US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: North American Free Trade Agreement
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Letter to Congress; Washington, DC
Date: May 1, 19915/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States, Mexico, Canada
Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade
[TEXT]
Following is the text of identical letters to the Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Finance Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee Dan Rostenkowski, and House Majority
Leader Richard Gephardt. A similar letter was sent to every Member
of Congress.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Through the better part of this century, successive
Congresses and Administrations--Republican and Democratic--have
worked to open markets and expand American exports. This
partnership has resulted in unparalleled growth in world trade and
huge economic benefits for the United States. Opening foreign
markets means economic growth and jobs for all Americans.
Historically, the fast-track procedures established by the
Congress have served us well. On March 1, I requested an extension
of fast track so that we could continue to realize increased
economic growth and the other benefits of expanded trade. The fast
track in no way limits the ability of Congress to review any
agreement negotiated, including the Uruguay Round or a North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). If Congress is not
satisfied, it retains the unqualified right to reject whatever is
negotiated. But refusing to extend the fast track would end
negotiations before they have even begun and relinquish a critical
opportunity for future economic growth.
Initiatives to open markets will enhance the global
competitiveness of the United States and create new opportunities
for American workers, American exports, and American economic
growth. The Uruguay Round offers a vital opportunity to eliminate
barriers to our goods, investment, services, and ideas. A NAFTA
offers an historic opportunity to bring together the energies and
talents of three great nations, already bound by strong ties of
family, business, and culture. Prime Minister Mulroney and
President Salinas are both leaders of great vision. They believe, as
do I, that a NAFTA would enhance the well-being of our peoples.
They are ready to move forward with us in this unprecedented
enterprise.
In seeking to expand our economic growth, I am committed to
achieving a balance that recognizes the need to preserve the
environment, protect worker safety, and facilitate adjustment. In
your letter of March 7, you conveyed a number of important
Congressional concerns about free trade with Mexico. At my
direction, Ambassador Hills and my Economic Policy Council have
undertaken an intensive review of our NAFTA objectives and
strategy to ensure thorough consideration of the economic, labor,
and environmental issues raised by you and your colleagues. The
Administration's response is presented in the attached report. Let
me emphasize the following:
First, you have my personal commitment to close bipartisan
cooperation in the negotiations and beyond. And you have my
personal assurance that we will take the time necessary to
conclude agreements in which both the Congress and the
Administration can take pride.
Second, while economic studies show that a free trade
agreement would create jobs and promote growth in the United
States, I know there is concern about adjustment in some sectors.
These concerns will be addressed through provisions in the NAFTA
designed to ease the transition for import-sensitive industries. In
addition, my Administration is committed to working with the
Congress to ensure that there is adequate assistance and effective
retraining for dislocated workers.
Third, based on my discussions with President Salinas, I am
convinced that he is firmly committed to strengthened
environmental protection, and that there is strong support for this
objective among the Mexican people. Because economic growth can
and should be supported by enhanced environmental protection, we
will develop and implement an expanded program of environmental
cooperation in parallel with the free trade talks.
Fourth, President Salinas has also made it clear to me that his
objective in pursuing free trade is to better the lives of Mexican
working people. Mexico has strong laws regulating labor standards
and worker rights. Beyond what Mexico is already doing, we work
through new initiatives to expand US-Mexico labor cooperation.
Thus, our efforts toward economic integration will be
complemented by expanded programs of cooperation on labor and the
environment. The catalyst for these efforts is the promise of
economic growth that a NAFTA can provide, and the key to these
efforts is the extension of unencumbered fast-track procedures.
There are great challenges ahead. The world is changing
dramatically, as nations more toward democracy and free markets.
The United States must continue to open new markets and lead in
technological innovation, confident that America can and will
prevail in this new and emerging world. By working together, we
can negotiate good trade agreements that assure a strong and
healthy America as we prepare to meet the challenges of the next
century.
Sincerely,
George Bush
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: Negotiating a North American Free Trade Agreement:
Executive Summary
Description: Washington, DC
Date: May 1, 19915/1/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: North America
Country: United States, Mexico, Canada
Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade
[TEXT]
Summary of report entitled Response to Issues Raised in
Connection With the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade
Agreement. Copies of the complete report may be obtained from the
Office of the US Trade Representative, (202) 395-3230.
In letters to the President from Chairmen Bentsen and
Rostenkowski, and from Majority Leader Gephardt, the
Administration has been asked to address a variety of economic,
labor, and environmental concerns that have been raised about the
proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The
Administration's response sets forth detailed action plans for
addressing these concerns, as well as views on the economic impact
of a NAFTA.
The Positive Economic Impact of a NAFTA
-- From 1986 to 1990, as Mexico reduced import barriers, our
exports more than doubled from $12.4 billion to $28.4 billion
generating 264,000 additional US jobs.
-- Under a NAFTA, we can do even better. Mexico still has
higher trade barriers than the United States. Mexico's average duty
is 10% compared to 4% in the United States. Significant non-tariff
barriers remain. We, therefore, have much to gain from the
elimination of these barriers.
-- All three major economic analyses done to date
corroborate that the United States will benefit from a NAFTA in
exports, output, and employment.
-- We will benefit from Mexican growth: for each dollar
Mexico spends on imports, 70 cents is spent on US goods; for each
dollar of gross national product growth, 15 cents is spent on US
goods.
-- Further, the resulting economic integration will strengthen
the ability of the United States to compete with Japan and the
European Community.
Adjustment Provisions We Will Seek in the NAFTA
-- Transition Measures. In order to avoid dislocations to
industries and workers producing goods that are import-sensitive,
tariffs and non-tariff barriers on such products should be
eliminated in small increments over a time period sufficient to
ensure orderly adjustment.
--In determining import sensitivity, we will rely heavily on
advice of the International Trade Commission, the Congress, and the
private sector.
--We will be prepared to consider transition periods beyond
those in the US-Canada FTA [Free Trade Agreement].
-- Effective Safeguard Provisions. Even where reductions in
tariffs and other trade barriers are staged over a lengthy period,
there may be isolated cases in which injurious increases in imports
could occur. To prevent injury from such increases, we will seek to
include in the agreement a procedure allowing temporary
reimposition of duties and other restrictions.
--This mechanism should be designed to respond quickly,
especially in cases of sudden import increases.
--Special "snap-back" provisions should be included to
address the unique problems faced by producers of perishable
products.
-- Strict Rules of Origin. We will negotiate rules of origin to
ensure that the benefits of a NAFTA do not flow to mere pass-
through operations exporting third-country products to the United
States with only minimal assembly in Mexico.
--Rules of origin will impose clear, tough, and predictable
standards to the benefit of North American products.
--We will seek to strengthen the required North American
content for assembled automotive products.
--We will consult closely with the private sector and the
Congress in designing these rules.
Domestic Worker Adjustment Program
-- Since trade barriers on sensitive products should be
decreased over a long timeframe, we do not expect immediate or
substantial job dislocations.
-- Nevertheless, beyond including adjustment provisions in
the NAFTA itself, there is a need to assist dislocated workers who
may have adjustment difficulties.
-- The Administration is committed to working with
Congress to ensure a worker adjustment program that is adequately
funded and that provides effective services to workers who may
lose their jobs as a result of an agreement with Mexico.
-- Whether provided through the improvement or expansion of
an existing program or through the creation of a new program,
worker adjustment measures should be targeted to provide
dislocated workers with comprehensive services in a timely
fashion.
Labor Issues
-- Labor Mobility. We have agreed with Mexico that labor
mobility and our immigration laws are not on the table in NAFTA
talks, with the possible exception of a narrow provision facilitating
temporary entry of certain professionals and managers.
-- Worker Rights and Labor Standards. Protections afforded
by Mexican labor law and practice are stronger than generally
known.
-- Mexico's laws provide comprehensive rights and standards
for workers in all sectors, including the maquiladoras.
--Mexico has ratified 73 International Labor Organization
conventions on worker rights, including those on occupational
safety and health.
--Mexico has a minimum working age of 14 and mandates
special protections and shorter working hours for those between
the ages of 14 and 16.
-- A substantially higher proportion of the Mexican work
force is unionized than is the US work force.
-- While enforcement problems have resulted largely from a
lack of resources, a NAFTA would both raise living standards and
create resources for enforcing existing laws.
Future US-Mexico Cooperation on Labor Matters
-- Memorandum of Understanding. The Secretary of Labor and
her counterpart from Mexico are prepared to sign a Memorandum of
Understanding providing for cooperation and joint action on a
number of labor issues which could be implemented in parallel with
our FTA negotiations.
--These include health and safety measures; work conditions,
including labor standards and enforcement; labor conflicts; labor
statistics; and other areas of concern to the United States and
Mexico.
-- Specific Projects. US and Mexican officials have agreed on
joint projects to address specific concerns in the labor sector.
--Initial projects include occupational health and safety,
child labor, and labor statistics.
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Mexico's Commitment to Environmental Protection
-- Mexico has no interest in becoming a pollution haven for
US companies.
-- Mexico's comprehensive environmental law of 1988, which
is based on US law and experience, is a solid foundation for tackling
its environmental problems.
-- All new investments are being held to these higher legal
standards, and an environmental impact assessment is required to
show how they will comply.
-- Enforcement has, in the past, been a key problem, but
Mexico's record has been improving dramatically. Since 1989,
Mexico has ordered more than 980 temporary and 82 permanent
shutdowns of industrial facilities for environmental violations; the
budget of SEDUE (Mexico's EPA) has increased almost eightfold.
Environmental Issues in the NAFTA
-- Protection of Health and Safety. We will ensure that our
right to safeguard the environment is preserved in the NAFTA.
--We will maintain the right to exclude any products that do
not meet our health or safety requirements, and we will continue to
enforce those requirements.
--We will maintain our right to impose stringent pesticide,
energy conservation, toxic waste, and health and safety standards.
--We will maintain our rights, consistent with other
international obligations, to limit trade in products controlled by
international treaties (such as treaties on endangered species or
protection of the ozone layer).
-- Enhancement and Enforcement of Standards. We will seek a
commitment to work together with Mexico to enhance
environmental, health, and safety standards regarding products, and
to promote their enforcement.
--We will provide for full public and scientific scrutiny of
any changes to standards before they are implemented.
--We will provide for consultations on enhancing
enforcement capability, inspection training, monitoring, and
verification.
Joint Environmental Initiatives
-- In parallel to the FTA negotiations, we intend to pursue an
ambitious program of cooperation on a wide range of environmental
matters.
-- We will design and implement an integrated border
environmental plan to address air and water pollution, hazardous
wastes, chemical spills, pesticides, and enforcement.
-- During the design phase of the border plan, there will be an
opportunity for public comment and hearings; during
implementation, there will be periodic comprehensive reviews.
-- We will consult on national environmental standards and
regulations and will provide an opportunity for the public to submit
data on alleged noncompliance.
-- We will discuss expanded cooperative enforcement
activities, such as coordinated targeting of environmental
violators.
-- We will establish a program of technical cooperation and
training, which will include facilitating sharing of technology for
pollution abatement.
Informed Policy-making and Public Participation
-- We will broaden public participation in the formulation
and implementation of trade policy to ensure that efforts to
liberalize trade are consistent with sound environmental practices.
-- We will appoint individuals to selected trade policy
advisory committees who can contribute both an environmental
perspective and substantive expertise.
-- In consultation with interested members of the public, we
will complete a review of US-Mexico environmental issues, with
particular emphasis on possible environmental effects of the
NAFTA, to enable US officials to consider the results during FTA
negotiations and other bilateral efforts.
