US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991
Title: Middle East Arms Control Initiative
Description: Office of the Press Secretary, the White House,
Washington, DC
Date: May 29, 19915/29/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, United Kingdom,
Canada
Subject: Arms Control, Mideast Peace Process,
Nuclear Nonproliferation, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
Fulfilling the pledge he made in his March 6 address to Congress,
the President has announced proposals intended to curb the spread
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the Middle East, and
the missiles that can deliver them. The proposals also seek to
restrain destabilizing conventional arms build-ups in the region.
The proposals would apply to the entire Middle East, including
Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and the other countries of the Maghreb and the Gulf Cooperation
Council. They reflect US consultations with allies, governments in
the region, and key suppliers of arms and technology.
The support of arms exporters and importers will be essential
to the initiative's success. Since proliferation is a global problem,
it requires a global solution. At the same time, the situation in the
Middle East poses unique dangers and opportunities. Thus, the
President's proposal will concentrate on the Middle East as its
starting point, and complement other initiatives such as those
taken by Prime Ministers John Major [of the United Kingdom] and
Brian Mulroney [of Canada].
Supplier Restraint
The initiative calls on the five major suppliers of conventional
arms to meet at senior levels in the near future to discuss the
establishment of guidelines for restraints on destabilizing
transfers of conventional arms, as well as weapons of mass
destruction and associated technology. France has agreed to host
the initial meeting. (The United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union,
China, and the United States have supplied the vast majority of the
conventional arms exported to the Middle East in the last decade.)
At the same time, these guidelines will permit countries in the
region to acquire the conventional capabilities they legitimately
need to deter and defend against military aggression.
These discussions will be expanded to include other
suppliers in order to obtain the broadest possible cooperation. The
London summit of the G-7, to be hosted by the British in July, will
provide an early opportunity to begin to engage other governments.
To implement this regime, the suppliers would commit:
-- To observe a general code of responsible arms transfers;
-- To avoid destabilizing transfers; and
-- To establish effective domestic export controls on the
end-use of arms or other items to be transferred.
The guidelines will include a mechanism for consultations
among suppliers, who would:
-- Notify one another in advance of certain arms sales;
-- Meet regularly to consult on arms transfers;
-- Consult on an ad hoc basis if a supplier believed guidelines
were not being observed; and
-- Provide one another with an annual report on transfers.
Missiles
The initiative proposes a freeze on the acquisition, production, and
testing of surface-to-surface missiles by states in the region with
a view to the ultimate elimination of such missiles from their
arsenals.
Suppliers would also step up efforts to coordinate export
licensing for equipment, technology, and services that could be used
to manufacture surface-to-surface missiles. Export licenses would
be provided only for peaceful uses.
Nuclear Weapons
The initiative builds on existing institutions and focuses on
activities directly related to nuclear weapons capability. The
initiative would:
-- Call on countries in the region to implement a verifiable
ban on the production and acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear
material (enriched uranium or separated plutonium);
-- Reiterate the US call on all countries in the region that
have not already done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
-- Reiterate the US call to place all nuclear facilities in the
region under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; and
-- Continue to support the eventual creation of a regional
nuclear weapon-free zone.
Chemical Weapons
The proposal will build on the President's recent initiative to
achieve early completion of the global chemical weapons
convention.
-- The initiative calls for all states in the region to commit
to becoming original parties to the convention; and
-- Given the history of possession and use of chemical
weapons in the region, the initiative also calls for regional states
to institute confidence-building measures by engaging in pre-
signature implementation of appropriate chemical weapons
convention provisions.
Biological Weapons
As with the approach to chemical weapon controls, the proposals
build on an existing global approach. The initiative would:
-- Call for strengthening the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) through full implementation of existing BWC
provisions and an improved mechanism for information exchange.
These measures will be pursued at the 5-year review conference of
the BWC this September.
-- Urge countries to adopt biological weapons confidence-
building measures.
This initiative complements continuing US support for the
continuation of the UN Security Council embargo against arms
transfers to Iraq, as well as the efforts of the UN Special
Commission to eliminate Iraq's remaining capabilities to use or
produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles
to deliver them. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991
Title: Proposed Middle East Arms Control Initiative
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpts from remarks at the US Air Force Academy
Date: May 29, 19915/29/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, United Kingdom,
Canada
Subject: Arms Control, Mideast Peace Process,
Nuclear Nonproliferation, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
...Nowhere are the dangers of weapons proliferation more urgent
than in the Middle East. After consulting with governments in the
region and elsewhere about how to slow and then reverse the
buildup of unnecessary and destabilizing weapons, I am today
proposing a Middle East arms control initiative.
It features supplier guidelines on conventional arms exports;
barriers to exports that contribute to weapons of mass destruction;
a freeze now, and later a ban on surface-to-surface missiles in the
region; and a ban on production of nuclear weapons material.
