US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991
Title: Foreign Assistance Funding Proposal for FY 1992
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Statement prepared for delivery before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: May 22, 19915/22/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa, East Asia, Eurasia,
North America, Europe, Caribbean, Central America,
Southeast Asia, Subsaharan Africa
Country: Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, Cambodia,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Canada, Taiwan,
South Korea, Chile, USSR (former)
Subject: North America Free Trade, Arms Control,
Development/Relief Aid, Trade/Economics,
Military Affairs, NATO, CSCE, EC, United Nations,
Terrorism, Refugees, International Law,
Mideast Peace Process
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, I am privileged to appear before this subcommittee to
testify on behalf of our foreign assistance funding proposal for
fiscal year (FY) 1992.
I would like to report on my recent trips to the Middle East,
devoting the bulk of my remarks to the Middle East peace process
and to the situation in Iraq. I also would like to make some brief
observations about the Soviet Union and the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The Peace Process
For the past 2 months, we've been engaged in an intensive effort to
find a path to a comprehensive settlement through direct
negotiations between Israel, the Arab states, and Palestinians.
Since we began that effort, I have had no illusions about the
challenges and difficulties involved. But I also have had a strong
sense that the Gulf war may have created some new possibilities
for peace-making in the region and that the United States has a
unique obligation to help explore them. While it would be sad if it
turns out that old obstacles are more formidable than new
opportunities, it would be sadder still if the United States failed to
energetically pursue a chance for peace. Those chances do not come
along very often in the Middle East.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait brought together a historic
international coalition. The United States, the Soviet Union,
Europeans, Arabs, and others joined to reverse Iraq's aggression.
The United Nations played the role its founders had intended. And
through its restraint in the face of Iraqi provocation, Israel became
a silent partner in the coalition's success. The net result was a
staggering defeat for Saddam Hussein and the path of violence and
intimidation that he represented and new hope for the alternative
path of diplomacy and negotiations.
To test the moment and transform the ground rules for Arab-
Israeli peace-making, we felt it important to engage in a process
that would break the taboos on direct dialogue. If the impulse to
make peace was different, we needed to overcome the barriers to
Israelis, Arabs, and Palestinians meeting directly. We needed to
establish that dialogue and diplomacy--not violence or
rejectionism--could become the currency of politics in the region.
The war provided a grim reminder of the dangers of conflict in
an era of escalating military competition. It was a reminder that
the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians was
still at the core of the Arab-Israeli problem--but that the state-
to-state dimension also had to be addressed. And it was a hopeful
reminder that Israel and the Arab states sometimes find common
ground between them--common ground which might provide room
for maneuver to encourage Israeli-Palestinian accommodation.
Our post-war task, therefore, was to try to blend what was
new and promising following the crisis with the enduring principles
of Arab-Israeli diplomacy. That was the purpose of my first three
trips to the region after the war. The result was a consensus among
the parties on five key points.
First, general agreement that the objective of the process is a
comprehensive settlement achieved through direct negotiations
based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
Second, broad understanding that the negotiating process
would proceed simultaneously along two tracks, involving direct
negotiations between Israel and Arab states and between Israel and
Palestinians from the occupied territories.
Third, agreement that the negotiations between Israel and
Palestinians would proceed in phases, with talks on interim self-
government preceding negotiations over the permanent status of the
occupied territories.
Fourth, agreement that Palestinians would be represented in
the process by leaders from the occupied territories who accept the
two-track process and phased approach to negotiations and who
commit to living in peace with Israel.
Fifth, general acceptance that a conference, co-sponsored by
the United States and the Soviet Union, would break the old taboos
about public contacts between the parties and be the launching pad
for direct negotiations between the parties.
These are not insignificant areas of consensus. And they
certainly provide a baseline for progress. But they still have to be
translated into a practical process, and that was the purpose of my
most recent trip to the area. Let me give you a sense of the key
issues we are still trying to resolve.
Resolution of Key Issues
The first set of issues relates to modalities of the peace
conference. There has been a great deal of misunderstanding on this
question so let me lay out simply what we have in mind. Our
objective is to launch direct negotiations. That's what this effort
is all about. We believe the best way to do this is through a peace
conference that would lead directly to bilateral negotiations
between Israel and its Arab and Palestinian neighbors and
multilateral negotiations on issues such as arms control and
regional security, the environment, and water.
Let me be clear about this. We are not considering an
international conference with a plenary that has the power or
authority to impose its views, nor are we considering any
mechanism that would interfere in any way with negotiations. In
fact, as I've told those in the region, the conference is not a forum
for negotiations. Quite simply, it's a means to an end, a tool in our
effort to get the parties to sit down face-to-face to sort out their
differences and to break anachronistic taboos.
This conference would be co-sponsored by the United States
and the Soviet Union. Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and
Palestinians from the occupied territories would attend. As you
know, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has already taken a very
important step and agreed to send its Secretary General as
observer.
In addition, each of the member states of the GCC, the six Gulf
states, have announced they will participate in the direct
negotiations on multilateral issues.
We also believe the European Community (EC) could play a
constructive role in support of this process, and especially in the
hard work of economic development that would follow a negotiated
peace. The EC should be able to participate in the conference.
Similarly, the United Nations should have some role; a formula
ought to be found that is acceptable to all the parties, that
prejudices none, and that channels the new-found potential of the
United Nations in ways that can be helpful in promoting peace and
reconciliation in the area. The exact nature of EC and UN
involvement is still unresolved. Another open question is the
ability of the conference to reconvene. The United States believes
it should be able to do so, if all the parties agree, in order to hear
reports from the bilateral and multilateral negotiating groups.
The point is that none of this will, in any way, interfere with
direct negotiations. Indeed, face-to-face negotiations offer the
only way to make any progress, and we would not accept any
proposal that would lead any party to believe that it could avoid
negotiations or have others relieve it of the need to negotiate.
The other set of issues deals with the question of Palestinian
representation in the negotiations.
From the beginning of this Administration, we have made it
clear that our objective is to get Israel and Palestinians from the
occupied territories into negotiations. Of course, Palestinians must
choose their representatives, but our view is--and many other
parties agree--that a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation could
be a useful vehicle to get to the conference as well as to handle any
number of issues that might arise during the negotiations.
So the purpose of my recent trip to the region was to continue
to explore these issues with the parties and to determine where
there was consensus and which areas required more work. Overall, I
found that there is more agreement than disagreement on the key
elements of our approach. And I found a willingness to continue
looking for ways to resolve those areas that are still not nailed
down.
I also had extremely useful discussions with Soviet Foreign
Minister Bessmertnykh in the Soviet Union and in Cairo. The Soviets
have been very supportive of our approach. The fact that the Soviet
Union and the United States are in basic agreement about how to
proceed on the peace process creates a new factor--one that
improves the chances of getting this process launched.
Nonetheless, we are obviously not at the point I would like to
be. There are areas of disagreement, particularly between Israel
and Syria over the modalities of the conference, both on the issue of
the UN role and over the issue of reconvening the conference. I'm
not going to pretend that sorting these out will be easy or that it
will be done quickly.
But I will say that we will continue to try so long as we
believe that all parties are working in good faith and are serious
about finding ways to resolve differences. The President and I have
talked about our next steps, and we believe we should continue to
press ahead and see if we can overcome the gaps and get to
negotiations.
Finally, I believe the parties in the region do appreciate that
there's a real chance to launch a process. We've defined a workable
pathway to negotiations that would enable Israel, Arab states, and
Palestinians to capture that chance and make a real break with the
past in favor of peace. It is there for the taking, but it will not last
forever.
What remains to be seen is whether the parties are willing to
seize this chance. The United States is there, ready and willing to
help them try. But we cannot create the political will to act, if it
does not exist in the region.
The Situation In Iraq
With his aggression outward against Kuwait defeated, Saddam
Hussein turned his terror inward in the aftermath of the Gulf War
and drove hundreds of thousands of Iraqis out of their homes and
into foreign lands. This created, as the United Nations recognized in
Resolution 688, a new threat to international peace and security.
The issue for all of us can no longer be just Kuwait.
Today, I want to review with you the three-pronged strategy
that we and our allies have pursued to cope with this terrible
situation. First, we have worked to relieve the immediate suffering
of Iraqi refugees. Second, we are working to prevent another round
of terror by creating safe and secure conditions within Iraq so that
the refugees can return to their homes and live in safety. Third, we
will continue to isolate Saddam Hussein as long as he holds power.
Let me discuss each of these aspects of our strategy.
The first has been aimed at the immediate problem: saving
the lives of refugees by providing them food, water, medicine,
blankets,and housing. Through Operation Provide Comfort, we have
airdropped and trucked supplies to refugees on the mountains in
northern Iraq and southern Turkey, have built refugee camps in both
Iraq and Turkey, and have re-secured portions of northern Iraq so
that they could begin to return to their homes.
The President has contacted the leaders of the major
industrial countries and our coalition partners from the Arab world
and urged them to make generous pledges to the various UN appeals.
We appreciate the conference committee's action on Tuesday, and
we hope the Congress will act expeditiously on our supplemental
refugee request.
As a result of our efforts, the situation has improved
considerably. Death rates among the refugees have dropped
markedly, and well over half the refugees have come down from the
mountains.
It has not been enough, however, to provide only for the
immediate needs of the refugees. We also have a duty to try to
prevent a greater tragedy: a situation where Saddam could exercise
his terror once again.
This second aspect of our strategy requires uniting the world
community to ensure international access to the affected regions
throughout Iraq in strict conformity with Security Council
Resolution 688, which calls for respect for the humanitarian and
political rights of the Iraqi people.
Saddam's ruthless suppression of his own people is yet
another reminder that he cannot be trusted. We remain concerned
that Saddam would, if conditions altered, resume a systematic
extermination of regime opponents and innocent Iraqi civilians. The
world community is not moving to save these poor, innocent people
now, so that they can be slaughtered by Saddam Hussein later.
That is why we warned Iraq not to interfere with
humanitarian relief efforts underway in Iraq. That is why, in
support of Resolution 688, we have urged the United Nations to
move quickly to provide personnel to ensure the safety of those
refugees returning to Iraq. The United States does not seek to keep
its forces in northern Iraq any longer than is absolutely necessary;
we look forward to their early replacement by an effective
international presence.
It is our firm conviction that some kind of international
presence, however organized, must take over for the job now being
done by American and coalition forces. We hope that this
international presence will serve as the international community's
watchdog to inhibit Saddam from repeating his most recent
atrocities.
In the future, we hope that Iraq can fully rejoin the
community of nations. Iraq has a tremendously talented, creative,
and diverse population. I believe that a new Iraqi political compact
which reflects the pluralistic make-up of its population and its rich
historical and cultural traditions is possible. And such a compact
must be arrived at by negotiations among all Iraqis, not by force.
We respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity and do
not wish to see a fragmented state. We have said repeatedly that
we have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. And our actions
reinforce our words. While our soldiers have been feeding and
caring for refugees, Saddam's soldiers were strafing and shelling
them.
Thus, I can say without equivocation or doubt: Saddam
Hussein himself is the single greatest obstacle to any hopeful
future for the people of Iraq--whether in terms of their own
development as a society or their reintegration into the
international community. Left alone, free to reconsolidate his
brutal dictatorship and military machine, we know Saddam will act
again to brutalize his own people and threaten his neighbors.
Without constant international monitoring of and pressure against
Saddam, this Iraqi government will continue to pose a danger to the
peace and security of the Middle East.
That's why we can have a formal cease-fire but no genuine
peace with the government of Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein
remains in power.
Let me be absolutely clear about this third aspect of our
strategy: Saddam Hussein is a pariah whose actions put him beyond
the pale of civilized international society. Therefore, we will act
with others to continue to isolate Saddam's regime.
That means we will never normalize relations with Iraq so
long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. That means maintaining
UN sanctions in place so long as Saddam remains in power. And
that means Iraqis will not participate in post-crisis political,
economic, and security arrangements until there is a change in
regime.
With a new government, however, new possibilities will
emerge for Iraq to rejoin the international community. With a new
government, we may well be able to lift most sanctions, save those
that constrain Iraq's military potential. And in that new Iraq,
tolerance must replace terror, and the fear that so long has gripped
the Iraqi people must give way to peaceful realization of the vast
potential of the Iraqi people and their homeland.
Three Observations About US-Soviet Relations
First, the President and I feel it is important to stress that Soviet
new thinking continues to guide Soviet behavior in many aspects of
our relations. In the Middle East, Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh's
help has been invaluable to our attempts to reinvigorate the peace
process. Soviet cooperation also has been critical to the historic
agreement that will end the Angolan civil war--an agreement that I
will join in signing in Lisbon next week. The Soviets have also been
helpful in other regional areas--most notably, Central America and
Cambodia.
In arms control, we hope to resolve our differences over the
CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, prepare CFE for
ratification, and move forward with START [strategic arms
reduction talks] and preparations for a Moscow summit.
Second, the so-called one-plus-nine agreement of April 23
between [Soviet President] Gorbachev and the republics creates an
opportunity for a positive shift toward new political arrangements
in the Soviet Union. If Gorbachev and the nine follow up this
agreement in the way they have suggested-- through an all-union
treaty and a new constitution--then this would be an important
step
toward establishing a new political legitimacy in the Soviet Union.
These steps, along with the on-going talks between Moscow and the
Baltics, create new opportunities for reconciliation to replace the
political polarization that has characterized Soviet politics since
last September.