Fast-Track Authority Crucial To Free Trade
Excerpts from the President's remarks to the Society of Business
Editors and Writers, Washington, DC, May 1, 1991.
In recent years, trade has kept our economy growing. Export
business accounted for 84% of our economic growth last year.
That's nothing new. Merchandise exports have risen 73% in the last
4 years--more than twice the rate of import growth.
Recent, unparalleled growth in world trade has produced huge
benefits for us. Our free trade agreement (FTA) with Canada has
opened up previously closed agricultural markets. I wanted to check
my figures on the helicopter coming back from Maryland this
morning, just now. I called our Secretary of Agriculture, and he
told me that our agricultural exports to Canada increased 35% over
the last 2 years because of this agreement. And we expect the
growth to intensify as the agreement takes full effect.
You go back and look at the legislative history--or the free
trade agreement history--and you'll find many who were predicting
a far gloomier outlook.
Our trade strategy is simple: We want to build on the success
of the Canadian FTA. The United States will continue to lead the
world toward a system of free trade and open markets. That system
makes American genius available to the whole world and gives
Americans access to the good ideas and good products from abroad.
Trade means economic growth. Trade means jobs for all Americans.
That's why extension of our fast-track procedures in these
trade negotiations is absolutely critical. Fast track lets us open up
new markets and new opportunities.
Fast track really is another term for "good faith." It means
that we will consult closely with the Congress. Congress has some
constitutional responsibilities here. We have been--and we will
consult closely with Congress and also the private sector during
these trade talks. It means that we will not tinker with trade
agreements worked out by our negotiators and their foreign
counterparts.
It gives the American people a fair say. We will take all the
time necessary to address the issues that concern Americans. And
there are some issues that concern Americans, and we have to have
good answers for those questions, and I believe we do.
Fast track lets us treat our foreign counterparts fairly. It
promises that we will not attach amendments or make changes,
since to do so could force negotiators to call off talks or start
again from square one.
Our trading partners consider fast track an essential
ingredient for successful trade talks. We've had fast-track
authority since 1974, and we will need it--and we need to keep it if
we hope to pursue these vital trade agreements--the Uruguay Round
of the GATT talks, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and,
of course, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Without fast
track, very candidly, we jeopardize those agreements. And we
jeopardize trade. And we jeopardize American jobs.
Right now, we have the chance to look forward, to expand
economic growth, to expand opportunity from the Yukon to the
Yucatan. The North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada,
our largest trading partner, would create the largest, richest
market in the entire world. Think about it--360 million consumers
and $6 trillion in annual output.
A unified North American market would let each of our
countries build on our strengths. It would provide more and better
jobs for US workers. It would stimulate price competition, lower
consumer prices, improve product quality. The agreement would
make necessities such as food and clothing more affordable and
more available to our poorest citizens. It would raise productivity
and produce a higher standard of living throughout the world. And
the resulting economic integration will strengthen American
businesses in the global marketplace.
Let me just try to illustrate the stakes that are involved in
the fast-track debate by discussing the Mexican component of the
North American Free Trade Agreement. Trade with Mexico has
helped both our countries. Just 4 years ago, we had a $4.9 billion
trade debt--deficit--with Mexico. And, since then, Mexico's
President Carlos Salinas has slashed tariff rates. He came in
determined to shake things up in Mexico, and he's done a great job at
that. He slashed the tariff rates. Our exports to Mexico have
increased nearly 130% to $28 billion, and our trade deficit has
shrunk two-thirds to $1.8 billion.
This export boom has created an estimated 264,000 new jobs
in the United States. And each additional billion dollars in exports
creates nearly 20,000 new jobs here in the United States. And,
meanwhile, the trade boom has offered new opportunities for
Mexican workers. It's offered prosperity to those who before had
lived in squalor.
Some people are concerned about these negotiations with
Mexico. And just this morning--in the spirit of working closely
with Congress, which I am determined to continue--we sent a
detailed report to Chairman Lloyd Bentsen of the Senate Finance
Committee; to Congressman Dan Rostenkowski, the Chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee; and to Majority Leader Richard
Gephardt, who, incidentally, has just come back from Mexico. And I
believe that this letter and our report responded to the concerns--
the understandable concerns that they have raised. I gave them my
personal commitment to close bipartisan cooperation in the
negotiations.
While economic studies show that a free trade agreement
would produce jobs in the United States as well as greater exports
and output, I know that there's a concern--not just on Capitol Hill
but in many of the labor halls around this country--about job loss.
And our negotiators will address these concerns in provisions of the
North American Free Trade Agreement. We will ensure an adequate
transition period for workers in import-sensitive industries. We
will work with Congress to see that dislocated workers receive
proper assistance and retraining. I believe we have the answers to
the questions that are being raised by the labor unions and by some
on Capitol Hill.
At the same time, it is worth noting that the agreement will
create high-wage, high-skill manufacturing jobs in the machinery,
computer, telecommunications, and electronic industries. As
Mexico develops further, it will need even more of these high-tech
goods and services. Those goods and services are more likely to
come from the United States than from anyone else in the world.
And, secondly, President Salinas and the Mexican people have
no interest in allowing their country to become a pollution haven
for US companies. Because economic growth goes hand-in-hand
with environmental protection, we will expand environmental
cooperation programs parallel to the free trade talks. I can assure
cooperation programs parallel to the free trade talks. I can assure
you, having dealt with him and talked to him quite recently in
Houston, Texas, on this very problem, that President Salinas is
deeply concerned about the problems facing the environment. He has
already ordered shut down the major polluting refinery, the PEMEX
[Mexican state-owned oil company] refinery, in Mexico. And that is
strong evidence of his good faith, because he had to take on some
very powerful people to make that happen.
I will share with you a story that maybe some of you heard me
refer to before, but it made a real impact on me when we were
talking about the environment. And he says that when the school
children around Mexico City, where they have that high smog
content--when the school children paint the sky, they don't show
the stars. They paint it gray or black. And they can't see the stars.
And he said, my ambition is that these young children in Mexico will
paint in the stars. And I think that says, as emotionally as I could
possibly say it, something about this man's commitment to doing
something about the environment.
And so we are concerned, but we believe that the
environmental cooperation programs that we have in mind, and that
we've discussed with him, can satisfy anybody who's reasonable on
this question.
And, finally, President Salinas has also made it clear that this
agreement will improve opportunities for Mexican working people.
Mexico has strong laws regulating labor standards and workers'
rights. Beyond those, we will also begin new initiatives to expand
labor cooperation between our two countries.
None of these things will happen, though--none of this can
happen--if we cannot bargain in good faith. If the fast-track
procedures that we have employed for 17 years--Republican and
Democrat administrations alike--suddenly are withdrawn or
weakened, the United States must continue to open new markets,
create new technologies, and seize new opportunities before us. I
am confident, and so are the American people, that we can and will
prevail in this exciting and challenging world. And I am confident
that as we head into the next century--the next American century--
a strong and healthy America will lead the way . .(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: Free Trade Agreement and Fast Track: A Boon to
Agriculture
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpts from the President's remarks to the Society of
Business Editors and Writers, Washington, DC
Date: May 1, 19915/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States, Canada, Mexico
Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade
[TEXT]
We are the most agriculturally productive nation the world has ever
known. And I want to be sure that we continue to be that. I'm still
convinced that we can compete with anybody, provided we remove
some of the barriers to trade. And that's one of the reasons that the
Secretary and I are as committed that a Mexico free trade
agreement would be in our own best interests.
As a matter of fact, we've got a new one with Canada. It's
been in effect for 2 years, and agricultural exports have gone up by
35%. So those that want to criticize ought to take a look at the
reality, and I think then they'd understand why we are committed--
because we think it's good for American agriculture as well as good
for--I think it's good for jobs, too. Just across the labor frontier
there.
There are three important trade agreements. You're all
familiar with them. The Uruguay Round--the GATT talks, the trade
component of our Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which is, I
think, a bold, new program that must succeed in terms of helping
these democracies--fledgling democracies, many of them--in South
America and thus building new markets for our own goods. But in
any event, that's the second one. And then the third one, of course,
is the North American Free Trade Agreement that I mentioned
earlier that features--in this instance--features Mexico.
Now, there are some questions about whether this would be of
benefit--these would be of benefit to the American farmers. Let
me just give you a couple--click off a couple of little numbers here.
Free trade in North America would give our farmers a freely
accessible market of 360 million people with a GNP of $6 trillion.
And that's a market that's larger than the European Community.
And, likewise, the negotiation of a successful GATT agreement
would decrease the trade barriers worldwide, offering potentially
unlimited export opportunities.
We're not there yet. We've had some difficulties getting our
friends in Europe--and they are friends--to understand this. But
the Secretary and I and our US Trade Representative, Ambassador
Carla Hills, and the Secretary of Treasury and the Secretary of
Commerce--all of us are working on this important agreement. But
we think that it would be a boon to American agriculture when
we're successful.
The success, obviously, hinges on what you know and I know as
fast-track negotiating authority. It is simply not right to--you
can't negotiate an agreement if the people you're negotiating with
think that it will be amended in many, many ways. The Congress
will, though--there's a misunderstanding because some think that
when we ask for fast track that we're asking Congress to yield their
right to vote on it. And that simply isn't--I found that hard to
believe, but I think there's been some confusion on that.
We are going to--they obviously would vote up and down. And
if they didn't like it, they'd vote for it. But you can't have 25,000
amendments to an agreement and expect your trading partners to
negotiate seriously.
So the Congress--and I'm very respectful of Congress' role in
this. They have a constitutional role on international trade, and
some forget that. So we're sensitive to that role. We've had
extensive consultations.
I don't believe I've seen an initiative that's had more consultation
with Congress than this one. And I think we're going to be all right
on it, but we're going to continue to work very hard to get fast-
track approval.
New applications for agricultural products like the
alternative fuels, fuels blended with ethanol and biodegradable
plastics, and some not so modern uses like food and clothing provide
farmers with exciting opportunities. I understand that there's some
differences in the agricultural community. I was just talking to the
Secretary about this. But, generally speaking, we're committed to
alternative fuels, and I believe that we're--I believe that the Clean
Air Act alone is going to create tremendous opportunities for
alternative fuel. So I haven't lost my enthusiasm for this at all.
The fast track assures our trading partners that we will go
through with our agreement. We will vote on what they and we
negotiate, and I mentioned that point earlier. New applications for
agricultural products is important. And we're talking about some
fuels blended with ethanol and biodegradable plastics. And all of
these kinds of things, I think, have a brilliant future for agriculture.
It's been a little slower than I had hoped, frankly, but I think there's
a big market and big future out there.
And so I would say to farmers, do not despair because you
haven't yet reached the full benefit from--the full potential of
these new markets for your products.
I'm going to be asking agriculture over and over again for
support on this fast-track extension, and I think that the bottom
line is they will enjoy more export opportunity if we're successful
here. And I think it will be a boon for the rural economy as well as-
-well, obviously it would if we continue to sell more abroad. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: NAFTA: A Critical Priority
McAllister
Source: Eugene J. McAllister, Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs
Description: Address before the Caribbean/Latin American Action
Conference on Mexico, San Antonio, Texas
Date: Apr 11, 19914/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States, Mexico, Canada
Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics,
Environment
[TEXT]
I am delighted to be here in San Antonio for the conference on
Mexico sponsored by Caribbean/Latin American Action. The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as the President has been
saying, is a critical priority for the Administration, a priority that
many of you share.