Halting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional
weapons in the Middle East, while supporting the legitimate needs
of every state to defend itself, will require the cooperation of many
states, in the region and around the world. It won't be easy-but the
path to peace never is....(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991
Title: Conventional Armed Forces-Agreement in Principle
Baker, Bessmertnykh
Source: Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh
Description: Excerpts from remarks to press in Lisbon, Portugal
Date: Jun 1, 19916/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Eurasia, Europe,
North America
Country: USSR (former), United States, Syria
Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales,
Mideast Peace Process
[TEXT]
Secretary Baker: Ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by
saying that we had, I think, a very, very useful and productive
session today. We've covered a number of items beginning with the
remaining issues in the conventional forces agreement. We talked
about START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks], we talked about the
possibility of a summit between President Bush and President
Gorbachev and, of course, we talked as well about our joint efforts
to promote a process of peace in the Middle East.
With respect to the remaining issues in the conventional
forces agreement, those issues that were remaining as we began
this morning, I think that we can say that we have an agreement in
principle that will resolve those issues-agreement at least as far
as the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned. But we-
this is, after all a multilateral negotiation, and we do not presume
to speak for all of the other countries that are involved, so the
understandings that were reached here today, the United States at
least, will want to submit to their partners for their approval.
There are some technicalities that will have to be put into writing
by the experts, and it is contemplated that that process would begin
very, very soon, perhaps in Moscow the early part of next week.
We agreed that assuming that we, indeed, resolved the
outstanding issues in the conventional forces agreement-and, as I
indicated, I think we believe we have-we intend to turn our
attention in a rather intensive way to the remaining issues in the
strategic arms treaty in the hopes that we can conclude those
issues so as to put the two leaders in a position to meet in Moscow
at the earliest possible opportunity. We had hoped, of course, that
this could be done within the first half of 1991. I can't stand here
today and tell you that we can, for sure, meet that schedule. But, I
think it is fair to say that it is the intention of both countries to
work very hard to that end.
We talked as well about our joint approach to the question of
a peace process for the Middle East. Each of us will be meeting this
afternoon with the Foreign Minister of Syria. As I indicated to you
on the way in this morning, I will be delivering to him a detailed
letter from President Bush to President Assad, and I wanted to have
the opportunity to meet with him face to face, so that I could go
over the letter in person rather than just simply having it
communicated by cable or mailed to Damascus.
Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: Well, I would say that the
Secretary has just described the results of our intensive
discussions this morning fully and correctly, and I can support
every word of what he has just said. This is the agenda for our
talks this morning, and I think we have made real progress on the
basic items and especially on the conventional forces in Europe, so
the agreement in principle which has been reached really opens the
way for turning our attention to some other basic problems of the
relationship and [inaudible] to the strategic arms limitation
negotiations in Geneva.
And, we are going to be more intensive about the efforts to be
made there, and I am sure that the delegations will be working
harder and probably will be supported by some other gentlemen
there, and we shall be working for the possibility of having a
summit at the earliest possible date. So, there is quite a program
before us.
As for the Middle East, we have had a very detailed discussion
of the efforts that the two co-sponsors have made in the previous
time between the last meeting that we had together and today, and
we have also discussed the possible steps that we may take in the
future. And, the first step that we are taking is the discussion that
we are going to have today with the Foreign Minister of Syria, and I
understand that the two sides are going to be in constant touch with
each other in the future days and weeks and also with the parties
that may come to the peace conference that we are working out
together with the Secretary of
State....(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991
Title: US Policy Towards Yugoslavia
Tutwiler
Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Washington, DC
Date: May 24, 19915/24/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization,
Human Rights
[TEXT]
The Secretary has invoked the discretionary waiver authority of the
Nickles-Bentley Amendment and has so informed the Congress. In
addition to the requisite certification, the Secretary has also
provided Members of Congress with the following statement on US
policy toward Yugoslavia, on violations of human rights in the
Serbian Republic, and on new US policy steps.
The provisions of the Nickles-Bentley Amendment, which
entered into effect on May 5, establish certain conditions for US
assistance to Yugoslavia as well as discretionary waiver authority
for the Administration in implementing the amendment. The
Administration has examined its response to the provisions of the
Nickles-Bentley Amendment against the background of the ongoing
and still intensifying crisis in Yugoslavia.
US policy toward Yugoslavia is based on support for the
interrelated objectives of democracy, dialogue, human rights,
market reform, and unity.
-- By democracy, we mean that all citizens of Yugoslavia
should enjoy democratic rights and civil liberties and be able to
represent themselves through free and fair elections.
-- By dialogue, we mean that disputes between republics,
ethnic groups, or individuals should be resolved only through
peaceful means. We would be strongly opposed to any use of force
or intimidation to settle political differences, change external or
internal borders, block democratic change, or impose a non-
democratic unity.
-- By human rights, we mean the standards of behavior laid
down in international commitments to which Yugoslavia is a party,
including the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) documents. We attach
particular importance to the provisions relating to the treatment of
members of minorities.
-- By market reforms, we mean that we support Yugoslavia's
transition to a full market economy, open to private ownership and
investment.
-- By unity, we mean the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia
within its present borders. We believe that the ethnic
heterogeneity of most Yugoslav republics means that any
dissolution of Yugoslavia is likely to exacerbate rather than resolve
ethnic tensions.
