US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991

Title:

Foreign Assistance Funding Proposal for FY 1992

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Statement prepared for delivery before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC Date: May 22, 19915/22/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa, East Asia, Eurasia, North America, Europe, Caribbean, Central America, Southeast Asia, Subsaharan Africa Country: Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Canada, Taiwan, South Korea, Chile, USSR (former) Subject: North America Free Trade, Arms Control, Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics, Military Affairs, NATO, CSCE, EC, United Nations, Terrorism, Refugees, International Law, Mideast Peace Process [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, I am privileged to appear before this subcommittee to testify on behalf of our foreign assistance funding proposal for fiscal year (FY) 1992. I would like to report on my recent trips to the Middle East, devoting the bulk of my remarks to the Middle East peace process and to the situation in Iraq. I also would like to make some brief observations about the Soviet Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The Peace Process
For the past 2 months, we've been engaged in an intensive effort to find a path to a comprehensive settlement through direct negotiations between Israel, the Arab states, and Palestinians. Since we began that effort, I have had no illusions about the challenges and difficulties involved. But I also have had a strong sense that the Gulf war may have created some new possibilities for peace-making in the region and that the United States has a unique obligation to help explore them. While it would be sad if it turns out that old obstacles are more formidable than new opportunities, it would be sadder still if the United States failed to energetically pursue a chance for peace. Those chances do not come along very often in the Middle East. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait brought together a historic international coalition. The United States, the Soviet Union, Europeans, Arabs, and others joined to reverse Iraq's aggression. The United Nations played the role its founders had intended. And through its restraint in the face of Iraqi provocation, Israel became a silent partner in the coalition's success. The net result was a staggering defeat for Saddam Hussein and the path of violence and intimidation that he represented and new hope for the alternative path of diplomacy and negotiations. To test the moment and transform the ground rules for Arab- Israeli peace-making, we felt it important to engage in a process that would break the taboos on direct dialogue. If the impulse to make peace was different, we needed to overcome the barriers to Israelis, Arabs, and Palestinians meeting directly. We needed to establish that dialogue and diplomacy--not violence or rejectionism--could become the currency of politics in the region. The war provided a grim reminder of the dangers of conflict in an era of escalating military competition. It was a reminder that the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians was still at the core of the Arab-Israeli problem--but that the state- to-state dimension also had to be addressed. And it was a hopeful reminder that Israel and the Arab states sometimes find common ground between them--common ground which might provide room for maneuver to encourage Israeli-Palestinian accommodation. Our post-war task, therefore, was to try to blend what was new and promising following the crisis with the enduring principles of Arab-Israeli diplomacy. That was the purpose of my first three trips to the region after the war. The result was a consensus among the parties on five key points. First, general agreement that the objective of the process is a comprehensive settlement achieved through direct negotiations based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Second, broad understanding that the negotiating process would proceed simultaneously along two tracks, involving direct negotiations between Israel and Arab states and between Israel and Palestinians from the occupied territories. Third, agreement that the negotiations between Israel and Palestinians would proceed in phases, with talks on interim self- government preceding negotiations over the permanent status of the occupied territories. Fourth, agreement that Palestinians would be represented in the process by leaders from the occupied territories who accept the two-track process and phased approach to negotiations and who commit to living in peace with Israel. Fifth, general acceptance that a conference, co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, would break the old taboos about public contacts between the parties and be the launching pad for direct negotiations between the parties. These are not insignificant areas of consensus. And they certainly provide a baseline for progress. But they still have to be translated into a practical process, and that was the purpose of my most recent trip to the area. Let me give you a sense of the key issues we are still trying to resolve.
Resolution of Key Issues
The first set of issues relates to modalities of the peace conference. There has been a great deal of misunderstanding on this question so let me lay out simply what we have in mind. Our objective is to launch direct negotiations. That's what this effort is all about. We believe the best way to do this is through a peace conference that would lead directly to bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab and Palestinian neighbors and multilateral negotiations on issues such as arms control and regional security, the environment, and water. Let me be clear about this. We are not considering an international conference with a plenary that has the power or authority to impose its views, nor are we considering any mechanism that would interfere in any way with negotiations. In fact, as I've told those in the region, the conference is not a forum for negotiations. Quite simply, it's a means to an end, a tool in our effort to get the parties to sit down face-to-face to sort out their differences and to break anachronistic taboos. This conference would be co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestinians from the occupied territories would attend. As you know, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has already taken a very important step and agreed to send its Secretary General as observer. In addition, each of the member states of the GCC, the six Gulf states, have announced they will participate in the direct negotiations on multilateral issues. We also believe the European Community (EC) could play a constructive role in support of this process, and especially in the hard work of economic development that would follow a negotiated peace. The EC should be able to participate in the conference. Similarly, the United Nations should have some role; a formula ought to be found that is acceptable to all the parties, that prejudices none, and that channels the new-found potential of the United Nations in ways that can be helpful in promoting peace and reconciliation in the area. The exact nature of EC and UN involvement is still unresolved. Another open question is the ability of the conference to reconvene. The United States believes it should be able to do so, if all the parties agree, in order to hear reports from the bilateral and multilateral negotiating groups. The point is that none of this will, in any way, interfere with direct negotiations. Indeed, face-to-face negotiations offer the only way to make any progress, and we would not accept any proposal that would lead any party to believe that it could avoid negotiations or have others relieve it of the need to negotiate. The other set of issues deals with the question of Palestinian representation in the negotiations. From the beginning of this Administration, we have made it clear that our objective is to get Israel and Palestinians from the occupied territories into negotiations. Of course, Palestinians must choose their representatives, but our view is--and many other parties agree--that a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation could be a useful vehicle to get to the conference as well as to handle any number of issues that might arise during the negotiations. So the purpose of my recent trip to the region was to continue to explore these issues with the parties and to determine where there was consensus and which areas required more work. Overall, I found that there is more agreement than disagreement on the key elements of our approach. And I found a willingness to continue looking for ways to resolve those areas that are still not nailed down. I also had extremely useful discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh in the Soviet Union and in Cairo. The Soviets have been very supportive of our approach. The fact that the Soviet Union and the United States are in basic agreement about how to proceed on the peace process creates a new factor--one that improves the chances of getting this process launched. Nonetheless, we are obviously not at the point I would like to be. There are areas of disagreement, particularly between Israel and Syria over the modalities of the conference, both on the issue of the UN role and over the issue of reconvening the conference. I'm not going to pretend that sorting these out will be easy or that it will be done quickly. But I will say that we will continue to try so long as we believe that all parties are working in good faith and are serious about finding ways to resolve differences. The President and I have talked about our next steps, and we believe we should continue to press ahead and see if we can overcome the gaps and get to negotiations. Finally, I believe the parties in the region do appreciate that there's a real chance to launch a process. We've defined a workable pathway to negotiations that would enable Israel, Arab states, and Palestinians to capture that chance and make a real break with the past in favor of peace. It is there for the taking, but it will not last forever. What remains to be seen is whether the parties are willing to seize this chance. The United States is there, ready and willing to help them try. But we cannot create the political will to act, if it does not exist in the region.
The Situation In Iraq
With his aggression outward against Kuwait defeated, Saddam Hussein turned his terror inward in the aftermath of the Gulf War and drove hundreds of thousands of Iraqis out of their homes and into foreign lands. This created, as the United Nations recognized in Resolution 688, a new threat to international peace and security. The issue for all of us can no longer be just Kuwait. Today, I want to review with you the three-pronged strategy that we and our allies have pursued to cope with this terrible situation. First, we have worked to relieve the immediate suffering of Iraqi refugees. Second, we are working to prevent another round of terror by creating safe and secure conditions within Iraq so that the refugees can return to their homes and live in safety. Third, we will continue to isolate Saddam Hussein as long as he holds power. Let me discuss each of these aspects of our strategy. The first has been aimed at the immediate problem: saving the lives of refugees by providing them food, water, medicine, blankets,and housing. Through Operation Provide Comfort, we have airdropped and trucked supplies to refugees on the mountains in northern Iraq and southern Turkey, have built refugee camps in both Iraq and Turkey, and have re-secured portions of northern Iraq so that they could begin to return to their homes. The President has contacted the leaders of the major industrial countries and our coalition partners from the Arab world and urged them to make generous pledges to the various UN appeals. We appreciate the conference committee's action on Tuesday, and we hope the Congress will act expeditiously on our supplemental refugee request. As a result of our efforts, the situation has improved considerably. Death rates among the refugees have dropped markedly, and well over half the refugees have come down from the mountains. It has not been enough, however, to provide only for the immediate needs of the refugees. We also have a duty to try to prevent a greater tragedy: a situation where Saddam could exercise his terror once again. This second aspect of our strategy requires uniting the world community to ensure international access to the affected regions throughout Iraq in strict conformity with Security Council Resolution 688, which calls for respect for the humanitarian and political rights of the Iraqi people. Saddam's ruthless suppression of his own people is yet another reminder that he cannot be trusted. We remain concerned that Saddam would, if conditions altered, resume a systematic extermination of regime opponents and innocent Iraqi civilians. The world community is not moving to save these poor, innocent people now, so that they can be slaughtered by Saddam Hussein later. That is why we warned Iraq not to interfere with humanitarian relief efforts underway in Iraq. That is why, in support of Resolution 688, we have urged the United Nations to move quickly to provide personnel to ensure the safety of those refugees returning to Iraq. The United States does not seek to keep its forces in northern Iraq any longer than is absolutely necessary; we look forward to their early replacement by an effective international presence. It is our firm conviction that some kind of international presence, however organized, must take over for the job now being done by American and coalition forces. We hope that this international presence will serve as the international community's watchdog to inhibit Saddam from repeating his most recent atrocities. In the future, we hope that Iraq can fully rejoin the community of nations. Iraq has a tremendously talented, creative, and diverse population. I believe that a new Iraqi political compact which reflects the pluralistic make-up of its population and its rich historical and cultural traditions is possible. And such a compact must be arrived at by negotiations among all Iraqis, not by force. We respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity and do not wish to see a fragmented state. We have said repeatedly that we have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. And our actions reinforce our words. While our soldiers have been feeding and caring for refugees, Saddam's soldiers were strafing and shelling them. Thus, I can say without equivocation or doubt: Saddam Hussein himself is the single greatest obstacle to any hopeful future for the people of Iraq--whether in terms of their own development as a society or their reintegration into the international community. Left alone, free to reconsolidate his brutal dictatorship and military machine, we know Saddam will act again to brutalize his own people and threaten his neighbors. Without constant international monitoring of and pressure against Saddam, this Iraqi government will continue to pose a danger to the peace and security of the Middle East. That's why we can have a formal cease-fire but no genuine peace with the government of Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. Let me be absolutely clear about this third aspect of our strategy: Saddam Hussein is a pariah whose actions put him beyond the pale of civilized international society. Therefore, we will act with others to continue to isolate Saddam's regime. That means we will never normalize relations with Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. That means maintaining UN sanctions in place so long as Saddam remains in power. And that means Iraqis will not participate in post-crisis political, economic, and security arrangements until there is a change in regime. With a new government, however, new possibilities will emerge for Iraq to rejoin the international community. With a new government, we may well be able to lift most sanctions, save those that constrain Iraq's military potential. And in that new Iraq, tolerance must replace terror, and the fear that so long has gripped the Iraqi people must give way to peaceful realization of the vast potential of the Iraqi people and their homeland.
Three Observations About US-Soviet Relations
First, the President and I feel it is important to stress that Soviet new thinking continues to guide Soviet behavior in many aspects of our relations. In the Middle East, Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh's help has been invaluable to our attempts to reinvigorate the peace process. Soviet cooperation also has been critical to the historic agreement that will end the Angolan civil war--an agreement that I will join in signing in Lisbon next week. The Soviets have also been helpful in other regional areas--most notably, Central America and Cambodia. In arms control, we hope to resolve our differences over the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, prepare CFE for ratification, and move forward with START [strategic arms reduction talks] and preparations for a Moscow summit. Second, the so-called one-plus-nine agreement of April 23 between [Soviet President] Gorbachev and the republics creates an opportunity for a positive shift toward new political arrangements in the Soviet Union. If Gorbachev and the nine follow up this agreement in the way they have suggested-- through an all-union treaty and a new constitution--then this would be an important step toward establishing a new political legitimacy in the Soviet Union. These steps, along with the on-going talks between Moscow and the Baltics, create new opportunities for reconciliation to replace the political polarization that has characterized Soviet politics since last September. We also welcome enactment of new emigration legislation. For almost two decades, we have made the right of emigration a central part of US-Soviet relations. We regard passage of the new law as a major step in Soviet reform and in fulfillment of Soviet CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] commitments. For our part, we continue to expand our contacts with all levels and segments of Soviet society, ranging from reformers and democrats to traditionalists and the military. Not only will this increase our understanding of Soviet society, but it will allow us-- through what I have called a "democratic dialogue"--to help promote political pluralism and economic freedom and the success of Soviet reform. As the President and I have made abundantly clear by now, the continuation and success of Soviet reform is in everyone's interest. Third, even with the tentative steps toward political accommodation, Soviet economic reform still has a long way to go. We and almost everyone else who has looked at it are convinced that Prime Minister Pavlov's anti-crisis program will not work. We believe the Soviet leadership urgently needs to embrace fundamental market economic reform. Without a commitment to fundamental reform, we expect the Soviet economy to continue its severe decline--and that is in no one's interest. We continue to study various ways we can assist Soviet economic reform, but the usefulness of our efforts still depends above all on the choices the Soviets themselves make.
NAFTA and Fast Track
We are seeking a North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada because we are convinced such an agreement promises important economic benefits for all three countries. Since the President's announcement last June of his desire to seek a free trade agreement with Mexico, we have engaged in extensive consultations with Congress and the private sector. I believe there is a tremendous amount at stake here--in terms of both foreign and economic policy and in terms of our growing cooperative work with Mexico on important regional and transnational issues. It also will enhance American exports, job opportunities, as well as global competitiveness. In order to achieve global markets and hemispheric trade cooperation, it is critical that fast-track negotiating authority be extended by the Congress. Without this step, our foreign and economic leadership position will be seriously impaired.
Overview of Our Funding Request
For FY 1992, we seek $21.9 billion in discretionary budget authority for International Affairs Budget Function 150, an increase of $1.7 billion over levels appropriated for FY 1991. In addition, we are requesting a one-time appropriation of $12.2 billion as the US share of a global quota increase for the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For the accounts under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, we are requesting $15.2 billion in FY 1992 discretionary budget authority, a $455- million increase over FY 1991 appropriations. In accordance with the terms of the Budget Enforcement Act, our request falls within specific, stringent limits on our spending levels, despite unprecedented demands for US leadership across the globe. In order to achieve our world-wide objectives within these resource constraints, additional flexibility is needed. Last year, I appealed to this subcommittee to make constructive consultation-- not earmarking--the primary vehicle for achieving consensus on program objectives. I am pleased to note that with the cooperation of this subcommittee, we made some progress toward that goal last session. Earmarking in our Economic Support Fund (ESF) declined from 82% in FY 1990 to just over 68% in FY 1991. In our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account, the decline was less dramatic but still significant, from 92% to 87%. This is a welcome trend, one that we want to encourage and promote. But we still have a long way to go. To support our request this year, let me express the Administration's willingness to work in partnership with Congress to develop greater flexibility in our foreign assistance authorization and appropriations legislation. To guide this effort, let me suggest five broad objectives for our international cooperation programs, built around the five foreign policy challenges which I outlined to Congress last year. First, promoting and consolidating democratic values, including free and fair elections and respect for human rights. As the President noted in his State of the Union address, this fundamental American principle has stood as a beacon to peoples across the globe for more than two centuries. Transitions toward democracy, however difficult, cannot be accomplished in isolation from the rest of the world. The essential ingredients of democracy--respect for human rights, the rule of law, free and fair elections, and political and economic freedom-- also are the basic building blocks of the new world order. Second, promoting free market principles and strengthening US competitiveness. Sustainable economic development cannot be separated from the pursuit of sound, growth-oriented policies; together, these can promote US economic interests abroad. By fostering market forces through deregulation, privatization, and promotion of free trade and investment, reform-minded countries can establish an appropriate complement to building and securing democracy. They also can develop into thriving markets for US exports and the jobs they represent. Indeed, US exports to recent aid graduates--Chile, Taiwan, and Korea--total more than twice the value of our entire world-wide foreign assistance budget. Our long- run goal should be to graduate more countries from foreign assistance toward mutually beneficial trade and investment relationships with the United States. Third, promoting peace by helping to defuse regional conflicts, strengthening the security of our regional partners, and pursuing arms control and non-proliferation efforts. As the crisis in the Persian Gulf has demonstrated, there is no substitute for strong US leadership. We continue to play a vital role in bolstering the security of regional allies around the world. Egypt and Turkey--two long-standing beneficiaries of US security assistance--have been bulwarks of the coalition against Saddam Hussein. National and regional security are preconditions for democracy and free enterprise to flourish. Saddam Hussein's aggression