US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991

Title:

North American Free Trade Agreement

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Letter to Congress; Washington, DC Date: May 1, 19915/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States, Mexico, Canada Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade [TEXT] Following is the text of identical letters to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Dan Rostenkowski, and House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt. A similar letter was sent to every Member of Congress. Dear Mr. Chairman: Through the better part of this century, successive Congresses and Administrations--Republican and Democratic--have worked to open markets and expand American exports. This partnership has resulted in unparalleled growth in world trade and huge economic benefits for the United States. Opening foreign markets means economic growth and jobs for all Americans. Historically, the fast-track procedures established by the Congress have served us well. On March 1, I requested an extension of fast track so that we could continue to realize increased economic growth and the other benefits of expanded trade. The fast track in no way limits the ability of Congress to review any agreement negotiated, including the Uruguay Round or a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). If Congress is not satisfied, it retains the unqualified right to reject whatever is negotiated. But refusing to extend the fast track would end negotiations before they have even begun and relinquish a critical opportunity for future economic growth. Initiatives to open markets will enhance the global competitiveness of the United States and create new opportunities for American workers, American exports, and American economic growth. The Uruguay Round offers a vital opportunity to eliminate barriers to our goods, investment, services, and ideas. A NAFTA offers an historic opportunity to bring together the energies and talents of three great nations, already bound by strong ties of family, business, and culture. Prime Minister Mulroney and President Salinas are both leaders of great vision. They believe, as do I, that a NAFTA would enhance the well-being of our peoples. They are ready to move forward with us in this unprecedented enterprise. In seeking to expand our economic growth, I am committed to achieving a balance that recognizes the need to preserve the environment, protect worker safety, and facilitate adjustment. In your letter of March 7, you conveyed a number of important Congressional concerns about free trade with Mexico. At my direction, Ambassador Hills and my Economic Policy Council have undertaken an intensive review of our NAFTA objectives and strategy to ensure thorough consideration of the economic, labor, and environmental issues raised by you and your colleagues. The Administration's response is presented in the attached report. Let me emphasize the following: First, you have my personal commitment to close bipartisan cooperation in the negotiations and beyond. And you have my personal assurance that we will take the time necessary to conclude agreements in which both the Congress and the Administration can take pride. Second, while economic studies show that a free trade agreement would create jobs and promote growth in the United States, I know there is concern about adjustment in some sectors. These concerns will be addressed through provisions in the NAFTA designed to ease the transition for import-sensitive industries. In addition, my Administration is committed to working with the Congress to ensure that there is adequate assistance and effective retraining for dislocated workers. Third, based on my discussions with President Salinas, I am convinced that he is firmly committed to strengthened environmental protection, and that there is strong support for this objective among the Mexican people. Because economic growth can and should be supported by enhanced environmental protection, we will develop and implement an expanded program of environmental cooperation in parallel with the free trade talks. Fourth, President Salinas has also made it clear to me that his objective in pursuing free trade is to better the lives of Mexican working people. Mexico has strong laws regulating labor standards and worker rights. Beyond what Mexico is already doing, we work through new initiatives to expand US-Mexico labor cooperation. Thus, our efforts toward economic integration will be complemented by expanded programs of cooperation on labor and the environment. The catalyst for these efforts is the promise of economic growth that a NAFTA can provide, and the key to these efforts is the extension of unencumbered fast-track procedures. There are great challenges ahead. The world is changing dramatically, as nations more toward democracy and free markets. The United States must continue to open new markets and lead in technological innovation, confident that America can and will prevail in this new and emerging world. By working together, we can negotiate good trade agreements that assure a strong and healthy America as we prepare to meet the challenges of the next century. Sincerely, George Bush
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

Negotiating a North American Free Trade Agreement: Executive Summary

Description: Washington, DC Date: May 1, 19915/1/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: North America Country: United States, Mexico, Canada Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade [TEXT] Summary of report entitled Response to Issues Raised in Connection With the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement. Copies of the complete report may be obtained from the Office of the US Trade Representative, (202) 395-3230. In letters to the President from Chairmen Bentsen and Rostenkowski, and from Majority Leader Gephardt, the Administration has been asked to address a variety of economic, labor, and environmental concerns that have been raised about the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Administration's response sets forth detailed action plans for addressing these concerns, as well as views on the economic impact of a NAFTA.
The Positive Economic Impact of a NAFTA
-- From 1986 to 1990, as Mexico reduced import barriers, our exports more than doubled from $12.4 billion to $28.4 billion generating 264,000 additional US jobs. -- Under a NAFTA, we can do even better. Mexico still has higher trade barriers than the United States. Mexico's average duty is 10% compared to 4% in the United States. Significant non-tariff barriers remain. We, therefore, have much to gain from the elimination of these barriers. -- All three major economic analyses done to date corroborate that the United States will benefit from a NAFTA in exports, output, and employment. -- We will benefit from Mexican growth: for each dollar Mexico spends on imports, 70 cents is spent on US goods; for each dollar of gross national product growth, 15 cents is spent on US goods. -- Further, the resulting economic integration will strengthen the ability of the United States to compete with Japan and the European Community.
Adjustment Provisions We Will Seek in the NAFTA
-- Transition Measures. In order to avoid dislocations to industries and workers producing goods that are import-sensitive, tariffs and non-tariff barriers on such products should be eliminated in small increments over a time period sufficient to ensure orderly adjustment. --In determining import sensitivity, we will rely heavily on advice of the International Trade Commission, the Congress, and the private sector. --We will be prepared to consider transition periods beyond those in the US-Canada FTA [Free Trade Agreement]. -- Effective Safeguard Provisions. Even where reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers are staged over a lengthy period, there may be isolated cases in which injurious increases in imports could occur. To prevent injury from such increases, we will seek to include in the agreement a procedure allowing temporary reimposition of duties and other restrictions. --This mechanism should be designed to respond quickly, especially in cases of sudden import increases. --Special "snap-back" provisions should be included to address the unique problems faced by producers of perishable products. -- Strict Rules of Origin. We will negotiate rules of origin to ensure that the benefits of a NAFTA do not flow to mere pass- through operations exporting third-country products to the United States with only minimal assembly in Mexico. --Rules of origin will impose clear, tough, and predictable standards to the benefit of North American products. --We will seek to strengthen the required North American content for assembled automotive products. --We will consult closely with the private sector and the Congress in designing these rules.
Domestic Worker Adjustment Program
-- Since trade barriers on sensitive products should be decreased over a long timeframe, we do not expect immediate or substantial job dislocations. -- Nevertheless, beyond including adjustment provisions in the NAFTA itself, there is a need to assist dislocated workers who may have adjustment difficulties. -- The Administration is committed to working with Congress to ensure a worker adjustment program that is adequately funded and that provides effective services to workers who may lose their jobs as a result of an agreement with Mexico. -- Whether provided through the improvement or expansion of an existing program or through the creation of a new program, worker adjustment measures should be targeted to provide dislocated workers with comprehensive services in a timely fashion.
Labor Issues
-- Labor Mobility. We have agreed with Mexico that labor mobility and our immigration laws are not on the table in NAFTA talks, with the possible exception of a narrow provision facilitating temporary entry of certain professionals and managers. -- Worker Rights and Labor Standards. Protections afforded by Mexican labor law and practice are stronger than generally known. -- Mexico's laws provide comprehensive rights and standards for workers in all sectors, including the maquiladoras. --Mexico has ratified 73 International Labor Organization conventions on worker rights, including those on occupational safety and health. --Mexico has a minimum working age of 14 and mandates special protections and shorter working hours for those between the ages of 14 and 16. -- A substantially higher proportion of the Mexican work force is unionized than is the US work force. -- While enforcement problems have resulted largely from a lack of resources, a NAFTA would both raise living standards and create resources for enforcing existing laws.
Future US-Mexico Cooperation on Labor Matters
-- Memorandum of Understanding. The Secretary of Labor and her counterpart from Mexico are prepared to sign a Memorandum of Understanding providing for cooperation and joint action on a number of labor issues which could be implemented in parallel with our FTA negotiations. --These include health and safety measures; work conditions, including labor standards and enforcement; labor conflicts; labor statistics; and other areas of concern to the United States and Mexico. -- Specific Projects. US and Mexican officials have agreed on joint projects to address specific concerns in the labor sector. --Initial projects include occupational health and safety, child labor, and labor statistics.
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Mexico's Commitment to Environmental Protection
-- Mexico has no interest in becoming a pollution haven for US companies. -- Mexico's comprehensive environmental law of 1988, which is based on US law and experience, is a solid foundation for tackling its environmental problems. -- All new investments are being held to these higher legal standards, and an environmental impact assessment is required to show how they will comply. -- Enforcement has, in the past, been a key problem, but Mexico's record has been improving dramatically. Since 1989, Mexico has ordered more than 980 temporary and 82 permanent shutdowns of industrial facilities for environmental violations; the budget of SEDUE (Mexico's EPA) has increased almost eightfold.
Environmental Issues in the NAFTA
-- Protection of Health and Safety. We will ensure that our right to safeguard the environment is preserved in the NAFTA. --We will maintain the right to exclude any products that do not meet our health or safety requirements, and we will continue to enforce those requirements. --We will maintain our right to impose stringent pesticide, energy conservation, toxic waste, and health and safety standards. --We will maintain our rights, consistent with other international obligations, to limit trade in products controlled by international treaties (such as treaties on endangered species or protection of the ozone layer). -- Enhancement and Enforcement of Standards. We will seek a commitment to work together with Mexico to enhance environmental, health, and safety standards regarding products, and to promote their enforcement. --We will provide for full public and scientific scrutiny of any changes to standards before they are implemented. --We will provide for consultations on enhancing enforcement capability, inspection training, monitoring, and verification.
Joint Environmental Initiatives
-- In parallel to the FTA negotiations, we intend to pursue an ambitious program of cooperation on a wide range of environmental matters. -- We will design and implement an integrated border environmental plan to address air and water pollution, hazardous wastes, chemical spills, pesticides, and enforcement. -- During the design phase of the border plan, there will be an opportunity for public comment and hearings; during implementation, there will be periodic comprehensive reviews. -- We will consult on national environmental standards and regulations and will provide an opportunity for the public to submit data on alleged noncompliance. -- We will discuss expanded cooperative enforcement activities, such as coordinated targeting of environmental violators. -- We will establish a program of technical cooperation and training, which will include facilitating sharing of technology for pollution abatement. Informed Policy-making and Public Participation -- We will broaden public participation in the formulation and implementation of trade policy to ensure that efforts to liberalize trade are consistent with sound environmental practices. -- We will appoint individuals to selected trade policy advisory committees who can contribute both an environmental perspective and substantive expertise. -- In consultation with interested members of the public, we will complete a review of US-Mexico environmental issues, with particular emphasis on possible environmental effects of the NAFTA, to enable US officials to consider the results during FTA negotiations and other bilateral efforts.
Fast-Track Authority Crucial To Free Trade
Excerpts from the President's remarks to the Society of Business Editors and Writers, Washington, DC, May 1, 1991. In recent years, trade has kept our economy growing. Export business accounted for 84% of our economic growth last year. That's nothing new. Merchandise exports have risen 73% in the last 4 years--more than twice the rate of import growth. Recent, unparalleled growth in world trade has produced huge benefits for us. Our free trade agreement (FTA) with Canada has opened up previously closed agricultural markets. I wanted to check my figures on the helicopter coming back from Maryland this morning, just now. I called our Secretary of Agriculture, and he told me that our agricultural exports to Canada increased 35% over the last 2 years because of this agreement. And we expect the growth to intensify as the agreement takes full effect. You go back and look at the legislative history--or the free trade agreement history--and you'll find many who were predicting a far gloomier outlook. Our trade strategy is simple: We want to build on the success of the Canadian FTA. The United States will continue to lead the world toward a system of free trade and open markets. That system makes American genius available to the whole world and gives Americans access to the good ideas and good products from abroad. Trade means economic growth. Trade means jobs for all Americans. That's why extension of our fast-track procedures in these trade negotiations is absolutely critical. Fast track lets us open up new markets and new opportunities. Fast track really is another term for "good faith." It means that we will consult closely with the Congress. Congress has some constitutional responsibilities here. We have been--and we will consult closely with Congress and also the private sector during these trade talks. It means that we will not tinker with trade agreements worked out by our negotiators and their foreign counterparts. It gives the American people a fair say. We will take all the time necessary to address the issues that concern Americans. And there are some issues that concern Americans, and we have to have good answers for those questions, and I believe we do. Fast track lets us treat our foreign counterparts fairly. It promises that we will not attach amendments or make changes, since to do so could force negotiators to call off talks or start again from square one. Our trading partners consider fast track an essential ingredient for successful trade talks. We've had fast-track authority since 1974, and we will need it--and we need to keep it if we hope to pursue these vital trade agreements--the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and, of course, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Without fast track, very candidly, we jeopardize those agreements. And we jeopardize trade. And we jeopardize American jobs. Right now, we have the chance to look forward, to expand economic growth, to expand opportunity from the Yukon to the Yucatan. The North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada, our largest trading partner, would create the largest, richest market in the entire world. Think about it--360 million consumers and $6 trillion in annual output. A unified North American market would let each of our countries build on our strengths. It would provide more and better jobs for US workers. It would stimulate price competition, lower consumer prices, improve product quality. The agreement would make necessities such as food and clothing more affordable and more available to our poorest citizens. It would raise productivity and produce a higher standard of living throughout the world. And the resulting economic integration will strengthen American businesses in the global marketplace. Let me just try to illustrate the stakes that are involved in the fast-track debate by discussing the Mexican component of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Trade with Mexico has helped both our countries. Just 4 years ago, we had a $4.9 billion trade debt--deficit--with Mexico. And, since then, Mexico's President Carlos Salinas has slashed tariff rates. He came in determined to shake things up in Mexico, and he's done a great job at that. He slashed the tariff rates. Our exports to Mexico have increased nearly 130% to $28 billion, and our trade deficit has shrunk two-thirds to $1.8 billion. This export boom has created an estimated 264,000 new jobs in the United States. And each additional billion dollars in exports creates nearly 20,000 new jobs here in the United States. And, meanwhile, the trade boom has offered new opportunities for Mexican workers. It's offered prosperity to those who before had lived in squalor. Some people are concerned about these negotiations with Mexico. And just this morning--in the spirit of working closely with Congress, which I am determined to continue--we sent a detailed report to Chairman Lloyd Bentsen of the Senate Finance Committee; to Congressman Dan Rostenkowski, the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee; and to Majority Leader Richard Gephardt, who, incidentally, has just come back from Mexico. And I believe that this letter and our report responded to the concerns-- the understandable concerns that they have raised. I gave them my personal commitment to close bipartisan cooperation in the negotiations. While economic studies show that a free trade agreement would produce jobs in the United States as well as greater exports and output, I know that there's a concern--not just on Capitol Hill but in many of the labor halls around this country--about job loss. And our negotiators will address these concerns in provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement. We will ensure an adequate transition period for workers in import-sensitive industries. We will work with Congress to see that dislocated workers receive proper assistance and retraining. I believe we have the answers to the questions that are being raised by the labor unions and by some on Capitol Hill. At the same time, it is worth noting that the agreement will create high-wage, high-skill manufacturing jobs in the machinery, computer, telecommunications, and electronic industries. As Mexico develops further, it will need even more of these high-tech goods and services. Those goods and services are more likely to come from the United States than from anyone else in the world. And, secondly, President Salinas and the Mexican people have no interest in allowing their country to become a pollution haven for US companies. Because economic growth goes hand-in-hand with environmental protection, we will expand environmental cooperation programs parallel to the free trade talks. I can assure cooperation programs parallel to the free trade talks. I can assure you, having dealt with him and talked to him quite recently in Houston, Texas, on this very problem, that President Salinas is deeply concerned about the problems facing the environment. He has already ordered shut down the major polluting refinery, the PEMEX [Mexican state-owned oil company] refinery, in Mexico. And that is strong evidence of his good faith, because he had to take on some very powerful people to make that happen. I will share with you a story that maybe some of you heard me refer to before, but it made a real impact on me when we were talking about the environment. And he says that when the school children around Mexico City, where they have that high smog content--when the school children paint the sky, they don't show the stars. They paint it gray or black. And they can't see the stars. And he said, my ambition is that these young children in Mexico will paint in the stars. And I think that says, as emotionally as I could possibly say it, something about this man's commitment to doing something about the environment. And so we are concerned, but we believe that the environmental cooperation programs that we have in mind, and that we've discussed with him, can satisfy anybody who's reasonable on this question. And, finally, President Salinas has also made it clear that this agreement will improve opportunities for Mexican working people. Mexico has strong laws regulating labor standards and workers' rights. Beyond those, we will also begin new initiatives to expand labor cooperation between our two countries. None of these things will happen, though--none of this can happen--if we cannot bargain in good faith. If the fast-track procedures that we have employed for 17 years--Republican and Democrat administrations alike--suddenly are withdrawn or weakened, the United States must continue to open new markets, create new technologies, and seize new opportunities before us. I am confident, and so are the American people, that we can and will prevail in this exciting and challenging world. And I am confident that as we head into the next century--the next American century-- a strong and healthy America will lead the way . .(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