Let me begin with three observations:
-- Quietly, in an event perhaps overlooked, the United States
is now a trading nation or, more accurately, an exporting nation. US
exports to Japan have increased 73% over the past 3 years, an
average 20% annually. The increase in US exports to Europe in the
past 4 years exceeds our total exports to Japan. During 1989-90,
exports growth accounted for 88% of US GNP growth.
-- We Americans want to shape our future; we want to
control our destiny. As a trading nation, our future is broad, ranging
from soybeans to semiconductors from Krakow to Cairo. But it is
indisputable that the two countries most critical to our future are
Mexico and Canada. Simple common sense dictates that we shape
our future best by working with Canada and Mexico to create new
and greater economic opportunities.
-- There is a revolution taking place in economics around the
world--it started in Asia, has taken root in Mexico, and is
struggling in Eastern Europe. It is vital to the United States that
these nations succeed. As they become more market oriented, more
outward looking, we become partners in trade and investment and
perhaps other endeavors. The vision of economic ties leading to and
strengthening political freedoms has guided US policies since the
Second World War. As our vision of the world comes within grasp,
we must reach out.
The United States--A Trading Nation
Let me elaborate on these observations. It may seem a bit peculiar
to be proclaiming the United States now to be a trading nation.
After all, we have always exported and imported raw materials and
finished goods. And in the early days of the republic, we imported
far more finished goods than we produced ourselves.
But, in my view, there has been a qualitative change in the
United States over the past few years--a qualitative change that is
only beginning to become apparent quantitatively--in the dollar
value of the goods and services we export. This change marks a new
era, a step into the future.
In late 1989, as the Berlin Wall came down, a debate was
beginning: "Would the United States turn inward, revert to an
isolationist inclination?" The events in the Persian Gulf have
answered that question authoritatively. But even without the
invasion of Kuwait, I believe the answer would have been
resounding. The United States will not--indeed cannot--become
inward oriented.
Let me give you some reasons why. One in six jobs in
manufacturing is involved in exports. Each $1 billion in US exports
creates 22,000 jobs in the United States. Thousands of US
businessmen travel each year to such exotic places as Pakistan,
Brazil, and Senegal to invest and trade. Small business is very
active in exporting. The US Small Business Administration reported
in 1989 that small businesses with fewer than 500 employees
accounted for 12% of the goods produced in the United States that
were exported directly.
Nearly 65,000 US students study abroad each year--the most
of any nation. And that is up from 48,000 as recently as 1986.
There has been an impressive increase in the number of US students
studying foreign languages; the number of students studying
Japanese has increased 50% in the last 4 years. There are more
than 150 international studies programs at institutions of higher
learning in the United States, with schools such as Saint Mary's
University in San Antonio, North Texas State University, Tulane, and
the University of Maine at Orono.
Our Future--Mexico and Canada
Our future lies with Mexico and Canada, not Mexico or Canada alone,
but rather with a special relationship with them--a relationship
that is based on cold, hard facts as well as an alluring vision.
On February 5, President Bush, President Salinas, and Prime
Minister Mulroney announced that they would seek a North American
free trade area, which according to President Bush ". . . will link
our three economies in bold and far-reaching ways. Successful
conclusion of the free trade agreement will expand market
opportunities, increase prosperity, and help our three countries
meet the economic challenges of the future."
The promise of such an agreement is enormous: 360 million
consumers and a combined gross national product of $6 trillion--by
way of comparison, the world GNP was $6 trillion in 1957; 21.3
million square miles of productive resources, seven times as large
as EC, 33% of world's oil production, and largest deposits of coal
and uranium. A magnet for capital--the United States, Canada, and
Mexico attracted nearly $30 billion in foreign direct investment in
1990--capital that creates jobs.
That's a grand vision, but what does it mean in real terms?
How does the United States benefit from opening our market to the
Mexicans or making more concessions to the Canadians?
Again, let's look at the record. The US-Canada FTA has helped
to boost US merchandise exports to Canada by 18%. Industries on
both sides of the border have agreed among themselves about the
benefits of accelerated tariff removal. At industries' request the
United States and Canada agreed to accelerate tariff elimination on
more than 400 tariff items covering approximately $5 billion in
bilateral trade. More than 75% of bilateral trade is now duty-free.
The record tells us the free trade agreement with Canada
works. It works with Canada, and it will work with Mexico. In fact,
in some aspects the case for free trade with Mexico is more compelling.
Professor Harold Hill of Gary, Indiana, one of the greatest
salesmen of all time, said: "Ya gotta know the territory." Well, that
territory is Mexico. Mexico is our third largest trading partner. The
United States has a 70% share of Mexico's total trade. US exports to
Mexico more than doubled between 1986 and 1990. Manufactured
goods accounted for over 80% of our exports to Mexico in 1989.
Remarkably, the United States had a $16 million surplus in bilateral
textile trade in 1990.
A good salesman like Harold Hill would grasp immediately
that the NAFTA presents an extraordinary opportunity--not just to
know the territory but also to "shape" the territory.
Sounds logical enough. But it will not be easy. To negotiate
the North America free trade area, the President must have what is
called "fast-track" negotiating authority. That is, the President
would send to Congress a completed agreement for their approval.
Under fast-track authority, Congress could not offer amendments to
the agreement but must vote up or down, with a simple majority
required, and that vote must take place within 60 legislative days.
On March 1, the President notified Congress of his intention to
extend fast-track authority for 2 more years, starting June 1. This
fast-track extension would cover not only the NAFTA but also the
Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT. Under congressional rules,
the Congress may deny the President fast-track authority by a
simple majority vote in either house before June 1.
Let me note here an important point: A Congressman with
reservations about the outcome of the NAFTA or the Uruguay Round
can in good conscience support fast track because he will later have
the opportunity to vote on the particular agreements. Working with
the Congress to ensure that the President's fast-track authority is
not denied is one of the Administration's highest priorities.
Without fast track we surrender leadership; we lose control of our
future.
We are facing two lines of argument against fast track,
focusing primarily on the prospect of an FTA with Mexico. The
objections are:
First, we should not engage in free trade negotiations with
Mexico because: Mexican companies are polluting the transborder
environment; an FTA will prompt more US firms to shift production
to Mexico to escape environmental regulations; and because Mexican
companies face less strict standards, they have a competitive
advantage over US firms.
Second, the US will lose jobs if we permit Mexican imports
better access to the United States.
There are real concerns. They deserve to be addressed and the
Administration is addressing them.
Environment
On the environment, first, we will not weaken US environmental
laws and regulations or standards on pesticides, energy
conservation, toxic waste, or health and safety standards as part of
an FTA. Moreover, we will continue to refuse to allow products to
enter our market if they do not meet our health, safety, pesticide,
food and drug, and environmental regulations.
But the environmental naysayers are missing two critical
points. President Salinas and his team are taking strong steps on
environmental protection in their own national interests. Much of
Mexico's 1988 general law for ecological equilibrium and
environmental protection is based on US law. And President Salinas
is devoting considerable resources to enforcement. A good example
is the shutting down of Mexico's largest oil refinery, which is
estimated to cost Mexico about $500 million and 2,000-3,000 jobs.
In addition, the Salinas government has instituted a policy that
requires drivers in Mexico City to leave their car at home 1 day a
week and is requiring catalytic converters to be installed in new
cars beginning with this model year. Unleaded gas in Mexico became
available at the pump in September 1990.
The US and Mexico are working closely together in a number of
forums, including the International Boundary and Water Commission
(IBWC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-SEDUE [Mexican
ministry for environmental affairs] cooperation, and the annual US-
Mexico Binational Commission. The United States entered into an
agreement in 1989 to provide technical support for the efforts to
clean up Mexico City's environment. Together, we have developed
training and technical assistance programs to deal with the
problems of air and water pollution, hazardous waste, and
environmental health. This EPA program has been supplemented by a
US Department of Energy agreement with the Mexican Petroleum
Institute to prepare a computer model of Mexico City's air pollution.
We have also sought to work with Mexico in the Inter-American
Development Bank to put together a debt-for-nature swap to fund
reforestation effort around Mexico.
Through the International Boundary and Water Commission, we
are helping to resolve water pollution problems. For example, the
IBWC is constructing major sewage collection and treatment
systems at an estimated cost of over $234 million at Nuevo Laredo,
Tijuana/San Diego, and Nogales. And the IBWC is planning joint
improvements in sewage collection and treatment facilities for a
long-term solution to pollution of the New River at Mexicali-
Calexico.
Let me ask a rhetorical question: If we turn away from the
NAFTA, does anyone believe this will strengthen Mexican
environmental efforts? Or does anyone doubt that as Mexico
becomes more prosperous, they will devote more resources to the
environment?
Jobs
With regard to jobs, we recognize that changes in trade policy will
affect US workers, and thus we will negotiate transition rules that
will minimize any adverse impact. But we are absolutely convinced
that the FTA will create jobs. The Department of Labor has
calculated that NAFTA will create between 44,000 and 64,000 jobs
over 10 years, many of these jobs in manufacturing. Rudiger
Dornbusch, a respected economist at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, is much more bullish, predicting 150,000 jobs will be
created in the United States because of increased Mexican demand
for US goods and services.
An interesting parallel to the debate about the effect of an
FTA between partners with a significant difference between wage
levels is the accession of Portugal and Spain to the EC. As
enlargement occurred, Portuguese manufacturing workers earned
less than one-fifth of West German counterparts. The same
arguments about jobs were heard then.
The result? Not only did the trade balance shift in favor of
the European Community (EC)-10, in part because rising investment
in Portugal and Spain attracted more imports, but real wages in the
EC-10 continued to grow after enlargement.
Wages are a function of productivity, and the US workers are
the most productive in the world. History tells us that more trade
is the key to prosperity, raising living standards, creating jobs, and
promoting growth.
The "Economics" Revolution
We are in the midst of a revolution in economic policy that is
sweeping the world--from the former communist bloc, to the
countries of Latin America, to Islamic nations such as Morocco and
Pakistan, to the geographically remote Mongolia.
Think back to the 1970s when foreign investment and
multinational corporations were considered "imperialistic;" when
debate was North-South, focusing on the new international order;
and when the developing countries were urging the creation of a
common fund, which was the antithesis of the market.
Nowhere is this revolution better illustrated than in Mexico
and the bold leadership of President Salinas. Since 1985, Mexico
has reduced its maximum tariff from 110% to 20% and eliminated
import licenses on all but about 200 products. In 1989, President
Salinas issued a decree opening up two-thirds of the economy to
majority foreign-owned investment. The government has slashed
the number of state-owned enterprises and sold off such major
firms as its airlines and its telecommunications monopoly. In
addition, the Salinas administration has changed the constitution to
allow the reprivatization of the commercial banks.
The rewards to Mexico are evident, and that success supports
other reformers: 1.6 million new jobs have been created since
1988, foreign investment has grown from $1.5 billion to more than
$4 billion each year, and Mexican exports have expanded by an
average rate of 20%.
As the industrialized nations have urged the developing world
to adopt open markets, so we must support them in these endeavors
or else they cannot succeed. We cannot encourage them to trade
with us and then deny them the opportunity to export; we cannot
preach that foreign direct investment is superior to official debt
and then ignore their efforts to attract investors; we cannot argue
that the means to creating meaningful jobs is free trade and then
turn around and claim that industrialized nations cannot afford free
trade because it will cost jobs.
The NAFTA is of critical importance to the Bush
Administration, but it is not the Administration's only initiative to
build stronger ties to the rest of the world, to the emerging
economies of the world. Among the most important are:
The Uruguay Round, which is critical to all, including the
developing countries because so much is at stake, especially
agriculture.
