US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 20, May 20, 1991
Title: Central and Eastern Europe: A Year Later
Eagleburger
Source: Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
Description: Remarks as prepared for delivery at the annual
conference of the US Export-Import Bank, Washington, DC
Date: May 16, 19915/16/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Poland, Czechoslovakia (former)Hungary
[TEXT]
In March 1990, I gave a speech on Eastern Europe before the
Eximbank's last annual conference at a time when truly
revolutionary events in that region had just taken place. There was,
understandably, a good deal of euphoria then over the sudden
collapse of the Iron Curtain and the triumph of freedom throughout
Central and Eastern Europe. At one end of the spectrum, there was
the curious assertion that history had come to an end, and at the
other, a kind of complacent assumption that the conversion of
Eastern Europe to democracy and free enterprise meant that we
would no longer have to concern ourselves with developments in
that region as we had for the previous half century.
More level-headed observers were, of course, aware of just
how unusual and difficult would be the tasks facing our East
European friends and how important their success is to American
interests. But the drama of their struggle was no longer of a nature
to capture newspaper headlines, particularly as they settled down
to the humdrum business of democratic electioneering and economic
policy-making with which we are all too familiar. In the meantime,
events in the Persian Gulf soon conspired to shift our attention
elsewhere.
If there is one point which I would like to reassert today,
however, it is the strategic place which Central and Eastern Europe
will continue to occupy in American foreign policy for the
foreseeable future. In fact, I believe we ought to look at the
revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Gulf war as having both
ushered in a new era in international relations, one which, for lack
of a better name, we are calling the post-Cold War era. This era
will have two defining features:
First, it will be dominated by the worldwide transition from
command to free market economies, a movement whose outcome
will help determine the fate of the worldwide trend toward
democracy, which is also underway; and
Second, as we saw with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it will be
characterized by a much greater fluidity in international
relationships, as the historically unusual discipline imposed by the
Cold War disappears.
Both of these features of the new era are apparent today in
Central and Eastern Europe, where the struggle to consolidate
democracy and the market economy has coincided with the waning
of the Cold War security order. Clearly, our goal must be to see the
successful integration of the former communist countries into the
wider pattern of European and Western cooperation, which has
fostered both peace and prosperity among nations which habitually
were at each other's throats for the better part of a millennium. No
one can say what failure would bring. We do know, however, that
nature abhors a vacuum and that when Central and Eastern Europe
was weak and unstable in the first half of this century, the great
powers twice wound up colliding. And so we must succeed.
The Past Year: Achievements and Obstacles
So much for the stakes involved. What I would like to do today is to
describe the progress and the problems our European friends have
encountered on the path of reform over the past year, and what the
US government is doing to help.
There have been important successes, most notably in the
political and security fields. The commitment to democracy is
unequivocal in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and even Bulgaria.
It is being institutionalized in parliaments, in a free press, and in
legal safeguards which protect individual liberties and human
rights. Meanwhile, Soviet troops are being withdrawn completely
this year from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and a timetable for
their removal from Poland is currently under negotiation. Perhaps
the most tangible sign of change was the region's full and costly
cooperation with the international coalition against Saddam
Hussein.
You do not have to be a rocket scientist, however, to
understand that the region is in tough shape economically and that
its fledgling democratic institutions will face severe testing for
some time to come. The last year has seen deepening recession, a
legacy of the outmoded and decaying economic infrastructure left
by the communists, and, to a degree, a result of the very reform
measures undertaken to restore economic health. There has been a
series of unanticipated shocks: the cutoff of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil;
the collapse of trade with the USSR; the Soviet decision to force
payment for goods in hard currency; and the loss of the East German
market.
Fortunately, these events have not shaken the fundamental
commitment of the governments in the region to navigate the
transition to market economies, nor have they appreciably blunted
their willingness to implement the painful reforms needed to reach
the ultimate destination.
Poland continues to set the pace of reform. Its bold
stabilization program of last year--aided significantly by the
United States and its Western partners --succeeded in driving down
inflation, lowering interest rates, and making the zloty convertible.
It is true that a serious drop in industrial output and a major
increase in unemployment have resulted. But unemployment still
does not reach West European levels, and for the first time in
memory, store shelves are full, and queues have disappeared.
Poland's neighbors have demonstrated, to varying degrees,
greater caution in implementing reforms. However, both Hungary
and Czechoslovakia now have plans in place for macroeconomic
stabilization and, over
a several-year period, for removing the distortions of state
intervention in the economy. And Bulgaria, after electing
a multi-party parliament in June, has moved boldly down the path of
economic reform.
To be frank we have encountered, over the past year, two sets
of obstacles to fundamental reform in Central and Eastern Europe.
First has been the slowness in moving from macro- to
microeconomic reform; that is, from macroeconomic stabilization
to the actual transformation of command economies into market
economies. The second has been the emergence of potentially
dangerous political phenomena, which coexist with the nascent
democratic institutions in the area.