Free Trade Agreement and Fast Track: A Boon to Agriculture

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from the President's remarks to the Society of Business Editors and Writers, Washington, DC Date: May 1, 19915/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States, Canada, Mexico Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade [TEXT] We are the most agriculturally productive nation the world has ever known. And I want to be sure that we continue to be that. I'm still convinced that we can compete with anybody, provided we remove some of the barriers to trade. And that's one of the reasons that the Secretary and I are as committed that a Mexico free trade agreement would be in our own best interests. As a matter of fact, we've got a new one with Canada. It's been in effect for 2 years, and agricultural exports have gone up by 35%. So those that want to criticize ought to take a look at the reality, and I think then they'd understand why we are committed-- because we think it's good for American agriculture as well as good for--I think it's good for jobs, too. Just across the labor frontier there. There are three important trade agreements. You're all familiar with them. The Uruguay Round--the GATT talks, the trade component of our Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which is, I think, a bold, new program that must succeed in terms of helping these democracies--fledgling democracies, many of them--in South America and thus building new markets for our own goods. But in any event, that's the second one. And then the third one, of course, is the North American Free Trade Agreement that I mentioned earlier that features--in this instance--features Mexico. Now, there are some questions about whether this would be of benefit--these would be of benefit to the American farmers. Let me just give you a couple--click off a couple of little numbers here. Free trade in North America would give our farmers a freely accessible market of 360 million people with a GNP of $6 trillion. And that's a market that's larger than the European Community. And, likewise, the negotiation of a successful GATT agreement would decrease the trade barriers worldwide, offering potentially unlimited export opportunities. We're not there yet. We've had some difficulties getting our friends in Europe--and they are friends--to understand this. But the Secretary and I and our US Trade Representative, Ambassador Carla Hills, and the Secretary of Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce--all of us are working on this important agreement. But we think that it would be a boon to American agriculture when we're successful. The success, obviously, hinges on what you know and I know as fast-track negotiating authority. It is simply not right to--you can't negotiate an agreement if the people you're negotiating with think that it will be amended in many, many ways. The Congress will, though--there's a misunderstanding because some think that when we ask for fast track that we're asking Congress to yield their right to vote on it. And that simply isn't--I found that hard to believe, but I think there's been some confusion on that. We are going to--they obviously would vote up and down. And if they didn't like it, they'd vote for it. But you can't have 25,000 amendments to an agreement and expect your trading partners to negotiate seriously. So the Congress--and I'm very respectful of Congress' role in this. They have a constitutional role on international trade, and some forget that. So we're sensitive to that role. We've had extensive consultations. I don't believe I've seen an initiative that's had more consultation with Congress than this one. And I think we're going to be all right on it, but we're going to continue to work very hard to get fast- track approval. New applications for agricultural products like the alternative fuels, fuels blended with ethanol and biodegradable plastics, and some not so modern uses like food and clothing provide farmers with exciting opportunities. I understand that there's some differences in the agricultural community. I was just talking to the Secretary about this. But, generally speaking, we're committed to alternative fuels, and I believe that we're--I believe that the Clean Air Act alone is going to create tremendous opportunities for alternative fuel. So I haven't lost my enthusiasm for this at all. The fast track assures our trading partners that we will go through with our agreement. We will vote on what they and we negotiate, and I mentioned that point earlier. New applications for agricultural products is important. And we're talking about some fuels blended with ethanol and biodegradable plastics. And all of these kinds of things, I think, have a brilliant future for agriculture. It's been a little slower than I had hoped, frankly, but I think there's a big market and big future out there. And so I would say to farmers, do not despair because you haven't yet reached the full benefit from--the full potential of these new markets for your products. I'm going to be asking agriculture over and over again for support on this fast-track extension, and I think that the bottom line is they will enjoy more export opportunity if we're successful here. And I think it will be a boon for the rural economy as well as- -well, obviously it would if we continue to sell more abroad. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