We also welcome enactment of new emigration legislation.
For almost two decades, we have made the right of emigration a
central part of US-Soviet relations. We regard passage of the new
law as a major step in Soviet reform and in fulfillment of Soviet
CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]
commitments.
For our part, we continue to expand our contacts with all
levels and segments of Soviet society, ranging from reformers and
democrats to traditionalists and the military. Not only will this
increase our understanding of Soviet society, but it will allow us--
through what I have called a "democratic dialogue"--to help promote
political pluralism and economic freedom and the success of Soviet
reform. As the President and I have made abundantly clear by now,
the continuation and success of Soviet reform is in everyone's
interest.
Third, even with the tentative steps toward political
accommodation, Soviet economic reform still has a long way to go.
We and almost everyone else who has looked at it are convinced that
Prime Minister Pavlov's anti-crisis program will not work. We
believe the Soviet leadership urgently needs to embrace
fundamental market economic reform.
Without a commitment to fundamental reform, we expect the
Soviet economy to continue its severe decline--and that is in no
one's interest. We continue to study various ways we can assist
Soviet economic reform, but the usefulness of our efforts still
depends above all on the choices the Soviets themselves make.
NAFTA and Fast Track
We are seeking a North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico
and Canada because we are convinced such an agreement promises
important economic benefits for all three countries. Since the
President's announcement last June of his desire to seek a free
trade agreement with Mexico, we have engaged in extensive
consultations with Congress and the private sector.
I believe there is a tremendous amount at stake here--in
terms of both foreign and economic policy and in terms of our
growing cooperative work with Mexico on important regional and
transnational issues. It also will enhance American exports, job
opportunities, as well as global competitiveness. In order to
achieve global markets and hemispheric trade cooperation, it is
critical that fast-track negotiating authority be extended by the
Congress. Without this step, our foreign and economic leadership
position will be seriously impaired.
Overview of Our Funding Request
For FY 1992, we seek $21.9 billion in discretionary budget authority
for International Affairs Budget Function 150, an increase of $1.7
billion over levels appropriated for FY 1991. In addition, we are
requesting a one-time appropriation of $12.2 billion as the US share
of a global quota increase for the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
For the accounts under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee,
we are requesting $15.2 billion in FY 1992 discretionary budget
authority, a $455- million increase over FY 1991 appropriations.
In accordance with the terms of the Budget Enforcement Act,
our request falls within specific, stringent limits on our spending
levels, despite unprecedented demands for US leadership across the
globe.
In order to achieve our world-wide objectives within these
resource constraints, additional flexibility is needed. Last year, I
appealed to this subcommittee to make constructive consultation--
not earmarking--the primary vehicle for achieving consensus on
program objectives. I am pleased to note that with the cooperation
of this subcommittee, we made some progress toward that goal last
session.
Earmarking in our Economic Support Fund (ESF) declined from
82% in FY 1990 to just over 68% in FY 1991. In our Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) account, the decline was less dramatic but still
significant, from 92% to 87%. This is a welcome trend, one that we
want to encourage and promote.
But we still have a long way to go. To support our request
this year, let me express the Administration's willingness to work
in partnership with Congress to develop greater flexibility in our
foreign assistance authorization and appropriations legislation. To
guide this effort, let me suggest five broad objectives for our
international cooperation programs, built around the five foreign
policy challenges which I outlined to Congress last year.
First, promoting and consolidating democratic values,
including free and fair elections and respect for human rights. As
the President noted in his State of the Union address, this
fundamental American principle has stood as a beacon to peoples
across the globe for more than two centuries.
Transitions toward democracy, however difficult, cannot be
accomplished in isolation from the rest of the world. The essential
ingredients of democracy--respect for human rights, the rule of
law, free and fair elections, and political and economic freedom--
also are the basic building blocks of the new world order.
Second, promoting free market principles and strengthening
US competitiveness. Sustainable economic development cannot be
separated from the pursuit of sound, growth-oriented policies;
together, these can promote US economic interests abroad. By
fostering market forces through deregulation, privatization, and
promotion of free trade and investment, reform-minded countries
can establish an appropriate complement to building and securing
democracy. They also can develop into thriving markets for US
exports and the jobs they represent. Indeed, US exports to recent
aid graduates--Chile, Taiwan, and Korea--total more than twice the
value of our entire world-wide foreign assistance budget. Our long-
run goal should be to graduate more countries from foreign
assistance toward mutually beneficial trade and investment
relationships with the United States.
Third, promoting peace by helping to defuse regional conflicts,
strengthening the security of our regional partners, and pursuing
arms control and non-proliferation efforts. As the crisis in the
Persian Gulf has demonstrated, there is no substitute for strong US
leadership. We continue to play a vital role in bolstering the
security of regional allies around the world. Egypt and Turkey--two
long-standing beneficiaries of US security assistance--have been
bulwarks of the coalition against Saddam Hussein.
National and regional security are preconditions for
democracy and free enterprise to flourish. Saddam Hussein's
aggression is a dramatic reminder of the continuing need to protect
the security of regional states of vital interest to the United States
and our allies. The proliferation of missile systems and nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons technology further sharpens our
interest in promoting regional stability.
Fourth, protecting against transnational threats, especially
to the environment and from narcotics and terrorism. As I noted in
my first statement to Congress 2 years ago, "The future of our
civilization demands that we act in concert to deal with a new
class of problems, transnational in nature." This includes curbing
proliferation, protecting the environment, and countering terrorism
and narcotics.
We have made progress in all of these areas. We have led the
international effort to tighten non-proliferation export controls on
a global basis. We continue to work to advance our environmental
agenda. We are actively pressing state sponsors of terrorism in an
effort to thwart terrorism around the globe. And our international
narcotics efforts to counter supply are complemented by reports of
declining demand at home.
But progress is sometimes slow, unheralded, and hard won.
Iraq's conduct following its invasion of Kuwait is a brutal reminder
of the danger posed by the interaction of these transnational
threats. Saddam Hussein's actions during the Gulf war illustrate
how traditional concepts of threats to national security need to be
extended. Indeed, Iraq has combined:
-- A credible threat of the use of chemical and biological
weapons;
-- A contemptible use of missile technology as a weapon of
terror against innocent civilian populations;
-- Perhaps the world's first deliberate use of an
environmental disaster as a war-time weapon, with unknown
consequences for the entire region for years to come; and
-- A world-wide call for terrorist actions, sometimes
supported by embassies abroad in flagrant violation of the basic
principles of diplomacy.
These challenges to international order can all be defeated by
a committed world community, supported by firm US leadership and
appropriate resources as needed.
Finally, meeting urgent humanitarian needs will continue to
reflect deep and abiding concerns of the American people. America's
record for responding quickly and substantially to alleviate severe
suffering caused by natural and man-made disasters is unequaled. We
salute the role played by American private voluntary agencies and
private American citizens in this regard. Meeting the most pressing
humanitarian needs with food aid, disaster relief, and refugee
assistance will always be an essential component of US assistance
policies. Indeed, our current effort to mobilize a broad
international response to alleviate the suffering of Iraqi refugees is
another of US leadership in this area.
We have submitted legislation to Congress that builds on
these basic objectives to provide more flexibility and simplicity to
our economic cooperation efforts. Working with our global
partners, we envision the use of five principal mechanisms to
advance this agenda world-wide:
One, more flexible and integrated bilateral assistance
authorities. In authorization legislation, which we recently
submitted to Congress, we seek more flexible account structures
and greater ability to transfer funds both within and among accounts
to meet pressing, unexpected needs. We hope to move toward an
assistance program unified around a single set of core objectives,
along the lines of those outlined above. As a first step toward this
goal, we have proposed a modest $20-million presidential contingency
fund in our FY 1992 budget request.
The need for flexibility is especially urgent at a moment when
developments in the world are moving so quickly and unpredictably,
while our ability to respond with additional resources is severely
constrained by budgetary realities. The Gulf crisis, the restoration
of democratic rule in Nicaragua and Panama, and the dramatic
developments in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and South Africa
over the past year illustrate that when unprecedented demands for
American leadership are combined with limited resources, our need
for flexibility becomes all the more urgent.
Two, we see scope for more creative use of multilateral
mechanisms to advance our objectives, through both the
international financial institutions and the UN system.
The Bretton Woods institutions moved quickly to liberalize
and expand their programs to assist countries seriously affected by
the Gulf crisis. The IMF and World Bank have now admitted all the
East European countries except Albania and are playing a central
role in structuring sound, adequately financed programs to ease
their transition to market economies based on private initiative.
Should the Soviet Union move further along the path of structural
economic and political reform, we would expect the IMF and the
World Bank to play a role in facilitating its transformation as well.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will promote
the development of the private sector, as well as infrastructure and
environmental programs, in the reforming countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, through our Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative, the Inter-American Development Bank is expected to play
a major role in promoting sound investment policy in our own
hemisphere.
To support these efforts, we are again proposing full funding
for the multilateral development banks--including all arrears--plus
a periodic quota increase for the IMF. This funding will allow these
institutions to leverage other contributions in support of our
objective of promoting sound, growth-oriented economic policies in
the developing world.
As President Bush noted in his State of the Union address, the
United Nations has played a historic role in the Gulf crisis, one that
is close to fulfilling the vision of its founders. The Security
Council's 14 resolutions, which laid the basis for ending the crisis,
symbolize the unity of the international community against Iraq's
aggression and established the principle of collective security as a
cornerstone of the post-Cold War era.
At the same time, the humanitarian organizations of the UN
system--together with the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and the International Organization for Migration--are
coordinating a broad international effort to assist the hundreds of
thousands of refugees fleeing from Iraqi aggression.
The United States has a vital interest in strengthening this
new, revitalized United Nations as a full partner in the building of a
post-Cold War world where peace, stability, and prosperity prevail.
Three, we foresee greater reliance on creative responsibility-
sharing as we strengthen our global partnerships, especially with
the European Community and its members and with Japan. As many
in Congress have noted, our own difficult budgetary situation makes
such efforts especially important for the advancement of a common
agenda with partners who share our values and interests.
No effort so well illustrates the collective response of the
world community to defend world peace as our successful efforts to
enlist world-wide support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm, and for the front-line states whose economies have been set
back by the effects of Saddam Hussein's aggression.
In 1990, our coalition partners pledged $9.7 billion to meet
Desert Shield costs, representing 73% of the roughly $13.2 billion in
total incremental expenses we incurred. As soon as hostilities
broke out, our allies again responded promptly and generously to
shoulder their fair share of coalition military expenses under
Operation Desert Storm. Indeed, we have received unprecedented
pledges totaling in excess of $44 billion from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Germany, and Korea, to offset
Desert Shield/Storm expenses for 1991.
The world community also has responded swiftly and
generously to the needs of the front-line states, especially Egypt
and Turkey, as they incurred substantial costs in standing up to
Saddam Hussein's aggression. Through the US-chaired Gulf Crisis
Financial Coordination Group, over $16 billion has been pledged by
the Gulf states, Europe, Japan, Korea, and other countries to ensure
that the economies of affected regional states are stabilized. The
United States has played its part in this effort, supported by
Congress, by canceling Egypt's $6.7 billion military debt, thereby
relieving a heavy burden on a critical regional ally. Other countries
have followed suit and canceled an additional $8 billion in Egyptian
debt.
Similarly, in responding to the urgent needs of Iraqi refugees
and displaced persons, the international community is in the
process of mobilizing more than $500 million, under UN and ICRC
auspices, for urgent humanitarian relief efforts.
Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, the successful G-24 [Group of
24] process chaired by the European Community Commission, has
mobilized more than $18 billion in pledges for Poland and Hungary
to ease their transition to market economies. And in the
Philippines, the Multilateral Assistance Initiative (MAI) has been
responsible for nearly doubling the level of international assistance
to this struggling democracy.
In our own hemisphere, we are working with our world-wide
partners to assist in clearing arrearages of Panama and Nicaragua
to the international financial institutions and to help finance the
enhanced debt strategy. And just last month, the United States and
the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]
countries joined together with Central America, Mexico, Colombia,
and Venezuela to create the Partnership for Democracy and
Development in Central America, a new multilateral grouping
designed to support regional democratization and economic
development. Finally, we are encouraging Europe and Japan to join
us in pledging $100 million a year over 5 years to create a
Multilateral Investment Fund for Latin America and the Caribbean.
This fund is a key part of the President's Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative and will play a crucial role in enabling
countries to move from aid to trade and private investment as the
principal engines of economic growth.
In each case, both strong US leadership and a community of
interests are essential to catalyze a broad world-wide response.
Four, we envision more creative use of trade and investment
policies as vehicles to promote US interests in world economic
growth, as well as to enhance our own economic strength.
Central to these efforts over the past 4 years has been our
determination to pursue a successful conclusion to the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations. We continue to believe that the
Uruguay Round has profound political as well as economic
implications for the shape of the world in the next century.
Successful conclusion of the round is essential for the economic
growth and stability of the emerging East European democracies, as
well as the wide range of developing countries who ultimately will
rely on expansion of world trade--not aid--as the primary vehicle
to generate employment opportunities and sustainable economic
growth.
In our own hemisphere, the President's Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative represents a comprehensive effort to promote
economic growth and stability in the region, combining free trade
and investment--the primary vehicles for growth--with debt relief
and environmental initiatives.