The fact of the matter is that history affords few, if any,
examples of attempts to privatize an economy which was entirely
run by the state. There are no precedents, and, thus, no guidelines.
You will recall that last year we rejected proposals for a massive
bailout of the East European economies on the lines of the 1947
Marshall Plan. It tended to be forgotten by some that a market
economy was already in place in Western Europe after World War II,
ready to absorb the infusion of capital needed to get the region back
on its feet. That simply is not the case in Central and Eastern
Europe today.
Instead, the first order of business in the region, following
macroeconomic stabilization, was, and is, the creation, piece by
piece, of a free market infrastructure. This has been a contentious
and confusing process. Fundamental issues have to be decided. To
whom does formerly state property belong? To whom should state
enterprises be sold? How should those whose property was
confiscated by the communists be compensated? Which industries
should be salvaged and which sacrificed to the realities of the
international marketplace?
To the list of fundamental issues to be decided we must add a
list of fundamental skills to be acquired--worker skills,
management skills, information skills, and financial skills to name
but a few.
And finally, the infrastructure of a modern and internationally
competitive economy needs to be created--in banking,
communications, transportation, housing, and other sectors.
Thus, it is not surprising that in Poland, for example, where
macroeconomic stabilization has been most far-reaching, the
desired supply-side response has been slow to follow.
Privatization has lagged, and state enterprises have remained
insulated from the market and competitive forces. Moreover, we
cannot discount important psychological obstacles to
microeconomic reform resulting from the communist era: the
attachment to job security, and quite simply, fear of change and
fear of the unknown.
New US Strategy for Economic Reform
Let me assure you that the Administration has drawn a lesson from
the experiences of the past year and has shifted its assistance
priorities accordingly. This is not to say we are abandoning
macroeconomic support--witness the US-led Paris Club initiative
which produced agreement on exceptional debt reduction for Poland.
But we feel that the greatest needs in Central and Eastern Europe
today are microeconomic in nature, particularly the need to
stimulate private sector activity. We believe that the number one
way to meet those needs is to promote enhanced trade and greater
access to Western markets as well as larger flows of Western
investment. Accordingly, our new approach will have the following
three components.
First, emphasis on technical assistance to help train
bankers and managers; to help draft tax, labor, and commercial laws
which will make competition a reality; to help build financial
intermediaries to assist in the privatization process; and to help
with enterprise restructuring and with removing the bureaucracy's
stranglehold over economic activities: Together with the
Enterprise Funds for Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, technical
assistance will receive the greatest commitment of US resources in
the coming years.
Second, expansion of trade with the West. At a time
when East European trade with the USSR and East Germany has
collapsed, Western markets are more important than Western aid.
Unless they can increase their exports, the new democracies of
Central and Eastern Europe will lose more from the trade
hemorrhage than they could possibly gain from any transfusion of
Western aid. Therefore, the United States has launched a trade
enhancement initiative, which includes:
-- A significant expansion of duty-free benefits covering
Central and East European exports under the Generalized System of
Preferences;
-- Technical assistance on US trade laws and regulations to
help overcome informational barriers trade; and
-- Development of a program through which the Commerce
Department will match companies, especially small- and medium-
size firms, in complementary economic regions of the United States
with those in Central and Eastern Europe.
We should not be taking these steps alone. The European
Community, which represents the greatest market for Central and
Eastern Europe, should also provide--and, indeed, has an obligation
to provide--greater market access, and we are encouraging them to
do so in the context of their association agreements. We emphasize,
however, that these agreements should conform to GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] rules by covering all areas of
trade, including agriculture.
Our third and final priority is to expand the region's
productive capacity, and thus boost trade, by promoting increased
levels of direct Western investment in the Central and East
European economies. Frankly, this form of support has been
disappointing to date. For example, [Polish] President [Lech] Walesa
noted during this visit here that US private investment in Poland
has totaled only $30 million thus far.
The centerpiece of this effort is our recently launched
American Business and Private Sector Development Initiative,
which is designed to promote the growth of US investment in the
region, increase participation by US firms in infrastructure
development, and increase the involvement of small- and medium-
sized US companies in bilateral trade. This is a $45 million
2-year project carried out by the US Agency for International
Development (USAID), the Department of Commerce, the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the US Trade and
Development Program, in partnership with the private sector.
Primary emphasis will be on five key sectors identified by the
Central and East European countries, and which represent unique
opportunities for American business--agriculture and agribusiness,
energy, environment, telecommunications, and housing. The
initiative includes, inter alia, the following elements.
-- An American Business Center in Warsaw, which will make
available office space and technical business services on a user-fee
basis in cooperation with the private sector.