NAFTA: A Critical Priority

McAllister Source: Eugene J. McAllister, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs Description: Address before the Caribbean/Latin American Action Conference on Mexico, San Antonio, Texas Date: Apr 11, 19914/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States, Mexico, Canada Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics, Environment [TEXT] I am delighted to be here in San Antonio for the conference on Mexico sponsored by Caribbean/Latin American Action. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as the President has been saying, is a critical priority for the Administration, a priority that many of you share. Let me begin with three observations: -- Quietly, in an event perhaps overlooked, the United States is now a trading nation or, more accurately, an exporting nation. US exports to Japan have increased 73% over the past 3 years, an average 20% annually. The increase in US exports to Europe in the past 4 years exceeds our total exports to Japan. During 1989-90, exports growth accounted for 88% of US GNP growth. -- We Americans want to shape our future; we want to control our destiny. As a trading nation, our future is broad, ranging from soybeans to semiconductors from Krakow to Cairo. But it is indisputable that the two countries most critical to our future are Mexico and Canada. Simple common sense dictates that we shape our future best by working with Canada and Mexico to create new and greater economic opportunities. -- There is a revolution taking place in economics around the world--it started in Asia, has taken root in Mexico, and is struggling in Eastern Europe. It is vital to the United States that these nations succeed. As they become more market oriented, more outward looking, we become partners in trade and investment and perhaps other endeavors. The vision of economic ties leading to and strengthening political freedoms has guided US policies since the Second World War. As our vision of the world comes within grasp, we must reach out.
The United States--A Trading Nation
Let me elaborate on these observations. It may seem a bit peculiar to be proclaiming the United States now to be a trading nation. After all, we have always exported and imported raw materials and finished goods. And in the early days of the republic, we imported far more finished goods than we produced ourselves. But, in my view, there has been a qualitative change in the United States over the past few years--a qualitative change that is only beginning to become apparent quantitatively--in the dollar value of the goods and services we export. This change marks a new era, a step into the future. In late 1989, as the Berlin Wall came down, a debate was beginning: "Would the United States turn inward, revert to an isolationist inclination?" The events in the Persian Gulf have answered that question authoritatively. But even without the invasion of Kuwait, I believe the answer would have been resounding. The United States will not--indeed cannot--become inward oriented. Let me give you some reasons why. One in six jobs in manufacturing is involved in exports. Each $1 billion in US exports creates 22,000 jobs in the United States. Thousands of US businessmen travel each year to such exotic places as Pakistan, Brazil, and Senegal to invest and trade. Small business is very active in exporting. The US Small Business Administration reported in 1989 that small businesses with fewer than 500 employees accounted for 12% of the goods produced in the United States that were exported directly. Nearly 65,000 US students study abroad each year--the most of any nation. And that is up from 48,000 as recently as 1986. There has been an impressive increase in the number of US students studying foreign languages; the number of students studying Japanese has increased 50% in the last 4 years. There are more than 150 international studies programs at institutions of higher learning in the United States, with schools such as Saint Mary's University in San Antonio, North Texas State University, Tulane, and the University of Maine at Orono.
Our Future--Mexico and Canada
Our future lies with Mexico and Canada, not Mexico or Canada alone, but rather with a special relationship with them--a relationship that is based on cold, hard facts as well as an alluring vision. On February 5, President Bush, President Salinas, and Prime Minister Mulroney announced that they would seek a North American free trade area, which according to President Bush ". . . will link our three economies in bold and far-reaching ways. Successful conclusion of the free trade agreement will expand market opportunities, increase prosperity, and help our three countries meet the economic challenges of the future." The promise of such an agreement is enormous: 360 million consumers and a combined gross national product of $6 trillion--by way of comparison, the world GNP was $6 trillion in 1957; 21.3 million square miles of productive resources, seven times as large as EC, 33% of world's oil production, and largest deposits of coal and uranium. A magnet for capital--the United States, Canada, and Mexico attracted nearly $30 billion in foreign direct investment in 1990--capital that creates jobs. That's a grand vision, but what does it mean in real terms? How does the United States benefit from opening our market to the Mexicans or making more concessions to the Canadians? Again, let's look at the record. The US-Canada FTA has helped to boost US merchandise exports to Canada by 18%. Industries on both sides of the border have agreed among themselves about the benefits of accelerated tariff removal. At industries' request the United States and Canada agreed to accelerate tariff elimination on more than 400 tariff items covering approximately $5 billion in bilateral trade. More than 75% of bilateral trade is now duty-free. The record tells us the free trade agreement with Canada works. It works with Canada, and it will work with Mexico. In fact, in some aspects the case for free trade with Mexico is more compelling. Professor Harold Hill of Gary, Indiana, one of the greatest salesmen of all time, said: "Ya gotta know the territory." Well, that territory is Mexico. Mexico is our third largest trading partner. The United States has a 70% share of Mexico's total trade. US exports to Mexico more than doubled between 1986 and 1990. Manufactured goods accounted for over 80% of our exports to Mexico in 1989. Remarkably, the United States had a $16 million surplus in bilateral textile trade in 1990. A good salesman like Harold Hill would grasp immediately that the NAFTA presents an extraordinary opportunity--not just to know the territory but also to "shape" the territory. Sounds logical enough. But it will not be easy. To negotiate the North America free trade area, the President must have what is called "fast-track" negotiating authority. That is, the President would send to Congress a completed agreement for their approval. Under fast-track authority, Congress could not offer amendments to the agreement but must vote up or down, with a simple majority required, and that vote must take place within 60 legislative days. On March 1, the President notified Congress of his intention to extend fast-track authority for 2 more years, starting June 1. This fast-track extension would cover not only the NAFTA but also the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT. Under congressional rules, the Congress may deny the President fast-track authority by a simple majority vote in either house before June 1. Let me note here an important point: A Congressman with reservations about the outcome of the NAFTA or the Uruguay Round can in good conscience support fast track because he will later have the opportunity to vote on the particular agreements. Working with the Congress to ensure that the President's fast-track authority is not denied is one of the Administration's highest priorities. Without fast track we surrender leadership; we lose control of our future. We are facing two lines of argument against fast track, focusing primarily on the prospect of an FTA with Mexico. The objections are: First, we should not engage in free trade negotiations with Mexico because: Mexican companies are polluting the transborder environment; an FTA will prompt more US firms to shift production to Mexico to escape environmental regulations; and because Mexican companies face less strict standards, they have a competitive advantage over US firms. Second, the US will lose jobs if we permit Mexican imports better access to the United States. There are real concerns. They deserve to be addressed and the Administration is addressing them.
Environment
On the environment, first, we will not weaken US environmental laws and regulations or standards on pesticides, energy conservation, toxic waste, or health and safety standards as part of an FTA. Moreover, we will continue to refuse to allow products to enter our market if they do not meet our health, safety, pesticide, food and drug, and environmental regulations. But the environmental naysayers are missing two critical points. President Salinas and his team are taking strong steps on environmental protection in their own national interests. Much of Mexico's 1988 general law for ecological equilibrium and environmental protection is based on US law. And President Salinas is devoting considerable resources to enforcement. A good example is the shutting down of Mexico's largest oil refinery, which is estimated to cost Mexico about $500 million and 2,000-3,000 jobs. In addition, the Salinas government has instituted a policy that requires drivers in Mexico City to leave their car at home 1 day a week and is requiring catalytic converters to be installed in new cars beginning with this model year. Unleaded gas in Mexico became available at the pump in September 1990. The US and Mexico are working closely together in a number of forums, including the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-SEDUE [Mexican ministry for environmental affairs] cooperation, and the annual US- Mexico Binational Commission. The United States entered into an agreement in 1989 to provide technical support for the efforts to clean up Mexico City's environment. Together, we have developed training and technical assistance programs to deal with the problems of air and water pollution, hazardous waste, and environmental health. This EPA program has been supplemented by a US Department of Energy agreement with the Mexican Petroleum Institute to prepare a computer model of Mexico City's air pollution. We have also sought to work with Mexico in the Inter-American Development Bank to put together a debt-for-nature swap to fund reforestation effort around Mexico. Through the International Boundary and Water Commission, we are helping to resolve water pollution problems. For example, the IBWC is constructing major sewage collection and treatment systems at an estimated cost of over $234 million at Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana/San Diego, and Nogales. And the IBWC is planning joint improvements in sewage collection and treatment facilities for a long-term solution to pollution of the New River at Mexicali- Calexico. Let me ask a rhetorical question: If we turn away from the NAFTA, does anyone believe this will strengthen Mexican environmental efforts? Or does anyone doubt that as Mexico becomes more prosperous, they will devote more resources to the environment?
Jobs
With regard to jobs, we recognize that changes in trade policy will affect US workers, and thus we will negotiate transition rules that will minimize any adverse impact. But we are absolutely convinced that the FTA will create jobs. The Department of Labor has calculated that NAFTA will create between 44,000 and 64,000 jobs over 10 years, many of these jobs in manufacturing. Rudiger Dornbusch, a respected economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is much more bullish, predicting 150,000 jobs will be created in the United States because of increased Mexican demand for US goods and services. An interesting parallel to the debate about the effect of an FTA between partners with a significant difference between wage levels is the accession of Portugal and Spain to the EC. As enlargement occurred, Portuguese manufacturing workers earned less than one-fifth of West German counterparts. The same arguments about jobs were heard then. The result? Not only did the trade balance shift in favor of the European Community (EC)-10, in part because rising investment in Portugal and Spain attracted more imports, but real wages in the EC-10 continued to grow after enlargement. Wages are a function of productivity, and the US workers are the most productive in the world. History tells us that more trade is the key to prosperity, raising living standards, creating jobs, and promoting growth.
The "Economics" Revolution
We are in the midst of a revolution in economic policy that is sweeping the world--from the former communist bloc, to the countries of Latin America, to Islamic nations such as Morocco and Pakistan, to the geographically remote Mongolia. Think back to the 1970s when foreign investment and multinational corporations were considered "imperialistic;" when debate was North-South, focusing on the new international order; and when the developing countries were urging the creation of a common fund, which was the antithesis of the market. Nowhere is this revolution better illustrated than in Mexico and the bold leadership of President Salinas. Since 1985, Mexico has reduced its maximum tariff from 110% to 20% and eliminated import licenses on all but about 200 products. In 1989, President Salinas issued a decree opening up two-thirds of the economy to majority foreign-owned investment. The government has slashed the number of state-owned enterprises and sold off such major firms as its airlines and its telecommunications monopoly. In addition, the Salinas administration has changed the constitution to allow the reprivatization of the commercial banks. The rewards to Mexico are evident, and that success supports other reformers: 1.6 million new jobs have been created since 1988, foreign investment has grown from $1.5 billion to more than $4 billion each year, and Mexican exports have expanded by an average rate of 20%. As the industrialized nations have urged the developing world to adopt open markets, so we must support them in these endeavors or else they cannot succeed. We cannot encourage them to trade with us and then deny them the opportunity to export; we cannot preach that foreign direct investment is superior to official debt and then ignore their efforts to attract investors; we cannot argue that the means to creating meaningful jobs is free trade and then turn around and claim that industrialized nations cannot afford free trade because it will cost jobs. The NAFTA is of critical importance to the Bush Administration, but it is not the Administration's only initiative to build stronger ties to the rest of the world, to the emerging economies of the world. Among the most important are: The Uruguay Round, which is critical to all, including the developing countries because so much is at stake, especially agriculture. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. President Bush has launched the Enterprise for the Americas [Initiative]--a trade, investment, debt dialogue--as an effort to support the Latin countries as they pursue economic reform. The Partnership for Democracy and Development is an initiative to bring the resources and attention of the industrialized nations to bear in supporting democratic and market-based reforms in Central America. The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, begun in 1989, is designed to bring all the nations of the Asian Pacific together to discuss measures to create a Pacific economic infrastructure, including transportation and environmental ideas. G-24 for Eastern Europe. The G-24 for Eastern Europe is another undertaking by the industrialized nations, this to coordinate efforts to ensure a successful transition to market-based economics in Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe. The unifying theme on each of these is partnership. We are forging new relations with a number of countries, with Mexico as a cornerstone, particularly with the Caribbean, Central America, and Latin America. Achieving fast-track authority and the NAFTA is imperative to maintaining US leadership. Failure to achieve this will be a lost opportunity that may never be regained. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

Status Report of US Sanctions on South Africa

Cohen Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Apr 30, 19914/30/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: South Africa Subject: Human Rights, Trade/Economics, Democratization [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to come before this committee again. We place great value on the broad consensus which has guided US policy toward South Africa in the last 2 years. Speaking with one voice has maximized our ability to affect events there. We want to work with you to sustain that approach. I am delighted that you and other interested Members of Congress had the opportunity to assess progress in South Africa first-hand in connection with the recent Aspen Institute conference in Cape Town. I look forward to comparing notes and sharing reactions during this hearing. I have been asked to comment on the subject of sanctions on South Africa. I can report that the Administration has, over the last 2 years, implemented the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA) fully and faithfully. Section 101 of the act states that US policy should encourage the government of South Africa to "bring about reforms in that system of Government that will lead to the establishment of a non-racial democracy," and Section 311 further specifies that it is US policy to support negotiations. I am pleased to say that over the last 18 months, South Africa has made unquestioned progress toward achieving these objectives. The remaining pillars of apartheid are tumbling down. Dialogue and negotiations are replacing persecution and repression. As President Bush has stated, we believe that this process of change in South Africa has become irreversible. All of us here, from the Administration and from Congress, can be proud of our contributions to these positive developments. We have shared a sense of moral revulsion over the indignity, injustice, and human suffering visited on the people of South Africa by institutionalized racial discrimination and exclusion. Apartheid is contrary to the most fundamental principles of human equality and equal opportunity which our country is committed to realizing at home and encouraging abroad. Sometimes it may have seemed that the racial conflict in that beautiful and rich land would never really be settled through anything less than violent confrontation. However, to their great credit, despite years of apartheid and repression, the black majority of South Africa has shown itself still willing to enter into a process of dialogue and reconciliation with their white fellow countrymen. In fact, on all sides we are seeing an all too rare example of people of good faith stopping at the abyss to give peace a chance. In today's world, that is worthy of special note.
World Reaction to Changes in South Africa
Indeed, the world has noticed these changes. The European Community has lifted the sanctions it adopted in 1986, including bans on new investment in South Africa and on the import of iron and steel and gold coins. Other countries have done the same, some publicly, some not, most West European countries have hosted visits by President [F.W.] De Klerk. On March 23, the Nordic countries decided to expand contact between their countries and South Africa. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and South Africa are opening interest sections in each other's capitals. East European countries, which broke off relations with South Africa in 1963, are re-establishing relations. In the first weeks of April, South Africa appointed heads of mission to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Trade between Eastern Europe and South Africa is rapidly expanding. In Africa, to cite a few of many examples of changing attitudes, Ghana has announced that newly issued passports will be "valid for all countries," not "valid for all countries except South Africa." Zambia has agreed to issue visas to South Africans at the border, in contrast to previous lengthy visa processing. Delegations from Gabon and Angola visited South Africa in January 1991. South African Airways recently reached new agreements for landing rights in a number of African countries. Other African countries appear on the verge of taking similar positive moves.
Keeping the Negotiations on Track
As the current dispute between the government and the African National Congress (ANC) over violence indicates, the road toward a negotiated settlement will not be easy. The parties to this violence must do all they can to end it. Unquestionably, the government has a special responsibility to ensure the impartiality and credibility of the police. We believe that President De Klerk, Mr. Mandela, and their colleagues will find a way to keep the negotiations on track. It is imperative that they do so. Responsible political leaders in South Africa understand that the real issue at this crucial point in their country's history is completing the move forward into negotiations to bring about non-racial democracy. These negotiations must include representatives of all major political groupings in order to ensure an outcome broadly acceptable for all of South Africa's people. The ANC proposed an all-party conference to discuss these matters and the government endorsed that proposal. The Inkatha Freedom Party has agreed to participate in the all-party conference. US policy is to encourage such broad-based negotiations on the establishment of a non-racial, multi-party democracy in South Africa. The new constitution should enshrine individual rights and establish the legal basis for a viable market-based economy capable of generating the renewed growth necessary to meet the expectations of all South Africans for a prosperous future. We believe strongly that a pluralistic political system, with a market- oriented economy based upon equal opportunity, is the greatest guarantor against authoritarian rule and racial discrimination. We stand ready, as necessary and appropriate, to offer whatever assistance we can to help move the negotiations forward and bring them to a successful outcome. Last year, the President met with President De Klerk and with Nelson Mandela. He used both occasions to encourage these leaders to go forward into negotiations and to do all they can to further the prospects of peaceful change in South Africa. Since these meetings, the President has remained in direct contact with President De Klerk and Mr. Mandela to keep them apprised of developments in US policy and to seek their views. We also have encouraged other relevant political groups to commit themselves to peaceful change. We have met at various times with representatives of the Pan African Congress (PAC), the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), Inkatha, the Conservative Party, the Democratic Party and others to urge them to join the peace process. Through diplomatic channels and in our public comments, we encourage the South African government to maintain a proper climate for negotiations. Most recently, we have been pressing all parties to work together to find a mutually agreeable means of dealing with the tragic problem of violence which has distracted energy and attention from the all-important process of negotiations on South Africa's political future.
Ensuring Strong Economic Growth
Our concerns, however, go beyond the present phase of the process of change. South Africa faces a tremendous challenge as it moves from a system which benefited mainly a minority to one which allows equal opportunity to all while beginning to redress imbalances of the past. South Africa must urgently seek to provide blacks with tangible evidence that a market economy can work for them. A new democratic government will be under heavy pressure to redistribute resources to a majority heretofore denied their fair share. Strong economic growth is essential to achieving this goal while avoiding strains which could undercut political support for a peaceful transition. All sectors and parties will have to remain sober in their expectations and committed to finding ways to encourage growth while improving the circumstances of the disadvantaged. Meanwhile, the government and South African business must do more to ensure that those disadvantaged by apartheid have adequate housing, education, health care, access to land and more opportunities in the civil service and management. These needs are pressing; perhaps we in the international community should also consider refocusing, at least, some of our efforts in this direction. "Open," multi-racial universities and efforts to improve deplorable housing conditions in the townships are examples of areas where outside help could make a critical contribution. Times of great change require great effort. In this regard, I am proud to note that American companies active in South Africa have led the way in demonstrating how business and equal opportunity reinforce each other. The CAAA's fair labor standards, monitored closely by the Department of State, serve as a model of enlightened corporate civic responsibility. It is significant that, under the CAAA, the fair labor standards provisions would remain in force even after the South African government meets the requirements set for lifting CAAA sanctions. The universal rejection abroad of apartheid, and the resultant political, moral, and economic judgments drawn by the outside world on the injustice of a racially divided South Africa, have doubtless played a role in bringing the white community to face up to the need for fundamental change. Now that the process of change has begun in earnest, we in the international community have a responsibility to do all we can to assist those committed to achieving through peaceful means a new, non-racial and democratic South Africa. This must lead to a focus that goes beyond sanctions to seek ways to help South Africa achieve the strong growth rate necessary to meet the rising expectations of the black majority. We must, therefore, also seek ways to help stimulate economic growth. This is necessary for the future of South Africa and for the region as a whole. The Administration is committed to carrying out the provisions of the CAAA, which wisely recognized that, once the transition process got well underway, renewed external contacts, trade, and communication would play a vital role in encouraging continued progress and laying a sound economic basis for renewed growth in post-apartheid South Africa. The CAAA focused its targets clearly on promoting a process of change and negotiations. Title 3 of the CAAA sets five conditions for the South African government to meet. Sections 311(A) and 311(B) set the terms under which sanctions might be terminated, modified, or suspended. South Africa has so far satisfied three of these CAAA conditions: -- Repealing the state of emergency and releasing all detainees held under it. In June 1990, the government lifted the state of emergency everywhere except Natal. In October 1990, the state of emergency in Natal was lifted as well. The South African Human Rights Commission confirmed that there are no detainees held under the state of emergency. -- Unbanning democratic political parties and permitting the free exercise by South Africans of all races of the right to form political parties, express political opinions, and otherwise participate in the political process. After President De Klerk's historic speech on February 2, 1990, the South African government unbanned all political parties, including the ANC, the PAC, the South African Communist Party, and other opposition groups. Since then, South Africans of all races have freely exercised the right to form political parties and express political opinions. They are participating in a political process which has as its centerpiece negotiations to abolish apartheid and establish a non-racial democracy. -- Agreeing to enter into good faith negotiations with truly representative members of the black majority without preconditions. The government has expressed its desire and intention to enter without conditions into good faith negotiations with the opposition. Its actions bear this out. Discussions between the government and the ANC led to the breakthrough Pretoria minute of August 6, 1990. This document provides for the suspension of violence and the release of political prisoners, as well as for subsequent negotiations on implementation, which are ongoing. Once the minute is fully implemented, the ANC's conditions for beginning full-fledged constitutional negotiations will have been met.
Two conditions have not yet been met:
-- Release of all persons persecuted for their political beliefs or detained unduly without trial. Over 700 persons have been released since February 1990, including Nelson Mandela and other opposition political leaders. However, the process agreed to between the government and the ANC, in August 1990, is still underway. The government has expedited efforts to meet the April 30 target date set in the August agreement but has stated that it needs more time to work through the full lists of persons made available by human rights groups. We will continue to closely review progress in implementing the political prisoner release process to determine whether it meets the CAAA's requirement that all those persecuted for their political beliefs be released. -- Repeal of the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act without instituting any measures with the same purposes. In February, President De Klerk announced that the Group Areas Act and Population Registration Act, along with Land Acts, would be repealed during the current session of the South African Parliament. The government has, in fact, begun the repeal process. We will review the government's proposal for temporary transitional measures to ensure they are not measures with the same purposes of the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts. President Bush has emphasized that the conditions of the CAAA are clear-cut and not open to reinterpretation. We intend to follow the law as we determine if the conditions have been met. We will follow developments in South Africa closely. We shall continue our consultations with Congress. It is worth noting that even should the sanctions under Title 3 terminate, various other non-CAAA sanctions--such as the arms embargo, exports to the military and police, and the Gramm amendment governing US votes at the International Monetary Fund--would remain in place. These measures will give us continued leverage as the negotiating process develops. US policy should continue to emphasize the future and remain focused on encouraging the successful transition to genuine democracy in South Africa. The Administration looks forward to working closely with Congress to implement an effective policy designed to respond constructively to the fundamental changes taking place in South Africa and to the need to help ensure that this process leads to the prosperous and democratic future we all hope for. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

