US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991


US Expands Kurdish Relief Efforts

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Opening statement at White House news conference, Washington, DC Date: Apr 16, 19914/16/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey Subject: Military Affairs, Refugees, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] Eleven days ago, on April 5th, I announced that the United States would initiate what soon became the largest US relief effort mounted in modern military history. Such an undertaking was made necessary by the terrible human tragedy unfolding in and around Iraq as a result of Saddam Hussein's brutal treatment of Iraqi citizens. Within 48 hours, our operation was providing scores of tons of food, water, coats, tents, blankets, and medicines to the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq and southern Turkey. The scale of this effort is truly unprecedented. Yet the fact remains that the scale of the problem is even greater. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds are in difficult-to-reach mountain areas in southern Turkey and along the Turkish-Iraq border. The government of Turkey, along with US, British, and French military units, and numerous international organizations, have launched a massive relief operation. But despite these efforts, hunger, malnutrition, disease, and exposure are taking their grim toll. No one can see the pictures or hear the accounts of this human suffering-men, women, and most painfully of all, innocent children- and not be deeply moved. It is for this reason that this afternoon, following consultations with Prime Minister Major [UK], President Mitterrand [France], President Ozal of Turkey, Chancellor Kohl [Germany] this morning, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, I'm announcing an expanded-a greatly expanded-and more ambitious relief effort. The approach is quite simple: if we cannot get adequate food, medicine, clothing, and shelter to the Kurds living in the mountains along the Turkish-Iraq border, we must encourage the Kurds to move to areas in northern Iraq where the geography facilitates rather than frustrates such a large-scale relief effort. Consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 688 and working closely with the UN and other international relief organizations and our European partners, I have directed the US military to begin immediately to establish several encampments in northern Iraq where relief supplies for these refugees will be made available in large quantities and distributed in an orderly way. I can well appreciate that many Kurds have good reason to fear for their safety if they return to Iraq. And let me reassure them that adequate security will be provided at these temporary sites by US, British, and French air and ground forces, again consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 688. We are hopeful that others in the coalition will join this effort. I want to underscore that all that we are doing is motivated by humanitarian concerns. We continue to expect the government of Iraq not to interfere in any way with this latest relief effort. The prohibition against Iraqi fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel thus remains in effect. And I want to stress that this new effort, despite its scale and scope, is not intended as a permanent solution to the plight of the Iraqi Kurds. To the contrary, it is an interim measure designed to meet an immediate, penetrating humanitarian need. Our long- term objective remains the same-for Iraqi Kurds and, indeed, for all Iraqi refugees, wherever they are, to return home and to live in peace, free from repression, free to live their lives. I also want to point out that we're acutely concerned about the problem of the Iraqi refugees now along the Iran-Iraq border and in Iran. I commend the members of the European Community for their efforts to alleviate hardship in this area. We, ourselves, have offered to contribute to international efforts designed to meet this humanitarian challenge. As I stated earlier, the relief effort being announced here today constitutes an undertaking different in scale and approach. What is not different is basic policy. All along, I have said that the United States is not going to intervene militarily in Iraq's internal affairs and risk being drawn into a Vietnam-style quagmire. This remains the case. Nor will we become an occupying power with US troops patrolling the streets of Baghdad. We intend to turn over the administration of and security for these sites as soon as possible to the UN, just as we are fulfilling our commitment to withdraw our troops and hand over responsibility to UN forces along Iraq's southern border, the border with Kuwait. But we must do everything in our power to save innocent life. This is the American tradition, and we will continue to live up to that tradition.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991 Title:

Crisis of Refugees ∧ Displaced Persons

Lyman Source: Princeton N. Lyman, Director of the Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee Date: Apr 15, 19914/15/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Iran, Turkey Subject: Refugees [TEXT] I appreciate this opportunity to address the crisis of the refugees and displaced people of Iraq. As you know, I have just returned from a trip to the region and to Geneva regarding this important and urgent issue. Everyone here has likely seen the TV footage of the people affected and the horrors of it. From cities and villages; from all across the north and parts of the south of Iraq; Kurds, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Shias, and Sunnis; 11.2 million people have had to flee their homes. Many, too many by even one, have died in mountain passes shorn of support or before even making it there.
Background to the Crisis
I would note that movements of refugees and displaced persons during the Persian Gulf crisis can be divided into three stages: -- From August 2, the date of the invasion, through mid- January 1991; -- The armed conflict, January 17 February 28; and -- Post-war. From August to mid-October, more than 1 million people of numerous nationalities fled Iraq and Kuwait into the neighboring states of Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Except for the Kuwaitis, who fled to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, these people were overwhelmingly third-country nationals. With the aid of the international community or their own governments, it was possible to repatriate these expatriate workers in Iraq and Kuwait out of the region and to their home countries. The international community organized rapidly to provide humanitarian relief to this sudden and large flow of people. There were no confirmed reports of death due to starvation or disease. Food and water supplies as well as sanitation and health care in the camps were adequate. Finally, the international effort to repatriate the displaced persons, directed by the International Organization for Migration, went very, very well. By mid-October, the flow of displaced persons from Iraq and Kuwait slowed to a trickle, and the burden on the neighboring states and the international community subsided. The international community provided nearly $300 million for the operation. From October to January, as the potential for hostilities increased, the international community began to plan for a second large migration of refugees and displaced persons. Under the coordination of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), the UN developed a Regional Action Plan to move adequate supplies into the area, upgrade and expand camp sites, and provide a management system in Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which had played an important role in the previous assistance activities, also drafted an operational plan. Both UNDRO and ICRC issued funding appeals- for $175 million and $112 million, respectively-predicated on 400,000 refugees. Donors pledged about $136 million to both appeals. The United States provided $7.6 million in cash and food aid. Migration from Iraq and Kuwait following January 16 was extremely low, which is why the appeals were not fully funded. By the end of March, only about 65,000 people had fled to the neighboring states, most of them (about 45,000) to Iran. Iraq's closure of its border with Turkey, coalition air activity against Scud and other military sites in western Iraq, and the concentration of ground combat to the south all served to limit the migration. Although some relief infrastructure was, thus, already in place in Turkey and Iran, and more was planned, no one foresaw the magnitude of the civil conflict which caused the latest massive migration of Kurds and other Iraqi civilians. In addressing the current crisis, I would like to focus on three particular facets of this situation that bear upon how we respond: the magnitude of the problem, the rapidity of the build-up, and the difficulties in reaching these people.
. Today, there are more than 1.4 million people who have crossed into Iran and the Turkey border region, and many more displaced from their homes who are fleeing to the border areas. About 1 million of the above have fled to Iran and 500,000-700,000 are just across the border. There are some 400,000 people on the Turkey-Iraq border and perhaps 300,000 more approaching it. The UN places the number of displaced who may need urgent assistance at 1.5 million, but that is only what has been clearly identified so far. Witnesses report empty cities in northern Iraq, suggesting perhaps half or more of northern Iraq's population of 3-5 million may be in flight. In the south, there are some 27,000 people getting assistance from US forces. Although the numbers here are smaller, there are special problems of protection that I will discuss below.
Rapidity of the build-up
. It is not just the numbers but the rapidity of the build-up with which this crisis has unfolded that has made it so enormous. A month after the hostilities ended, February 28, there were no more than 50,000 refugees in surrounding countries. Just 2 weeks before April 8, the day Secretary Baker looked out on 40,000 refugees at Cukurca, Turkey, a UN team had surveyed the same spot and found no one there. Since Secretary Baker's visit, 1 week ago, the number at Cukurca may have doubled. The numbers are mounting so fast that estimates change daily if not by the hour. Perhaps 20,000 persons enter the Turkey-Iraq border area every day. In Iran, the number of refugees went from 300,000 to 700,000 in 5 days and to 900,000 3 days later. Preparations by the UN, as far back as January to receive even as many as 400,000 refugees in the entire region, were swamped by this explosion of human need. A UN appeal issued on April 5 had to be revised dramatically upward April 9, and already it is out of date.
It is not uncommon for refugees to flee into areas bereft of support, areas without good land, water, roads. Refugees cannot choose. In many cases, they are fleeing for their lives. But in this instance, the problems posed are especially difficult. The border areas of Turkey and Iraq are mountainous; the weather is cold; snow and rain are still falling. Few of the areas of concentration are reachable by roads. People are not in camps but stretched out along a line 165 miles long. This is, in short, a logistics nightmare. In Iran, the conditions are only somewhat better, but the numbers are even greater. Mounting a sufficient relief effort in these conditions takes tremendous resources and-unfortunately-time. There can be short- cuts, such as air drops, and others I will mention below. But to establish a sustained and steady pipeline of the most basic human services for the number of people in this region-food, shelter, water, minimum health care-demands a logistics effort of enormous scope. This is what the world is rushing to provide. A major turning point in addressing this crisis was the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 688 on April 5. This resolution condemns Saddam's oppression of the civilian population as a threat to international peace and security in the region. It insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to "all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq." It requests the Secretary General to pursue humanitarian efforts in Iraq, to use all relevant UN agencies to address the critical needs of the refugees and displaced, and to report on the plight of all those, especially the Kurds, suffering from the repression. The resolution appeals to all member states and humanitarian organizations to contribute to the relief efforts. Finally, UNSC [Resolution] 688 demands that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary General to these ends. This resolution gives exceptional scope as well as urgency to the UN humanitarian effort both within Iraq's borders and for the refugees. The Secretary General has appointed Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as his Executive Delegate [for Humanitarian Assistance for Iraqi Refugees] to oversee the humanitarian programs for Iraq, Kuwait, and border areas. Prince Sadruddin has designated UNHCR [Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees] as the lead agency. The Secretary General also has designated Ambassador [Eric] Suy to assess the plight of the repressed and displaced. Donor nations are already providing assistance at increasingly significant levels, in direct response to UNSC [Resolution] 688, requests of the United Nations for assistance, our own approaches to donor governments. It is in this context that I would like to turn to the efforts underway in each theater.
Turkey-Iraq border
. I will start with Turkey from which I have just returned following Secretary Baker's visit. As I mentioned, there are more than 400,000 people now in this region and more arriving every day. They are stretched along a border 165 miles long, in perhaps 10-15 concentrations. They are on both sides of the border: in some cases, the border is irrelevant as concentrations spread over both sides. The government of Turkey has not distinguished between those on either side of the border in this region. Assistance and protection are being provided to all. The Turkish Red Crescent Society, a highly proficient organization, is devoting much of its personnel and resources to this effort and is serving as a principal channel for assistance from many parts of the world. The regional governor is diverting resources from the Turkish population in his area of responsibility to the needs of refugees. Road-building crews are working through the dark of night to open up relief routes. Turkish villagers and citizens from all over the country are donating food, clothing, and other items for the refugees. But, there is no way the government and people of Turkey could manage this crisis alone. A massive international effort is underway. Because of the urgency and magnitude of the crisis, a two-pronged strategy is being employed. -- A massive effort by the US military is underway at this very moment to save the lives of up to 700,000 people in this region for the next 30 days. This operation involves more than 40 C-130s, close to 60 helicopters, 75-100 small tactical vehicles, a civil affairs battalion, two medical holding companies, a Seabees construction battalion, and massive amounts of food, tents, blankets, and medical supplies. Air drops began over 1 week ago. But the present effort will deliver supplies much more efficiently, directly to sites, first by helicopter and as soon as possible by ground transport. Other donors are joining in this effort. Australia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and the EC [European Community] are all participating with planes and helicopters as well as supplies. An international task force coordinates this effort, just as it did during Desert Storm. This past weekend, supplies from this operation began arriving at Uludere, one of the