafficking syndicates. Regrettably, in Peru, insurgent violence, corruption, and a change of government did not permit the same level of success. However, the output of the world's largest coca crop did remain static for the first time. In addition, Peruvian authorities helped curb future growth by destroying the equivalent of 14,000 hectares of coca seedbeds. In Mexico, the Salinas government intensified its campaign against corruption and trafficking. Authorities jailed four of the six most-wanted traffickers in 1990 and dismissed scores of officials for drug-related corruption. Mexico also tightened its interdiction procedures. Working with the United States, the government of Mexico established a Northern Border Response Force (NBRF) which seized more than half (29 mt) of all the cocaine captured in Mexico in 1990. In addition, Mexican authorities eradicated record numbers of opium poppy and cannabis fields, contributing to the first net decreases in both crops. Central American countries faced a greater flow of cocaine during the year, as trafficking organizations expanded and diversified their smuggling routes through the region. While the United States provided some assistance, several countries took independent initiatives. The government of Belize enacted a comprehensive anti-drug law which permits asset seizure. The governments of Costa Rica and Honduras joined the Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN), while Guatemala, with US assistance, continued its intensive aerial poppy field spraying program. In the Caribbean, countries which lie along transit routes took steps to counter increased trafficking activity. The CBRN station in the Dominican Republic became operational in July, as the government enhanced the capability of the joint information coordination center (JICC) and increased its naval interdiction patrols. Jamaica unilaterally strengthened security at its ports and airports. The Bahamas and most of the other Caribbean countries seized important quantities of cocaine, along with other tangible assets such as vehicles, planes, boats, and cash. An exception is Suriname, which appears to be becoming a significant transit point for cocaine bound for the United States and Europe.
Opium and Heroin
Although attention has been focused on highly addictive crack cocaine, heroin remains a serious threat to American society. Unlike crack which rapidly destroys its addicts, heroin is an extremely addictive drug which can be used over long periods of time. Heroin could become the focus of international trafficking organizations targeting the United States as cocaine use declines among the American population since it also generates greater profits per kilo. International opium and heroin control efforts have produced mixed results at best. Although total opium production dropped 10% in 1990, the opium in Burma alone could supply much of the world's heroin demand. In Southwest Asia, where local demand for heroin is on the rise, there have been inconsistencies in government anti- narcotics efforts. Pakistan tightened enforcement of the poppy cultivation ban in areas under its control but was less effective in destroying trafficking organizations and heroin laboratories. For example, the Pakistan Frontier Corps broke a world record in October by seizing more than 2 mt of heroin in Baluchistan, but--the United States believes--did not conduct any follow-up investigation of suspected traffickers. The large quantities of opium entering the region from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Burma has strained enforcement capabilities in India, which also faces the dual problem of controlling illegal opium production and diversion from its legal crop. In the "Golden Triangle" area of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, the 10% decline in Burmese opium production was, unfortunately, the result of weather conditions rather than active government intervention. Although Thailand established senior anti-narcotics positions, the Thais arrested only one major trafficker--in contrast to seven the previous year. A lower court cleared a major international trafficker charged with trafficking heroin to the United States. Cooperation between the United States and Laos has improved, but more active law enforcement steps are needed. Both Laos and Burma have linked opium poppy eradication programs to the institution of rural development and crop substitution programs--a slow process at best. The US government believes that in Laos and Burma some government officials actively encourage and facilitate opium trafficking. It is clear that until the government of Burma, in particular, takes more aggressive measures against drug trafficking, the supply of available heroin will grow.
Next Steps
After more than a decade of activity, the international narcotics control effort now is beginning to make important headway against great odds. Halting the spread of the coca crop, improving regional cooperation, and dramatically increasing the quantities of drugs seized are laudable accomplishments but are only the first encouraging signs in a continuing struggle. The principal force driving these advances is the realization of governments in drug- affected countries that their own national security interests have put them on an inevitable collision course with the drug trade. The 1980s amply demonstrated that, left unchecked, the drug trade will grow exponentially. Drug addiction has become a new scourge of the developing world, adding another dimension of misery to countries with grave economic and social problems. While the use of certain drugs may be on the wane in the United States, addict populations are multiplying in less developed countries such as the Andean nations, Pakistan, India, and Iran. Since no responsible government can ignore the potential consequences of weakened societies and correspondingly strengthened criminal organizations, more countries are likely to enter the struggle against drugs every year. Despite the improved performance of individual governments, there is no room for complacency. Reverses in the cocaine trade are likely to be ephemeral without a persistent offensive by all countries. Trafficking organizations are well entrenched and capable of absorbing considerable losses, and their power to intimidate and undermine governments remains formidable. Their resources range from the ability to mount campaigns of violence to the potential for purchasing influence and protection at nearly every level of government. Until the traffickers and their cartels are stripped of this power, drug traffickers will remain strong. While the United States will contribute counter-narcotics assistance, each affected government must intensify its attacks on all facets of the drug trade by: -- Pursuing criminal cartels and trafficking organizations relentlessly; -- Putting pressure on growers to abandon coca production, as well as providing them with incentives and alternatives; -- Determining the level of effort against growers, traffickers, and insurgents linked to the drug trade based on national interest--not foreign assistance; -- Identifying, prosecuting, and punishing corruption when it taints cabinet-level officials and senior military and law enforcement officers; and -- Undertaking and implementing essential judicial reform to ensure that any gains in law enforcement are not undone by a weak judiciary. While global drug traffickers may be formidable, they are by no means invincible. The drug trade can only survive by corrupting and isolating the countries on which it depends for survival. Over time, it cannot withstand a concerted and protracted offensive. If the international community continues the commitment and cooperation shown in 1990, it should be possible to weaken the international drug trade to a point where it would no longer pose a serious threat to the world community.