As I noted above, as an important step toward the eventual
goal of hemispheric free trade, the Administration is seeking a
North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada,
which we are convinced promises important economic benefits for
all three countries. A North American Free Trade Agreement will
create the world's largest market, worth over $6 trillion a year and
including more than 360 million consumers. There is a tremendous
amount at stake for our economic future, foreign policy, trade
policy, and historic reconciliation with Mexico.
Meanwhile, the United States has worked actively with our
Asian partners in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to
advance market-oriented cooperation among member states.
Our bilateral investment treaty program has been an important
vehicle in ensuring an open and liberal investment climate for US
investors and exporters. Over the past year, we completed
negotiations with Poland and Czechoslovakia and are actively
negotiating with nine other countries which are in the process of
undertaking economic restructuring programs.
Finally, we will be challenged to pursue more vigorous US
diplomacy, and will seek a State Department operations budget that
reflects an activist approach to the diplomatic challenges of a
changing world.
Bilateral Assistance
Bilateral military and economic assistance will remain an essential
tool in advancing US interests through the 1990s, assuming the
necessary flexibility can be provided to meet emerging needs. No
other vehicle at our disposal is as well-suited to provide timely
support to our allies and friends around the world. Our interests in
political pluralism, market-driven economic development, peace-
making, and strengthening alliances--can all be advanced by prudent
use of bilateral assistance resources.
For FY 1992, our request for discretionary budget authority
for bilateral assistance programs totals $13.1 billion. That marks a
6.5% increase over the $12.3 billion appropriated by Congress for FY
1991. Highlights of this request by category are as follows:
-- $4.65 billion in FMF, supporting a program level of $4.92
billion;
-- $3.24 billion in ESF, up from $3.14 billion;
-- $1.3 billion in development assistance, the same as the
prior year;
-- $800 million for the Development Fund for Africa;
-- $400 million for Central and Eastern Europe, a slight
increase over the FY 1991 appropriation;
-- $160 million for the Multilateral Assistance Initiative
for the Philippines;
-- $1.3 billion for bilateral PL 480 [Food for Peace] food aid,
supporting the export of 5.9 million metric tons of US commodities;
-- $172 million for that portion of the Administration's
international counter-narcotics program implemented by the State
Department.
Near East and South Asia ($6.2 billion)
.
The Middle East has been profoundly affected by the Gulf war and
the economic turmoil associated with the conflict. Although the
war is now over, the economic dislocations and hardships continue.
In our bilateral assistance request, we continue to focus our efforts
to promote peace and stability on our traditional partners, Israel
($3 billion) and Egypt ($2.3 billion). Additional costs which regional
states have incurred as a result of the crisis are being compensated
through efforts of the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group,
bilateral donors, and the international financial institutions. In
partnership with our friends and allies, we are working on
developing mechanisms to catalyze the resources needed to support
the efforts of these countries to achieve sustained economic
growth.
Reflecting developments associated with the crisis and our
own budgetary limitations, assistance levels for Jordan and Yemen
have been set at $57 million and $3 million, respectively. We also
are requesting $24 million in assistance for Tunisia for FY 1992.
We hope to be able to support Pakistan's development and security
needs with a substantial assistance program and have set aside
$260 million in total FY 1992 resources for this purpose. Provision
of this assistance, however, will be contingent on the ability of
Pakistan to satisfy the standards set in the Pressler Amendment.
East Asia and the Pacific ($702 million)
.
In Asia, our principal assistance request is for the Philippines, for
which we seek a total of $556 million in total FY 1992 bilateral
funding, including a commitment of $160 million toward the
Multilateral Assistance Initiative. This funding is designed to
strengthen a fragile democracy and promote economic reform. We
also are nearing conclusion of negotiations that we hope will make
possible our continued use of Philippines military facilities and
help build a new, more balanced relationship.
Other highlights of our request for East Asia include $27.5
million for Cambodia to support the achievement of a
comprehensive settlement based on a UN-supervised free election.
We expect to support community development, leadership and human
rights training, and election efforts--as well as continuing to meet
the very special needs of the children of Cambodia.
Europe ($1.6 billion)
.
The Administration's FY 1992 request for Europe includes $400
million for the Special Assistance Initiative for Central and Eastern
Europe, a slight increase over our FY 1991 appropriation. In
accordance with authorizing legislation, these funds support a
broad spectrum of activities, including democratic
initiatives to assist with political and social reform, and support
for economic reform, including environmental and energy projects,
enterprise funds, and technical assistance.
Contributing to the military capabilities of our NATO allies in
the Southern Flank remains a central concern for US policy in the
Mediterranean. Recognizing the pivotal role played by Turkey in the
Persian Gulf crisis, we seek $625 million in FMF and $75 million in
ESF funding for FY 1992, a combined increase of $150 million over
FY 1991 levels. Turkey took the lead in the enforcement of
economic sanctions against Iraq and has taken a courageous position
in support of the UN resolutions despite severe domestic economic
costs. This crisis has demonstrated Turkey's on-going need for air
defense support and other military equipment to bolster its role as
a key regional partner, both in Europe and the Middle East.
For Greece, we seek $350 million in FMF to assist with Greek
force modernization. We also seek $125 million in FMF and $40
million in ESF for Portugal to support force modernization efforts
and assist in the development of the Azores region where US forces
are based.
Latin America and the Caribbean ($2.1 billion).
For foreign assistance programs in Latin America
and the Caribbean, we seek $2.1 billion in total funding, the bulk of
which will be used to support the Andean Narcotics Initiative and
the emerging democracies of Central America.
To implement the President's Andean strategy, we are seeking
a total of $481 million in combined narcotics control, development
assistance, and security assistance funding. These programs
provide funding for bilateral counter-narcotics efforts, coordinated
military assistance, and economic aid to offset the dislocations of
successful counter-narcotics operations and provide alternatives to
narcotics production.
To support democratization and economic growth in Central
America, we are seeking $783 million in total bilateral assistance,
down from $906 million the prior year. As in prior years, over
three-fourths of this amount will support economic as opposed to
military assistance. We believe that sustaining these programs is
crucial to the opportunity to end the conflicts in both El Salvador
and Guatemala this year.
We also are seeking $310 million in budget authority to cover
the debt reduction provisions of the President's Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative, and, as discussed above, $100 million for the
proposed multilateral investment fund.
Africa ($1 billion).
For FY 1992, the fifth year of the Development Fund for Africa, we
seek $800 million in resources to promote broadly based and
sustainable economic growth. Priority attention will continue to be
given to those countries pursuing sound economic policies. We also
are proposing modest amounts of ESF for Africa ($29.3 million),
including a new regional "Support for African Democracy Fund." Our
$34 million request for FMF request supports maintaining and
replacing equipment supplied to our friends in past years and is
almost exclusively non-lethal. In addition we are seeking almost
$150 million in PL 480 food assistance.
The United States already has provided approximately $550
million in debt forgiveness for qualifying African countries. In
addition to bilateral assistance, the United States also provides
important financial resources to Africa through institutions such as
the IMF, the World Bank (about half of concessional disbursements),
the African Development Bank and Fund, and many UN agencies.
Our FY 1992 request for Africa is designed to encourage the
growing movement toward responsible governance in Africa,
particularly the trend toward pluralistic democracy.
Multilateral Assistance
For the multilateral development banks, we are requesting $1.7
billion in FY 1992 budget authority, up from $1.6 billion in FY 1991.
This includes $1.1 billion in funding for the International
Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank,
which provides concessionary financing to the world's poorest
countries, as well as full funding for the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the other regional development
banks.
Our FY 1992 budget request also contains $12.2 billion in
budget authority for the proposed increase in the US quota in the
IMF, as provided for in the Budget Enforcement Act. This is to
ensure that the fund has the resources necessary to fulfill its
responsibilities as the world's principal monetary institution. In
the Third World, IMF arrangements support market-oriented
adjustment and underpin debt reduction operations in support of the
Brady Plan. The Fund also has spearheaded economic reform in
Eastern Europe and responded vigorously to assist countries
seriously affected by the Persian Gulf crisis.
In addition, we are seeking $250 million for voluntary
contributions to international organizations including the UN
Development Program ($115 million) and UNICEF [UN International
Children's Emergency Fund]
($55 million).
Counter-narcotics Assistance
For the international narcotics control programs administered by
the State Department, we are seeking $172 million, an increase of
$22 million over FY 1991 levels. These funds serve as a critical
element in motivating and assisting cooperative foreign
governments to fulfill their narcotics control responsibilities.
Over two-thirds of the increased funding requested for FY
1992 will support expanded programs in Latin America, with an
emphasis on helicopters. Indeed, Latin American and regional
aviation programs will absorb fully 80% of our total FY 1992
request.
Refugees and Other Assistance Programs
The United States continues to play a pre-eminent role in
addressing the plight of the world's refugees through our
international assistance and domestic resettlement programs, as
well as our diplomatic efforts in support of permanent solutions to
refugee situations.
For FY 1992, we are requesting $491 million for migration and
refugee assistance, up from $486 million in FY 1991.
For our refugee assistance programs overseas, we seek $233
million in FY 1992 funding, a $20-million increase over the FY 1991
level. These programs will continue to focus on basic life-
sustaining activities for the most vulnerable groups and support
lasting solutions through opportunities for voluntary repatriation
and local integration.
To finance refugee admission and resettlement, we seek $192
million in FY 1992 funding. This will cover the expenses of an
estimated 120,000 refugees--about the same number as last year.
Most refugee admissions will be from the Soviet Union and Vietnam,
but there also will be admissions from Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin
America, and the Near East. Family reunification will continue to
be a priority, as will the resettlement of persecuted religious
minorities and former political prisoners.
In addition, we request $20 million to replenish the
President's Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund, to
enable us to respond to unforeseen refugee and migration needs
world-wide.
Another important component of our international
development assistance request is our $200-million request for
Peace Corps operating expenses.
Thank you. We look forward to working with you and the
members of this subcommittee in the coming months to mobilize
the flexible resources we need to carry out our ambitious foreign
affairs agenda. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991
Title: The 89th Anniversary Of Cuban Independence
Aronson
Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs
Description: Address before the Cuban-American National Foundation's
10th Anniversary Meeting, Miami, Florida
Date: May 20, 19915/20/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Cuba
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
It's a special honor to speak to the Cuban American National
Foundation on this, the 89th, anniversary of Cuban independence. As
I look out on this audience and the larger Cuban-American
community beyond these halls, I see a mirror of America. Like so
many of our fellow citizens, including my own family, you or your
parents or grandparents came to the United States fleeing
oppression in hope of finding a better life. America offered all our
families the promise of freedom, and we will always be grateful for
what America gave us. But I think it is also important to note what
you, the Cuban-American community, have given back to America.
You did not come to the United States asking for charity; you
came asking only for a chance--the opportunity to live in a
democracy, to work hard, to improve your lives, to raise your
children in the land of the free and the home of the brave. Many of
you came to this country with literally nothing in your pockets,
having been forced to leave behind all that you had worked for in
Cuba.
Yet you did not ask for a handout. Instead, you rolled up your
sleeves and went to work. Many of you worked from dusk to dawn.
In one generation, you raised families and educated your children.
You started businesses, trained doctors and lawyers, and elected
legislators, mayors, judges, and Members of Congress. You have
become a vital part of this community and of this nation. My
specialty is foreign policy, not domestic affairs. But I have no fear
of contradiction in saying this: America is a richer, stronger, and
freer nation because of the contribution of the Cuban-American
community to these United States.
But you did something more. You never forgot where you came
from or the people you left behind. Instead, you kept faith with a
vision of freedom and hope for the Cuban people on the island that
you love and remember as your home.
It is fitting on this day commemorating Cuban independence to
remember that dream and to recommit ourselves to its fulfillment.
I think you know that, today, the President of the United States
shares that dream. Rather than describe his commitment to you, I
think the President would prefer to speak in his own voice [see box
on p. 378 for President's audio message].
Many of you remember a more hopeful time in Cuba's history.
A revolution was waged 32 years ago in the name of democracy.
Many of you fought in that struggle. The Cuban people were
promised "Freedom with bread. Bread without terror." Today,
instead, the people of Cuba have the freedom to stand in line
waiting for bread. But if they grow tired standing in that line and
try to trade away their place, they can be prosecuted by the state.
Today, the Cuban people are told they must choose "socialism
or death," but that is not a choice the Cuban people wish to make.
For, in truth, it is only a choice between slow death and fast.
As President Bush has stated clearly, we hope the Cuban
people will enjoy a real choice--the opportunity to choose their
own leaders and their own form of government in free and fair
elections, as so many other governments of this hemisphere have
carried out.
Today, as we look to our south, every Latin government in this
hemisphere except Cuba is headed by a democratically elected head
of state. Every other island in the Caribbean is led by a
democratically elected leader. Look at tiny, struggling Haiti which
for two centuries enjoyed independence but never political liberty.
Yet on February 7, I had the privilege to stand with other
representatives of democratic nations and witness the first
inauguration of a democratically elected leader of Haiti.
The people of Nicaragua, the people of Chile, the people of
Haiti, and the people of El Salvador have all enjoyed the right to
choose their own leaders in a free and fair election. Why should the
people of Cuba be denied?
If elections in Cuba were truly free, if political prisoners
were released, if opposition parties were allowed to organize and
campaign without interference, and if television and radio and
newspapers were open to every point of view, and if the
Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and
other international observers could verify that the vote count was
free and fair, real change and a real choice could come to Cuba
finally.
