US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991
Title: Fast Track and Trade Opportunities
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address before the Hispanic Free Trade Breakfast,
Houston, Texas
Date: Apr 8, 19914/8/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America, South America, Central America
Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade
[TEXT]
I have been looking forward to meeting with you today, because I
want to discuss two issues important to us all: America's ability
to compete in the global marketplace and our ability to negotiate
with our trading partners. I've said many times that the hard work
of freedom awaits us. Now, I'm asking for your help in that
challenge.
Last month, I asked Congress to support our fast-track
authority in trade negotiations. Fast track is a way of assuring our
trading counterparts that the agreements they reach at the
bargaining table with our negotiators will be the same ones
reviewed by our Congress.
Fast track doesn't affect Congress' power to accept or reject
trade agreements. But it does prevent 11th-hour changes to
agreements we have reached, changes that force everyone involved
to start from scratch.
We need fast-track authority to pursue vital trade objectives-
-the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Uruguay Round, and
the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. If we lose our fast-
track authority, we lose any hope of achieving these three
agreements. We lose trade. We lose jobs and jeopardize economic
growth.
Here's the key: A vote against fast track is a vote against
things we all hold dear--prosperity at home, growth in other lands.
It ignores the dramatic and wonderful changes in the world
economy.
We want to play a leading role in that emerging, exciting
world; we don't want to hide from it. We want to join in the
thrilling business of innovation; we don't want to chain people to
outmoded technologies and ideas.
Right now, we have the chance to expand opportunity and
economic growth from the Yukon to the Yucatan. Think of it: The
North American Free Trade Agreement would link us with our
largest trading partner, Canada, and our third-largest partner,
Mexico. It would create the largest, richest trade zone on earth--
360 million consumers in a market that generates $6 trillion in
output a year.
A unified North American market would let each of our
countries build on our strengths. It would provide more and better
jobs for US workers. It would stimulate price competition, lower
consumer prices, improve product quality. The agreement would
make necessities such as food and clothing more affordable and
more available to our poorest citizens. It would raise productivity
and produce a higher standard of living throughout the continent.
Let me illustrate the stakes involved in the fast track debate
by discussing the Mexican component of the North American Free
Trade Agreement. Trade with Mexico has helped both our countries.
Just 4 years ago, we had a $4.9 billion trade deficit with Mexico.
Since then, we have cut that deficit by two-thirds, to $1.8 billion.
This turnaround took place in part because Mexican President Carlos
Salinas believes in free trade. He has slashed tariff rates for some
goods from 100% to 10%. One result: Our exports to Mexico have
increased 130% in the past 4 years. This export boom has created
more than 300,000 new jobs in the United States. And each
additional billion dollars in exports creates 20,000 new jobs here
in the United States.
Now, I don't have to tell anyone in this room about Mexico's
market potential--85 million consumers who want to buy our goods.
Nor do I have to tell you that as Mexico grows and prospers, it will
need even more of the goods we're best at producing--computers,
manufacturing equipment, high-tech and high-value products.
Unfortunately, we have a tough fight ahead of us. Some
members of Congress are concerned about the potential impact that
any agreement may have on American jobs, American companies, and
American exports. Other members of Congress
say they worry about wage rates, environmental quality, and health
and safety issues. I believe concern about those very same issues
is the strongest argument for supporting fast track.
Let's talk about those concerns. We've already seen what the
reduction in Mexican tariffs has done for American exports. A free
trade agreement would eliminate the remaining tariffs entirely.
That would stimulate exports, create new jobs, generate wealth and
hope on both sides of the border.
Let's take a look at the impact on American companies. When
trade barriers vanish, goods flow freely across borders. And
everybody--businessmen and workers, farmers and consumers--
reaps the benefits of growth.
Consider the environment: The North American Free Trade
Agreement fits into a winning strategy for improving environmental
quality. Opponents of fast track and the trade pacts forget that
prosperity offers the surest road to worker safety, public health,
and environmental quality.
This Administration wants to ensure that Mexican economic
growth goes hand-in-hand with environmental protection. Our
Environmental Protection Agency is already assisting the Salinas
government with its environmental programs. President Salinas has
shown he's serious about cleaning up the environment by requiring
all new cars to have catalytic converters and, recently, by shutting
down Mexico's largest oil refinery because it was polluting the air.