-- Consortia of American Businesses in Eastern Europe, which
will support small- and medium-sized US companies wishing to
enter the East European market. Grants will assist US trade and
business associations in selected sectors in establishing a presence
in the region.
-- A USAID Capital Development Initiative, which is designed
to provide assistance to East European governments and private
sector firms in designing infrastructure projects in ways that will
encourage the involvement of US companies.
-- We are seeking legislative authority to expand OPIC's pilot
equity investment program to include Eastern Europe so that OPIC
can make direct investments in promising joint ventures.
We fully recognize that the major obstacles to direct
investment are to be found within the countries of the region
themselves. They need to take more steps to lower their barriers to
trade with each other, and to effect changes in laws, policies, and
institutions to enable private enterprise truly to flourish. In
particular, specific barriers to foreign investment must be
removed, such as limitations on foreign ownership of real estate,
ceilings on foreign equity holdings, and retroactive liability for
past environmental damage. I might add that these impediments
also hamper the development of domestic enterprise, since foreign
capital can bring technology and management expertise and help
restructure industry in a way that does not burden these economies
with debt.
The Future of Democracy in the Region
I mentioned earlier that we have encountered, over the past year, a
second set of challenges in the form of some disquieting political
trends, particularly the emergence of ethnic strife within several
Central and East European countries, and, to a lesser extent,
nationalist tensions between and among them. Whereas after World
War II, West European historical enmities were dealt with openly
and attenuated by factors such as economic prosperity, common
democratic institutions, and the construction of a Pan-European
identity; in the East, such sentiments were merely repressed under
communist rule. It ought, therefore, to have been no surprise when
they suddenly re-emerged following the revolutions of 1989.
Ethnic animosities are not the only negative political legacy
of the totalitarian era. Communism accustomed its subjects to the
politics of absolutism--that is, a belief in magic formulas and all-
encompassing blueprints, and the tendency to view opponents as
enemies and to see all issues in black and white terms.
Confronting this legacy forces us, I believe, to the sober
conclusion that moving from macro- to micro-level reform may be
just as challenging in the political sphere as we have discovered it
to be in the economic sphere. The institutional structure of
democracy is falling into place, but the habits and the everyday
practice of democracy--the virtues of patience, tolerance, and
respect for diversity--will have to be acquired over time.
Unfortunately, these virtues are going to be needed not over
the long run but in the present. The fact is that there is bound to be
a collision between the nearly universal expectation that democracy
will mean rapid attainment of Western standards of living and the
harsh reality of adjustment to reform and the transition to a
market economy. There is, thus, the danger that disillusionment
could spawn impatience with the deliberate pace and essential give
and take of democracy and lead to different kinds of instability.
What the West Can Do
One thing we in the West should not do is sit in judgment on our
East European friends or attempt to dictate choices which are
theirs to make. We should, after all, remember from our own
historical experiences that democracy is perhaps the most
challenging form of government under the best of circumstances.
However, there are certain things which the West,
particularly we in the United States, can do to help ensure that the
difficult economic transition underway does not destabilize either
the fragile new democratic institutions or the peace of the region
as a whole.
First, we must continue to provide advice and technical
assistance in the field of democratic institution-building.
Our friends in the region tell us that such help, to date, has been
absolutely critical to the successes achieved thus far--the
elections held, constitutions written, and the like. Henceforth, we
must concentrate on strengthening democracy at the grass-roots
level, namely, the institutions of local government plus those
bodies which safeguard and mediate a healthy pluralist society --
such as unions, press organs, and the judiciary. Our aim must be to
help create a system from top to bottom in which debate and
opposition are channeled constructively and demo-cratically, a
system which can absorb the inevitable shocks to come.
Second, we must make sure that the overall system of
European security, transformed by the end of the
Cold War, can itself withstand any potential shocks emanating from
Central and Eastern Europe. On a concrete level, this effort will
eventually mean the creation of a new European political, economic,
and security architecture. But we must also endeavor to convince
the Central and East Europeans that staying the course on
democracy is the sine qua non of joining the family of Western
nations. Merely hectoring them about their investment regimes or
ethnic troubles is not the answer. They must understand for
themselves that there is no alternative to Western political and
economic practices if their goal is to enjoy Western prosperity and
consolidated freedoms. And they must also learn to reconcile the
perfectly legitimate right to ethnic self-determination and self-
expression with the imperatives of economic and political
development in a Europe which is fast moving not toward
fragmentation but integration.
Finally, we must influence the psychological dynamic
at work today in Central and Eastern Europe to ensure that euphoria
is replaced with confidence, and not with despair. We can do this by
convincing our friends that there is light at the end of the tunnel,
and that we will walk with them through that tunnel until they
achieve full-fledged membership in the Western community of
nations.
This cannot, however, be the work of Western governments
alone. The ultimate test of our commitment to democracy and free
enterprise in Central and Eastern Europe may well be the
willingness of our private sector to involve itself in this great
experiment and, thereby, help the region to acquire the human skills
and the capital which are urgently required.