We believe that unity, to be preserved, must be put on a new,
democratic, mutually agreed basis. This can only be achieved
through dialogue and the furtherance of democratic processes.
The United States will not encourage or reward secession; it
will respect any framework, federal, confederal, or other, on which
the people of Yugoslavia peacefully and democratically decide. We
firmly believe that Yugoslavia's external or internal borders should
not be changed unless by peaceful consensual means.
Whether or not these five objectives are realized in
Yugoslavia depends primarily on the people of Yugoslavia and their
leaders at the republic and federal levels. The key factor in their
ability to do so is the consolidation of peaceful, democratic
dialogue as the mechanism for addressing their differences.
The consolidation of peaceful, democratic dialogue has,
therefore, been the main thrust of US bilateral and multilateral
diplomacy over the past year, along with support for a democratic,
unified Yugoslavia that fully respects human rights and that
addresses the difficult decisions involved in market reform.
Over this period, Yugoslavia as a whole has made significant
progress toward observance of CSCE principles, and the Yugoslav
people and their leaders have preserved a commitment to dialogue
under increasingly difficult circumstances.
However, progress toward a democratic, unified Yugoslavia
achieved through dialogue has been increasingly threatened by a rise
in ethnic tensions that threatens to reverse Yugoslavia's transition
to democracy and free markets.
The United States strongly supports timely completion of the
transfer of constitutional authority by the normal presidential
rotation to Stipe Mesic.
The Serbian leadership's efforts to block the constitutional
transfer of authority within the collective Yugoslav presidency are
inconsistent with democratic principles and threaten disintegration
and civil conflict.
Yugoslav Prime Minister Markovic and Stipe Mesic have sought
to resolve this impasse constitutionally. Their efforts are critical
to the continuity of Yugoslav federal authority and to further all-
Yugoslav democratic and market reform.
The United States supports these efforts and will continue to
press strongly, both bilaterally and in parallel with others in the
international community, for a constitutional transfer of authority
in the Yugoslav presidency.
We hold the leadership of the Serbian Republic responsible for
the crisis in the Yugoslav presidency, which can only be interpreted
as a deliberate effort to exacerbate the political situation and raise
the odds of disintegration and violence.
The conduct of the leadership of the Serbian Republic, both
with respect to elections and to human rights, has also been in
contrast to Yugoslavia's overall progress toward CSCE principles, in
the context of the Nickles-Bentley Amendment.
We believe there have been serious flaws in the electoral
process in the Serbian Republic.
Although the December 1990 election was a significant
improvement over any held in Serbia in over 50 years, the electoral
campaign was characterized by severe imbalances between access
to the media and access to official sources of funding for the ruling
and opposition parties. Republican authorities exhausted public
resources to ameliorate the economic situation during the campaign
and subsequently made an illegal incursion into the Yugoslav
monetary supply estimated at $1.8 billion to compensate for those
expenditures. Republican authorities have also sought to perpetuate
their control over the media in the aftermath of the election,
making only grudging concessions to massive protests in favor of a
free flow of information.
The holding of free and fair elections, like the free flow of
information, is a measure of a government's commitment to a
democratic political process; we do not believe that the present
Serbian leadership has fully demonstrated such a commitment.
We assess the violations of human rights by Serbian
authorities in Kosovo Province as extremely grave. There is a
deteriorating cycle of action and reaction in the context of a
fundamental political conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians.
Basing its claim to Kosovo primarily on historical grounds, Serbia
is seeking to reestablish its control over Kosovo through repressive
means which clearly violate CSCE principles. The majority ethnic
Albanian population in Kosovo bases its claim to autonomy within
the province on ethnic grounds and, in the face of Serbian
repression, has escalated its demands since mid-1990 to insist on
republican status separate from Serbia.
In the province of Kosovo, Serbian authorities continued and
intensified repressive measures that featured, in 1990, thousands
of political arrests, tens of thousands of politically motivated job
dismissals, and widespread police violence against ethnic
Albanians. This violence included the use of excessive force by the
police to disperse peaceful demonstrators, including random and at
times unprovoked shooting by the police, resulting in at least 30
deaths and hundreds of injured.
Human rights abuses by the Serbian authorities against the
majority Albanian population in Kosovo have continued thus far in
1991. Albanians are arrested, beaten, and otherwise harassed for
attempting to exercise basic human rights such as freedom of
speech and assembly. Principal provincial government organs
remain shut down and most government functions have been taken
over by Serbs appointed from Belgrade. Albanian media organs
remain closed; persons attempting to bring in Albanian language
publications printed outside Kosovo are sometimes harassed. Many
Albanian-language schools in Kosovo have been closed because of a
refusal by teachers and pupils to use a new curriculum imposed by
Serbia, and Serbian administrators almost completely dominate the
Pristina University Rectorate and some individual faculties, and
many ethnic Albanian professors have been fired or driven out.
The ability of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to pursue their
interests through the political process has been further curtailed by
the Serbian government's abolition of the presidency and executive
council of Kosovo Province and by its replacement of Kosovo
Province's representative on the federal presidency.