I believe that President Salinas cares deeply about his nation and
its people and that he means business when he says he wants to
clean up Mexico's air and water.
Finally, consider the matter of working conditions in Mexico.
As our trade with Mexico has grown, so have the wages of Mexican
workers. Indeed, Mexican wages have risen very quickly in recent
years, with no tangible impact on American pay scales. That being
the case, someone ought to ask the opponents of fast track why they
oppose prosperity in Mexico. Someone should ask why they oppose
letting our neighbors enjoy the benefits of progress. Ask them what
is wrong with increased productivity throughout the continent. And
ask them what's wrong with a more stable Mexico.
A free trade pact would encourage investment, create jobs,
lift wages, and give talented Mexican citizens opportunities they
don't enjoy today. A stronger Mexico, in turn, means a stronger
United States and a stronger North American alliance.
So you see, we have much to gain from extending fast track--a
new era of open, free, and fair trade--a future of unprecedented
economic growth and regional harmony.
As with most good things in life, competition involves risk.
But we always have been a nation of risk-takers, adventurers. Our
forefathers transformed a rough wilderness into an industrial
superpower. We have created technologies and products unlike any
others produced in human history. We have placed the wisdom of
the ages within reach of anyone who can operate a computer.
The vote on fast track really is a vote on what kind of
America we want to build. A "yes" vote expresses confidence in
American know-how and ingenuity. It says we believe in ourselves.
Indeed, as we prepare to join a world linked primarily by
economic, not military, competition, we have nothing to fear but the
fear-mongers themselves. They seem to be the only ones who
haven't learned lately that defeatism produces defeat, while
confidence and self-reliance produce greatness.
We must seize the opportunities that the new world economy
offers us. With your help, I know we will. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991
Title: North American Free Trade Agreement; Extending Fast-
Track Negotiating Authority
Zoellick
Source: Robert B. Zoellick, Counselor of the
Department
Description: Prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Apr 11, 19914/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: Mexico, United States, Canada
Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics,
Environment, Immigration, Narcotics
[TEXT]
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the importance of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the
continuation of fast-track negotiating authority.
Some have asked whether the North American Free Trade
Agreement, particularly our negotiation of a free trade agreement
with Mexico, is motivated by foreign or by economic policy
interests. My answer is yes and yes.
Indeed, if the free trade agreement were solely in our foreign
policy interest, we would not recommend it. Economic policy is and
must become an increasingly critical component of the United
States' foreign policy strategy. And that is why this free trade
agreement is so important. It is a rare strategic opportunity to
secure, strengthen, and develop our continental base economically
and politically in a way that will promote America's foreign policy
agenda, our economic strength and leadership, and US global
influence.
Our ability to seize this historic moment depends on the
Congress' willingness to maintain the special executive-
congressional partnership on trade negotiations established 57
years ago in the wake of the Smoot-Hawley protectionist debacle.
If the Congress now decides to reverse course, to abandon the
strategy that Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Congress first set
through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, the United
States will no longer be able to exert international economic
leadership. There should be no mistake--the stakes are that high.
I have organized my statement as follows:
-- The foreign policy benefits of the North American Free
Trade Agreement;
-- The economic significance, including general economic
benefits, jobs, and labor standards;
-- Environmental initiatives; and
-- The need for the continuation of fast-track trade
negotiating authority.
FOREIGN POLICY BENEFITS
There are five reasons why the North American Free Trade
Agreement is definitely in the foreign policy interest of the United
States.
First
, it will provide a unique opportunity to
achieve a historic reconciliation with our two bordering neighbors.
Second
, it will give economic and political
impetus to our current efforts to address a range of pressing North
American problems.
Third
, it will help forge a US-Mexican
partnership that could lead to closer cooperation on other foreign
policy issues.
Fourth
, it will send an encouraging signal
throughout all of Latin America.
Fifth
, it will strengthen the hand of US
foreign economic policy.
First, we are at the threshold of a unique opportunity to
achieve a historic reconciliation with our two bordering neighbors.
The word historic is often overused, but I do not employ it
lightly.
