US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991

Title:

Middle East Arms Control Initiative

Description: Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Washington, DC Date: May 29, 19915/29/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, United Kingdom, Canada Subject: Arms Control, Mideast Peace Process, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] Fulfilling the pledge he made in his March 6 address to Congress, the President has announced proposals intended to curb the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the Middle East, and the missiles that can deliver them. The proposals also seek to restrain destabilizing conventional arms build-ups in the region. The proposals would apply to the entire Middle East, including Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the other countries of the Maghreb and the Gulf Cooperation Council. They reflect US consultations with allies, governments in the region, and key suppliers of arms and technology. The support of arms exporters and importers will be essential to the initiative's success. Since proliferation is a global problem, it requires a global solution. At the same time, the situation in the Middle East poses unique dangers and opportunities. Thus, the President's proposal will concentrate on the Middle East as its starting point, and complement other initiatives such as those taken by Prime Ministers John Major [of the United Kingdom] and Brian Mulroney [of Canada].
Supplier Restraint
The initiative calls on the five major suppliers of conventional arms to meet at senior levels in the near future to discuss the establishment of guidelines for restraints on destabilizing transfers of conventional arms, as well as weapons of mass destruction and associated technology. France has agreed to host the initial meeting. (The United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States have supplied the vast majority of the conventional arms exported to the Middle East in the last decade.) At the same time, these guidelines will permit countries in the region to acquire the conventional capabilities they legitimately need to deter and defend against military aggression. These discussions will be expanded to include other suppliers in order to obtain the broadest possible cooperation. The London summit of the G-7, to be hosted by the British in July, will provide an early opportunity to begin to engage other governments. To implement this regime, the suppliers would commit: -- To observe a general code of responsible arms transfers; -- To avoid destabilizing transfers; and -- To establish effective domestic export controls on the end-use of arms or other items to be transferred. The guidelines will include a mechanism for consultations among suppliers, who would: -- Notify one another in advance of certain arms sales; -- Meet regularly to consult on arms transfers; -- Consult on an ad hoc basis if a supplier believed guidelines were not being observed; and -- Provide one another with an annual report on transfers.
Missiles
The initiative proposes a freeze on the acquisition, production, and testing of surface-to-surface missiles by states in the region with a view to the ultimate elimination of such missiles from their arsenals. Suppliers would also step up efforts to coordinate export licensing for equipment, technology, and services that could be used to manufacture surface-to-surface missiles. Export licenses would be provided only for peaceful uses.
Nuclear Weapons
The initiative builds on existing institutions and focuses on activities directly related to nuclear weapons capability. The initiative would: -- Call on countries in the region to implement a verifiable ban on the production and acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear material (enriched uranium or separated plutonium); -- Reiterate the US call on all countries in the region that have not already done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; -- Reiterate the US call to place all nuclear facilities in the region under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; and -- Continue to support the eventual creation of a regional nuclear weapon-free zone.
Chemical Weapons
The proposal will build on the President's recent initiative to achieve early completion of the global chemical weapons convention. -- The initiative calls for all states in the region to commit to becoming original parties to the convention; and -- Given the history of possession and use of chemical weapons in the region, the initiative also calls for regional states to institute confidence-building measures by engaging in pre- signature implementation of appropriate chemical weapons convention provisions.
Biological Weapons
As with the approach to chemical weapon controls, the proposals build on an existing global approach. The initiative would: -- Call for strengthening the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) through full implementation of existing BWC provisions and an improved mechanism for information exchange. These measures will be pursued at the 5-year review conference of the BWC this September. -- Urge countries to adopt biological weapons confidence- building measures. This initiative complements continuing US support for the continuation of the UN Security Council embargo against arms transfers to Iraq, as well as the efforts of the UN Special Commission to eliminate Iraq's remaining capabilities to use or produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991 Title:

Proposed Middle East Arms Control Initiative

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from remarks at the US Air Force Academy Date: May 29, 19915/29/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, United Kingdom, Canada Subject: Arms Control, Mideast Peace Process, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] ...Nowhere are the dangers of weapons proliferation more urgent than in the Middle East. After consulting with governments in the region and elsewhere about how to slow and then reverse the buildup of unnecessary and destabilizing weapons, I am today proposing a Middle East arms control initiative. It features supplier guidelines on conventional arms exports; barriers to exports that contribute to weapons of mass destruction; a freeze now, and later a ban on surface-to-surface missiles in the region; and a ban on production of nuclear weapons material. Halting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons in the Middle East, while supporting the legitimate needs of every state to defend itself, will require the cooperation of many states, in the region and around the world. It won't be easy-but the path to peace never is....(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991 Title:

Conventional Armed Forces-Agreement in Principle

Baker, Bessmertnykh Source: Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh Description: Excerpts from remarks to press in Lisbon, Portugal Date: Jun 1, 19916/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Eurasia, Europe, North America Country: USSR (former), United States, Syria Subject: Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales, Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] Secretary Baker: Ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by saying that we had, I think, a very, very useful and productive session today. We've covered a number of items beginning with the remaining issues in the conventional forces agreement. We talked about START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks], we talked about the possibility of a summit between President Bush and President Gorbachev and, of course, we talked as well about our joint efforts to promote a process of peace in the Middle East. With respect to the remaining issues in the conventional forces agreement, those issues that were remaining as we began this morning, I think that we can say that we have an agreement in principle that will resolve those issues-agreement at least as far as the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned. But we- this is, after all a multilateral negotiation, and we do not presume to speak for all of the other countries that are involved, so the understandings that were reached here today, the United States at least, will want to submit to their partners for their approval. There are some technicalities that will have to be put into writing by the experts, and it is contemplated that that process would begin very, very soon, perhaps in Moscow the early part of next week. We agreed that assuming that we, indeed, resolved the outstanding issues in the conventional forces agreement-and, as I indicated, I think we believe we have-we intend to turn our attention in a rather intensive way to the remaining issues in the strategic arms treaty in the hopes that we can conclude those issues so as to put the two leaders in a position to meet in Moscow at the earliest possible opportunity. We had hoped, of course, that this could be done within the first half of 1991. I can't stand here today and tell you that we can, for sure, meet that schedule. But, I think it is fair to say that it is the intention of both countries to work very hard to that end. We talked as well about our joint approach to the question of a peace process for the Middle East. Each of us will be meeting this afternoon with the Foreign Minister of Syria. As I indicated to you on the way in this morning, I will be delivering to him a detailed letter from President Bush to President Assad, and I wanted to have the opportunity to meet with him face to face, so that I could go over the letter in person rather than just simply having it communicated by cable or mailed to Damascus. Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: Well, I would say that the Secretary has just described the results of our intensive discussions this morning fully and correctly, and I can support every word of what he has just said. This is the agenda for our talks this morning, and I think we have made real progress on the basic items and especially on the conventional forces in Europe, so the agreement in principle which has been reached really opens the way for turning our attention to some other basic problems of the relationship and [inaudible] to the strategic arms limitation negotiations in Geneva. And, we are going to be more intensive about the efforts to be made there, and I am sure that the delegations will be working harder and probably will be supported by some other gentlemen there, and we shall be working for the possibility of having a summit at the earliest possible date. So, there is quite a program before us. As for the Middle East, we have had a very detailed discussion of the efforts that the two co-sponsors have made in the previous time between the last meeting that we had together and today, and we have also discussed the possible steps that we may take in the future. And, the first step that we are taking is the discussion that we are going to have today with the Foreign Minister of Syria, and I understand that the two sides are going to be in constant touch with each other in the future days and weeks and also with the parties that may come to the peace conference that we are working out together with the Secretary of State....(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991 Title:

US Policy Towards Yugoslavia

Tutwiler Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: May 24, 19915/24/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Democratization, Human Rights [TEXT] The Secretary has invoked the discretionary waiver authority of the Nickles-Bentley Amendment and has so informed the Congress. In addition to the requisite certification, the Secretary has also provided Members of Congress with the following statement on US policy toward Yugoslavia, on violations of human rights in the Serbian Republic, and on new US policy steps. The provisions of the Nickles-Bentley Amendment, which entered into effect on May 5, establish certain conditions for US assistance to Yugoslavia as well as discretionary waiver authority for the Administration in implementing the amendment. The Administration has examined its response to the provisions of the Nickles-Bentley Amendment against the background of the ongoing and still intensifying crisis in Yugoslavia. US policy toward Yugoslavia is based on support for the interrelated objectives of democracy, dialogue, human rights, market reform, and unity. -- By democracy, we mean that all citizens of Yugoslavia should enjoy democratic rights and civil liberties and be able to represent themselves through free and fair elections. -- By dialogue, we mean that disputes between republics, ethnic groups, or individuals should be resolved only through peaceful means. We would be strongly opposed to any use of force or intimidation to settle political differences, change external or internal borders, block democratic change, or impose a non- democratic unity. -- By human rights, we mean the standards of behavior laid down in international commitments to which Yugoslavia is a party, including the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) documents. We attach particular importance to the provisions relating to the treatment of members of minorities. -- By market reforms, we mean that we support Yugoslavia's transition to a full market economy, open to private ownership and investment. -- By unity, we mean the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia within its present borders. We believe that the ethnic heterogeneity of most Yugoslav republics means that any dissolution of Yugoslavia is likely to exacerbate rather than resolve ethnic tensions. We believe that unity, to be preserved, must be put on a new, democratic, mutually agreed basis. This can only be achieved through dialogue and the furtherance of democratic processes. The United States will not encourage or reward secession; it will respect any framework, federal, confederal, or other, on which the people of Yugoslavia peacefully and democratically decide. We firmly believe that Yugoslavia's external or internal borders should not be changed unless by peaceful consensual means. Whether or not these five objectives are realized in Yugoslavia depends primarily on the people of Yugoslavia and their leaders at the republic and federal levels. The key factor in their ability to do so is the consolidation of peaceful, democratic dialogue as the mechanism for addressing their differences. The consolidation of peaceful, democratic dialogue has, therefore, been the main thrust of US bilateral and multilateral diplomacy over the past year, along with support for a democratic, unified Yugoslavia that fully respects human rights and that addresses the difficult decisions involved in market reform. Over this period, Yugoslavia as a whole has made significant progress toward observance of CSCE principles, and the Yugoslav people and their leaders have preserved a commitment to dialogue under increasingly difficult circumstances. However, progress toward a democratic, unified Yugoslavia achieved through dialogue has been increasingly threatened by a rise in ethnic tensions that threatens to reverse Yugoslavia's transition to democracy and free markets. The United States strongly supports timely completion of the transfer of constitutional authority by the normal presidential rotation to Stipe Mesic. The Serbian leadership's efforts to block the constitutional transfer of authority within the collective Yugoslav presidency are inconsistent with democratic principles and threaten disintegration and civil conflict. Yugoslav Prime Minister Markovic and Stipe Mesic have sought to resolve this impasse constitutionally. Their efforts are critical to the continuity of Yugoslav federal authority and to further all- Yugoslav democratic and market reform. The United States supports these efforts and will continue to press strongly, both bilaterally and in parallel with others in the international community, for a constitutional transfer of authority in the Yugoslav presidency. We hold the leadership of the Serbian Republic responsible for the crisis in the Yugoslav presidency, which can only be interpreted as a deliberate effort to exacerbate the political situation and raise the odds of disintegration and violence. The conduct of the leadership of the Serbian Republic, both with respect to elections and to human rights, has also been in contrast to Yugoslavia's overall progress toward CSCE principles, in the context of the Nickles-Bentley Amendment. We believe there have been serious flaws in the electoral process in the Serbian Republic. Although the December 1990 election was a significant improvement over any held in Serbia in over 50 years, the electoral campaign was characterized by severe imbalances between access to the media and access to official sources of funding for the ruling and opposition parties. Republican authorities exhausted public resources to ameliorate the economic situation during the campaign and subsequently made an illegal incursion into the Yugoslav monetary supply estimated at $1.8 billion to compensate for those expenditures. Republican authorities have also sought to perpetuate their control over the media in the aftermath of the election, making only grudging concessions to massive protests in favor of a free flow of information. The holding of free and fair elections, like the free flow of information, is a measure of a government's commitment to a democratic political process; we do not believe that the present Serbian leadership has fully demonstrated such a commitment. We assess the violations of human rights by Serbian authorities in Kosovo Province as extremely grave. There is a deteriorating cycle of action and reaction in the context of a fundamental political conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians. Basing its claim to Kosovo primarily on historical grounds, Serbia is seeking to reestablish its control over Kosovo through repressive means which clearly violate CSCE principles. The majority ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo bases its claim to autonomy within the province on ethnic grounds and, in the face of Serbian repression, has escalated its demands since mid-1990 to insist on republican status separate from Serbia. In the province of Kosovo, Serbian authorities continued and intensified repressive measures that featured, in 1990, thousands of political arrests, tens of thousands of politically motivated job dismissals, and widespread police violence against ethnic Albanians. This violence included the use of excessive force by the police to disperse peaceful demonstrators, including random and at times unprovoked shooting by the police, resulting in at least 30 deaths and hundreds of injured. Human rights abuses by the Serbian authorities against the majority Albanian population in Kosovo have continued thus far in 1991. Albanians are arrested, beaten, and otherwise harassed for attempting to exercise basic human rights such as freedom of speech and assembly. Principal provincial government organs remain shut down and most government functions have been taken over by Serbs appointed from Belgrade. Albanian media organs remain closed; persons attempting to bring in Albanian language publications printed outside Kosovo are sometimes harassed. Many Albanian-language schools in Kosovo have been closed because of a refusal by teachers and pupils to use a new curriculum imposed by Serbia, and Serbian administrators almost completely dominate the Pristina University Rectorate and some individual faculties, and many ethnic Albanian professors have been fired or driven out. The ability of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to pursue their interests through the political process has been further curtailed by the Serbian government's abolition of the presidency and executive council of Kosovo Province and by its replacement of Kosovo Province's representative on the federal presidency. Meanwhile, official Serbian arguments that Serbian policies in Kosovo are directed only against ethnic Albanian separatism from Serbia (and potentially from Yugoslavia to join neighboring Albania) have become to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy: Ethnic Albanians and their leaders in Kosovo have grown increasingly insistent on achieving a republic separate from Serbia and have boycotted opportunities, like the Serbian elections in December 1990, to participate in the Serbian political process. There is also some concern in 1991 about human rights abuses in the Republic of Croatia. Serbian activists there have asserted that significant numbers of Serbs (some 11% of the republic's population) have been fired from official positions in republic organs, especially the police, and from some public sector enterprises solely on ethnic grounds. Serbs also assert that they are sometimes subject to arrest, physical attacks, or other harassment by Croatian authorities. Serbian citizens of Croatia are also concerned at the prospect that Croatia might secede from Yugoslavia, thus cutting them off from their current country and Serbia against their will. The situation in Croatia, however, is complicated by the existence of Serbian nationalist leaders who are attempting, including by use of armed force, to separate parts of Croatia from republican authority and who have rejected repeated and unconditional offers of dialogue by Croatian authorities. There are also widespread reports that Croats living in Serbian-inhabited parts of Croatia are subject to arrest, attacks, and harassment by Serbs. We support the principles that underlie the Nickles-Bentley Amendment and aim to ensure that our assistance is closely tied to democratic and market reform and respect for human rights. In considering the implementation of this amendment, however, we need to be careful not to hit the wrong target. For this reason, the Administration has decided to take the following steps: 1. The Secretary of State has invoked the certification mechanism of the Nickles-Bentley Amendment; 2. The United States will resume assistance to Yugoslavia on a selective basis; and 3. The United States will invoke step two of the CSCE human dimensions mechanism with regard to human rights violations in Serbia and urge other CSCE members to follow suit; in addition, due to underwriting concerns relating to human rights and other problems in the Serbian Republic, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation will suspend assistance to new US investments in the Serbian Republic. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991 Title:

Recent Developments in Ethiopia

Tutwiler Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: May 21, 19915/21/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Ethiopia Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] We have been officially informed by the government of Ethiopia that President Mengistu Haile Mariam has resigned and departed the country for exile. Vice President Tesfaye Gebre Kidan has, under the constitution, replaced Mengistu. Ethiopia is thus embarked on an important political transition. We welcome these developments and hope that the door is now open for the establishment of peace and democracy in this war- ravaged country. In light of these developments, we urge that all government and opposition forces immediately cease military operations in order to allow a political dialogue to begin. The United States is moving ahead with its plans to hold a meeting in London beginning May 27 including both the government and insurgent groups to discuss a peaceful transition. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991 Title:

Recent Developments in Ethiopia

Cohen Source: Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: London, England Date: May 28, 19915/28/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Ethiopia Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] I would like to summarize for you our consultations in London with representatives of the outgoing government, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The subjects covered were: -- The establishment of a transitional government; -- The situation in Addis Ababa, and -- The facilitation of international relief efforts. At this point, the United States government makes the following recommendations and observations.
Transitional Government.
A transitional government should be established in Addis Ababa as soon as possible. The transitional government should assume all legal and political responsibility for the governance of Ethiopia. The transitional government should be broadly representative of all Ethiopian society, including diverse political groupings, and should, wherever appropriate, utilize the existing civil administrative structures in carrying out its responsibilities. The primary responsibility of the transitional government should be to prepare the country for free, democratic, internationally monitored elections in 9-12 months to produce a constituent assembly to prepare a new constitution for Ethiopia. The new constitution should guarantee fundamental individual rights and should respect the identity and interests of all the different peoples of Ethiopia. The transitional government should consider an appropriate amnesty or indemnity for past acts not constituting violations of the laws of war or international human rights. Any persons accused of such offenses should be afforded due process of law in accordance with international norms, and all procedures should be open to observers from internationally recognized organizations. Discussions should continue in London regarding the composition of the transitional government.
Addis Ababa
. Elements of the EPRDF armed forces have entered Addis Ababa and taken up garrison positions. The city should be demilitarized as soon as possible. Hostilities throughout Ethiopia should cease as soon as possible.
International Relief.
All parties should continue to cooperate with on-going international relief efforts. The US government calls on the international donor community to make all possible efforts to help maintain essential services and continue providing relief assistance. The United States calls on the parties to conduct their activities in the spirit of reconciliation and justice and to create the conditions necessary for the establishment of democracy. The United States stands ready to assist them to achieve this goal.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991 Title:

Recent Developments in Ethiopia

Tutwiler Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: May 29, 19915/29/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Ethiopia Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] The United States welcomes the May 28 joint declaration in London on the Ethiopian combatants who have agreed to organize an all- parties conference to select a transitional government no later than July 1, 1991. This decision reflects a commitment to a democratic process. We hope that Ethiopian political organizations will take advantage of this opportunity to help plan a pluralistic future for their country. We also welcome the decision of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), who will establish an interim administration in Addis Ababa, to work with the existing administrative structures with the support of Ethiopia's dedicated and competent professional civil servants. The willingness of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) authorities in Eritrea to maintain all existing economic linkages with Ethiopia will contribute to the rapid stabilization of the region. The United States wishes to reiterate that the development of Ethiopia's great economic potential can be assured only if the democratic process initiated by the combatants in London is fulfilled by a free and fair election within a reasonable time frame. In the interim, the United States will continue to provide humanitarian relief for the Ethiopian people who continue to suffer the effects of extended civil conflict. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991 Title:

Economics and National Security

Kimmitt Source: Robert M. Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Description: Address before the American Bar Association, Section on International Law and Practice, Washington, DC Date: Apr 25, 19914/25/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, Europe, East Asia Country: Japan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Germany, South Korea Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales, International Organizations, NATO, United Nations, Military Affairs [TEXT] Thanks for that very kind introduction. I speak to a number of audiences during the course of the year, but it's always an honor for me to address fellow members of the bar. Although I've been engaged in the policy process for over 2 years, as mentioned, I consider it a special privilege to have this chance to address the section this morning. You have a long and respected tradition as a forum for serious discussion of issues that affect us all-issues rooted in the legal landscape which also look out onto the larger landscape we inhabit as citizens. The subject of this morning's timely program, economics and national security, is worthy of our attention both as lawyers and as students and practitioners of public policy. As you will hear later this morning, the economic dimension to national security has spurred phenomenal growth in both the public and private sides of the profession. Those of you who chose a career in the law principally to avoid a life filled with numbers and statistics have no cause for joy at this prospect. For those of us who work the policy side of the street, it is impossible to speak of national security any longer without also speaking about economics. It is now an accepted truth that there is an essential economic dimension cutting across the more familiar political and military aspects of our overall national security strategy. Though once neglected by the strategists of the early post-war era, economics has clearly become the growth sector of the national security business, and there is no sign of the boom subsiding. There is no better illustration of the importance of the economic dimension of our national security policy than the Persian Gulf crisis. I will spend the latter part of my remarks this morning discussing this aspect of the crisis. But first I would like to spend a few minutes sketching out the framework of national security strategy and then highlighting the economic dimension of that strategy. As mentioned, I would be glad afterward to take a few questions, but I hope at least to lay down some markers to stimulate both panel comment and your exchange with the panel.
National Security Structure
As I think everyone in this room knows, our national security system is based on the structure outlined by Congress in the National Security Act of 1947. That act established the National Security Council "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security." The hallmark of our national security system is policy integration and coordination. The task of integrating domestic, foreign, and military policies requires more than bureaucratic coordination, though that is no small feat in itself. True integration, however, requires coordination of the three basic components of national security strategy-defense, diplomacy, and economics-all resting on a firm intelligence base. -- First, we need to maintain strong, deployable military forces and stable military relationships with our allies around the world. As our recent experience in the Gulf makes plain, a formidable military capability remains a necessary means of last resort to protect vital American interests. Moreover, the fact that we possess substantial military resources augments our diplomatic leverage. -- The second element of our national security strategy is diplomacy. Our bilateral relationships with other governments are the basis for protecting our vital interests. It is only through continuous and extensive consultation with foreign capitals that we are able to coordinate policies with our allies and understand the intentions of our adversaries. And, as the world becomes increasingly interdependent, it is largely through those bilateral relationships that we advance the cause of multilateral cooperation and understanding. The renewed vigor of the United Nations, which played a central role in reversing Iraq's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait-and which I'm sure will be a topic of discussion with [US Ambassador to the United Nations] Tom Pickering tomorrow-is due in large part to the vigor of our bilateral diplomatic efforts. -- The third element of our strategy, and the subject I wish to explore in detail later, is economics. We must focus as never before on the economic dimensions of security as it relates both to economic health at home and protection of American security interests abroad. Finally, it is important that we have a reliable and effective intelligence base for military, diplomatic, and economic matters. Without timely and relevant information, policymakers would be unable either to formulate or execute these components of our national security strategy.
Economics and National Security: An Overview
The Rise of Economic-Based Power. In the post-war period, when the Cold War dominated international relations, national security professionals thought largely in two dimensions: political and military. Security structures took the form of politico-military groupings: from NATO and the Warsaw Pact to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Australia, New Zealand, United States security treaty (ANZUS), and a host of others. Planners and strategists thought in terms of alliances of like-minded political systems, often bound together by the common bond of ideology. These alliances or groupings were thought to be the exclusive building blocks of the international political system. Over the past two decades, there has been a sea change-and over the last 2 years, a revolution. Military alliances that were once a fixture of the political landscape, such as the Warsaw Pact, have disappeared. Those that remain, such as NATO, continue to be vital to national security but are part of a more elaborate mosaic-a mosaic that includes powerful economic structures. Some of these structures are international financial institutions. Others are groupings of states, some with broad, others with more focused, agendas. Still others are collections of powerful private actors. The most prominent of these structures