I fully realize that, for the American business community,
this is not a matter of philanthropy. I have not pulled any punches
today in describing the obstacles to change and reform that we have
encountered over the past year. But I am willing without any
hesitation to renew my appeal to you to invest in the region. I am
convinced that the payoff, though not immediate, will be great.
Yes, the status of private property is still unclear, but it will
be clarified. Yes, the investment regimes do not yet meet all of
your expectations, but soon they will. Yes, the pace of privatization
has been slow, but there is simply no
alternative to its going forward.
The fact of the matter is that Central and Eastern Europe are
going to make it, and this consideration ought to be central to your
investment decisions. And by making it, I also mean that the region
will surely join itself over time to the historic process of economic
integration underway in Western Europe--a process from which
American business cannot afford to be excluded. Central and
Eastern Europe can be a profitable gateway to the Europe of
tomorrow--but only if American business is willing to assume the
risks, and to face the obstacles, which are present in the region
today. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 20, May 20, 1991
Title: US Chemical Weapons Initiative
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: The White House, Washington, DC
Date: May 13, 19915/13/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Country: United States
Subject: Arms Control
[TEXT]
The Gulf war has once again raised the specter of chemical weapons
and demonstrated that unscrupulous regimes can and will threaten
innocent populations with these weapons of terror so long as we
permit them to exist. These stark events renew and reinforce my
conviction, shared by responsible leaders around the world, that
chemical weapons must be banned--everywhere in the world.
The world's best hope for this goal is the chemical weapons
convention now being negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva. The United States is committed to the early, successful
completion of this convention, and I am today announcing a number
of steps we will take to accelerate the negotiations and achieve an
effective chemical weapons ban as soon as possible. I hope this
initiative also will spur other nations to commit themselves
equally to this critical objective.
I have instructed the United States negotiating team in Geneva
to implement my decisions at the next session, which begins May
14. To demonstrate the US commitment to banning chemical
weapons, we are formally forswearing the use of chemical weapons
for any reason, including retaliation, against any state, effective
when the convention enters into force, and will propose that all
states follow suit. Further, the United States unconditionally
commits itself to the destruction of all our stocks of chemical
weapons within 10 years of entry into force and will propose that
all other states do likewise. We will offer technical assistance to
others to do this efficiently and safely.
In addition, we will call for setting a target date to conclude
the convention and recommend the conference stay in continuous
session if necessary to meet the target. The United States also
will propose new and effective verification measures for inspecting
sites suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons. To
provide tangible benefits for those states that join the convention
and significant penalties for those that fail to support it, the
United States will propose the convention require parties to refuse
to trade in chemical weapon-related materials with states that do
not join in the convention. The United States reaffirms that we
will impose all appropriate sanctions in response to violations of
the convention, especially the use of chemical weapons.
These steps can move the world significantly closer to the
goal of a world free of chemical weapons. I call upon all other
nations to join us in the serious and cooperative pursuit of this
important goal. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 20, May 20, 1991
Title: Gulf Responsibility-Sharing Efforts
McAllister
Source: Eugene J. McAllister, Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs
Description: The House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: May 14, 19915/14/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Japan,
United Arab Emirates
Subject: Military Affairs, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on gulf responsibility-sharing efforts.
Last September, we embarked on a very important and historic
effort. Secretaries Baker and [Nicholas F.] Brady traveled to the
Middle East, Europe, and Asia to encourage our partners to
contribute to the effort to liberate Kuwait by helping offset the
enormous incremental costs of the US military presence and
assisting those countries critical to the sanctions effort.
In my testimony, I would like to stress three points:
-- The extraordinary levels of responsibility sharing that
have been achieved, both military and economic;
-- The vigorous nature of US efforts to assure timely
payments; and
-- To emphasize our confidence that all commitments will be
honored.
The Scope of Responsibility Sharing
The unprovoked aggression of Saddam Hussein and the Gulf war
elicited an extraordinary response from the international
community: 14 UN resolutions, ranging from condemning the Iraqi
invasion to permitting the use of all necessary means to end Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait; a sanctions regime that was the most
comprehensive and effective in modern history; and the formation
of a military coalition of 29 countries.
One of the most remarkable elements of the crisis was the
unprecedented responsibility-sharing effort.
-- Over $70 billion in total financial contributions was
raised. This $70 billion in extraordinary spending is greater than
the GDP [gross domestic product] of a number of countries, including
Greece, Portugal, and Yugoslavia.
-- In the sphere of economic assistance, 26 countries have
committed $16 billion in 1990 and 1991 mainly for those "front-
line" states critical to the sanctions regime, notably Egypt and
Turkey. This effort has been coordinated through the US-led Gulf
Crisis Financial Coordination Group (GCFCG).