This generation of political leaders--all of you--has the
opportunity to fulfill a lost promise of America's revolutionary
generation. Our revolution won more than our independence; it was
viewed at the time as a practical experiment emanating from the
Age of Reason, the Spirit of Enlightenment. That's why Robert
Middlekauff called it the "Glorious Cause"; that's how James
McPherson has recently explained Lincoln viewed it and was moved
by it.
Our experiment inspired others, inspired the causes of Bolivar
and San Martin. But while the revolutions against Spanish colonial
authority in Latin America were victorious on the field of battle,
their hopes were not fulfilled. Indeed, a traveler to Washington, DC,
today will see the special place accorded statues of Latin American
liberators--not European, not Asian--among the capital's memorials
to our American heroes; mute statements of a dream not yet
realized.
The United States' hemispheric relations, starting at our Latin
border with Mexico, were marked by disappointments and conflicts
on both sides.
A significant strain of Mexico's nationalism reflected anxiety
and distrust of its large neighbor to the north. Mexicans remember
that they lost about one-half of their new nation to the United
States in the wars of the 19th century. As recently as the first two
decades of this century, an American President, Woodrow Wilson,
ordered major military incursions into Veracruz and northern
Mexico. Mexican wariness contributed to policies that further
eroded our relations. Mexico nationalized American investments. It
retreated behind policies of economic autarky.
But the original vision still survived, preserved by leaders
with imagination on both sides of the border, people who understood
the importance of US-Mexican relations.
In the 1860s, during our Civil War, President Lincoln
supported President Juarez in his struggle against French
installation of an emperor in Mexico.
In 1933, shortly after assuming office, FDR rose above
preoccupation with the economy at home to chart a new course with
Mexico: He called it the Good Neighbor Policy. He dismissed the
special interests who argued that Mexico was "different" and not
ready for such a special relationship.
Almost 30 years later, in 1961, another new President, John F.
Kennedy, called for an Alliance for Progress with Latin America.
You, Mr. Chairman, like many other Americans, answered that call to
reach out to our hemispheric neighbors, to rise above those who
lament about what we cannot do, saying the Latins are poorer--or
"different."
Now, another 30 years later, we have the opportunity to
sustain and invigorate that vision. After 200 years, history is
coming full circle. This generation, on both sides of the border, has
the opportunity to integrate North America in a way that will build
a foundation for stronger cooperation, cohesion, and growth.
The American people may take for granted our geopolitical
good fortune. Unlike much of the rest of the world, our land borders
with our neighbors, extending over 7,500 miles, are marked by the
absence of military threat. But the challenges of the 21st century
will be of economics, environment, narcotics, migration, as well as
military. The security of our citizens will encompass this broader
set of challenges. So we need to complete the North American
reconciliation in a way that strengthens our ability to handle these
challenges cooperatively. The North American Free Trade
Agreement can be the cornerstone of this structure.
The second foreign policy benefit is related to the first:
The FTA [free trade agreement] will give important economic and
political impetus to our current efforts to address a range of
pressing North American problems.
Unfortunately, some critics of the FTA disregard the intense
efforts already begun by Mexico and the United States to address
our sweeping agenda. To pull these multiple efforts together, to
relate them to one another, the Bush and Salinas Administrations
have reinvigorated the Binational Commission (BNC) that brings
together many of the cabinet members of our two nations in regular
working meetings. It may be a surprise to some that these
meetings involve so many different agencies: State; Treasury,
including Customs; Justice, including the FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation], INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service], and
DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration]; Agriculture; Commerce;
USTR [US Trade Representative]; Education; EPA [Environmental
Protection Agency]; and USIA [United States Information Agency].
And now our labor ministers will join us.
The BNC convenes the senior-most officials of both nations to
review our ongoing agenda in an integrated fashion. We also have
begun a similar meeting of sub-ministerial officials to keep the
momentum up between the annual BNC meetings. Then the
respective agencies proceed on their work programs together
throughout the course of the year. A staggering array of working
groups and projects gives substance to this process, evidence that
both sides recognize our common interest in addressing both
traditional problems and the new challenges of the transnational
agenda.
An FTA would generate economic growth that would help both
countries deal with the many other issues on our binational agenda.