is a dramatic reminder of the continuing need to protect the security of regional states of vital interest to the United States and our allies. The proliferation of missile systems and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons technology further sharpens our interest in promoting regional stability. Fourth, protecting against transnational threats, especially to the environment and from narcotics and terrorism. As I noted in my first statement to Congress 2 years ago, "The future of our civilization demands that we act in concert to deal with a new class of problems, transnational in nature." This includes curbing proliferation, protecting the environment, and countering terrorism and narcotics. We have made progress in all of these areas. We have led the international effort to tighten non-proliferation export controls on a global basis. We continue to work to advance our environmental agenda. We are actively pressing state sponsors of terrorism in an effort to thwart terrorism around the globe. And our international narcotics efforts to counter supply are complemented by reports of declining demand at home. But progress is sometimes slow, unheralded, and hard won. Iraq's conduct following its invasion of Kuwait is a brutal reminder of the danger posed by the interaction of these transnational threats. Saddam Hussein's actions during the Gulf war illustrate how traditional concepts of threats to national security need to be extended. Indeed, Iraq has combined: -- A credible threat of the use of chemical and biological weapons; -- A contemptible use of missile technology as a weapon of terror against innocent civilian populations; -- Perhaps the world's first deliberate use of an environmental disaster as a war-time weapon, with unknown consequences for the entire region for years to come; and -- A world-wide call for terrorist actions, sometimes supported by embassies abroad in flagrant violation of the basic principles of diplomacy. These challenges to international order can all be defeated by a committed world community, supported by firm US leadership and appropriate resources as needed. Finally, meeting urgent humanitarian needs will continue to reflect deep and abiding concerns of the American people. America's record for responding quickly and substantially to alleviate severe suffering caused by natural and man-made disasters is unequaled. We salute the role played by American private voluntary agencies and private American citizens in this regard. Meeting the most pressing humanitarian needs with food aid, disaster relief, and refugee assistance will always be an essential component of US assistance policies. Indeed, our current effort to mobilize a broad international response to alleviate the suffering of Iraqi refugees is another of US leadership in this area. We have submitted legislation to Congress that builds on these basic objectives to provide more flexibility and simplicity to our economic cooperation efforts. Working with our global partners, we envision the use of five principal mechanisms to advance this agenda world-wide: One, more flexible and integrated bilateral assistance authorities. In authorization legislation, which we recently submitted to Congress, we seek more flexible account structures and greater ability to transfer funds both within and among accounts to meet pressing, unexpected needs. We hope to move toward an assistance program unified around a single set of core objectives, along the lines of those outlined above. As a first step toward this goal, we have proposed a modest $20-million presidential contingency fund in our FY 1992 budget request. The need for flexibility is especially urgent at a moment when developments in the world are moving so quickly and unpredictably, while our ability to respond with additional resources is severely constrained by budgetary realities. The Gulf crisis, the restoration of democratic rule in Nicaragua and Panama, and the dramatic developments in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and South Africa over the past year illustrate that when unprecedented demands for American leadership are combined with limited resources, our need for flexibility becomes all the more urgent. Two, we see scope for more creative use of multilateral mechanisms to advance our objectives, through both the international financial institutions and the UN system. The Bretton Woods institutions moved quickly to liberalize and expand their programs to assist countries seriously affected by the Gulf crisis. The IMF and World Bank have now admitted all the East European countries except Albania and are playing a central role in structuring sound, adequately financed programs to ease their transition to market economies based on private initiative. Should the Soviet Union move further along the path of structural economic and political reform, we would expect the IMF and the World Bank to play a role in facilitating its transformation as well. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will promote the development of the private sector, as well as infrastructure and environmental programs, in the reforming countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, through our Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the Inter-American Development Bank is expected to play a major role in promoting sound investment policy in our own hemisphere. To support these efforts, we are again proposing full funding for the multilateral development banks--including all arrears--plus a periodic quota increase for the IMF. This funding will allow these institutions to leverage other contributions in support of our objective of promoting sound, growth-oriented economic policies in the developing world. As President Bush noted in his State of the Union address, the United Nations has played a historic role in the Gulf crisis, one that is close to fulfilling the vision of its founders. The Security Council's 14 resolutions, which laid the basis for ending the crisis, symbolize the unity of the international community against Iraq's aggression and established the principle of collective security as a cornerstone of the post-Cold War era. At the same time, the humanitarian organizations of the UN system--together with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Organization for Migration--are coordinating a broad international effort to assist the hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from Iraqi aggression. The United States has a vital interest in strengthening this new, revitalized United Nations as a full partner in the building of a post-Cold War world where peace, stability, and prosperity prevail. Three, we foresee greater reliance on creative responsibility- sharing as we strengthen our global partnerships, especially with the European Community and its members and with Japan. As many in Congress have noted, our own difficult budgetary situation makes such efforts especially important for the advancement of a common agenda with partners who share our values and interests. No effort so well illustrates the collective response of the world community to defend world peace as our successful efforts to enlist world-wide support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and for the front-line states whose economies have been set back by the effects of Saddam Hussein's aggression. In 1990, our coalition partners pledged $9.7 billion to meet Desert Shield costs, representing 73% of the roughly $13.2 billion in total incremental expenses we incurred. As soon as hostilities broke out, our allies again responded promptly and generously to shoulder their fair share of coalition military expenses under Operation Desert Storm. Indeed, we have received unprecedented pledges totaling in excess of $44 billion from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Germany, and Korea, to offset Desert Shield/Storm expenses for 1991. The world community also has responded swiftly and generously to the needs of the front-line states, especially Egypt and Turkey, as they incurred substantial costs in standing up to Saddam Hussein's aggression. Through the US-chaired Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group, over $16 billion has been pledged by the Gulf states, Europe, Japan, Korea, and other countries to ensure that the economies of affected regional states are stabilized. The United States has played its part in this effort, supported by Congress, by canceling Egypt's $6.7 billion military debt, thereby relieving a heavy burden on a critical regional ally. Other countries have followed suit and canceled an additional $8 billion in Egyptian debt. Similarly, in responding to the urgent needs of Iraqi refugees and displaced persons, the international community is in the process of mobilizing more than $500 million, under UN and ICRC auspices, for urgent humanitarian relief efforts. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, the successful G-24 [Group of 24] process chaired by the European Community Commission, has mobilized more than $18 billion in pledges for Poland and Hungary to ease their transition to market economies. And in the Philippines, the Multilateral Assistance Initiative (MAI) has been responsible for nearly doubling the level of international assistance to this struggling democracy. In our own hemisphere, we are working with our world-wide partners to assist in clearing arrearages of Panama and Nicaragua to the international financial institutions and to help finance the enhanced debt strategy. And just last month, the United States and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries joined together with Central America, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela to create the Partnership for Democracy and Development in Central America, a new multilateral grouping designed to support regional democratization and economic development. Finally, we are encouraging Europe and Japan to join us in pledging $100 million a year over 5 years to create a Multilateral Investment Fund for Latin America and the Caribbean. This fund is a key part of the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and will play a crucial role in enabling countries to move from aid to trade and private investment as the principal engines of economic growth. In each case, both strong US leadership and a community of interests are essential to catalyze a broad world-wide response. Four, we envision more creative use of trade and investment policies as vehicles to promote US interests in world economic growth, as well as to enhance our own economic strength. Central to these efforts over the past 4 years has been our determination to pursue a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. We continue to believe that the Uruguay Round has profound political as well as economic implications for the shape of the world in the next century. Successful conclusion of the round is essential for the economic growth and stability of the emerging East European democracies, as well as the wide range of developing countries who ultimately will rely on expansion of world trade--not aid--as the primary vehicle to generate employment opportunities and sustainable economic growth. In our own hemisphere, the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative represents a comprehensive effort to promote economic growth and stability in the region, combining free trade and investment--the primary vehicles for growth--with debt relief and environmental initiatives. As I noted above, as an important step toward the eventual goal of hemispheric free trade, the Administration is seeking a North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada, which we are convinced promises important economic benefits for all three countries. A North American Free Trade Agreement will create the world's largest market, worth over $6 trillion a year and including more than 360 million consumers. There is a tremendous amount at stake for our economic future, foreign policy, trade policy, and historic reconciliation with Mexico. Meanwhile, the United States has worked actively with our Asian partners in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to advance market-oriented cooperation among member states. Our bilateral investment treaty program has been an important vehicle in ensuring an open and liberal investment climate for US investors and exporters. Over the past year, we completed negotiations with Poland and Czechoslovakia and are actively negotiating with nine other countries which are in the process of undertaking economic restructuring programs. Finally, we will be challenged to pursue more vigorous US diplomacy, and will seek a State Department operations budget that reflects an activist approach to the diplomatic challenges of a changing world.
Bilateral Assistance
Bilateral military and economic assistance will remain an essential tool in advancing US interests through the 1990s, assuming the necessary flexibility can be provided to meet emerging needs. No other vehicle at our disposal is as well-suited to provide timely support to our allies and friends around the world. Our interests in political pluralism, market-driven economic development, peace- making, and strengthening alliances--can all be advanced by prudent use of bilateral assistance resources. For FY 1992, our request for discretionary budget authority for bilateral assistance programs totals $13.1 billion. That marks a 6.5% increase over the $12.3 billion appropriated by Congress for FY 1991. Highlights of this request by category are as follows: -- $4.65 billion in FMF, supporting a program level of $4.92 billion; -- $3.24 billion in ESF, up from $3.14 billion; -- $1.3 billion in development assistance, the same as the prior year; -- $800 million for the Development Fund for Africa; -- $400 million for Central and Eastern Europe, a slight increase over the FY 1991 appropriation; -- $160 million for the Multilateral Assistance Initiative for the Philippines; -- $1.3 billion for bilateral PL 480 [Food for Peace] food aid, supporting the export of 5.9 million metric tons of US commodities; -- $172 million for that portion of the Administration's international counter-narcotics program implemented by the State Department.
Near East and South Asia ($6.2 billion)
. The Middle East has been profoundly affected by the Gulf war and the economic turmoil associated with the conflict. Although the war is now over, the economic dislocations and hardships continue. In our bilateral assistance request, we continue to focus our efforts to promote peace and stability on our traditional partners, Israel ($3 billion) and Egypt ($2.3 billion). Additional costs which regional states have incurred as a result of the crisis are being compensated through efforts of the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group, bilateral donors, and the international financial institutions. In partnership with our friends and allies, we are working on developing mechanisms to catalyze the resources needed to support the efforts of these countries to achieve sustained economic growth. Reflecting developments associated with the crisis and our own budgetary limitations, assistance levels for Jordan and Yemen have been set at $57 million and $3 million, respectively. We also are requesting $24 million in assistance for Tunisia for FY 1992. We hope to be able to support Pakistan's development and security needs with a substantial assistance program and have set aside $260 million in total FY 1992 resources for this purpose. Provision of this assistance, however, will be contingent on the ability of Pakistan to satisfy the standards set in the Pressler Amendment.
East Asia and the Pacific ($702 million)
. In Asia, our principal assistance request is for the Philippines, for which we seek a total of $556 million in total FY 1992 bilateral funding, including a commitment of $160 million toward the Multilateral Assistance Initiative. This funding is designed to strengthen a fragile democracy and promote economic reform. We also are nearing conclusion of negotiations that we hope will make possible our continued use of Philippines military facilities and help build a new, more balanced relationship. Other highlights of our request for East Asia include $27.5 million for Cambodia to support the achievement of a comprehensive settlement based on a UN-supervised free election. We expect to support community development, leadership and human rights training, and election efforts--as well as continuing to meet the very special needs of the children of Cambodia.
Europe ($1.6 billion)
. The Administration's FY 1992 request for Europe includes $400 million for the Special Assistance Initiative for Central and Eastern Europe, a slight increase over our FY 1991 appropriation. In accordance with authorizing legislation, these funds support a broad spectrum of activities, including democratic initiatives to assist with political and social reform, and support for economic reform, including environmental and energy projects, enterprise funds, and technical assistance. Contributing to the military capabilities of our NATO allies in the Southern Flank remains a central concern for US policy in the Mediterranean. Recognizing the pivotal role played by Turkey in the Persian Gulf crisis, we seek $625 million in FMF and $75 million in ESF funding for FY 1992, a combined increase of $150 million over FY 1991 levels. Turkey took the lead in the enforcement of economic sanctions against Iraq and has taken a courageous position in support of the UN resolutions despite severe domestic economic costs. This crisis has demonstrated Turkey's on-going need for air defense support and other military equipment to bolster its role as a key regional partner, both in Europe and the Middle East. For Greece, we seek $350 million in FMF to assist with Greek force modernization. We also seek $125 million in FMF and $40 million in ESF for Portugal to support force modernization efforts and assist in the development of the Azores region where US forces are based.
Latin America and the Caribbean ($2.1 billion).
For foreign assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, we seek $2.1 billion in total funding, the bulk of which will be used to support the Andean Narcotics Initiative and the emerging democracies of Central America. To implement the President's Andean strategy, we are seeking a total of $481 million in combined narcotics control, development assistance, and security assistance funding. These programs provide funding for bilateral counter-narcotics efforts, coordinated military assistance, and economic aid to offset the dislocations of successful counter-narcotics operations and provide alternatives to narcotics production. To support democratization and economic growth in Central America, we are seeking $783 million in total bilateral assistance, down from $906 million the prior year. As in prior years, over three-fourths of this amount will support economic as opposed to military assistance. We believe that sustaining these programs is crucial to the opportunity to end the conflicts in both El Salvador and Guatemala this year. We also are seeking $310 million in budget authority to cover the debt reduction provisions of the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, and, as discussed above, $100 million for the proposed multilateral investment fund.
Africa ($1 billion).
For FY 1992, the fifth year of the Development Fund for Africa, we seek $800 million in resources to promote broadly based and sustainable economic growth. Priority attention will continue to be given to those countries pursuing sound economic policies. We also are proposing modest amounts of ESF for Africa ($29.3 million), including a new regional "Support for African Democracy Fund." Our $34 million request for FMF request supports maintaining and replacing equipment supplied to our friends in past years and is almost exclusively non-lethal. In addition we are seeking almost $150 million in PL 480 food assistance. The United States already has provided approximately $550 million in debt forgiveness for qualifying African countries. In addition to bilateral assistance, the United States also provides important financial resources to Africa through institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank (about half of concessional disbursements), the African Development Bank and Fund, and many UN agencies. Our FY 1992 request for Africa is designed to encourage the growing movement toward responsible governance in Africa, particularly the trend toward pluralistic democracy.
Multilateral Assistance
For the multilateral development banks, we are requesting $1.7 billion in FY 1992 budget authority, up from $1.6 billion in FY 1991. This includes $1.1 billion in funding for the International Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank, which provides concessionary financing to the world's poorest countries, as well as full funding for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the other regional development banks. Our FY 1992 budget request also contains $12.2 billion in budget authority for the proposed increase in the US quota in the IMF, as provided for in the Budget Enforcement Act. This is to ensure that the fund has the resources necessary to fulfill its responsibilities as the world's principal monetary institution. In the Third World, IMF arrangements support market-oriented adjustment and underpin debt reduction operations in support of the Brady Plan. The Fund also has spearheaded economic reform in Eastern Europe and responded vigorously to assist countries seriously affected by the Persian Gulf crisis. In addition, we are seeking $250 million for voluntary contributions to international organizations including the UN Development Program ($115 million) and UNICEF [UN International Children's Emergency Fund] ($55 million).
Counter-narcotics Assistance
For the international narcotics control programs administered by the State Department, we are seeking $172 million, an increase of $22 million over FY 1991 levels. These funds serve as a critical element in motivating and assisting cooperative foreign governments to fulfill their narcotics control responsibilities. Over two-thirds of the increased funding requested for FY 1992 will support expanded programs in Latin America, with an emphasis on helicopters. Indeed, Latin American and regional aviation programs will absorb fully 80% of our total FY 1992 request.
Refugees and Other Assistance Programs
The United States continues to play a pre-eminent role in addressing the plight of the world's refugees through our international assistance and domestic resettlement programs, as well as our diplomatic efforts in support of permanent solutions to refugee situations. For FY 1992, we are requesting $491 million for migration and refugee assistance, up from $486 million in FY 1991. For our refugee assistance programs overseas, we seek $233 million in FY 1992 funding, a $20-million increase over the FY 1991 level. These programs will continue to focus on basic life- sustaining activities for the most vulnerable groups and support lasting solutions through opportunities for voluntary repatriation and local integration. To finance refugee admission and resettlement, we seek $192 million in FY 1992 funding. This will cover the expenses of an estimated 120,000 refugees--about the same number as last year. Most refugee admissions will be from the Soviet Union and Vietnam, but there also will be admissions from Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Near East. Family reunification will continue to be a priority, as will the resettlement of persecuted religious minorities and former political prisoners. In addition, we request $20 million to replenish the President's Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund, to enable us to respond to unforeseen refugee and migration needs world-wide. Another important component of our international development assistance request is our $200-million request for Peace Corps operating expenses. Thank you. We look forward to working with you and the members of this subcommittee in the coming months to mobilize the flexible resources we need to carry out our ambitious foreign affairs agenda. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991 Title:

The 89th Anniversary Of Cuban Independence

Aronson Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs Description: Address before the Cuban-American National Foundation's 10th Anniversary Meeting, Miami, Florida Date: May 20, 19915/20/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean Country: Cuba Subject: Democratization [TEXT] It's a special honor to speak to the Cuban American National Foundation on this, the 89th, anniversary of Cuban independence. As I look out on this audience and the larger Cuban-American community beyond these halls, I see a mirror of America. Like so many of our fellow citizens, including my own family, you or your parents or grandparents came to the United States fleeing oppression in hope of finding a better life. America offered all our families the promise of freedom, and we will always be grateful for what America gave us. But I think it is also important to note what you, the Cuban-American community, have given back to America. You did not come to the United States asking for charity; you came asking only for a chance--the opportunity to live in a democracy, to work hard, to improve your lives, to raise your children in the land of the free and the home of the brave. Many of you came to this country with literally nothing in your pockets, having been forced to leave behind all that you had worked for in Cuba. Yet you did not ask for a handout. Instead, you rolled up your sleeves and went to work. Many of you worked from dusk to dawn. In one generation, you raised families and educated your children. You started businesses, trained doctors and lawyers, and elected legislators, mayors, judges, and Members of Congress. You have become a vital part of this community and of this nation. My specialty is foreign policy, not domestic affairs. But I have no fear of contradiction in saying this: America is a richer, stronger, and freer nation because of the contribution of the Cuban-American community to these United States. But you did something more. You never forgot where you came from or the people you left behind. Instead, you kept faith with a vision of freedom and hope for the Cuban people on the island that you love and remember as your home. It is fitting on this day commemorating Cuban independence to remember that dream and to recommit ourselves to its fulfillment. I think you know that, today, the President of the United States shares that dream. Rather than describe his commitment to you, I think the President would prefer to speak in his own voice [see box on p. 378 for President's audio message]. Many of you remember a more hopeful time in Cuba's history. A revolution was waged 32 years ago in the name of democracy. Many of you fought in that struggle. The Cuban people were promised "Freedom with bread. Bread without terror." Today, instead, the people of Cuba have the freedom to stand in line waiting for bread. But if they grow tired standing in that line and try to trade away their place, they can be prosecuted by the state. Today, the Cuban people are told they must choose "socialism or death," but that is not a choice the Cuban people wish to make. For, in truth, it is only a choice between slow death and fast. As President Bush has stated clearly, we hope the Cuban people will enjoy a real choice--the opportunity to choose their own leaders and their own form of government in free and fair elections, as so many other governments of this hemisphere have carried out. Today, as we look to our south, every Latin government in this hemisphere except Cuba is headed by a democratically elected head of state. Every other island in the Caribbean is led by a democratically elected leader. Look at tiny, struggling Haiti which for two centuries enjoyed independence but never political liberty. Yet on February 7, I had the privilege to stand with other representatives of democratic nations and witness the first inauguration of a democratically elected leader of Haiti. The people of Nicaragua, the people of Chile, the people of Haiti, and the people of El Salvador have all enjoyed the right to choose their own leaders in a free and fair election. Why should the people of Cuba be denied? If elections in Cuba were truly free, if political prisoners were released, if opposition parties were allowed to organize and campaign without interference, and if television and radio and newspapers were open to every point of view, and if the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and other international observers could verify that the vote count was free and fair, real change and a real choice could come to Cuba finally. Cuba could join the nations of the hemisphere that have returned to democracy and respect the peace and security of its neighbors. Cuba's wealth would no longer be squandered buying surface-to-air missiles and bombs to send to violent revolutionary groups in Central America; it could be used to build factories, farms, bridges, and schools. The Cuban people would enjoy the fruits of their own labor instead of having to work for the state. They could actually buy the things they want and need, from razor blades and shampoo to housing and gasoline. The Cuban people could decide their own futures, freely visit other countries and return to Cuba, choose a profession, study abroad, and still enjoy Cuban life to the fullest. The youth of Cuba would no longer be sent to fight on foreign soil for causes that they do not understand. They could walk the Malecon with a lover or go to the beach on a beautiful summer day. Instead, today, hundreds of Cubans risk their lives every year on small boats and inner tubes, desperate to escape Cuba and what the future holds for them. The United States has no blueprint for Cuba. We do not claim the right to order the affairs of that nation. That is a right only the Cuban people should enjoy through a democratic process. All we hope for is genuine self-determination and change that can come peacefully. No one wishes to see violence, trauma, and suffering for the Cuban people. The people of Cuba are told they face some threat of invasion from the United States. But this is not true, and I believe the Cuban people know it. The United States does not threaten Cuba. The American people respect and have affection for the Cuban people. President Bush has made clear, the United States harbors no aggressive intentions toward any nation in this hemisphere, including Cuba. This false threat is just another excuse to deny the Cuban people the right to determine their own destiny, and it is the oldest excuse of all--national security. This Administration would like nothing more than to welcome Cuba back into the democratic community in this hemisphere. What President Bush called for in his statement is not a set of goals written in Washington; they represent the fundamental principles embodied in the Charter of the OAS: democracy, the defense of human rights, and respect for other nations. The call for free elections in Cuba does not originate in Miami or New York. It is the plea of Cubans in Havana, Santiago, and Matanzas, and the government of Cuba would hear that plea if it only let its citizens speak. It is easy to be discouraged after 32 years of promises betrayed, but I believe there is reason for hope. This generation of Americans, North and South, is constructing something the world has never seen before: the world's first completely democratic hemisphere. Some day the Cuban people will be part of that great democratic hemisphere. And when they are, the people of Cuba will long remember the entire Cuban American community, who never lost faith, who never gave up hope, who refused to allow the dream of democracy in Cuba to die. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991 Title:

The 89th Anniversary of Cuban Independence

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Audio Message by President Bush (also broadcast on Radio Marti Date: May 17, 19915/17/91 Region: Caribbean Country: Cuba Subject: Democratization [TEXT] On May 20th, Cuban Americans commemorate the 89th anniversary of Cuban independence, a day that celebrates the heroic efforts of the people who forged the Cuban republic. The history of our two countries is closely intertwined. During our own revolution, when American troops were short on supplies, the women of Havana banded together and raised money for the cause of American freedom and independence. Eighty-two years later, Cubans banded together and, after a long, brutal struggle, built their own republic. Today, we remember that victory for freedom and hope for its renewal in Cuba. Freedom demands sacrifices. And the battle for freedom draws upon people's most heroic instincts and abilities. Jose Marti, a hero of freedom, the father of Cuban independence, said, "To witness a crime in silence is like committing it." So, today, we again reiterate unwavering commitment for a free and democratic Cuba. Nothing shall turn us away from this objective. I ask Fidel Castro to make this an Independence Day to remember. I call on Fidel Castro to free political prisoners in Cuba and allow the UN Commission on Human Rights to investigate possible human rights violations in Cuba. I challenge Mr. Castro to let Cuba live in peace with its neighbors. And I challenge Mr. Castro to follow the examples of countries like Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Chile in their achievement of new democracies. Put democracy to a test--permit political parties to organize and a free press to thrive. Hold free and fair elections under international supervision. Ninety-nine percent of the people of this hemisphere live either in a democracy or a country that is on the road to democracy. One percent live under the hemisphere's last dictator, Fidel Castro. On Cuban Independence Day, our goals for the Cuban nation, shared by Cubans everywhere, are plain and clear. Freedom and democracy, Mr. Castro--not sometime, not some day, but now. If Cuba holds fully free and fair elections under international supervision, respects human rights, and stops subverting its neighbors, we can expect relations between our two countries to improve significantly. Thank you, and may God bless the freedom-loving people of Cuba and the United States. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991 Title:

Update on Iraqi Refugees And Displaced Persons

Lyman Source: Princeton N. Lyman, Director Of the Bureau for Refugee Programs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC Date: May 20, 19915/20/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Turkey, Iran Subject: Refugees, United Nations, Immigration [TEXT] I appreciate this opportunity to provide an update on the crisis of the Iraqi refugees and displaced people. This crisis has been a human tragedy of tremendous proportions, magnified by the rapidity with which it happened. Some 2 million people fled Saddam Hussein's brutal crackdown of unsuccessful rebellions, seeking safety in or on the border of neighboring countries. We and the international community have been committed to providing sustenance, care, and protection to these people. After an initial period in which people suffered and died, we and our coalition partners have provided sufficient life-sustaining humanitarian assistance to have drastically reduced the initial tragic death rate of children, the elderly, and other innocent victims of this terrible situation. Further, we have assisted in fostering conditions to allow many refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes. In my last appearance before the subcommittee on April 15, I discussed the background to the crisis. Let me now turn to an update of the situation.
Current Situation
Over the past month, there has been considerable improvement in the plight of the refugees and displaced persons in all the areas which have been affected: Turkey, northern Iraq, Iran, and southern Iraq. Relief systems have been put into place, people moved into more accessible and suitable areas, more assistance is being provided more efficiently, and death rates have gone down markedly. The United States and other allied forces have established a safety zone in northern Iraq, and voluntary repatriation, which began about April 30, has turned into a flood. The United Nations has started to move into place and has issued a revised and consolidated appeal. We are now working to assure a transition to the medium- term protection and assistance effort under UN auspices and to further the long-term goal of facilitating the ability of all of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safe and secure conditions. I will now outline the status of the situation in each of the areas where refugees and displaced have concentrated and the steps we are taking to try to assure an effective turnover to the United Nations.
The Turkey Border Region and Northern Iraq
As you know, the tremendously fast buildup of this crisis started following the last weekend of March and coincided with harsh weather and logistical conditions. This region of southeastern Turkey, one of the poorest and most inaccessible in the country, was woefully ill-equipped to support such a massive population influx. Local villagers, generous in their assistance, were coming under an insupportable strain, and government of Turkey resources, even with UN assistance, were overwhelmed by the sheer numbers needing help on the 165-mile-long border. When an effective international response to the situation on the Turkish border could not be mobilized fast enough, and President Ozal of Turkey requested emergency assistance, the President directed the US military to begin an emergency air-drop relief mission on Sunday, April 7, for the refugees along the mountainous border between Turkey and Iraq. The international community worked to get a relief system in place to provide bulk food, shelter, and medical care. However, moving food and other emergency aid to the refugees in the mountains along the border could only be a stopgap measure. The only way to save lives and provide adequate shelter, food, and medical care to the refugees was to get them down off the mountains. Therefore, on April 16, President Bush announced that US troops would enter northern Iraq to create a safe area in the flat lands around Zakhu. This decision followed discussions with our allies, particularly with [British] Prime Minister Major, [French] President Mitterrand, and President Ozal. Taking such a step was fully consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 688, which had been passed on April 5. In addition, a memorandum of understanding was negotiated between the Secretary General's Executive Delegate [for Humanitarian Assistance for Iraqi Refugees] Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan and the government of Iraq on April 18. This memorandum calls for the United Nations to provide humanitarian assistance throughout the country and requires the Iraqi government both to facilitate relief assistance and to allow the United Nations to work wherever it believes necessary. As part of the memorandum, the United Nations is to establish a series of UN humanitarian centers, staffed with international personnel under the auspices of the United Nations. These centers are to serve as relay stations for refugees who eventually choose to return to their homes under UN protection. Operation Provide Comfort for the refugees and displaced persons in Turkey and massed at the border has been the largest US relief effort mounted in modern military history. The US military was soon joined by forces provided by United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, and the Netherlands, to assist the Turkish government and the Turkish Red Crescent Society in providing food and emergency care for the refugees. UN agencies and private voluntary organizations have also been providing assistance from the beginning of the crisis. Since early April, the situation along the Turkish border has improved considerably. Up to 20 camp sites were established in Sirnak and Hakkari Provinces. The most vulnerable segments of the refugee population were moved down from the camps with the most serious conditions to better sites inside Turkey at Silopi and Semdinli. By May 3, death rates had dropped, there was a several- day surplus of food in most of the camps, bulk food had increasingly replaced meals-ready-to-eat (MREs), and a measles vaccination program (coordinated by UNICEF) had begun. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the death rate at Yekmal had dropped from 30 per day to 3, while the death rate from the worst camps at Isikveren had declined from approximately 50 per day in early April to 16 per day by early May. As noted earlier, the informal voluntary repatriation from the Turkish border area, which started at the end of April, has turned into a flood. As of May 16, the Department of Defense estimated that 170,300 refugees remained on the border, down from an original total of almost half a million. An average of more than 10,000 refugees a day have been returning to northern Iraq from Turkey. Several camps along the border have been closed, including Isikveren--which held at least 80,000 people on April 21, 40,000 on April 30, and 5,000 on May 13. The camp at Uzumlu held 70,000 refugees on April 30 and had a population of 15,000 on May 15. The only large camp remaining is Cukurca, and it is expected that this site will be closed within a month. The Turkish government has, throughout the crisis, been a major source of help to the refugees--it spent $93.4 million in April alone for the care of the refugees and is one of the largest donors--despite the burdens, both economic and political, placed on the country. The government has spent about $1.6 million per day for refugee care and has absorbed costs for moving food supplies to remote border locations. As I have mentioned before, the military contribution has been outstanding, and the cooperation among coalition forces and with the Turkish authorities and military has been excellent. As of May 17, there were 20,700 coalition troops from 11 nations--troops from Italy, Spain, Australia, and Belgium have joined those mentioned before--doing humanitarian work in Turkey and northern Iraq; more than half--11,700--are from the United States. Meanwhile, in the Zakhu area of northern Iraq, US, British, and French military forces worked to secure the area and build temporary encampments, one of which has become a humanitarian center under UN control. Troops from the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy are also working in the area. US military officials also persuaded the Kurdish Pesh Merga resistance to remove roadblocks stopping refugees from returning to Iraq. Many of the returnees appear to have gone to their homes in and around Zakhu town. The population of the three camps at Zakhu was about 52,000 on May 16; Zakhu I and II are now full. Construction of Zakhu III was begun on May 13. The coalition forces are planning to build up to five more camps in the Zakhu area. US and coalition military forces have secured territory within a 30-kilometer radius from Zakhu east through Amadiyah to Suriya and as far south as the northern outskirts of Dahok. According to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) Disaster Assistance Response Team, preliminary indications are that all but about 30,000-50,000 of the refugees on the Turkish border are from the areas of Zakhu, Dahok, and areas further east. One reason for the rapid buildup of the population at the encampments at Zakhu is that many of the returnees from the Dahok region continue to express unwillingness to go home under present security circumstances. Dahok-area residents account for up to half or more of those in the Turkish border region, creating a potentially large camp population in the secure zone of northern Iraq if the security situation in Dahok is not resolved. Truck convoys of relief supplies flying UN flags arrived in Zakhu on April 30 from both Silopi, Turkey, and Baghdad. The UN's Special Envoy in Turkey, Stefan Di Mistura, and 15 staff members accompanied one of the convoys and established a small operations site close to the Zakhu temporary settlement. A week ago today, the UN flag was raised at the first Zakhu camp in a ceremony. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, who last week returned from a visit to the region, has told us that UN takeover of the coalition effort would accelerate in the next few weeks.
Iran Border Region
At the same time as the explosion of refugees moving toward Turkey occurred at the beginning of April, there were even more rushing to Iran for sanctuary. The international community has taken major steps to alleviate the plight of these people. At the beginning of the crisis, the government of Iran and the Iranian Red Crescent Society, with help from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LICROSS), mobilized quickly to meet initial demands. As the number of refugees grew rapidly, the Iranian government publicly appealed for international assistance on April 12. There are now still about 1 million Iraqi refugees in this region, concentrated in the provinces of west Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Bakhtaran, Ilam, and Khuzistan. Up to this point, the lead operational international agency in Iran has been the ICRC. However, the ICRC is now shifting its emphasis to inside Iraq as the UNHCR has expanded its capability in the area. The Iranian Red Crescent Society, with assistance from the ICRC and LICROSS, is providing shelter, food, and medical care to 500,000 refugees located in 56 camps. Others are housed in military facilities, homes, and villages, but about one-third are still lacking shelter. The Iranian Red Crescent Society has sent 6,000 staff members to work in the camps. The ICRC has had more than a hundred expatriate personnel working in Iran and has provided medical supplies, blankets, tents, and food and has had a primary role in setting up camps. The UNHCR, in addition to staff in Tehran, has established a presence in west Azerbaijan, Bakhtaran, and Kurdistan, the three provinces with the highest number of refugees. The World Food Program is providing over 48,000 tons of food, sufficient to feed 1 million people for 3 months. A private French medical group is also assisting 10,000 refugees. While the United States has taken the lead in mobilizing and providing assistance along the Turkish border, the European Community, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and other European donors are providing significant amounts of aid to Iran and proportionately more assistance than to the refugees in Turkey. About 70% of the EC's assistance, for example, is going to the Iran theater. Despite a lack of relations with Iran, the United States also responded to the Iranian government appeal and offered direct assistance. After modalities were worked out with Iran, a US military flight, loaded with blankets donated by the private sector, arrived in Tehran on April 27. In addition, through the Bureau for Refugee Programs, we have provided multilateral assistance comprising $12 million to the UNHCR and $7 million to the ICRC for the relief activities throughout the region, including Iran. Informal voluntary repatriation appears to have started from Iran as well as from Turkey. According to the United Nations, the returnee flow appears to be a response to assumptions about security arrangements as well as to agricultural and economic factors. Poor conditions in camps in Iran may also be a motivating factor. It is still unclear how large the flow of returnees from Iran is. The ICRC believes that there may be up to 5,000-10,000 persons a day returning to Iraq from Iran, mostly along the Piranshah-Irbil route, while the UNHCR estimates that 5,000 refugees are leaving per province per day (for a total of up to 20,000 per day). The returnees appear to be able to pass Iraqi government checkpoints from Pesh Merga-controlled territory with little difficulty. Most of these returnees seem to be going to areas south of the coalition secure zone. However, these are preliminary indications.
Southern Iraq
The area occupied by US forces in southern Iraq posed a special problem. With the collapse of the rebellion in southern Iraq in March, about 100,000 people fled the area to Iran and the US- occupied zone. About 30,000 persons received protection, food, medical care, and other assistance from US troops. As US forces withdrew from this area, UN observer forces (UNIKOM) were deployed in the demilitarized zone along the Iraqi- Kuwaiti border. The United States worked closely with the ICRC and UNHCR to arrange for their taking over assistance to those who had fled to the occupied zone. However, because of concerns that UNIKOM would not be able to provide adequate protection after the departure of US troops and [because] the area reverted to Iraqi control for those in the occupied zone who had been involved in anti-regime activities, the government of Saudi Arabia--which had been administering a camp just over its border in the occupied zone of Iraq--agreed to provide first asylum protection to persons from that camp, from the Safwan area, and to some displaced civilians in a camp just inside Kuwait by moving them to a new camp inside Saudi Arabia near Rafha. The movement of displaced civilians in Safwan to the Rafha camp in Saudi Arabia was completed by the US military on May 9; 6,270 people were moved in this operation. About 11,000 displaced civilians in Al Sadah, the Saudi-administered camp in southern Iraq, have also been transported to Rafha. In addition, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) completed the move of close to 2,000 Iraqi Shias of Iranian descent from the Safwan camp to Iran on April 29. Although it is now difficult for us to obtain reliable and detailed information on conditions in southern Iraq, we are concerned that health and sanitation conditions could deteriorate in this area. Some of this is clearly the result of the Iraqi government's brutal suppression of opponents and its lack of attention to restoring services in this area. We are hopeful that the UN will be able to convince the Iraqi government to turn attention to this region. This is where we are now, about 7 weeks since the crisis began: mostly stabilized situations in the neighboring countries, a relief system in place--extending from the countries of first asylum into the refugees' home areas in northern Iraq--and a flow of voluntary repatriation.
Transition to UN Management
We have also had progress toward moving to the next phase: the turnover of the protection and relief activities to the United Nations. The UN has moved a long way in the last 7 weeks, by purchasing and supplying millions of dollars of relief goods into Turkey and Iran, concluding the memorandum of understanding, setting up a presence in Zakhu and Dahok, issuing appeals, and moving staff into place in the affected region. More has to be done, however, before the United Nations can--in effect--replace the extraordinary bilateral efforts of the US and allied military. In addition, the United Nations, along with the ICRC, is working to establish humanitarian centers wherever necessary inside Iraq and at the border regions in order to provide humanitarian relief to the refugees and displaced persons. Such a presence is necessary wherever the refugees and displaced happen to be: in northern Iraq, further inside the country, along the Turkish border, in Iran, in southern Iraq, and in the Rafha camp of Saudi Arabia. The ICRC has already established such presence in the border areas, including Irbil, Dahok, and Kani Masi, and plans to expand its presence to Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. As noted, the United Nations has begun to establish its presence in northern Iraq, starting with Zakhu and Dahok. The UNHCR plans to have a presence in nine sites in northern Iraq and to send out mobile teams from these sites. One problem has been funding. Despite an outpouring of generosity from the international community of more than $700 million since the beginning of April--and I would note that this is in addition to the $435 million provided for the two earlier movements of displaced people from Iraq and Kuwait--much of this has been in bilateral assistance or in pledges. It is necessary to turn the pledges into tangible donations so that the United Nations can have the cash to expand its operations. On May 15, the United Nations issued a revised and coordinated appeal, which delineates responsibilities by theater of operations and agency and makes it easier for donors to contribute to programs in each major theater of the UN's humanitarian responsibility. The appeal calls for $415 million for a 4-month period ending August 31, 1991. This 4-month timeframe takes into account that the significant movement of returnees will continue to occur through the summer of 1991. About 73% of the programs of the appeal are directed toward refugees or returnees. To further facilitate the UN takeover of the relief operation, we have suggested that a meeting take place in Geneva, UNHCR headquarters, or in the region of all those agencies involved in the humanitarian operation and in the transition planning-- representatives from Prince Sadruddin's office, the UNHCR, the European Command, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the State Department, the Department of Defense, and Embassy Ankara--to agree on all aspects of the operational turnover of the relief operation.
Protection
The longer-term goal, as I indicated at the outset of my testimony, is to enable the refugees and displaced to return to their homes. The issue of protection thus is of great importance. Initially, the presence of US and allied forces, reinforced by the withdrawal of Iraqi military units, for the allied area of operations offers protection for those returning. The next step is for the United Nations and ICRC to establish a presence throughout northern Iraq which can not only provide assistance, but also ensure that Iraq, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 688, does not interfere with international humanitarian activities. They would bear witness to any violation of that resolution and to any persecution of the people in the region. The resolution makes clear that any violation, as well as the general treatment by Iraq of its population, will have a bearing on the lifting of economic sanctions against Iraq. There is also discussion underway of a lightly armed UN guard force to help protect international humanitarian relief activities. Prince Sadruddin and other UN officials have been discussing this idea with the Iraqi government. We are prepared to examine this proposal once negotiations have proceeded further. Further, the outcome of negotiations between Kurdish rebels and the Iraqi government will be an additional factor affecting the security situation.
US Contribution
Acting on the President's directive of April 5, US military forces have orchestrated the international relief effort in Turkey and northern Iraq. In addition, the United States has been in the forefront of contributors to alleviating this crisis. To date, the United States has committed $207.6 million toward the plight of the refugees. Of this amount, approximately $140 million in goods and services has come from Department of Defense sources, and I would point out that this figure does not include the pay of the nearly 12,000 servicemen and women who are carrying out this program. Their performance has been outstanding as has every level of the US military in carrying out a truly unprecedented humanitarian relief operation. I cannot say enough about the speed, commitment, and effectiveness with which our military is responding. Thousands are alive today because of their rapid response. OFDA has provided strong support to the military effort and to the establishment of a reliable relief effort inside Iraq. OFDA has obligated $12.9 million toward these objectives. OFDA also assembled a 17-person Disaster Assistance Response Team to provide expertise to assist in every aspect of the relief effort. USAID has also committed nearly 50,000 metric tons of food, delivered or on its way to the region, and valued at $31.6 million, of Food for Peace assistance. From the President's Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance account, we have provided $23 million. These funds have gone to the UNHCR and ICRC for the most part, and $2 million were allocated for emergency procurement in Turkey for water, baby food, and other urgently needed items. The Administration appreciates the prompt action of both houses of Congress in responding to the President's request for supplemental appropriations. The recently passed supplemental appropriations bill provides $125 million for State Department and USAID emergency programs for the Gulf region, $25.5 million for peace-keeping activities, and $85 million in additional funding for the emergency refugee and disaster assistance accounts. We plan to program the funds appropriated for the migration and refugee assistance account to assist in making the next phase of the relief effort--the international phase run by the United Nations-- successful in providing assistance to the refugees and returnees and, depending on the security arrangements, in assisting the reintegration of the returnees into their communities. The $85 million for replenishment of funds expended is also very important. This will enable us to address, I am sorry to say, humanitarian crises of equal or greater magnitude in many parts of Africa and, more recently, Bangladesh. The bill also includes the authority to transfer such sums as may be necessary from the Persian Gulf Regional Defense Fund to the Department of Defense for the incremental costs of humanitarian assistance in this effort.
Conclusion
In conclusion, let me say that the world should not ever forget the cruelty and destruction caused by the regime of Saddam Hussein that lie at the heart of this crisis. As the United States now commits personnel and resources to respond to the horrible tragedy in Bangladesh, and as we mourn for its many victims, we must not forget that the cause of human suffering in Iraq is wholly different. This tragedy is not from a freak of nature but from the deliberate actions of a ruler against his own people. It need not have happened at all. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991 Title:

US Relations With East Asia and the Pacific: A New Era

Solomon Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Description: Statement before the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: May 17, 19915/17/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia, Pacific Country: Japan, South Korea, China, North Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Mongolia, New Zealand, Burma, Taiwan Subject: POW/MIA Issues, Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales, Development/Relief Aid, Democratization [TEXT] I appreciate this opportunity to present an overview of US policy in the East Asia-Pacific region in the context of our corresponding FY 1992 bureau request.
Dilemmas of Success
In preparing this testimony, I reflected on how dramatically the region has changed from the time 20 years ago when I first came to Washington to serve in the government. In the early 1970s, the region was engulfed in war and great power confrontation, burdened by millennial poverty, and challenged by aggressive communist movements. The list of our aid recipients in Asia was a long one; and our trade with the region was smaller than our commerce with Latin America. The subsequent decades have brought transforming developments to East Asia and the Pacific. The region is largely at peace today, with the ideals and objectives of economic growth and political and social advancement increasingly realized. This changed environment, in no small measure, reflects the effectiveness of our past policies and actions in this area of the world. Our security presence, cumulative aid and investment, and emphasis on open markets, political pluralism and human rights have all contributed to the coming of age of East Asia and the Pacific. The region is now one of the engines of global growth, and increasingly people speak of a coming Pacific century. Our investment in blood and treasure in the Asia-Pacific region over the past 45 years has thus yielded substantial dividends for American interests. Our bilateral and multilateral economic assistance has helped East Asia become the most economically dynamic region in the world, a force for open trade and investment, and our most promising market for the future. Our forward- deployed military presence and security assistance has helped forge bilateral defense relationships fundamental to regional stability. Despite some setbacks to the global trend toward democratization- -most dramatically in China and Burma, and most recently in Thailand--political development is clearly evident in the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and now even Mongolia. And I am pleased to report that Thailand appears to be on the road back to democracy. Yet our successes have also generated a new set of challenges to major bilateral relations in East Asia. The US-Japan relationship remains the keystone of our engagement in Asia, yet Japan also has become a robust economic competitor. Our relations with China have lost their Cold War compass and now are buffeted by a new set of concerns ranging from trade disputes and human rights matters to missile and nuclear proliferation. The Republic of Korea has prospered under our security umbrella to become a major economic and political player on the world stage. Dynamic economies such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia may well become Asia's next generation of developing "tigers" in the new millennium. Only the Philippines is now classified as a major recipient of US aid. And our defense relations and future security presence in the Philippines face an uncertain future. At the same time, our successes have also meant that many former aid recipients have moved beyond their previous state of need, thus reducing our aid requirements. Our current aid request of $702.5 million for East Asia and the Pacific is oriented primarily to the Philippines (nearly 80%). Moreover, this request represents only 5.8% of total US foreign assistance--down markedly from a decade ago. Our request is, thus, a quite modest investment in a region of great and growing importance to the US. Indeed, compared to Japan's aid programs, it is a minuscule request. Japan's official development assistance (ODA) to the Asia/Pacific region is roughly 10 times larger than our own--although their total ODA is slightly less than our own. In Indonesia, for example, Japan, provides $1.14 billion annually while the US provides $83 million. At a time when the world is in flux, our modest aid program is key to sustaining our influence in East Asia. It is an expression of our continuing engagement in this region as we seek to pursue our interests and ideals. Beyond a sizeable economic and security aid commitment to the Philippines, our FY 1992 aid request also includes economic and security assistance designed to advance prosperity, democratization, and security throughout the Asia/Pacific region. For example, we are requesting $56.1 million in economic assistance to Indonesia--the fifth largest country in the world--a country which has implemented significant economic reform, where there is substantial US investment, and a country that is playing a key role in our search for a political settlement in Cambodia. We seek $12.3 million for Thailand (although currently in suspension), a treaty ally that provided significant support with limited resources during Desert Storm. We also seek a package of $19.6 million in economic and development assistance for the South Pacific islands, and $4 million to support the emerging democracy in Mongolia. In addition, we are requesting security assistance, principally IMET [International Military Education and Training], for Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia as well as for Korea. These are small programs which together total $6.7 million, but which are highly cost effective in terms of our important security relationships with these friends and allies.
The Realities of a New Era
Over the past few years, we have begun to see new economic and political relations take shape in East Asia and the Pacific. The region is becoming economically integrated in terms of both trans- Pacific and intra-Asian trade and investment. For the US, our two- way trade with the Asia-Pacific now exceeds $300 billion annually, more than one-third larger than our trans-Atlantic trade. New patterns of diplomacy and international cooperation are also unfolding. From normalized Sino-Soviet relations, North-South Korean talks, Moscow establishing relations with Seoul, Secretary Baker's meeting with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach last fall, or Mr. Gorbachev's unprecedented visit just last month to Japan and South Korea, the confrontations of the Cold War era are rapidly giving way to reconciliation and new patterns of cooperation. Amidst this broad sweep of change, however, we also see problems still lingering from the Cold War era: The heavily armed stand-off on the Korean Peninsula continues unabated, and conflict in Indochina has yet to be resolved. As we move from the Cold War years into a new cycle of history, we see, most poignantly in the recent war in the Persian Gulf, that the new era now taking shape poses its own--and no less daunting--challenges to international security and cooperation. From the tense but relatively stable bipolar world of US-Soviet confrontation, we are entering a time of uncertain and complex multipolar reality. We see a renascent ethno-nationalism and the re-emergence of regional antagonisms, ambitions, and suspicions long frozen during the Cold War period. We are entering an era of some daunting international contradictions. Power among nations is increasingly diffuse, yet nations are more interdependent than ever. Ancient feuds and rivalries are again being played out, yet with the destructive potential of readily accessible state-of-the- art weaponry. We are entering a world in which the information revolution--with its instantaneous flows of communications and capital on a global scale--is eroding the boundaries of the nation- state. Yet we lack adequate supra-national institutions to deal with problems of global scope--preserving the environment, halting illegal narcotics traffic, and managing refugee flows.
The US and Asia: Challenges of a New Era
Our broad policy challenge is to manage this mix of problems which linger from the Cold War era while giving institutional form to the new economic and political realities which will shape the world of the 21st century. Meeting this challenge requires sustained engagement. Mindful of the successes our policies have brought us over the past four decades, as we advance into the 1990s we must: -- Adjust our forward-deployed military presence in the region to a still uncertain security environment in ways that sustain our defenses and those of our allies--yet in ways that will forge more mature patterns of responsibility-sharing that reflect the enhanced capabilities and success of our allies and friends; -- Promote expanded US commercial activity in the region by realizing growing export and investment opportunities; -- Redress imbalances in our economic relations with Japan and build a solid foundation for realizing the possibilities of a US- Japan global partnership; -- Continue our engagement with China on issues of common concern, while making clear our desire to see the PRC [People's Republic of China] continue down the path of social and economic reform--including reforms that are responsive to our fundamental concern for human rights; -- Define a new relationship with the Philippines that will ensure continuing defense cooperation, advance economic development, and the consolidation of democratic institutions generated by the "EDSA" revolution of 1986; -- Reshape and strengthen our alliance with the Republic of Korea by encouraging the Koreans to assume responsibilities of leadership that are more commensurate with their new economic and military strengths, while maintaining our core commitment to Seoul's security; -- Continue our pursuit of a comprehensive settlement to the Cambodian conflict based on the UN-endorsed peace plan and the work of the Paris conference, the realization of which--along with progress on POW/MIA issues--could open the door to normalization of relations with Vietnam and to integrating both Vietnam and Cambodia into the region; [and] -- Deepen regional economic cooperation and build a consensus for free trade and investment, particularly through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Initiative (APEC). We view economic development as a common interest that holds the most promise for bringing greater cohesion to the Asia-Pacific region.
Fruits of our Policies: Asia and the Gulf War
The strength and durability of our bilateral alliance relationships in Asia were clearly illuminated by the forthcoming response of our allies and friends bring the recent Gulf crisis. I would like to address security issues in the region first by updating you on Asian support for coalition goals in the Gulf war. I am glad to say that support for Operation Desert Storm was timely, firm, and generous. It demonstrated the region's recognition that Saddam Hussein's aggression threatened peace and prosperity, in not just in Gulf, but in Asia and the Pacific as well. It has also demonstrated the region's dedication to the principle of collective security. As you know, Australia dispatched two warships and medical teams to the Gulf early on. South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and New Zealand sent medical teams. A number of countries have also contributed to the relief and evacuation of refugees from Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Let me focus on the contributions made by Japan and the Republic of Korea. Japan: In addition to providing unwavering political backing, the Japanese government also pledged more than $13 billion in support of the Gulf effort--the most substantial financial contribution of any of our non-Arab coalition partners. We appreciate these very substantial contributions to our efforts. As we grapple with post-war realities, I am confident that Japan will continue to play an active and important role in assisting the economic recovery and political stabilization of the region. As we witnessed during the Gulf crisis, Japan is in the process of defining its post-Cold War engagement in world affairs. However frustrating their internal debates may have been at times, we believe that Japan's leaders have seen in the Gulf crisis the importance of becoming active participants with the US in global crises. The US went through a similar process between the two World Wars; and as the fate of US support for the League of Nations demonstrated, building a national consensus for an active global role can be a very difficult business. We are confident, however, that given the broad convergence of US and Japanese interests, prospects for building a US-Japanese global partnership will be enhanced by the continuing debate on Japan's international role. We note Japan's recent dispatching of minesweepers to the Gulf as a sign that its debate is headed toward greater engagement. The Republic of Korea committed $220 million in cash and in kind to the Gulf effort last fall. It included $100 million in economic support for the front-line states and $120 million in cash, logistical support, and military supplies for coalition forces. In January, Korea committed another $280 million. The pledge included $130 million in cash, $50 million in kind, and $100 million for transportation costs and brought the total contribution to a solid $500 million. The Republic of Korea has contributed in more than financial terms. The Koreans were the first to provide wide-body air cargo flights from the US to the Gulf, and they provided five C-130 transports to coalition forces. In addition, a 154-member hospital support group worked in Saudi Arabia from January to April.
The Security Consensus and Regional Issues
If the region's backing for Desert Storm demonstrates a shared commitment to global security and UN peace-keeping efforts, then enhanced host nation support for US forces forward-deployed in the Pacific reflects broad support for our continuing security presence there. In this context, I call your attention to efforts made by Japan and the Republic of Korea to assume larger share of the responsibility of maintaining US forces on their territory. Japan. We are very pleased with the new host nation support (HNS) agreement with the Japanese government. I believe Japan's commitment to our alliance, the security treaty, and to a more equitable sharing of the costs of maintaining US forces in Japan is strong and warrants greater recognition than it has received to date. At present, Japan's support of US forces in Japan is $3 billion per year. In the 1991-95 period, Japan's total, cumulative HNS payments will approach some $17 billion. If military and civilian Department of Defense salaries are not included in US forces-Japan (USFJ) total costs, Japan would be paying more than 73% of the cost of our presence in Japan by 1995. The Administration and some in the Congress disagree about which costs related to our presence in Japan the government of Japan should pay. While we both agree that Japan should not pay USFJ salaries, the Congress has required, in the defense appropriations bill, that Japan pay for all other costs or face annual US troop reductions. We do not believe that Japan should pay all non-salary costs. Our objective should be to have Japan pay all appropriate yen-based costs. The new HNS agreement takes us considerably closer to that goal. Let me explain why we believe Japan should not pay all non- salary costs. With 73% of USFJ's non-salary costs to be paid by Japan in 1995, that leaves about 27% for the US to cover. This 27% consists largely of operational costs associated with running a military establishment no matter where it is located, such as training exercises, spare parts, and supplies. Asking Japan to cover all non-entitled costs could limit our operational flexibility. If the government of Japan is to pay for US operations, the government of Japan would naturally want some say in what those operations should be. I doubt that our commanders in the field desire this kind of an arrangement. South Korea. For many years, both Koreans and Americans viewed the Republic of Korea as a developing nation. By 1988, however, a generation of spectacular economic progress reached a point at which it was clear that the Republic of Korea could share additional responsibility for defending our common interests. With the East Asia Strategy Initiative (Nunn-Warner report) last year, we outlined a three-phased approach that will reshape our security partnership over the next decade. Under the provisions of the East Asia Strategy Initiative, approximately 7,000 US troops will be withdrawn from Korea by the end of 1992, and the South Korean government will begin to assume a leading role in its own defense while the US moves into a supporting role. Our requests for increased cost-sharing came as the entire US-Korean security relationship was in a period of natural evolution. South Korea, which has devoted a higher percentage of its GNP to defense expenditures than most of our allies--despite a lower level of national wealth--has of necessity been more deliberate in responding to our cost-sharing requests than some other allies. We have pressed Korea annually since 1988 for substantial increases in cost sharing. Our goals have been to prepare a multi-year plan under which Korean contributions would increase and to establish a set of general principles to guide cost- sharing implementation. In December we concluded an agreement with the Republic of Korea (ROK) government which provides a legal basis for the Republic of Korea to begin paying costs of Korean labor working for US forces Korea. The Korean government also signed a memorandum of understanding in which it committed to pay the full cost of moving US forces out of Seoul (Yongsan), estimated at between $1-3 billion. The Korean government has promised $43 million in 1991 for labor costs--an entirely new category. In all, South Korean contributions this year will be $150 million, more than double the 1990 level of $70 million. As we reshape our security relations with South Korea, it is important to keep in mind that the Korean Peninsula remains one of the world's most dangerous flash points. The North Korean threat is undiminished, as more than 1 million Democratic Republic of Korea troops--some 70% forward-deployed near the DMZ--face some 650,000 South Korean counterparts. Moreover, North Korea's nuclear program is a major concern throughout East Asia. Our force adjustments are aimed at creating a sustainable security commitment to the South Korean government while maintaining effective deterrence. Philippines. I would like to highlight our requests for continued economic and security assistance for the Philippines, which accounts for the majority of our entire aid request for the region. Nowhere are our interests and ideals better joined than in US policy toward the Philippines. The best investment we can make in a more prosperous and democratic Philippines is assistance that can help develop an economy able to provide an adequate standard of living for all of the Philippine people. Economic reform in the Philippines is a prerequisite for economic growth. With approximately one-half of the population living below the poverty line, economic reform is both a dire necessity and a challenge. A deadly earthquake, devastating floods, droughts, and the fallout from the December 1989 coup attempt and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait have made this challenge even more difficult. Many of our assistance programs, such as Economic Support Fund (ESF), direct assistance (DA), and the Multilateral Assistance Initiative (MAI), support policy reforms necessary to generate broadly based, self-sustaining growth. Our ESF program, for example, supports privatization, import liberalization, improved tax administration, better public sector resource management, and infrastructure development. Money committed under the MAI is predicated on policy reforms which complement these efforts. Furthermore, our strong support for the MAI encourages participation from other donor countries. MAI funds also have been used for technical assistance, natural resource management, and infrastructure development. We also encourage Philippine economic reform through our participation in the IMF (International Monetary Fund), World Bank, and Asian Development Bank. The Philippines also participates in our PL-480 program (Food for Peace). The Philippine government needs to fight the threats to democracy by military as well as economic means. The FMF (Foreign Military Financing) and IMET (International Military Education and Training Program) programs help equip and train the armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) to counter the threat from an estimated 17,000 communist guerrillas active throughout the country. Within the last year, the AFP has made headway in the struggle against the communist insurgency. It is imperative that the Philippine government maintain its momentum against the insurgency as well as threats from the political right, as manifested most dramatically by the December 1989 coup attempt which resulted in the loss of over 100 Philippine lives. Thailand. I would also like to focus on the situation in Thailand, a treaty ally which provided significant support for Operation Desert Storm, and an impressive economic success which experienced--what by all appearances is a temporary setback to democracy--earlier this year. This occurred on February 23, when Thai military forces took power in a bloodless coup d'etat, announced the abolition of the constitution, dissolved the appointed senate and the elected national assembly, and declared martial law. We issued a statement on the day of coup expressing our deep regret at these developments and urged that immediate steps be taken to return Thailand to civilian, democratic rule. Consistent with US policy and law, we suspended US military and economic assistance to Thailand. We are gratified that martial law ended on May 2, and on May 9 three acts restricting political activities were lifted. This followed promulgation of a provisional constitution on March 1 and the appointment of a largely civilian provisional government on March 6. Anan Panyarachun, the former Thai ambassador to the US, was named as interim prime minister. Former Prime Minister Chatichai and others detained as a result of the coup have been released. Formal press restrictions initiated after the coup have already been lifted, although most papers are practicing self- censorship; and political parties have remained in existence. An interim national assembly has begun to function, and has chosen a committee which is now drafting a new constitution. It appears the national peace-keeping council has recognized the necessity of an early return to democracy in Thailand: movement toward democratic elections for a civilian government are on track and the council has indicated that they may occur by the end of the year, but certainly no later than early next spring. Region-wide Security Issues. In more general terms, we and other East Asia-Pacific powers continue to see a need for security cooperation based principally on our formal bilateral security relations with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, as well as with the Philippines. While Soviet intentions may have changed, Soviet military deployments, while reduced in quantity, have undergone qualitative improvements through modernization programs. Quite apart from the Soviet military presence, there remains concern about that which cannot be foreseen. Indeed, were the Soviet presence to disappear, in the emerging security environment our role as regional balancer and honest broker would, if anything, be more important than ever in a region which continues to grow in importance to US interests. Thus, sustaining our bilateral security relationships is fundamental--not just for stability in the region, but also for enhancing our overall influence in East Asia and the Pacific. It is in this context that I would urge the Congress to view our security assistance programs, particularly, IMET. Fiscal stringency has led us