US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991
Title: US Expands Kurdish Relief Efforts
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Opening statement at White House news conference,
Washington, DC
Date: Apr 16, 19914/16/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey
Subject: Military Affairs, Refugees,
Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
Eleven days ago, on April 5th, I announced that the United States
would initiate what soon became the largest US relief effort
mounted in modern military history. Such an undertaking was made
necessary by the terrible human tragedy unfolding in and around Iraq
as a result of Saddam Hussein's brutal treatment of Iraqi citizens.
Within 48 hours, our operation was providing scores of tons of
food, water, coats, tents, blankets, and medicines to the Iraqi Kurds
in northern Iraq and southern Turkey. The scale of this effort is
truly unprecedented. Yet the fact remains that the scale of the
problem is even greater. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds are in
difficult-to-reach mountain areas in southern Turkey and along the
Turkish-Iraq border.
The government of Turkey, along with US, British, and French
military units, and numerous international organizations, have
launched a massive relief operation. But despite these efforts,
hunger, malnutrition, disease, and exposure are taking their grim
toll. No one can see the pictures or hear the accounts of this human
suffering-men, women, and most painfully of all, innocent children-
and not be deeply moved.
It is for this reason that this afternoon, following
consultations with Prime Minister Major [UK], President Mitterrand
[France], President Ozal of Turkey, Chancellor Kohl [Germany] this
morning, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, I'm announcing an
expanded-a greatly expanded-and more ambitious relief effort. The
approach is quite simple: if we cannot get adequate food, medicine,
clothing, and shelter to the Kurds living in the mountains along the
Turkish-Iraq border, we must encourage the Kurds to move to areas
in northern Iraq where the geography facilitates rather than
frustrates such a large-scale relief effort.
Consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 688 and
working closely with the UN and other international relief
organizations and our European partners, I have directed the US
military to begin immediately to establish several encampments in
northern Iraq where relief supplies for these refugees will be made
available in large quantities and distributed in an orderly way.
I can well appreciate that many Kurds have good reason to
fear for their safety if they return to Iraq. And let me reassure
them that adequate security will be provided at these temporary
sites by US, British, and French air and ground forces, again
consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 688. We are hopeful
that others in the coalition will join this effort.
I want to underscore that all that we are doing is motivated
by humanitarian concerns. We continue to expect the government of
Iraq not to interfere in any way with this latest relief effort. The
prohibition against Iraqi fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft flying north
of the 36th parallel thus remains in effect.
And I want to stress that this new effort, despite its scale
and scope, is not intended as a permanent solution to the plight of
the Iraqi Kurds. To the contrary, it is an interim measure designed
to meet an immediate, penetrating humanitarian need. Our long-
term objective remains the same-for Iraqi Kurds and, indeed, for all
Iraqi refugees, wherever they are, to return home and to live in
peace, free from repression, free to live their lives.
I also want to point out that we're acutely concerned about
the problem of the Iraqi refugees now along the Iran-Iraq border and
in Iran. I commend the members of the European Community for
their efforts to alleviate hardship in this area. We, ourselves, have
offered to contribute to international efforts designed to meet this
humanitarian challenge.
As I stated earlier, the relief effort being announced here
today constitutes an undertaking different in scale and approach.
What is not different is basic policy. All along, I have said that the
United States is not going to intervene militarily in Iraq's internal
affairs and risk being drawn into a Vietnam-style quagmire. This
remains the case. Nor will we become an occupying power with US
troops patrolling the streets of Baghdad.
We intend to turn over the administration of and security for
these sites as soon as possible to the UN, just as we are fulfilling
our commitment to withdraw our troops and hand over
responsibility to UN forces along Iraq's southern border, the border
with Kuwait.
But we must do everything in our power to save innocent life.
This is the American tradition, and we will continue to live up to
that tradition.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991
Title: Crisis of Refugees ∧ Displaced Persons
Lyman
Source: Princeton N. Lyman, Director of the Department's
Bureau for Refugee Programs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration and
Refugee Affairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee
Date: Apr 15, 19914/15/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Iran, Turkey
Subject: Refugees
[TEXT]
I appreciate this opportunity to address the crisis of the refugees
and displaced people of Iraq. As you know, I have just returned from
a trip to the region and to Geneva regarding this important and
urgent issue.
Everyone here has likely seen the TV footage of the people
affected and the horrors of it. From cities and villages; from all
across the north and parts of the south of Iraq; Kurds, Assyrians,
Chaldeans, Shias, and Sunnis; 11.2 million people have had to flee
their homes. Many, too many by even one, have died in mountain
passes shorn of support or before even making it there.
Background to the Crisis
I would note that movements of refugees and displaced persons
during the Persian Gulf crisis can be divided into three stages:
-- From August 2, the date of the invasion, through mid-
January 1991;
-- The armed conflict, January 17 February 28; and
-- Post-war.
From August to mid-October, more than 1 million people of
numerous nationalities fled Iraq and Kuwait into the neighboring
states of Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Except for
the Kuwaitis, who fled to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, these
people were overwhelmingly third-country nationals. With the aid
of the international community or their own governments, it was
possible to repatriate these expatriate workers in Iraq and Kuwait
out of the region and to their home countries.
The international community organized rapidly to provide
humanitarian relief to this sudden and large flow of people. There
were no confirmed reports of death due to starvation or disease.
Food and water supplies as well as sanitation and health care in the
camps were adequate. Finally, the international effort to repatriate
the displaced persons, directed by the International Organization
for Migration, went very, very well. By mid-October, the flow of
displaced persons from Iraq and Kuwait slowed to a trickle, and the
burden on the neighboring states and the international community
subsided. The international community provided nearly $300
million for the operation.
From October to January, as the potential for hostilities
increased, the international community began to plan for a second
large migration of refugees and displaced persons. Under the
coordination of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization
(UNDRO), the UN developed a Regional Action Plan to move adequate
supplies into the area, upgrade and expand camp sites, and provide a
management system in Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which had played
an important role in the previous assistance activities, also drafted
an operational plan. Both UNDRO and ICRC issued funding appeals-
for $175 million and $112 million, respectively-predicated on
400,000 refugees. Donors pledged about $136 million to both appeals.
The United States provided $7.6 million in cash and food aid.
Migration from Iraq and Kuwait following January 16 was
extremely low, which is why the appeals were not fully funded. By
the end of March, only about 65,000 people had fled to the
neighboring states, most of them (about 45,000) to Iran. Iraq's
closure of its border with Turkey, coalition air activity against
Scud and other military sites in western Iraq, and the concentration
of ground combat to the south all served to limit the migration.
Although some relief infrastructure was, thus, already in
place in Turkey and Iran, and more was planned, no one foresaw the
magnitude of the civil conflict which caused the latest massive
migration of Kurds and other Iraqi civilians.
In addressing the current crisis, I would like to focus on three
particular facets of this situation that bear upon how we respond:
the magnitude of the problem, the rapidity of the build-up, and the
difficulties in reaching these people.
Magnitude
. Today, there are more than 1.4
million people who have crossed into Iran and the Turkey border
region, and many more displaced from their homes who are fleeing
to the border areas. About 1 million of the above have fled to Iran
and 500,000-700,000 are just across the border. There are some
400,000 people on the Turkey-Iraq border and perhaps 300,000 more
approaching it. The UN places the number of displaced who may
need urgent assistance at 1.5 million, but that is only what has been
clearly identified so far. Witnesses report empty cities in northern
Iraq, suggesting perhaps half or more of northern Iraq's population
of 3-5 million may be in flight.
In the south, there are some 27,000 people getting assistance
from US forces. Although the numbers here are smaller, there are
special problems of protection that I will discuss below.
Rapidity of the build-up
. It is not just the
numbers but the rapidity of the build-up with which this crisis has
unfolded that has made it so enormous. A month after the
hostilities ended, February 28, there were no more than 50,000
refugees in surrounding countries. Just 2 weeks before April 8, the
day Secretary Baker looked out on 40,000 refugees at Cukurca,
Turkey, a UN team had surveyed the same spot and found no one
there. Since Secretary Baker's visit, 1 week ago, the number at
Cukurca may have doubled. The numbers are mounting so fast that
estimates change daily if not by the hour. Perhaps 20,000 persons
enter the Turkey-Iraq border area every day. In Iran, the number of
refugees went from 300,000 to 700,000 in 5 days and to 900,000 3
days later. Preparations by the UN, as far back as January to
receive even as many as 400,000 refugees in the entire region, were
swamped by this explosion of human need. A UN appeal issued on
April 5 had to be revised dramatically upward April 9, and already
it is out of date.
Difficulties.
It is not uncommon for refugees
to flee into areas bereft of support, areas without good land, water,
roads. Refugees cannot choose. In many cases, they are fleeing for
their lives. But in this instance, the problems posed are especially
difficult. The border areas of Turkey and Iraq are mountainous; the
weather is cold; snow and rain are still falling. Few of the areas
of concentration are reachable by roads. People are not in camps
but stretched out along a line 165 miles long. This is, in short, a
logistics nightmare. In Iran, the conditions are only somewhat
better, but the numbers are even greater.
Mounting a sufficient relief effort in these conditions takes
tremendous resources and-unfortunately-time. There can be short-
cuts, such as air drops, and others I will mention below. But to
establish a sustained and steady pipeline of the most basic human
services for the number of people in this region-food, shelter,
water, minimum health care-demands a logistics effort of
enormous scope. This is what the world is rushing to provide.
A major turning point in addressing this crisis was the
passage of UN Security Council Resolution 688 on April 5. This
resolution condemns Saddam's oppression of the civilian population
as a threat to international peace and security in the region. It
insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international
humanitarian organizations to "all those in need of assistance in all
parts of Iraq." It requests the Secretary General to pursue
humanitarian efforts in Iraq, to use all relevant UN agencies to
address the critical needs of the refugees and displaced, and to
report on the plight of all those, especially the Kurds, suffering
from the repression. The resolution appeals to all member states
and humanitarian organizations to contribute to the relief efforts.
Finally, UNSC [Resolution] 688 demands that Iraq cooperate with the
Secretary General to these ends.
This resolution gives exceptional scope as well as urgency to
the UN humanitarian effort both within Iraq's borders and for the
refugees. The Secretary General has appointed Prince Sadruddin Aga
Khan as his Executive Delegate [for Humanitarian Assistance for
Iraqi Refugees] to oversee the humanitarian programs for Iraq,
Kuwait, and border areas. Prince Sadruddin has designated UNHCR
[Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees] as the lead
agency. The Secretary General also has designated Ambassador
[Eric] Suy to assess the plight of the repressed and displaced. Donor
nations are already providing assistance at increasingly significant
levels, in direct response to UNSC [Resolution] 688, requests of the
United Nations for assistance, our own approaches to donor
governments. It is in this context that I would like to turn to the
efforts underway in each theater.