Cease-fire and Political Settlement in Angola

Cohen Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Description: Opening statement at a news briefing, Washington, DC Date: May 1, 19915/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: Angola Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] A s you know, for the past 12 months the parties to the Angolan conflict have been negotiating to resolve the conflict under the auspices of the Portuguese government. I'm very pleased to inform you that the negotiators have now completed their work. As we speak, they are now making an announcement in Lisbon on the completion of the work and the initialing of a set of agreements--initialing ad referendum--and they have agreed that they will inform the mediator no later than May 15 whether or not they finally accept these agreements. If they do, a cease-fire will go into effect at the end of May. This will lead to a process of forming a new national army, legalization of political parties, including UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], and a political process leading to a free and fair election between September 1 and November 30, 1992. I would like to give you some perspective on what this means. First, this agreement will end 16 years of war in Angola, which has resulted in tremendous devastation and many people dying of warfare and disease and famine. It will allow the country to be reconstructed. Second, it is a vindication of US policy which, in effect, has always been that a military solution to the Angolan conflict is not possible. We have always said that our action in Angola has been to promote negotiations leading to national reconciliation which would be determined through a free and fair election. This is exactly what has happened as a result of this negotiation that went on for 1 year. I would like to point out the US role in this negotiation. Approximately 13 months ago, Secretary Baker met with President [Jose Eduardo] dos Santos of Angola in Namibia during the Namibian independence celebrations. He assured him that it was not our policy to overthrow the Angolan government and replace it with a UNITA government. Our policy was to promote negotiations, and he urged President dos Santos to accept the beginning of negotiations leading to free and fair elections. President dos Santos accepted Secretary Baker's recommendation and asked the Portuguese government to mediate negotiations. In December 1990, the negotiations had progressed but had reached sort of an impasse. In a meeting between Secretary Baker and [Soviet] Foreign Minister [Eduard] Shevardnadze in Houston, they agreed to make a special effort to break through the impasse. They did it in two ways. We co-sponsored a meeting in Washington on December 13 on all the parties, including the Soviets, the Americans, the Portuguese, and the two Angolan parties. Secretary Baker met publicly with the Angolan Foreign Minister, and Shevardnadze met publicly with President [Jonas] Savimbi of UNITA; therefore, demonstrating our determination to bring the two parties together. This meeting resulted in a document called the Washington Concepts Paper, which, effectively, broke the impasse and led to the events that we are seeing today in a final agreement. In addition to a vindication of US policy in Angola, this is a demonstration of US- Soviet cooperation in conflict resolution on regional issues. After the December meeting, the United States and the Soviet Union were brought into the negotiations as official observers. We both played a very important role in helping to bring about compromises under the overall jurisdiction of the Portuguese mediator. Another important element is that the UN will be requested to provide monitoring of the cease-fire and monitoring of the operations of the military and the police. This is another indication of the increased use of the UN as a mechanism for resolving international conflicts. The agreements obligate both parties to stop receiving all lethal military equipment from any source. That means that both the US and the Soviet role in assisting the government of Angola and UNITA with lethal equipment will stop with the entry into force of the cease-fire. In effect, the two parties have agreed to stop receiving it, and the Americans and the Soviets have agreed to abide by their agreement. The furnishing of other types of assistance--humanitarian and economic--will continue to be allowed under this agreement. This agreement would not have been possible without the 1988 New York agreements leading to the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. In addition to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, the 1988 agreements also provided for the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola and the withdrawal of African National Congress fighting forces from Angola. The departure of these foreign military forces from Angola greatly facilitated the political settlement that we're witnessing today because, at that point, the two Angolan parties no longer had the complication of working with foreign military forces. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)

Date: May 6, 19915/6/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations [TEXT] On April 3, 1991, following extensive consultations, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687 (see Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 14) setting specific terms for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and Kuwait and the member states cooperating with Kuwait. In paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Security Council established a demilitarized zone along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and requested the Secretary General to submit to the council, within 3 days, a plan for the immediate deployment of a UN observer unit. Following consultations with the governments of Kuwait and Iraq, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar submitted his plan for a "United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission" (UNIKOM) on April 6, 1991. On April 9, the Security Council approved the plan and decided to set up UNIKOM for the initial period of 6 months. The first group of UN observers left for the area on the same day.
Purpose of the Mission
UNIKOM's purpose is to: -- Monitor the Khor Abdullah water-way between the two countries and a demilitarized zone extending 6 miles (10 km) into Iraq and 3 miles (5 km) into Kuwait, based on borders established between Kuwait and Iraq under a 1963 agreement; -- Deter violations of the country through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; and -- Observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one state to the other. The demilitarized zone is about 125 miles (200 km) long; the Khor Abdullah about 25 miles (40 km). For the most part, the zone is barren and almost uninhabited, except for the oilfields and two towns, Umm Qasr and Safwan.
Chain of Command
In accordance with established principles for UN peacekeeping operations, UNIKOM will function under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary General, under the authority of the Security Council. Command in the field will be exercised by a chief military observer appointed by the Secretary General with the consent of the Security Council. The chief military observer will be responsible to the Secretary General, who will report regularly to the Security Council on UNIKOM operations and the situation in the area. Maj. Gen. Gunther G. Greindl (Austria) has been appointed as chief military observer.
Composition
Armed and unarmed military personnel will comprise UNIKOM. It will be composed of a group of 300 military observers and an infantry contingent of about 680 soldiers and officers. The infantry--five companies drawn from existing UN peacekeeping operations in the region--temporarily will be assigned to UNIKOM to provide essential security for the mission during the setting-up phase. A field engineer unit also will be attached to UNIKOM to clear mines and unexploded ordnance in the zone. In addition, the mission will have an air unit with fixed-wing aircraft and light helicopters, a logistic unit responsible primarily for medical care, supply and transport, and a headquarters unit. The maximum initial troop strength of UNIKOM will be about 1,440 for all ranks. Military personnel and logistic support will be provided by the following 36 countries: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. UNIKOM will be headquartered in Umm Qasr (Iraq) and will have liaison offices in Baghdad and Kuwait City.
Concept of Operation
UNIKOM seeks to ensure that no military personnel and equipment are within the demilitarized zone and that no military fortifications and installations are maintained in it. To this end, the mission will: -- Monitor the withdrawal of any armed forces now in the zone which is to be demilitarized; -- Operate observation posts on the main roads to monitor traffic into and out of the demilitarized zone; -- Operate observation posts at selected locations in the demilitarized zone; -- Conduct patrols throughout the demilitarized zone by land and air; -- Monitor the Khor Abdullah from observation posts set up on its shores and from the air; and -- Carry out investigations. To enable UNIKOM to effectively carry out its mandate, the governments of Iraq and Kuwait have been requested to extend to the mission full freedom of movement, on land and through the air, across the border and throughout the demilitarized zone; to control movement into and out of the demilitarized zone by requiring all traffic to be routed past UN observation posts; to notify UNIKOM in advance of sea and air traffic in the demilitarized zone and the Khor Abdullah; and to establish limitations on the right of their citizens to bear arms in the demilitarized zone. As an observation mission, UNIKOM is not authorized to take physical action to prevent the entry of military personnel or equipment into the demilitarized zone. UNIKOM and its personnel can use force only in self-defense. The mission will not interfere in the normal civilian life of the area. The governments of Iraq and Kuwait will carry out all aspects of civilian administration in their respective parts of the demilitarized zone, including the maintenance of law and order.
Financial Aspects
The estimated cost for UNIKOM is $83 million for the first 6-month period. The costs of the mission will be met from the assessed contributions of the UN member states to a UNIKOM special account. In addition, the Secretary General has called for voluntary contributions for setting up and maintaining the mission. (Source: UN Department of Public Information.) (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