It would eliminate or reduce the economic barriers between the
United States and Mexico that create inefficiencies and higher
costs. A rejection of Mexico's request for an FTA, on the other hand,
will be seen as a rebuff to the Mexican political leaders and people
who have sought to reorient their country toward North America.
The United States would be trying to isolate itself from its
neighbors, something it cannot, in fact, do. We would do irreparable
harm to our ability to work together, with mutual respect, on the
numerous issues--migration, narcotics, environment, and others--
that do not recognize borders. We would repeat mistakes of the
past. We would fail to answer the call for leadership.
The third foreign policy benefit of the FTA is that it would
help forge a US-Mexican partnership that could lead to closer
cooperation on other foreign policy issues. It is no secret that
the legacy of the past has been one of US and Mexican foreign policy
outlooks that have frequently been at odds. But in recent years, as
we have begun to work together more closely on our economic and
transnational agenda, we have also begun to move closer on foreign
policy issues.
Let me give you just a few examples. Mexico and the United
States--for years at odds over Central America--have worked
together over the last 2 years to end the conflicts in Central
America and to secure a new peace based on liberty, free markets,
and regional integration. Mexico has joined with the United States
and others to provide President Chamorro an extremely generous
renegotiation of Nicaragua's oil debt, making possible renewed
access to Mexican oil on concessionary terms. Mexico is working as
one of the "friends" of the UN Secretary General to end the long
conflict between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN
[Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front]. Mexico has joined with
the United States and other Latins, Europeans, and the Japanese to
develop a multilateral Partnership for Democracy and Development
in Central America, an idea similar to that recommended by the
Sanford Commission. Together, we are encouraging a new
generation of Central American leaders to support one another in
their common effort to end bloodshed and spur economic growth.
Nor do we only see Mexico's increasing cooperation in this
hemisphere. In August of last year, immediately after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, the Mexican government announced that it would
increase oil production capacity by 100,000 barrels a day, despite
capacity restraints, to demonstrate its solidarity.
Fourth, including Mexico in the North American Free Trade
Agreement will send a strong encouraging signal throughout all of
Latin America. A new cadre of leaders throughout the
hemisphere is struggling to transform our region into one pledged to
democracy, market economics, and growth. These men and women
are taking a totally new attitude toward the United States. They
reject the excuses of "dependency theory." But the process of
progress is still fragile; tremendous barriers must still be
overcome.
The governments of Latin America, and even more important,
the people of Latin America, are trusting that the people of the
United States will continue to stand for the ideals that we have
espoused for so long. They know that the tasks of reform are theirs
to perform--but they also know that their prospects for success
depend on the willingness of the United States to preserve and
promote international systems based on the free flow of capital,
trade, and ideas. If there is to be a New World Order that unites
security and economic policies, certainly these must be our
objectives.
But the Latins are troubled by the new echoes of the old nay-
sayers in the United States who grumble that Latin America is in
some way "different," or even a threat.
In sum, this Administration cannot promote the same vision
that Lincoln and FDR and JFK acted on, if this Congress abandons
America's faith in bettering itself--and others.
Fifth, this North American Free Trade Agreement would
strengthen the hand of the United States' foreign economic policy.
The United States is the only nation in the world today that
ranks at the top of the scales of political, military, and economic
power. We have just once again demonstrated our political and
military leadership. But it is also important that we remain in the
forefront of international economic policy.
This agreement would be a key component of a network of
global, regional, and bilateral arrangements that promote American
interests. It can strengthen the capabilities of North America,
enhancing our ability to compete globally.
Attention to the challenges of regionalism is definitely not
the same as the promotion of regional blocs. The United States,
Mexico, and Canada intend to be outward-looking, promoting
liberalization of trade and capital flows in our own hemisphere as a
step in promoting them globally. The signal the United States
wants to send the world is that we are committed to opening
markets and that we will extend a hand to others who share that
commitment. By doing so, we hope to build support globally for
ongoing efforts through the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade].
We want to support the efforts of Mexico, and then the rest of
Latin America, to leave the illogic of "dependency theory" and
economic autarky behind. The new market-oriented leaders of Latin
America want to do business with Asia and Europe as well as with
North America. It is in our interest to support their transition to
the global marketplace.