Turkey-Iraq border
. I will start with Turkey
from which I have just returned following Secretary Baker's visit.
As I mentioned, there are more than 400,000 people now in this
region and more arriving every day. They are stretched along a
border 165 miles long, in perhaps 10-15 concentrations. They are
on both sides of the border: in some cases, the border is irrelevant
as concentrations spread over both sides.
The government of Turkey has not distinguished between those
on either side of the border in this region. Assistance and
protection are being provided to all. The Turkish Red Crescent
Society, a highly proficient organization, is devoting much of its
personnel and resources to this effort and is serving as a principal
channel for assistance from many parts of the world. The regional
governor is diverting resources from the Turkish population in his
area of responsibility to the needs of refugees. Road-building
crews are working through the dark of night to open up relief
routes. Turkish villagers and citizens from all over the country are
donating food, clothing, and other items for the refugees.
But, there is no way the government and people of Turkey
could manage this crisis alone. A massive international effort is
underway. Because of the urgency and magnitude of the crisis, a
two-pronged strategy is being employed.
-- A massive effort by the US military is underway at this
very moment to save the lives of up to 700,000 people in this region
for the next 30 days. This operation involves more than 40 C-130s,
close to 60 helicopters, 75-100 small tactical vehicles, a civil
affairs battalion, two medical holding companies, a Seabees
construction battalion, and massive amounts of food, tents,
blankets, and medical supplies. Air drops began over 1 week ago.
But the present effort will deliver supplies much more efficiently,
directly to sites, first by helicopter and as soon as possible by
ground transport.
Other donors are joining in this effort. Australia, Austria,
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and the EC
[European Community] are all participating with planes and
helicopters as well as supplies. An international task force
coordinates this effort, just as it did during Desert Storm. This
past weekend, supplies from this operation began arriving at
Uludere, one of the worst sites in the region. Visited last
Wednesday by our Ambassador, Mort Abramowitz, together with
Governor Kozakcioglu, Uludere contains 80,000 people mired in rain
and mud with virtually no shelter or sources of support.
Private agencies such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, Save the
Children, the International Rescue Committee, CARE, and others are
flying in supplies and personnel as well.
-- The second prong is an international effort under UN
leadership. The US military and allied operation is a massive but
short-term effort. It is designed to save people's lives until the
international relief effort, led by the UN, is fully operational. The
military effort will greatly facilitate the UN program, by building
storage facilities, opening up roads, and stabilizing the condition of
the refugees. The UN must take over with a fully organized pipeline
of support, reaching down to the refugees, with logistics, health
and sanitation personnel, and with the funds to fully support and
sustain the program.
The UN effort, supported by donors from all over the world, is
already under way. As part of earlier preparations under the UN
Regional Plan of Action, the UN had food for 20,000 persons and
other supplies for 100,000 when the crisis began. Those, of course,
are all now depleted. Millions of dollars of additional supplies are
coming in; the international staff is expanding; an information
system with donors [is] being established; coordination mechanisms
[are] being put in place. A USAID [US Agency for International
Development] Disaster Assistance Reconnaissance Team is on the
ground in Turkey assisting the US military and providing a technical
bridge from the US-led to the UN-led program. Finally, our embassy
in Ankara has deployed teams to the field, to provide essential
liaison between USAID and DOD [US Department of Defense] officials
and Turkish authorities.
Iran.
Iran was in some ways better prepared
to meet the crisis than Turkey. Its Red Crescent organization had
large-scale relief experience from the 8-year Iran-Iraq war and
from devastating earthquakes. As many as 10,000 Iranians have had
disaster relief training. The build-up also began earlier there, and
the UN and the ICRC had begun expanding supplies and personnel as
the numbers grew. As noted earlier, the terrain has not been as
formidable as that on the Turkish side.
Iran has now called for massive international help. It has
announced readiness to receive international relief flights. The
ICRC, by the end of this week, will be caring for 200,000 people in
this theater, the UNHCR 100,000. More, of course, must be done
urgently. Our contributions to date have been through international
agencies, primarily the UN and the ICRC. We have asked Iran to
define their needs.
Southern Iraq
The area occupied by US forces
poses a special problem. Some 27,000 persons have been receiving
food, medical care, and other help in this area, and more have
received supplies to take to other areas.
The UNHCR has accepted the responsibility for taking over
assistance and protection of people in this area once US forces
withdraw. The ICRC also will have a presence here. The UN also
will have an observer force patrolling a 15-kilometer wide
demilitarized zone along the border. We are concerned that Iraq not
violate the rights of the people in this area when US forces
withdraw. UNSC [Resolution] 688 demands that Iraq cooperate with
the UN in carrying out relief and assistance programs. The UN
presence will hopefully act as more than a witness to Iraqi behavior
but as deterrence to any persecution.
The Scope of the Effort
I noted at the beginning of my testimony that there have been three
stages of refugee or displaced persons movement since Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait August 2 of last year. The first involved 1
million foreign workers who were repatriated to their home
countries. The international community mobilized nearly $300
million for this effort. The second stage, during the hostilities
January-February of this year, addressed the needs of 65,000
persons and stockpiled materiel for many more. This stage cost
$136 million. Thus, even before the third, current crisis occurred,
over $400 million had been spent on refugees and displaced persons
in this region.
Now facing this overwhelming new wave of humanity, we are
only beginning to grasp its requirements. New UN and Red
Cross/Red Crescent appeals have been issued for $700 million, and
these cover in most cases no more than 3 months. The costs will
surely rise dramatically by year's end.
So far, in a space of 2 weeks, over $270 million has been
pledged for this latest period, and more pledges are coming in
constantly. The US contribution to the above is over $53 million and
growing. Over $28 million of this total has been contributed in food
aid, OFDA [Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance] assistance, and
drawdowns from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
fund. US military assistance to the effort for the refugees from
northern and southern Iraq, including operational costs of the
massive relief effort, is estimated to be in excess of $25 million
and, further, is expected to increase substantially over the next 30
days.
Perhaps one of the most acute shortages is relief management
and logistics expertise. The international community was providing
protection and assistance to 15 million refugees worldwide when
this crisis erupted. The UN, NGOs [non-governmental organizations],
and other repositories
of such skills were already heavily engaged. Now we need many
more such people.
Problems.
Even as this major effort gets
underway, three special problems will complicate further our task.
In the current circumstances, the Turkish government has readily
acknowledged the need for international assistance and has asked
the UN to organize the relief effort that will succeed current US
activities. Problems remain on both the Turkish and UN sides,
however, especially in deploying international relief workers into
the region and to refugee concentration points. But we are hopeful
they will soon be overcome.
Obstacles to repatriation
. Everyone agrees
that the desired outcome of this situation is for these people to be
able to return home voluntarily. Maintaining them on the border for
any long period of time conjures up visions of another Gaza Strip.
Yet, what is required for people who fled a killer regime to be able
to return home safely? One step is to establish a UN and ICRC
presence not only to where people have moved but also in the areas
from which people fled, under the authority of UNSC [Resolution]
688. Coupled with humanitarian assistance from these
organizations, it is hoped that this will enable people to return
home safely. We are at the very beginning of this process, and it is
too early to know exactly how it will unfold. It goes beyond the
concept of an "enclave." It aims at providing an international
humanitarian presence and relief wherever needed in the country, so
that people can stay as close to, and eventually return, home. We
have added to our earlier warning to Iraq that it is not to take any
actions which interfere with relief activities in any part of the
country.
This crisis has attracted world attention and rightfully world
sympathy. Unfortunately, it comes at the same time as other less
publicized crises also demanding our attention. Civil unrest in
Somalia has uprooted 350,000 people into Ethiopia whose condition
is perilous. The number of Liberian refugees has grown beyond the
expectations and budget of UNHCR. A drought in Sudan threatens
famine of massive proportions. These crises also demand our
attention and our resources. Both in money and personnel,
international humanitarian responses and capability-and, indeed,
attention-will be stretched thin. Yet, as much as possible, we must
endeavor to respond to this emergency in Iraq without doing it at
the cost of others. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991
Title: Remarks on Iraqi Refugees
Baker, Aga Khan
Source: Remarks by Secretary Baker and Prince Sadruddin Aga
Khan, UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Description: Geneva, Switzerland
Date: Apr 12, 19914/12/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Iran, Turkey
[TEXT]
Secretary Baker: Let me simply say that I value the opportunity to
have met here this afternoon with my friend and colleague His
Highness, who will be heading this effort for the UN, and with the
international relief agency heads.
The visit that I took to the Turkish border 4 or 5 days ago
revealed, as I indicated at that time, a massive human tragedy. A
tragedy that is almost beyond belief, when you see it there on the
ground, as we did-hundreds of thousands of people homeless,
without shelter, without food, without clean water, without
medical supplies, struggling actually to simply survive and live
through each day. A situation that simply cannot be permitted to
continue.
The only answer in the immediate and short term is for there
to be a massive international relief effort literally to save lives.
And that's what has been set in motion here in Geneva. That is what
the UN is moving to accomplish. That, of course, is also what the
United States, through its very, very substantial military airlift
efforts, is trying to contribute to. And that's why we are so pleased
by the appointment of Sadruddin Aga Khan; we welcome so very
much his efforts to coordinate this relief assistance.
I don't know whether His Highness wants to say anything or
not, but please let me give you the mike.
Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan: Well, Mr. Secretary, I'd like to
thank you, on behalf of all my colleagues here in Geneva, for giving
us so much of your time, and for listening to the point of view of
the UN agencies as we face this monumental human tragedy. I think
you have identified the problems, the suffering. You were there.
Many of us are going to the area in the coming days and weeks, and I
think we will share your assessment.
We now need the support of the international community as a
whole. We cannot achieve lasting solutions without the help of
many donor countries. And I think the High Commissioner for
Refugees, which will play a leading role in this operation for the
UN, is looking for the opportunity of creating incentives for people
to go home.
There is no better solution than voluntary repatriation. It's
easier to open camps than to close them. And what we have to do is
to look down the road, make sure that people are helped now, that
they don't die of hunger and exposure, that women and children can
survive on both sides of the border-all the vulnerable groups-but
then look for lasting solutions. I think the talks today will help us
to chart the way. And with your support and the support of so many
major donor countries, the UN will certainly, in the coming days, do
everything it can to go toward a solution of this disastrous,
monumental human tragedy. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991
Title: Proposed International Cooperation Act of 1991
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Letter to Congress, Washington, DC
Date: Apr 12, 19914/12/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Country: United States
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Arms Control,
State Department
[TEXT]
Following is the text of identical letters to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House.