Cuba could join the nations of the hemisphere that have
returned to democracy and respect the peace and security of its
neighbors. Cuba's wealth would no longer be squandered buying
surface-to-air missiles and bombs to send to violent revolutionary
groups in Central America; it could be used to build factories,
farms, bridges, and schools. The Cuban people would enjoy the
fruits of their own labor instead of having to work for the state.
They could actually buy the things they want and need, from razor
blades and shampoo to housing and gasoline. The Cuban people could
decide their own futures, freely visit other countries and return to
Cuba, choose a profession, study abroad, and still enjoy Cuban life
to the fullest. The youth of Cuba would no longer be sent to fight on
foreign soil for causes that they do not understand. They could walk
the Malecon with a lover or go to the beach on a beautiful summer
day. Instead, today, hundreds of Cubans risk their lives every year
on small boats and inner tubes, desperate to escape Cuba and what
the future holds for them.
The United States has no blueprint for Cuba. We do not claim
the right to order the affairs of that nation. That is a right only the
Cuban people should enjoy through a democratic process. All we
hope for is genuine self-determination and change that can come
peacefully. No one wishes to see violence, trauma, and suffering for
the Cuban people.
The people of Cuba are told they face some threat of invasion
from the United States. But this is not true, and I believe the Cuban
people know it. The United States does not threaten Cuba. The
American people respect and have affection for the Cuban people.
President Bush has made clear, the United States harbors no
aggressive intentions toward any nation in this hemisphere,
including Cuba. This false threat is just another excuse to deny the
Cuban people the right to determine their own destiny, and it is the
oldest excuse of all--national security.
This Administration would like nothing more than to welcome
Cuba back into the democratic community in this hemisphere. What
President Bush called for in his statement is not a set of goals
written in Washington; they represent the fundamental principles
embodied in the Charter of the OAS: democracy, the defense of
human rights, and respect for other nations.
The call for free elections in Cuba does not originate in Miami
or New York. It is the plea of Cubans in Havana, Santiago, and
Matanzas, and the government of Cuba would hear that plea if it only
let its citizens speak.
It is easy to be discouraged after 32 years of promises
betrayed, but I believe there is reason for hope. This generation of
Americans, North and South, is constructing something the world
has never seen before: the world's first completely democratic
hemisphere. Some day the Cuban people will be part of that great
democratic hemisphere. And when they are, the people of Cuba will
long remember the entire Cuban American community, who never
lost faith, who never gave up hope, who refused to allow the dream
of democracy in Cuba to die. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991
Title: The 89th Anniversary of Cuban Independence
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Audio Message by President Bush (also broadcast on
Radio Marti
Date: May 17, 19915/17/91
Region: Caribbean
Country: Cuba
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
On May 20th, Cuban Americans commemorate the 89th anniversary
of Cuban independence, a day that celebrates the heroic efforts of
the people who forged the Cuban republic.
The history of our two countries is closely intertwined.
During our own revolution, when American troops were short on
supplies, the women of Havana banded together and raised money for
the cause of American freedom and independence.
Eighty-two years later, Cubans banded together and, after a
long, brutal struggle, built their own republic. Today, we remember
that victory for freedom and hope for its renewal in Cuba.
Freedom demands sacrifices. And the battle for freedom
draws upon people's most heroic instincts and abilities. Jose Marti,
a hero of freedom, the father of Cuban independence, said, "To
witness a crime in silence is like committing it." So, today, we
again reiterate unwavering commitment for a free and democratic
Cuba. Nothing shall turn us away from this objective.
I ask Fidel Castro to make this an Independence Day to
remember. I call on Fidel Castro to free political prisoners in Cuba
and allow the UN Commission on Human Rights to investigate
possible human rights violations in Cuba. I challenge Mr. Castro to
let Cuba live in peace with its neighbors. And I challenge Mr. Castro
to follow the examples of countries like Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, and Chile in their achievement of new democracies.
Put democracy to a test--permit political parties to organize
and a free press to thrive. Hold free and fair elections under
international supervision. Ninety-nine percent of the people of this
hemisphere live either in a democracy or a country that is on the
road to democracy. One percent live under the hemisphere's last
dictator, Fidel Castro.
On Cuban Independence Day, our goals for the Cuban nation,
shared by Cubans everywhere, are plain and clear. Freedom and
democracy, Mr. Castro--not sometime, not some day, but now. If
Cuba holds fully free and fair elections under international
supervision, respects human rights, and stops subverting its
neighbors, we can expect relations between our two countries to
improve significantly.
Thank you, and may God bless the freedom-loving people of
Cuba and the United States. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991
Title: Update on Iraqi Refugees And Displaced Persons
Lyman
Source: Princeton N. Lyman, Director Of the Bureau for
Refugee Programs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration and
Refugee Affairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: May 20, 19915/20/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Turkey, Iran
Subject: Refugees, United Nations, Immigration
[TEXT]
I appreciate this opportunity to provide an update on the crisis of
the Iraqi refugees and displaced people. This crisis has been a
human tragedy of tremendous proportions, magnified by the rapidity
with which it happened. Some 2 million people fled Saddam
Hussein's brutal crackdown of unsuccessful rebellions, seeking
safety in or on the border of neighboring countries. We and the
international community have been committed to providing
sustenance, care, and protection to these people. After an initial
period in which people suffered and died, we and our coalition
partners have provided sufficient life-sustaining humanitarian
assistance to have drastically reduced the initial tragic death rate
of children, the elderly, and other innocent victims of this terrible
situation. Further, we have assisted in fostering conditions to
allow many refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes.
In my last appearance before the subcommittee on April 15, I
discussed the background to the crisis. Let me now turn to an
update of the situation.
Current Situation
Over the past month, there has been considerable improvement in
the plight of the refugees and displaced persons in all the areas
which have been affected: Turkey, northern Iraq, Iran, and southern
Iraq. Relief systems have been put into place, people moved into
more accessible and suitable areas, more assistance is being
provided more efficiently, and death rates have gone down markedly.
The United States and other allied forces have established a safety
zone in northern Iraq, and voluntary repatriation, which began about
April 30, has turned into a flood. The United Nations has started to
move into place and has issued a revised and consolidated appeal.
We are now working to assure a transition to the medium-
term protection and assistance effort under UN auspices and to
further the long-term goal of facilitating the ability of all of the
refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safe and
secure conditions.
I will now outline the status of the situation in each of the
areas where refugees and displaced have concentrated and the steps
we are taking to try to assure an effective turnover to the United
Nations.
The Turkey Border Region and Northern Iraq
As you know, the tremendously fast buildup of this crisis started
following the last weekend of March and coincided with harsh
weather and logistical conditions. This region of southeastern
Turkey, one of the poorest and most inaccessible in the country,
was woefully ill-equipped to support such a massive population
influx. Local villagers, generous in their assistance, were coming
under an insupportable strain, and government of Turkey resources,
even with UN assistance, were overwhelmed by the sheer numbers
needing help on the 165-mile-long border.
When an effective international response to the situation on
the Turkish border could not be mobilized fast enough, and President
Ozal of Turkey requested emergency assistance, the President
directed the US military to begin an emergency air-drop relief
mission on Sunday, April 7, for the refugees along the mountainous
border between Turkey and Iraq. The international community
worked to get a relief system in place to provide bulk food, shelter,
and medical care.
However, moving food and other emergency aid to the refugees
in the mountains along the border could only be a stopgap measure.
The only way to save lives and provide adequate shelter, food, and
medical care to the refugees was to get them down off the
mountains.
Therefore, on April 16, President Bush announced that US
troops would enter northern Iraq to create a safe area in the flat
lands around Zakhu. This decision followed discussions with our
allies, particularly with [British] Prime Minister Major, [French]
President Mitterrand, and President Ozal. Taking such a step was
fully consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 688, which had
been passed on April 5.
In addition, a memorandum of understanding was negotiated
between the Secretary General's Executive Delegate [for
Humanitarian Assistance for Iraqi Refugees] Prince Sadruddin Aga
Khan and the government of Iraq on April 18. This memorandum
calls for the United Nations to provide humanitarian assistance
throughout the country and requires the Iraqi government both to
facilitate relief assistance and to allow the United Nations to work
wherever it believes necessary. As part of the memorandum, the
United Nations is to establish a series of UN humanitarian centers,
staffed with international personnel under the auspices of the
United Nations. These centers are to serve as relay stations for
refugees who eventually choose to return to their homes under UN
protection.
Operation Provide Comfort for the refugees and displaced
persons in Turkey and massed at the border has been the largest US
relief effort mounted in modern military history. The US military
was soon joined by forces provided by United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Canada, and the Netherlands, to assist the Turkish
government and the Turkish Red Crescent Society in providing food
and emergency care for the refugees. UN agencies and private
voluntary organizations have also been providing assistance from
the beginning of the crisis.
Since early April, the situation along the Turkish border has
improved considerably. Up to 20 camp sites were established in
Sirnak and Hakkari Provinces. The most vulnerable segments of the
refugee population were moved down from the camps with the most
serious conditions to better sites inside Turkey at Silopi and
Semdinli. By May 3, death rates had dropped, there was a several-
day surplus of food in most of the camps, bulk food had increasingly
replaced meals-ready-to-eat (MREs), and a measles vaccination
program (coordinated by UNICEF) had begun. The UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the death rate at
Yekmal had dropped from 30 per day to 3, while the death rate from
the worst camps at Isikveren had declined from approximately 50
per day in early April to 16 per day by early May.
As noted earlier, the informal voluntary repatriation from the
Turkish border area, which started at the end of April, has turned
into a flood. As of May 16, the Department of Defense estimated
that 170,300 refugees remained on the border, down from an
original total of almost half a million. An average of more than
10,000 refugees a day have been returning to northern Iraq from
Turkey. Several camps along the border have been closed, including
Isikveren--which held at least 80,000 people on April 21, 40,000 on
April 30, and 5,000 on May 13. The camp at Uzumlu held 70,000
refugees on April 30 and had a population of 15,000 on May 15. The
only large camp remaining is Cukurca, and it is expected that this
site will be closed within a month.
The Turkish government has, throughout the crisis, been a
major source of help to the refugees--it spent $93.4 million in
April alone for the care of the refugees and is one of the largest
donors--despite the burdens, both economic and political, placed on
the country. The government has spent about $1.6 million per day
for refugee care and has absorbed costs for moving food supplies to
remote border locations.
As I have mentioned before, the military contribution has been
outstanding, and the cooperation among coalition forces and with
the Turkish authorities and military has been excellent. As of May
17, there were 20,700 coalition troops from 11 nations--troops
from Italy, Spain, Australia, and Belgium have joined those
mentioned before--doing humanitarian work in Turkey and northern
Iraq; more than half--11,700--are from the United States.
Meanwhile, in the Zakhu area of northern Iraq, US, British, and
French military forces worked to secure the area and build
temporary encampments, one of which has become a humanitarian
center under UN control. Troops from the Netherlands, Spain, and
Italy are also working in the area. US military officials also
persuaded the Kurdish Pesh Merga resistance to remove roadblocks
stopping refugees from returning to Iraq. Many of the returnees
appear to have gone to their homes in and around Zakhu town. The
population of the three camps at Zakhu was about 52,000 on May 16;
Zakhu I and II are now full. Construction of Zakhu III was begun on
May 13. The coalition forces are planning to build up to five more
camps in the Zakhu area.
US and coalition military forces have secured territory within
a 30-kilometer radius from Zakhu east through Amadiyah to Suriya
and as far south as the northern outskirts of Dahok. According to
the US Agency for International Development (USAID) Disaster
Assistance Response Team, preliminary indications are that all but
about 30,000-50,000 of the refugees on the Turkish border are from
the areas of Zakhu, Dahok, and areas further east.
One reason for the rapid buildup of the population at the
encampments at Zakhu is that many of the returnees from the Dahok
region continue to express unwillingness to go home under present
security circumstances. Dahok-area residents account for up to
half or more of those in the Turkish border region, creating a
potentially large camp population in the secure zone of northern
Iraq if the security situation in Dahok is not resolved.
Truck convoys of relief supplies flying UN flags arrived in
Zakhu on April 30 from both Silopi, Turkey, and Baghdad. The UN's
Special Envoy in Turkey, Stefan Di Mistura, and 15 staff members
accompanied one of the convoys and established a small operations
site close to the Zakhu temporary settlement. A week ago today,
the UN flag was raised at the first Zakhu camp in a ceremony.
Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, who last week returned from a visit to
the region, has told us that UN takeover of the coalition effort
would accelerate in the next few weeks.
Iran Border Region
At the same time as the explosion of refugees moving toward
Turkey occurred at the beginning of April, there were even more
rushing to Iran for sanctuary. The international community has
taken major steps to alleviate the plight of these people. At the
beginning of the crisis, the government of Iran and the Iranian Red
Crescent Society, with help from the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (LICROSS), mobilized quickly to meet initial demands. As
the number of refugees grew rapidly, the Iranian government
publicly appealed for international assistance on April 12.
There are now still about 1 million Iraqi refugees in this
region, concentrated in the provinces of west Azerbaijan, Kurdistan,
Bakhtaran, Ilam, and Khuzistan. Up to this point, the lead
operational international agency in Iran has been the ICRC.
However, the ICRC is now shifting its emphasis to inside Iraq as the
UNHCR has expanded its capability in the area.
The Iranian Red Crescent Society, with assistance from the
ICRC and LICROSS, is providing shelter, food, and medical care to
500,000 refugees located in 56 camps. Others are housed in
military facilities, homes, and villages, but about one-third are
still lacking shelter. The Iranian Red Crescent Society has sent
6,000 staff members to work in the camps.