Indeed, Mexico has already demonstrated the benefits of this
approach. Since Mexico joined the GATT in 1986, it has become an
important advocate of multilateral liberalization. The old, sterile
chants about "Northern" domination of the "South" have given way to
a new debate. Mexico has opened up its markets and intends to open
them more. The Mexicans want trade, not aid. The United States
should be leading this new movement in the realm of political
economy.
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
General Economic Benefits
The North American Free Trade Agreement would create the largest
market in the world: 360 million consumers with a total output of
$6 trillion.
The agreement would eliminate economic barriers and
inefficiencies with our first and third largest trading partners. In
1990, our three-way trade amounted to $236 billion.
The independent International Trade Commission (ITC), in a
1991 study requested by Chairmen Bentsen and Rostenkowski, found
that this FTA would benefit the US economy by "expanding trade
opportunities, lowering prices, increasing competition, and
improving the ability of US firms to exploit economies of scale."
The study stated that "[t]otal real income in the United States
would increase because of the trade creating effects of the FTA."
The ITC went on to explain: "Real income for US skilled workers and
capital service owners is expected to rise." And after the release
of this report, the ITC has even concluded that unskilled workers
will also probably enjoy a slight increase in real income (although
the effect is so small as to be indiscernible).
The FTA is likely to increase sales opportunities for US firms,
improve their operating efficiency, and spur growth in Mexico and
Canada. This growth multiplies benefits for the United States. For
each dollar of growth in Mexico, about 15% is spent on US goods. As
Mexico grows more, it will import more. Seventy cents of each
Mexican import dollar is spent on goods from the United States.
This is an important point, often overlooked by critics: Trade is not
a "you-win, I-lose" proposition. By generating growth, trade
multiplies the purchasing power of our trading partners. The United
States gets a special benefit from these dynamic "multiplier"
effects because the United States supplies such a large portion of
our neighbors' imports.
Of course, Mexico's economy is relatively small compared to
that of the United States. Its GNP, approximately $225 billion, is
about the same as Florida's. Because Mexico's economy is only about
1/25th the size of the US economy and its exports only amount to
about 6% of US imports, the scare stories of mass dislocations from
reducing barriers simply are not credible.
Moreover, the factual record since 1986, when Mexico began a
major opening of its economy, tells a very encouraging story. US
exports to Mexico have increased from $12.4 to $28.4 billion. Of
this total, US manufacturing exports increased from $10.4 to $24
billion, almost twice the rate of our overall growth in
manufacturing exports during this period. Capital goods exports
increased from $4.6 to $9.1 billion. Consumer goods exports tripled
from $1 to $3 billion.
Exports of corn tripled. Exports of autos and autoparts
doubled. Exports of telecommunications equipment doubled. Our
trade deficit shrank from $4.9 billion in 1986 to $1.8 billion in
1990; if one excludes petroleum imports, the United States would
have a $2.7 billion surplus with Mexico.
I will take just a moment to cite some sectors of special
concern to the United States in recent years. (Even a recent
favorable editorial in The New York Times opined that the FTA
would lead to layoffs of steel and textile workers when the
evidence suggests the opposite may be the case.)
-- In 1990, steel exports to Mexico amounted to about $500
million, about 18% of total US steel exports. And our exports were
about 75% higher than our imports from Mexico, a sharp shift from
our deficit of 4 years ago. Indeed, our steel sector has been in
surplus with Mexico for a number of years. So it should not be a
surprise that the American Iron and Steel Institute, representing
about 80% of US steel production capacity, supports the FTA with
Mexico.
-- The US textile, fiber, and apparel industry, with nearly $1
billion of exports to Mexico in 1990, has been in slight surplus with
Mexico for the past couple of years. Indeed, US textile and apparel
exports to Mexico have increased at an average annual rate of 25%
since 1986. This industry may offer an opportunity for
complementary production that will benefit both nations,
strengthening our ability to compete globally.
-- Our agricultural exports to Mexico have grown over 130%
since 1986, from $1.1 to $2.5 billion. Mexico was our third largest
agricultural customer in 1989; we supply about 80% of its
agricultural imports. (Indeed, Mexico accounted for 20%-50% of our
world-wide dairy sales between 1986 and 1989.)