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. President Bush
has launched the Enterprise for the Americas [Initiative]--a trade,
investment, debt dialogue--as an effort to support the Latin
countries as they pursue economic reform.
The Partnership for Democracy and Development is an
initiative to bring the resources and attention of the industrialized
nations to bear in supporting democratic and market-based reforms
in Central America.
The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, begun in 1989, is
designed to bring all the nations of the Asian Pacific together to
discuss measures to create a Pacific economic infrastructure,
including transportation and environmental ideas.
G-24 for Eastern Europe. The G-24 for Eastern Europe is
another undertaking by the industrialized nations, this to coordinate
efforts to ensure a successful transition to market-based
economics in Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe.
The unifying theme on each of these is partnership. We are
forging new relations with a number of countries, with Mexico as a
cornerstone, particularly with the Caribbean, Central America, and
Latin America. Achieving fast-track authority and the NAFTA is
imperative to maintaining US leadership. Failure to achieve this
will be a lost opportunity that may never be regained. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: Status Report of US Sanctions on South Africa
Cohen
Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Apr 30, 19914/30/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: South Africa
Subject: Human Rights, Trade/Economics, Democratization
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to come before this
committee again. We place great value on the broad consensus
which has guided US policy toward South Africa in the last 2 years.
Speaking with one voice has maximized our ability to affect events
there. We want to work with you to sustain that approach. I am
delighted that you and other interested Members of Congress had the
opportunity to assess progress in South Africa first-hand in
connection with the recent Aspen Institute conference in Cape
Town. I look forward to comparing notes and sharing reactions
during this hearing.
I have been asked to comment on the subject of sanctions on
South Africa. I can report that the Administration has, over the
last 2 years, implemented the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986 (CAAA) fully and faithfully. Section 101 of the act states
that US policy should encourage the government of South Africa to
"bring about reforms in that system of Government that will lead to
the establishment of a non-racial democracy," and Section 311
further specifies that it is US policy to support negotiations. I am
pleased to say that over the last 18 months, South Africa has made
unquestioned progress toward achieving these objectives. The
remaining pillars of apartheid are tumbling down. Dialogue and
negotiations are replacing persecution and repression. As President
Bush has stated, we believe that this process of change in South
Africa has become irreversible.
All of us here, from the Administration and from Congress,
can be proud of our contributions to these positive developments.
We have shared a sense of moral revulsion over the indignity,
injustice, and human suffering visited on the people of South Africa
by institutionalized racial discrimination and exclusion. Apartheid
is contrary to the most fundamental principles of human equality
and equal opportunity which our country is committed to realizing
at home and encouraging abroad.
Sometimes it may have seemed that the racial conflict in that
beautiful and rich land would never really be settled through
anything less than violent confrontation. However, to their great
credit, despite years of apartheid and repression, the black
majority of South Africa has shown itself still willing to enter into
a process of dialogue and reconciliation with their white fellow
countrymen. In fact, on all sides we are seeing an all too rare
example of people of good faith stopping at the abyss to give peace
a chance. In today's world, that is worthy of special note.
World Reaction to Changes in South Africa
Indeed, the world has noticed these changes. The European
Community has lifted the sanctions it adopted in 1986, including
bans on new investment in South Africa and on the import of iron
and steel and gold coins. Other countries have done the same, some
publicly, some not, most West European countries have hosted visits
by President [F.W.] De Klerk. On March 23, the Nordic countries
decided to expand contact between their countries and South Africa.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and South Africa are opening interest
sections in each other's capitals. East European countries, which
broke off relations with South Africa in 1963, are re-establishing
relations. In the first weeks of April, South Africa appointed heads
of mission to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Trade
between Eastern Europe and South Africa is rapidly expanding.
In Africa, to cite a few of many examples of changing
attitudes, Ghana has announced that newly issued passports will be
"valid for all countries," not "valid for all countries except South
Africa." Zambia has agreed to issue visas to South Africans at the
border, in contrast to previous lengthy visa processing. Delegations
from Gabon and Angola visited South Africa in January 1991. South
African Airways recently reached new agreements for landing
rights in a number of African countries. Other African countries
appear on the verge of taking similar positive moves.
Keeping the Negotiations on Track
As the current dispute between the government and the African
National Congress (ANC) over violence indicates, the road toward a
negotiated settlement will not be easy. The parties to this violence
must do all they can to end it. Unquestionably, the government has a
special responsibility to ensure the impartiality and credibility of
the police. We believe that President De Klerk, Mr. Mandela, and
their colleagues will find a way to keep the negotiations on track.
It is imperative that they do so. Responsible political leaders in
South Africa understand that the real issue at this crucial point in
their country's history is completing the move forward into
negotiations to bring about non-racial democracy.
These negotiations must include representatives of all major
political groupings in order to ensure an outcome broadly acceptable
for all of South Africa's people. The ANC proposed an all-party
conference to discuss these matters and the government endorsed
that proposal. The Inkatha Freedom Party has agreed to participate
in the all-party conference.
US policy is to encourage such broad-based negotiations on
the establishment of a non-racial, multi-party democracy in South
Africa. The new constitution should enshrine individual rights and
establish the legal basis for a viable market-based economy capable
of generating the renewed growth necessary to meet the
expectations of all South Africans for a prosperous future. We
believe strongly that a pluralistic political system, with a market-
oriented economy based upon equal opportunity, is the greatest
guarantor against authoritarian rule and racial discrimination. We
stand ready, as necessary and appropriate, to offer whatever
assistance we can to help move the negotiations forward and bring
them to a successful outcome.
Last year, the President met with President De Klerk and with
Nelson Mandela. He used both occasions to encourage these leaders
to go forward into negotiations and to do all they can to further the
prospects of peaceful change in South Africa. Since these meetings,
the President has remained in direct contact with President De
Klerk and Mr. Mandela to keep them apprised of developments in US
policy and to seek their views.
We also have encouraged other relevant political groups to
commit themselves to peaceful change. We have met at various
times with representatives of the Pan African Congress (PAC), the
Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), Inkatha, the Conservative
Party, the Democratic Party and others to urge them to join the
peace process. Through diplomatic channels and in our public
comments, we encourage the South African government to maintain
a proper climate for negotiations. Most recently, we have been
pressing all parties to work together to find a mutually agreeable
means of dealing with the tragic problem of violence which has
distracted energy and attention from the all-important process of
negotiations on South Africa's political future.
Ensuring Strong Economic Growth
Our concerns, however, go beyond the present phase of the process
of change. South Africa faces a tremendous challenge as it moves
from a system which benefited mainly a minority to one which
allows equal opportunity to all while beginning to redress
imbalances of the past. South Africa must urgently seek to provide
blacks with tangible evidence that a market economy can work for
them. A new democratic government will be under heavy pressure
to redistribute resources to a majority heretofore denied their fair
share. Strong economic growth is essential to achieving this goal
while avoiding strains which could undercut political support for a
peaceful transition. All sectors and parties will have to remain
sober in their expectations and committed to finding ways to
encourage growth while improving the circumstances of the
disadvantaged.
Meanwhile, the government and South African business must
do more to ensure that those disadvantaged by apartheid have
adequate housing, education, health care, access to land and more
opportunities in the civil service and management. These needs are
pressing; perhaps we in the international community should also
consider refocusing, at least, some of our efforts in this direction.
"Open," multi-racial universities and efforts to improve deplorable
housing conditions in the townships are examples of areas where
outside help could make a critical contribution. Times of great
change require great effort.
In this regard, I am proud to note that American companies
active in South Africa have led the way in demonstrating how
business and equal opportunity reinforce each other. The CAAA's
fair labor standards, monitored closely by the Department of State,
serve as a model of enlightened corporate civic responsibility. It is
significant that, under the CAAA, the fair labor standards
provisions would remain in force even after the South African
government meets the requirements set for lifting CAAA sanctions.
The universal rejection abroad of apartheid, and the resultant
political, moral, and economic judgments drawn by the outside
world on the injustice of a racially divided South Africa, have
doubtless played a role in bringing the white community to face up
to the need for fundamental change. Now that the process of change
has begun in earnest, we in the international community have a
responsibility to do all we can to assist those committed to
achieving through peaceful means a new, non-racial and democratic
South Africa. This must lead to a focus that goes beyond sanctions
to seek ways to help South Africa achieve the strong growth rate
necessary to meet the rising expectations of the black majority.
We must, therefore, also seek ways to help stimulate
economic growth. This is necessary for the future of South Africa
and for the region as a whole. The Administration is committed to
carrying out the provisions of the CAAA, which wisely recognized
that, once the transition process got well underway, renewed
external contacts, trade, and communication would play a vital role
in encouraging continued progress and laying a sound economic basis
for renewed growth in post-apartheid South Africa. The CAAA
focused its targets clearly on promoting a process of change and
negotiations.
Title 3 of the CAAA sets five conditions for the South African
government to meet. Sections 311(A) and 311(B) set the terms
under which sanctions might be terminated, modified, or suspended.
South Africa has so far satisfied three of these CAAA conditions:
-- Repealing the state of emergency and releasing all
detainees held under it. In June 1990, the government lifted the
state of emergency everywhere except Natal. In October 1990, the
state of emergency in Natal was lifted as well. The South African
Human Rights Commission confirmed that there are no detainees
held under the state of emergency.
-- Unbanning democratic political parties and permitting
the free exercise by South Africans of all races of the right to form
political parties, express political opinions, and otherwise
participate in the political process. After President De Klerk's
historic speech on February 2, 1990, the South African government
unbanned all political parties, including the ANC, the PAC, the South
African Communist Party, and other opposition groups. Since then,
South Africans of all races have freely exercised the right to form
political parties and express political opinions. They are
participating in a political process which has as its centerpiece
negotiations to abolish apartheid and establish a non-racial
democracy.
-- Agreeing to enter into good faith negotiations with truly
representative members of the black majority without
preconditions. The government has expressed its desire and
intention to enter without conditions into good faith negotiations
with the opposition. Its actions bear this out. Discussions between
the government and the ANC led to the breakthrough Pretoria minute
of August 6, 1990. This document provides for the suspension of
violence and the release of political prisoners, as well as for
subsequent negotiations on implementation, which are ongoing.
Once the minute is fully implemented, the ANC's conditions for
beginning full-fledged constitutional negotiations will have been
met.
Two conditions have not yet been met:
-- Release of all persons persecuted for their political
beliefs or detained unduly without trial. Over 700 persons have
been released since February 1990, including Nelson Mandela and
other opposition political leaders. However, the process agreed
to between the government and the ANC, in August 1990, is still
underway. The government has expedited efforts to meet the April
30 target date set in the August agreement but has stated that it
needs more time to work through the full lists of persons made
available by human rights groups. We will continue to closely
review progress in implementing the political prisoner release
process to determine whether it meets the CAAA's requirement that
all those persecuted for their political beliefs be released.
-- Repeal of the Group Areas Act and the Population
Registration Act without instituting any measures with the same
purposes. In February, President De Klerk announced that the
Group Areas Act and Population Registration Act, along with Land
Acts, would be repealed during the current session of the South
African Parliament. The government has, in fact, begun the repeal
process. We will review the government's proposal for temporary
transitional measures to ensure they are not measures with the
same purposes of the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts.
President Bush has emphasized that the conditions of the
CAAA are clear-cut and not open to reinterpretation. We intend
to follow the law as we determine if the conditions have been met.