Vietnam: The Road Ahead

Solomon Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Date: Apr 25, 19914/25/91 Region: Southeast Asia Country: Vietnam, Cambodia Subject: POW/MIA Issues, Human Rights, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, Senator Murkowski, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss another aspect of our policies toward Indochina--our effort to return to a dialogue on normalization with Vietnam. The Administration's contemporary approach to Hanoi is part of a larger effort to forge normal, constructive relations with all three states of Indochina--Cambodia and Laos as well as Vietnam. But today I want to focus on our policy, present activities, and future plans regarding Vietnam.
US Policy
Let me begin by saying the war is over. As the President has said, our Vietnam syndrome is behind us. The United States looks to the future and seeks reconciliation with Vietnam based on the national interests of both countries. A genuine and durable reconciliation will require conflict resolution and stability in Southeast Asia and domestic support here at home. For reasons of returning peace and stability to the region, the United States has premised normalization of US- Vietnamese relations since Vietnam invaded Cambodia in late 1978 on the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops and advisers from Cambodia and self-determination for the Cambodian people. For reasons of domestic concern, we have long held that the pace and scope of normalization, once the process begins, should be commensurate with Vietnam's cooperation on the POW/MIA [prisoners of war/missing in action] issue and other humanitarian concerns.
The Roadmap to Normalized Relations
In an effort to impart momentum to what we hope is the final stage of the Cambodia peace process and to accelerate progress on POW/MIAs and other humanitarian issues, I met in New York on April 9 with Vietnam's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Trinh Xuan Lang. I presented to Ambassador Lang a four-phase "roadmap" to political and economic normalization that could, in relatively short order, end the trade embargo and our opposition to lending to Vietnam by the international financial institutions as our concerns for a Cambodia settlement and POW/MIA accounting are resolved. We want Vietnam's leadership to have no doubt that the United States is prepared to move expeditiously, provided Vietnam is also prepared to reciprocate. At the same time, given the way the Vietnam war ended, a climate of mistrust remains. Thus, in order to avoid further false starts, much less another serious setback, both Washington and Hanoi must engage in a process of trust- and confidence-building through step-by-step reciprocal concrete actions. Vietnam needs to understand that the American government and people stand united in our goals of restoring tranquility to Cambodia, building a settlement with safeguards against a Khmer Rouge return to power, and resolving the fate of Americans still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. For our part, we seek to build mutual understanding and credibility through the phased process of normalization laid out in the roadmap. We do not see normalization as a zero-sum game requiring painful concessions by either party. We see it as a win-win situation. Stability in Cambodia and resolution of the humanitarian issues are in Vietnam's interest as well as our own. It is in Vietnam's interest that the international community assume the burden of resisting a Khmer Rouge return to power. Moreover, a collective response to the Cambodian problem--reflected in the UN/Paris Conference settlement process--would minimize regional suspicions and enhance prospects for stability and for a peaceful environment conducive to the economic development which Vietnam seeks.
Economic Prospects
I believe we share a mutual interest with Hanoi in seeking to realize the possibilities for the economic development of Vietnam. Vietnam needs the capital, technology, and management expertise that would flow to it with full economic normalization. And it is in our national interest to develop trade and investment ties with Vietnam as we seek to expand open trade in a world of growing economic competitiveness. We hear much speculation about the commercial opportunities now opening up in Vietnam. Clearly, the possibilities of a market of 70 million people suddenly opening to the outside world has sparked the imagination of some in the business community. Vietnam has begun a process of reform--particularly in its pricing and exchange-rate policies--in line with some of the prescriptions of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). If Hanoi's reforms deepen and foreign assistance begins to flow on a significant scale, Vietnam's medium- and long-term economic prospects are promising. At the same time, it should be recognized that expectations of a continuing confrontation over Cambodia, internal problems of bureaucratic management, a poor infrastructure, and a lack of legal protections for business limit Vietnam's ability to attract foreign investment. In the near term, the oil and service sectors appear most promising to foreign investors, and much of some $1.3 billion in total approved foreign investment contracts is concentrated in these areas, though largely awaiting implementation. We look forward to the time when US firms can pursue normal trade and investment relations with Vietnam. Such a time could approach swiftly if we begin the confidence-building process we have laid out in the roadmap. We hope Vietnam shares our desire for the expanded diplomatic contact as well as cultural and economic exchanges that a fully normal relationship would facilitate. The four-phase process of settling the Cambodia conflict and resolving our POW/MIA concerns is the most rapid path to this end.
Cambodia
Two weeks ago I was privileged to address this subcommittee at some length about the Cambodia peace process. I will not review today the issues discussed at that time, except to reiterate that the linkage between normalization with Vietnam and a political settlement in Cambodia has been the policy of three presidents and five secretaries of state. We recognize there can be no peaceful settlement for Cambodia without Vietnam's support. It was Vietnam, after all, that established the present regime in Phnom Penh over a decade ago and remains the regime's staunchest ally. Moreover, as I mentioned during our last session, Vietnam still retains several thousand military and some civilian advisers in Cambodia. We understand that Hanoi's influence in Cambodia is not unlimited. But there is no question that Vietnam enjoys considerable influence with the Phnom Penh authorities. Thus, we believe there is an organic connection between our policies toward Vietnam and Cambodia. Given the history of this region, including Vietnam's decade-long occupation of, and continuing involvement in, Cambodia, we believe Vietnam has an obligation to use its influence to bring about a just and durable peace. Once it does so--and as we see improved cooperation on humanitarian issues--there will be a firm basis for a new relationship between the United States and Vietnam.
Humanitarian Issues
Let me now turn to the humanitarian matters that will affect the pace and scope of normalization. These issues reflect concerns deeply held by the Administration, the Congress, and the American people. Only with resolution of these issues can we put our relationship with Vietnam on the solid foundation of broad public support.
POW/MIAs
. The most compelling and deeply felt humanitarian concern is resolution of the POW/MIA issue. This has been a consistent US position. As President Bush has said, and as President Reagan said before him, the US government considers resolution of this issue a matter of the highest national priority. Our first priority in POW/MIA accounting is resolution of the "discrepancy cases" of American servicemen known to have been alive when captured and whose fates Vietnam should certainly have some knowledge of. Resolving these cases has been the primary focus of the joint investigations promoted under the Vessey initiative. We also continue to stress to the Vietnamese our serious interest in pursuing reports suggesting that Americans may still be alive in Vietnam. Gen. John Vessey, the President's Special Emissary to Hanoi on POW/MIA matters, has just returned from 2 days of meetings in Vietnam with Foreign Minister Thach. Supported by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl Ford, the Executive Director of the National League of Families Ann Mills Griffiths, and my deputy Ken Quinn, General Vessey gave Minister Thach our assessment of progress since their meeting here in Washington last October. We have found some improvements in cooperation but limited results, and Vietnam really needs to accelerate unilateral and joint efforts to achieve the results we are seeking. It was with this objective in mind that General Vessey and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach announced on April 20 that the United States would establish a temporary office in Hanoi to support the POW/MIA accounting process. Our decision reflected a previous understanding that we would establish such a presence in Vietnam if we determined it would facilitate resolution of the issue, including advance planning for joint activities and efforts to resolve live sighting reports on which we request assistance. The office will be staffed by Defense personnel augmented by POW/MIA specialists who will rotate through on temporary duty. It will have no diplomatic or political responsibilities and should not be seen as a first step in the normalization process. It can, however, help to accelerate normalization once a Cambodia settlement is signed in Paris if its activities are productive in resolving POW/ MIA issues.
Orderly Departure Program
Release of all re-education camp political prisoners has also been a consistent US goal. The Orderly Departure Program (ODP), with Vietnam's cooperation, has undergone considerable expansion in recent years. Under the ODP, the United States takes in Vietnamese citizens associated with our country and its citizens by work or family ties, including Amerasians. This month we raised the interview rate to 10,000 per month, twice the level of a year ago. As a result, overall ODP departures will be nearly double last year's rate. This dramatic expansion constitutes a major contribution to the comprehensive plan of action for Indochina refugees by bolstering ODP as a safe, predictable, and realistic alternative to departures by boat. We are pleased that the ODP program now also includes former re-education center detainees, who began arriving in the United States only in January of 1990. Last fiscal year, about 9,000 former detainees and family members came to the United States. We hope to double the flow this fiscal year. While we are encouraged by this development, we continue to ask Vietnam to free all political prisoners and to allow all of them who are eligible for the ODP to depart for the United States if they so desire.
The Vessey Initiative: Humanitarian Assistance.
Just as we ask Vietnam to help with our humanitarian concerns, we encourage American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to address the humanitarian needs of Vietnam's citizens, particularly in the areas of prosthetics and child survival. Since 1987, when General Vessey pledged our support in these areas, there has been a series of meetings in Hanoi between Vietnamese and American officials at the working level to review progress and identify areas where useful activities could be carried out. The US government encourages the work of NGOs which raise funds and gather material donations to help the people of Vietnam. And the American NGO community has responded generously to Vietnam's humanitarian needs. As announced by Secretary Baker last July, to facilitate their efforts we have eased licensing procedures for humanitarian assistance. Many NGOs not previously active in Vietnam, or not active since 1975, have started new programs. A number of new groups, particularly veterans organizations, have been formed for the specific purpose of providing humanitarian assistance to Vietnam. Since last July 18, 36 different organizations or individuals have been licensed to provide humanitarian donations to Vietnam. Financial contributions since that time total approximately $4.3 million. Although up to now no US government assistance has gone directly to Vietnam, we did assist indirectly in the repatriation of nearly 16,000 Vietnamese citizens trapped in the Gulf region during the crisis by contributing approximately $11 million to the International Organization of Migration. In addition, I am pleased to announce today that, in the context of the Vessey Initiative, we will be making available through the US Agency for International Development approximately $1 million to address Vietnamese humanitarian needs in the areas of prosthetics.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Vietnam is a country of some 70 million people with a rich history and culture. It is a nation with which we are profoundly connected by our historical experience and by more than 1 million Vietnamese residing in the United States. It is also a country which--if it can escape the trap of its security burdens and impediments to economic growth--could over time come to play an increasingly significant role in Southeast Asia. Our current efforts toward normalization reflect an interest in putting US-Vietnamese relations on a new basis. As Secretary Baker told Foreign Minister Thach last fall in New York, the United States is prepared to turn a page in history. But the effort has to be mutual. The "roadmap" proposal we have presented to Hanoi is a good faith effort to establish step-by-step the trust and confidence necessary to move beyond a difficult period of history and begin a new era in US relations with Vietnam--and indeed, in our relations with all three countries of Indochina. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