The ICRC has had more than a hundred expatriate personnel
working in Iran and has provided medical supplies, blankets, tents,
and food and has had a primary role in setting up camps.
The UNHCR, in addition to staff in Tehran, has established a
presence in west Azerbaijan, Bakhtaran, and Kurdistan, the three
provinces with the highest number of refugees. The World Food
Program is providing over 48,000 tons of food, sufficient to feed
1 million people for 3 months. A private French medical group is
also assisting 10,000 refugees.
While the United States has taken the lead in mobilizing and
providing assistance along the Turkish border, the European
Community, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and other European
donors are providing significant amounts of aid to Iran and
proportionately more assistance than to the refugees in Turkey.
About 70% of the EC's assistance, for example, is going to the Iran
theater.
Despite a lack of relations with Iran, the United States also
responded to the Iranian government appeal and offered direct
assistance. After modalities were worked out with Iran, a US
military flight, loaded with blankets donated by the private sector,
arrived in Tehran on April 27. In addition, through the Bureau for
Refugee Programs, we have provided multilateral assistance
comprising $12 million to the UNHCR and $7 million to the ICRC for
the relief activities throughout the region, including Iran.
Informal voluntary repatriation appears to have started from
Iran as well as from Turkey. According to the United Nations, the
returnee flow appears to be a response to assumptions about
security arrangements as well as to agricultural and economic
factors. Poor conditions in camps in Iran may also be a motivating
factor.
It is still unclear how large the flow of returnees from Iran
is. The ICRC believes that there may be up to 5,000-10,000 persons
a day returning to Iraq from Iran, mostly along the Piranshah-Irbil
route, while the UNHCR estimates that 5,000 refugees are leaving
per province per day (for a total of up to 20,000 per day).
The returnees appear to be able to pass Iraqi government
checkpoints from Pesh Merga-controlled territory with little
difficulty. Most of these returnees seem to be going to areas south
of the coalition secure zone. However, these are preliminary
indications.
Southern Iraq
The area occupied by US forces in southern Iraq posed a special
problem. With the collapse of the rebellion in southern Iraq in
March, about 100,000 people fled the area to Iran and the US-
occupied zone. About 30,000 persons received protection, food,
medical care, and other assistance from US troops.
As US forces withdrew from this area, UN observer forces
(UNIKOM) were deployed in the demilitarized zone along the Iraqi-
Kuwaiti border. The United States worked closely with the ICRC and
UNHCR to arrange for their taking over assistance to those who had
fled to the occupied zone. However, because of concerns that
UNIKOM would not be able to provide adequate protection after the
departure of US troops and [because] the area reverted to Iraqi
control for those in the occupied zone who had been involved in
anti-regime activities, the government of Saudi Arabia--which had
been administering a camp just over its border in the occupied zone
of Iraq--agreed to provide first asylum protection to persons from
that camp, from the Safwan area, and to some displaced civilians in
a camp just inside Kuwait by moving them to a new camp inside
Saudi Arabia near Rafha.
The movement of displaced civilians in Safwan to the Rafha
camp in Saudi Arabia was completed by the US military on May 9;
6,270 people were moved in this operation. About 11,000 displaced
civilians in Al Sadah, the Saudi-administered camp in southern Iraq,
have also been transported to Rafha.
In addition, the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
completed the move of close to 2,000 Iraqi Shias of Iranian descent
from the Safwan camp to Iran on April 29.
Although it is now difficult for us to obtain reliable and
detailed information on conditions in southern Iraq, we are
concerned that health and sanitation conditions could deteriorate in
this area. Some of this is clearly the result of the Iraqi
government's brutal suppression of opponents and its lack of
attention to restoring services in this area. We are hopeful that the
UN will be able to convince the Iraqi government to turn attention
to this region.
This is where we are now, about 7 weeks since the crisis
began: mostly stabilized situations in the neighboring countries, a
relief system in place--extending from the countries of first
asylum into the refugees' home areas in northern Iraq--and a flow
of voluntary repatriation.
Transition to UN Management
We have also had progress toward moving to the next phase: the
turnover of the protection and relief activities to the United
Nations. The UN has moved a long way in the last 7 weeks, by
purchasing and supplying millions of dollars of relief goods into
Turkey and Iran, concluding the memorandum of understanding,
setting up a presence in Zakhu and Dahok, issuing appeals, and
moving staff into place in the affected region. More has to be done,
however, before the United Nations can--in effect--replace the
extraordinary bilateral efforts of the US and allied military.
In addition, the United Nations, along with the ICRC, is
working to establish humanitarian centers wherever necessary
inside Iraq and at the border regions in order to provide
humanitarian relief to the refugees and displaced persons. Such a
presence is necessary wherever the refugees and displaced happen
to be: in northern Iraq, further inside the country, along the Turkish
border, in Iran, in southern Iraq, and in the Rafha camp of Saudi
Arabia. The ICRC has already established such presence in the
border areas, including Irbil, Dahok, and Kani Masi, and plans to
expand its presence to Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. As noted, the
United Nations has begun to establish its presence in northern Iraq,
starting with Zakhu and Dahok. The UNHCR plans to have a presence
in nine sites in northern Iraq and to send out mobile teams from
these sites.
One problem has been funding. Despite an outpouring of
generosity from the international community of more than $700
million since the beginning of April--and I would note that this is
in addition to the $435 million provided for the two earlier movements
of displaced people from Iraq and Kuwait--much of this has been in
bilateral assistance or in pledges. It is necessary to turn the
pledges into tangible donations so that the United Nations can have
the cash to expand its operations. On May 15, the United Nations
issued a revised and coordinated appeal, which delineates
responsibilities by theater of operations and agency and makes it
easier for donors to contribute to programs in each major theater of
the UN's humanitarian responsibility. The appeal calls for $415
million for a 4-month period ending August 31, 1991. This 4-month
timeframe takes into account that the significant movement of
returnees will continue to occur through the summer of 1991. About
73% of the programs of the appeal are directed toward refugees or
returnees.
To further facilitate the UN takeover of the relief operation,
we have suggested that a meeting take place in Geneva, UNHCR
headquarters, or in the region of all those agencies involved in the
humanitarian operation and in the transition planning--
representatives from Prince Sadruddin's office, the UNHCR, the
European Command, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA), the State Department, the Department of Defense, and
Embassy Ankara--to agree on all aspects of the operational
turnover of the relief operation.
Protection
The longer-term goal, as I indicated at the outset of my testimony,
is to enable the refugees and displaced to return to their homes.
The issue of protection thus is of great importance.
Initially, the presence of US and allied forces, reinforced by
the withdrawal of Iraqi military units, for the allied area of
operations offers protection for those returning. The next step is
for the United Nations and ICRC to establish a presence throughout
northern Iraq which can not only provide assistance, but also ensure
that Iraq, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 688,
does not interfere with international humanitarian activities. They
would bear witness to any violation of that resolution and to any
persecution of the people in the region. The resolution makes clear
that any violation, as well as the general treatment by Iraq of its
population, will have a bearing on the lifting of economic sanctions
against Iraq.
There is also discussion underway of a lightly armed UN guard
force to help protect international humanitarian relief activities.
Prince Sadruddin and other UN officials have been discussing this
idea with the Iraqi government. We are prepared to examine this
proposal once negotiations have proceeded further. Further, the
outcome of negotiations between Kurdish rebels and the Iraqi
government will be an additional factor affecting the security
situation.
US Contribution
Acting on the President's directive of April 5, US military forces
have orchestrated the international relief effort in Turkey and
northern Iraq. In addition, the United States has been in the
forefront of contributors to alleviating this crisis. To date, the
United States has committed $207.6 million toward the plight of
the refugees. Of this amount, approximately $140 million in goods
and services has come from Department of Defense sources, and I
would point out that this figure does not include the pay of the
nearly 12,000 servicemen and women who are carrying out this
program. Their performance has been outstanding as has every level
of the US military in carrying out a truly unprecedented
humanitarian relief operation. I cannot say enough about the speed,
commitment, and effectiveness with which our military is
responding. Thousands are alive today because of their rapid
response.
OFDA has provided strong support to the military effort and to
the establishment of a reliable relief effort inside Iraq. OFDA has
obligated $12.9 million toward these objectives. OFDA also
assembled a 17-person Disaster Assistance Response Team to
provide expertise to assist in every aspect of the relief effort.
USAID has also committed nearly 50,000 metric tons of food,
delivered or on its way to the region, and valued at $31.6 million, of
Food for Peace assistance.
From the President's Emergency Refugee and Migration
Assistance account, we have provided $23 million. These funds
have gone to the UNHCR and ICRC for the most part, and $2 million
were allocated for emergency procurement in Turkey for water,
baby food, and other urgently needed items.
The Administration appreciates the prompt action of both
houses of Congress in responding to the President's request for
supplemental appropriations. The recently passed supplemental
appropriations bill provides $125 million for State Department and
USAID emergency programs for the Gulf region, $25.5 million for
peace-keeping activities, and $85 million in additional funding for
the emergency refugee and disaster assistance accounts. We plan to
program the funds appropriated for the migration and refugee
assistance account to assist in making the next phase of the relief
effort--the international phase run by the United Nations--
successful in providing assistance to the refugees and returnees
and, depending on the security arrangements, in assisting the
reintegration of the returnees into their communities.
The $85 million for replenishment of funds expended is also
very important. This will enable us to address, I am sorry to say,
humanitarian crises of equal or greater magnitude in many parts of
Africa and, more recently, Bangladesh.
The bill also includes the authority to transfer such sums as
may be necessary from the Persian Gulf Regional Defense Fund to
the Department of Defense for the incremental costs of
humanitarian assistance in this effort.
Conclusion
In conclusion, let me say that the world should not ever forget the
cruelty and destruction caused by the regime of Saddam Hussein
that lie at the heart of this crisis. As the United States now
commits personnel and resources to respond to the horrible tragedy
in Bangladesh, and as we mourn for its many victims, we must not
forget that the cause of human suffering in Iraq is wholly different.
This tragedy is not from a freak of nature but from the deliberate
actions of a ruler against his own people. It need not have happened
at all. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991
Title: US Relations With East Asia and the Pacific: A New Era
Solomon
Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs
Description: Statement before the East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: May 17, 19915/17/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia, Pacific
Country: Japan, South Korea, China, North Korea,
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Mongolia,
New Zealand, Burma, Taiwan
Subject: POW/MIA Issues, Trade/Economics,
Security Assistance and Sales, Development/Relief Aid,
Democratization
[TEXT]
I appreciate this opportunity to present an overview of US policy in
the East Asia-Pacific region in the context of our corresponding FY
1992 bureau request.
Dilemmas of Success
In preparing this testimony, I reflected on how dramatically the
region has changed from the time 20 years ago when I first came to
Washington to serve in the government. In the early 1970s, the
region was engulfed in war and great power confrontation, burdened
by millennial poverty, and challenged by aggressive communist
movements. The list of our aid recipients in Asia was a long one;
and our trade with the region was smaller than our commerce with
Latin America.
The subsequent decades have brought transforming
developments to East Asia and the Pacific. The region is largely at
peace today, with the ideals and objectives of economic growth and
political and social advancement increasingly realized. This
changed environment, in no small measure, reflects the
effectiveness of our past policies and actions in this area of the
world. Our security presence, cumulative aid and investment, and
emphasis on open markets, political pluralism and human rights
have all contributed to the coming of age of East Asia and the
Pacific. The region is now one of the engines of global growth, and
increasingly people speak of a coming Pacific century.
Our investment in blood and treasure in the Asia-Pacific
region over the past 45 years has thus yielded substantial dividends
for American interests. Our bilateral and multilateral economic
assistance has helped East Asia become the most economically
dynamic region in the world, a force for open trade and investment,
and our most promising market for the future. Our forward-
deployed military presence and security assistance has helped forge
bilateral defense relationships fundamental to regional stability.
Despite some setbacks to the global trend toward democratization-
-most dramatically in China and Burma, and most recently in
Thailand--political development is clearly evident in the
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and now even Mongolia. And I am
pleased to report that Thailand appears to be on the road back to
democracy.
Yet our successes have also generated a new set of challenges
to major bilateral relations in East Asia. The US-Japan relationship
remains the keystone of our engagement in Asia, yet Japan also has
become a robust economic competitor. Our relations with China
have lost their Cold War compass and now are buffeted by a new set
of concerns ranging from trade disputes and human rights matters
to missile and nuclear proliferation. The Republic of Korea has
prospered under our security umbrella to become a major economic
and political player on the world stage. Dynamic economies such as
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia may well become Asia's next
generation of developing "tigers" in the new millennium. Only the
Philippines is now classified as a major recipient of US aid. And
our defense relations and future security presence in the
Philippines face an uncertain future.
At the same time, our successes have also meant that many
former aid recipients have moved beyond their previous state of
need, thus reducing our aid requirements. Our current aid request of
$702.5 million for East Asia and the Pacific is oriented primarily to
the Philippines (nearly 80%). Moreover, this request represents only
5.8% of total US foreign assistance--down markedly from a decade ago.
Our request is, thus, a quite modest investment in a region of
great and growing importance to the US. Indeed, compared to
Japan's aid programs, it is a minuscule request. Japan's official
development assistance (ODA) to the Asia/Pacific region is roughly
10 times larger than our own--although their total ODA is slightly
less than our own. In Indonesia, for example, Japan, provides $1.14
billion annually while the US provides $83 million.