We will follow developments in South Africa closely. We shall
continue our consultations with Congress. It is worth noting that
even should the sanctions under Title 3 terminate, various other
non-CAAA sanctions--such as the arms embargo, exports to the
military and police, and the Gramm amendment governing US votes
at the International Monetary Fund--would remain in place. These
measures will give us continued leverage as the negotiating process
develops.
US policy should continue to emphasize the future and remain
focused on encouraging the successful transition to genuine
democracy in South Africa. The Administration looks forward to
working closely with Congress to implement an effective policy
designed to respond constructively to the fundamental changes
taking place in South Africa and to the need to help ensure that this
process leads to the prosperous and democratic future we all hope
for. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: Cease-fire and Political Settlement in Angola
Cohen
Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Description: Opening statement at a news briefing, Washington, DC
Date: May 1, 19915/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Country: Angola
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
A s you know, for the past 12 months the parties to the Angolan
conflict have been negotiating to resolve the conflict under the
auspices of the Portuguese government.
I'm very pleased to inform you that the negotiators have now
completed their work. As we speak, they are now making an
announcement in Lisbon on the completion of the work and the
initialing of a set of agreements--initialing ad referendum--and
they have agreed that they will inform the mediator no later than
May 15 whether or not they finally accept these agreements.
If they do, a cease-fire will go into effect at the end of May.
This will lead to a process of forming a new national army,
legalization of political parties, including UNITA [National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola], and a political process leading to
a free and fair election between September 1 and November 30,
1992.
I would like to give you some perspective on what this means.
First, this agreement will end 16 years of war in
Angola, which has resulted in tremendous devastation and many
people dying of warfare and disease and famine. It will allow the
country to be reconstructed.
Second, it is a vindication of US policy which, in
effect, has always been that a military solution to the Angolan
conflict is not possible. We have always said that our action in
Angola has been to promote negotiations leading to national
reconciliation which would be determined through a free and fair
election. This is exactly what has happened as a result of this
negotiation that went on for 1 year.
I would like to point out the US role in this negotiation.
Approximately 13 months ago, Secretary Baker met with President
[Jose Eduardo] dos Santos of Angola in Namibia during the Namibian
independence celebrations. He assured him that it was not our policy
to overthrow the Angolan government and replace it with a UNITA
government. Our policy was to promote negotiations, and he urged
President dos Santos to accept the beginning of negotiations leading
to free and fair elections. President dos Santos accepted Secretary
Baker's recommendation and asked the Portuguese government to
mediate negotiations.
In December 1990, the negotiations had progressed but had
reached sort of an impasse. In a meeting between Secretary Baker
and [Soviet] Foreign Minister [Eduard] Shevardnadze in Houston, they
agreed to make a special effort to break through the impasse. They
did it in two ways.
We co-sponsored a meeting in Washington on December 13 on
all the parties, including the Soviets, the Americans, the
Portuguese, and the two Angolan parties. Secretary Baker met
publicly with the Angolan Foreign Minister, and Shevardnadze met
publicly with President [Jonas] Savimbi of UNITA; therefore,
demonstrating our determination to bring the two parties together.
This meeting resulted in a document called the Washington
Concepts Paper, which, effectively, broke the impasse and led to the
events that we are seeing today in a final agreement. In addition to
a vindication of US policy in Angola, this is a demonstration of US-
Soviet cooperation in conflict resolution on regional issues.
After the December meeting, the United States and the Soviet
Union were brought into the negotiations as official observers. We
both played a very important role in helping to bring about
compromises under the overall jurisdiction of the Portuguese
mediator.
Another important element is that the UN will be requested to
provide monitoring of the cease-fire and monitoring of the
operations of the military and the police. This is another indication
of the increased use of the UN as a mechanism for resolving
international conflicts.
The agreements obligate both parties to stop receiving all
lethal military equipment from any source. That means that both
the US and the Soviet role in assisting the government of Angola and
UNITA with lethal equipment will stop with the entry into force of
the cease-fire. In effect, the two parties have agreed to stop
receiving it, and the Americans and the Soviets have agreed to abide
by their agreement.
The furnishing of other types of assistance--humanitarian and
economic--will continue to be allowed under this agreement.
This agreement would not have been possible without the
1988 New York agreements leading to the independence of Namibia
and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. In addition to the
withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, the 1988 agreements also
provided for the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola
and the withdrawal of African National Congress fighting forces
from Angola. The departure of these foreign military forces from
Angola greatly facilitated the political settlement that we're
witnessing today because, at that point, the two Angolan parties no
longer had the complication of working with foreign military
forces. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)
Date: May 6, 19915/6/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations
[TEXT]
On April 3, 1991, following extensive consultations, the UN
Security Council adopted Resolution 687 (see Dispatch, Vol. 2, No.
14) setting specific terms for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and
Kuwait and the member states cooperating with Kuwait. In
paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Security Council established a
demilitarized zone along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and
requested the Secretary General to submit to the council, within 3
days, a plan for the immediate deployment of a UN observer unit.
Following consultations with the governments of Kuwait and
Iraq, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar submitted his plan for a
"United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission" (UNIKOM) on April
6, 1991. On April 9, the Security Council approved the plan and
decided to set up UNIKOM for the initial period of 6 months. The
first group of UN observers left for the area on the same day.
Purpose of the Mission
UNIKOM's purpose is to:
-- Monitor the Khor Abdullah water-way between the two
countries and a demilitarized zone extending 6 miles
(10 km) into Iraq and 3 miles (5 km) into Kuwait, based on borders
established between Kuwait and Iraq under a 1963 agreement;
-- Deter violations of the country through its presence in and
surveillance of the demilitarized zone; and
-- Observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted
from the territory of one state to the other.
The demilitarized zone is about 125 miles (200 km) long; the
Khor Abdullah about 25 miles (40 km). For the most part, the zone
is barren and almost uninhabited, except for the oilfields and two
towns, Umm Qasr and Safwan.
Chain of Command
In accordance with established principles for UN peacekeeping
operations, UNIKOM will function under the command of the United
Nations, vested in the Secretary General, under the authority of the
Security Council. Command in the field will be exercised by a chief
military observer appointed by the Secretary General with the
consent of the Security Council. The chief military observer will be
responsible to the Secretary General, who will report regularly to
the Security Council on UNIKOM operations and the situation in the
area. Maj. Gen. Gunther G. Greindl (Austria) has been appointed as
chief military observer.
Composition
Armed and unarmed military personnel will comprise UNIKOM. It
will be composed of a group of 300 military observers and an
infantry contingent of about 680 soldiers and officers. The
infantry--five companies drawn from existing UN peacekeeping
operations in the region--temporarily will be assigned to UNIKOM to
provide essential security for the mission during the setting-up
phase.
A field engineer unit also will be attached to UNIKOM to clear
mines and unexploded ordnance in the zone. In addition, the mission
will have an air unit with fixed-wing aircraft and light helicopters,
a logistic unit responsible primarily for medical care, supply and
transport, and a headquarters unit. The maximum initial troop
strength of UNIKOM will be about 1,440 for all ranks.
Military personnel and logistic support will be provided by the
following 36 countries: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada,
Chile, China, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria,
Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, USSR, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
UNIKOM will be headquartered in Umm Qasr (Iraq) and will
have liaison offices in Baghdad and Kuwait City.
Concept of Operation
UNIKOM seeks to ensure that no military personnel and equipment
are within the demilitarized zone and that no military
fortifications and installations are maintained in it. To this end,
the mission will:
-- Monitor the withdrawal of any armed forces now in the
zone which is to be demilitarized;
-- Operate observation posts on the main roads to monitor
traffic into and out of the demilitarized zone;
-- Operate observation posts at selected locations in the
demilitarized zone;
-- Conduct patrols throughout the demilitarized zone by land
and air;
-- Monitor the Khor Abdullah from observation posts set up on
its shores and from the air; and
-- Carry out investigations.
To enable UNIKOM to effectively carry out its mandate, the
governments of Iraq and Kuwait have been requested to extend to
the mission full freedom of movement, on land and through the air,
across the border and throughout the demilitarized zone; to control
movement into and out of the demilitarized zone by requiring all
traffic to be routed past UN observation posts; to notify UNIKOM in
advance of sea and air traffic in the demilitarized zone and the Khor
Abdullah; and to establish limitations on the right of their citizens
to bear arms in the demilitarized zone.
As an observation mission, UNIKOM is not authorized to take
physical action to prevent the entry of military personnel or
equipment into the demilitarized zone. UNIKOM and its personnel
can use force only in self-defense. The mission will not interfere
in the normal civilian life of the area. The governments of Iraq and
Kuwait will carry out all aspects of civilian administration in their
respective parts of the demilitarized zone, including the
maintenance of law and order.
Financial Aspects
The estimated cost for UNIKOM is $83 million for the first 6-month
period. The costs of the mission will be met from the assessed
contributions of the UN member states to a UNIKOM special account.
In addition, the Secretary General has called for voluntary
contributions for setting up and maintaining the mission. (Source:
UN Department of Public Information.) (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: Vietnam: The Road Ahead
Solomon
Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and
Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Date: Apr 25, 19914/25/91
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Vietnam, Cambodia
Subject: POW/MIA Issues, Human Rights,
Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, Senator Murkowski, members of the subcommittee, I
am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss another aspect of our
policies toward Indochina--our effort to return to a dialogue on
normalization with Vietnam. The Administration's contemporary
approach to Hanoi is part of a larger effort to forge normal,
constructive relations with all three states of Indochina--Cambodia
and Laos as well as Vietnam. But today I want to focus on our
policy, present activities, and future plans regarding Vietnam.
US Policy
Let me begin by saying the war is over. As the President has said,
our Vietnam syndrome is behind us. The United States looks to the
future and seeks reconciliation with Vietnam based on the national
interests of both countries.
A genuine and durable reconciliation will require conflict
resolution and stability in Southeast Asia and domestic support
here at home. For reasons of returning peace and stability to the
region, the United States has premised normalization of US-
Vietnamese relations since Vietnam invaded Cambodia in late 1978
on the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops and advisers from
Cambodia and self-determination for the Cambodian people. For
reasons of domestic concern, we have long held that the pace and
scope of normalization, once the process begins, should be
commensurate with Vietnam's cooperation on the POW/MIA
[prisoners of war/missing in action] issue and other humanitarian
concerns.
The Roadmap to Normalized Relations
In an effort to impart momentum to what we hope is the final stage
of the Cambodia peace process and to accelerate progress on
POW/MIAs and other humanitarian issues, I met in New York on April
9 with Vietnam's Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
Ambassador Trinh Xuan Lang. I presented to Ambassador Lang a
four-phase "roadmap" to political and economic normalization that
could, in relatively short order, end the trade embargo and our
opposition to lending to Vietnam by the international financial
institutions as our concerns for a Cambodia settlement and
POW/MIA accounting are resolved.
We want Vietnam's leadership to have no doubt that the United
States is prepared to move expeditiously, provided Vietnam is also
prepared to reciprocate. At the same time, given the way the
Vietnam war ended, a climate of mistrust remains. Thus, in order
to avoid further false starts, much less another serious setback,
both Washington and Hanoi must engage in a process of trust- and
confidence-building through step-by-step reciprocal concrete
actions.
Vietnam needs to understand that the American government
and people stand united in our goals of restoring tranquility to
Cambodia, building a settlement with safeguards against a Khmer
Rouge return to power, and resolving the fate of Americans still
unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. For our part, we seek to build
mutual understanding and credibility through the phased process of
normalization laid out in the roadmap.