As the ITC study reported, the overall benefits for the US
economy will be positive. Moreover, the potential benefits for the
future, as our three economies improve their integration and
efficiency, should be striking. Of course, some US sectors will face
increased competition, so the trade agreement needs to be
structured to ease the transition.
The United States has much to gain because our economy is
already relatively open. Right now Mexico has relatively good
access to our economy; an FTA will help us secure reciprocal access
to Mexico's economy. To take just one example, our already sizable
agricultural exports to Mexico are still less than they could be
because restrictive Mexican import licenses still apply to about
40% of the value of US agricultural exports. The overall effect of
Mexican tariffs and non-tariff barriers has been estimated to result
in effective protection for Mexican producers of grains and oilseeds
of at least 30%-35%.
Finally, in deciding whether to proceed with an FTA with
Mexico, I think it is a serious miscalculation to assume that the
alternative is Mexican barriers as they exist today. Those lower
barriers are a recent phenomenon, a 4-year-long policy shift by
Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas away from the historical
Mexican reliance on high protectionism and economic autarky. At
the end of 1985, Mexican tariffs ranged up to 100%, the average
tariff was about 30%, and licenses for imports protected 47% of
domestic output (down from 92% earlier in the year); today Mexico's
maximum tariff is 20%, its average trade-weighted tariff is about
10%, and many more licensing restrictions have been removed.
If the United States sends a signal to the Mexican people that
we intend to reject this historic opening, I could easily see a return
to the old ways. This is a rare window of opportunity. The choice
faced by the Congress is either yes or no--this decision cannot be
put off without risking all that has occurred and all we might build.
Politics and economics are dynamic, not static, systems.
There are political forces in Mexico, as in the United States, that
are afraid of competition. In Mexico, these forces usually are
strongly associated with antipathy to the United States. Our
rejection would fuel their animosity for decades. If we explain that
the United States cannot proceed now because Mexico is still
"different," we will give these negative protectionists the upper
hand.
Therefore, I believe an FTA would not only further reduce
higher Mexican barriers and create growth that will benefit the
United States and Mexico, but it would also help secure significant
unilateral reductions and openings already made by the Mexicans.
An FTA Will Create Jobs
One of the most frequent assertions made by opponents of the FTA
is that it will lead to job flight from the United States. This
argument just does not stand up to scrutiny. But since the claim is
repeated so frequently, I think it is worth noting in some detail six
reasons why people concerned about good jobs at good wages should
support the FTA.
One
, jobs don't flee to places just because
wages are lower. If they did, I imagine Haiti--which already has
the benefit of duty-free entry into the United States under the CBI
[Caribbean Basin Initiative]--would be the manufacturing center of
the world. In fact, firms' decisions on locations of investments and
their ability to pay higher wages depend significantly on the
productivity of the labor force. Productivity, in turn, depends on
the education, skills, capital, technology, management, and overall
infrastructure (including financial and communication systems)
that can be brought to bear.
We have two good experiments to substantiate my point. In
1982, the AFL-CIO fiercely resisted the extension of trade
preferences to over 20 Caribbean Basin nations. Indeed, the AFL-
CIO used many of the same arguments that it is using against
Mexico. Let's examine the prophecy and the reality.
In 1982, Mr. Stephen Koplan, the Legislative Representative of
the AFL-CIO, testified before the House Ways and Means Committee
that: "The CBI incentives will only serve to further weaken the US
industrial base by encouraging new runaways by US industries to
the Caribbean region, result in a quickening of lost US jobs--skilled
as well as unskilled. . . ." He went on to forecast that if the CBI bill
were adopted, "a flood of imports world-wide" would be funneled
through the CBI countries.
So what actually happened after the CBI was enacted?
Our trade balance with the CBI nations soared from a deficit
of over $200 million in 1986 to a surplus of $1.8 billion in 1990.
We enjoy surpluses with 20 of the 24 CBI nations. These gains were
driven by an increase in US exports from $5.6 to $9.3 billion, an
average annual rate of increase of 12.1%. (Imports grew from $6.1
to $7.5 billion, a 5.3% annual rate.) Therefore, our export increase
was more than double the rate of the import increase. And during
this period, the US economy added over 8 million jobs.