Dear Mr. President:
I attach great importance to the proposed "International
Cooperation Act of 1991," which we are submitting for
congressional consideration. Secretary Baker and I look forward to
working closely with the Congress to ensure its prompt enactment.
Events in recent months have dramatically illustrated the
growing urgency for flexible and rapidly available economic,
military, and humanitarian assistance as a vital instrument of
American foreign policy. Before us loom international opportunities
and challenges as promising as any our nation has faced since the
end of the Second World War. Yet the law governing foreign
assistance has become so complex, splintered and restrictive that
it no longer serves our essential national interests and aspirations.
The shortcomings of existing law are likely to become even more
pronounced and damaging as we move ahead through the volatile
transition to a new world order.
Together, we must regain the essentials of administrative
simplicity, flexibility, accountability, and clarity of purpose that
originally characterized the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The
world, of course, has changed fundamentally since then, especially
during the two years following our last effort to reform the law
governing foreign assistance. What have not changed, however, are
the basic values and national outlook that motivate our foreign
assistance.
My overarching goal is for the United States to remain at the
forefront of a world community that is increasingly democratic,
market-oriented, and willing and able to cooperate against
aggression. The urgently needed reforms I propose would restore
the necessary coherence and flexibility to pursue effectively the
five basic and closely inter-related objectives that now frame our
foreign policy: promoting and consolidating democratic values,
promoting market principles and strengthening US competitiveness,
promoting peace, protecting against transnational threats, and
meeting urgent humanitarian needs.
All of the continuing programs that have been included in the
proposed legislation are essential to our national interest, at least
in the short run. I fully recognize, however, that pressures to
adjust to new international realities are rapidly increasing, and, in
the years immediately ahead, we must work energetically together
to meet the new challenges they are producing. We must also reach
these important, if difficult, decisions within the constraints
imposed by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.
In my March 6 address to the Joint Session of Congress, I
observed that our nation cannot lead internationally if we propose
politics as usual in devising and implementing foreign assistance.
I asked Congress to work with me to put an end to
micromanagement of all of our foreign economic, security, and
humanitarian assistance programs. Each of these programs must
become part of a coherent strategy that will advance a foreign
policy worthy of our deepest and most abiding national aspirations.
Without the flexibility provided for in the proposed International
Cooperation Act, it will be impossible to forge such coherence and
to sustain the international leadership that we both desire.
On my part, I pledge to work closely and cooperatively with
the Congress throughout each stage of the foreign policy-making
process so that you can fully meet your responsibilities under the
Constitution. But I am also convinced that we will be unable to deal
with the momentous-and often unpredictable-events of today's
world if Congress continues to restrict presidential prerogatives.
Such micromanagement must not be part of this legislation.
In seeking to restore the proper balance of congressional and
presidential authority in the conduct of foreign policy, the
Administration's proposal deletes the many restrictions,
prohibitions, burdensome reports, unnecessary reporting
requirements, and statutory waiting periods that have accumulated
over several decades. The proposed revisions will significantly
strengthen our capacity to respond positively and effectively to a
rapidly changing environment, while reducing the risk of missed
opportunities.
The restitution of presidential authorities would extend to all
aspects of the proposed legislation. One especially sensitive and
important area concerns nuclear nonproliferation. Consistent with
our approach of removing country-specific provisions, the
Administration's proposal does not contain a specific provision on
assistance to Pakistan, as stipulated in the current Foreign
Assistance Act.
Nevertheless, I give the Congress my unequivocal assurance
that my position on the critical issue of preventing nuclear
proliferation in South Asia and elsewhere will not weaken. While
the proposed elimination of the Pakistan-specific certification
requirement is intended to uphold the general principle of
presidential authority, I will continue to insist on unambiguous
specific steps by Pakistan in meeting nonproliferation standards,
including those specifically reflected in the omitted language,
known as the Pressler Amendment. Satisfaction of the Pressler
standard will remain the essential basis for exercising the national
interest waiver that is in the Administration's proposal in order to
resume economic and military assistance to Pakistan. By adopting
this policy firmly and publicly as the Administration's position, my
intention is to send the strongest possible message to Pakistan and
other potential proliferators that nonproliferation is among the
highest priorities of my Administration's foreign policy,
irrespective of whether such a policy is required by law.
The proposed legislation addresses many complex and
difficult issues, with profound political and moral implications for
America's global role. But the world we seek to influence is in the
throes of an historic transition that creates special opportunities
and responsibilities for our nation. The process by which we
resolve our differences will be as important to the effectiveness of
our foreign policy as the decisions finally taken. I hope that you
will find this proposal to be an appropriate foundation for building
such cooperation, and moving forward to revitalize foreign
assistance so as to serve better our most fundamental values and
interests.
Sincerely, GEORGE BUSH
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991
Title: International Cooperation Act of 1991: Background
Date: Apr 12, 19914/12/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Country: United States
Subject: Development/Relief Aid, Arms Control,
State Department
[TEXT]
On April 12, 1991, the Administration transmitted the International
Cooperation Act of 1991 to the Congress. This legislation would
replace existing laws governing US foreign assistance programs and
establish a framework tailored to the challenges of a new era.
President Bush, Secretary Baker, and USAID Administrator
Roskens attach great importance to this bill, and they look forward
to working closely with the Congress to ensure the bill's prompt and
successful enactment. Our task is vital and urgent.
The current challenge-to identify and quickly move
substantial resources to aid desperate Kurdish refugees-is only the
latest illustration of why this new legislation is so badly needed.
Three major concerns guided preparation of the proposed
legislation:
-- To regain foreign assistance as an effective and well-
integrated instrument of foreign policy;
-- To restore the President's authority to use this instrument
as it was originally intended, as a flexible cost-effective means to
advance our national interest, rather than permitting it to remain
hostage to narrow special interests protected by heavily earmarked
accounts; and
-- To strengthen bipartisan cooperation and public support
for this bill and, more generally, for our post-Cold War foreign
policy.
The current Foreign Assistance Act was enacted 30 years ago,
in 1961, at the height of the Cold War. The world has changed and
continues to change rapidly; democracy is expanding, and the United
States faces new challenges. When originally passed, the act gave
the President the necessary authority and flexibility to address the
critical challenges of the day. Over time, and with a shrinking
budget, the legislation has ballooned to encompass some 33 distinct
and often conflicting objectives, with reporting requirements and
other restrictions so onerous that they often defeat the bill's
stated purposes.
Three years ago, key members of Congress wisely concluded
that current legislation had lost touch with reality and ill-served
our national interests and ideals. The House Foreign Affairs
Committee, led by Chairman Dante Fascell and ranking Minority
Member William Broomfield, produced a major aid reform package,
commonly known as the Hamilton/Gilman bill. The proposed
legislation took the earlier House bill as its starting point, building
on the important work of members and staff of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee. In December 1990, these members wrote to ask
that the Administration engage the Congress this year on new
foreign assistance legislation. We are doing that.
Since 1989, the historic international developments that
helped focus the reform effort in Congress have accelerated. We
now seek, therefore, authorities that are even more in line with the
essential flexibility, administrative simplicity, and clarity of
purpose of the original 1961 Foreign Assistance Act.
Our overarching concern is to regain sufficient authority to
allow the President to use the resources envisioned under this bill
to achieve five closely inter-related foreign policy objectives:
-- Promoting and consolidating democratic values;
-- Promoting market principles and the strengthening of US
competitiveness;
-- Promoting peace;
-- Protecting against transnational threats; and
-- Meeting humanitarian needs.
Collectively, these five objectives-as described in the proposed
bill-should comprise the measure of American leadership for
decades to come. We recognize that adapting existing programs to
advance these ideals could occasionally strain the goodwill that
now exists between Congress and the President. We believe that
the proposed legislation sets a solid foundation for cooperation. On
our part, we are determined to work closely and cooperatively with
Congress throughout each stage of the foreign policy making
process.
To effect a successful transformation of foreign assistance
into a more relevant foreign policy instrument capable of fostering
mutually beneficial cooperation with other nations, we recommend
simplifying existing authorities in many important ways, including
by:
-- Consolidating USAID economic development assistance
accounts into one account;
-- Amending substantially the Arms Export Control Act;
-- Cutting back sharply the provisions that restrict
assistance to particular countries;
-- Authorizing a broader range of assistance, even to
countries for which assistance is otherwise prohibited;
-- Liberalizing waivers and other flexibility authorities; and
-- Expanding contingency authorities, including following up
a suggestion by Chairman Fascell to provide the President with a
small but potentially significant fund to assist democratizing
nations.
The reforms contained in the proposed legislation raise many
complex and difficult issues for both branches of government.
Building and sustaining bipartisan consensus for the reforms and
the programs that would follow will be critical. Our foreign policy,
like the world it seeks to influence, is in the early stages of an
unprecedented transition. We hope that this bill, once enacted, will
provide the means that will allow us to continue to lead an
international community that is increasingly receptive to
democracy, market economics, and cooperation against aggression.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991
Title: Updating and Streamlining Foreign Assistance Law
Date: Apr 12, 19914/12/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Country: United States
Subject: Arms Control, Development/Relief Aid,
State Department, International Law
[TEXT]
Updating and Streamlining Foreign Assistance Law
The Administration's bill comprehensively updates and streamlines
existing foreign assistance law. Its goal is to make the law easier
to understand and administer. The following points illustrate the
kind of changes the Administration is proposing in this connection:
-- Development Assistance
. Under current
law, there are eight separate accounts for development assistance,
each with its own set of requirements and priorities on how to use
development assistance funds. Under the new approach, there would
be a single account.
-- Objectives and Priorities
. In 1989, the
House Foreign Affairs Committee Task Force on Foreign Assistance
reported that there were 33 competing "objectives" scattered
through the current Foreign Assistance Act, and 75 separate
"priorities" for economic assistance. The result is that the
objectives are clouded and nothing can really be considered a
priority. Our bill would establish five clearly articulated objectives
that would serve as the basis for all our foreign assistance
programs.
-- Congressional Notifications.
Under
current law, the US Agency for International Development is subject
to extensive notify-and-wait provisions before providing certain
funding. In the last year, it has had to submit nearly 1,000 such
notifications, covering even relatively minor proposals. A large
portion of these notifications are completely routine and do nothing
but cause delays. Under our bill, we estimate the number of
notifications would be cut in half.