We do not see normalization as a zero-sum game requiring
painful concessions by either party. We see it as a win-win
situation. Stability in Cambodia and resolution of the humanitarian
issues are in Vietnam's interest as well as our own. It is in
Vietnam's interest that the international community assume the
burden of resisting a Khmer Rouge return to power. Moreover, a
collective response to the Cambodian problem--reflected in the
UN/Paris Conference settlement process--would minimize regional
suspicions and enhance prospects for stability and for a peaceful
environment conducive to the economic development which Vietnam
seeks.
Economic Prospects
I believe we share a mutual interest with Hanoi in seeking to
realize the possibilities for the economic development of Vietnam.
Vietnam needs the capital, technology, and management expertise
that would flow to it with full economic normalization. And it is in
our national interest to develop trade and investment ties with
Vietnam as we seek to expand open trade in a world of growing
economic competitiveness.
We hear much speculation about the commercial opportunities
now opening up in Vietnam. Clearly, the possibilities of a market of
70 million people suddenly opening to the outside world has sparked
the imagination of some in the business community. Vietnam has
begun a process of reform--particularly in its pricing and
exchange-rate policies--in line with some of the prescriptions of
international financial institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). If Hanoi's reforms deepen and foreign
assistance begins to flow on a significant scale, Vietnam's
medium- and long-term economic prospects are promising.
At the same time, it should be recognized that expectations of
a continuing confrontation over Cambodia, internal problems of
bureaucratic management, a poor infrastructure, and a lack of legal
protections for business limit Vietnam's ability to attract foreign
investment. In the near term, the oil and service sectors appear
most promising to foreign investors, and much of some $1.3 billion
in total approved foreign investment contracts is concentrated in
these areas, though largely awaiting implementation.
We look forward to the time when US firms can pursue normal
trade and investment relations with Vietnam. Such a time could
approach swiftly if we begin the confidence-building process we
have laid out in the roadmap. We hope Vietnam shares our desire for
the expanded diplomatic contact as well as cultural and economic
exchanges that a fully normal relationship would facilitate. The
four-phase process of settling the Cambodia conflict and resolving
our POW/MIA concerns is the most rapid path to this end.
Cambodia
Two weeks ago I was privileged to address this subcommittee at
some length about the Cambodia peace process. I will not review
today the issues discussed at that time, except to reiterate that the
linkage between normalization with Vietnam and a political
settlement in Cambodia has been the policy of three presidents and
five secretaries of state. We recognize there can be no peaceful
settlement for Cambodia without Vietnam's support. It was
Vietnam, after all, that established the present regime in Phnom
Penh over a decade ago and remains the regime's staunchest ally.
Moreover, as I mentioned during our last session, Vietnam
still retains several thousand military and some civilian advisers in
Cambodia. We understand that Hanoi's influence in Cambodia is not
unlimited. But there is no question that Vietnam enjoys
considerable influence with the Phnom Penh authorities.
Thus, we believe there is an organic connection between our
policies toward Vietnam and Cambodia. Given the history of this
region, including Vietnam's decade-long occupation of, and
continuing involvement in, Cambodia, we believe Vietnam has an
obligation to use its influence to bring about a just and durable
peace. Once it does so--and as we see improved cooperation on
humanitarian issues--there will be a firm basis for a new
relationship between the United States and
Vietnam.
Humanitarian Issues
Let me now turn to the humanitarian matters that will affect the
pace and scope of normalization. These issues reflect concerns
deeply held by the Administration, the Congress, and the American
people. Only with resolution of these issues can we put our
relationship with Vietnam on the solid foundation of broad public
support.
POW/MIAs
.
The most compelling and deeply felt humanitarian concern is
resolution of the POW/MIA issue. This has been a consistent US
position. As President Bush has said, and as President Reagan said
before him, the US government considers resolution of this issue a
matter of the highest national priority.
Our first priority in POW/MIA accounting is resolution of the
"discrepancy cases" of American servicemen known to have been
alive when captured and whose fates Vietnam should certainly have
some knowledge of. Resolving these cases has been the primary
focus of the joint investigations promoted under the Vessey
initiative. We also continue to stress to the Vietnamese our
serious interest in pursuing reports suggesting that Americans may
still be alive in Vietnam.
Gen. John Vessey, the President's Special Emissary to Hanoi on
POW/MIA matters, has just returned from 2 days of meetings in
Vietnam with Foreign Minister Thach. Supported by Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl Ford, the Executive
Director of the National League of Families Ann Mills Griffiths, and
my deputy Ken Quinn, General Vessey gave Minister Thach our
assessment of progress since their meeting here in Washington last
October. We have found some improvements in cooperation but
limited results, and Vietnam really needs to accelerate unilateral
and joint efforts to achieve the results we are seeking.
It was with this objective in mind that General Vessey and
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach announced on April 20 that the
United States would establish a temporary office in Hanoi to
support the POW/MIA accounting process. Our decision reflected a
previous understanding that we would establish such a presence in
Vietnam if we determined it would facilitate resolution of the
issue, including advance planning for joint activities and efforts to
resolve live sighting reports on which we request assistance. The
office will be staffed by Defense personnel augmented by POW/MIA
specialists who will rotate through on temporary duty. It will have
no diplomatic or political responsibilities and should not be seen as
a first step in the normalization process. It can, however, help to
accelerate normalization once a Cambodia settlement is signed in
Paris if its activities are productive in resolving POW/ MIA issues.
Orderly Departure Program
Release of all re-education camp political prisoners has also been a
consistent US goal. The Orderly Departure Program (ODP), with
Vietnam's cooperation, has undergone considerable expansion in
recent years. Under the ODP, the United States takes in Vietnamese
citizens associated with our country and its citizens by work or
family ties, including Amerasians. This month we raised the
interview rate to 10,000 per month, twice the level of a year ago.
As a result, overall ODP departures will be nearly double last year's
rate. This dramatic expansion constitutes a major contribution to
the comprehensive plan of action for Indochina refugees by
bolstering ODP as a safe, predictable, and realistic alternative to
departures by boat.
We are pleased that the ODP program now also includes former
re-education center detainees, who began arriving in the United
States only in January of 1990. Last fiscal year, about 9,000
former detainees and family members came to the United States.
We hope to double the flow this fiscal year. While we are
encouraged by this development, we continue to ask Vietnam to free
all political prisoners and to allow all of them who are eligible for
the ODP to depart for the United States if they so desire.
The Vessey Initiative: Humanitarian Assistance.
Just as we ask Vietnam to help with our humanitarian concerns, we
encourage American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
address the humanitarian needs of Vietnam's citizens, particularly
in the areas of prosthetics and child survival. Since 1987, when
General Vessey pledged our support in these areas, there has been a
series of meetings in Hanoi between Vietnamese and American
officials at the working level to review progress and identify areas
where useful activities could be carried out.
The US government encourages the work of NGOs which raise
funds and gather material donations to help the people of Vietnam.
And the American NGO community has responded generously to
Vietnam's humanitarian needs. As announced by Secretary Baker
last July, to facilitate their efforts we have eased licensing
procedures for humanitarian assistance. Many NGOs not previously
active in Vietnam, or not active since 1975, have started new
programs. A number of new groups, particularly veterans
organizations, have been formed for the specific purpose of
providing humanitarian assistance to Vietnam. Since last July 18,
36 different organizations or individuals have been licensed to
provide humanitarian donations to Vietnam. Financial contributions
since that time total approximately $4.3 million.
Although up to now no US government assistance has gone
directly to Vietnam, we did assist indirectly in the repatriation of
nearly 16,000 Vietnamese citizens trapped in the Gulf region during
the crisis by contributing approximately $11 million to the
International Organization of Migration.
In addition, I am pleased to announce today that, in the
context of the Vessey Initiative, we will be making available
through the US Agency for International Development approximately
$1 million to address Vietnamese humanitarian needs in the areas
of prosthetics.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Vietnam is a country of some 70 million people with a
rich history and culture. It is a nation with which we are
profoundly connected by our historical experience and by more than
1 million Vietnamese residing in the United States. It is also a
country which--if it can escape the trap of its security burdens and
impediments to economic growth--could over time come to play an
increasingly significant role in Southeast Asia.
Our current efforts toward normalization reflect an interest
in putting US-Vietnamese relations on a new basis. As Secretary
Baker told Foreign Minister Thach last fall in New York, the United
States is prepared to turn a page in history. But the effort has to be
mutual. The "roadmap" proposal we have presented to Hanoi is a
good faith effort to establish step-by-step the trust and confidence
necessary to move beyond a difficult period of history and begin a
new era in US relations with Vietnam--and indeed, in our relations
with all three countries of Indochina. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: A Multi-faceted Approach to Non-proliferation
Clarke
Source: Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary for
Politico- Military Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Technology and
National Security of the Joint Economic Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Apr 23, 19914/23/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Country: Iraq, Australia
Subject: Arms Control, International Organizations
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, thank you for Inviting me to testify before this
committee. The proliferation of missiles and nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons is a significant threat to US national security
and to the vital interests of our friends and allies.
In recent years, five countries have been attacked by ballistic
missiles, three of them this year. The Iraqi "triple threat" in the
Gulf war--missiles, chemical and biological weapons, along with
Iraq's nuclear weapons potential--vividly underscores the need for
effective and urgent international cooperation to stem
proliferation.
In the last year, I believe we have turned the corner, and the
tide is now running against missile proliferation. As I will detail in
this statement, we have now:
-- Thwarted missile projects in several countries;
-- Put in effect the tightest export controls in the world on
missile proliferation-relevant technologies;
-- Greatly expanded the number of countries participating in
or adhering to international guidelines against missile-related
exports;
-- Moved to strengthen and institutionalize the international
missile export control regime;
-- Begun the process of placing US sanctions on those
engaged in missile proliferation; and
-- Reoriented our SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program
to address the missile proliferation threat through the GPALS
[Global Protection Against Limited Strikes] program.
On chemical and biological weapons, we have:
-- Implemented a major new initiative to strengthen US
chemical and biological weapons proliferation controls; and
-- Stimulated dramatic increases in chemical weapons
controls by other major supplier countries.
In the nuclear area, 26 members of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group met last month to strengthen nuclear export controls. We
hope that a multilateral export control arrangement on dual-use
items will be completed within a year's time.
Of necessity, we have a multi-faceted approach to non-
proliferation. This approach includes vigorous arms control
measures, encouraging regional confidence-building, export
controls, multilateral supplier group efforts, focused intervention
in specific cases, and sanctions.
Iraq
Let us begin with Iraq. As a result of the Gulf war, Iraq is subject
to extraordinary control measures to divest it of chemical and
biological weapons and missile capabilities and to prevent the
resurgence of such capabilities or development of a nuclear
weapons capability. In accordance with UN Security Council
Resolution 687, stringent cease-fire conditions are being imposed
on Iraq. These will include supervised destruction of Iraqi nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and missile capabilities, and long-
term monitoring of compliance. The US is deeply involved in the
effort to develop and implement this program. The United States
actively participates in the special commission charged with
overseeing compliance with the UN resolution. Inter-agency
working groups of the Non-Proliferation PPC [policy planning
committee], which I chair, have been formed to deal with specific
aspects of the issue, and a Special Commission Backstopping
Support Office to support UN Special Commission has been set up in
the Politico-Military Bureau of the Department of State. With
sustained international effort, we believe these cease-fire
conditions will deal effectively with the Iraqi non-conventional
threat.
Iraq is not, however, a typical case. What is possible and
appropriate there is not necessarily applicable elsewhere.