-- In military responsibility sharing, our partners have
committed $54.6 billion to the United States--$9.7 billion in 1990,
or 73% of the $13.2 billion in 1990 incremental costs, and $44.8
billion for 1991 incremental military costs.
-- In addition, contributors to responsibility sharing have
assisted our military partners. Germany, for instance, provided
$822 million to the United Kingdom, and Japan provided $330
million to the United Kingdom. Gulf states--Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates--have provided $6 billion to support
our military partners.
Before turning to our efforts to ensure timely payments, let
me briefly highlight the contributions of several key countries.
Kuwait
.
In addition to $16 billion pledged to offset our military costs,
Kuwait also pledged $3.7 billion for economic support to assist the
states directly affected by the crisis and a further $1.3 billion to
help offset the UK's military costs.
Saudi Arabia.
The Saudis, of course, committed their entire armed forces to
Desert Shield/Storm, but they also pledged $16.8 billion for US
Desert Shield/Storm, $4.7 billion for economic assistance through
the GCFCG, and $3.4 billion for other military
forces.
Germany
.
The Federal Republic strongly supported the coalition efforts. Its
broad support included $6.6 billion for US Desert Shield/Storm; $1.3
billion for economic assistance through the GCFCG; $822 million
for UK Desert Shield/Storm; support for Turkey, including $1
billion in financial assistance, deployment of troops, aircraft, and
air defense batteries to Turkey; and support for Israel, including
Patriot missiles and other assistance valued at $1 billion.
Japan
.
The government of Japan pledged over $13 billion for the Gulf
effort, the largest financial contribution outside the Gulf states--
$11 billion for coalition military partners
and $2.6 billion for economic assistance through the GCFCG.
United Arab Emirates
.
The United Arab Emirates pledged $4 billion for US Desert
Shield/Storm,$1.4 billion in economic assistance through GCFCG,
and $1 billion for European allies who participated in Desert Storm.
Efforts To Ensure Timely Payments
Let me briefly review the status of commitments and
disbursements.
Germany
has disbursed all of its Desert
Shield/Storm commitments. Germany's strong commitment to
responsibility sharing was demonstrated by its very rapid
disbursements of military financing in support of Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. In late January, Chancellor [Helmut] Kohl committed
$5.5 billion for Desert Storm. Two months later, all of that
committed funding had been deposited in the Defense Cooperation
Account.
The United Arab Emirates
has disbursed
nearly all of its $4 billion 1990 and 1991 Desert Shield/Storm
commitments and all of its GCFCG economic assistance
commitments.
Saudi Arabia
has disbursed the bulk of its
1990 Desert Shield commitments, particularly with regard to its
cash commitments; the US government has transmitted our 1990
transportation and in-theater expenses, which are being jointly
reviewed. For 1991, the Saudis have disbursed nearly half of their
$13.5 billion commitment. With regard to economic assistance, the
Saudis have disbursed 78% of their $4.7 billion GCFCG commitments.
Kuwait
has met all of its 1990 Desert Shield
commitments and 50% of its 1991 Desert Shield/Storm
commitments. Kuwait also has disbursed nearly half of its $3.7
billion GCFCG
commitments.
Japan
has disbursed $9.4 billion to the United
States in Desert Shield/Storm commitments. We are continuing to
discuss with Japan how it can contribute toward our on-going
military costs associated with the crisis.
Korea
, in recognition of its global
responsibilities, also contributed financially to offset our costs
and has disbursed $154 million of its $385 million Desert
Shield/Storm commitments.
The Bush Administration is very vigorously conveying to our
partners our desire to achieve rapid disbursements of the remaining
commitments. We are focusing on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Japan, and
the GCFCG.
We are raising the need for rapid disbursements through all
available channels, including the Department of Defense, diplomatic
channels--our ambassador abroad--Secretary Baker, and even the
President. These interventions are showing results.
The Saudi government, for instance, has stated it will
complete its Desert Storm commitment through two payments--the
first coming at the end of May; the second at the end of June.
The Kuwaiti government has made six disbursements, each of
at least $1 billion, since the Desert Storm pledge was made in late
January. We expect the Kuwaitis to continue to make regular
payments until its pledge is fully met.
We expect a complete disbursement of Korea's commitment by
the end of June after the Korean legislative process is completed.
Confidence in Complete Payment
Please be assured that receiving the final payments remains a top
priority of the Administration. We recognize its importance to the
Congress, and our partners do as well. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 20, May 20, 1991
Title: The Horn of Africa
Davidow
Source: Jeffrey Davidow, Acting Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC
Date: May 14, 19915/14/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, United Nations
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear this afternoon.