At a time when the world is in flux, our modest aid program is
key to sustaining our influence in East Asia. It is an expression of
our continuing engagement in this region as we seek to pursue our
interests and ideals.
Beyond a sizeable economic and security aid commitment to
the Philippines, our FY 1992 aid request also includes economic and
security assistance designed to advance prosperity,
democratization, and security throughout the Asia/Pacific region.
For example, we are requesting $56.1 million in economic
assistance to Indonesia--the fifth largest country in the world--a
country which has implemented significant economic reform, where
there is substantial US investment, and a country that is playing a
key role in our search for a political settlement in Cambodia. We
seek $12.3 million for Thailand (although currently in suspension), a
treaty ally that provided significant support with limited resources
during Desert Storm. We also seek a package of $19.6 million in
economic and development assistance for the South Pacific islands,
and $4 million to support the emerging democracy in Mongolia.
In addition, we are requesting security assistance, principally
IMET [International Military Education and Training], for Indonesia,
Thailand, and Malaysia as well as for Korea. These are small
programs which together total $6.7 million, but which are highly
cost effective in terms of our important security relationships
with these friends and allies.
The Realities of a New Era
Over the past few years, we have begun to see new economic and
political relations take shape in East Asia and the Pacific. The
region is becoming economically integrated in terms of both trans-
Pacific and intra-Asian trade and investment. For the US, our two-
way trade with the Asia-Pacific now exceeds $300 billion annually,
more than one-third larger than our trans-Atlantic trade.
New patterns of diplomacy and international cooperation are
also unfolding. From normalized Sino-Soviet relations, North-South
Korean talks, Moscow establishing relations with Seoul, Secretary
Baker's meeting with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach last fall,
or Mr. Gorbachev's unprecedented visit just last month to Japan and
South Korea, the confrontations of the Cold War era are rapidly
giving way to reconciliation and new patterns of cooperation.
Amidst this broad sweep of change, however, we also see
problems still lingering from the Cold War era: The heavily armed
stand-off on the Korean Peninsula continues unabated, and conflict
in Indochina has yet to be resolved.
As we move from the Cold War years into a new cycle of
history, we see, most poignantly in the recent war in the Persian
Gulf, that the new era now taking shape poses its own--and no less
daunting--challenges to international security and cooperation.
From the tense but relatively stable bipolar world of US-Soviet
confrontation, we are entering a time of uncertain and complex
multipolar reality. We see a renascent ethno-nationalism and the
re-emergence of regional antagonisms, ambitions, and suspicions
long frozen during the Cold War period. We are entering an era of
some daunting international contradictions. Power among nations
is increasingly diffuse, yet nations are more interdependent than
ever. Ancient feuds and rivalries are again being played out, yet
with the destructive potential of readily accessible state-of-the-
art weaponry. We are entering a world in which the information
revolution--with its instantaneous flows of communications and
capital on a global scale--is eroding the boundaries of the nation-
state. Yet we lack adequate supra-national institutions to deal
with problems of global scope--preserving the environment, halting
illegal narcotics traffic, and managing refugee flows.
The US and Asia: Challenges of a New Era
Our broad policy challenge is to manage this mix of problems which
linger from the Cold War era while giving institutional form to the
new economic and political realities which will shape the world of
the 21st century. Meeting this challenge requires sustained
engagement.
Mindful of the successes our policies have brought us over the
past four decades, as we advance into the 1990s we must:
-- Adjust our forward-deployed military presence in the
region to a still uncertain security environment in ways that
sustain our defenses and those of our allies--yet in ways that will
forge more mature patterns of responsibility-sharing that reflect
the enhanced capabilities and success of our allies and friends;
-- Promote expanded US commercial activity in the region by
realizing growing export and investment opportunities;
-- Redress imbalances in our economic relations with Japan
and build a solid foundation for realizing the possibilities of a US-
Japan global partnership;
-- Continue our engagement with China on issues of common
concern, while making clear our desire to see the PRC [People's
Republic of China] continue down the path of social and economic
reform--including reforms that are responsive to our fundamental
concern for human rights;
-- Define a new relationship with the Philippines that will
ensure continuing defense cooperation, advance economic
development, and the consolidation of democratic institutions
generated by the "EDSA" revolution of 1986;
-- Reshape and strengthen our alliance with the Republic of
Korea by encouraging the Koreans to assume responsibilities of
leadership that are more commensurate with their new economic
and military strengths, while maintaining our core commitment to
Seoul's security;
-- Continue our pursuit of a comprehensive settlement to the
Cambodian conflict based on the UN-endorsed peace plan and the
work of the Paris conference, the realization of which--along with
progress on POW/MIA issues--could open the door to
normalization of relations with Vietnam and to integrating both
Vietnam and Cambodia into the region; [and]
-- Deepen regional economic cooperation and build a
consensus for free trade and investment, particularly through the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Initiative (APEC). We view
economic development as a common interest that holds the most
promise for bringing greater cohesion to the Asia-Pacific region.
Fruits of our Policies: Asia and the Gulf War
The strength and durability of our bilateral alliance relationships in
Asia were clearly illuminated by the forthcoming response of our
allies and friends bring the recent Gulf crisis. I would like to
address security issues in the region first by updating you on Asian
support for coalition goals in the Gulf war. I am glad to say that
support for Operation Desert Storm was timely, firm, and generous.
It demonstrated the region's recognition that Saddam Hussein's
aggression threatened peace and prosperity, in not just in Gulf, but
in Asia and the Pacific as well. It has also demonstrated the
region's dedication to the principle of collective security.
As you know, Australia dispatched two warships and medical
teams to the Gulf early on. South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the
Philippines, and New Zealand sent medical teams. A number of
countries have also contributed to the relief and evacuation of
refugees from Jordan, Syria, and Turkey.
Let me focus on the contributions made by Japan and the
Republic of Korea.
Japan: In addition to providing unwavering political backing,
the Japanese government also pledged more than $13 billion in
support of the Gulf effort--the most substantial financial
contribution of any of our non-Arab coalition partners. We
appreciate these very substantial contributions to our efforts. As
we grapple with post-war realities, I am confident that Japan will
continue to play an active and important role in assisting the
economic recovery and political stabilization of the region.
As we witnessed during the Gulf crisis, Japan is in the
process of defining its post-Cold War engagement in world affairs.
However frustrating their internal debates may have been at times,
we believe that Japan's leaders have seen in the Gulf crisis the
importance of becoming active participants with the US in global
crises. The US went through a similar process between the two
World Wars; and as the fate of US support for the League of Nations
demonstrated, building a national consensus for an active global
role can be a very difficult business. We are confident, however,
that given the broad convergence of US and Japanese interests,
prospects for building a US-Japanese global partnership will be
enhanced by the continuing debate on Japan's international role. We
note Japan's recent dispatching of minesweepers to the Gulf as a
sign that its debate is headed toward greater engagement.
The Republic of Korea committed $220 million in cash and in
kind to the Gulf effort last fall. It included $100 million in
economic support for the front-line states and $120 million in cash,
logistical support, and military supplies for coalition forces. In
January, Korea committed another $280 million. The pledge
included $130 million in cash, $50 million in kind, and $100 million
for transportation costs and brought the total contribution to a
solid $500 million.
The Republic of Korea has contributed in more than financial
terms. The Koreans were the first to provide wide-body air cargo
flights from the US to the Gulf, and they provided five C-130
transports to coalition forces. In addition, a 154-member hospital
support group worked in Saudi Arabia from January to April.
The Security Consensus and Regional Issues
If the region's backing for Desert Storm demonstrates a shared
commitment to global security and UN peace-keeping efforts, then
enhanced host nation support for US forces forward-deployed in the
Pacific reflects broad support for our continuing security presence
there. In this context, I call your attention to efforts made by
Japan and the Republic of Korea to assume larger share of the
responsibility of maintaining US forces on their territory.
Japan. We are very pleased with the new host nation support
(HNS) agreement with the Japanese government. I believe Japan's
commitment to our alliance, the security treaty, and to a more
equitable sharing of the costs of maintaining US forces in Japan is
strong and warrants greater recognition than it has received to
date. At present, Japan's support of US forces in Japan is $3 billion
per year. In the 1991-95 period, Japan's total, cumulative HNS
payments will approach some $17 billion. If military and civilian
Department of Defense salaries are not included in US forces-Japan
(USFJ) total costs, Japan would be paying more than 73% of the cost
of our presence in Japan by 1995.
The Administration and some in the Congress disagree about
which costs related to our presence in Japan the government of
Japan should pay. While we both agree that Japan should not pay
USFJ salaries, the Congress has required, in the defense
appropriations bill, that Japan pay for all other costs or face annual
US troop reductions. We do not believe that Japan should pay all
non-salary costs. Our objective should be to have Japan pay all
appropriate yen-based costs. The new HNS agreement takes us
considerably closer to that goal.
Let me explain why we believe Japan should not pay all non-
salary costs. With 73% of USFJ's non-salary costs to be paid by
Japan in 1995, that leaves about 27% for the US to cover. This 27%
consists largely of operational costs associated with running a
military establishment no matter where it is located, such as
training exercises, spare parts, and supplies. Asking Japan to cover
all non-entitled costs could limit our operational flexibility. If the
government of Japan is to pay for US operations, the government of
Japan would naturally want some say in what those operations
should be. I doubt that our commanders in the field desire this kind
of an arrangement.
South Korea. For many years, both Koreans and Americans
viewed the Republic of Korea as a developing nation. By 1988,
however, a generation of spectacular economic progress reached a
point at which it was clear that the Republic of Korea could share
additional responsibility for defending our common interests. With
the East Asia Strategy Initiative (Nunn-Warner report) last year, we
outlined a three-phased approach that will reshape our security
partnership over the next decade. Under the provisions of the East
Asia Strategy Initiative, approximately 7,000 US troops will be
withdrawn from Korea by the end of 1992, and the South Korean
government will begin to assume a leading role in its own defense
while the US moves into a supporting role.
Our requests for increased cost-sharing came as the entire
US-Korean security relationship was in a period of natural
evolution. South Korea, which has devoted a higher percentage of
its GNP to defense expenditures than most of our allies--despite a
lower level of national wealth--has of necessity been more
deliberate in responding to our cost-sharing requests than some
other allies. We have pressed Korea annually since 1988 for
substantial increases in cost sharing. Our goals have been to
prepare a multi-year plan under which Korean contributions would
increase and to establish a set of general principles to guide cost-
sharing implementation.
In December we concluded an agreement with the Republic of
Korea (ROK) government which provides a legal basis for the
Republic of Korea to begin paying costs of Korean labor working for
US forces Korea. The Korean government also signed a memorandum
of understanding in which it committed to pay the full cost of
moving US forces out of Seoul (Yongsan), estimated at between $1-3
billion. The Korean government has promised $43 million in 1991
for labor costs--an entirely new category. In all, South Korean
contributions this year will be $150 million, more than double the
1990 level of $70 million.
As we reshape our security relations with South Korea, it is
important to keep in mind that the Korean Peninsula remains one of
the world's most dangerous flash points. The North Korean threat is
undiminished, as more than 1 million Democratic Republic of Korea
troops--some 70% forward-deployed near the DMZ--face some
650,000 South Korean counterparts. Moreover, North Korea's
nuclear program is a major concern throughout East Asia. Our force
adjustments are aimed at creating a sustainable security
commitment to the South Korean government while maintaining
effective deterrence.
Philippines. I would like to highlight our requests for
continued economic and security assistance for the Philippines,
which accounts for the majority of our entire aid request for the
region. Nowhere are our interests and ideals better joined than in
US policy toward the Philippines. The best investment we can make
in a more prosperous and democratic Philippines is assistance that
can help develop an economy able to provide an adequate standard of
living for all of the Philippine people. Economic reform in the
Philippines is a prerequisite for economic growth. With
approximately one-half of the population living below the poverty
line, economic reform is both a dire necessity and a challenge. A
deadly earthquake, devastating floods, droughts, and the fallout
from the December 1989 coup attempt and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
have made this challenge even more difficult.
Many of our assistance programs, such as Economic Support
Fund (ESF), direct assistance (DA), and the Multilateral Assistance
Initiative (MAI), support policy reforms necessary to generate
broadly based, self-sustaining growth. Our ESF program, for
example, supports privatization, import liberalization, improved tax
administration, better public sector resource management, and
infrastructure development. Money committed under the MAI is
predicated on policy reforms which complement these efforts.
Furthermore, our strong support for the MAI encourages
participation from other donor countries. MAI funds also have been
used for technical assistance, natural resource management, and
infrastructure development. We also encourage Philippine economic
reform through our participation in the IMF (International Monetary
Fund), World Bank, and Asian Development Bank. The Philippines
also participates in our PL-480 program (Food for Peace).
The Philippine government needs to fight the threats to
democracy by military as well as economic means. The FMF (Foreign
Military Financing) and IMET (International Military Education and
Training Program) programs help equip and train the armed forces
of the Philippines (AFP) to counter the threat from an estimated
17,000 communist guerrillas active throughout the country. Within
the last year, the AFP has made headway in the struggle against the
communist insurgency. It is imperative that the Philippine
government maintain its momentum against the insurgency as well
as threats from the political right, as manifested most
dramatically by the December 1989 coup attempt which resulted in
the loss of over 100 Philippine lives.