In other, less dramatic ways, our non-proliferation efforts
have progressed well in the months since we last appeared before
this subcommittee. There is, of course, still more to be done. We
are working in all areas to make non-proliferation policy work
better, and we welcome the ideas and suggestions of the Congress.
Limiting Missile Proliferation
Intense US non-proliferation efforts have thwarted missile
projects in several countries. Two special projects have yielded
striking results. The multi-national Condor missile program has
been of concern to the United States for some years. Our efforts to
attack this problem on several fronts have paid off. Through
coordinated use of intelligence and information-sharing political
demarches to several governments, vigorous pursuit of illegal US
exports, and visits to several involved countries, we have made
great progress toward assuring that Condor will not be a
proliferation threat in the future.
We also have been concerned about the presence of SS-23
missiles in Eastern and Central Europe and are pursuing their
disposition with the countries involved. We are finding that the
political changes in Eastern Europe and unification of Germany have
created a climate of increased candor in which we are able to
obtain information and cooperation from these governments. I
anticipate full success in our efforts to eliminate the SS-23
problem. But our success appears to go beyond the SS-23. The
former East Germans and at least two other countries have already
indicated a desire to eliminate their missiles.
US Missile Controls
The United States has imposed tight export controls on technology
relevant to missile proliferation. An important recent move was
the publication of a regulation to make US citizen assistance to
foreign missile projects subject to license, as well as knowing
export of any item to foreign missile projects of proliferation
concern. This will give us a strong hand in thwarting missile
proliferation.
We also have strengthened and institutionalized the
international missile control regime. The Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) has undergone dramatic growth, and the
partners have significantly strengthened its implementation.
Starting with only seven members in 1987, the regime has more
than doubled to a total of 16 members, including Spain, Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Australia,
and New Zealand. We have discussed membership with various other
countries. Several other countries are close to joining. In addition,
Sweden and Finland are in the process of implementing export
controls consistent with the MTCR guidelines. A number of other
countries have expressed interest in adopting the MTCR export
guidelines. Overall, size, effectiveness, stature, and influence have
all grown.
The partners are working hard to bring into the MTCR the
remaining European Community, NATO, and European Space Agency
countries.
At the most recent MTCR meeting, in Tokyo March 18-20,
[1991], the partners made significant progress toward adopting a
revised, updated annex of controlled technologies. We plan to add a
number of additional items usable in missile development and
clarify technical parameters for several other items. We expect to
finish this work at a technical group meeting in May and put the
revised annex into effect in all member countries by December.
They also agreed to consider other controls the United States has
imposed and further harmonization of controls and procedures.
These steps are designed to strengthen the MTCR by making its
implementation more uniform among partners, an objective that is
crucial to the regime's continued success.
I am pleased to inform you that the United States will host
the next partners' meeting in the fall. This will be a major event
for which we will be planning an active agenda.
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)
In his State of the Union address, President Bush announced the
reorientation of SDI toward Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes (GPALS). GPALS would be a missile defense system against
accidental, unauthorized, or limited ballistic missile launches,
whatever their source. The system would provide protection for the
United States, for our forces overseas, and for our friends and
allies.
As the Patriot's performance in the Middle East recently
proved, defenses against ballistic missile attacks--even if they are
not foolproof--can play a vital role in conflicts. Defenses against
ballistic missiles would become even more important if the number
of Third World countries with offensive missiles increases, and as
countries increase the range and improve the accuracy of these
missiles. GPALS will lessen the threat from Third World missile
proliferators.
The largest single Administration non-proliferation effort of
the last year has been the development of the Enhanced
Proliferation Controls Initiative (EPCI). This initiative
encompasses new US export controls as well as vigorous efforts to
get foreign countries to apply comparable controls. Well before the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Administration recognized the need for
tightened proliferation export controls on items that could
contribute to chemical and biological weapon or missile
proliferation. Before the invasion, the Administration had already
begun to consider the imposition of additional controls on Iraq. In
November l990, the President issued an Executive Order mandating a
licensing requirement for certain dual-use chemical and biological
weapons-related goods and technology, and requiring sanctions on
countries and companies involved in chemical and biological
weapons proliferation activities. After careful development
through the inter-agency process, new controls were announced by
the White House on December 13, and regulations to implement
EPCI were issued on March 13 of this year.
The March 13 EPCI regulations provide major new authority to
prevent US goods or services from aiding foreign proliferation
projects, wherever they might be.
-- We have expanded from 11 to 50 the number of chemical
weapons precursors controlled by the United States to all countries
except the 20 Australia Group of nations which cooperate against
chemical and biological weapons proliferation.
-- A license is required for the export of certain dual-use
chemical and biological weapons-related equipment to designated
destinations.
-- A license will be required for the export of whole
chemical plants making chemical weapons precursors, and designs
for such plants, outside the Australian Group.
-- EPCI will require a license when the supplier knows or is
informed by the US government that any export is destined for a
chemical and biological weapons or missile project.
-- Knowingly providing assistance by US persons to such
projects will also be subject to a license requirement.
-- All of these measures respond to real-world problems.
The[y] present an interlocking set of controls, which, working
together, we believe will effectively prevent US assistance to
proliferation activities. In developing these measures, we
consulted closely with US industry. They have been narrowed and
refined where possible, in an effort to minimize the burden on
legitimate trade.
While it is too early to assess the results of EPCI, we expect
it to be a highly useful new tool in our fight against proliferation.
Multilateral Efforts
We have been vigorously seeking to convince other countries to
adopt controls comparable to EPCI. Several have already done so.
We have pursued EPCI through existing multilateral mechanisms and
in our bilateral dealings.
The Australia Group, which consists of 20 countries concerned
about proliferation, has been making important strides. Last
December's meeting of the Australia Group was highly successful.
We presented the substance of EPCI at that time and urged the other
Australian Group members to adopt comparable controls.
Spurred on by the immediacy of the Gulf chemical and
biological weapons threat, Australian Group members announced
significant expansions of their controls. Eleven of the 20 members
now control exports of all 50 chemical weapons precursors. This is
a dramatic change. As recently as 1989, only two member countries
controlled all 50 chemicals. The remaining members expanded the
number of chemicals they control as well as said they would review
adopting controls on all 50. Several Australia Group partners also
announced other EPCI-like controls, including controls on whole
plants and chemical weapons equipment, curbs on citizen
proliferation activities, and end-user controls.
In the months since the last Australia Group meeting, several
countries have adopted additional chemical and biological weapons
non-proliferation measures. Germany has put additional curbs on
its citizens' activities and improved enforcement. France, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Switzerland have or are in the
process of imposing additional controls.
We look forward to additional progress at the upcoming
Australia Group meeting next month and are working actively with
our partners to promote agreement to further strengthen chemical
and biological weapons controls.
The Nuclear Suppliers' Group
Substantial progress also is being made in the nuclear weapons non-
proliferation area. An informal meeting took place last month in
the Netherlands of the 26 countries that have adhered to the nuclear
supplier guidelines. These guidelines are an agreed set of
principles and conditions that apply to transfers of nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology. This group of countries met
to review current supplier arrangements and the conditions of
supply and to consider some ways and means to strengthen them
with a view to reinforcing the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The participants at that meeting reconfirmed their strong
commitment to preventing nuclear weapon proliferation, which
represents one of the greatest threats to worldwide security and
stability facing the international community.
The participants at the meeting also recognized the growing
problem posed by the potential use of nuclear-related dual-use
materials, equipment, and technology in contributing to
unsafeguarded nuclear programs or to the development of nuclear
explosive devices. They agreed to establish a working group to
examine all possible arrangements that supplier countries could use
to control nuclear-related dual-use items. This working group will
begin its important work within a month, and we expect that
multilateral export control arrangement will be completed within a
year's time.
We continue to press for universal adherence to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and urge supplier states to require full
scope IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards as a
condition for nuclear supply.
There remain supplier countries outside the multilateral
groups whose cooperation we need if non-proliferation efforts are
to be fully successful. We have taken several steps to address this
problem.
First, we have encouraged some suppliers to join the
multilateral non-proliferation groups.
Second, in other cases, we have held bilateral discussions
with the aim of getting other nations to establish effective non-
proliferation export systems comparable to our own. For example,
Deputy Assistant Secretary [Elizabeth G.] Verville went to Eastern
Europe last summer for non-proliferation discussions. This was
followed by a seminar on export controls for the East European
countries held in London after the meeting of Australia Group
members last December. We will continue to assist in improving
the East European countries' export control systems, and we will be
offering further technical assistance to them.
We have continued our efforts with China and the Soviet Union.
In the May 1990 Washington joint statement on non-proliferation,
the Soviets agreed to support the objectives of the MTCR and to
work to stop proliferation, particularly in regions of tension such
as the Middle East. We are discussing with the Soviets and our
partners how to bring the Soviets more fully into the regime. We
also have pressed the Chinese hard on missile proliferation. They
have said they will "take into account relevant international
parameters" on missiles and not sell intermediate-range missiles
to the Middle East. We will expect actions consistent with these
statements and will continue to urge an explicit Chinese
commitment to observe the MTCR guidelines.
Our US government inter-agency interdiction groups for
chemical and biological weapons and missiles also have proven
effective. These groups seek to identify illicit proliferation-
related shipments and stop them through cooperation with foreign
governments. We have succeeded in a number of cases.
Sanctions
US laws and policy provide for the imposition of specific sanctions
in response to certain nuclear weapons proliferation actions.
Sanctions against countries and persons involved in certain
chemical and biological weapons or missile-related activities have
recently been added to our arsenal against proliferation. Executive
Order 12735 of November 16, 1990, provides for imposition of
penalties on foreign countries and foreign persons. The missile
sanctions provisions of the 1990 National Defense Authorization
Act provides similar authority for missiles. We hope the sanctions
provisions will prove a deterrent [to] illicit activities, inducing
restraint both by governments and companies.
An inter-agency chemical and biological weapons sanctions
working group has been established to evaluate intelligence and
identify potentially sanctionable chemical and biological weapons
activity after November 16, 1990, the effective date of the
Executive Order.
The Missile Trade Analysis Group, an inter-agency group, was
assigned the responsibility of identifying potentially sanctionable
missile activities of US and foreign firms. Both groups have met
and vetted the large amount of possibly relevant information on
sanctionable activities but have not as yet made any sanctions
determinations, in part, because the executive order and law are
prospective in character, targeting activities starting in November
1990, and good evidence to confirm such activities takes some time
to develop. We are reviewing several potential sanctions cases. As
you well understand, these cases involve sensitive issues--
including intelligence considerations --such preclude my going into
detail here.
Other Arms Control Efforts
I will mention only in passing that the United States is making
vigorous negotiating efforts in the area of chemical weapons and
biological weapons, as part of a longer term effort to ban chemical
weapons and make the prohibition on biological weapons more
effective. We are working to complete the final details of a
protocol to our bilateral chemical weapons destruction and non-
production agreement with the Soviet Union. In the Conference on
Disarmament, we are intensifying work on a comprehensive global
ban on chemical weapons, which is the best long-term solution to
chemical weapons proliferation. The President has made early
conclusion of the global chemical weapons ban a high foreign policy
priority. We also are developing a series of proposals to ensure
that the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in
September will result in measures to strengthen the convention.
Coordinating Committee For Multilateral Security Export
Control (COCOM) and Proliferation
At the June 1990 high-level meeting of COCOM , all partners agreed
that reductions or changes in COCOM controls on advanced
technology should not, in turn, allow further proliferation of non-
conventional weapons or otherwise damage our security. Each
partner nation agreed that national controls--consistent with
multilateral proliferation arrangements--would be applied to goods
and technologies released from COCOM control but still of
proliferation concern.