US International Narcotics Control Funding, FY 1992 ($ thousands)
Country FY 1990 FY 1991 FY 1992 Program Enacted Estimate Request
Latin America
The Bahamas 1,520(A) 1,200 1,200 Bolivia 15,700(B) 15,700 15,700 Brazil 1,900 2,500 3,500 Colombia 20,000(B) 20,000 20,000 Ecuador 1,400 1,500 3,000 Jamaica 1,000 1,400 1,500 Mexico 15,000 18,300 26,000 Peru 10,000 19,000 0(C) Venezuela 1,000 1,000 2,000 Latin America Regional 4,480 6,000 27,000(C) Subtotal 72,000 86,600 99,900
East Asia
Laos 575 500(D) 2,000 Thailand 3,500 4,000 5,000 Subtotal 4,075 4,500 7,000
Southwest Asia
Pakistan 5,000 7,500 7,500 Turkey 400 350 400 Asia/Africa/Europe Regional 325 800 2,000 Subtotal 5,725 8,650 9,900 InterregionalAviation Support 32,700 33,450 37,800 Total Country Programs 114,500 133,200 154,600
Other Programs
International Organizations 3,100 4,800 4,600 Training/Demand Reduction/Public Awareness 6,200 7,000 7,000 Program Support and Development 5,740 5,000 5,300 [TEXT]
GRAND TOTAL
$129,540 $150,000(E) $171,500 Notes: A Reflected in the Latin American regional budget for FY 1990. B Includes $16.5 million 610 transfer from Security Assistance to INM to support the Andean Strategy (Bolivia $6.5 million, Colombia $10 million. C Funds for assistance to Peru are not included as a separate country program in the FY 1992 budget request. Instead, $19 million designated for Peru has been included in the Latin American regional account and may be programmed for Peru on condition of a satisfactory counter-narcotics program. D Reprogramming to increase FY 1991 funding for programs in Laos is under consideration. E Does not reflect reduction of $2.85 million pursuant to PL 101- 508(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 23, June 10, 1991 Title:

Current Treaty Actions

Date: Jun 10, 19916/10/91 Region: Subsaharan Africa, North America, Central America, Europe, South America Country: Ghana, Mexico, Nicaragua, United Kingdom, Uruguay Subject: International Law, Science/Technology, Human Rights, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT]
Multilateral
Aviation
Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation, supplementary to the convention of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS 7570). Done at Montreal Feb. 24, 1988. Entered into force Aug. 6, 1989.1 Ratification deposited: Spain, May 9, 1991.
Labor
Convention No. 105 concerning the abolition of forced labor. Adopted at Geneva June 25, 1957. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1959.1 Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 14, 1991.2
Red Cross
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.1 Senate Treaty Doc. 100-2. Ratifications deposited: Germany, Fed. Rep., Feb. 14, 1991.3; Chile, Apr. 24, 1991.3 Accessions deposited: Djibouti, Apr. 8, 1991; Uganda, Mar. 13, 1991.
Bilateral
Ghana
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Accra July 28, 1989 and Apr. 17, 1991. Entered into force Apr. 17, 1991.
Mexico
Treaty on cooperation for mutual legal assistance. Signed at Mexico Dec. 9, 1987. Senate Treaty Doc. 100-13. Ratifications exchanged: May 3, 1991. Entered into force: May 3, 1991.
Nicaragua
Grant agreement for economic stabilization and recovery program III. Signed at Managua May 8, 1991. Entered into force May 8, 1991.
Singapore
Memorandum of understanding concerning configuration of tactical command, control and communications standards, with annexes. Signed at Camp Smith, Hawaii Feb. 22, 1991. Entered into force Feb. 22, 1991.
United Kingdom
Amendment 3 to the memorandum of understanding of Oct. 5 and 11, 1984, as amended, concerning the provision of mutual logistic support, supplies and services. Signed at London and Stuttgart- Vaihingen Mar. 12 and Apr. 2, 1991. Entered into force Apr. 2, 1991.
Uruguay
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. Signed at Montevideo May 6, 1991. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. 1 Not in force for the US 2 With understandings. 3 With declaration(s) to Protocol I.(###)