-- Arms Sales
. Under current law, there are
six separate congressional notification requirements for arms
transfers. Under our bill, there would be one provision-governing all
such transfers-with one set of clearly articulated procedures.
-- Excess Defense Articles
. Under current
law, there are four separate provisions regarding the provision of
excess defense articles. Our bill would consolidate them into one.
-- Prohibitions on Assistance
. Under current
law, scores of restrictions on assistance to particular countries
are scattered throughout the Foreign Assistance Act, as well as a
variety of annual acts that Congress has passed over the last 30
years. The scattering of these restrictions makes them more
difficult to explain and apply. Our bill would organize the
restrictions in one place and provide clear guidance for those
responsible for administering foreign assistance programs.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991
Title: Cambodia and Vietnam: Time for Peace and Normalization
Solomon
Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington,
DC
Date: Apr 10, 19914/10/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Cambodia, Vietnam
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest
[TEXT]
I welcome this opportunity to review our continuing efforts to
achieve a political settlement to the Cambodia conflict.
After nearly 2 years of diplomatic activity-first in the
context of the Paris conference on Cambodia (PCC) [International
Conference on Cambodia, Paris, France, July 30, 1989] in the
summer of 1989, and since the fall of that year in the framework of
the deliberations of the UN Security Council's five permanent
members-[China, France, USSR, UK, US-UN Perm Five]-we have
reached a critical point in our efforts to construct a political
settlement process. A comprehensive settlement agreement is now
within reach, if the Cambodian parties and others-including
Vietnam-will cooperate. As we approach what is hopefully a
resolution of this tragic situation, I know that Secretary Baker
believes your concern and your personal support remain vital to the
settlement process.
DEVELOPING THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
The Paris Conference Creates Momentum
We have come a long way toward a settlement in these past 2 years.
After a decade of military occupation of Cambodia, Vietnam
announced 2 years ago this month its intention to withdraw its
forces by the end of September 1989. In response, and in order to
prevent ongoing warfare, France, Indonesia, and other interested
countries joined together to convene an international conference to
create a political settlement process. The Paris conference on
Cambodia met throughout August 1989. Delegations from the four
Cambodian factions, 18 countries, and the United Nations attempted
to build a settlement process based on a formula in which the
Cambodian factions would share power until elections were held
under UN auspices.
Ultimately, the conference was unable to resolve the central
issue of power-sharing during the interim period leading up to
elections. Hanoi and the Phnom Penh regime were not prepared to
accept the establishment of a provisional coalition administration
under Prince Sihanouk to guide the country to democratic elections.
Phnom Penh was clear in its refusal to share power with anyone
before elections were held under its unilateral authority. Those
involved in the resistance did not see this as an opportunity for
meaningful elections.
Although the Paris conference did not achieve a breakthrough,
a positive diplomatic momentum was established. The PCC
confirmed the necessity of a comprehensive settlement, reached a
virtual consensus that the United Nations must play a significant
role in any settlement process, and made progress on many of the
specific elements involved in peacekeeping, international
guarantees for Cambodia's sovereignty and rehabilitation and
repatriation.
A Settlement Approach Involving an Enhanced UN
Role
An alternative formula was subsequently developed which would
create neutral political conditions in Cambodia, allowing all
political parties to compete on an equal basis in free and fair
elections organized and conducted by the UN. An attempt was made
to break the impasse among the four Cambodian factions-the
Sihanoukists, the KPNLF [Kampuchean People's National Liberation
Front], the Phnom Penh regime, and the Khmer Rouge-by conceiving
of Cambodian sovereignty embodied in a supreme national council of
individuals reflecting the spectrum of political opinion in Cambodia.
And the potential UN role was expanded from traditional
peacekeeping and election operations to include responsibility for
administrative oversight as well.
Prince Sihanouk had been advocating an enhanced UN role for
some time, and Congressman [Stephen] Solarz expressed his support
for this approach in the spring of 1989. Secretary Baker discussed
such a settlement effort with his UN Perm Five and ASEAN
[Association of South East Asian Nations] counterparts in
September at the 1989 UN General Assembly and instructed those of
us within the State Department with responsibility for Cambodian
affairs to begin planning for an approach that would build on the
accomplishments of the Paris conference. Australia's Foreign
Minister [Gareth] Evans added his support for a settlement based on
an enhanced UN role in late November 1989, and the Australian
government, subsequently, developed a series of planning papers and
diplomatic efforts that have provided important intellectual and
political support for the UN settlement process.
The Perm Five Process
Representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council began meeting regularly in Paris and New York in January
1990. During the subsequent 8 months, they succeeded in
constructing a framework for a comprehensive settlement in which
the United Nations would create a secure and politically neutral
environment for supervised elections. Since the Perm Five members
supported different Cambodian factions, they were able to
represent the differing points of view of the contending parties.
The momentum developed by the Perm Five process was
increased by regional efforts promoted by Indonesia, Japan, and
Thailand as well as by our own policy adjustments announced by
Secretary Baker in July 1990, which led to our talks with Vietnam
and then to direct contacts with the Phnom Penh regime. In these
contacts, we have stressed to both Hanoi and Phnom Penh the need
for their active support of the Perm Five process if a just and
stable political settlement is to be achieved.
The Perm Five framework agreement was completed in New
York on August 28, 1990. The framework outlines an enhanced UN
role in the interim administrative and military arrangements to be
put in place before elections are held under UN auspices. It also
stresses the importance of human rights protections and
international guarantees for the terms of a settlement.
The framework includes the following elements:
-- Creation of a supreme national council of individuals as
the "embodiment of the independence, sovereignty and unity of
Cambodia" until a new government is formed after elections;
-- A UN-supervised cease-fire, cantonment of the factional
military forces, and a phased process of arms control and reduction;
and
-- Creation of a UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC) with the responsibilities of supervising the cease-fire,
verifying the withdrawal of all foreign military forces and advisers
and the end of all arms supplies to the four factions, monitoring the
neutralization of the civil administration, and conducting free and
fair elections.
We believe the Perm Five formula is the only promising basis
for a just and durable settlement, but it requires the active support
of all parties involved. It would move the current military conflict
from the battlefield to the ballot box. It would give the people of
Cambodia the opportunity to choose their own government, and it
provides them a non-communist political alternative in the
prospective candidacies of Prince Sihanouk and the non-communist
groups. We also firmly believe the settlement process is the best-
and probably the only-way to provide credible and effective
guarantees against a Khmer Rouge return to violent domination of
Cambodia.
In building the consensus behind the settlement framework,
we received close cooperation from the other four permanent
members of the Security Council and believe each member remains
fully committed to the results of this collective effort. The five
were actively supported in their work by interested parties,
including the UN Secretary General's Intra-Secretariat Task Force
on Cambodia, established in February 1990, as well as by Indonesia,
Australia, Thailand, and Japan.
The Perm Five and Paris Conference Efforts Come Together
Developments in the fall of 1990 were very encouraging to further
progress toward a settlement. The four Cambodian factions met in
Jakarta [Indonesia] in early September under the auspices of the
PCC co-chairmen-France and Indonesia. They announced their
acceptance of the Perm Five framework agreement as the basis for
a Cambodian settlement and formed the Supreme National Council
(SNC) as called for in the framework agreement. The framework
was endorsed by the full UN Security Council in Resolution 668,
passed by a vote of 15-0 on September 20, 1990, and by consensus
in the General Assembly on October 15.
On November 9 and 10, the PCC co-chairmen convened a
"friends of the co-chairmen" meeting in Jakarta. This group
included representatives of 12 of the nations participating in the
PCC and the UN Secretary General. Under the skillful leadership of
Indonesian Foreign Minister [Ali] Alatas, the participants made
important progress toward the goal of elaborating the Perm Five
framework into the draft of a final settlement agreement.
The Perm Five met again in late November in Paris-together
with Indonesian and UN representatives-and took the Jakarta
documents a major step further toward final form. After a thorough
review, the group reached consensus on November 26 on an
elaborated set of documents which, in combination, constitute the
overall agreement for a comprehensive settlement to be concluded
at a reconvened Paris conference.
We can say with satisfaction that the work of the Perm Five
has received widespread support throughout the international
community, not only from the Secretary General of the UN, the
entire Security Council, and the General Assembly, but more
specifically from the six members of ASEAN and the Cambodian
resistance factions. To date, only Phnom Penh and Hanoi have yet to
join in the broad international consensus.
At a meeting chaired by Paris conference co-chairmen Dumas
and Alatas in Paris in late December, in which a representative of
the UN Secretary General also participated, the SNC members
reviewed the November 26 draft of the settlement agreement.
According to the meeting's final statement, "there was concurrence
on most of the fundamental points." In fact, while the resistance
members accepted the draft agreement in its entirety, the Phnom
Penh regime and its supporters in Hanoi began to express serious
reservations, particularly regarding military and sovereignty
issues, thus slowing movement toward the final consensus needed
to reconvene the Paris conference.
Consultations have continued in the first months of 1991 in an
effort to overcome the reservations of Phnom Penh and Hanoi.
These included a January 31 to February 3 visit to Vietnam by
representatives of the Paris co-chairmen and the UN Secretary
General to try to gain from Vietnam support for the draft
agreement. Such support, essential to concluding a settlement, has
yet to be forthcoming, not withstanding these consultations.
The next step in the diplomacy, we anticipate, will be an SNC
meeting in Jakarta convened by the PCC co-chairmen, probably in
mid-May. SNC support for the draft documents would allow the PCC
to reconvene, hopefully by mid-1991, to make any final adjustments
and endorse the overall agreement-which would then be referred to
the United Nations for implementation.
We believe that active US involvement in the Perm Five
process-along with our parallel diplomatic efforts with Hanoi,
Phnom Penh, and others-has been essential to moving these efforts
toward a successful conclusion. We have actively participated in
the design of the Perm Five settlement process involving an
enhanced UN role, especially in the critical areas of control of the
military forces, civil administration and elections, and protection
of human rights. Our involvement has paid significant dividends.
The settlement documents-which are derived directly from the
Perm Five framework agreement-offer a viable formula for a
durable settlement, establish the conditions of military security
necessary to bring the fighting to a halt, and produce the
administrative stability and neutral political conditions necessary
for a free and fair election.
All of these elements, we believe, are the best, if not the only
way to achieve a settlement that will meet the critical objectives
of US policy: prevention of a return to power by the murderous
Khmer Rouge; verification of the withdrawal of all Vietnamese
forces; creation of a political process culminating in genuine self-
determination for the Cambodian people; and preservation of a non-
communist alternative at the negotiating table and in the electoral
process.