A Multi-faceted Approach to Non-proliferation

Clarke Source: Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary for Politico- Military Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Committee, Washington, DC Date: Apr 23, 19914/23/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Country: Iraq, Australia Subject: Arms Control, International Organizations [TEXT] Mr. Chairman, thank you for Inviting me to testify before this committee. The proliferation of missiles and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is a significant threat to US national security and to the vital interests of our friends and allies. In recent years, five countries have been attacked by ballistic missiles, three of them this year. The Iraqi "triple threat" in the Gulf war--missiles, chemical and biological weapons, along with Iraq's nuclear weapons potential--vividly underscores the need for effective and urgent international cooperation to stem proliferation. In the last year, I believe we have turned the corner, and the tide is now running against missile proliferation. As I will detail in this statement, we have now: -- Thwarted missile projects in several countries; -- Put in effect the tightest export controls in the world on missile proliferation-relevant technologies; -- Greatly expanded the number of countries participating in or adhering to international guidelines against missile-related exports; -- Moved to strengthen and institutionalize the international missile export control regime; -- Begun the process of placing US sanctions on those engaged in missile proliferation; and -- Reoriented our SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program to address the missile proliferation threat through the GPALS [Global Protection Against Limited Strikes] program. On chemical and biological weapons, we have: -- Implemented a major new initiative to strengthen US chemical and biological weapons proliferation controls; and -- Stimulated dramatic increases in chemical weapons controls by other major supplier countries. In the nuclear area, 26 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group met last month to strengthen nuclear export controls. We hope that a multilateral export control arrangement on dual-use items will be completed within a year's time. Of necessity, we have a multi-faceted approach to non- proliferation. This approach includes vigorous arms control measures, encouraging regional confidence-building, export controls, multilateral supplier group efforts, focused intervention in specific cases, and sanctions.
Iraq
Let us begin with Iraq. As a result of the Gulf war, Iraq is subject to extraordinary control measures to divest it of chemical and biological weapons and missile capabilities and to prevent the resurgence of such capabilities or development of a nuclear weapons capability. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 687, stringent cease-fire conditions are being imposed on Iraq. These will include supervised destruction of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missile capabilities, and long- term monitoring of compliance. The US is deeply involved in the effort to develop and implement this program. The United States actively participates in the special commission charged with overseeing compliance with the UN resolution. Inter-agency working groups of the Non-Proliferation PPC [policy planning committee], which I chair, have been formed to deal with specific aspects of the issue, and a Special Commission Backstopping Support Office to support UN Special Commission has been set up in the Politico-Military Bureau of the Department of State. With sustained international effort, we believe these cease-fire conditions will deal effectively with the Iraqi non-conventional threat. Iraq is not, however, a typical case. What is possible and appropriate there is not necessarily applicable elsewhere. In other, less dramatic ways, our non-proliferation efforts have progressed well in the months since we last appeared before this subcommittee. There is, of course, still more to be done. We are working in all areas to make non-proliferation policy work better, and we welcome the ideas and suggestions of the Congress.
Limiting Missile Proliferation
Intense US non-proliferation efforts have thwarted missile projects in several countries. Two special projects have yielded striking results. The multi-national Condor missile program has been of concern to the United States for some years. Our efforts to attack this problem on several fronts have paid off. Through coordinated use of intelligence and information-sharing political demarches to several governments, vigorous pursuit of illegal US exports, and visits to several involved countries, we have made great progress toward assuring that Condor will not be a proliferation threat in the future. We also have been concerned about the presence of SS-23 missiles in Eastern and Central Europe and are pursuing their disposition with the countries involved. We are finding that the political changes in Eastern Europe and unification of Germany have created a climate of increased candor in which we are able to obtain information and cooperation from these governments. I anticipate full success in our efforts to eliminate the SS-23 problem. But our success appears to go beyond the SS-23. The former East Germans and at least two other countries have already indicated a desire to eliminate their missiles.
US Missile Controls
The United States has imposed tight export controls on technology relevant to missile proliferation. An important recent move was the publication of a regulation to make US citizen assistance to foreign missile projects subject to license, as well as knowing export of any item to foreign missile projects of proliferation concern. This will give us a strong hand in thwarting missile proliferation. We also have strengthened and institutionalized the international missile control regime. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has undergone dramatic growth, and the partners have significantly strengthened its implementation. Starting with only seven members in 1987, the regime has more than doubled to a total of 16 members, including Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Australia, and New Zealand. We have discussed membership with various other countries. Several other countries are close to joining. In addition, Sweden and Finland are in the process of implementing export controls consistent with the MTCR guidelines. A number of other countries have expressed interest in adopting the MTCR export guidelines. Overall, size, effectiveness, stature, and influence have all grown. The partners are working hard to bring into the MTCR the remaining European Community, NATO, and European Space Agency countries. At the most recent MTCR meeting, in Tokyo March 18-20, [1991], the partners made significant progress toward adopting a revised, updated annex of controlled technologies. We plan to add a number of additional items usable in missile development and clarify technical parameters for several other items. We expect to finish this work at a technical group meeting in May and put the revised annex into effect in all member countries by December. They also agreed to consider other controls the United States has imposed and further harmonization of controls and procedures. These steps are designed to strengthen the MTCR by making its implementation more uniform among partners, an objective that is crucial to the regime's continued success. I am pleased to inform you that the United States will host the next partners' meeting in the fall. This will be a major event for which we will be planning an active agenda.
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)
In his State of the Union address, President Bush announced the reorientation of SDI toward Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). GPALS would be a missile defense system against accidental, unauthorized, or limited ballistic missile launches, whatever their source. The system would provide protection for the United States, for our forces overseas, and for our friends and allies. As the Patriot's performance in the Middle East recently proved, defenses against ballistic missile attacks--even if they are not foolproof--can play a vital role in conflicts. Defenses against ballistic missiles would become even more important if the number of Third World countries with offensive missiles increases, and as countries increase the range and improve the accuracy of these missiles. GPALS will lessen the threat from Third World missile proliferators. The largest single Administration non-proliferation effort of the last year has been the development of the Enhanced Proliferation Controls Initiative (EPCI). This initiative encompasses new US export controls as well as vigorous efforts to get foreign countries to apply comparable controls. Well before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Administration recognized the need for tightened proliferation export controls on items that could contribute to chemical and biological weapon or missile proliferation. Before the invasion, the Administration had already begun to consider the imposition of additional controls on Iraq. In November l990, the President issued an Executive Order mandating a licensing requirement for certain dual-use chemical and biological weapons-related goods and technology, and requiring sanctions on countries and companies involved in chemical and biological weapons proliferation activities. After careful development through the inter-agency process, new controls were announced by the White House on December 13, and regulations to implement EPCI were issued on March 13 of this year. The March 13 EPCI regulations provide major new authority to prevent US goods or services from aiding foreign proliferation projects, wherever they might be. -- We have expanded from 11 to 50 the number of chemical weapons precursors controlled by the United States to all countries except the 20 Australia Group of nations which cooperate against chemical and biological weapons proliferation. -- A license is required for the export of certain dual-use chemical and biological weapons-related equipment to designated destinations. -- A license will be required for the export of whole chemical plants making chemical weapons precursors, and designs for such plants, outside the Australian Group. -- EPCI will require a license when the supplier knows or is informed by the US government that any export is destined for a chemical and biological weapons or missile project. -- Knowingly providing assistance by US persons to such projects will also be subject to a license requirement. -- All of these measures respond to real-world problems. The[y] present an interlocking set of controls, which, working together, we believe will effectively prevent US assistance to proliferation activities. In developing these measures, we consulted closely with US industry. They have been narrowed and refined where possible, in an effort to minimize the burden on legitimate trade. While it is too early to assess the results of EPCI, we expect it to be a highly useful new tool in our fight against proliferation.
Multilateral Efforts
We have been vigorously seeking to convince other countries to adopt controls comparable to EPCI. Several have already done so. We have pursued EPCI through existing multilateral mechanisms and in our bilateral dealings. The Australia Group, which consists of 20 countries concerned about proliferation, has been making important strides. Last December's meeting of the Australia Group was highly successful. We presented the substance of EPCI at that time and urged the other Australian Group members to adopt comparable controls. Spurred on by the immediacy of the Gulf chemical and biological weapons threat, Australian Group members announced significant expansions of their controls. Eleven of the 20 members now control exports of all 50 chemical weapons precursors. This is a dramatic change. As recently as 1989, only two member countries controlled all 50 chemicals. The remaining members expanded the number of chemicals they control as well as said they would review adopting controls on all 50. Several Australia Group partners also announced other EPCI-like controls, including controls on whole plants and chemical weapons equipment, curbs on citizen proliferation activities, and end-user controls. In the months since the last Australia Group meeting, several countries have adopted additional chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation measures. Germany has put additional curbs on its citizens' activities and improved enforcement. France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Switzerland have or are in the process of imposing additional controls. We look forward to additional progress at the upcoming Australia Group meeting next month and are working actively with our partners to promote agreement to further strengthen chemical and biological weapons controls.
The Nuclear Suppliers' Group
Substantial progress also is being made in the nuclear weapons non- proliferation area. An informal meeting took place last month in the Netherlands of the 26 countries that have adhered to the nuclear supplier guidelines. These guidelines are an agreed set of principles and conditions that apply to transfers of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. This group of countries met to review current supplier arrangements and the conditions of supply and to consider some ways and means to strengthen them with a view to reinforcing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The participants at that meeting reconfirmed their strong commitment to preventing nuclear weapon proliferation, which represents one of the greatest threats to worldwide security and stability facing the international community. The participants at the meeting also recognized the growing problem posed by the potential use of nuclear-related dual-use materials, equipment, and technology in contributing to unsafeguarded nuclear programs or to the development of nuclear explosive devices. They agreed to establish a working group to examine all possible arrangements that supplier countries could use to control nuclear-related dual-use items. This working group will begin its important work within a month, and we expect that multilateral export control arrangement will be completed within a year's time. We continue to press for universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and urge supplier states to require full scope IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards as a condition for nuclear supply. There remain supplier countries outside the multilateral groups whose cooperation we need if non-proliferation efforts are to be fully successful. We have taken several steps to address this problem. First, we have encouraged some suppliers to join the multilateral non-proliferation groups. Second, in other cases, we have held bilateral discussions with the aim of getting other nations to establish effective non- proliferation export systems comparable to our own. For example, Deputy Assistant Secretary [Elizabeth G.] Verville went to Eastern Europe last summer for non-proliferation discussions. This was followed by a seminar on export controls for the East European countries held in London after the meeting of Australia Group members last December. We will continue to assist in improving the East European countries' export control systems, and we will be offering further technical assistance to them. We have continued our efforts with China and the Soviet Union. In the May 1990 Washington joint statement on non-proliferation, the Soviets agreed to support the objectives of the MTCR and to work to stop proliferation, particularly in regions of tension such as the Middle East. We are discussing with the Soviets and our partners how to bring the Soviets more fully into the regime. We also have pressed the Chinese hard on missile proliferation. They have said they will "take into account relevant international parameters" on missiles and not sell intermediate-range missiles to the Middle East. We will expect actions consistent with these statements and will continue to urge an explicit Chinese commitment to observe the MTCR guidelines. Our US government inter-agency interdiction groups for chemical and biological weapons and missiles also have proven effective. These groups seek to identify illicit proliferation- related shipments and stop them through cooperation with foreign governments. We have succeeded in a number of cases.
Sanctions
US laws and policy provide for the imposition of specific sanctions in response to certain nuclear weapons proliferation actions. Sanctions against countries and persons involved in certain chemical and biological weapons or missile-related activities have recently been added to our arsenal against proliferation. Executive Order 12735 of November 16, 1990, provides for imposition of penalties on foreign countries and foreign persons. The missile sanctions provisions of the 1990 National Defense Authorization Act provides similar authority for missiles. We hope the sanctions provisions will prove a deterrent [to] illicit activities, inducing restraint both by governments and companies. An inter-agency chemical and biological weapons sanctions working group has been established to evaluate intelligence and identify potentially sanctionable chemical and biological weapons activity after November 16, 1990, the effective date of the Executive Order. The Missile Trade Analysis Group, an inter-agency group, was assigned the responsibility of identifying potentially sanctionable missile activities of US and foreign firms. Both groups have met and vetted the large amount of possibly relevant information on sanctionable activities but have not as yet made any sanctions determinations, in part, because the executive order and law are prospective in character, targeting activities starting in November 1990, and good evidence to confirm such activities takes some time to develop. We are reviewing several potential sanctions cases. As you well understand, these cases involve sensitive issues-- including intelligence considerations --such preclude my going into detail here.
Other Arms Control Efforts
I will mention only in passing that the United States is making vigorous negotiating efforts in the area of chemical weapons and biological weapons, as part of a longer term effort to ban chemical weapons and make the prohibition on biological weapons more effective. We are working to complete the final details of a protocol to our bilateral chemical weapons destruction and non- production agreement with the Soviet Union. In the Conference on Disarmament, we are intensifying work on a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons, which is the best long-term solution to chemical weapons proliferation. The President has made early conclusion of the global chemical weapons ban a high foreign policy priority. We also are developing a series of proposals to ensure that the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in September will result in measures to strengthen the convention.
Coordinating Committee For Multilateral Security Export Control (COCOM) and Proliferation
At the June 1990 high-level meeting of COCOM , all partners agreed that reductions or changes in COCOM controls on advanced technology should not, in turn, allow further proliferation of non- conventional weapons or otherwise damage our security. Each partner nation agreed that national controls--consistent with multilateral proliferation arrangements--would be applied to goods and technologies released from COCOM control but still of proliferation concern.
Looking to the Future
We have made significant strides in our non-proliferation policy and have an active agenda to build on them. I would highlight the following plans: -- We will continue to negotiate a chemical weapons convention as one facet of the solution to the problem of chemical weapons proliferation. -- Strengthening existing non-proliferation mechanisms must be a primary focus. We are pressing for greater uniformity and harmonization of controls. This could extend to licensing procedures, control lists, enforcement procedures, and the like. We also are expanding Australia Group activities, including creation of working groups and more frequent meetings. -- We need to bring along other major suppliers, whether inside or outside the non-proliferation groups. This includes major countries such as Brazil, Argentina, China, and India. We have made progress, but there is much to be done. We will continue our efforts to this end. Proposals for new international non-proliferation mechanisms are proliferating. Several of our allies have advanced skeletal ideas along these lines. We expect to discuss these when the concepts have been better fleshed out. We will be pleased to consider any idea with real promise of improving non-proliferation performance. In theory, a new mechanism connecting the separate, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and missile non-proliferation groups could facilitate easier international coordination cutting across these different areas. However, the existing organizations work, and their performance is steadily improving. They contain different members because there are varying suppliers of different items. The several regimes target different projects or countries of concern for different purposes, and their methods are tailored to their particular subject matter. We do not need another bureaucratic layer without compelling justification. Likewise, you can expect us to be very cautious about diluting the effectiveness of COCOM by proposing the addition of proliferation issues to its responsibilities. On the one hand, COCOM has, in the past, supported our proliferation objectives by working to strengthen Western export control systems and, when necessary, agreeing to place on its control lists certain items of proliferation concern. On the other, encouraging countries--in many cases friendly, non-aligned countries--not to develop weapons of mass destruction is a somewhat different task than controlling the sale of strategic goods and technology to countries posing a potential military threat to members of COCOM. Proliferation issues often require the cooperation of COCOM-proscribed destinations (e.g., the Soviet Union), utilize scientific and technical cooperation in addition to export controls, and often involve lower levels of technology available from countries outside of COCOM. We must be careful that any proposed changes in existing regimes complement rather than detract from our overall policy objectives. Other proposals have focused on improving US procedures for handling proliferation-related export controls. Several things have recently been done. In December 1990, the President directed new procedures to avoid needless delay and inadequate consideration of all facets of a proposed export. The new guidance provides for explicit timetables for review of export applications at the sub-Cabinet and Cabinet levels. The establishment of the Center for Defense Trade at the State Department has streamlined the handling of cases subject to State Department administered licensing of defense goods and services. We have worked hard to make our non-proliferation policy a success. We have made considerable headway in what is an inherently difficult area. There are frequently competing and legitimate interests at play--national security, foreign policy, and export promotion. The result is a balancing act. The Gulf war has given a real stimulus to our non-proliferation efforts nationally and internationally. We intend to capitalize on it fully. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