worst sites in the region. Visited last Wednesday by our Ambassador, Mort Abramowitz, together with Governor Kozakcioglu, Uludere contains 80,000 people mired in rain and mud with virtually no shelter or sources of support. Private agencies such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, Save the Children, the International Rescue Committee, CARE, and others are flying in supplies and personnel as well. -- The second prong is an international effort under UN leadership. The US military and allied operation is a massive but short-term effort. It is designed to save people's lives until the international relief effort, led by the UN, is fully operational. The military effort will greatly facilitate the UN program, by building storage facilities, opening up roads, and stabilizing the condition of the refugees. The UN must take over with a fully organized pipeline of support, reaching down to the refugees, with logistics, health and sanitation personnel, and with the funds to fully support and sustain the program. The UN effort, supported by donors from all over the world, is already under way. As part of earlier preparations under the UN Regional Plan of Action, the UN had food for 20,000 persons and other supplies for 100,000 when the crisis began. Those, of course, are all now depleted. Millions of dollars of additional supplies are coming in; the international staff is expanding; an information system with donors [is] being established; coordination mechanisms [are] being put in place. A USAID [US Agency for International Development] Disaster Assistance Reconnaissance Team is on the ground in Turkey assisting the US military and providing a technical bridge from the US-led to the UN-led program. Finally, our embassy in Ankara has deployed teams to the field, to provide essential liaison between USAID and DOD [US Department of Defense] officials and Turkish authorities.
Iran was in some ways better prepared to meet the crisis than Turkey. Its Red Crescent organization had large-scale relief experience from the 8-year Iran-Iraq war and from devastating earthquakes. As many as 10,000 Iranians have had disaster relief training. The build-up also began earlier there, and the UN and the ICRC had begun expanding supplies and personnel as the numbers grew. As noted earlier, the terrain has not been as formidable as that on the Turkish side. Iran has now called for massive international help. It has announced readiness to receive international relief flights. The ICRC, by the end of this week, will be caring for 200,000 people in this theater, the UNHCR 100,000. More, of course, must be done urgently. Our contributions to date have been through international agencies, primarily the UN and the ICRC. We have asked Iran to define their needs.
Southern Iraq
The area occupied by US forces poses a special problem. Some 27,000 persons have been receiving food, medical care, and other help in this area, and more have received supplies to take to other areas. The UNHCR has accepted the responsibility for taking over assistance and protection of people in this area once US forces withdraw. The ICRC also will have a presence here. The UN also will have an observer force patrolling a 15-kilometer wide demilitarized zone along the border. We are concerned that Iraq not violate the rights of the people in this area when US forces withdraw. UNSC [Resolution] 688 demands that Iraq cooperate with the UN in carrying out relief and assistance programs. The UN presence will hopefully act as more than a witness to Iraqi behavior but as deterrence to any persecution.
The Scope of the Effort
I noted at the beginning of my testimony that there have been three stages of refugee or displaced persons movement since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait August 2 of last year. The first involved 1 million foreign workers who were repatriated to their home countries. The international community mobilized nearly $300 million for this effort. The second stage, during the hostilities January-February of this year, addressed the needs of 65,000 persons and stockpiled materiel for many more. This stage cost $136 million. Thus, even before the third, current crisis occurred, over $400 million had been spent on refugees and displaced persons in this region. Now facing this overwhelming new wave of humanity, we are only beginning to grasp its requirements. New UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent appeals have been issued for $700 million, and these cover in most cases no more than 3 months. The costs will surely rise dramatically by year's end. So far, in a space of 2 weeks, over $270 million has been pledged for this latest period, and more pledges are coming in constantly. The US contribution to the above is over $53 million and growing. Over $28 million of this total has been contributed in food aid, OFDA [Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance] assistance, and drawdowns from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance fund. US military assistance to the effort for the refugees from northern and southern Iraq, including operational costs of the massive relief effort, is estimated to be in excess of $25 million and, further, is expected to increase substantially over the next 30 days. Perhaps one of the most acute shortages is relief management and logistics expertise. The international community was providing protection and assistance to 15 million refugees worldwide when this crisis erupted. The UN, NGOs [non-governmental organizations], and other repositories of such skills were already heavily engaged. Now we need many more such people.
Even as this major effort gets underway, three special problems will complicate further our task. In the current circumstances, the Turkish government has readily acknowledged the need for international assistance and has asked the UN to organize the relief effort that will succeed current US activities. Problems remain on both the Turkish and UN sides, however, especially in deploying international relief workers into the region and to refugee concentration points. But we are hopeful they will soon be overcome.
Obstacles to repatriation
. Everyone agrees that the desired outcome of this situation is for these people to be able to return home voluntarily. Maintaining them on the border for any long period of time conjures up visions of another Gaza Strip. Yet, what is required for people who fled a killer regime to be able to return home safely? One step is to establish a UN and ICRC presence not only to where people have moved but also in the areas from which people fled, under the authority of UNSC [Resolution] 688. Coupled with humanitarian assistance from these organizations, it is hoped that this will enable people to return home safely. We are at the very beginning of this process, and it is too early to know exactly how it will unfold. It goes beyond the concept of an "enclave." It aims at providing an international humanitarian presence and relief wherever needed in the country, so that people can stay as close to, and eventually return, home. We have added to our earlier warning to Iraq that it is not to take any actions which interfere with relief activities in any part of the country. This crisis has attracted world attention and rightfully world sympathy. Unfortunately, it comes at the same time as other less publicized crises also demanding our attention. Civil unrest in Somalia has uprooted 350,000 people into Ethiopia whose condition is perilous. The number of Liberian refugees has grown beyond the expectations and budget of UNHCR. A drought in Sudan threatens famine of massive proportions. These crises also demand our attention and our resources. Both in money and personnel, international humanitarian responses and capability-and, indeed, attention-will be stretched thin. Yet, as much as possible, we must endeavor to respond to this emergency in Iraq without doing it at the cost of others. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991 Title:

Remarks on Iraqi Refugees

Baker, Aga Khan Source: Remarks by Secretary Baker and Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Description: Geneva, Switzerland Date: Apr 12, 19914/12/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Iran, Turkey [TEXT] Secretary Baker: Let me simply say that I value the opportunity to have met here this afternoon with my friend and colleague His Highness, who will be heading this effort for the UN, and with the international relief agency heads. The visit that I took to the Turkish border 4 or 5 days ago revealed, as I indicated at that time, a massive human tragedy. A tragedy that is almost beyond belief, when you see it there on the ground, as we did-hundreds of thousands of people homeless, without shelter, without food, without clean water, without medical supplies, struggling actually to simply survive and live through each day. A situation that simply cannot be permitted to continue. The only answer in the immediate and short term is for there to be a massive international relief effort literally to save lives. And that's what has been set in motion here in Geneva. That is what the UN is moving to accomplish. That, of course, is also what the United States, through its very, very substantial military airlift efforts, is trying to contribute to. And that's why we are so pleased by the appointment of Sadruddin Aga Khan; we welcome so very much his efforts to coordinate this relief assistance. I don't know whether His Highness wants to say anything or not, but please let me give you the mike. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan: Well, Mr. Secretary, I'd like to thank you, on behalf of all my colleagues here in Geneva, for giving us so much of your time, and for listening to the point of view of the UN agencies as we face this monumental human tragedy. I think you have identified the problems, the suffering. You were there. Many of us are going to the area in the coming days and weeks, and I think we will share your assessment. We now need the support of the international community as a whole. We cannot achieve lasting solutions without the help of many donor countries. And I think the High Commissioner for Refugees, which will play a leading role in this operation for the UN, is looking for the opportunity of creating incentives for people to go home. There is no better solution than voluntary repatriation. It's easier to open camps than to close them. And what we have to do is to look down the road, make sure that people are helped now, that they don't die of hunger and exposure, that women and children can survive on both sides of the border-all the vulnerable groups-but then look for lasting solutions. I think the talks today will help us to chart the way. And with your support and the support of so many major donor countries, the UN will certainly, in the coming days, do everything it can to go toward a solution of this disastrous, monumental human tragedy. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991 Title:

Proposed International Cooperation Act of 1991

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Letter to Congress, Washington, DC Date: Apr 12, 19914/12/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Country: United States Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Arms Control, State Department [TEXT] Following is the text of identical letters to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. Dear Mr. President: I attach great importance to the proposed "International Cooperation Act of 1991," which we are submitting for congressional consideration. Secretary Baker and I look forward to working closely with the Congress to ensure its prompt enactment. Events in recent months have dramatically illustrated the growing urgency for flexible and rapidly available economic, military, and humanitarian assistance as a vital instrument of American foreign policy. Before us loom international opportunities and challenges as promising as any our nation has faced since the end of the Second World War. Yet the law governing foreign assistance has become so complex, splintered and restrictive that it no longer serves our essential national interests and aspirations. The shortcomings of existing law are likely to become even more pronounced and damaging as we move ahead through the volatile transition to a new world order. Together, we must regain the essentials of administrative simplicity, flexibility, accountability, and clarity of purpose that originally characterized the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The world, of course, has changed fundamentally since then, especially during the two years following our last effort to reform the law governing foreign assistance. What have not changed, however, are the basic values and national outlook that motivate our foreign assistance. My overarching goal is for the United States to remain at the forefront of a world community that is increasingly democratic, market-oriented, and willing and able to cooperate against aggression. The urgently needed reforms I propose would restore the necessary coherence and flexibility to pursue effectively the five basic and closely inter-related objectives that now frame our foreign policy: promoting and consolidating democratic values, promoting market principles and strengthening US competitiveness, promoting peace, protecting against transnational threats, and meeting urgent humanitarian needs. All of the continuing programs that have been included in the proposed legislation are essential to our national interest, at least in the short run. I fully recognize, however, that pressures to adjust to new international realities are rapidly increasing, and, in the years immediately ahead, we must work energetically together to meet the new challenges they are producing. We must also reach these important, if difficult, decisions within the constraints imposed by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. In my March 6 address to the Joint Session of Congress, I observed that our nation cannot lead internationally if we propose politics as usual in devising and implementing foreign assistance. I asked Congress to work with me to put an end to micromanagement of all of our foreign economic, security, and humanitarian assistance programs. Each of these programs must become part of a coherent strategy that will advance a foreign policy worthy of our deepest and most abiding national aspirations. Without the flexibility provided for in the proposed International Cooperation Act, it will be impossible to forge such coherence and to sustain the international leadership that we both desire. On my part, I pledge to work closely and cooperatively with the Congress throughout each stage of the foreign policy-making process so that you can fully meet your responsibilities under the Constitution. But I am also convinced that we will be unable to deal with the momentous-and often unpredictable-events of today's world if Congress continues to restrict presidential prerogatives. Such micromanagement must not be part of this legislation. In seeking to restore the proper balance of congressional and presidential authority in the conduct of foreign policy, the Administration's proposal deletes the many restrictions, prohibitions, burdensome reports, unnecessary reporting requirements, and statutory waiting periods that have accumulated over several decades. The proposed revisions will significantly strengthen our capacity to respond positively and effectively to a rapidly changing environment, while reducing the risk of missed opportunities. The restitution of presidential authorities would extend to all aspects of the proposed legislation. One especially sensitive and important area concerns nuclear nonproliferation. Consistent with our approach of removing country-specific provisions, the Administration's proposal does not contain a specific provision on assistance to Pakistan, as stipulated in the current Foreign Assistance Act. Nevertheless, I give the Congress my unequivocal assurance that my position on the critical issue of preventing nuclear proliferation in South Asia and elsewhere will not weaken. While the proposed elimination of the Pakistan-specific certification requirement is intended to uphold the general principle of presidential authority, I will continue to insist on unambiguous specific steps by Pakistan in meeting nonproliferation standards, including those specifically reflected in the omitted language, known as the Pressler Amendment. Satisfaction of the Pressler standard will remain the essential basis for exercising the national interest waiver that is in the Administration's proposal in order to resume economic and military assistance to Pakistan. By adopting this policy firmly and publicly as the Administration's position, my intention is to send the strongest possible message to Pakistan and other potential proliferators that nonproliferation is among the highest priorities of my Administration's foreign policy, irrespective of whether such a policy is required by law. The proposed legislation addresses many complex and difficult issues, with profound political and moral implications for America's global role. But the world we seek to influence is in the throes of an historic transition that creates special opportunities and responsibilities for our nation. The process by which we resolve our differences will be as important to the effectiveness of our foreign policy as the decisions finally taken. I hope that you will find this proposal to be an appropriate foundation for building such cooperation, and moving forward to revitalize foreign assistance so as to serve better our most fundamental values and interests. Sincerely, GEORGE BUSH (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991 Title:

International Cooperation Act of 1991: Background

Date: Apr 12, 19914/12/91 Category: Fact Sheets Country: United States Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Arms Control, State Department [TEXT] On April 12, 1991, the Administration transmitted the International Cooperation Act of 1991 to the Congress. This legislation would replace existing laws governing US foreign assistance programs and establish a framework tailored to the challenges of a new era. President Bush, Secretary Baker, and USAID Administrator Roskens attach great importance to this bill, and they look forward to working closely with the Congress to ensure the bill's prompt and successful enactment. Our task is vital and urgent. The current challenge-to identify and quickly move substantial resources to aid desperate Kurdish refugees-is only the latest illustration of why this new legislation is so badly needed. Three major concerns guided preparation of the proposed legislation: -- To regain foreign assistance as an effective and well- integrated instrument of foreign policy; -- To restore the President's authority to use this instrument as it was originally intended, as a flexible cost-effective means to advance our national interest, rather than permitting it to remain hostage to narrow special interests protected by heavily earmarked accounts; and -- To strengthen bipartisan cooperation and public support for this bill and, more generally, for our post-Cold War foreign policy. The current Foreign Assistance Act was enacted 30 years ago, in 1961, at the height of the Cold War. The world has changed and continues to change rapidly; democracy is expanding, and the United States faces new challenges. When originally passed, the act gave the President the necessary authority and flexibility to address the critical challenges of the day. Over time, and with a shrinking budget, the legislation has ballooned to encompass some 33 distinct and often conflicting objectives, with reporting requirements and other restrictions so onerous that they often defeat the bill's stated purposes. Three years ago, key members of Congress wisely concluded that current legislation had lost touch with reality and ill-served our national interests and ideals. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, led by Chairman Dante Fascell and ranking Minority Member William Broomfield, produced a major aid reform package, commonly known as the Hamilton/Gilman bill. The proposed legislation took the earlier House bill as its starting point, building on the important work of members and staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In December 1990, these members wrote to ask that the Administration engage the Congress this year on new foreign assistance legislation. We are doing that. Since 1989, the historic international developments that helped focus the reform effort in Congress have accelerated. We now seek, therefore, authorities that are even more in line with the essential flexibility, administrative simplicity, and clarity of purpose of the original 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. Our overarching concern is to regain sufficient authority to allow the President to use the resources envisioned under this bill to achieve five closely inter-related foreign policy objectives: -- Promoting and consolidating democratic values; -- Promoting market principles and the strengthening of US competitiveness; -- Promoting peace; -- Protecting against transnational threats; and -- Meeting humanitarian needs. Collectively, these five objectives-as described in the proposed bill-should comprise the measure of American leadership for decades to come. We recognize that adapting existing programs to advance these ideals could occasionally strain the goodwill that now exists between Congress and the President. We believe that the proposed legislation sets a solid foundation for cooperation. On our part, we are determined to work closely and cooperatively with Congress throughout each stage of the foreign policy making process. To effect a successful transformation of foreign assistance into a more relevant foreign policy instrument capable of fostering mutually beneficial cooperation with other nations, we recommend simplifying existing authorities in many important ways, including by: -- Consolidating USAID economic development assistance accounts into one account; -- Amending substantially the Arms Export Control Act; -- Cutting back sharply the provisions that restrict assistance to particular countries; -- Authorizing a broader range of assistance, even to countries for which assistance is otherwise prohibited; -- Liberalizing waivers and other flexibility authorities; and -- Expanding contingency authorities, including following up a suggestion by Chairman Fascell to provide the President with a small but potentially significant fund to assist democratizing nations. The reforms contained in the proposed legislation raise many complex and difficult issues for both branches of government. Building and sustaining bipartisan consensus for the reforms and the programs that would follow will be critical. Our foreign policy, like the world it seeks to influence, is in the early stages of an unprecedented transition. We hope that this bill, once enacted, will provide the means that will allow us to continue to lead an international community that is increasingly receptive to democracy, market economics, and cooperation against aggression. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991 Title:

Updating and Streamlining Foreign Assistance Law

Date: Apr 12, 19914/12/91 Category: Fact Sheets Country: United States Subject: Arms Control, Development/Relief Aid, State Department, International Law [TEXT]
Updating and Streamlining Foreign Assistance Law
The Administration's bill comprehensively updates and streamlines existing foreign assistance law. Its goal is to make the law easier to understand and administer. The following points illustrate the kind of changes the Administration is proposing in this connection: --
Development Assistance
. Under current law, there are eight separate accounts for development assistance, each with its own set of requirements and priorities on how to use development assistance funds. Under the new approach, there would be a single account. --
Objectives and Priorities
. In 1989, the House Foreign Affairs Committee Task Force on Foreign Assistance reported that there were 33 competing "objectives" scattered through the current Foreign Assistance Act, and 75 separate "priorities" for economic assistance. The result is that the objectives are clouded and nothing can really be considered a priority. Our bill would establish five clearly articulated objectives that would serve as the basis for all our foreign assistance programs. --
Congressional Notifications.
Under current law, the US Agency for International Development is subject to extensive notify-and-wait provisions before providing certain funding. In the last year, it has had to submit nearly 1,000 such notifications, covering even relatively minor proposals. A large portion of these notifications are completely routine and do nothing but cause delays. Under our bill, we estimate the number of notifications would be cut in half. --
Arms Sales
. Under current law, there are six separate congressional notification requirements for arms transfers. Under our bill, there would be one provision-governing all such transfers-with one set of clearly articulated procedures. --
Excess Defense Articles
. Under current law, there are four separate provisions regarding the provision of excess defense articles. Our bill would consolidate them into one. --
Prohibitions on Assistance
. Under current law, scores of restrictions on assistance to particular countries are scattered throughout the Foreign Assistance Act, as well as a variety of annual acts that Congress has passed over the last 30 years. The scattering of these restrictions makes them more difficult to explain and apply. Our bill would organize the restrictions in one place and provide clear guidance for those responsible for administering foreign assistance programs.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991 Title:

Cambodia and Vietnam: Time for Peace and Normalization

Solomon Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Apr 10, 19914/10/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Cambodia, Vietnam Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] I welcome this opportunity to review our continuing efforts to achieve a political settlement to the Cambodia conflict. After nearly 2 years of diplomatic activity-first in the context of the Paris conference on Cambodia (PCC) [International Conference on Cambodia, Paris, France, July 30, 1989] in the summer of 1989, and since the fall of that year in the framework of the deliberations of the UN Security Council's five permanent members-[China, France, USSR, UK, US-UN Perm Five]-we have reached a critical point in our efforts to construct a political settlement process. A comprehensive settlement agreement is now within reach, if the Cambodian parties and others-including Vietnam-will cooperate. As we approach what is hopefully a resolution of this tragic situation, I know that Secretary Baker believes your concern and your personal support remain vital to the settlement process.
The Paris Conference Creates Momentum
We have come a long way toward a settlement in these past 2 years. After a decade of military occupation of Cambodia, Vietnam announced 2 years ago this month its intention to withdraw its forces by the end of September 1989. In response, and in order to prevent ongoing warfare, France, Indonesia, and other interested countries joined together to convene an international conference to create a political settlement process. The Paris conference on Cambodia met throughout August 1989. Delegations from the four Cambodian factions, 18 countries, and the United Nations attempted to build a settlement process based on a formula in which the Cambodian factions would share power until elections were held under UN auspices. Ultimately, the conference was unable to resolve the central issue of power-sharing during the interim period leading up to elections. Hanoi and the Phnom Penh regime were not prepared to accept the establishment of a provisional coalition administration under Prince Sihanouk to guide the country to democratic elections. Phnom Penh was clear in its refusal to share power with anyone before elections were held under its unilateral authority. Those involved in the resistance did not see this as an opportunity for meaningful elections. Although the Paris conference did not achieve a breakthrough, a positive diplomatic momentum was established. The PCC confirmed the necessity of a comprehensive settlement, reached a virtual consensus that the United Nations must play a significant role in any settlement process, and made progress on many of the specific elements involved in peacekeeping, international guarantees for Cambodia's sovereignty and rehabilitation and repatriation.
A Settlement Approach Involving an Enhanced UN Role
An alternative formula was subsequently developed which would create neutral political conditions in Cambodia, allowing all political parties to compete on an equal basis in free and fair elections organized and conducted by the UN. An attempt was made to break the impasse among the four Cambodian factions-the Sihanoukists, the KPNLF [Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front], the Phnom Penh regime, and the Khmer Rouge-by conceiving of Cambodian sovereignty embodied in a supreme national council of individuals reflecting the spectrum of political opinion in Cambodia. And the potential UN role was expanded from traditional peacekeeping and election operations to include responsibility for administrative oversight as well. Prince Sihanouk had been advocating an enhanced UN role for some time, and Congressman [Stephen] Solarz expressed his support for this approach in the spring of 1989. Secretary Baker discussed such a settlement effort with his UN Perm Five and ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] counterparts in September at the 1989 UN General Assembly and instructed those of us within the State Department with responsibility for Cambodian affairs to begin planning for an approach that would build on the accomplishments of the Paris conference. Australia's Foreign Minister [Gareth] Evans added his support for a settlement based on an enhanced UN role in late November 1989, and the Australian government, subsequently, developed a series of planning papers and diplomatic efforts that have provided important intellectual and political support for the UN settlement process.
The Perm Five Process
Representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council began meeting regularly in Paris and New York in January 1990. During the subsequent 8 months, they succeeded in constructing a framework for a comprehensive settlement in which the United Nations would create a secure and politically neutral environment for supervised elections. Since the Perm Five members supported different Cambodian factions, they were able to represent the differing points of view of the contending parties. The momentum developed by the Perm Five process was increased by regional efforts promoted by Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand as well as by our own policy adjustments announced by Secretary Baker in July 1990, which led to our talks with Vietnam and then to direct contacts with the Phnom Penh regime. In these contacts, we have stressed to both Hanoi and Phnom Penh the need for their active support of the Perm Five process if a just and stable political settlement is to be achieved. The Perm Five framework agreement was completed in New York on August 28, 1990. The framework outlines an enhanced UN role in the interim administrative and military arrangements to be put in place before elections are held under UN auspices. It also stresses the importance of human rights protections and international guarantees for the terms of a settlement. The framework includes the following elements: -- Creation of a supreme national council of individuals as the "embodiment of the independence, sovereignty and unity of Cambodia" until a new government is formed after elections; -- A UN-supervised cease-fire, cantonment of the factional military forces, and a phased process of arms control and reduction; and -- Creation of a UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) with the responsibilities of supervising the cease-fire, verifying the withdrawal of all foreign military forces and advisers and the end of all arms supplies to the four factions, monitoring the neutralization of the civil administration, and conducting free and fair elections. We believe the Perm Five formula is the only promising basis for a just and durable settlement, but it requires the active support of all parties involved. It would move the current military conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box. It would give the people of Cambodia the opportunity to choose their own government, and it provides them a non-communist political alternative in the prospective candidacies of Prince Sihanouk and the non-communist groups. We also firmly believe the settlement process is the best- and probably the only-way to provide credible and effective guarantees against a Khmer Rouge return to violent domination of Cambodia. In building the consensus behind the settlement framework, we received close cooperation from the other four permanent members of the Security Council and believe each member remains fully committed to the results of this collective effort. The five were actively supported in their work by interested parties, including the UN Secretary General's Intra-Secretariat Task Force on Cambodia, established in February 1990, as well as by Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, and Japan.
The Perm Five and Paris Conference Efforts Come Together
Developments in the fall of 1990 were very encouraging to further progress toward a settlement. The four Cambodian factions met in Jakarta [Indonesia] in early September under the auspices of the PCC co-chairmen-France and Indonesia. They announced their acceptance of the Perm Five framework agreement as the basis for a Cambodian settlement and formed the Supreme National Council (SNC) as called for in the framework agreement. The framework was endorsed by the full UN Security Council in Resolution 668, passed by a vote of 15-0 on September 20, 1990, and by consensus in the General Assembly on October 15. On November 9 and 10, the PCC co-chairmen convened a "friends of the co-chairmen" meeting in Jakarta. This group included representatives of 12 of the nations participating in the PCC and the UN Secretary General. Under the skillful leadership of Indonesian Foreign Minister [Ali] Alatas, the participants made important progress toward the goal of elaborating the Perm Five framework into the draft of a final settlement agreement. The Perm Five met again in late November in Paris-together with Indonesian and UN representatives-and took the Jakarta documents a major step further toward final form. After a thorough review, the group reached consensus on November 26 on an elaborated set of documents which, in combination, constitute the overall agreement for a comprehensive settlement to be concluded at a reconvened Paris conference. We can say with satisfaction that the work of the Perm Five has received widespread support throughout the international community, not only from the Secretary General of the UN, the entire Security Council, and the General Assembly, but more specifically from the six members of ASEAN and the Cambodian resistance factions. To date, only Phnom Penh and Hanoi have yet to join in the broad international consensus. At a meeting chaired by Paris conference co-chairmen Dumas and Alatas in Paris in late December, in which a representative of the UN Secretary General also participated, the SNC members reviewed the November 26 draft of the settlement agreement. According to the meeting's final statement, "there was concurrence on most of the fundamental points." In fact, while the resistance members accepted the draft agreement in its entirety, the Phnom Penh regime and its supporters in Hanoi began to express serious reservations, particularly regarding military and sovereignty issues, thus slowing movement toward the final consensus needed to reconvene the Paris conference. Consultations have continued in the first months of 1991 in an effort to overcome the reservations of Phnom Penh and Hanoi. These included a January 31 to February 3 visit to Vietnam by representatives of the Paris co-chairmen and the UN Secretary General to try to gain from Vietnam support for the draft agreement. Such support, essential to concluding a settlement, has yet to be forthcoming, not withstanding these consultations. The next step in the diplomacy, we anticipate, will be an SNC meeting in Jakarta convened by the PCC co-chairmen, probably in mid-May. SNC support for the draft documents would allow the PCC to reconvene, hopefully by mid-1991, to make any final adjustments and endorse the overall agreement-which would then be referred to the United Nations for implementation. We believe that active US involvement in the Perm Five process-along with our parallel diplomatic efforts with Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and others-has been essential to moving these efforts toward a successful conclusion. We have actively participated in the design of the Perm Five settlement process involving an enhanced UN role, especially in the critical areas of control of the military forces, civil administration and elections, and protection of human rights. Our involvement has paid significant dividends. The settlement documents-which are derived directly from the Perm Five framework agreement-offer a viable formula for a durable settlement, establish the conditions of military security necessary to bring the fighting to a halt, and produce the administrative stability and neutral political conditions necessary for a free and fair election. All of these elements, we believe, are the best, if not the only way to achieve a settlement that will meet the critical objectives of US policy: prevention of a return to power by the murderous Khmer Rouge; verification of the withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces; creation of a political process culminating in genuine self- determination for the Cambodian people; and preservation of a non- communist alternative at the negotiating table and in the electoral process.
We believe the Perm Five documents are balanced so as to maintain the involvement in the settlement process of all the relevant parties. We have carefully reviewed the concerns raised by Phnom Penh and Hanoi regarding these documents. In our view, any effort to renegotiate them would be an endless exercise likely to undermine the settlement process. However, we believe it is possible to respond to reasonable concerns by clarifying or elaborating some elements of the draft agreement in ways that are consistent with the overall Perm Five approach. At the December meeting of the SNC, UN Under Secretary General Ahmed drafted an "explanatory note" regarding some of the issues of concern to Phnom Penh. We view his note as potentially helpful to building the full consensus necessary to complete the settlement agreement.
Dealing with the Concerns of Hanoi and Phnom Penh