OVERCOMING HANOI'S AND PHNOM PENH'S
RESERVATIONS
We believe the Perm Five documents are balanced so as to maintain
the involvement in the settlement process of all the relevant
parties.
We have carefully reviewed the concerns raised by Phnom
Penh and Hanoi regarding these documents. In our view, any effort
to renegotiate them would be an endless exercise likely to
undermine the settlement process. However, we believe it is
possible to respond to reasonable concerns by clarifying or
elaborating some elements of the draft agreement in ways that are
consistent with the overall Perm Five approach. At the December
meeting of the SNC, UN Under Secretary General Ahmed drafted an
"explanatory note" regarding some of the issues of concern to Phnom
Penh. We view his note as potentially helpful to building the full
consensus necessary to complete the settlement agreement.
Dealing with the Concerns of Hanoi and Phnom Penh
The stated concerns of Hanoi and Phnom Penh relate to the issues of
"sovereignty," "demobilization," and "genocide." We have given
serious consideration to these issues and believe they can be
resolved within the Perm Five settlement framework-if the parties
concerned are truly committed to a political settlement.
Sovereignty. Hanoi and Phnom Penh have expressed
concern that the settlement violates Cambodia's sovereignty. We
firmly believe that Cambodia's sovereignty resides with the people-
not with a regime established through foreign invasion and
occupation, much less with a faction compromised by the genocidal
violence of the 1970s. The Cambodian people deserve the
opportunity to establish a legitimate government in Phnom Penh
through free and fair elections. The SNC-composed of individuals
reflecting the existing factions-will assure that Cambodia's
sovereignty is upheld during the transitional period until those
elections are held. As the draft agreement states, "the SNC is the
unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout
the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of
Cambodia are enshrined."
If the SNC can reach consensus on any given settlement issue,
the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia will follow its lead-
unless the advice is not consistent with the objectives of the
settlement agreement. If the SNC is paralyzed, however, UNTAC
will keep the election process moving forward to that ultimate
exercise of Cambodian sovereignty-free and fair elections.
As Under Secretary General Ahmed's explanatory note makes
clear, no one envisages "dismantling" the Phnom Penh
administrative structure during the interim period. We concur fully
in his statement that "an efficient and cost-effective discharge of
its mandate will require UNTAC to take
a pragmatic, realistic, and practical approach in full consultation
and cooperation with the Supreme National Council and the existing
civil administration." The UN has neither the manpower nor the
detailed expertise necessary to run the country. The UN role is
intended to do only that which is necessary to bring about free and
fair elections in a neutral political environment and, thus, establish
a legitimate government-the most basic expression of Cambodia's
sovereignty.
Demobilization. The return to civilian life of the
factional military forces is a more challenging issue. We
understand the concern that demobilizing the Phnom Penh regime's
army could leave the field open to clandestine or guerrilla elements
of the Khmer Rouge. The United States and other involved countries
also are very concerned about any Khmer Rouge actions which might
undermine the settlement process. Our support for a strong and
mobile UN military presence is designed to minimize any possibility
that the Khmer Rouge, or any other party to the settlement, can
avoid compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Indeed, a
major role of the UN peacekeeping force will be to investigate any
and all reports of failure of any factional forces-including all
guerrilla units-to report to cantonments or to disclose their
possession of arms and to identify and control arms caches.
A UN peacekeeping operation would not be concerned only with
territory controlled by Phnom Penh; it will be equally concerned
with, and present in, areas controlled by the other factions-and
undertake liaison with neighboring governments over any
developments in or near their territory which could endanger
implementation of the agreement. This must include investigation
of reports of sanctuary areas. In view of our own concerns about
the Khmer Rouge, we will insist upon and give whatever support we
can to such efforts. Similarly, UN monitors must assure that
military supplies do not cross borders from any neighboring country
into Cambodia to aid any factions. China's commitment to support
the settlement process is an important aspect of our efforts to
control the Khmer Rouge.
We will support a very aggressive role for the UN in ensuring
compliance with the military commitments by all regular, guerrilla,
irregular, and paramilitary forces and units. The UN peacekeepers
will work with all the factions through a military working group, as
well as with local villagers, as the peace-keeping process
continues to identify any attempt to evade compliance with the
commitments of the settlement agreement.
To build confidence in the process of controlling the factional
forces, demobilization is designed to occur in stages; no single
force would be disarmed unilaterally. Movement from one stage to
the next in this process would not occur until all parties have had a
reasonable time and opportunity to satisfy themselves that
everything called for in each stage has been accomplished. This is
consistent with Under Secretary General Ahmed's explanatory note.
At the same time, disagreements among the Cambodian parties
cannot be permitted to paralyze any part of the settlement
agreement.
Overall, having the troops return to civilian life would be of
major benefit to the settlement process-both by minimizing the
expense and potential danger of keeping all the troops together in
cantonments, as well as by demobilizing the men to help develop the
civilian economy. Clearly, the countries which will contribute
personnel and help pay for the settlement effort strongly believe
that a substantial reduction in the number of troops is necessary to
stabilize the transitional period. In addition, no one would want to
leave in place the factional forces which, after the expense and
effort of a UN settlement, could return to warfare as soon as the UN
presence is removed.
To further enhance the overall security of the settlement
period, we are willing to consider supporting the phased
development of a new national army in parallel with the phased
return to civilian life of the factional troops. At the end of the
transitional period, the new Cambodian government could make
arrangements with troop contributing countries to keep former
UNTAC officers in country as trainers. Alternatively, depending on
circumstances at the time, the UN Security Council could consider a
Cambodian request to keep the UNTAC military contingent in place
for a finite time period, following installation of the new
government, in order to assist the new national army.
Genocide. Of the issues raised by Hanoi and Phnom Penh,
the United States shares most strongly their opposition to the
return to power of the Khmer Rouge. We have publicly stated this in
the past and will continue to do so during the settlement process.
Indeed, our government has taken the lead during the negotiations
to ensure that the Perm Five framework includes as many practical,
effective measures as possible to help control this murderous
group. The entire human rights section of the framework
agreement-which we drafted for consideration at the March 1990
meeting of the Perm Five-is designed to assure that the terrible
abuses of the past cannot recur.
The draft documents include references to rights and
freedoms embodied in the [UN] Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments.
Let me be clear, we worked to assure that these references were
included in the texts. One such instrument is the International
Convention on Genocide, to which Cambodia is a party. At a
reconvened Paris conference, we are prepared-unilaterally if
necessary-to make a formal public statement expressing our
concern about the past violence of the Khmer Rouge and our strong
support for those elements of the settlement agreement designed to
protect the human rights of the Cambodian people and to ensure that
such genocidal violence never again occurs.
In our view, the bottom line is that the peace process is the
one promising way of bringing security and justice to the
Cambodian people. Its successful completion cannot be held back
over the issue of including or not including the word "genocide." The
Khmer Rouge would be the only beneficiary if discord over this
issue blocks moving forward to conclude a political settlement.
We firmly believe that a comprehensive settlement agreement
represents the best and probably the only real means of controlling
the Khmer Rouge. Let me be very direct on this point. In our view,
the worst possibility for the future of Cambodia would be a
collapse of current diplomatic efforts and a period of unconstrained
warfare. Such a development would give the Khmer Rouge its best
chance at a return to power, and it would ensure a continuation of
the suffering of the Cambodian people.
For those who assert that support for the Phnom Penh regime
provides a credible alternative to blocking a return to power by the
Khmer Rouge, the record suggests quite the opposite. Vietnam tried
to stabilize the Phnom Penh regime for over a decade with more
than 150,000 of its own seasoned troops, and with Soviet military
and economic assistance estimated at more than $400 million per
year. Such outside support failed to achieve its goal; indeed, it
weakened the legitimacy of the Phnom Penh authorities and gave the
Khmer Rouge the powerful appeal of nationalism as it sought to
regain popular support.
If a political settlement is not reached, and as military
conflict continues, we anticipate that the Phnom Penh regime will
weaken over time. The reduction in Soviet assistance, the
disruption in the countryside, and the growing difficulties facing
the current regime will be difficult to overcome. Thus, if we do not
work actively in support of the UN/Paris conference settlement
now, the Khmer Rouge will be the only beneficiary.
The settlement process provides the most credible approach
to controlling the Khmer Rouge threat. How many Cambodians will
vote for the Khmer Rouge in a free and fair election? We believe
the political indoctrination being carried out by the Khmer Rouge
can be offset by nationwide education about human rights and the
opportunity for self-determination through a UN-supervised
election. The military elements of the settlement process-the
strong UN peace-keeping presence, the cantonment of forces,
demobilization, the possible creation of a new national army-will
all help to counter the Khmer Rouge military threat. We will work
to ensure full compliance by all the countries involved to the
settlement provision regarding the ending of outside arms aid and
other support for the Khmer Rouge and the other factions.
We support strong UN human rights monitoring in Cambodia,
including after the elections, to ensure that any Khmer Rouge
violations will be held up to international scrutiny and
condemnation. We are prepared to assist a future sovereign
government-one freely elected by the Cambodian people-to ensure
Cambodia's future security. Such a government would have the
legitimacy and authority to deal with the genocide issue, both past
and future.
THE ROAD AHEAD AND A "ROAD MAP"
Final agreement on the Perm Five settlement process should and can
be reached at an early date so that the Paris conference process can
be concluded and the work of the UN can begin. This can only be to
the benefit of all concerned-not only to the people of Cambodia but
also to the authorities in Phnom Penh and their supporters in Hanoi.
Benefits to Phnom Penh
The Phnom Penh leadership should realize that if it supports the
settlement process, such support can only serve its own best
interests. As the settlement process is designed, the UN
transitional authority will work through the administrative
structures now in place; they will not be dismantled, only
politically neutralized. As long as those administrative structures
operate in accordance with the goals of the settlement plan and in a
neutral manner, the UN role will essentially be to monitor its
operations.
In addition, once the settlement process verifies the complete
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge
will lose its main propaganda focus: Vietnamese support for the
Phnom Penh regime. Without this nationalistic message, Khmer
Rouge candidates in the election will have to defend their genocidal
practices of the late 1970s. No one expects the Khmer Rouge to do
well in that situation.
If the Khmer Rouge fails to live up to the provisions of the
settlement agreement, they would become isolated, and the UN-
assisted SNC, or its elected successor, would receive increased
international support. The only way the Khmer Rouge can win is if
the settlement process is blocked and the military struggle
continues. The Khmer Rouge is stronger in the military arena than
in the political realm; and, in our estimation, without a political
settlement, time is not on the side of Phnom Penh. It is essential,
therefore, that the Khmer Rouge be contained within the settlement
process and its external support ended.