Meanwhile, official Serbian arguments that Serbian policies in
Kosovo are directed only against ethnic Albanian separatism from
Serbia (and potentially from Yugoslavia to join neighboring Albania)
have become to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy: Ethnic
Albanians and their leaders in Kosovo have grown increasingly
insistent on achieving a republic separate from Serbia and have
boycotted opportunities, like the Serbian elections in December
1990, to participate in the Serbian political process.
There is also some concern in 1991 about human rights abuses
in the Republic of Croatia. Serbian activists there have asserted
that significant numbers of Serbs (some 11% of the republic's
population) have been fired from official positions in republic
organs, especially the police, and from some public sector
enterprises solely on ethnic grounds.
Serbs also assert that they are sometimes subject to arrest,
physical attacks, or other harassment by Croatian authorities.
Serbian citizens of Croatia are also concerned at the prospect that
Croatia might secede from Yugoslavia, thus cutting them off from
their current country and Serbia against their will.
The situation in Croatia, however, is complicated by the
existence of Serbian nationalist leaders who are attempting,
including by use of armed force, to separate parts of Croatia from
republican authority and who have rejected repeated and
unconditional offers of dialogue by Croatian authorities. There are
also widespread reports that Croats living in Serbian-inhabited
parts of Croatia are subject to arrest, attacks, and harassment by
Serbs.
We support the principles that underlie the Nickles-Bentley
Amendment and aim to ensure that our assistance is closely tied to
democratic and market reform and respect for human rights. In
considering the implementation of this amendment, however, we
need to be careful not to hit the wrong target.
For this reason, the Administration has decided to take the
following steps:
1. The Secretary of State has invoked the certification
mechanism of the Nickles-Bentley Amendment;
2. The United States will resume assistance to Yugoslavia on
a selective basis; and
3. The United States will invoke step two of the CSCE human
dimensions mechanism with regard to human rights violations in
Serbia and urge other CSCE members to follow suit; in addition, due
to underwriting concerns relating to human rights and other
problems in the Serbian Republic, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation will suspend assistance to new US investments in the
Serbian Republic. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991
Title: Recent Developments in Ethiopia
Tutwiler
Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Washington, DC
Date: May 21, 19915/21/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Ethiopia
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
We have been officially informed by the government of Ethiopia that
President Mengistu Haile Mariam has resigned and departed the
country for exile. Vice President Tesfaye Gebre Kidan has, under
the constitution, replaced Mengistu. Ethiopia is thus embarked on
an important political transition.
We welcome these developments and hope that the door is now
open for the establishment of peace and democracy in this war-
ravaged country.
In light of these developments, we urge that all government
and opposition forces immediately cease military operations in
order to allow a political dialogue to begin.
The United States is moving ahead with its plans to hold a
meeting in London beginning May 27 including both the government
and insurgent groups to discuss a peaceful transition. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991
Title: Recent Developments in Ethiopia
Cohen
Source: Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Description: London, England
Date: May 28, 19915/28/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Ethiopia
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest,
Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
I would like to summarize for you our consultations in London with
representatives of the outgoing government, the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the Oromo Liberation Front
(OLF), and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The
subjects covered were:
-- The establishment of a transitional government;
-- The situation in Addis Ababa, and
-- The facilitation of international relief efforts.
At this point, the United States government makes the
following recommendations and observations.
Transitional Government.
A transitional
government should be established in Addis Ababa as soon as
possible. The transitional government should assume all legal and
political responsibility for the governance of Ethiopia.
The transitional government should be broadly representative
of all Ethiopian society, including diverse political groupings, and
should, wherever appropriate, utilize the existing civil
administrative structures in carrying out its responsibilities.
The primary responsibility of the transitional government
should be to prepare the country for free, democratic,
internationally monitored elections in 9-12 months to produce a
constituent assembly to prepare a new constitution for Ethiopia.
The new constitution should guarantee fundamental individual
rights and should respect the identity and interests of all the
different peoples of Ethiopia.
The transitional government should consider an appropriate
amnesty or indemnity for past acts not constituting violations of
the laws of war or international human rights. Any persons accused
of such offenses should be afforded due process of law in
accordance with international norms, and all procedures should be
open to observers from internationally recognized organizations.
Discussions should continue in London regarding the
composition of the transitional government.
Addis Ababa
. Elements of the EPRDF armed
forces have entered Addis Ababa and taken up garrison positions.
The city should be demilitarized as soon as possible. Hostilities
throughout Ethiopia should cease as soon as possible.
International Relief.
All parties should
continue to cooperate with on-going international relief efforts.
The US government calls on the international donor community to
make all possible efforts to help maintain essential services and
continue providing relief assistance.
The United States calls on the parties to conduct their
activities in the spirit of reconciliation and justice and to create
the conditions necessary for the establishment of democracy. The
United States stands ready to assist them to achieve this
goal.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991
Title: Recent Developments in Ethiopia
Tutwiler
Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Washington, DC
Date: May 29, 19915/29/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Ethiopia
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest,
Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
The United States welcomes the May 28 joint declaration in London
on the Ethiopian combatants who have agreed to organize an all-
parties conference to select a transitional government no later than
July 1, 1991. This decision reflects a commitment to a democratic
process. We hope that Ethiopian political organizations will take
advantage of this opportunity to help plan a pluralistic future for
their country.