include: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EC, G-7, G- 24, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Paris and London Clubs. In many respects, these economic groupings rival, and in some cases eclipse, politico-military structures. They are all formidable centers of power, and, as such, they can both augment and strain traditional politico-military relationships that have been the foundation of our national security strategy. The rise of these economic groups reflects the changing concept of national power and the uses of that power in the international system. Nations have begun more and more to marshal their collective means-including economic means-in the service of both low and high political ends. In this respect, the Persian Gulf crisis is a watershed event. It is a harbinger of the high politics of the emerging New World Order that President Bush has described-an order, quite simply, that stands for collective action to promote and protect common interests. I will return to this theme later in my remarks. But before turning to the Gulf itself, I want to pursue further the connection between economic means and strategic or political ends. In particular, I want to sketch out the economic dimension of our ability to project American power and protect vital American interests-which is, after all, the essence of our national security policy.
Economic Elements of National Security Policy
. First, there is the basic point that a robust and advanced industrial economy is the bedrock upon which rests America's military and political power. In practical terms, this means that a modern industrial base is essential to the maintenance of American military superiority. Our triumph in Operation Desert Storm was in large measure a triumph for American industrial and technological prowess. American economic power also enhances our political influence abroad. For instance, we use the power of our market, as well as economic assistance, to bolster key political relationships. Strong economic relationships with other states help cement our political relationships, and often lead to a convergence of strategic interests. More generally, we use American economic strength to promote the development of other market economies. This, of course, serves not only our economic interests, but our long-term strategic interests as well. Healthy, diverse market economies give individuals opportunity and promote economic growth. Societies that prosper economically offer fertile ground for stable democratic institutions, which, in turn, tend to foster governments less interested in military adventurism and more interested in public welfare. Though by no means a panacea for the world's problems, a healthy global economy is a prerequisite for lasting security and peace. And America's economic power is a vital instrument in advancing that cause. Just as there is an economic dimension to our military and political strength, there is also one to that of our adversaries. Since both allies and adversaries seek access to our markets and technology, we need a comprehensive approach to our export control systems-one that balances our very real security concerns with industry's desire to compete effectively in the global marketplace. And as technology spreads, our security depends on effective coordination with our strategic partners in ensuring that our enemies do not gain access to militarily destabilizing technologies. In this regard, I would note that the United States has led the effort to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction, relying first on nuclear-related export controls and, more recently, on controls of chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems. We have been vigorous supporters of the 20-member Australia Group, formed in 1984 to discourage the spread of chemical weapons. Today the group maintains a warning list of 50 dual-use chemical weapons precursors and a core list of 11 chemicals for which all members now have some form of export controls. In addition, since 1987, we have joined with 15 other industrial nations to form the Missile Technology Control Regime, which restricts the proliferation of missiles and related equipment and technology.
Economics and the Persian Gulf Crisis
I would like to turn now to a more in-depth discussion of the central international event of the last year, the Persian Gulf crisis and the threat to vital American interests posed by Saddam Hussein's aggression. The Gulf crisis is a defining moment of the emerging New World Order, which President Bush has described as: "A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak." Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was nothing less than an all-out assault on this order. And the world's response was nothing less than an acknowledgment of the "shared responsibility" of which the President spoke. If it is to thrive, the New World Order must be supported by collective action-collective military, political, and economic action to protect and promote common interests. I must note here that while the order may be new, this idea of marshalling collective means to advance common ends, of course, is not. Collective action and responsibility is the very soul of the UN Charter and, indeed, of the ageless goal of creating an enlightened world community. In signaling an end to the old ways of Cold War confrontation, our united front in the Gulf has also given new life to the principle of collective security set down in San Francisco over 45 years ago.
Nature of Saddam's Threat: The Economic Dimension
The Gulf crisis demonstrates that collective security-and American national security-in the New World Order has an essential economic dimension. This dimension was made apparent both by the nature of Saddam's threat to our security and our strategy in combating that threat. It is on this particular aspect of the crisis that I wish to focus the remainder of my remarks. Of course, the multilateral response to Saddam's aggression cannot be explained in purely economic terms. We did not send our young women and men into harm's way simply to defend the price of gasoline. As I have suggested, what was at stake was our vision of international relations in the post-Cold War era. But if vital issues of principle were at stake so were vital economic interests. Saddam Hussein is the latest in a long line of dictators who have sought to use aggression to achieve regional domination. But he was a particularly formidable foe in part because he was able to use Iraq's substantial oil wealth for his own twisted personal ambition. I would note that he tried to make an argument during the course of the conflict that this was a case of haves versus have- nots, and he tried to present himself as the champion of the have- nots. In point of fact, Iraq is a very wealthy country, blessed with natural resources, blessed with a very industrious populace, blessed with water, blessed with arable land. The problem was that Saddam did not use those resources for the betterment of his people. His decision, whenever it was presented to him, was always to feed the army first; equip the army first. In doing so, he built the fourth largest army in the world, with more main battle tanks than Britain and France combined. He acquired, and used, weapons of mass destruction and was actively developing a viable nuclear capability. Saddam's unbridled ambition threatened a region vital to the United States and vital to the world. If his attempt at regional domination had gone unchecked, Saddam would have had in his grasp the power to wreak havoc with the world economy. Not just the American economy, the world economy. Iraq controls roughly 10% of the world's proven oil reserves, and Kuwait about the same. As President Bush stated, "An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors-neighbors that control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We [could not] permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless." Saddam's effective control over such a vital resource as oil would have fostered economic dislocation and associated political instability in the Middle East and beyond. Staunch allies in the region such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and, of course, Israel would have faced a real and immediate threat to their stability. The developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America would have been threatened with arbitrary and capricious economic devastation. The industrial democracies of the West and the fledgling democracies of the East would have been at the economic mercy of a man who had little inclination to show any mercy himself. If Saddam's aggression makes plain the economic dimension of our national security, so did the multilateral response to that aggression. The multinational coalition employed its economic power as both sword and shield to defeat Saddam's aggression.