The stated concerns of Hanoi and Phnom Penh relate to the issues of "sovereignty," "demobilization," and "genocide." We have given serious consideration to these issues and believe they can be resolved within the Perm Five settlement framework-if the parties concerned are truly committed to a political settlement. Sovereignty. Hanoi and Phnom Penh have expressed concern that the settlement violates Cambodia's sovereignty. We firmly believe that Cambodia's sovereignty resides with the people- not with a regime established through foreign invasion and occupation, much less with a faction compromised by the genocidal violence of the 1970s. The Cambodian people deserve the opportunity to establish a legitimate government in Phnom Penh through free and fair elections. The SNC-composed of individuals reflecting the existing factions-will assure that Cambodia's sovereignty is upheld during the transitional period until those elections are held. As the draft agreement states, "the SNC is the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined." If the SNC can reach consensus on any given settlement issue, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia will follow its lead- unless the advice is not consistent with the objectives of the settlement agreement. If the SNC is paralyzed, however, UNTAC will keep the election process moving forward to that ultimate exercise of Cambodian sovereignty-free and fair elections. As Under Secretary General Ahmed's explanatory note makes clear, no one envisages "dismantling" the Phnom Penh administrative structure during the interim period. We concur fully in his statement that "an efficient and cost-effective discharge of its mandate will require UNTAC to take a pragmatic, realistic, and practical approach in full consultation and cooperation with the Supreme National Council and the existing civil administration." The UN has neither the manpower nor the detailed expertise necessary to run the country. The UN role is intended to do only that which is necessary to bring about free and fair elections in a neutral political environment and, thus, establish a legitimate government-the most basic expression of Cambodia's sovereignty. Demobilization. The return to civilian life of the factional military forces is a more challenging issue. We understand the concern that demobilizing the Phnom Penh regime's army could leave the field open to clandestine or guerrilla elements of the Khmer Rouge. The United States and other involved countries also are very concerned about any Khmer Rouge actions which might undermine the settlement process. Our support for a strong and mobile UN military presence is designed to minimize any possibility that the Khmer Rouge, or any other party to the settlement, can avoid compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Indeed, a major role of the UN peacekeeping force will be to investigate any and all reports of failure of any factional forces-including all guerrilla units-to report to cantonments or to disclose their possession of arms and to identify and control arms caches. A UN peacekeeping operation would not be concerned only with territory controlled by Phnom Penh; it will be equally concerned with, and present in, areas controlled by the other factions-and undertake liaison with neighboring governments over any developments in or near their territory which could endanger implementation of the agreement. This must include investigation of reports of sanctuary areas. In view of our own concerns about the Khmer Rouge, we will insist upon and give whatever support we can to such efforts. Similarly, UN monitors must assure that military supplies do not cross borders from any neighboring country into Cambodia to aid any factions. China's commitment to support the settlement process is an important aspect of our efforts to control the Khmer Rouge. We will support a very aggressive role for the UN in ensuring compliance with the military commitments by all regular, guerrilla, irregular, and paramilitary forces and units. The UN peacekeepers will work with all the factions through a military working group, as well as with local villagers, as the peace-keeping process continues to identify any attempt to evade compliance with the commitments of the settlement agreement. To build confidence in the process of controlling the factional forces, demobilization is designed to occur in stages; no single force would be disarmed unilaterally. Movement from one stage to the next in this process would not occur until all parties have had a reasonable time and opportunity to satisfy themselves that everything called for in each stage has been accomplished. This is consistent with Under Secretary General Ahmed's explanatory note. At the same time, disagreements among the Cambodian parties cannot be permitted to paralyze any part of the settlement agreement. Overall, having the troops return to civilian life would be of major benefit to the settlement process-both by minimizing the expense and potential danger of keeping all the troops together in cantonments, as well as by demobilizing the men to help develop the civilian economy. Clearly, the countries which will contribute personnel and help pay for the settlement effort strongly believe that a substantial reduction in the number of troops is necessary to stabilize the transitional period. In addition, no one would want to leave in place the factional forces which, after the expense and effort of a UN settlement, could return to warfare as soon as the UN presence is removed. To further enhance the overall security of the settlement period, we are willing to consider supporting the phased development of a new national army in parallel with the phased return to civilian life of the factional troops. At the end of the transitional period, the new Cambodian government could make arrangements with troop contributing countries to keep former UNTAC officers in country as trainers. Alternatively, depending on circumstances at the time, the UN Security Council could consider a Cambodian request to keep the UNTAC military contingent in place for a finite time period, following installation of the new government, in order to assist the new national army. Genocide. Of the issues raised by Hanoi and Phnom Penh, the United States shares most strongly their opposition to the return to power of the Khmer Rouge. We have publicly stated this in the past and will continue to do so during the settlement process. Indeed, our government has taken the lead during the negotiations to ensure that the Perm Five framework includes as many practical, effective measures as possible to help control this murderous group. The entire human rights section of the framework agreement-which we drafted for consideration at the March 1990 meeting of the Perm Five-is designed to assure that the terrible abuses of the past cannot recur. The draft documents include references to rights and freedoms embodied in the [UN] Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments. Let me be clear, we worked to assure that these references were included in the texts. One such instrument is the International Convention on Genocide, to which Cambodia is a party. At a reconvened Paris conference, we are prepared-unilaterally if necessary-to make a formal public statement expressing our concern about the past violence of the Khmer Rouge and our strong support for those elements of the settlement agreement designed to protect the human rights of the Cambodian people and to ensure that such genocidal violence never again occurs. In our view, the bottom line is that the peace process is the one promising way of bringing security and justice to the Cambodian people. Its successful completion cannot be held back over the issue of including or not including the word "genocide." The Khmer Rouge would be the only beneficiary if discord over this issue blocks moving forward to conclude a political settlement. We firmly believe that a comprehensive settlement agreement represents the best and probably the only real means of controlling the Khmer Rouge. Let me be very direct on this point. In our view, the worst possibility for the future of Cambodia would be a collapse of current diplomatic efforts and a period of unconstrained warfare. Such a development would give the Khmer Rouge its best chance at a return to power, and it would ensure a continuation of the suffering of the Cambodian people. For those who assert that support for the Phnom Penh regime provides a credible alternative to blocking a return to power by the Khmer Rouge, the record suggests quite the opposite. Vietnam tried to stabilize the Phnom Penh regime for over a decade with more than 150,000 of its own seasoned troops, and with Soviet military and economic assistance estimated at more than $400 million per year. Such outside support failed to achieve its goal; indeed, it weakened the legitimacy of the Phnom Penh authorities and gave the Khmer Rouge the powerful appeal of nationalism as it sought to regain popular support. If a political settlement is not reached, and as military conflict continues, we anticipate that the Phnom Penh regime will weaken over time. The reduction in Soviet assistance, the disruption in the countryside, and the growing difficulties facing the current regime will be difficult to overcome. Thus, if we do not work actively in support of the UN/Paris conference settlement now, the Khmer Rouge will be the only beneficiary. The settlement process provides the most credible approach to controlling the Khmer Rouge threat. How many Cambodians will vote for the Khmer Rouge in a free and fair election? We believe the political indoctrination being carried out by the Khmer Rouge can be offset by nationwide education about human rights and the opportunity for self-determination through a UN-supervised election. The military elements of the settlement process-the strong UN peace-keeping presence, the cantonment of forces, demobilization, the possible creation of a new national army-will all help to counter the Khmer Rouge military threat. We will work to ensure full compliance by all the countries involved to the settlement provision regarding the ending of outside arms aid and other support for the Khmer Rouge and the other factions. We support strong UN human rights monitoring in Cambodia, including after the elections, to ensure that any Khmer Rouge violations will be held up to international scrutiny and condemnation. We are prepared to assist a future sovereign government-one freely elected by the Cambodian people-to ensure Cambodia's future security. Such a government would have the legitimacy and authority to deal with the genocide issue, both past and future.
Final agreement on the Perm Five settlement process should and can be reached at an early date so that the Paris conference process can be concluded and the work of the UN can begin. This can only be to the benefit of all concerned-not only to the people of Cambodia but also to the authorities in Phnom Penh and their supporters in Hanoi.
Benefits to Phnom Penh
The Phnom Penh leadership should realize that if it supports the settlement process, such support can only serve its own best interests. As the settlement process is designed, the UN transitional authority will work through the administrative structures now in place; they will not be dismantled, only politically neutralized. As long as those administrative structures operate in accordance with the goals of the settlement plan and in a neutral manner, the UN role will essentially be to monitor its operations. In addition, once the settlement process verifies the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge will lose its main propaganda focus: Vietnamese support for the Phnom Penh regime. Without this nationalistic message, Khmer Rouge candidates in the election will have to defend their genocidal practices of the late 1970s. No one expects the Khmer Rouge to do well in that situation. If the Khmer Rouge fails to live up to the provisions of the settlement agreement, they would become isolated, and the UN- assisted SNC, or its elected successor, would receive increased international support. The only way the Khmer Rouge can win is if the settlement process is blocked and the military struggle continues. The Khmer Rouge is stronger in the military arena than in the political realm; and, in our estimation, without a political settlement, time is not on the side of Phnom Penh. It is essential, therefore, that the Khmer Rouge be contained within the settlement process and its external support ended.
Benefits to Hanoi
If Vietnam actively supports the Paris conference/UN settlement process, its relations with the international community will be greatly strengthened. At the same time, Hanoi's concerns about the Khmer Rouge threat-something Vietnam could not bring under control during a decade of military occupation -would be dealt with by the community of nations. As stability returns to the sub- region, other nations will more seriously consider investments in Vietnam-not an insignificant benefit to a country badly in need of development capital. A Cambodian settlement would remove a principal barrier to better relations between Hanoi and Beijing and, thus, allow the Vietnamese further to reduce the onerous burden of their still very large military establishment. Secretary Baker reaffirmed to Deputy Prime Minister Thach last September our longstanding policy that normalization with Vietnam can occur only in the context of the verified withdrawal of all Vietnamese military forces as part of a comprehensive Cambodian settlement-with the pace and scope of the normalization process directly affected by the seriousness of Hanoi's cooperation with us on the POW/MIA [prisoners of war/missing-in-action] issue and other humanitarian concerns. To make certain that Vietnam's leaders clearly understand the choices before them, I met on April 9 with Vietnam's permanent representative to the United Nations to spell out our policy on normalization in precise detail. We discussed a four-phase "road map" to political and economic normalization that could, in relatively short order, end the trade embargo and our opposition to IMF [International Monetary Fund], World Bank, and ADB [Asian Development Bank] loans to Vietnam as our concerns for a Cambodian settlement and POW/MIA accounting are resolved. We hope that, in a spirit of reconciliation and farsightedness, Vietnam's leaders will give serious consideration to our proposal and not miss this opportunity to normalize relations. In parallel with this demarche, we also have had another meeting with the representative of the Phnom Penh regime in Vientiane, Laos, to describe how US relations with Cambodia could develop in the context of the UN settlement process. We also discussed Phnom Penh's concerns about the draft settlement agreement.
We believe that a new page of history could soon be turned in Indochina, that we can enter a period of political reconciliation and national development. But all the parties involved must now work together in the necessary spirit of compromise so that a settlement agreement can be signed, a UN operation can be put in place, and the international community can begin to offer the assistance that Cambodia so urgently requires. After decades of terror and turmoil, the Cambodian people deserve peace, stability, and the support of the international community. But a settlement in Cambodia will not only benefit the people of that small country. It will have a much broader impact on the entire region. The conflict in Cambodia has kept alive regional and ideological rivalries which should have been relegated long ago to the dustbin of history. The Soviet Union and China have overcome significant obstacles and moved to improve their bilateral relations. China also has negotiated directly with Vietnam to achieve a Cambodian settlement. Both of these bilateral relationships will be improved by a Cambodian settlement. The nations of ASEAN have shown that economic growth is the true source of national strength and security-not military power or domination of one's neighbors. We look forward to Vietnam becoming part of the mainstream of Southeast Asian progress. We want Cambodia as well as Laos to play their respective roles in this process. Such a transformation of this unhappy region will become possible in the context of a Cambodian settlement. We are gratified that the Perm Five-as well as other regional powers-have played a major role in constructing this settlement agreement. It establishes a precedent for resolution of other regional conflicts in the post-Cold War environment and affirms the possibility of a new era in international peacekeeping. Let me note, however, that the momentum moving us toward a comprehensive Cambodian settlement will not last indefinitely. Other critical problems in other regions of the world will surely arise and demand the attention and the resources of the international community. I hope the Cambodian parties all realize that the greatest possibility of strong international support for a settlement exists if that settlement is achieved in the near future. I believe the role for the United States at this moment is clear: We must stay the course, maintain our involvement, and continue our active efforts to achieve a successful settlement. In this process, we-the Congress and the executive branch-must continue to work together closely with patience and perseverance, and we look to bipartisan support from the Congress in this effort. If we succeed in bringing to fruition all that has now been laid in place through diplomacy, we must then be prepared to support the UN in its enhanced settlement role and to help meet the urgent practical needs of the Cambodian people-including food, medicines, education, and infrastructure redevelopment. The Cambodian people deserve our best efforts. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991 Title:

Priorities of US AssistanceTo Central and Eastern Europe

Barry Source: Ambassdor Robert L. Barry, Special Adviser for Eastern European Assistance Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Apr 16, 19914/16/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Czechoslovakia (former), Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Yugoslavia (former) Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid, State Department [TEXT] In my testimony today I would like to describe the general strategic direction of our assistance program for Central and Eastern Europe. What are our priorities and how do we set them? How are they changing over time? What unforeseen problems have arisen and how are we trying to cope with them? How do US programs fit in with those of other donors? What is the role of the private sector? What are the unique features of the East European programs, and how are these "experiments" working? Dr. Carol Adelman, Assistant Administrator of the US Agency for International Development, is here to discuss the programs for which USAID is responsible. I am here representing Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger, who is responsible for overall coordination of US assistance to the region whether funded through the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act or otherwise.
US Objectives and Priorities
The goals of US assistance are constant, and the progress made by the countries of the region toward these goals determine their eligibility for US assistance. Similar criteria have been adopted by the 24 donor nations which coordinate their assistance through the G-24 mechanism chaired by the European Community (EC) Commission in Brussels. We seek: -- Democratic, pluralistic societies based on the rule of law and respect for human rights and individual liberties; -- The creation of market-based economies with strong private sectors; and -- Reintegration of these nations into the economic and political structure of the West, as befits their history and values, and the development of friendly relations with the United States. Based on these criteria, our country priorities first focused on Poland and Hungary, as furthest along the road of economic and political reform. Czechoslovakia joined the "priority" list in 1990. In 1991, the bold reform program, led by President Zhelev of Bulgaria, warrants our increased support, especially since Bulgarian success could have a stabilizing effect on the Balkans. Beyond this we continue to provide limited assistance to Yugoslavia, with particular emphasis on support for democratic institutions and training in the skills needed for free-market economies and to Romania, with particular emphasis on humanitarian aid and democracy-building.
Setting Functional Priorities
The types of assistance programs we have developed are closely related to these goals. In each of these functional areas, we have developed a variety of programs where we believe the United States has a comparative advantage over other potential donors. Concurrently, we have been carrying out an extensive dialogue with the countries of the region in an effort to determine what their priorities are and how we can best meet them. At the same time, the G-24 coordination mechanism in Brussels provides a means of ensuring that our programs complement those of other donors. As part of this process, we are continually trying to assess the major obstacles to political and economic reforms, so that we can adapt our own priorities and make new resources available as necessary. Let me share with you our thoughts on where the major problem areas lie at present and thus where we think our attention should be concentrated in the next few months.
Obstacles to Reform
First, the problem of political instability in some countries of the region is more serious than anticipated. We expected that the developing institutions of the new democracies would be challenged by the economic problems of transition, but the pain was increased by the Gulf war and the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union. The virulence of resurgent nationalism was also greater, and more lasting, than we thought a year ago. The size of the protest vote in the Polish presidential elections and the progressive disintegration of Yugoslavia are reminders of the historical fact that economic depression and rising ethnic tension can create a volatile mixture in this part of Europe. To deal with this challenge, we need to emphasize our democracy-building and quality of life programs. From helping Czechoslovakia draft a federal constitution which protects Slovak rights or creating a program to provide jobs for the handicapped in Hungary, our involvement can make a difference. Second, the lag between macroeconomic and microeconomic reform has been more of a problem than we anticipated a year ago. Poland's bold stabilization program in 1990 did not produce the desired supply-side response because privatization lagged and state enterprises were insulated from the market and competitive forces. Poland has now adopted a comprehensive 3-year program, and we are urging all countries of the region to accelerate the pace of privatization and the creation of truly competitive market conditions. Here the United States has a number of tools which we will emphasize. Our enterprise funds are stimulating the private sector in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. We are gearing up to train managers and bankers and to provide assistance in the privatization process in industry and agriculture. We are helping to draft laws which will make competition a reality and to build financial intermediaries which will assist the privatization process. In terms of US government resources, this must be our greatest commitment in FY 1992 as well as FY 1991. At the same time, we must work to focus the activities of other major donors-like the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], EBRD [European Bank for Reconstruction and Development], and EC Commission-on the bottlenecks to private sector growth. Thirdly, the trade gap is widening, and investment flows from the West have been disappointing. The collapse of trade with the USSR has been more precipitate than anyone predicted and this, combined with the loss of the GDR [German Democratic Republic] as a market, has demanded a major reorientation of trade patterns. At the same time, Western investors have been cautious; up until the eve of President Walesa's visit to the United States, US firms had invested only $30 million in Poland. Improving the climate for trade and investment is our major new priority for the rest of 1991. Polish debt reduction should make a major contribution to that goal. The American Business Initiative and the Trade Enhancement Initiative, announced during the Walesa visit, should improve the climate for US trade and investment in the entire region. Others must do their part. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe need to take more steps to lower their barriers to trade with each other and especially to make the climate more attractive to Western investors so as to attract the private capital that, over time, will do far more for their economies than any Western governmental assistance. And our European allies need to provide expanded market access for exports from the region. A year ago, we all said that expanded trade and investment would be the engine of growth and reform in Central and Eastern Europe. We need to make this a reality in 1991. Finally, political and economic integration with the West has not kept pace with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and its ancillary structures. This has left the elected leaders of these countries feeling cut adrift, particularly as they realize that neither NATO nor the EC will provide a secure "home" in the short run. The possibility of a return to repressive policies of the past in Moscow has created a new sense of urgency about this quest for "roots." Our answer has been to strengthen the entire web of East- West relationships. We have encouraged ties to the EC and EFTA [European Free Trade Association], we have favored new institutional arrangements as part of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process, we have encouraged closer consultative ties with NATO through the liaison relationships the President proposed at the London NATO summit last year. We have created a new status in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] for reforming Central and East European countries to support economic reform and the transition to market economies; we hope this ultimately leads to OECD membership for countries that qualify. We have supported regional groups such as the Pentagonale and are using our own assistance programs as an incentive to greater regional cooperation by offering to finance cooperative efforts of two or more countries of the region to deal with common environmental or energy projects. But more needs to be done in this area as well, and the reinforcement of this "web" is, therefore, a central US priority for 1991 and 1992.
1992 Budget Request
Based upon the above priorities, the Administration has asked for $470 million in assistance to Eastern Europe, a significant increase in our request over FY 1991. Of this amount, $70 million is for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The $400 million for other assistance activities include: -- $29 million for the development of democratic institutions; -- $305 million to promote economic restructuring; -- $61 million for quality-of-life-related projects; and -- $5 million for audit, evaluation, and for USAID administrative expenses. Looked at another way, the use of the $400 million we have requested for FY 1992 is largely already determined by activities under way. It would be spent approximately as follows: -- $190 million for projects authorized under SEED I [Support for East European Democracy Act], of which $164 million will be for the enterprise funds; -- $55 million for programs not authorized in SEED I but which will be administered by agencies other than USAID, US Information Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Departments of Energy, Labor, etc.); and -- $60 million for the continuation of a few major projects begun in FY 1991. The remainder of the funding would be largely devoted to smaller projects (less than $10 million) which will be carried over from 1991 or to increase the scope of large projects which are particularly successful.
Building Country Programs
In addition to our overall regional priorities, we must adapt our programs to the needs of each individual country and coordinate with others which are trying to deal with the same problems. This requires a continuing dialogue with the host country, with the major bilateral and multilateral donors, and among the 20 US government agencies engaged in the assistance process. In each country of the region, we are trying to construct a US assistance program which is visible, focused, and easy to administer; at the same time, the scale of that program must reflect the degree of progress that country is making against the criteria we and our allies have set. For countries that are further behind on the path toward democratic reform, we have put in place only a very few programs. In Romania, for example, we are moving ahead with six limited programs: humanitarian assistance, food aid, assistance to Romanian children, support for independent media and the rule of law, management training, and emergency energy efficiency programs. In Poland, by way of contrast, we are carrying out some two dozen programs. But here, too, we want to focus on a few key areas where more resources can be provided if the demand is there. Support for the process of privatization and expansion of trade and investment are two such functional focal points for Poland. Agricultural and agri-business is our central functional priority in Bulgaria; in Hungary, we see reform of the banking system as a key need the United States can help to meet. A second way of adding synergy to our aid is to concentrate some smaller programs in a single city or region so they can reinforce the activities of American investors or USAID projects sponsored by the US government or private sector groups like the Citizens Democracy Corps. Krakow has become a focal point for US programs in Poland, as has Baranya County in Hungary. The Peace Corps, the Department of Labor, the EPA, the Department of Energy, and the other agencies involved in US assistance can do more by reinforcing each others' programs in a single location than by heading off in different directions. Of course, coordination with other donors, and with the host country, is an essential element of a coherent assistance strategy. By and large, we believe the G-24 mechanism managed by the EC Commission has been effective, especially as a means of mobilizing resources. More emphasis needs to be placed on country-level coordination in each capital, and we are working with the EC Commission and the World Bank to bring this about.
Unique Features of the SEED Program
I would like to describe some ways in which the programs we are carrying out in Central and Eastern Europe are different than other US assistance programs.
. The need to carry through comprehensive reforms as quickly as possible dictates the pace of our own assistance program. We will have to be prepared to provide targeted assistance precisely at those times when the governments are ready to take the critical steps we are asking them to take. For example, we believe the pace of privatization should be accelerated. That means our own privatization assistance has to be available now.
. Extensive coordination is required, not just among the 20 US agencies involved but also with major donors such as the IBRD, the EBRD, the EC Commission, etc. That is why much more program design and implementation has to take place in Washington than usual.
New Methods of Delivery
. In dollar terms, we expect that by 1992 at least two-thirds of our assistance will flow through vehicles not usually used in aid programs-enterprise funds, the EBRD, parallel financing with other donors such as the World Bank and the EC Commission, grants to new entities such as the International Media Fund and through US government agencies such as EPA and USIA. We want to use these programs because they are easy to administer, but more importantly because they can serve to accelerate reform.
The problem we face is not one of development in the usual sense but conversion-or as some would have it, "making eggs out of an omelet." This risky experiment can only work if it is dealt with as an integrated whole-where political issues, trade issues, assistance programs and integration issues are all seen as a whole.
Private-Sector Role
We think the private sector-the business community, the labor movement, our private voluntary organizations, and individual Americans can play a uniquely important role in assisting the transition in Eastern Europe. As these new democracies end the old centralized political and economic systems, the American example of local government, pluralistic institutions, and individual involvement is the model they are reaching for. I have already mentioned the American Business Initiative and the Trade Enhancement Initiative, designed to expand trade and investment and help American business at the same time. The AFL-CIO, in partnership with the Department of Labor, is playing a major role. Our private voluntary organizations, using their own resources as well as US assistance funding, are doing remarkable work on the community level. The Citizens Democracy Corps is mobilizing American business to provide assistance in key areas on a pro bono basis and at the same time helping to match individual American volunteers with US or East European organizations looking for special kinds of talents.
In closing, let me ask you to reflect not on the formidable obstacle to economic and political reform but to the remarkable progress that has been made in the past year. In 1988, who would have expected Lech Walesa to visit Washington as the President of a democratic Poland, to talk about the timetable for the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from his country? Who would have expected Bulgaria to be in the forefront of political and economic reform? Who would have expected democratic elections, however flawed, in Albania? Most of all, who would have expected a powerful consensus to develop throughout the region that rapid, comprehensive transition to democratic rule and market economies is the only solution to the problems of the region. Assisting in this transition is as much a central strategic priority for this Administration as it was 2 years ago when the images of revolution so fired our imagination. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991 Title:

Focus on Central and Eastern Europe: Summary of Initiatives

Date: Apr 22, 19914/22/91 Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies Region: E/C Europe Country: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (former), Hungary, Poland Subject: State Department, CSCE, Media/Telecommunications, Science/Technology, Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid, International Law, EC [TEXT]
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Parliamentarians from the 34-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have agreed to establish a 245- member assembly to help guide a new era of cooperation in East- West relations and strengthen parliamentary democracy in former communist countries. At an April 3 meeting in Madrid, Spain, lawmakers from North America and Europe decided to meet annually to review security, economic, and human rights issues. Their resolutions will form an agenda for the annual meetings of foreign ministers and for the biennial meetings of heads of government. The foreign ministers plan to meet June 19-20 in Berlin. The next meeting of heads of government is scheduled for March 1992 in Helsinki. The creation of a CSCE legislative arm completes the building of institutions intended to shape East-West relations after the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe that replaced communist governments with democracies and effectively ended the Cold War. Last autumn, heads of government from the United States, Canada, and all European countries except Albania pledged respect for democratic elections, economic freedoms, and human rights. They also established a small secretariat in Prague, Czechoslovakia, a conflict-prevention center in Vienna, Austria, and an election-monitoring center in Warsaw, Poland. As the largest members, the United States and the Soviet Union will have the most seats, 17 each, in the new assembly. France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom will have 13. The remaining members will have representation according to size, down to two seats each for Monaco and San Marino. US delegates to the Madrid meeting said they were pleased by the decision to use the new assembly essentially as a consultative forum for senior legislators. "This will give us a chance to help deepen the democratic experience among the new legislatures in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," said House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell (Democrat from Florida), who led the US delegation. Delegates agreed to the principle of majority voting, provided that certain important questions would require approval by two- thirds of the member states. The North Atlantic Assembly will be responsible for the CSCE's security aspects while the Council of Europe will handle its human rights work.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady represented the United States at the inaugural meeting of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in London April 15-16. Representatives of 40 countries signed a treaty on May 29, 1990, to establish the $12- billion institution that will provide aid to help revive the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and develop a strong private sector. Under the bank's charter, three major objectives of the United States were achieved: -- Lending will be directed toward the private sector (at least 60% of the bank's lending will be to the private sector; a maximum of 40% may fund public infrastructure projects, such as roads and telecommunications, to help the private sector develop, and may fund public enterprises operating in a competitive fashion); -- Borrowing by the USSR will be restricted (for at least 3 years, to the amount of capital the Soviet Union puts in); and -- There will be a strong environmental focus (promoting structural and sectoral reforms that are environmentally sound, and funding loans/technical assistance for environmental programs, necessary for transition to a market-oriented economy). The bank will report annually on the environmental impact of its activities. For more information, contact the Office of Public Relations, EBRD, 6 Broadgate, London EC2M 2QS, United Kingdom (Tel: 011- 4471-496-0060).
Business Opportunities
In Austria, the US embassy and the American Chamber of Commerce will host a conference in Vienna June 10-11, 1991, to explore business opportunities for US firms in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Small and medium-sized US manufacturers new to these markets are invited to participate. The conference will feature presentations on doing business in Central and Eastern Europe, followed by individual country workshops to develop specific matches between the anticipated 180 US participants and prospective Central and East European business partners. On June 12, the US firms will have the opportunity to travel to one or more of the four countries to continue discussions with specific companies. The conference will focus on environmental-protection products and services, energy conservation and alternative sources, information and communication, and industry machinery. Opportunities in other areas also will be identified during the process of cross matching supplier firms with needs in the four Central and East European countries and Austria in a broad range of trade, partnership, licensing, investment, and franchising arrangements. Senior US embassy representatives, business executives, industry association representatives, and economic development specialists will participate. Each visiting team will conduct its own seminar in which specific business opportunities in a particular country will be identified. Other US participants are expected from the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. For additional information or to get a brochure with the schedule of events, costs, and registration form, call Philip Combs, Austria Desk Officer, US Department of Commerce (202-377-2920) or the Austrian Trade Commissioner in the USA (Chicago: 312-644- 5556; Houston: 713-850-8888; Los Angeles: 213-477-9988; New York City: 212-421-5250; Washington, DC: 202-835-8962).
Central and East European Law Initiative
Bulgaria. March 11-15, the American Bar Association's Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) conducted a series of workshop sessions with Bulgaria's Grand National Assembly to discuss issues relevant to drafting the country's new constitution. The CEELI delegation also held sessions with representatives of the various political parties in Bulgaria. In the opening session, Prime Minister Dimitar Popov stressed the importance of CEELI's last visit and urged its continued participation in Bulgaria's legal reform process. In one extraordinary event, the CEELI delegation was asked to participate in an actual session of the Constitutional Parliamentary Commission discussing proposed constitutional provisions on local government. During the workshop sessions, the issues that provoked the most discussion included the protection of minority rights, the structure of municipalities and local government, what powers should be allocated to the president, the procedures for investigating the executive office, and general concepts of structuring a constitution. CEELI experts also have completed a review of Bulgaria's foreign investment law and stock exchange law.
. April 22-26, CEELI provides follow-up to its criminal law revision workshop held in Prague last November. Dr. Leon Richter, the minister of justice, requested this April CEELI workshop to review Czechoslovakia's draft judicial law. CEELI provided a preliminary assessment of the draft law in February and its comments were incorporated in the new draft law.
. A CEELI working group is structuring a workshop on local government to be held in Poland in May.
. CEELI conducted a workshop on judicial restructuring in Bucharest April 15-19. The workshop addressed numerous issues important to the development of an independent judicial system, such as judicial independence; judicial review and restraint; the selection, training, and qualifications of judges; the tenure, conduct, discipline, and removal of judges; the role of the prosecutor; the role of the defense counsel; the enforcement and interpretations of a penal code; human rights in a judicial system; military courts; and the relationship between the courts and the press.
Sister Law School Program
Eight US law school deans went to Central and Eastern Europe April 15-19 to meet their counterparts in the first stage of CEELI's proposed sister law school law program. The goal of the visit was to initiate discussions on possible areas of mutual interest, such as exchange visits between US and European law faculty members, assistance by US law schools in furnishing library materials, future joint scholarship and research between members of US and European law faculties, law student and graduate exchange programs, and cooperative efforts between the schools on curricular development, among other things. For more information about CEELI or any of its programs, call its Executive Director, Mark Ellis, at 202-331-2619 (fax: 202- 457-1163).
Foreign Affairs Assistance Corps
A group of former Foreign Service officers and private entrepreneurs has organized a corps of skilled people willing to help former command economies in the difficult transition to free- market economies. The corps will initially provide skilled labor in finance, planning, media, and technology transfer to countries- principally the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe-under current US government and corporate programs. For more information, contact Eugene Bird, 3133 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 702, Washington, DC 20008. Tel: 202-745-0701.
Special TV Programing by the US Information Agency (USIA)
As reported in the December 19, 1990, edition of Focus, USIA/TV's Worldnet began broadcasting 2 hours of special programing during evening prime time in Central and Eastern Europe on December 3. Since then, elements of this programing have been rebroadcast by TV stations in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania on a weekly basis in several cases. This article updates the December information. The purpose of this feed is: -- To assist fledgling independent broadcasters, many of whom have or expect to have access to increasing numbers of hours of broadcast time on national state systems and, eventually, frequencies of their own; -- To assist established state broadcast systems seeking to offer more educational material on building a democracy and a market economy, by offering programs on US English, market economics, constitutional issues, and similar themes; and -- To assist US broadcasters in introducing their material to Central and East European audiences and in competing with material now being furnished by satellite from European sources. Central and East European broadcasters have told Worldnet that they do want the educational and documentary programing the United States has to offer. This includes such things as "ABC News Presents," "Growing a Business," "The Constitution - That Delicate Balance," "Business File," "Science World," and "Firing Line." To enable them to receive this special feed, USIA/TV donated C-Band dish antennas to TV stations in Bratislava and Prague, Czechoslovakia; Budapest, Hungary (an independent station); and Bucharest, Romania. USIA/TV is now sending antennas to Sofia, Bulgaria; Tallinn, Estonia; Riga, Latvia; Vilnius, Lithuania; Gdansk, Poznan, and Wroclaw, Poland; and Belgrade and Sarajevo, Yugoslavia. USIA/TV also has designated C-Band dishes for donation to Hungarian state TV and to TV stations in Leningrad and Moscow, USSR. Thus, by mid-1991, this special feed will be bringing public affairs and educational programing to 17 broadcasters in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For more information about this program, call USIA/TV's Paul Kozelka at 202-501-7044.
Albania is added to this edition of Focus on Central and Eastern Europe because the March 31 elections in that country were the first step on the long road to democracy. The Albanian people voted for members of the new 250-person parliament in the nation's first multi-party elections since 1945. According to official accounts, 96% of Albania's 1.9 million eligible voters cast ballots. The democratic opposition, which did not exist 4 months ago, now has more than 32% of the seats in parliament and is pressing for political and economic reforms in a society with little recent experience in the democratic process. A partial foundation has been laid for political pluralism and democracy. The Albanian Central Election Commission announced officially that the Albanian Workers Party (communist) won 168 of the 250 seats in parliament (67%), the Democratic Party 75 (30%), the Omonia Organization (a Greek party) 3 (1%), and the Veterans' Committee 1 (0.4%). The ruling Communist Party won heavily in the countryside while the opposition Democratic Party won impressively in the capital (Tirana) and other major cities. Based on reports from US observers and other international election monitors, the Albanian electoral process fell short in several key areas of standards for free and fair elections established by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the campaign, the opposition parties were allowed only limited access to the government-controlled media, although they were allotted some time for televised political broadcasts and were able to publish newspapers that received partial dissemination. Official parties enjoyed overwhelming use of state resources while opposition parties had limited access to these resources. There also are credible reports of widespread intimidation against opposition party candidates and activists during the campaign and on election day. It is questionable why the authorities delayed issuing official election results for more than 2 days and why the list of winning and losing candidates contained no vote count. The US government called upon the Albanian authorities to investigate fully and openly all charges of electoral abuses and to propose appropriate measures to redress legitimate grievances. Now it is up to all elements of Albanian society to help the newly created multiparty system function effectively. In particular, the majority party must fully respect the rights of the minority parties as stipulated by the CSCE. The United States firmly supports the principles of democracy in Albania and those who are working to establish freedom and human rights. The US election monitoring delegation in Albania reported that the Democratic Party's local leader in Shkoder was killed on April 2 by gunfire. The gunfire reportedly came from the Communist Party's headquarters when the victim attempted to disperse a peaceful group of opposition party supporters gathered outside the Communist Party's headquarters to protest against alleged election fraud and intimidation and against the delay in the announcement of the official March 31 election results. The head of the US delegation, David Swartz, met with Albanian Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani on April 3 and officially protested the use of force against peaceful demonstrators. Swartz also urged the Albanian authorities to investigate irregularities in the electoral process promptly and fully. On April 3, the US government condemned the use of violence against peaceful demonstrators in Albania and called upon the Albanian government to cease the use of deadly force against citizens who are exercising their fundamental rights including the right to peaceful assembly. The US government also urged all Albanian parties to exercise restraint. In light of Albania's aspirations to CSCE membership, the US government deplored such violence as contrary to CSCE principles regarding the rule of law, free and fair elections, and respect for basic human rights. The US government also called on the Albanian authorities to investigate the acts of violence thoroughly in a manner compatible with international rule-of-law standards and punish those responsible for this violation of human rights. On April 4, Swartz was informed officially that Albanian government leaders had met in emergency session on April 3 to discuss the situation in Shkoder and that the government had appointed a special commission to investigate the killings there. The US government welcomed the Albanian government's decision but also reiterated to the Albanian authorities the importance of fully and openly investigating charges of electoral abuses and taking appropriate measures to redress legitimate grievances. According to news reports, the Albanian government released 258 political prisoners on March 30. The exact number of political prisoners in Albania is difficult to determine. Some observers have estimated the number to be much higher than the 258 reportedly freed. The US government welcomed the reported Albanian decision and continued to strongly urge the Albanian authorities to release all persons imprisoned for non-violent and political offenses in a timely manner. On the economic front, Albania's state radio announced that the government had taken the first step toward privatization by instructing ministries to designate which state-run enterprises would be eligible for private ownership. On the diplomatic front, representatives of the United States and Albania on March 15 signed a memorandum of understanding resuming diplomatic relations after a break of 52 years. The United States seeks to support the movement toward democratic and economic reforms in Albania and to expand relations in the cultural and economic fields.
TV Program on US Banking. In March, a top journalist from Hungarian state television completed a 2-week USIA/TV-assisted visit to the United States to do a program on the US banking system. Produced through USIA's "TV-Coop" program, in which foreign broadcasters receive facilitative and sometimes financial assistance to produce programs on subjects of mutual interest, the completed program will be shown on Hungarian television.
Textbooks Donated. Twenty newly established Polish teacher- training colleges have received more than 2,500 Spectrum English- teaching textbooks courtesy of USIA.
Ambassador Barry's Congressional Testimony
For the text of Ambassador Robert L. Barry's April 16 testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, which describes the strategic direction of the US assistance program for Central and Eastern Europe, see page 286 of this issue of Dispatch. Ambassador Barry is the Special Adviser for Eastern European Assistance to the Deputy Secretary of State.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991 Title:

Dispatch Supplement

Date: Apr 22, 19914/22/91 Category: Features Region: Europe Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization [TEXT] A special Dispatch Supplement containing the text of the Charter of Paris and the Joint Declaration of 22 States can be purchased for $1.25 (stock no. 044-000-02308-3) through the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402- 9325 (tel. 202-783-3238). (###)