We are concerned and worried about the serious food shortages and
the wars that plague the countries of the Horn of Africa. There is,
of course, a direct relationship between the endemic fighting in the
Horn and the humanitarian crises affecting Ethiopia, Sudan, and
Somalia. My colleague Andrew Natsios [Director of USAID's Office
of US Foreign Disaster Assistance] will address our continuing
efforts to bring relief to the people of those torn lands. I do wish
to state, however, that though we hear much of "donor fatigue,"
neither our will nor our means are exhausted.
The United States is in the lead of donor efforts in Sudan and
Ethiopia. We are by necessity less active in Somalia but trying hard
to broaden the international effort there. Today's hearing is a
valuable opportunity to signal to the international community that
we must not let down our guard now. More than ever, the people of
the Horn of Africa need and deserve all the help we can provide.
Sudan
Sudan has been difficult for us to deal with. It has an authoritarian
government which believes its predecessors were insufficiently
nationalistic and insufficiently pure. It pays little attention to
international opinion. It wants peace with the south but not,
apparently, if that would entail Sudan's becoming once again a
secular state. It uses repressive measures as it sees fit. We and
the other donors saw this year's food shortages coming as early as
last August, and we pressed Khartoum to ask for an international
relief effort. Khartoum found donor concern intrusive. It did not
act until February.
To give credit where it is due, we now see Khartoum starting
to cooperate on the northern relief program. But the hour is late,
and the main problem, which we have always foreseen, is
transporting and distributing the food throughout Sudan. We will
need to be hard at work on that in the months just ahead.
In southern Sudan, the situation has been even more difficult.
Khartoum canceled UN flights and food convoys to southern Sudan
when it became suspicious that the UN-sponsored Operation Lifeline
Sudan (OLS) relief program was benefiting the rebel Sudanese
Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). There are signs that this program
is now getting back on track. UN flights have resumed, and
discussions are underway on a plan of action for this year's
program. We have emphasized to Khartoum that OLS must continue
while these talks are underway. We also need greater cooperation
from the SPLA.
The Sudanese know that a better bilateral relationship with
us could come if there was more attention in Khartoum to peace-
making with the south and more respect for human rights as well as
better performance on relief.
On peace, we have made various attempts to bring both sides
together. Last year, we suggested a military disengagement in
southern Sudan, to be followed quickly by movement toward a
constitutional conference. Both the government and the SPLA
showed skepticism about a military disengagement but said
essentially that they still wished to move to political talks. At the
same time, they could not agree on who would participate in those
talks. This issue is not as procedural as it looks. Issues of
legitimacy are involved on both sides. The government does not
want to participate in talks as just one more participant among
others. It denies that Sudan's former political parties have a place
at the table. The SPLA would only participate if Sudan's other
"political forces" are brought in. So at this point both sides use
terms like democracy and federalism, but they in fact mean quite
different things.
We criticize the al-Bashir regime when it violates human
rights. Many human rights problems remain, including restrictions
on the press and labor unions. We note the recent announcement by
President al-Bashir that all political prisoners would be freed. Our
information is that some prisoners have been released but that
others remain in detention. The government has reaffirmed to us
that all prisoners will be released. We will be pleased when that is
done.
We do not have easy prescriptions for Sudan's political
problems. The government seems embarked on formulas for
federalism and majority rule irrespective of what minorities and
southerners think. Sudan's problems can only be solved by
negotiations, we believe, not by imposed systems. Its system of
government should allow free political expression for all Sudanese
and respect their human rights.
Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, we also have the depressing nexus of humanitarian
tragedy and civil war. The government in Addis has battled Eritrean
and Tigrayan insurgents for years. Over the past few months, rebel
offensives seem to have changed the strategic equation, making
fundamental change and political transition only a question of time.
Recently, the Ethiopian government called for a roundtable to
consider transitional arrangements. The main rebel groups did not
accept this offer as such, but they have instituted at least a
temporary stand-down of hostilities while the United States
explores how peace might be given a chance.
We have made it clear to all that we are ready to do anything
we can to help lift the burden of conflict. We have been working to
facilitate negotiations between the government and the Eritrean
People's Liberation Front. Now we are inviting Addis and the three
principal insurgent groups to a meeting in Europe to discuss how a
peaceful transition could be achieved.
In the meantime, the United States has a full agenda of other
issues in Ethiopia. We press the Ethiopian government to improve
its human rights record. Hundreds of political prisoners are being
held without trial, and forced conscription of underaged children is
a common occurrence. In the most highly visible of Ethiopia's
human rights problems, we are attempting to win for Ethiopian
Jews (Falashas) the chance to emigrate to Israel. Last month,
President Bush asked former Senator Boschwitz to travel to
Ethiopia as his personal emissary to express our conviction that all
Falashas who wish to do so should be allowed to leave for Israel
without further delay. We will continue to work for the resolution
of this urgent human rights question.
Mr. Natsios will discuss what we are doing this year in famine
relief. I am pleased to say donor efforts managed to avoid the
worst last year--I remember this committee was having other
hearings on the Ethiopian famine just 1 year ago.