Benefits to Hanoi
If Vietnam actively supports the Paris conference/UN settlement
process, its relations with the international community will be
greatly strengthened. At the same time, Hanoi's concerns about the
Khmer Rouge threat-something Vietnam could not bring under
control during a decade of military occupation -would be dealt with
by the community of nations. As stability returns to the sub-
region, other nations will more seriously consider investments in
Vietnam-not an insignificant benefit to a country badly in need of
development capital. A Cambodian settlement would remove a
principal barrier to better relations between Hanoi and Beijing and,
thus, allow the Vietnamese further to reduce the onerous burden of
their still very large military establishment.
Secretary Baker reaffirmed to Deputy Prime Minister Thach
last September our longstanding policy that normalization with
Vietnam can occur only in the context of the verified withdrawal of
all Vietnamese military forces as part of a comprehensive
Cambodian settlement-with the pace and scope of the normalization
process directly affected by the seriousness of Hanoi's cooperation
with us on the POW/MIA [prisoners of war/missing-in-action] issue
and other humanitarian concerns.
To make certain that Vietnam's leaders clearly understand the
choices before them, I met on April 9 with Vietnam's permanent
representative to the United Nations to spell out our policy on
normalization in precise detail. We discussed a four-phase "road
map" to political and economic normalization that could, in
relatively short order, end the trade embargo and our opposition to
IMF [International Monetary Fund], World Bank, and ADB [Asian
Development Bank] loans to Vietnam as our concerns for a
Cambodian settlement and POW/MIA accounting are resolved. We
hope that, in a spirit of reconciliation and farsightedness,
Vietnam's leaders will give serious consideration to our proposal
and not miss this opportunity to normalize relations.
In parallel with this demarche, we also have had another
meeting with the representative of the Phnom Penh regime in
Vientiane, Laos, to describe how US relations with Cambodia could
develop in the context of the UN settlement process. We also
discussed Phnom Penh's concerns about the draft settlement
agreement.
TURNING A PAGE IN HISTORY
We believe that a new page of history could soon be turned in
Indochina, that we can enter a period of political reconciliation and
national development. But all the parties involved must now work
together in the necessary spirit of compromise so that a settlement
agreement can be signed, a UN operation can be put in place, and the
international community can begin to offer the assistance that
Cambodia so urgently requires. After decades of terror and turmoil,
the Cambodian people deserve peace, stability, and the support of
the international community.
But a settlement in Cambodia will not only benefit the people
of that small country. It will have a much broader impact on the
entire region. The conflict in Cambodia has kept alive regional and
ideological rivalries which should have been relegated long ago to
the dustbin of history. The Soviet Union and China have overcome
significant obstacles and moved to improve their bilateral
relations. China also has negotiated directly with Vietnam to
achieve a Cambodian settlement. Both of these bilateral
relationships will be improved by a Cambodian settlement.
The nations of ASEAN have shown that economic growth is the
true source of national strength and security-not military power or
domination of one's neighbors. We look forward to Vietnam
becoming part of the mainstream of Southeast Asian progress. We
want Cambodia as well as Laos to play their
respective roles in this process. Such a transformation of this
unhappy region will become possible in the context of a Cambodian
settlement.
We are gratified that the Perm Five-as well as other regional
powers-have played a major role in constructing this settlement
agreement. It establishes a precedent for resolution of other
regional conflicts in the post-Cold War environment and affirms the
possibility of a new era in international peacekeeping.
Let me note, however, that the momentum moving us toward a
comprehensive Cambodian settlement will not last indefinitely.
Other critical problems in other regions of the world will surely
arise and demand the attention and the resources of the
international community. I hope the Cambodian parties all realize
that the greatest possibility of strong international support for a
settlement exists if that settlement is achieved in the near future.
I believe the role for the United States at this moment is
clear: We must stay the course, maintain our involvement, and
continue our active efforts to achieve a successful settlement. In
this process, we-the Congress and the executive branch-must
continue to work together closely with patience and perseverance,
and we look to bipartisan support from the Congress in this effort.
If we succeed in bringing to fruition all that has now been laid in
place through diplomacy, we must then be prepared to support the
UN in its enhanced settlement role and to help meet the urgent
practical needs of the Cambodian people-including food, medicines,
education, and infrastructure redevelopment. The Cambodian people
deserve our best efforts. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991
Title: Priorities of US AssistanceTo Central and Eastern Europe
Barry
Source: Ambassdor Robert L. Barry, Special Adviser for
Eastern European Assistance
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Apr 16, 19914/16/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Czechoslovakia (former), Poland, Hungary,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Yugoslavia (former)
Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid,
State Department
[TEXT]
In my testimony today I would like to describe the general strategic
direction of our assistance program for Central and Eastern Europe.
What are our priorities and how do we set them? How are they
changing over time? What unforeseen problems have arisen and how
are we trying to cope with them? How do US programs fit in with
those of other donors? What is the role of the private sector?
What are the unique features of the East European programs, and
how are these "experiments" working? Dr. Carol Adelman, Assistant
Administrator of the US Agency for International Development, is
here to discuss the programs for which USAID is responsible. I am
here representing Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger, who is
responsible for overall coordination of US assistance to the region
whether funded through the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act
or otherwise.
US Objectives and Priorities
The goals of US assistance are constant, and the progress made by
the countries of the region toward these goals determine their
eligibility for US assistance. Similar criteria have been adopted by
the 24 donor nations which coordinate their assistance through the
G-24 mechanism chaired by the European Community (EC)
Commission in Brussels. We seek:
-- Democratic, pluralistic societies based on the rule of law
and respect for human rights and individual liberties;
-- The creation of market-based economies with strong
private sectors; and
-- Reintegration of these nations into the economic and
political structure of the West, as befits their history and values,
and the development of friendly relations with the United States.
Based on these criteria, our country priorities first focused
on Poland and Hungary, as furthest along the road of economic and
political reform. Czechoslovakia joined the "priority" list in 1990.
In 1991, the bold reform program, led by President Zhelev of
Bulgaria, warrants our increased support, especially since Bulgarian
success could have a stabilizing effect on the Balkans.
Beyond this we continue to provide limited assistance to
Yugoslavia, with particular emphasis on support for democratic
institutions and training in the skills needed for free-market
economies and to Romania, with particular emphasis on
humanitarian aid and democracy-building.
Setting Functional Priorities
The types of assistance programs we have developed are closely
related to these goals. In each of these functional areas, we have
developed a variety of programs where we believe the United States
has a comparative advantage over other potential donors.
Concurrently, we have been carrying out an extensive dialogue with
the countries of the region in an effort to determine what their
priorities are and how we can best meet them. At the same time,
the G-24 coordination mechanism in Brussels provides a means of
ensuring that our programs complement those of other donors.
As part of this process, we are continually trying to assess
the major obstacles to political and economic reforms, so that we
can adapt our own priorities and make new resources available as
necessary. Let me share with you our thoughts on where the major
problem areas lie at present and thus where we think our attention
should be concentrated in the next few months.
Obstacles to Reform
First, the problem of political instability in some countries of the
region is more serious than anticipated. We expected that the
developing institutions of the new democracies would be challenged
by the economic problems of
transition, but the pain was increased by the Gulf war and the
collapse of trade with the Soviet Union. The virulence of resurgent
nationalism was also greater, and more lasting, than we thought a
year ago. The size of the protest vote in the Polish presidential
elections and the progressive disintegration of Yugoslavia are
reminders of the historical fact that economic depression and
rising ethnic tension can create a volatile mixture in this part of
Europe.
To deal with this challenge, we need to emphasize our
democracy-building and quality of life programs. From helping
Czechoslovakia draft a federal constitution which protects Slovak
rights or creating a program to provide jobs for the handicapped in
Hungary, our involvement can make a difference.
Second, the lag between macroeconomic and microeconomic
reform has been more of a problem than we anticipated a year ago.
Poland's bold stabilization program in 1990 did not produce the
desired supply-side response because privatization lagged and state
enterprises were insulated from the market and competitive forces.
Poland has now adopted a comprehensive 3-year program, and we
are urging all countries of the region to accelerate the pace of
privatization and the creation of truly competitive market
conditions.
Here the United States has a number of tools which we will
emphasize. Our enterprise funds are stimulating the private sector
in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. We are gearing up to train
managers and bankers and to provide assistance in the privatization
process in industry and agriculture. We are helping to draft laws
which will make competition a reality and to build financial
intermediaries which will assist the privatization process.
In terms of US government resources, this must be
our greatest commitment in FY 1992 as well as FY 1991. At the
same time, we must work to focus the activities of other major
donors-like the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development], EBRD [European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development], and EC Commission-on the bottlenecks to private
sector growth.
Thirdly, the trade gap is widening, and investment flows from
the West have been disappointing. The collapse of trade with the
USSR has been more precipitate than anyone predicted and this,
combined with the loss of the GDR [German Democratic Republic] as
a market, has demanded a major reorientation of trade patterns. At
the same time, Western investors have been cautious; up until the
eve of President Walesa's visit to the United States, US firms had
invested only $30 million in Poland.
Improving the climate for trade and investment is our major
new priority for the rest of 1991. Polish debt reduction should
make a major contribution to that goal. The American Business
Initiative and the Trade Enhancement Initiative, announced during
the Walesa visit, should improve the climate for US trade and
investment in the entire region. Others must do their part. The
countries of Central and Eastern Europe need to take more steps to
lower their barriers to trade with each other and especially to make
the climate more attractive to Western investors so as to attract
the private capital that, over time, will do far more for their
economies than any Western governmental assistance. And our
European allies need to provide expanded market access for exports
from the region. A year ago, we all said that expanded trade and
investment would be the engine of growth and reform in Central and
Eastern Europe. We need to make this a reality in 1991.
Finally, political and economic integration with the West has
not kept pace with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and its
ancillary structures. This has left the elected leaders of these
countries feeling cut adrift, particularly as they realize that
neither NATO nor the EC will provide a secure "home" in the short
run. The possibility of a return to repressive policies of the past in
Moscow has created a new sense of urgency about this quest for
"roots."