We also welcome the decision of the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), who will establish an
interim administration in Addis Ababa, to work with the existing
administrative structures with the support of Ethiopia's dedicated
and competent professional civil servants. The willingness of the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) authorities in Eritrea to
maintain all existing economic linkages with Ethiopia will
contribute to the rapid stabilization of the region.
The United States wishes to reiterate that the development of
Ethiopia's great economic potential can be assured only if the
democratic process initiated by the combatants in London is
fulfilled by a free and fair election within a reasonable time frame.
In the interim, the United States will continue to provide
humanitarian relief for the Ethiopian people who continue to suffer
the effects of extended civil conflict. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991
Title: Economics and National Security
Kimmitt
Source: Robert M. Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs
Description: Address before the American Bar Association, Section on
International Law and Practice, Washington, DC
Date: Apr 25, 19914/25/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Europe, East Asia
Country: Japan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, Germany, South Korea
Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales,
International Organizations, NATO, United Nations,
Military Affairs
[TEXT]
Thanks for that very kind introduction. I speak to a number of
audiences during the course of the year, but it's always an honor for
me to address fellow members of the bar. Although I've been
engaged in the policy process for over 2 years, as mentioned, I
consider it a special privilege to have this chance to address the
section this morning. You have a long and respected tradition as a
forum for serious discussion of issues that affect us all-issues
rooted in the legal landscape which also look out onto the larger
landscape we inhabit as citizens.
The subject of this morning's timely program, economics and
national security, is worthy of our attention both as lawyers and as
students and practitioners of public policy. As you will hear later
this morning, the economic dimension to national security has
spurred phenomenal growth in both the public and private sides of
the profession. Those of you who chose a career in the law
principally to avoid a life filled with numbers and statistics have
no cause for joy at this prospect.
For those of us who work the policy side of the street, it is
impossible to speak of national security any longer without also
speaking about economics. It is now an accepted truth that there is
an essential economic dimension cutting across the more familiar
political and military aspects of our overall national security
strategy. Though once neglected by the strategists of the early
post-war era, economics has clearly become the growth sector of
the national security business, and there is no sign of the boom
subsiding.
There is no better illustration of the importance of the
economic dimension of our national security policy than the Persian
Gulf crisis. I will spend the latter part of my remarks this morning
discussing this aspect of the crisis. But first I would like to spend
a few minutes sketching out the framework of national security
strategy and then highlighting the economic dimension of that
strategy. As mentioned, I would be glad afterward to take a few
questions, but I hope at least to lay down some markers to
stimulate both panel comment and your exchange with the panel.
National Security Structure
As I think everyone in this room knows, our national security
system is based on the structure outlined by Congress in the
National Security Act of 1947. That act established the National
Security Council "to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to
the national security."
The hallmark of our national security system is policy
integration and coordination. The task of integrating domestic,
foreign, and military policies requires more than bureaucratic
coordination, though that is no small feat in itself. True
integration, however, requires coordination of the three basic
components of national security strategy-defense, diplomacy, and
economics-all resting on a firm intelligence base.
-- First, we need to maintain strong, deployable military
forces and stable military relationships with our allies around the
world. As our recent experience in the Gulf makes plain, a
formidable military capability remains a necessary means of last
resort to protect vital American interests. Moreover, the fact that
we possess substantial military resources augments our diplomatic
leverage.
-- The second element of our national security strategy is
diplomacy. Our bilateral relationships with other governments are
the basis for protecting our vital interests. It is only through
continuous and extensive consultation with foreign capitals that we
are able to coordinate policies with our allies and understand the
intentions of our adversaries. And, as the world becomes
increasingly interdependent, it is largely through those bilateral
relationships that we advance the cause of multilateral cooperation
and understanding. The renewed vigor of the United Nations, which
played a central role in reversing Iraq's unprovoked aggression
against Kuwait-and which I'm sure will be a topic of discussion
with [US Ambassador to the United Nations] Tom Pickering
tomorrow-is due in large part to the vigor of our bilateral
diplomatic efforts.
-- The third element of our strategy, and the subject I wish
to explore in detail later, is economics. We must focus as never
before on the economic dimensions of security as it relates both to
economic health at home and protection of American security
interests abroad.
Finally, it is important that we have a reliable and effective
intelligence base for military, diplomatic, and economic matters.
Without timely and relevant information, policymakers would be
unable either to formulate or execute these components of our
national security strategy.
Economics and National Security: An Overview
The Rise of Economic-Based Power. In the post-war period, when
the Cold War dominated international relations, national security
professionals thought largely in two dimensions: political and
military. Security structures took the form of politico-military
groupings: from NATO and the Warsaw Pact to the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO), the South East Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO), the Australia, New Zealand, United States security treaty
(ANZUS), and a host of others. Planners and strategists thought in
terms of alliances of like-minded political systems, often bound
together by the common bond of ideology. These alliances or
groupings were thought to be the exclusive building blocks of the
international political system.