Thailand. I would also like to focus on the situation in
Thailand, a treaty ally which provided significant support for
Operation Desert Storm, and an impressive economic success which
experienced--what by all appearances is a temporary setback to
democracy--earlier this year. This occurred on February 23, when
Thai military forces took power in a bloodless coup d'etat,
announced the abolition of the constitution, dissolved the appointed
senate and the elected national assembly, and declared martial law.
We issued a statement on the day of coup expressing our deep regret
at these developments and urged that immediate steps be taken to
return Thailand to civilian, democratic rule. Consistent with US
policy and law, we suspended US military and economic assistance
to Thailand.
We are gratified that martial law ended on May 2, and on May 9
three acts restricting political activities were lifted. This
followed promulgation of a provisional constitution on March 1 and
the appointment of a largely civilian provisional government on
March 6. Anan Panyarachun, the former Thai ambassador to the US,
was named as interim prime minister. Former Prime Minister
Chatichai and others detained as a result of the coup have been
released. Formal press restrictions initiated after the coup have
already been lifted, although most papers are practicing self-
censorship; and political parties have remained in existence. An
interim national assembly has begun to function, and has chosen a
committee which is now drafting a new constitution. It appears the
national peace-keeping council has recognized the necessity of an
early return to democracy in Thailand: movement toward democratic
elections for a civilian government are on track and the council has
indicated that they may occur by the end of the year, but certainly
no later than early next spring.
Region-wide Security Issues. In more general terms, we and
other East Asia-Pacific powers continue to see a need for security
cooperation based principally on our formal bilateral security
relations with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, as
well as with the Philippines. While Soviet intentions may have
changed, Soviet military deployments, while reduced in quantity,
have undergone qualitative improvements through modernization
programs.
Quite apart from the Soviet military presence, there remains
concern about that which cannot be foreseen. Indeed, were the
Soviet presence to disappear, in the emerging security environment
our role as regional balancer and honest broker would, if anything,
be
more important than ever in a region which continues to grow in
importance to US interests.
Thus, sustaining our bilateral security relationships is
fundamental--not just for stability in the region, but also for
enhancing our overall influence in East Asia and the Pacific. It is in
this context that I would urge the Congress to view our security
assistance programs, particularly, IMET.
Fiscal stringency has led us to consider creative, effective,
and low- cost ways of maintaining increasingly important security
ties with our traditional friends. It is the unanimous opinion of our
East Asian ambassadors and military commanders that IMET is the
most cost-effective security assistance program we have. Training
friendly and allied students in US schools improves the
effectiveness of our alliances, exposes them to our values and
ideals, and enhances the prospects for collaborative efforts in
countering threats to regional security. I doubt that our operations
in the Gulf could have been as successful as they were if hundreds
of Saudi, Egyptian, and other coalition troops had not been trained in
US military schools. IMET is an invaluable tool for building long-
term defense relationships. Its potential dividends far outweigh
the minimal investment. It is with such considerations in mind that
we request a renewal of IMET for Malaysia.
Nunn-Warner Report. As we seek to adapt our defense
relationships to new circumstances, we concluded in last year's
Nunn-Warner report that new strategic realities in East Asia,
including the enhanced capabilities of Japan and South Korea, would
allow us to reduce our forces in the region by 10 to 12% over 3
years without loss of combat capability. These adjustments have
already begun, and in excess of 15,000 personnel will be withdrawn by
December 1992. We have reached agreement with our allies on both
our future force structure and, as I have mentioned, their
contributions to the common defense. We also have successfully
concluded an access agreement with Singapore which will permit
expanded US use of their facilities. We believe that we have
secured allied understanding of our continuing presence and are
consulting closely on establishing proper force levels to ensure that
we can meet our defense and treaty obligations in the region.
Collective Security Forums. Some observers have suggested
that the states of East Asia establish a collective security forum
similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). East Asia is a region so vastly different from Europe in
terms of its history, cultural diversity, levels of economic
development, and geopolitical architecture that imposing the logic
of European security is simply inappropriate. The Cold War did not
weld the region into two opposing blocs; and there is no single
threat commonly perceived across the region. Instead, there is a
multiplicity of security concerns that vary from one country to
another, from one sub-region to another. The one important
exception is the Korean Peninsula where European-style confidence-
building measures and CFE-type [Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe] arms reduction initiatives seem to make sense. I would
also add that there are good prospects for increasing cooperation
among the major powers of East Asia in support of the North-South
Korean dialogue, tension-reduction efforts, and ultimately, the
guaranteeing of outcomes reached through negotiation between the
two Korean governments.
The concept guiding our approach to Asian security is that
solutions be fashioned which fit the character of the problem.
Some of the collective security proposals we have seen strike us as
solutions in search of problems. As in the case of Korea, when
states have a direct interest in the solution of regional tensions,
we welcome their participation. Our work on the Cambodia
settlement with the Permanent Five members of the UN Security
Council, the Paris conference [on Cambodia], and the ASEAN
countries is a good example of our approach to the resolution of
regional conflicts. We see the region's problems addressed more
appropriately by adapting existing institutions to new
circumstances, working through the UN, and/or forging ad hoc
coalitions of states suited to the nature of the
problem rather than by working through a large, unwieldy and ill-
defined region-wide collective security forum.
Relations With Vietnam and Laos. We believe the time has
come--as Secretary Baker told Soviet Republic of Vietnam Foreign
Minister Thach in New York last fall--to turn a new page in history
and seek reconciliation and the development of a normal, productive
relationship with Vietnam. This requires attaining a comprehensive
solution to the Cambodian conflict and resolving the POW/MIA issue.
Last month, I met with Vietnam's UN ambassador and presented a
"road map" of how we could normalize relations quite rapidly in a
four-phase, confidence-building process. We are prepared to move
ahead on normalization, but Hanoi's active cooperation in achieving
a Cambodia settlement and in resolving the fate of American
POW/MIAs must be central to the deal if we are to proceed in a way
that has the support of the American people and brings stability to
all the countries of Indochina.
For whatever reasons, Hanoi and Phnom Penh have hesitated in
moving forward to support the UN settlement process for Cambodia.
We and other governments involved in the Paris Conference are
trying to address their concerns within the context of the
Permanent Five settlement framework which has the support of the
UN Security Council and General Assembly as well as the Paris
Conference co-chairmen.
Hanoi's cooperation is somewhat more evident on
humanitarian issues. With Vietnam's active support, we are rapidly
expanding the Orderly Departure Program, including, since 1990, the
participation of former reeducation-center detainees. As well,
Vietnam has improved cooperation on the POW/MIA issue since
Secretary Baker and General Vessey met separately with Minister
Thach last fall, although we need greater results from this process.
During a trip to Hanoi last month, General Vessey and
Minister Thach agreed to open a temporary POW/MIA office in Hanoi,
staffed by Defense personnel, to support the POW/MIA accounting
process. This decision reflected a previous understanding that we
would establish such a presence if we determined it would
facilitate resolution of the issue. While not a part of the
normalization "road map," this facility could accelerate that
process if it helps advance resolution of our POW/MIA concerns, we
are also making available through USAID approximately $1 million
to address Vietnamese humanitarian needs in the area of
prosthetics.
Our relations with Laos have continued to improve as the Lao
have bolstered cooperation on counter-narcotics activities and
continued to work seriously with us on POW/MIA accounting. Most
recently, we were able to conduct the first-ever investigation in
Laos of so-called discrepancy cases, involving men last known to be
alive in Laos, near the former Pathet Lao headquarters in the remote
northeast. On narcotics, the Lao recently acceded to our long-
standing requests to grant a multiple-entry visa to a Thailand-
based DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] agent and to arrange a
meeting for that agent with a high-level interior ministry official.
I would note that we have seen a 27% decrease in opium production,
facilitated by our crop substitution project at Houphan. We
continue to push for still further progress, particularly in the area
of law enforcement.
We have been pleased with the Lao government's continuing
economic reform effort and policy of welcoming back those Lao who
left after 1975 but who now want to return to live or do business in
Laos. Secretary Baker reminded the Lao Foreign Minister in October
that economic reform, to be effective, requires concurrent efforts
at political reform. We continue to urge the Lao to promote reform
and development. And we hope that increased cooperation on
narcotics and POW/MIA issues will make possible the upgrading of
our bilateral relations.
Democracy in Mongolia. Perhaps the most dramatic reforms in
Asia this past year have been in Mongolia. Leaving behind harsh
authoritarian rule and economic dependence on the Soviet Union,
Mongolia has, in the space of just 14 months, peacefully created a
multi-party democracy and made major steps toward fundamental
structural reforms, involving plans to privatize its economy. In
addition to the expected socio-economic strains inherent in
implementing reform, Mongolia had a poor harvest last year and saw
a large Soviet aid program abruptly eliminated. For reforms to
succeed under these difficult conditions, Mongolia must have help
from the United States and other democratic nations. The US has
authorized this year a $2 million USAID program of technical
assistance to help Mongolia succeed in reform. We have also
approved 30,000 tons of emergency food assistance to Mongolia
through USAID Title II.
Relations With New Zealand. We hope that future New Zealand
defense policies will permit that country to return to full
participation in the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-US] alliance.
Since assuming office in November 1990, New Zealand's new Prime
Minister, Jim Bolger, has expressed his desire to rebuild the
defense and security relationship with the United States and to
reaffirm New Zealand's standing among the Western nations through
steps such as its contribution of a medical team and two support
aircraft to the Gulf coalition.
However, the government of New Zealand has not yet tackled
the fundamental issue between our two countries--New Zealand's
anti-nuclear law, which effectively bars US Navy vessels from
visiting New Zealand on a "neither confirm nor deny" basis. We
believe that recent successes in arms control negotiations and the
multilateral action in the Gulf--to which New Zealand contributed-
demonstrate that collective security and alliances work. President
Bush, in a recent telephone conversation with Mr. Bolger,
emphasized the warm feelings held by Americans for New Zealand,
and our desire to build on our currently friendly relations. But it is
for New Zealand to decide what its long-term interests and goals
for defense and security relations with the US will be and to
undertake appropriate actions which would make possible a return
to active partnership in ANZUS.
South Pacific. President Bush's unprecedented summit with
the leaders of 11 Pacific island nations last fall underscored our
growing engagement in the South Pacific. We share with them a
firm commitment to preserving the environment and seek early
action by the Senate on the South Pacific Regional Environmental
Protection Convention. We share a common interest in the rational
use of the region's maritime resources as demonstrated by US
accession to the Wellington Convention on driftnet fishing. And we
look forward to negotiating an extension to the mutually beneficial
South Pacific fisheries treaty.
Democracy and Human Rights
As I suggested above, encouraging the growth and maturation of
democratic government is one of the fundamental objectives of the
Administration's foreign policy, while we have seen some setbacks
in East Asia and the Pacific over the past 2 years, we are confident
that democratization is a trend well at work in the region. We hope
the Congress will allow us the flexibility to promote this important
goal in a manner consistent with our many and complex long-term
interests in the region.
China. As President Bush told the press just this week, our
approach to China is to make clear our concern about human rights
abuses but also to recognize that cutting off all contacts is not the
way to effect change. This is particularly true at a time when all
other G-7 countries have largely restored their relations with
China--most particularly their trade relations--to pre-Tiananmen
levels. President Bush pointed out that during the Gulf conflict,
cooperation with China, a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, was essential to attaining world-wide support for
coalition efforts. At the same time that we pursue our enduring and
fundamental interest in universal human rights, we must recognize
that China is important in regional and global affairs. As the
President said, we have good reason to maintain constructive
relations with China. Such relations are essential if we are to
sustain and enhance US-PRC cooperation in the search for solutions
to regional tensions in East Asia and on other pressing issues. We
cannot gain cooperation from China on matters such as missile and
nuclear proliferation unless we remain engaged with the PRC.
The necessity of remaining engaged with the Chinese is
precisely the reason Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Robert M. Kimmitt visited Beijing just last week. He discussed key
areas of friction in the bilateral relationship--from human rights
and trade problems to proliferation concerns--as well as regional
issues where cooperation is essential to the success of our policies
for resolving the Cambodia conflict and enhancing security on the
Korean Peninsula. Progress will not come instantly, but through
patience and perseverance over time. For this reason we seek to
engage the Chinese authorities with sharply focused working visits
in both directions so we can ensure that we have done all that is
necessary to convey US concerns and promote US ideals and
interests.
We recognize that important indicators of human rights--
freedom of speech and association, due process, among others--
remain severely circumscribed in China today. We were encouraged
by the initiation of the first-ever official dialogue on human rights
with PRC officials when Assistant Secretary [for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs] Schifter went to China in December. Chinese
authorities told us that they have come to understand that human
rights is an essential component of our foreign policy and that the
issue must form part of our bilateral agenda. The Chinese have told
us that they recognize the importance of individual human rights,
and intend to improve the protection of such rights. We hope this
official dialogue--and similar dialogues which the PRC is
developing with France and Australia--will bear fruit.
Nevertheless, as noted in our 1990 human rights report, while
there were several positive developments in human rights in China
over the last year, serious abuses and political repression continue.
Most recently, we have been deeply disturbed by trials and
sentencing of a number of persons detained during the 1989
crackdown. Chinese authorities have claimed that those sentenced
were guilty of crimes of disturbing public order, but our general
impression is that they were apparently guilty of nothing more than
the peaceful expression of political views.