Allied Response: The Economic Dimension
Economic Sanctions
. A key element of the UN response to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was the imposition of the most comprehensive economic sanctions in the history of the institution. UN Security Council Resolution 661, one of twelve pre- hostilities resolutions, prohibited virtually all imports and exports of products originating in Iraq and Kuwait (Kuwait then, of course, under Iraqi control) and virtually all financial transactions involving the government of Iraq-with narrow exceptions carved out for humanitarian circumstances. Subsequent resolutions endorsed naval interdiction of shipping to enforce the UN mandate and banned virtually all commercial air traffic going to and from Iraq. Consistent with the UN mandate, the United States imposed its own economic sanctions against Iraq, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the President's inherent authority to conduct foreign affairs. These sanctions froze a substantial portion of Iraq's overseas liquid assets, as well as gave teeth to the prohibitions mandated by the Security Council. The economic sanctions, both domestic and multilateral, carried strategic, as well as political, significance. On a strategic level, economic sanctions contributed to the degradation of Saddam's military capability and the economic wherewithal to sustain it. But the sanctions were also of great political importance because they helped solidify the coalition that had formed at the United Nations under US leadership. The imposition of sanctions made our coalition partners collectively responsible for denying Saddam Hussein the economic benefits of his aggression. That shared responsibility ultimately formed the basis of the strong Security Council majority that authorized the use of force that ultimately ejected Saddam from Kuwait. Though important to the strength and preservation of the coalition, sanctions, regrettably, could not alone force Saddam's massive invasion force to leave Kuwait. Up until January 15, the date on which UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorized the use of force, there were no signs that sanctions alone could do the job. At best, sanctions could weaken the strength of Iraq's massive army and the resolve of Iraq's leadership. But they could not bring about actual withdrawal of tanks and troops. Moreover, the longer we waited for sanctions to "work," the more time Saddam's troops had to prepare for the coming allied attack. Planners decided that this additional time for preparation would hurt our troops more than sanctions would degrade his. In the end, policymakers had to turn to the military option to force Iraq from Kuwait and to implement the UN mandate.
Responsibility-Sharing
. There was also an economic element to the coalition's military victory. Beyond sanctions, key members of the coalition pooled their own economic resources to support the military effort. The United States itself received commitments of over $54 billion from six countries- Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Germany, and South Korea-to support our military efforts, first in Desert Shield and then in Desert Storm. When the final accounting is completed, we expect allied contributions to result in the highest percentage of responsibility-sharing we have ever achieved.
Responding to Dislocation.
In addition to sharing military costs, countries provided economic assistance through the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group (GCFCG) to those states in the region most adversely affected by the crisis. Chaired by the United States, the GCFCG included 26 participating countries, plus the European Community and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Donors have committed over $16 billion in exceptional economic assistance, including nearly $12 billion to the so-called front-line states of Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. This aid included project loans and outright grants. The exceptional economic assistance provided through the GCFCG was essential to the effectiveness of the economic sanctions. The economies of recipient countries were the most disrupted by the sanctions regime, other than Iraq. The group helped stabilize these economies and reduced the costs of sanctions compliance-compliance that was essential if sanctions were to have any bite at all. The GCFCG also ensured the cooperation of key members of the political and military coalition opposing Saddam. And, moreover, the mechanism applied by the group may well form a model for long-term approaches to promoting economic development and stability in the region.
The Aftermath.
Now that Iraq has been forced from Kuwait, we must also ensure that Iraq will no longer pose an offensive military threat to its neighbors. Our economic lever-the continuing sanctions, in particular-will have an important role to play in achieving that objective. UN Security Council Resolution 687, passed on April 3, imposes a series of obligations on Iraq, including those regarding the identification and destruction of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The council will not lift economic sanctions on Iraqi exports, including oil, if Iraq does not comply with these obligations and if the council does not also approve a plan for Iraq to pay compensation for damages arising from its invasion. The council will review Iraq's compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions every 60 days to determine whether economic restrictions should be reduced or lifted. Thus, just as economic sanctions helped cement the coalition during the crisis, these same sanctions continue to serve the coalition's long-term strategic and political objectives. We are also deeply engaged in addressing the larger issues that have made the Middle East a flashpoint for conflict. Secretary Baker, of course, is in the region right now pursuing Middle East peace. But also high on our agenda is the need for regional economic development. Such development may help bind the region together, contribute to mutual trust, and provide firm ground for resolving outstanding security concerns.
Conclusion
This has been something of a whirlwind tour of one aspect of the Persian Gulf crisis, and its complexity merits more study than time here permits. Indeed, historians will soon be examining the crisis and its aftermath to divine its message for future generations. But one message is already clear: American national security has an unmistakable economic dimension-one that is every bit as important as our diplomatic prowess and our military might. Saddam's threat to his region and to us was fueled by his economic power and motivated in part by his desire for more. In return, the alliance pooled its economic strength and employed a wide range of economic weapons as well as military and diplomatic measures. If we are wise, we will pay greater attention to economics as a solution-a solution for the twin problems of over-weaponization and under-development that have cost us dearly in both blood and treasure. Economics is a dimension of our vulnerability, as well as our power. Though no one can predict where our next challenge will arise, the events of the last year make clear that tomorrow's strategists can ignore economics only at their peril, and ours.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 22, June 3, 1991 Title:

COCOM-A New System Of Export Controls

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Boston, Massachusetts Date: May 24, 19915/24/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, North America, E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: Japan, Australia, USSR (former), China Subject: Arms Control, International Organizations, NATO [TEXT] Last evening, the United States and 16 Western allies agreed in Paris to implement a new system of export controls for dual-use goods and technologies with significant military applications. The agreement brings to a close a major review of allied East-West export control policy initiated in January 1990 in response to the President's call upon the member states of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to adapt their export control regimes to the rapidly changing international political and military environment. For over 40 years, COCOM, comprised of NATO members (less Iceland) plus Japan and Australia, has maintained a system of export controls to keep key technologies with both military and civilian uses from being used to enhance the military capability of certain countries. Historically, these have included the Soviet Union, former members of the Warsaw Pact, the People's Republic of China, and several other countries. The changes to be implemented by COCOM partners demonstrate the continued relevance of COCOM and its ability to adapt quickly to changing world circumstances. The agreement means a 50% reduction in existing export controls to a "core list" of militarily strategic technologies and goods. That reduction is in addition to a 33% cut in the list agreed to by COCOM in June 1990. The United States and its partners concluded that an overhaul of the lists was justified based on a changing strategic situation and rapid diffusion of some technologies that were making the existing control lists obsolete. The "core list" contains only the most critical goods and technologies which are essential in maintaining the existing significant gaps between Western and Soviet-based military systems, gaps that were demonstrated to be critical to our national security in Operation Desert Storm. On the other hand, because of the broad diffusion of certain technologies, export controls have been eliminated, for example, on most of the computers exported from the United States today. COCOM member states also agreed to significant reductions in controls on microprocessors, machine tools, aircraft, avionics, and propulsion systems. In addition, the United States will continue a presumption of approval for the export of core list items to bona fide civil end-users for civilian purposes. The new agreement continues the trend toward reducing controls on items destined for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, reflecting the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the fact that these three countries have entered into strategic trade agreements with Western nations to prevent diversion of Western-supplied technology to the Soviet Union. COCOM partners agreed that individual countries will continue controlling goods and technologies dropped from the COCOM list that could contribute to the development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. Full implementation of the new lists is planned for September 1, 1991(###)