Over the past two decades, there has been a sea change-and
over the last 2 years, a revolution. Military alliances that were
once a fixture of the political landscape, such as the Warsaw Pact,
have disappeared. Those that remain, such as NATO, continue to be
vital to national security but are part of a more elaborate mosaic-a
mosaic that includes powerful economic structures.
Some of these structures are international financial
institutions. Others are groupings of states, some with broad,
others with more focused, agendas. Still others are collections of
powerful private actors. The most prominent of these structures
include: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EC, G-7, G-
24, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Paris and
London Clubs. In many respects, these economic groupings rival, and
in some cases eclipse, politico-military structures. They are all
formidable centers of power, and, as such, they can both augment
and strain traditional politico-military relationships that have been
the foundation of our national security strategy.
The rise of these economic groups reflects the changing
concept of national power and the uses of that power in the
international system. Nations have begun more and more to marshal
their collective means-including economic means-in the service of
both low and high political ends. In this respect, the Persian Gulf
crisis is a watershed event. It is a harbinger of the high politics of
the emerging New World Order that President Bush has described-an
order, quite simply, that stands for collective action to promote and
protect common interests.
I will return to this theme later in my remarks. But before
turning to the Gulf itself, I want to pursue further the connection
between economic means and strategic or political ends. In
particular, I want to sketch out the economic dimension of our
ability to project American power and protect vital American
interests-which is, after all, the essence of our national security
policy.
Economic Elements of National Security Policy
.
First, there is the basic point that a robust and advanced industrial
economy is the bedrock upon which rests America's military and
political power. In practical terms, this means that a modern
industrial base is essential to the maintenance of American military
superiority. Our triumph in Operation Desert Storm was in large
measure a triumph for American industrial and technological prowess.
American economic power also enhances our political
influence abroad. For instance, we use the power of our market, as
well as economic assistance, to bolster key political relationships.
Strong economic relationships with other states help cement our
political relationships, and often lead to a convergence of strategic
interests.
More generally, we use American economic strength to
promote the development of other market economies. This, of
course, serves not only our economic interests, but our long-term
strategic interests as well. Healthy, diverse market economies
give individuals opportunity and promote economic growth.
Societies that prosper economically offer fertile ground for stable
democratic institutions, which, in turn, tend to foster governments
less interested in military adventurism and more interested in
public welfare. Though by no means a panacea for the world's
problems, a healthy global economy is a prerequisite for lasting
security and peace. And America's economic power is a vital
instrument in advancing that cause.
Just as there is an economic dimension to our military and
political strength, there is also one to that of our adversaries.
Since both allies and adversaries seek access to our markets and
technology, we need a comprehensive approach to our export control
systems-one that balances our very real security concerns with
industry's desire to compete effectively in the global marketplace.
And as technology spreads, our security depends on effective
coordination with our strategic partners in ensuring that our
enemies do not gain access to militarily destabilizing technologies.
In this regard, I would note that the United States has led the
effort to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction, relying
first on nuclear-related export controls and, more recently, on
controls of chemical and biological weapons and their delivery
systems.
We have been vigorous supporters of the 20-member Australia
Group, formed in 1984 to discourage the spread of chemical
weapons. Today the group maintains a warning list of 50 dual-use
chemical weapons precursors and a core list of 11 chemicals for
which all members now have some form of export controls. In
addition, since 1987, we have joined with 15 other industrial
nations to form the Missile Technology Control Regime, which
restricts the proliferation of missiles and related equipment and
technology.
Economics and the Persian Gulf Crisis
I would like to turn now to a more in-depth discussion of the
central international event of the last year, the Persian Gulf crisis
and the threat to vital American interests posed by Saddam
Hussein's aggression.
The Gulf crisis is a defining moment of the emerging New
World Order, which President Bush has described as:
"A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a
world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for
freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of
the weak."
Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was nothing less than an
all-out assault on this order. And the world's response was nothing
less than an acknowledgment of the "shared responsibility" of which
the President spoke. If it is to thrive, the New World Order must be
supported by collective action-collective military, political, and
economic action to protect and promote common interests.
I must note here that while the order may be new, this idea of
marshalling collective means to advance common ends, of course, is
not. Collective action and responsibility is the very soul of the UN
Charter and, indeed, of the ageless goal of creating an enlightened
world community. In signaling an end to the old ways of Cold War
confrontation, our united front in the Gulf has also given new life to
the principle of collective security set down in San Francisco over
45 years ago.
Nature of Saddam's Threat: The Economic Dimension
The Gulf crisis demonstrates that collective security-and American
national security-in the New World Order has an essential economic
dimension. This dimension was made apparent both by the nature of
Saddam's threat to our security and our strategy in combating that
threat. It is on this particular aspect of the crisis that I wish to
focus the remainder of my remarks.