In Tibet, restrictions on political and religious activity
remain in effect, but there have been some encouraging
developments, most importantly a break in the cycle of violence
that has plagued Tibet since 1987. Following the lifting of martial
law on May 1 last year, the security force presence in Ohasa was
scaled back. Some foreign officials have been allowed to visit,
including officials from our consulate general in Chengdu. It is our
desire that these steps lead to a restoration of the positive
momentum that characterized the situation in Tibet in the mid-
1980s. I should add that we view the Dalai Lama as an important
religious and humanitarian leader. President Bush's private meeting
with him underscores this view as well as our fundamental
commitment to human rights.
Burma. We remain concerned and extremely disappointed by
the total lack of progress toward the implementation of
parliamentary democracy in Burma. I am sorry to say that Burma
may miss a historic opportunity to promote national development
under a popular democratic government. Despite promises to do so
promptly, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) has refused to abide by the will of the Burmese people as
expressed in the results of the May 1990 election. No timetable for
a return to the promised civilian rule has been announced. The
election's victors, the opposition party, has been largely destroyed
by arrests and intimidation, and opposition within the Buddhist
clergy was ruthlessly suppressed. Clearly, the SLORC is attempting
to negate the results of the election, thus leaving little prospect
for an early return to genuine democracy in Burma.
Since the election, we have been active in multilateral efforts
to influence the Burmese. In July 1990, Secretary Baker urged
Burma's ASEAN neighbors to use their influence with Burmese
military authorities to encourage a transition to civilian
government
and the release of political prisoners. Our embassies in the region
have since reinforced this message. In addition, Secretary Baker
sent a letter in August to General Saw Maung, the chairman of the
SLORC, urging him to transfer power to a civilian government and to
release all political prisoners, including NLD (National League for
Democracy) leader Aung San Suu Kyi. We have also urged these
measures in the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights
Commission.
The US has also taken several economic measures against
Burma in an effort to encourage an improvement in the situation in
that country: We long ago terminated all forms of economic
assistance to Burma and actively urged others to do so; we have
suspended Burma's GSP [Generalized System of Preferences]
privileges; and we have decertified Burma on narcotics. This later
step means that we will oppose loans to Burma by the World Bank,
the IMF, and other international organizations. Unfortunately, thus
far these steps have not produced the kind of results we are hoping
for. While recognizing that our influence over this reclusive and
autarchic leadership is quite limited, we are continuing to consider
what further steps we might take which would be effective in
convincing the SLORC authorities to be more responsive to the will
of the Burmese people.
Economic Relations and Cooperation
We are entering an age in which technological and commercial
capabilities rather than military strength alone are significant
determinants of state power and influence. In considering our
economic role in the region in the 1990s, we must avoid over-
reacting to some of the side effects of the region's rapid economic
growth. We must resist the temptation to withdraw behind
protectionist barriers, or otherwise give the impression that we
are turning inward rather than taking measures to strengthen our
competitive position. In fact, the diffuse and complex environment
emerging in East Asia and the Pacific requires even closer economic
cooperation with our trading partners.
The US no longer dominates the region economically, but the
trade statistics reveal that American interests are well served by
the dynamic commerce that ever more closely links us to East Asia
and the Pacific. Trade in both directions continues to expand as the
countries of the region open their markets to imports. Merchandise
trade figures indicate a marked improvement in US exports to most
of our East Asian trading partners in 1990. Our 1990 world-wide
deficit was $101 billion, down 8% from the 1989 deficit of $109.4
billion, with an 8% increase in US exports to the East Asian region.
US imports from such major trading partners as Japan, Taiwan,
Korea, and Hong Kong fell while our exports grew, narrowing our
deficits with each of these economies. The bilateral deficit with
Japan alone improved by $8 billion to $41 billion, a 16% decline.
In broader terms, we must not forget that the East Asia-
Pacific region promises to be our best market in the 1990s. East
Asia conducts a larger volume of trade with the US than with any
other region, and our exports to East Asia have grown at a rate
higher than our exports to any other part of the world. The simple
fact is that from 1968 to 1988, our exports to the region grew by
over 1,400% while our exports to the EC [European Community]
during the same period grew by 743%. Japan purchases from us
much more than raw materials: over half of our exports to Japan in
1988 and 1989 were manufactured goods (about $22 billion), more
than Germany and France together purchased from us in those years.
I do not wish to downplay the significance for our economy of
the trade deficit or other bilateral economic issues with Japan and
other regional trading partners. These are serious matters and we
are pursuing them vigorously. We have made significant progress in
the structural impediments initiative. For example, Japan now
plans to increase its own public investment spending and has
removed obstacles to opening new large retail stores, thus
expanding opportunities for US exporters.
As we enumerate our economic grievances with the Japanese,
we need to keep a sense of perspective and recall that Japan is our
best market outside this continent. Trade will inevitably lead to
frictions and frictions to blisters. As we treat the blisters, we
need to reject the quick cure of amputation.
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation initiative is the
crystallization of these Asia/Pacific economic trends I have
mentioned. East Asia's future will be shaped by economic
integration. We are opposed to trading blocs, and we are doing what
we can to accelerate progress on the basis of open market
principles. We were pleased that recent progress in Geneva has
given new life to the Uruguay Round [of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade]. A successful outcome of the round remains a key
US objective.
We also are pleased with APEC to date, which has had
ministerial meetings in Canberra in 1989 and Singapore in 1990.
Agreement to hold future ministerials in Seoul in October 1991,
Bangkok in 1992, and in the US in 1993 lend political continuity to
APEC.
Between ministerials, the substantive work program of APEC
is overseen by senior officials meetings. APEC's work program
includes 10 working groups covering trade and investment data,
trade promotion, investment and technology transfer, human
resources development, energy cooperation, marine resource
conservation, telecommunications, transportation, tourism, and
fisheries. Several of these working groups will produce substantial
results in time for review by the November Seoul ministerial.
Several organizational issues are facing APEC. Arrangements
for the participation of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are yet to be
worked out. Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir's recent call for an
East Asian economic group raises questions about how such a
grouping would affect APEC. We remain concerned that a second,
less inclusive body for the same purpose as APEC could undermine
the momentum now behind the 1989 initiative.
The United States plays an active role in APEC. Secretary
Baker was an early supporter of this initiative, and US officials
lead two of APEC's working groups--transportation and tourism--
and co-lead two other groups, telecommunications and trade and
investment data. The partnership for education initiative, launched
by Secretary Baker at the Singapore ministerial, is viewed as a
model of cooperation by other APEC participants in the human
resources development working group. The initiative is laying the
groundwork for cooperation between US and APEC educational
institutions, and among US businesses in cooperative education and
internships. Activities under the initiative will be underway by the
time of the October ministerial.
Conclusion
The Administration's total economic and security assistance
requests for the East Asia-Pacific region come to $702.5 million,
with $492 million for economic assistance (DA, ESF, PL 480, and
the Philippines MAI) and $210.1 million in security assistance (IMET
and FMF credits). Over 90% of our FMF and ESF monies will go to the
Philippines, assuming that our current discussions are successful.
This represents only 5.8% of total US foreign assistance. The
overall level represents a 2% increase over FY 1991. Economic
assistance to the region increases by 2.6% with a 1% rise for
security assistance.
With these financial resources, and with our other political,
military, and economic efforts in the region, we are making an
investment in the future of the Pacific community. To date, the
region's dramatic economic success, its peace and prosperity, and
its continuing support for our foreign policy goals throughout the
world are the dividends paid on our past investments. Future
dividends will require future investments, and I hope you agree that
the returns we are receiving outweigh the relatively small price we
have paid. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991
Title: Department Statement on Gandhi Assassination
Tutwiler
Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Washington, DC
Date: May 21, 19915/21/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South Asia
Country: India
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Terrorism
[TEXT]
Secretary Baker is deeply saddened by the news of the
assassination of former Prime Minister and leading Indian
statesman Rajiv Gandhi. Mr. Gandhi's leadership during his term in
office helped produce a rapid expansion of ties between the United
States and India. We deplore this senseless act of violence which
insults the spirit of Indian democracy by removing a leading
candidate in the midst of national elections. He sends his
condolences and deepest sympathy to the Gandhi family and to the
Indian people at their loss. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 21, May 27, 1991
Title: Feature: From Isolationism to Global Leadership, 1933-45
Date: May 27, 19915/27/91
Category: Features
Region: North America
Country: United States, Germany, Argentina, Angola
[TEXT]
The following was prepared by the Office of Public Communication
and the Office of the Historian.
The Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-45), the longest
in US history, marked an important period of transition for the
United States as the country moved from isolationism to global
leadership. During the dangerous war-time years, Roosevelt
controlled foreign policy himself. A great believer in personal
diplomacy, he often negotiated with world leaders directly, at war-
time planning conferences in Casablanca, Tehran, Cairo, and Yalta.
He also relied on a series of special envoys who bypassed
traditional channels and reported directly to the White House.
At first, the Department of State struggled to adapt to the
President's new dynamic and assertive style. From the time of
George Washington, Americans had been suspicious of international
politics. As a result, the State Department remained aloof from
world events and dealt primarily with concrete matters--like
treaties of commerce and navigation--and provided consular
assistance. The Second World War would change all that, and, by
1945, the Department was in the vanguard of post-war planning.
Diplomacy in the 1930s
Despite his later interest, Roosevelt largely ignored foreign policy
during the 1932 campaign since his priority was the country's
economic situation. During his first term, FDR left foreign affairs
to his Secretary of State, Tennessean Cordell Hull. Hull, who served
in both the House and Senate, was a powerful and popular figure in
the Democratic Party with a strong political base on Capitol Hill.
He was a dedicated internationalist and worked consistently for
free trade. Hull viewed international problems in terms of moral
principle, which often brought him into conflict with the pragmatic
President. Nonetheless, Hull served the President for 11 years, only
retiring in 1945 because of ill health.
Confronted with rising aggression in Europe and the Far East
during the 1930s, the Department faced a difficult task. Americans
were not yet ready to assume global responsibilities, and a series
of neutrality laws prevented the United States from openly opposing
Europe's dictators. During these years, it was Secretary Hull--
working closely with FDR's confidant, Assistant Secretary Sumner
Welles--who began leading the country out of isolationism. Hull
was the author of FDR's Latin American "Good Neighbor Policy,"
which successfully provided a basis for partnership and cooperation
in the Western Hemisphere. The President was able to point to the
successes of the Good Neighbor policy as a model of a positive and
active international role for the United States.
The Department of State and the Second World War
During 1939, President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull concluded that
war was inevitable--despite strong congressional sentiment to the
contrary. As part of its preparation, the State Department began
around-the-clock monitoring of European shortwave radio
broadcasts, providing hourly situation reports to the President and
the Secretary. When Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, it
was Ambassador Anthony Biddle in Warsaw who broke the news in a
3:00 am phone call to Washington. By 4:00 am, top Department
officials had gathered in Hull's office to listen to Hitler on
shortwave radio.
The most dramatic and dangerous aspect of wartime
diplomacy was overseas service in posts near to--or even inside--
the war zone. For the first 2 years of the war, Foreign Service men
and women continued to work in Germany and Italy, faced hardship
at posts in China and the Soviet Union, and came under physical
attack in London and the Philippines. Some diplomats, like George
Kennan in Berlin and Charles Bohlen in Tokyo, were temporarily
interned as prisoners of war. Other Foreign Service officers, like
Robert D. Murphy in North Africa and David Bruce in France, served
as political advisors to Allied military commanders on the great
campaigns of the war.
World War II completely transformed the Department of State.
A 1936 photo showed all of the Department's Washington employees
standing on the steps of the building, but by 1946 a small stadium
would have been required. From 1939-45, the Department's
employees rose from 3,700 to 7,000. America's new leadership role
brought additional power and influence to the bureaus and offices
which implemented the new activist policies. The Department's
economic activities, for example, expanded more than fivefold as it
worked in conjunction with other independent agencies like the War
Production Board, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the
Lend-Lease Administration. The 38 operational units that managed
Department activities in 1938 grew to 18 offices and more than 80
divisions by the end of 1945, with quarters in 8 Washington office
buildings.
The needs of the military took precedence over other
government services during the war, and many new Department
Civil Service personnel were women who were vigorously recruited
across the nation. In 1941, President Roosevelt also issued an
executive order calling for fair employment principles in wartime
projects. This lead to the intensified hiring of African-Americans
and the breakdown of long-standing discriminatory practices
against them.
Planning for the Post-war World
The Department's most significant accomplishment of the war-time
period was its work in planning for the peace-time world. Even
before the United States entered the war, Secretary Hull created an
"Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Policy," which became
the first office to deal with post-war planning. The committee was
expanded in November 1941 and in held its first planning session in
February 1942. As early as March 1943, a draft constitution
existed for the organization that would become the United Nations,
and the drafting group produced the UN Charter--the basis for US
proposals at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944--by August 1943.
Secretary Hull, who had supported Woodrow Wilson's League of
Nations, was instrumental in making the United Nations a reality.
The UN Charter reflected Hull's perspective and style, and he used
his congressional ties to win bipartisan support for the
organization. President Roosevelt called Hull ". . .the one person in
all the world who has done the most to make this great plan for
peace an effective fact." In 1945, Secretary Hull won the Nobel
Peace Prize for his efforts and was awarded a Medal of Merit by
President Truman in 1947. In the words of the President, Hull--and
by implication the Department--had made diplomacy "a potent
instrument in laying the foundations of a stable and peaceful world
order in the postwar era." (###)