US Canada-Jpan High Seas Driftnet Fishing

Tutwiler Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: May 1, 19915/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia, North America Country: United States, Japan Subject: International Law, Resource Management [TEXT] The United States, Japan, and Canada have reached agreement on scientific monitoring and enforcement programs for Japan's high seas driftnet fisheries for the upcoming fishing season, which begins in June 1991. An exchange of letters to conclude the agreement was signed today; representatives of the Department of State's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs and the National Marine Fisheries Service signed on behalf of the United States. The trilateral accord extends and improves upon monitoring and enforcement programs originally agreed to in 1989 for Japan's driftnet fishery in the North Pacific Ocean. The agreement is consistent with the provisions of the 1989 UN General Assembly resolution on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing. The resolution recommends that, in contemplation of a moratorium on all large-scale high seas pelagic driftnet fisheries after June 30, 1992, nations involved in driftnet fishing cooperate with coastal states in the collection and sharing of statistically sound scientific data on driftnet fishing's effects. The understandings reached are aimed at producing statistically reliable estimates of the numbers of fish, marine mammals, turtles, and sea birds killed by driftnet fishing activities. They also include significant provisions designed, among other things, to minimize the bycatch of US origin salmon and steelhead trout.
1991-92 Scientific Monitoring Program
Under the terms of the agreement, 30 US, 21 Japanese, and 10 Canadian scientific observers will be deployed on 61 Japanese small-mesh squid driftnet vessels to monitor over 2,500 driftnet retrievals during the 1991 fishing season. The observers will be deployed to reflect the typical monthly pattern of 1990 fishing effort and will be assigned to vessel types (large and small) in proportion to the 1990 fishing effort by each vessel type: 45 on large-type vessels (those over 100 tons) and 16 on small-type vessels (those under 100 tons). It has been possible to reduce the number of observers by 13 from last year through an observer program designed to provide bycatch estimates within plus or minus 10% tolerable error at a confidence interval of 90% based on 1990 fishing effort. The progress of the squid driftnet fishery scientific monitoring program will be evaluated during the course of the season and adjusted as necessary. The parties will exchange on a weekly basis the number of observations by each deployed observer in order to check the cumulative total number of observations and adjust the coverage as needed. The number of observers placed on the Japanese large-mesh driftnet fleet will be determined by September 30, 1991, after data collected from the 1990-91 program are available. The required number of observations in 1991-92 will be calculated based on those data. Japan will provide total fishing catch and effort data on the small-mesh driftnet fishery by April 1, 1992, 2 months earlier than specified in the 1990 program. Agreement was also reached to move the date for the final report of the results of the 1991 observer program up by 1 month to May 1, 1992, as compared to last year's agreement.
1991-92 Enforcement Program
The enforcement program is scheduled to run through June 30, 1992. Japan agreed to review its regulatory measures regarding the illegal reflagging of Japanese driftnet vessels and, if necessary, is to reinforce penalties to deter any reflagging schemes. Japan also agreed to place satellite transmitters on all Japanese driftnet fishing vessels operating beyond its 200 nautical mile zone in 1991. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

Sea Turtle Conservation In Commercial Fisheries

Tutwiler Source: Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: May 1, 19915/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean, South America, Central America Country: Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, French Guiana, Guatemala, Guyana, Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela Subject: Environment, Resource Management, Trade/Economics [TEXT] The Department of State certified yesterday that 13 countries in the wider Caribbean region have taken initial steps to protect sea turtles from capture and drowning in their shrimp fishing operations. The Department's certification is required under a 1989 law (Section 609 of P.L. 101-162) that would ban the import of shrimp from any country not taking adequate measures to conserve sea turtles in commercial shrimp fisheries. The certification by the Department is valid for one year, which will allow countries to further develop and implement their respective programs. Because a certification could not be made for Suriname, shrimp imports from that country are prohibited as of May 1, 1991.
US Law and Policy
Sea turtles and shrimp share similar habitats in tropical and sub- tropical waters and, as a result, the air breathing turtles are often caught in shrimp nets and drown. This incidental drowning has been identified as the principal threat to the survival of sea turtles in US waters. To protect turtles, US shrimpers are required to use a piece of equipment in their nets called the turtle excluder device (or TED). These devices have been shown to be effective in allowing more than 97 percent of all turtles that enter shrimp nets to escape unharmed. The 1989 law is intended to extend the protection given to sea turtles under the US regulations to other areas these turtles inhabit throughout the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, and western central Atlantic (the wider Caribbean). The countries affected by the law are Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, French Guiana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. The law provides that, to continue exporting shrimp to the United States beyond May 1, 1991, a country must receive a certification that it has met specific conservation requirements. In order to receive a certification, a country must either provide evidence of the adoption of a regulatory program comparable to the US program or provide evidence that the fishing environment in its waters does not pose a threat to sea turtles. Because the use of the TED is the centerpiece of the US regulatory program, its use will eventually be the principal feature of any foreign program determined to be comparable to the US program. By the time the phased-in implementation of the foreign programs is completed in May 1994, the nations affected by this law must require the use of TEDs on all shrimp vessels operating in areas where there is a chance of taking sea turtles or their exports of shrimp to the United States will be embargoed.
International Discussions
Beginning in January 1990, officials of the Departments of State and Commerce began discussions with the affected countries to make each of them aware of the importance of taking the necessary measures to protect sea turtles. Thirteen of the countries affected by the law have indicated their intention to address the problem of incidental drowning and to develop programs comparable to the US program. Suriname did not provide the information necessary to receive a certification and, as a result, shrimp imports from Suriname to the United States are prohibited effective May 1, 1991. In addition to issuing the certifications for countries with commercial shrimp fisheries in the wider Caribbean, the State Department emphasized its interest in and commitment to seeing equivalent measures to protect sea turtles implemented on the Pacific coast of North, Central, and South America, and in other areas where sea turtles are taken incidental to commercial shrimp fishing operations. In this regard, the Department specifically recognized the efforts of Mexico, Colombia, and Nicaragua, each of which has indicated that its sea turtle protection program in the commercial shrimp fishery will apply equally to the Atlantic (Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean) and Pacific coasts. The Department has made clear that it is committed to promoting such efforts and is prepared to strengthen its own efforts to encourage actions by countries in the Pacific region and throughout the world to develop and implement equivalent programs to those required in the wider Caribbean. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