Of course, the multilateral response to Saddam's aggression
cannot be explained in purely economic terms. We did not send our
young women and men into harm's way simply to defend the price of
gasoline. As I have suggested, what was at stake was our vision of
international relations in the post-Cold War era. But if vital issues
of principle were at stake so were vital economic interests.
Saddam Hussein is the latest in a long line of dictators who
have sought to use aggression to achieve regional domination. But
he was a particularly formidable foe in part because he was able to
use Iraq's substantial oil wealth for his own twisted personal
ambition. I would note that he tried to make an argument during the
course of the conflict that this was a case of haves versus have-
nots, and he tried to present himself as the champion of the have-
nots. In point of fact, Iraq is a very wealthy country, blessed with
natural resources, blessed with a very industrious populace, blessed
with water, blessed with arable land. The problem was that Saddam
did not use those resources for the betterment of his people. His
decision, whenever it was presented to him, was always to feed the
army first; equip the army first. In doing so, he built the fourth
largest army in the world, with more main battle tanks than Britain
and France combined. He acquired, and used, weapons of mass
destruction and was actively developing a viable nuclear capability.
Saddam's unbridled ambition threatened a region vital to the
United States and vital to the world. If his attempt at regional
domination had gone unchecked, Saddam would have had in his grasp
the power to wreak havoc with the world economy. Not just the
American economy, the world economy.
Iraq controls roughly 10% of the world's proven oil reserves,
and Kuwait about the same. As President Bush stated,
"An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and
military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce
its neighbors-neighbors that control the lion's share of the world's
remaining oil reserves. We [could not] permit a resource so vital to
be dominated by one so ruthless."
Saddam's effective control over such a vital resource as oil
would have fostered economic dislocation and associated political
instability in the Middle East and beyond. Staunch allies in the
region such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and, of course, Israel
would have faced a real and immediate threat to their stability.
The developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America would
have been threatened with arbitrary and capricious economic
devastation. The industrial democracies of the West and the
fledgling democracies of the East would have been at the economic
mercy of a man who had little inclination to show any mercy
himself.
If Saddam's aggression makes plain the economic dimension of
our national security, so did the multilateral response to that
aggression. The multinational coalition employed its economic
power as both sword and shield to defeat Saddam's aggression.
Allied Response: The Economic Dimension
Economic Sanctions
. A key element of the UN
response to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was the imposition of the
most comprehensive economic sanctions in the history of the
institution. UN Security Council Resolution 661, one of twelve pre-
hostilities resolutions, prohibited virtually all imports and exports
of products originating in Iraq and Kuwait (Kuwait then, of course,
under Iraqi control) and virtually all financial transactions
involving the government of Iraq-with narrow exceptions carved out
for humanitarian circumstances.
Subsequent resolutions endorsed naval interdiction of
shipping to enforce the UN mandate and banned virtually all
commercial air traffic going to and from Iraq.
Consistent with the UN mandate, the United States imposed
its own economic sanctions against Iraq, pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the President's
inherent authority to conduct foreign affairs. These sanctions froze
a substantial portion of Iraq's overseas liquid assets, as well as
gave teeth to the prohibitions mandated by the Security Council.
The economic sanctions, both domestic and multilateral,
carried strategic, as well as political, significance. On a strategic
level, economic sanctions contributed to the degradation of
Saddam's military capability and the economic wherewithal to
sustain it.
But the sanctions were also of great political importance
because they helped solidify the coalition that had formed at the
United Nations under US leadership. The imposition of sanctions
made our coalition partners collectively responsible for denying
Saddam Hussein the economic benefits of his aggression. That
shared responsibility ultimately formed the basis of the strong
Security Council majority that authorized the use of force that
ultimately ejected Saddam from Kuwait.
Though important to the strength and preservation of the
coalition, sanctions, regrettably, could not alone force Saddam's
massive invasion force to leave Kuwait. Up until January 15, the
date on which UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorized the
use of force, there were no signs that sanctions alone could do the
job. At best, sanctions could weaken the strength of Iraq's massive
army and the resolve of Iraq's leadership. But they could not bring
about actual withdrawal of tanks and troops. Moreover, the longer
we waited for sanctions to "work," the more time Saddam's troops
had to prepare for the coming allied attack. Planners decided that
this additional time for preparation would hurt our troops more
than sanctions would degrade his. In the end, policymakers had to
turn to the military option to force Iraq from Kuwait and to
implement the UN mandate.
Responsibility-Sharing
. There was also an
economic element to the coalition's military victory. Beyond
sanctions, key members of the coalition pooled their own economic
resources to support the military effort. The United States itself
received commitments of over $54 billion from six countries-
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Germany,
and South Korea-to support our military efforts, first in Desert
Shield and then in Desert Storm. When the final accounting is
completed, we expect allied contributions to result in the highest
percentage of responsibility-sharing we have ever achieved.
Responding to Dislocation.
In addition to
sharing military costs, countries provided economic assistance
through the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group (GCFCG) to
those states in the region most adversely affected by the crisis.
Chaired by the United States, the GCFCG included 26 participating
countries, plus the European Community and the Gulf Cooperation
Council. Donors have committed over $16 billion in exceptional
economic assistance, including nearly $12 billion to the so-called
front-line states of Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. This aid included
project loans and outright grants.