The famine has extended into 1991. Our relief program has
been massive and has been operational across the constantly
shifting battle lines of a raging civil war. It's good to note that
finally, in January of this year, the port of Massawa was opened as
the result largely of US pressure and helpful advocacy from this
committee among others. For the first time in a long time, large
amounts of food are moving in Ethiopia across battle lines. With
intense effort we hope to keep abreast of famine again this year.
We will continue to keep all options open for moving food. As in
Sudan, the best thing that could happen would be an end to the
conflicts which create the problems and impede the free movement
of food.
Somalia
As difficult as Ethiopia and Sudan are, their humanitarian
situations have been with us for a number of years, and we see
governments as well as opposition groups there which have some
authority and some ability to operate.
In Somalia, there is a threshold problem of being able to be on
the ground at all. The factions picking up the pieces after the
defeat of the Siad Barre regime have not been able to guarantee
security in their areas of influence. Somalia has been too dangerous
for donors--and for the United Nations--to be meaningfully
involved. This goes for all regions of the country.
If one region were safe, we would not hesitate to send people
in. There may, in fact, now be modest reason to hope that security
is improving. This week we had one person visit Mogadishu to
assess relief needs there, and we are planning to send a refugee
officer into the Berbera area in the north. All the donors agree that
relief efforts can only be partially successful as long as political
turmoil prevails.
The United States wants to see peaceful reconciliation of
Somalia's civil strife. We do not regard the provisional group in
Mogadishu as having sufficient authority to speak as a government,
but we do talk informally with all the various factions, and we have
made clear we support the efforts of Egypt and Italy to organize a
roundtable of the parties. Other outside parties including the
Organization for African Unity and the United Nations, if the African
group in New York took the necessary procedural steps, could play a
role in helping Somalia to become a viable state. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 20, May 20, 1991
Title: Queen Elizabeth II's Arrival
Bush, Queen Elizabeth II
Source: President Bush, Queen Elizabeth II
Description: Remarks at arrival ceremony, the White House,
Washington, DC
Date: May 14, 19915/14/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: United Kingdom
Subject: Democratization, Human Rights, History
[TEXT]
The President:
Your Majesty and Your Royal Highness, ladies and gentlemen, and
friends of what is, indeed, our special relationship. Your Majesty,
on behalf of the American people, it is an honor to welcome you to
the United States and to the White House.
You have been freedom's friend for as long as we remember--
back to World War II when, at 18, you joined the war against
fascism. It was then that America first began to know you as one
of us--came to love you as standing fast with us for freedom,
summoning across the oceans our values and our dreams.
George Bernard Shaw once joked that Britain and America are
two countries separated by a common language. In truth, we are
joined by a common heritage and culture, civilization and soul.
On the occasion of your first state visit to the United States,
Dwight Eisenhower spoke of these bonds of friendship. He said,
"Those ties have been tested in the crucible of war when we have
fought side by side to defend the values we hold dear." That was
true in 1957 and just as true today.
For nearly 400 years, the histories of Britain and America
have been inseparable. The first permanent English settlement in
America was created at Jamestown, in Virginia, 384 years ago this
week. Thirteen years later, the Pilgrims landed far to the north at a
place they called Plymouth Rock, named after your great naval port
from which they sailed.
From those events sprang the American nation--believing, as
you do, in the sanctity of the individual and enriched by family ties
that make our nations one. Because those ties have never been
closer, today our alliance has perhaps never been stronger. For
evidence, look to the sands and seas of the Persian Gulf. Our
countries have long sought the real peace which means the triumph
of freedom, not merely the absence of war. We know that you can't
lock people behind walls forever when moral conviction uplifts
their souls. So like Monty and Ike, and Churchill and FDR, we linked
hands and hearts in the Gulf to do what was right and good.
Years from now, men will speak of American and British
heroism in the Gulf, as they do today of our cooperation in two
World Wars and 40 years of peace-time alliance. They will talk of
the 1st Infantry Division and the Desert Rats--and of the finest
sons and daughters any nation could ever have. They will praise
those who assured that naked aggression would not stand--and in so
doing, salute Britain's help and leadership in forging our great
coalition.
The past year has reaffirmed our alliance of shared principles,
our fidelity to democracy and to basic human rights, the fact that
there will always be a Britain and that Britain will always be our
friend.
In that spirit, let me close with your words from a 1947 radio
broadcast, when, in the aftermath of another war, you issued both a
pledge and a request. You told the British people: "My whole life,
whether it be long or short, shall be devoted to your service and the
service of our family to which we all belong." And then, you
concluded: "But I shall not have strength to carry out the resolution
alone unless you join it with me."
Your Majesty, your example helped inspire a nation and helped
your nation inspire the world. Because of what you
are--because of what Great Britain means--all freedom-loving
people stand ready to carry out your resolution: to achieve what is
just and honorable for the nations of the globe.