1990 Patterns of Global Terrorism

Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 30, 19901/30/90 Category: Reports Country: Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, South Korea, Syria Subject: Terrorism [TEXT] Excerpts from the "1990 Patterns of Global Terrorism" report. Copies of this report are available from the Office of Counter- Terrorism (S/CT), Room 2507, Department of State, Washington, DC, 20520.
Introduction
The continuing decline in the number of international terrorist incidents during 1990 is encouraging. From a peak of 856 in 1988, the number of incidents decreased to 455 in 1990. Even more encouraging is the increasing counter-terrorist cooperation among governments and our numerous successes in bringing the rule of law to bear on terrorists. As part of our overall counter-terrorist strategy, the United States works with other governments to identify, apprehend, and prosecute terrorists. Many terrorist trials were successfully completed in 1990, and many more cases are still in progress. Through training provided under the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance Program, we have improved the ability of other governments to pre-empt, or to investigate and prosecute, terrorist attacks. The program has been extremely successful, and in 1990 for the first time law enforcement officials from the newly democratic East European states participated. Another important element of our counter-terrorist effort, the Rewards for Terrorism Information Program, received a significant boost in 1990. This program provides rewards for information that leads to the "prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of terrorist acts against US persons or properties overseas." Late in 1989, Congress increased the ceiling for an individual reward to $2 million. Rewards of more than $500,000 have been paid under this program. In 1990, the Air Transport Association (ATA) and the Air Line Pilots' Association (ALPA) matched the reward ceiling with $2 million to create a potential $4 million reward for information about attacks on civil aviation. Despite this good news, the threat of terrorism remains. Still, the progress we have made reinforces our conviction that our counter-terrorist policy is working and that continued vigilance will increase the effectiveness of our efforts.
Year in Review
The year 1990 was one of the few in recent times in which there were no "spectacular" terrorist incidents resulting in the death or injury of a large number of victims. Despite this fact, there were a number of major terrorist developments, including a heightened international terrorist threat owing to Iraq's renewed association with terrorist groups worldwide. Perhaps the most significant development occurred in the wake of the August 2 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. A number of Palestinian groups, including the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command (PFLP-GC), pledged their support for Saddam Hussein, and most threatened terrorist attacks against the West, Israel, and moderate Arab targets in the event of war. Although by year's end no such attacks had taken place, the threat remained high. Another significant development was the abortive May 30 attack on Israeli beaches by the PLF. The PLF is a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and is, therefore, subject to the PLO's "renunciation" of terrorism. Following the PLO's refusal to condemn the attack, the United States suspended its dialogue with the PLO, pending action by the PLO demonstrating that it abides by the conditions it accepted in December 1988. Both of these events highlight the continuing importance of states that support terrorists and sponsor terrorist attacks. The PLF attack on Israel was planned and executed from Libya. In 1990 Iraq, which provides support for a growing number of terrorist allies, was returned to the US government's list of state sponsors of terrorism. The other countries on that list--Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria-- continued to provide varying degrees of support--safe haven, travel documents, arms, training and technical expertise--to terrorists. Latin America emerged in 1990 as the most frequent site for terrorist attacks against US interests. Most of these attacks took place in Chile, Peru, and Colombia. Latin American radical or guerrilla groups engaging in terrorism tended to attack domestic, rather than foreign, targets. Thus, although the number of international terrorist incidents was high, the escalating domestic political violence had an even greater impact on the region. There was a marked increase in international terrorism in Asia in 1990, primarily because of increased activity by the Communist New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines. At the same time, South Asia suffered from a notable upsurge in terrorism, particularly in Pakistan where the Afghan secret police was responsible for a rash of terrorist attacks. There were several positive developments regarding terrorism in 1990. Eight Western hostages held in the Middle East, including Americans Robert Polhill and Frank Reed, were released from captivity. Furthermore, no Westerners were taken hostage in Lebanon during 1990. Another positive development was the marked decline in terrorism in the Middle East and a reduction in Middle Eastern "spillover" terrorism in other regions. The advent of democracy in Eastern Europe brought a change in East European states' attitudes toward terrorism. The new East European governments were eager to expose the support previous regimes had provided to terrorists, such as East German safe haven for Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorists and Czechoslovak sales of Semtex plastic explosives. Terrorists no longer find official support or safe haven in the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. The trend toward multi-national cooperation on counter- terrorist issues continued during the year. Following major terrorist attacks, such as the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings, the United Nations directed the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop a method of "marking" plastic explosives for pre-blast detection. Substantial work was completed by ICAO members on a convention requiring all manufacturers of plastic explosives to add chemicals to the explosives that would make them easier to detect. An agreement, called the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection was signed in early 1991. Continuing the trend of previous years, a number of important terrorist trials took place in 1990, as governments continued to impose the rule of law on terrorists.
African Regional Review
There were 52 international terrorist incidents in Africa in 1990, just slightly more than in the previous year. The most significant of these incidents occurred in Djibouti in September, when hand- grenades thrown into two downtown cafes killed a child and wounded 17 persons. As in previous years, most acts of terrorism in Africa were conducted by local insurgents. In Liberia, Mozambique, and Somalia, for example, while a few international terrorist incidents took place in the context of bitter struggles against those governments, there were many more incidents of domestic terrorism. When foreigners were involved, they were usually targets of opportunity.
Asia Regional Review
The number of international terrorist incidents in Asia increased dramatically in 1990, from 56 incidents in 1989 to 96. This increase was primarily due to greater activity by Afghan agents in Pakistan and communist guerrillas in the Philippines. The greatest threat to Americans in the region remains in the Philippines, where communist insurgents launched attacks against US facilities and killed five Americans. In South Korea, radical students conducted several attacks against US facilities. Domestic political violence including sectarian and communal violence in India, particularly in Kashmir and Punjab, and the festering insurgency in Sri Lanka also were of concern in 1990.
European Regional Review
Two trends emerge in examining terrorist statistics for Western Europe in 1990. The first is the sharp decline in "spillover" terrorism from the Middle East as compared with previous years (in 1988 there were 29 such incidents, 31 in 1989, and only 8 in 1990). The second is the persistence--and violence --of autonomist groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), and Corsican nationalists. An alarming phenomenon is the continued attacks on Iranian political dissidents residing in Europe by official Iranian hit squads. Swiss authorities confirm official Iranian involvement in the murder of an Iranian dissident in Switzerland, and French authorities suspect that the November murder of an Iranian- American dissident in Paris was the work of Iranian hit men. In Greece, domestic terrorist groups were responsible for several attacks on US and other targets. In September, Greece declined a US extradition request against Palestinian terrorist Muhammad Rashid, charged with involvement in the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am aircraft. Rashid will be prosecuted in Greece. US interests continued to be targets of terrorism in Turkey, where domestic terrorism also increased during the year. Perhaps the most dramatic changes in the last year have come in Eastern Europe, where the fall of communist regimes has undermined the active or passive government support which terrorists had previously enjoyed in that region.
Latin American Regional Overview
The number of international terrorist incidents in Latin America rose to 162 in 1990, higher than any other region. Even so, these figures represent only a small percentage of the total number of terrorist acts committed in Central and South America. In most Latin American countries, the primary targets of guerrillas, narcotics traffickers, and others who engage in terrorism have been domestic--government and law enforcement officials, opinion- makers, and politicians. This was especially true in Colombia, Peru, and El Salvador where the levels of violence have been extremely high. In Peru, for example, of the more than 3,400 terrorist-related deaths in 1990, only six were foreigners. Roughly two-thirds of all anti-US attacks worldwide took place in Latin America, where US citizens and interests were the principal foreign targets of terrorist groups. Various groups have been operating for years in Central and South America and share a radical leftist ideology that, combined with a visible US presence in the region and historical antipathy toward the United States, contributes to the large number of attacks against Americans. Two Americans were killed in 1990--one in Peru and one in Panama--and 31 were wounded. Chile was the most common site of anti- American attacks in Latin America. The number of anti-US attacks there increased from 21 in 1989 to 61 in 1990. Most of these were bombings of Mormon Church facilities in Santiago and other parts of the country. Although narco-terrorist and guerrilla violence continued to plague Colombia, the number of anti-American incidents fell from 39 in 1989 to 25 in 1990. In Peru, with two murderous insurgent groups --Sendero Luminoso and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)--there were 22 anti-American incidents in 1990.
Middle Eastern Regional Overview
The number of international terrorist incidents in the Middle East dropped sharply, from 193 in 1989 to 63 in 1990. The incidence of Middle Eastern terrorist "spillover" into other parts of the world also declined from 43 to 21 attacks. International terrorism by Palestinians declined. Although Iraq encouraged many of the Palestinian terrorist groups to conduct operations against the international coalition opposing Baghdad's invasion of Kuwait, at year's end no such attacks had been carried out. Following the abortive May 30 PLF attack on the beaches at Tel Aviv, President Bush announced his decision to suspend the 18- month-old dialogue between the United States and the PLO. The dialogue began in December 1988, after PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat publicly renounced terrorism, accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and affirmed Israel's right to exist. The PLF is a member of the PLO, and its leader, Abu Abbas, is a member of the PLO executive committee. After the attempted May 30 raid, the PLO refused US calls to condemn the attack, disassociate itself from the PLF, and take steps to discipline Abu Abbas. A number of Palestinian groups, including the PLF and other members of the PLO, have made public statements supporting Iraq and opposing the multi-national forces deployed to enforce the UN resolutions regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein has attempted to portray his aggression against Kuwait as part of the struggle for a Palestinian homeland. Iraq's belligerence and promise of support have attracted those groups long favoring the use of force to solve the Arab-lsraeli conflict. The United States rejects the linkage of these two issues. The PLF, the PIJ, and the PFLP are among those who have threatened terrorist attacks against Western, Israeli, and moderate Arab targets in connection with the Gulf crisis. No new Western hostages were kidnapped this year. Eight Western hostages--including two Americans, Robert Polhill and Frank Reed--were released. Although these are positive developments, Iranian-supported Hezbollah members in Lebanon continue to hold some 14 Western hostages, 6 of them American citizens. Three of these hostages (Englishman Alec Collett, Italian Alberto Molinari, and American Col. William R. Higgins) are feared dead. Despite the decline in the number of international terrorist incidents undertaken by Middle Eastern groups, domestic terrorism continued in Israel, the occupied territories, and Lebanon. The October 8 Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) incident claimed the lives of 17 Arab civilians, killed by Israeli security forces. Internecine conflicts within and between Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist groups added to the violence. Iraq's sponsorship of Palestinian terrorist groups (discussed in the section on state-sponsored terrorism) poses a great threat. Iran's links to Hezbollah, other Islamic fundamentalist groups, and the Palestinians strengthened during the year, increasing the potential that these groups will continue to use terrorism to advance their political goals. The competition for influence in politically unstable Lebanon could also spawn terrorist attacks.
State-Sponsored Terrorism
State sponsorship of terrorism remains one of the most important factors in fostering international terrorism. A number of governments afford terrorists safe haven, travel documents, arms, training, and technical expertise. In addition to support for terrorist groups, some governments engage directly in terrorism as a tool of their foreign and domestic policies. Other governments, though not direct sponsors of terrorist groups, contribute to such groups' capabilities by allowing them unimpeded transit, permitting them to operate commercial enterprises, and allowing them to carry out recruitment and other support activities. Any type of government support for terrorist groups makes law enforcement efforts to counter-terrorism much more difficult. Thus, the United States and its allies in the fight against terrorism have focused on raising the costs for those governments who support, tolerate, and engage in terrorism. The United States currently lists Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria as state supporters of terrorism. This list is maintained pursuant to Section 6 (j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979. This and related US statutes impose trade and other restrictions on countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. The list is sent annually to Congress, though countries can be added or subtracted at any time that circumstances warrant. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen was dropped from the list in 1990 after it merged with its northern neighbor to form the Republic of Yemen. Iraq was added to the list because of its renewed support for terrorist groups in 1990. The international effort to eliminate state support for terrorism has achieved some notable results. International public opinion and cooperation among like-minded governments have generated great pressure on governments to change their behavior or, at a minimum, make significant efforts to hide their involvement in terrorism. This is reflected in the number of terrorist incidents attributable to governments on the US list of state supporters of terrorism. The totals have declined from 176 in 1988 to 58 in 1989 and finally to 54 in 1990. While these numbers are heartening, it should be noted that the investigations into the terrorist bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988 and of UTA Flight 772 in September 1989 continue and could uncover involvement of state sponsors. Indeed, the continuing danger posed by state sponsorship was demonstrated in 1990 by two developments. First, the May 30 abortive seaborne attack by the PLF on crowded Israeli beaches was made possible by Libyan government support for the training, provision, and transportation of the PLF terrorists. While the operation was foiled without civilian casualties, the attack significantly raised tensions in the region and resulted in the termination of the US-PLO dialogue. Had the operation succeeded, it could have led to numerous casualties among bathers on the crowded Tel Aviv public beaches. Second, after Iraq's August invasion of Kuwait, the world saw Iraq assemble an impressive array of terrorist groups aimed at intimidating the international coalition opposed to the invasion. Libya's involvement in terrorism during 1990 went beyond support for the May 30 attack on Israel. Tripoli continued to shelter and aid the notorious Abu Nidal organization, to fund other radical Palestinian groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC), and to support terrorist groups in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Iran continued its use of and support for terrorism in 1990, targeting and assassinating Iranian dissidents overseas, attacking Saudi officials and interests, continuing to support the holders of the American and other Western hostages in Lebanon, and supporting radical Palestinian groups such as the PIJ and the PFLP-GC. Syria continued to give refuge and support to Lebanese, Palestinian, Turkish, Japanese, and Iranian terrorists while maintaining that all attacks on Israel and the occupied territories are legitimate "national liberation" efforts. North Korea continued to harbor some Japanese Red Army (JRA) terrorists and to provide some support to the New People's Army in the Philippines. Cuba continued to supply and support groups that use terrorism in El Salvador, Colombia, Peru, Honduras, and Chile, among others. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

CSCE--Status of Conferences Mandated by Vienna

Date: May 6, 19915/6/91 Category: Fact Sheets Subject: CSCE [TEXT]
THE PROCESS
Heads of state and government signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, setting forth principles and commitments which guide relations among the states of Eastern and Western Europe, Canada, and the United States. Currently, 34 states participate in this forum. From its inception, CSCE served as the bridge across the East- West divide. It set important standards of state behavior, particularly in the human rights area. Through holding the East accountable to those standards, the West has used the CSCE process to foster democratic and economic reform. In signing the Paris Charter* for a New Europe in November 1990, President Bush and his 33 counterparts strengthened the CSCE by enhancing its structure and political consultations so that it can play a more active role in building a post-Cold War community of stable, prosperous, and democratic states. The Paris Charter reiterated basic Helsinki commitments and also established a small CSCE Secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw. It also endorsed the concept of greater parliamentary involvement in CSCE, leaving parliamentarians of CSCE states to decide on the modalities for such involvement. It also set up a series of intensified political consultations among the 34 participating states.
CSCE CALENDAR OF EVENTS
A new round of talks on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)--began in March 1989 and will continue until March 1992.
Meetings in 1990
-- Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe (March-April); -- Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (June); -- Palma de Mallorca meeting on the Mediterranean (September-October); -- New York meeting of CSCE foreign ministers (October); -- Paris CSCE summit (November).
Meetings in 1991
-- Valletta meeting of Experts on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (January-February); -- Krakow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage (May-June); -- Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers (June); -- Geneva meeting of Experts on National Minorities (July); -- Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (September-October). Our attendance at this meeting is conditional on continued Soviet human rights improvements and provision of open access. -- Oslo Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions (November). The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in Paris on November 1990, following negotiations conducted within the CSCE framework by the 22 nations of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. The follow-on negotiations are currently aimed at further strengthening security and stability, including through measures to limit the personnel strength of conventional forces in the area of application. Also, at the Paris summit, the 34 CSCE member states agreed to a new set of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that build on the existing regime of notifications and observations of military exercises. The next full CSCE Follow-up Meeting, which begins in March 1992 in Helsinki, will review the implementation of CSCE commitments by signatory states, survey the results of inter- sessional and other meetings since 1989, and set the future course for the CSCE process. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 18, May 6, 1991 Title:

American Foreign Policy: Foreign Affairs Press Briefings and Treaties, 1987

Date: May 6, 19915/6/91 Category: Features Region: MidEast/North Africa, Eurasia, Central America Country: Iraq, Iran, South Africa, Kuwait, USSR (former) Subject: History, International Law, Arms Control, Nuclear Nonproliferation, State Department, Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT]
State Department Releases American Foreign Policy Volume Supplement on Microfiche
The Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, has released American Foreign Policy: Foreign Affairs Press Briefings and Treaties, 1987, Supplement. This microfiche publication contains the transcripts of the special press briefings by senior Department and White House officials on foreign policy issues and all the formal daily press briefings conducted by the Department's spokesman during 1987. Also included are the treaties, protocols, and agreements signed by the United States in 1987, specifically those international agreements requiring formal Senate consent in the ratification process. This publication supplements the official record of principal messages, addresses, statements, and briefings in the printed volume American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1987, published in December 1988. These briefings cover major developments in US-Soviet relations, including the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington, DC, establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, and the reexamination of the US embassy construction project in Moscow. They document US objectives in the Persian Gulf and reactions to events in the region, with special focus on the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark, the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships, and the US attack on the Iranian Rashadat platform. The Iran arms and Contra aid investigations, the Central American Peace Agreement and American peace efforts in that region, the US-Canadian trade agreement, the Venice economic summit, and US policy toward Southern Africa also are covered. The documents are presented in two parts. Part I contains Department of State daily press briefings and the Department of State and White House Special Briefings and Press Conferences held in 1987. Following many of the daily briefings are "Posted Statements," which are the written responses to reporters' specific inquiries. Part II contains treaties, protocols, and agreements concluded by the United States in 1987. An accompanying 111-page printed guide contains lists of all briefings and treaties included in the microfiche, the names and positions of all on-the-record briefers, and a comprehensive index for both parts. In addition to the 1987 volume, annual printed volumes for 1981-89 have been published, along with annual microfiche supplements for 1981 through 1988. A supplement for 1989 will be published later this year. Copies of this microfiche publication (GPO Stock No. 044- 000- 02297-4, 5,200 pp. on 57 microfiche cards) may be purchased for $25.00 from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. For further information, contact: Sherrill B. Wells, Office of the Historian, (202) 663-1149. (###)