The exceptional economic assistance provided through the
GCFCG was essential to the effectiveness of the economic
sanctions. The economies of recipient countries were the most
disrupted by the sanctions regime, other than Iraq. The group helped
stabilize these economies and reduced the costs of sanctions
compliance-compliance that was essential if sanctions were to
have any bite at all. The GCFCG also ensured the cooperation of key
members of the political and military coalition opposing Saddam.
And, moreover, the mechanism applied by the group may well form a
model for long-term approaches to promoting economic development
and stability in the region.
The Aftermath.
Now that Iraq has been
forced from Kuwait, we must also ensure that Iraq will no longer
pose an offensive military threat to its neighbors. Our economic
lever-the continuing sanctions, in particular-will have an important
role to play in achieving that objective. UN Security Council
Resolution 687, passed on April 3, imposes a series of obligations
on Iraq, including those regarding the identification and destruction
of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The council will not
lift economic sanctions on Iraqi exports, including oil, if Iraq does
not comply with these obligations and if the council does not also
approve a plan for Iraq to pay compensation for damages arising
from its invasion. The council will review Iraq's compliance with
all relevant Security Council resolutions every 60 days to
determine whether economic restrictions should be reduced or
lifted. Thus, just as economic sanctions helped cement the
coalition during the crisis, these same sanctions continue to serve
the coalition's long-term strategic and political objectives.
We are also deeply engaged in addressing the larger issues
that have made the Middle East a flashpoint for conflict. Secretary
Baker, of course, is in the region right now pursuing Middle East
peace. But also high on our agenda is the need for regional economic
development. Such development may help bind the region together,
contribute to mutual trust, and provide firm ground for resolving
outstanding security concerns.
Conclusion
This has been something of a whirlwind tour of one aspect of the
Persian Gulf crisis, and its complexity merits more study than time
here permits. Indeed, historians will soon be examining the crisis
and its aftermath to divine its message for future generations. But
one message is already clear: American national security has an
unmistakable economic dimension-one that is every bit as
important as our diplomatic prowess and our military might.
Saddam's threat to his region and to us was fueled by his economic
power and motivated in part by his desire for more. In return, the
alliance pooled its economic strength and employed a wide range of
economic weapons as well as military and diplomatic measures. If
we are wise, we will pay greater attention to economics as a
solution-a solution for the twin problems of over-weaponization
and under-development that have cost us dearly in both blood and
treasure.
Economics is a dimension of our vulnerability, as well as our
power. Though no one can predict where our next challenge will
arise, the events of the last year make clear that tomorrow's
strategists can ignore economics only at their peril, and
ours.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991
Title: COCOM-A New System Of Export Controls
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Boston, Massachusetts
Date: May 24, 19915/24/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, North America, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: Japan, Australia, USSR (former), China
Subject: Arms Control, International Organizations, NATO
[TEXT]
Last evening, the United States and 16 Western allies agreed in
Paris to implement a new system of export controls for dual-use
goods and technologies with significant military applications. The
agreement brings to a close a major review of allied East-West
export control policy initiated in January 1990 in response to the
President's call upon the member states of the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to adapt their
export control regimes to the rapidly changing international
political and military environment.
For over 40 years, COCOM, comprised of NATO members (less
Iceland) plus Japan and Australia, has maintained a system of
export controls to keep key technologies with both military and
civilian uses from being used to enhance the military capability of
certain countries. Historically, these have included the Soviet
Union, former members of the Warsaw Pact, the People's Republic of
China, and several other countries. The changes to be implemented
by COCOM partners demonstrate the continued relevance of COCOM
and its ability to adapt quickly to changing world circumstances.
The agreement means a 50% reduction in existing export
controls to a "core list" of militarily strategic technologies and
goods. That reduction is in addition to a 33% cut in the list agreed
to by COCOM in June 1990. The United States and its partners
concluded that an overhaul of the lists was justified based on a
changing strategic situation and rapid diffusion of some
technologies that were making the existing control lists obsolete.
The "core list" contains only the most critical goods and
technologies which are essential in maintaining the existing
significant gaps between Western and Soviet-based military
systems, gaps that were demonstrated to be critical to our national
security in Operation Desert Storm. On the other hand, because of
the broad diffusion of certain technologies, export controls have
been eliminated, for example, on most of the computers exported
from the United States today. COCOM member states also agreed to
significant reductions in controls on microprocessors, machine
tools, aircraft, avionics, and propulsion systems. In addition, the
United States will continue a presumption of approval for the
export of core list items to bona fide civil end-users for civilian
purposes.
The new agreement continues the trend toward reducing
controls on items destined for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary,
reflecting the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the fact that
these three countries have entered into strategic trade agreements
with Western nations to prevent diversion of Western-supplied
technology to the Soviet Union.
COCOM partners agreed that individual countries will continue
controlling goods and technologies dropped from the COCOM list that
could contribute to the development of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them.
Full implementation of the new lists is planned for September
1, 1991(###)