Our answer has been to strengthen the entire web of East-
West relationships. We have encouraged ties to the EC and EFTA
[European Free Trade Association], we have favored new
institutional arrangements as part of the CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe] process, we have encouraged
closer consultative ties with NATO through the liaison
relationships the President proposed at the London NATO summit
last year. We have created a new status in the OECD [Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development] for reforming Central
and East European countries to support economic reform and the
transition to market economies; we hope this ultimately leads to
OECD membership for countries that qualify. We have supported
regional groups such as the Pentagonale and are using our own
assistance programs as an incentive to greater regional
cooperation by offering to finance cooperative efforts of two or
more countries of the region to deal with common environmental or
energy projects. But more needs to be done in this area as well, and
the reinforcement of this "web" is, therefore, a central US priority
for 1991 and 1992.
1992 Budget Request
Based upon the above priorities, the Administration has asked for
$470 million in assistance to Eastern Europe, a significant increase
in our request over FY 1991. Of this amount, $70 million is for the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The $400
million for other assistance activities include:
-- $29 million for the development of democratic
institutions;
-- $305 million to promote economic restructuring;
-- $61 million for quality-of-life-related projects; and
-- $5 million for audit, evaluation, and for USAID
administrative expenses.
Looked at another way, the use of the $400 million we have
requested for FY 1992 is largely already determined by activities
under way. It would be spent approximately as follows:
-- $190 million for projects authorized under SEED I
[Support for East European Democracy Act], of which $164 million
will be for the enterprise funds;
-- $55 million for programs not authorized in SEED I but
which will be administered by agencies other than USAID, US
Information Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Departments
of Energy, Labor, etc.); and
-- $60 million for the continuation of a few major projects
begun in FY 1991.
The remainder of the funding would be largely devoted to
smaller projects (less than $10 million) which will be carried over
from 1991 or to increase the scope of large projects which are
particularly successful.
Building Country Programs
In addition to our overall regional priorities, we must adapt our
programs to the needs of each individual country and coordinate
with others which are trying to deal with the same problems. This
requires a continuing dialogue with the host country, with the
major bilateral and multilateral donors, and among the 20 US
government agencies engaged in the assistance process. In each
country of the region, we are trying to construct a US assistance
program which is visible, focused, and easy to administer; at the
same time, the scale of that program must reflect the degree of
progress that country is making against the criteria we and our
allies have set.
For countries that are further behind on the path toward
democratic reform, we have put in place only a very few programs.
In Romania, for example, we are moving ahead with six limited
programs: humanitarian assistance, food aid, assistance to
Romanian children, support for independent media and the rule of
law, management training, and emergency energy efficiency
programs. In Poland, by way of contrast, we are carrying out some
two dozen programs. But here, too, we want to focus on a few key
areas where more resources can be provided if the demand is there.
Support for the process of privatization and expansion of trade and
investment are two such functional focal points for Poland.
Agricultural and agri-business is our central functional priority in
Bulgaria; in Hungary, we see reform of the banking system as a key
need the United States can help to meet.
A second way of adding synergy to our aid is to concentrate
some smaller programs in a single city or region so they can
reinforce the activities of American investors or USAID projects
sponsored by the US government or private sector groups like the
Citizens Democracy Corps. Krakow has become a focal point for US
programs in Poland, as has Baranya County in Hungary. The Peace
Corps, the Department of Labor, the EPA, the Department of Energy,
and the other agencies involved in US assistance can do more by
reinforcing each others' programs in a single location than by
heading off in different directions.
Of course, coordination with other donors, and with the host
country, is an essential element of a coherent assistance strategy.
By and large, we believe the G-24 mechanism managed by the EC
Commission has been effective, especially as a means of mobilizing
resources. More emphasis needs to be placed on country-level
coordination in each capital, and we are working with the EC
Commission and the World Bank to bring this about.
Unique Features of the SEED Program
I would like to describe some ways in which the programs we are
carrying out in Central and Eastern Europe are different than other
US assistance programs.
Speed
. The need to carry through
comprehensive reforms as quickly as possible dictates the pace of
our own assistance program. We will have to be prepared to provide
targeted assistance precisely at those times when the governments
are ready to take the critical steps we are asking them to take. For
example, we believe the pace of privatization should be accelerated.
That means our own privatization assistance has to be available
now.
Complexity
. Extensive coordination is
required, not just among the 20 US agencies involved but also with
major donors such as the IBRD, the EBRD, the EC Commission, etc.
That is why much more program design and implementation has to
take place in Washington than usual.
New Methods of Delivery
. In dollar terms, we
expect that by 1992 at least two-thirds of our assistance will flow
through vehicles not usually used in aid programs-enterprise funds,
the EBRD, parallel financing with other donors such as the World
Bank and the EC Commission, grants to new entities such as the
International Media Fund and through US government agencies such
as EPA and USIA. We want to use these programs because they are
easy to administer, but more importantly because they can serve to
accelerate reform.
Integration.
The problem we face is not one
of development in the usual sense but conversion-or as some would
have it, "making eggs out of an omelet." This risky experiment can
only work if it is dealt with as an integrated whole-where political
issues, trade issues, assistance programs and integration issues
are all seen as a whole.
Private-Sector Role
We think the private sector-the business community, the labor
movement, our private voluntary organizations, and individual
Americans can play a uniquely important role in assisting the
transition in Eastern Europe. As these new democracies end the old
centralized political and economic systems, the American example
of local government, pluralistic institutions, and individual
involvement is the model they are reaching for. I have already
mentioned the American Business Initiative and the Trade
Enhancement Initiative, designed to expand trade and investment
and help American business at the same time. The AFL-CIO, in
partnership with the Department of Labor, is playing a major role.
Our private voluntary organizations, using their own resources as
well as US assistance funding, are doing remarkable work on the
community level. The Citizens Democracy Corps is mobilizing
American business to provide assistance in key areas on a pro bono
basis and at the same time helping to match individual American
volunteers with US or East European organizations looking for
special kinds of talents.
Conclusion
In closing, let me ask you to reflect not on the formidable obstacle
to economic and political reform but to the remarkable progress
that has been made in the past year. In 1988, who would have
expected Lech Walesa to visit Washington as the President of a
democratic Poland, to talk about the timetable for the complete
withdrawal of Soviet forces from his country? Who would have
expected Bulgaria to be in the forefront of political and economic
reform? Who would have expected democratic elections, however
flawed, in Albania? Most of all, who would have expected a
powerful consensus to develop throughout the region that rapid,
comprehensive transition to democratic rule and market economies
is the only solution to the problems of the region. Assisting in this
transition is as much a central strategic priority for this
Administration as it was 2 years ago when the images of revolution
so fired our imagination. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991
Title: Focus on Central and Eastern Europe: Summary of Initiatives
Date: Apr 22, 19914/22/91
Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (former),
Hungary, Poland
Subject: State Department, CSCE,
Media/Telecommunications, Science/Technology,
Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid,
International Law, EC
[TEXT]
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Parliamentarians from the 34-nation Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have agreed to establish a 245-
member assembly to help guide a new era of cooperation in East-
West relations and strengthen parliamentary democracy in former
communist countries. At an April 3 meeting in Madrid, Spain,
lawmakers from North America and Europe decided to meet annually
to review security, economic, and human rights issues. Their
resolutions will form an agenda for the annual meetings of foreign
ministers and for the biennial meetings of heads of government.
The foreign ministers plan to meet June 19-20 in Berlin. The next
meeting of heads of government is scheduled for March 1992 in
Helsinki.
The creation of a CSCE legislative arm completes the building
of institutions intended to shape East-West relations after the
1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe that replaced
communist governments with democracies and effectively ended the
Cold War. Last autumn, heads of government from the United
States, Canada, and all European countries except Albania pledged
respect for democratic elections, economic freedoms, and human
rights. They also established a small secretariat in Prague,
Czechoslovakia, a conflict-prevention center in Vienna, Austria, and
an election-monitoring center in Warsaw, Poland.
As the largest members, the United States and the Soviet
Union will have the most seats, 17 each, in the new assembly.
France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom will have 13. The
remaining members will have representation according to size,
down to two seats each for Monaco and San Marino.
US delegates to the Madrid meeting said they were pleased by
the decision to use the new assembly essentially as a consultative
forum for senior legislators. "This will give us a chance to help
deepen the democratic experience among the new legislatures in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," said House Foreign Affairs
Committee Chairman Dante Fascell (Democrat from Florida), who
led the US delegation.
Delegates agreed to the principle of majority voting, provided
that certain important questions would require approval by two-
thirds of the member states. The North Atlantic Assembly will be
responsible for the CSCE's security aspects while the Council of
Europe will handle its human rights work.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady represented the United States at
the inaugural meeting of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) in London April 15-16. Representatives of 40
countries signed a treaty on May 29, 1990, to establish the $12-
billion institution that will provide aid to help revive the
economies of Central and Eastern Europe and develop a strong
private sector.
Under the bank's charter, three major objectives of the United
States were achieved:
-- Lending will be directed toward the private sector (at
least 60% of the bank's lending will be to the private sector; a
maximum of 40% may fund public infrastructure projects, such as
roads and telecommunications, to help the private sector develop,
and may fund public enterprises operating in a competitive fashion);
-- Borrowing by the USSR will be restricted (for at least 3
years, to the amount of capital the Soviet Union puts in); and
-- There will be a strong environmental focus (promoting
structural and sectoral reforms that are environmentally sound, and
funding loans/technical assistance for environmental programs,
necessary for transition to a market-oriented economy). The bank
will report annually on the environmental impact of its activities.
For more information, contact the Office of Public Relations,
EBRD, 6 Broadgate, London EC2M 2QS, United Kingdom (Tel: 011-
4471-496-0060).
Business Opportunities
In Austria, the US embassy and the American Chamber of Commerce
will host a conference in Vienna June 10-11, 1991, to explore
business opportunities for US firms in Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and Yugoslavia. Small and medium-sized US manufacturers
new to these markets are invited to participate.
The conference will feature presentations on doing business
in Central and Eastern Europe, followed by individual country
workshops to develop specific matches between the anticipated 180
US participants and prospective Central and East European business
partners. On June 12, the US firms will have the opportunity to
travel to one or more of the four countries to continue discussions
with specific companies.
The conference will focus on environmental-protection
products and services, energy conservation and alternative sources,
information and communication, and industry machinery.
Opportunities in other areas also will be identified during the
process of cross matching supplier firms with needs in the four
Central and East European countries and Austria in a broad range of
trade, partnership, licensing, investment, and franchising
arrangements.
Senior US embassy representatives, business executives,
industry association representatives, and economic development
specialists will participate. Each visiting team will conduct its
own seminar in which specific business opportunities in a
particular country will be identified. Other US participants are
expected from the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation.