Looking to the Future
We have made significant strides in our non-proliferation policy and
have an active agenda to build on them. I would highlight the
following plans:
-- We will continue to negotiate a chemical weapons
convention as one facet of the solution to the problem of chemical
weapons proliferation.
-- Strengthening existing non-proliferation mechanisms must
be a primary focus. We are pressing for greater uniformity and
harmonization of controls. This could extend to licensing
procedures, control lists, enforcement procedures, and the like. We
also are expanding Australia Group activities, including creation of
working groups and more frequent meetings.
-- We need to bring along other major suppliers, whether
inside or outside the non-proliferation groups. This includes major
countries such as Brazil, Argentina, China, and India. We have made
progress, but there is much to be done. We will continue our efforts
to this end.
Proposals for new international non-proliferation mechanisms
are proliferating. Several of our allies have advanced skeletal ideas
along these lines. We expect to discuss these when the concepts
have been better fleshed out. We will be pleased to consider any
idea with real promise of improving non-proliferation performance.
In theory, a new mechanism connecting the separate, nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons, and missile non-proliferation
groups could facilitate easier international coordination cutting
across these different areas.
However, the existing organizations work, and their
performance is steadily improving. They contain different members
because there are varying suppliers of different items. The several
regimes target different projects or countries of concern for
different purposes, and their methods are tailored to their
particular subject matter. We do not need another bureaucratic
layer without compelling justification.
Likewise, you can expect us to be very cautious about diluting
the effectiveness of COCOM by proposing the addition of
proliferation issues to its responsibilities. On the one hand, COCOM
has, in the past, supported our proliferation objectives by working
to strengthen Western export control systems and, when necessary,
agreeing to place on its control lists certain items of proliferation
concern. On the other, encouraging countries--in many cases
friendly, non-aligned countries--not to develop weapons of mass
destruction is a somewhat different task than controlling the sale
of strategic goods and technology to countries posing a potential
military threat to members of COCOM. Proliferation issues often
require the cooperation of COCOM-proscribed destinations (e.g., the
Soviet Union), utilize scientific and technical cooperation in
addition to export controls, and often involve lower levels of
technology available from countries outside of COCOM. We must be
careful that any proposed changes in existing regimes complement
rather than detract from our overall policy objectives.
Other proposals have focused on improving US procedures for
handling proliferation-related export controls. Several things have
recently been done. In December 1990, the President directed new
procedures to avoid needless delay and inadequate consideration of
all facets of a proposed export. The new guidance provides for
explicit timetables for review of
export applications at the sub-Cabinet and Cabinet levels. The
establishment of the Center for Defense Trade at the State
Department has streamlined the handling of cases subject to State
Department administered licensing of defense goods and services.
We have worked hard to make our non-proliferation policy a
success. We have made considerable headway in what is an
inherently difficult area. There are frequently competing and
legitimate interests at play--national security, foreign policy, and
export promotion. The result is a balancing act. The Gulf war has
given a real stimulus to our non-proliferation efforts nationally and
internationally. We intend to capitalize on it fully. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: US Canada-Jpan High Seas Driftnet Fishing
Tutwiler
Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Washington, DC
Date: May 1, 19915/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, North America
Country: United States, Japan
Subject: International Law, Resource Management
[TEXT]
The United States, Japan, and Canada have reached agreement on
scientific monitoring and enforcement programs for Japan's high
seas driftnet fisheries for the upcoming fishing season, which
begins in June 1991. An exchange of letters to conclude the
agreement was signed today; representatives of the Department of
State's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs and the National Marine Fisheries Service signed
on behalf of the United States. The trilateral accord extends and
improves upon monitoring and enforcement programs originally
agreed to in 1989 for Japan's driftnet fishery in the North Pacific
Ocean.
The agreement is consistent with the provisions of the 1989
UN General Assembly resolution on large-scale pelagic driftnet
fishing. The resolution recommends that, in contemplation of a
moratorium on all large-scale high seas pelagic driftnet fisheries
after June 30, 1992, nations involved in driftnet fishing cooperate
with coastal states in the collection and sharing of statistically
sound scientific data on driftnet fishing's effects.
The understandings reached are aimed at producing
statistically reliable estimates of the numbers of fish, marine
mammals, turtles, and sea birds killed by driftnet fishing
activities. They also include significant provisions designed, among
other things, to minimize the bycatch of US origin salmon and
steelhead trout.
1991-92 Scientific Monitoring Program
Under the terms of the agreement, 30 US, 21 Japanese, and 10
Canadian scientific observers will be deployed on 61 Japanese
small-mesh squid driftnet vessels to monitor over 2,500 driftnet
retrievals during the 1991 fishing season. The observers will be
deployed to reflect the typical monthly pattern of 1990 fishing
effort and will be assigned to vessel types (large and small) in
proportion to the 1990 fishing effort by each vessel type: 45 on
large-type vessels (those over 100 tons) and 16 on small-type
vessels (those under 100 tons).
It has been possible to reduce the number of observers by 13
from last year through an observer program designed to provide
bycatch estimates within plus or minus 10% tolerable error at a
confidence interval of 90% based on 1990 fishing effort. The
progress of the squid driftnet fishery scientific monitoring program
will be evaluated during the course of the season and adjusted as
necessary. The parties will exchange on a weekly basis the number
of observations by each deployed observer in order to check the
cumulative total number of observations and adjust the coverage as
needed.
The number of observers placed on the Japanese large-mesh
driftnet fleet will be determined by September 30, 1991, after data
collected from the 1990-91 program are available. The required
number of observations in 1991-92 will be calculated based on
those data.
Japan will provide total fishing catch and effort data on the
small-mesh driftnet fishery by April 1, 1992,
2 months earlier than specified in the 1990 program. Agreement
was also reached to move the date for the final report of the
results of the 1991 observer program up by 1 month to May 1, 1992,
as compared to last year's agreement.
1991-92 Enforcement Program
The enforcement program is scheduled to run through June 30, 1992.
Japan agreed to review its regulatory measures regarding the
illegal reflagging of Japanese driftnet vessels and, if necessary, is
to reinforce penalties to deter any reflagging schemes.
Japan also agreed to place satellite transmitters on all
Japanese driftnet fishing vessels operating beyond its 200 nautical
mile zone in 1991. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: Sea Turtle Conservation In Commercial Fisheries
Tutwiler
Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description: Washington, DC
Date: May 1, 19915/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean, South America, Central America
Country: Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
French Guiana, Guatemala, Guyana, Mexico, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago,
Venezuela
Subject: Environment, Resource Management,
Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
The Department of State certified yesterday that 13 countries in
the wider Caribbean region have taken initial steps to protect sea
turtles from capture and drowning in their shrimp fishing
operations. The Department's certification is required under a 1989
law (Section 609 of P.L. 101-162) that would ban the import of
shrimp from any country not taking adequate measures to conserve
sea turtles in commercial shrimp fisheries. The certification by
the Department is valid for one year, which will allow countries to
further develop and implement their respective programs. Because
a certification could not be made for Suriname, shrimp imports
from that country are prohibited as of May 1, 1991.
US Law and Policy
Sea turtles and shrimp share similar habitats in tropical and sub-
tropical waters and, as a result, the air breathing turtles are often
caught in shrimp nets and drown. This incidental drowning has been
identified as the principal threat to the survival of sea turtles in
US waters. To protect turtles, US shrimpers are required to use a
piece of equipment in their nets called the turtle excluder device
(or TED). These devices have been shown to be effective in allowing
more than 97 percent of all turtles that enter shrimp nets to escape
unharmed.
The 1989 law is intended to extend the protection given to sea
turtles under the US regulations to other areas these turtles inhabit
throughout the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, and western central
Atlantic (the wider Caribbean). The countries affected by the law
are Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, French Guiana, Guatemala,
Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Suriname, Trinidad
and Tobago, and Venezuela. The law provides that, to continue
exporting shrimp to the United States beyond May 1, 1991, a country
must receive a certification that it has met specific conservation
requirements.
In order to receive a certification, a country must either
provide evidence of the adoption of a regulatory program
comparable to the US program or provide evidence that the fishing
environment in its waters does not pose a threat to sea turtles.
Because the use of the TED is the centerpiece of the US regulatory
program, its use will eventually be the principal feature of any
foreign program determined to be comparable to the US program. By
the time the phased-in implementation of the foreign programs is
completed in May 1994, the nations affected by this law must
require the use of TEDs on all shrimp vessels operating in areas
where there is a chance of taking sea turtles or their exports of
shrimp to the United States will be embargoed.
International Discussions
Beginning in January 1990, officials of the Departments of State
and Commerce began discussions with the affected countries to
make each of them aware of the importance of taking the necessary
measures to protect sea turtles. Thirteen of the countries affected
by the law have indicated their intention to address the problem of
incidental drowning and to develop programs comparable to the US
program. Suriname did not provide the information necessary to
receive a certification and, as a result, shrimp imports from
Suriname to the United States are prohibited effective May 1, 1991.
In addition to issuing the certifications for countries with
commercial shrimp fisheries in the wider Caribbean, the State
Department emphasized its interest in and commitment to seeing
equivalent measures to protect sea turtles implemented on the
Pacific coast of North, Central, and South America, and in other
areas where sea turtles are taken incidental to commercial shrimp
fishing operations. In this regard, the Department specifically
recognized the efforts of Mexico, Colombia, and Nicaragua, each of
which has indicated that its sea turtle protection program in the
commercial shrimp fishery will apply equally to the Atlantic (Gulf
of Mexico and Caribbean) and Pacific coasts.
The Department has made clear that it is committed to
promoting such efforts and is prepared to strengthen its own
efforts to encourage actions by countries in the Pacific region and
throughout the world to develop and implement equivalent programs
to those required in the wider Caribbean. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991
Title: 1990 Patterns of Global Terrorism
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan 30, 19901/30/90
Category: Reports
Country: Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, South Korea, Syria
Subject: Terrorism
[TEXT]
Excerpts from the "1990 Patterns of Global Terrorism" report.
Copies of this report are available from the Office of Counter-
Terrorism (S/CT), Room 2507, Department of State, Washington, DC,
20520.
Introduction
The continuing decline in the number of international terrorist
incidents during 1990 is encouraging. From a peak of 856 in 1988,
the number of incidents decreased to 455 in 1990. Even more
encouraging is the increasing counter-terrorist cooperation among
governments and our numerous successes in bringing the rule of law
to bear on terrorists.
As part of our overall counter-terrorist strategy, the United
States works with other governments to identify, apprehend, and
prosecute terrorists. Many terrorist trials were successfully
completed in 1990, and many more cases are still in progress.
Through training provided under the Department of State's
Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance Program, we have improved the
ability of other governments to pre-empt, or to investigate and
prosecute, terrorist attacks. The program has been extremely
successful, and in 1990 for the first time law enforcement
officials from the newly democratic East European states
participated.
Another important element of our counter-terrorist effort,
the Rewards for Terrorism Information Program, received a
significant boost in 1990. This program provides rewards for
information that leads to the "prevention, frustration, or favorable
resolution of terrorist acts against US persons or properties
overseas." Late in 1989, Congress increased the ceiling for an
individual reward to $2 million. Rewards of more than $500,000
have been paid under this program. In 1990, the Air Transport
Association (ATA) and the Air Line Pilots' Association (ALPA)
matched the reward ceiling with $2 million to create a potential $4
million reward for information about attacks on civil aviation.
De