to consider creative, effective, and low- cost ways of maintaining increasingly important security ties with our traditional friends. It is the unanimous opinion of our East Asian ambassadors and military commanders that IMET is the most cost-effective security assistance program we have. Training friendly and allied students in US schools improves the effectiveness of our alliances, exposes them to our values and ideals, and enhances the prospects for collaborative efforts in countering threats to regional security. I doubt that our operations in the Gulf could have been as successful as they were if hundreds of Saudi, Egyptian, and other coalition troops had not been trained in US military schools. IMET is an invaluable tool for building long- term defense relationships. Its potential dividends far outweigh the minimal investment. It is with such considerations in mind that we request a renewal of IMET for Malaysia. Nunn-Warner Report. As we seek to adapt our defense relationships to new circumstances, we concluded in last year's Nunn-Warner report that new strategic realities in East Asia, including the enhanced capabilities of Japan and South Korea, would allow us to reduce our forces in the region by 10 to 12% over 3 years without loss of combat capability. These adjustments have already begun, and in excess of 15,000 personnel will be withdrawn by December 1992. We have reached agreement with our allies on both our future force structure and, as I have mentioned, their contributions to the common defense. We also have successfully concluded an access agreement with Singapore which will permit expanded US use of their facilities. We believe that we have secured allied understanding of our continuing presence and are consulting closely on establishing proper force levels to ensure that we can meet our defense and treaty obligations in the region. Collective Security Forums. Some observers have suggested that the states of East Asia establish a collective security forum similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). East Asia is a region so vastly different from Europe in terms of its history, cultural diversity, levels of economic development, and geopolitical architecture that imposing the logic of European security is simply inappropriate. The Cold War did not weld the region into two opposing blocs; and there is no single threat commonly perceived across the region. Instead, there is a multiplicity of security concerns that vary from one country to another, from one sub-region to another. The one important exception is the Korean Peninsula where European-style confidence- building measures and CFE-type [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] arms reduction initiatives seem to make sense. I would also add that there are good prospects for increasing cooperation among the major powers of East Asia in support of the North-South Korean dialogue, tension-reduction efforts, and ultimately, the guaranteeing of outcomes reached through negotiation between the two Korean governments. The concept guiding our approach to Asian security is that solutions be fashioned which fit the character of the problem. Some of the collective security proposals we have seen strike us as solutions in search of problems. As in the case of Korea, when states have a direct interest in the solution of regional tensions, we welcome their participation. Our work on the Cambodia settlement with the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, the Paris conference [on Cambodia], and the ASEAN countries is a good example of our approach to the resolution of regional conflicts. We see the region's problems addressed more appropriately by adapting existing institutions to new circumstances, working through the UN, and/or forging ad hoc coalitions of states suited to the nature of the problem rather than by working through a large, unwieldy and ill- defined region-wide collective security forum. Relations With Vietnam and Laos. We believe the time has come--as Secretary Baker told Soviet Republic of Vietnam Foreign Minister Thach in New York last fall--to turn a new page in history and seek reconciliation and the development of a normal, productive relationship with Vietnam. This requires attaining a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian conflict and resolving the POW/MIA issue. Last month, I met with Vietnam's UN ambassador and presented a "road map" of how we could normalize relations quite rapidly in a four-phase, confidence-building process. We are prepared to move ahead on normalization, but Hanoi's active cooperation in achieving a Cambodia settlement and in resolving the fate of American POW/MIAs must be central to the deal if we are to proceed in a way that has the support of the American people and brings stability to all the countries of Indochina. For whatever reasons, Hanoi and Phnom Penh have hesitated in moving forward to support the UN settlement process for Cambodia. We and other governments involved in the Paris Conference are trying to address their concerns within the context of the Permanent Five settlement framework which has the support of the UN Security Council and General Assembly as well as the Paris Conference co-chairmen. Hanoi's cooperation is somewhat more evident on humanitarian issues. With Vietnam's active support, we are rapidly expanding the Orderly Departure Program, including, since 1990, the participation of former reeducation-center detainees. As well, Vietnam has improved cooperation on the POW/MIA issue since Secretary Baker and General Vessey met separately with Minister Thach last fall, although we need greater results from this process. During a trip to Hanoi last month, General Vessey and Minister Thach agreed to open a temporary POW/MIA office in Hanoi, staffed by Defense personnel, to support the POW/MIA accounting process. This decision reflected a previous understanding that we would establish such a presence if we determined it would facilitate resolution of the issue. While not a part of the normalization "road map," this facility could accelerate that process if it helps advance resolution of our POW/MIA concerns, we are also making available through USAID approximately $1 million to address Vietnamese humanitarian needs in the area of prosthetics. Our relations with Laos have continued to improve as the Lao have bolstered cooperation on counter-narcotics activities and continued to work seriously with us on POW/MIA accounting. Most recently, we were able to conduct the first-ever investigation in Laos of so-called discrepancy cases, involving men last known to be alive in Laos, near the former Pathet Lao headquarters in the remote northeast. On narcotics, the Lao recently acceded to our long- standing requests to grant a multiple-entry visa to a Thailand- based DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] agent and to arrange a meeting for that agent with a high-level interior ministry official. I would note that we have seen a 27% decrease in opium production, facilitated by our crop substitution project at Houphan. We continue to push for still further progress, particularly in the area of law enforcement. We have been pleased with the Lao government's continuing economic reform effort and policy of welcoming back those Lao who left after 1975 but who now want to return to live or do business in Laos. Secretary Baker reminded the Lao Foreign Minister in October that economic reform, to be effective, requires concurrent efforts at political reform. We continue to urge the Lao to promote reform and development. And we hope that increased cooperation on narcotics and POW/MIA issues will make possible the upgrading of our bilateral relations. Democracy in Mongolia. Perhaps the most dramatic reforms in Asia this past year have been in Mongolia. Leaving behind harsh authoritarian rule and economic dependence on the Soviet Union, Mongolia has, in the space of just 14 months, peacefully created a multi-party democracy and made major steps toward fundamental structural reforms, involving plans to privatize its economy. In addition to the expected socio-economic strains inherent in implementing reform, Mongolia had a poor harvest last year and saw a large Soviet aid program abruptly eliminated. For reforms to succeed under these difficult conditions, Mongolia must have help from the United States and other democratic nations. The US has authorized this year a $2 million USAID program of technical assistance to help Mongolia succeed in reform. We have also approved 30,000 tons of emergency food assistance to Mongolia through USAID Title II. Relations With New Zealand. We hope that future New Zealand defense policies will permit that country to return to full participation in the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-US] alliance. Since assuming office in November 1990, New Zealand's new Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, has expressed his desire to rebuild the defense and security relationship with the United States and to reaffirm New Zealand's standing among the Western nations through steps such as its contribution of a medical team and two support aircraft to the Gulf coalition. However, the government of New Zealand has not yet tackled the fundamental issue between our two countries--New Zealand's anti-nuclear law, which effectively bars US Navy vessels from visiting New Zealand on a "neither confirm nor deny" basis. We believe that recent successes in arms control negotiations and the multilateral action in the Gulf--to which New Zealand contributed- demonstrate that collective security and alliances work. President Bush, in a recent telephone conversation with Mr. Bolger, emphasized the warm feelings held by Americans for New Zealand, and our desire to build on our currently friendly relations. But it is for New Zealand to decide what its long-term interests and goals for defense and security relations with the US will be and to undertake appropriate actions which would make possible a return to active partnership in ANZUS. South Pacific. President Bush's unprecedented summit with the leaders of 11 Pacific island nations last fall underscored our growing engagement in the South Pacific. We share with them a firm commitment to preserving the environment and seek early action by the Senate on the South Pacific Regional Environmental Protection Convention. We share a common interest in the rational use of the region's maritime resources as demonstrated by US accession to the Wellington Convention on driftnet fishing. And we look forward to negotiating an extension to the mutually beneficial South Pacific fisheries treaty.
Democracy and Human Rights
As I suggested above, encouraging the growth and maturation of democratic government is one of the fundamental objectives of the Administration's foreign policy, while we have seen some setbacks in East Asia and the Pacific over the past 2 years, we are confident that democratization is a trend well at work in the region. We hope the Congress will allow us the flexibility to promote this important goal in a manner consistent with our many and complex long-term interests in the region. China. As President Bush told the press just this week, our approach to China is to make clear our concern about human rights abuses but also to recognize that cutting off all contacts is not the way to effect change. This is particularly true at a time when all other G-7 countries have largely restored their relations with China--most particularly their trade relations--to pre-Tiananmen levels. President Bush pointed out that during the Gulf conflict, cooperation with China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, was essential to attaining world-wide support for coalition efforts. At the same time that we pursue our enduring and fundamental interest in universal human rights, we must recognize that China is important in regional and global affairs. As the President said, we have good reason to maintain constructive relations with China. Such relations are essential if we are to sustain and enhance US-PRC cooperation in the search for solutions to regional tensions in East Asia and on other pressing issues. We cannot gain cooperation from China on matters such as missile and nuclear proliferation unless we remain engaged with the PRC. The necessity of remaining engaged with the Chinese is precisely the reason Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert M. Kimmitt visited Beijing just last week. He discussed key areas of friction in the bilateral relationship--from human rights and trade problems to proliferation concerns--as well as regional issues where cooperation is essential to the success of our policies for resolving the Cambodia conflict and enhancing security on the Korean Peninsula. Progress will not come instantly, but through patience and perseverance over time. For this reason we seek to engage the Chinese authorities with sharply focused working visits in both directions so we can ensure that we have done all that is necessary to convey US concerns and promote US ideals and interests. We recognize that important indicators of human rights-- freedom of speech and association, due process, among others-- remain severely circumscribed in China today. We were encouraged by the initiation of the first-ever official dialogue on human rights with PRC officials when Assistant Secretary [for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs] Schifter went to China in December. Chinese authorities told us that they have come to understand that human rights is an essential component of our foreign policy and that the issue must form part of our bilateral agenda. The Chinese have told us that they recognize the importance of individual human rights, and intend to improve the protection of such rights. We hope this official dialogue--and similar dialogues which the PRC is developing with France and Australia--will bear fruit. Nevertheless, as noted in our 1990 human rights report, while there were several positive developments in human rights in China over the last year, serious abuses and political repression continue. Most recently, we have been deeply disturbed by trials and sentencing of a number of persons detained during the 1989 crackdown. Chinese authorities have claimed that those sentenced were guilty of crimes of disturbing public order, but our general impression is that they were apparently guilty of nothing more than the peaceful expression of political views. In Tibet, restrictions on political and religious activity remain in effect, but there have been some encouraging developments, most importantly a break in the cycle of violence that has plagued Tibet since 1987. Following the lifting of martial law on May 1 last year, the security force presence in Ohasa was scaled back. Some foreign officials have been allowed to visit, including officials from our consulate general in Chengdu. It is our desire that these steps lead to a restoration of the positive momentum that characterized the situation in Tibet in the mid- 1980s. I should add that we view the Dalai Lama as an important religious and humanitarian leader. President Bush's private meeting with him underscores this view as well as our fundamental commitment to human rights. Burma. We remain concerned and extremely disappointed by the total lack of progress toward the implementation of parliamentary democracy in Burma. I am sorry to say that Burma may miss a historic opportunity to promote national development under a popular democratic government. Despite promises to do so promptly, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has refused to abide by the will of the Burmese people as expressed in the results of the May 1990 election. No timetable for a return to the promised civilian rule has been announced. The election's victors, the opposition party, has been largely destroyed by arrests and intimidation, and opposition within the Buddhist clergy was ruthlessly suppressed. Clearly, the SLORC is attempting to negate the results of the election, thus leaving little prospect for an early return to genuine democracy in Burma. Since the election, we have been active in multilateral efforts to influence the Burmese. In July 1990, Secretary Baker urged Burma's ASEAN neighbors to use their influence with Burmese military authorities to encourage a transition to civilian government and the release of political prisoners. Our embassies in the region have since reinforced this message. In addition, Secretary Baker sent a letter in August to General Saw Maung, the chairman of the SLORC, urging him to transfer power to a civilian government and to release all political prisoners, including NLD (National League for Democracy) leader Aung San Suu Kyi. We have also urged these measures in the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission. The US has also taken several economic measures against Burma in an effort to encourage an improvement in the situation in that country: We long ago terminated all forms of economic assistance to Burma and actively urged others to do so; we have suspended Burma's GSP [Generalized System of Preferences] privileges; and we have decertified Burma on narcotics. This later step means that we will oppose loans to Burma by the World Bank, the IMF, and other international organizations. Unfortunately, thus far these steps have not produced the kind of results we are hoping for. While recognizing that our influence over this reclusive and autarchic leadership is quite limited, we are continuing to consider what further steps we might take which would be effective in convincing the SLORC authorities to be more responsive to the will of the Burmese people.
Economic Relations and Cooperation
We are entering an age in which technological and commercial capabilities rather than military strength alone are significant determinants of state power and influence. In considering our economic role in the region in the 1990s, we must avoid over- reacting to some of the side effects of the region's rapid economic growth. We must resist the temptation to withdraw behind protectionist barriers, or otherwise give the impression that we are turning inward rather than taking measures to strengthen our competitive position. In fact, the diffuse and complex environment emerging in East Asia and the Pacific requires even closer economic cooperation with our trading partners. The US no longer dominates the region economically, but the trade statistics reveal that American interests are well served by the dynamic commerce that ever more closely links us to East Asia and the Pacific. Trade in both directions continues to expand as the countries of the region open their markets to imports. Merchandise trade figures indicate a marked improvement in US exports to most of our East Asian trading partners in 1990. Our 1990 world-wide deficit was $101 billion, down 8% from the 1989 deficit of $109.4 billion, with an 8% increase in US exports to the East Asian region. US imports from such major trading partners as Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong fell while our exports grew, narrowing our deficits with each of these economies. The bilateral deficit with Japan alone improved by $8 billion to $41 billion, a 16% decline. In broader terms, we must not forget that the East Asia- Pacific region promises to be our best market in the 1990s. East Asia conducts a larger volume of trade with the US than with any other region, and our exports to East Asia have grown at a rate higher than our exports to any other part of the world. The simple fact is that from 1968 to 1988, our exports to the region grew by over 1,400% while our exports to the EC [European Community] during the same period grew by 743%. Japan purchases from us much more than raw materials: over half of our exports to Japan in 1988 and 1989 were manufactured goods (about $22 billion), more than Germany and France together purchased from us in those years. I do not wish to downplay the significance for our economy of the trade deficit or other bilateral economic issues with Japan and other regional trading partners. These are serious matters and we are pursuing them vigorously. We have made significant progress in the structural impediments initiative. For example, Japan now plans to increase its own public investment spending and has removed obstacles to opening new large retail stores, thus expanding opportunities for US exporters. As we enumerate our economic grievances with the Japanese, we need to keep a sense of perspective and recall that Japan is our best market outside this continent. Trade will inevitably lead to frictions and frictions to blisters. As we treat the blisters, we need to reject the quick cure of amputation. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation initiative is the crystallization of these Asia/Pacific economic trends I have mentioned. East Asia's future will be shaped by economic integration. We are opposed to trading blocs, and we are doing what we can to accelerate progress on the basis of open market principles. We were pleased that recent progress in Geneva has given new life to the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. A successful outcome of the round remains a key
US objective.
We also are pleased with APEC to date, which has had ministerial meetings in Canberra in 1989 and Singapore in 1990. Agreement to hold future ministerials in Seoul in October 1991, Bangkok in 1992, and in the US in 1993 lend political continuity to APEC. Between ministerials, the substantive work program of APEC is overseen by senior officials meetings. APEC's work program includes 10 working groups covering trade and investment data, trade promotion, investment and technology transfer, human resources development, energy cooperation, marine resource conservation, telecommunications, transportation, tourism, and fisheries. Several of these working groups will produce substantial results in time for review by the November Seoul ministerial. Several organizational issues are facing APEC. Arrangements for the participation of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are yet to be worked out. Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir's recent call for an East Asian economic group raises questions about how such a grouping would affect APEC. We remain concerned that a second, less inclusive body for the same purpose as APEC could undermine the momentum now behind the 1989 initiative. The United States plays an active role in APEC. Secretary Baker was an early supporter of this initiative, and US officials lead two of APEC's working groups--transportation and tourism-- and co-lead two other groups, telecommunications and trade and investment data. The partnership for education initiative, launched by Secretary Baker at the Singapore ministerial, is viewed as a model of cooperation by other APEC participants in the human resources development working group. The initiative is laying the groundwork for cooperation between US and APEC educational institutions, and among US businesses in cooperative education and internships. Activities under the initiative will be underway by the time of the October ministerial.
Conclusion
The Administration's total economic and security assistance requests for the East Asia-Pacific region come to $702.5 million, with $492 million for economic assistance (DA, ESF, PL 480, and the Philippines MAI) and $210.1 million in security assistance (IMET and FMF credits). Over 90% of our FMF and ESF monies will go to the Philippines, assuming that our current discussions are successful. This represents only 5.8% of total US foreign assistance. The overall level represents a 2% increase over FY 1991. Economic assistance to the region increases by 2.6% with a 1% rise for security assistance. With these financial resources, and with our other political, military, and economic efforts in the region, we are making an investment in the future of the Pacific community. To date, the region's dramatic economic success, its peace and prosperity, and its continuing support for our foreign policy goals throughout the world are the dividends paid on our past investments. Future dividends will require future investments, and I hope you agree that the returns we are receiving outweigh the relatively small price we have paid. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991 Title:

Department Statement on Gandhi Assassination

Tutwiler Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: May 21, 19915/21/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South Asia Country: India Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Terrorism [TEXT] Secretary Baker is deeply saddened by the news of the assassination of former Prime Minister and leading Indian statesman Rajiv Gandhi. Mr. Gandhi's leadership during his term in office helped produce a rapid expansion of ties between the United States and India. We deplore this senseless act of violence which insults the spirit of Indian democracy by removing a leading candidate in the midst of national elections. He sends his condolences and deepest sympathy to the Gandhi family and to the Indian people at their loss. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991 Title:

Feature: From Isolationism to Global Leadership, 1933-45

Date: May 27, 19915/27/91 Category: Features Region: North America Country: United States, Germany, Argentina, Angola [TEXT] The following was prepared by the Office of Public Communication and the Office of the Historian. The Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-45), the longest in US history, marked an important period of transition for the United States as the country moved from isolationism to global leadership. During the dangerous war-time years, Roosevelt controlled foreign policy himself. A great believer in personal diplomacy, he often negotiated with world leaders directly, at war- time planning conferences in Casablanca, Tehran, Cairo, and Yalta. He also relied on a series of special envoys who bypassed traditional channels and reported directly to the White House. At first, the Department of State struggled to adapt to the President's new dynamic and assertive style. From the time of George Washington, Americans had been suspicious of international politics. As a result, the State Department remained aloof from world events and dealt primarily with concrete matters--like treaties of commerce and navigation--and provided consular assistance. The Second World War would change all that, and, by 1945, the Department was in the vanguard of post-war planning.
Diplomacy in the 1930s
Despite his later interest, Roosevelt largely ignored foreign policy during the 1932 campaign since his priority was the country's economic situation. During his first term, FDR left foreign affairs to his Secretary of State, Tennessean Cordell Hull. Hull, who served in both the House and Senate, was a powerful and popular figure in the Democratic Party with a strong political base on Capitol Hill. He was a dedicated internationalist and worked consistently for free trade. Hull viewed international problems in terms of moral principle, which often brought him into conflict with the pragmatic President. Nonetheless, Hull served the President for 11 years, only retiring in 1945 because of ill health. Confronted with rising aggression in Europe and the Far East during the 1930s, the Department faced a difficult task. Americans were not yet ready to assume global responsibilities, and a series of neutrality laws prevented the United States from openly opposing Europe's dictators. During these years, it was Secretary Hull-- working closely with FDR's confidant, Assistant Secretary Sumner Welles--who began leading the country out of isolationism. Hull was the author of FDR's Latin American "Good Neighbor Policy," which successfully provided a basis for partnership and cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. The President was able to point to the successes of the Good Neighbor policy as a model of a positive and active international role for the United States.
The Department of State and the Second World War
During 1939, President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull concluded that war was inevitable--despite strong congressional sentiment to the contrary. As part of its preparation, the State Department began around-the-clock monitoring of European shortwave radio broadcasts, providing hourly situation reports to the President and the Secretary. When Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, it was Ambassador Anthony Biddle in Warsaw who broke the news in a 3:00 am phone call to Washington. By 4:00 am, top Department officials had gathered in Hull's office to listen to Hitler on shortwave radio. The most dramatic and dangerous aspect of wartime diplomacy was overseas service in posts near to--or even inside-- the war zone. For the first 2 years of the war, Foreign Service men and women continued to work in Germany and Italy, faced hardship at posts in China and the Soviet Union, and came under physical attack in London and the Philippines. Some diplomats, like George Kennan in Berlin and Charles Bohlen in Tokyo, were temporarily interned as prisoners of war. Other Foreign Service officers, like Robert D. Murphy in North Africa and David Bruce in France, served as political advisors to Allied military commanders on the great campaigns of the war. World War II completely transformed the Department of State. A 1936 photo showed all of the Department's Washington employees standing on the steps of the building, but by 1946 a small stadium would have been required. From 1939-45, the Department's employees rose from 3,700 to 7,000. America's new leadership role brought additional power and influence to the bureaus and offices which implemented the new activist policies. The Department's economic activities, for example, expanded more than fivefold as it worked in conjunction with other independent agencies like the War Production Board, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Lend-Lease Administration. The 38 operational units that managed Department activities in 1938 grew to 18 offices and more than 80 divisions by the end of 1945, with quarters in 8 Washington office buildings. The needs of the military took precedence over other government services during the war, and many new Department Civil Service personnel were women who were vigorously recruited across the nation. In 1941, President Roosevelt also issued an executive order calling for fair employment principles in wartime projects. This lead to the intensified hiring of African-Americans and the breakdown of long-standing discriminatory practices against them.
Planning for the Post-war World
The Department's most significant accomplishment of the war-time period was its work in planning for the peace-time world. Even before the United States entered the war, Secretary Hull created an "Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Policy," which became the first office to deal with post-war planning. The committee was expanded in November 1941 and in held its first planning session in February 1942. As early as March 1943, a draft constitution existed for the organization that would become the United Nations, and the drafting group produced the UN Charter--the basis for US proposals at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944--by August 1943. Secretary Hull, who had supported Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations, was instrumental in making the United Nations a reality. The UN Charter reflected Hull's perspective and style, and he used his congressional ties to win bipartisan support for the organization. President Roosevelt called Hull ". . .the one person in all the world who has done the most to make this great plan for peace an effective fact." In 1945, Secretary Hull won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts and was awarded a Medal of Merit by President Truman in 1947. In the words of the President, Hull--and by implication the Department--had made diplomacy "a potent instrument in laying the foundations of a stable and peaceful world order in the postwar era." (###)