For additional information or to get a brochure with the
schedule of events, costs, and registration form, call Philip Combs,
Austria Desk Officer, US Department of Commerce (202-377-2920)
or the Austrian Trade Commissioner in the USA (Chicago: 312-644-
5556; Houston: 713-850-8888; Los Angeles: 213-477-9988; New
York City: 212-421-5250; Washington, DC: 202-835-8962).
Central and East European Law Initiative
Bulgaria. March 11-15, the American Bar Association's Central and
East European Law Initiative (CEELI) conducted a series of workshop
sessions with Bulgaria's Grand National Assembly to discuss issues
relevant to drafting the country's new constitution. The CEELI
delegation also held sessions with representatives of the various
political parties in Bulgaria.
In the opening session, Prime Minister Dimitar Popov stressed
the importance of CEELI's last visit and urged its continued
participation in Bulgaria's legal reform process. In one
extraordinary event, the CEELI delegation was asked to participate
in an actual session of the Constitutional Parliamentary
Commission discussing proposed constitutional provisions on local
government.
During the workshop sessions, the issues that provoked the
most discussion included the protection of minority rights, the
structure of municipalities and local government, what powers
should be allocated to the president, the procedures for
investigating the executive office, and general concepts of
structuring a constitution.
CEELI experts also have completed a review of Bulgaria's
foreign investment law and stock exchange law.
Czechoslovakia
. April 22-26, CEELI provides
follow-up to its criminal law revision workshop held in Prague last
November. Dr. Leon Richter, the minister of justice, requested this
April CEELI workshop to review Czechoslovakia's draft judicial
law. CEELI provided a preliminary assessment of the draft law in
February and its comments were incorporated in the new draft law.
Poland
. A CEELI working group is structuring a
workshop on local government to be held in Poland in May.
Romania
. CEELI conducted a workshop on judicial
restructuring in Bucharest April 15-19. The workshop addressed
numerous issues important to the development of an independent
judicial system, such as judicial independence; judicial review and
restraint; the selection, training, and qualifications of judges; the
tenure, conduct, discipline, and removal of judges; the role of the
prosecutor; the role of the defense counsel; the enforcement and
interpretations of a penal code; human rights in a judicial system;
military courts; and the relationship between the courts and the
press.
Sister Law School Program
Eight US law school deans went to
Central and Eastern Europe April 15-19 to meet their counterparts
in the first stage of CEELI's proposed sister law school law
program. The goal of the visit was to initiate discussions on
possible areas of mutual interest, such as exchange visits between
US and European law faculty members, assistance by US law schools
in furnishing library materials, future joint scholarship and
research between members of US and European law faculties, law
student and graduate exchange programs, and cooperative efforts
between the schools on curricular development, among other things.
For more information about CEELI or any of its programs, call
its Executive Director, Mark Ellis, at 202-331-2619 (fax: 202-
457-1163).
Foreign Affairs Assistance Corps
A group of former Foreign Service officers and private
entrepreneurs has organized a corps of skilled people willing to
help former command economies in the difficult transition to free-
market economies. The corps will initially provide skilled labor in
finance, planning, media, and technology transfer to countries-
principally the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe-under
current US government and corporate programs.
For more information, contact Eugene Bird, 3133 Connecticut
Avenue, NW, Suite 702, Washington, DC 20008. Tel: 202-745-0701.
Special TV Programing by the US Information Agency
(USIA)
As reported in the December 19, 1990, edition of Focus, USIA/TV's
Worldnet began broadcasting 2 hours of special programing during
evening prime time in Central and Eastern Europe on December 3.
Since then, elements of this programing have been rebroadcast by
TV stations in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania on a
weekly basis in several cases. This article updates the December
information.
The purpose of this feed is:
-- To assist fledgling independent broadcasters, many of
whom have or expect to have access to increasing numbers of hours
of broadcast time on national state systems and, eventually,
frequencies of their own;
-- To assist established state broadcast systems seeking to
offer more educational material on building a democracy and a
market economy, by offering programs on US English, market
economics, constitutional issues, and similar themes; and
-- To assist US broadcasters in introducing their material to
Central and East European audiences and in competing with material
now being furnished by satellite from European sources.
Central and East European broadcasters have told Worldnet
that they do want the educational and documentary programing the
United States has to offer. This includes such things as "ABC News
Presents," "Growing a Business," "The Constitution - That Delicate
Balance," "Business File," "Science World," and "Firing Line."
To enable them to receive this special feed, USIA/TV donated
C-Band dish antennas to TV stations in Bratislava and Prague,
Czechoslovakia; Budapest, Hungary (an independent station); and
Bucharest, Romania. USIA/TV is now sending antennas to Sofia,
Bulgaria; Tallinn, Estonia; Riga, Latvia; Vilnius, Lithuania; Gdansk,
Poznan, and Wroclaw, Poland; and Belgrade and Sarajevo, Yugoslavia.
USIA/TV also has designated C-Band dishes for donation to
Hungarian state TV and to TV stations in Leningrad and Moscow,
USSR. Thus, by mid-1991, this special feed will be bringing public
affairs and educational programing to 17 broadcasters in Central
and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
For more information about this program, call USIA/TV's Paul
Kozelka at 202-501-7044.
Albania
Albania is added to this edition of Focus on Central and Eastern
Europe because the March 31 elections in that country were the
first step on the long road to democracy. The Albanian people voted
for members of the new 250-person parliament in the nation's first
multi-party elections since 1945. According to official accounts,
96% of Albania's 1.9 million eligible voters cast ballots. The
democratic opposition, which did not exist 4 months ago, now has
more than 32% of the seats in parliament and is pressing for
political and economic reforms in a society with little recent
experience in the democratic process. A partial foundation has been
laid for political pluralism and democracy.
The Albanian Central Election Commission announced
officially that the Albanian Workers Party (communist) won 168 of
the 250 seats in parliament (67%), the Democratic Party 75 (30%),
the Omonia Organization (a Greek party) 3 (1%), and the Veterans'
Committee 1 (0.4%). The ruling Communist Party won heavily in the
countryside while the opposition Democratic Party won
impressively in the capital (Tirana) and other major cities.
Based on reports from US observers and other international
election monitors, the Albanian electoral process fell short in
several key areas of standards for free and fair elections
established by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). During the campaign, the opposition parties were allowed
only limited access to the government-controlled media, although
they were allotted some time for televised political broadcasts and
were able to publish newspapers that received partial
dissemination.
Official parties enjoyed overwhelming use of state resources
while opposition parties had limited access to these resources.
There also are credible reports of widespread intimidation against
opposition party candidates and activists during the campaign and
on election day. It is questionable why the authorities delayed
issuing official election results for more than 2 days and why the
list of winning and losing candidates contained no vote count.
The US government called upon the Albanian authorities to
investigate fully and openly all charges of electoral abuses and to
propose appropriate measures to redress legitimate grievances.
Now it is up to all elements of Albanian society to help the
newly created multiparty system function effectively. In
particular, the majority party must fully respect the rights of the
minority parties as stipulated by the CSCE. The United States
firmly supports the principles of democracy in Albania and those
who are working to establish freedom and human rights.
The US election monitoring delegation in Albania reported that
the Democratic Party's local leader in Shkoder was killed on April 2
by gunfire. The gunfire reportedly came from the Communist
Party's headquarters when the victim attempted to disperse a
peaceful group of opposition party supporters gathered outside the
Communist Party's headquarters to protest against alleged election
fraud and intimidation and against the delay in the announcement of
the official March 31 election results.
The head of the US delegation, David Swartz, met with
Albanian Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani on April 3 and officially
protested the use of force against peaceful demonstrators. Swartz
also urged the Albanian authorities to investigate irregularities in
the electoral process promptly and fully.
On April 3, the US government condemned the use of violence
against peaceful demonstrators in Albania and called upon the
Albanian government to cease the use of deadly force against
citizens who are exercising their fundamental rights including the
right to peaceful assembly. The US government also urged all
Albanian parties to exercise restraint. In light of Albania's
aspirations to CSCE membership, the US government deplored such
violence as contrary to CSCE principles regarding the rule of law,
free and fair elections, and respect for basic human rights. The US
government also called on the Albanian authorities to investigate
the acts of violence thoroughly in a manner compatible with
international rule-of-law standards and punish those responsible
for this violation of human rights.
On April 4, Swartz was informed officially that Albanian
government leaders had met in emergency session on April 3 to
discuss the situation in Shkoder and that the government had
appointed a special commission to investigate the killings there.
The US government welcomed the Albanian government's decision
but also reiterated to the Albanian authorities the importance of
fully and openly investigating charges of electoral abuses and
taking appropriate measures to redress legitimate grievances.
According to news reports, the Albanian government released
258 political prisoners on March 30. The exact number of political
prisoners in Albania is difficult to determine. Some observers have
estimated the number to be much higher than the 258 reportedly
freed. The US government welcomed the reported Albanian decision
and continued to strongly urge the Albanian authorities to release
all persons imprisoned for non-violent and political offenses in a
timely manner.
On the economic front, Albania's state radio announced that
the government had taken the first step toward privatization by
instructing ministries to designate which state-run enterprises
would be eligible for private ownership.
On the diplomatic front, representatives of the United States
and Albania on March 15 signed a memorandum of understanding
resuming diplomatic relations after a break of 52 years. The United
States seeks to support the movement toward democratic and
economic reforms in Albania and to expand relations in the cultural
and economic fields.
Hungary
TV Program on US Banking. In March, a top journalist from
Hungarian state television completed a 2-week USIA/TV-assisted
visit to the United States to do a program on the US banking system.
Produced through USIA's "TV-Coop" program, in which foreign
broadcasters receive facilitative and sometimes financial
assistance to produce programs on subjects of mutual interest, the
completed program will be shown on Hungarian television.
Poland
Textbooks Donated. Twenty newly established Polish teacher-
training colleges have received more than 2,500 Spectrum English-
teaching textbooks courtesy of USIA.
Ambassador Barry's Congressional Testimony
For the text of Ambassador Robert L. Barry's April 16 testimony
before the Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations, which describes the strategic direction of the
US assistance program for Central and Eastern Europe, see page 286
of this issue of Dispatch. Ambassador Barry is the Special Adviser
for Eastern European Assistance to the Deputy Secretary of State.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 16, April 22, 1991
Title: Dispatch Supplement
Date: Apr 22, 19914/22/91
Category: Features
Region: Europe
Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization
[TEXT]
A special Dispatch Supplement containing the text of the Charter of
Paris and the Joint Declaration of 22 States can be purchased for
$1.25 (stock no. 044-000-02308-3) through the Superintendent of
Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402-
9325 (tel. 202-783-3238). (###)