With great pleasure, then, on behalf of an American people
which reveres their mother country, I welcome you and Prince
Philip to this country, the United States of America. Thank you very
much.
Queen Elizabeth II:
Mr. President, thank you for your warm welcome to Washington and
to the White House. We are both delighted to be back in the United
States and to find you in the best of health. It gives me particular
pleasure that this visit comes so soon after a vivid and effective
demonstration of the longstanding alliance between our two countries.
It is 15 years since our last visit to Washington when, with a
gallant disregard for history, we shared wholeheartedly in the
celebrations of the 200th anniversary of the founding of this great
nation. But it is 40 years since our first visit to this country, when
Mr. Truman was President. It made such a deep impression that I
can hardly believe that so many years have slipped past in the
meanwhile.
By now, I fully understand what Winston Churchill meant when
he spoke of the inspiration and renewed vitality he found every time
he came here.
This country means more to the rest of the world than a rich
and thriving community. In her third, as in her first, century the
United States represents an ideal, an emblem, and an example--an
ideal of freedom under the law, an emblem of democracy, and an
example of constant striving for the betterment of the people.
I know that our days in Washington will be full of interest.
And, once again, we expect to be inspired and surprised by the
warmth and generosity of the people of America. We are looking
forward to renewing old friendships and to making new ones.
Friendships need to be kept in good repair. Not just the
personal friendships between heads of state, but the more diffused
friendships between the governments and peoples of two nations.
There is a symbolism in the events of such a visit that defies
analysis but which has a way of reaching the hearts of people far
and wide.
At your kind invitation, Mr. President, we are here to
celebrate and to reaffirm that friendship. I can assure you that we
are truly happy to do so. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 20, May 20, 1991
Title: Country Profile: United Kingdom
Date: May 14, 19915/14/91
Category: Country Data
Region: Europe
Country: United Kingdom
Subject: History, International Organizations,
Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Official Name: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Geography
Area: 244,111 sq. km. (94,251 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than
Oregon.
Cities: Capital--London (metropolitan pop. about 6.7 million). Other
cities--Birmingham, Glasgow, Leeds, Sheffield, Liverpool, Bradford,
Manchester, Edinburgh, Bristol, Belfast.
Terrain: 30% arable, 50% meadow and pasture, 12% waste or urban,
7% forested, 1% inland water.
Climate: Generally mild and temperate; weather is subject to
frequent changes but to few extremes of temperature.
People
Nationality: Noun--Briton(s). Adjective--British.
Population (1989): 58 million.
Annual population growth rate: 1%.
Ethnic groups: British, West Indian, South Asian.
Religions: Church of England, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian.
Languages: English, Welsh, Gaelic. Education: Years compulsory--
12. Attendance--nearly 100%. Literacy--99%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--13/1,000. Life expectancy--males
70 yrs., females 76 yrs.
Government
Type: Constitutional monarchy. Constitution: Unwritten; partly
statutes, partly common law and practice.
Branches: Executive--monarch (chief of state), prime minister
(head of government), cabinet. Legislative--bicameral parliament:
House of Commons, House of Lords. Judicial--magistrates' courts,
county courts, high courts, appellate courts, House of Lords.
Subdivisions: Municipalities, counties, parliamentary
constituencies, province of Northern Ireland, and Scottish regions.
Political parties: Conservative, Labor, Social and Liberal Democrats
(SLD), and various smaller parties, including the Greens and parties
of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
Suffrage: British subjects and citizens of the Irish Republic
resident in the UK, 18 yrs. or older.
Government budget (1989): $283 billion.
Flag: The red, white, and blue Union Jack combines crosses of the
patron saints of England (St. George), Scotland (St. Andrew), and
Ireland (St. Patrick).
Economy
GDP (1989): $843 billion.
Annual growth rate (1988): 2.3%
Per capita GDP (1987): $12,000.
Avg. inflation rate (1989): 9%.
Natural resources: Coal, oil, gas (North Sea).
Agriculture (2% of GDP, 1988): Products--cereals, livestock,
livestock products, fish.
Industry (34% of GDP): Types--steel, heavy engineering and metal
manufacturing, textiles, motor vehicles, ships, and aircraft,
construction, electronics, chemicals.
Trade (1989 ): Exports--$153 billion: machinery and transport
equipment, petroleum, manufactures, chemicals. Major markets--
European Community, US, Sweden, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria,
Switzerland, South Africa. Imports--$198 billion: machinery and
transport equipment, manufactures, foodstuffs, petroleum,
chemicals. Major suppliers--EC, US, Japan, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland.
Fiscal year: April 1-March 31.
Membership in International Organizations
UN and some of its specialized and related agencies, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), European Community (EC), Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), INTELSAT. (###)