Puerto Rico offers another test case. Despite an average
industrial wage of $6.19 per hour, significant tax advantages, and
free trade access to the 50 states, we have not seen a massive
flight of jobs and investment to Puerto Rico.
Two
, the logic of the job-loss argument is
severely undercut by the fact that the United States is relatively
open to Mexican imports now--yet we have not seen the flight of
jobs and investment. The average trade-weighted US tariff for
Mexican goods is about 3%-4% and about 45% of Mexico's goods
already enter the United States duty free. In contrast, the average
Mexican trade-weighted tariff is about 10%, and Mexico still
applies quotas, licenses, performance requirements, and other
restrictions that limit many US exports. As long as our market is
already relatively open, certainly it makes sense to lower the
higher Mexican barriers so as to increase opportunities for US firms
to export.
Three
, the job-loss claimants make the
mistaken assumption that trade liberalization is a zero-sum
exchange, in which the benefit for one side must involve a loss for
the other. In fact, the history of the post-World War II era provides
ample evidence that trade liberalization creates a dynamic that
produces jobs and higher incomes for all parties. Indeed, as I
mentioned above, Mexican growth has an especially high payback for
the United States because 70% of every Mexican import dollar are
spent in the United States, and 15% of each dollar of Mexican income
growth flow back to the United States. (A one percentage point
increase in Mexico's growth rate means an additional $300 million
of US exports.)
Four
, the reduction of barriers on both sides
of the border will spur economic integration that should make US
firms more competitive globally. Japanese firms increase their
competitiveness and keep high-paying jobs by sourcing components
in Asia. EC [European Community] firms are doing the same with
inputs from southern Europe. A North American Free Trade
Agreement is likely to channel any additional shifts of lower wage,
low value-added, often assembly jobs to locations in Mexico that
would be integrated with higher wage US manufacturing operations.
If these jobs leave the continent, they are likely to end up in
locations that feed into Japanese or other nations' high wage
manufacturing operations. By increasing efficiency and lowering
the cost of inputs, higher value and higher wage US manufacturing
operations are likely to be better positioned to take on competition
from Europe and Asia. The 1991 ITC study expected the FTA to
increase real income for all US workers. Indeed, a 1988 survey by
the ITC found that the vast majority of responses from 323 US
firms stated that their Mexican assembly operations increased the
competitiveness of their US production. More than 100,000 jobs
have been created on the US side of the border to support the
Maquiladora facilities.
Five
, while the reduction of remaining US
barriers to competition would require adjustment by US firms and
workers, it is important not to overstate the scope of these
changes. Since Mexico's economy is about 4% the size of ours, it is
not likely to overwhelm us. In addition, I would expect that this
agreement, like our current agreement with Canada, will involve a
long transition period. (The Canadian FTA involves a 10-year
transition and some "snapback" protections that extend 20 years.)
The agreement could include safeguards that ease the transition if
the import flows become too disruptive. Moreover, to place this
adjustment in context, it is useful to recall that about 10% of the
US labor force changes jobs annually (90% of them voluntarily);
clearly, a lengthy transition period, plus safeguards, should ease
the process.
We also need to be frank about the alternative. If Mexicans
cannot find work at home, they will keep trying to come to the
United States (as did many of our ancestors).
Job changes can also be expedited and eased through the
financial assistance of the EDWAA [Economic Dislocation and
Worker Adjustment Assistance Act] program. EDWAA is a flexible,
comprehensive program that Congress created in 1988 with broad
bipartisan and Administration support. During its first 3 years,
EDWAA will serve approximately 700,000 workers in industries
including auto, timber, electronics, copper, food processing,
aerospace, defense, and steel. EDWAA's concentration on job
training and placement has produced a much higher record of
success (66% placement rate at an average wage of $7.50 per hour)
than earlier programs. Based on its successful record, the
Administration and the Congress have increased its funding for
program year 1991 to $527 million, up from $284 million in 1989.
Six
, the bottom-line analysis is that the FTA
will increase jobs for the United States. An outside study prepared
for the Department of Labor found that the FTA will help the United
States add between 44,500 jobs over 5 years and 64,000 jobs over
10 years, the bulk of them in manufacturing. Frankly, other
analysts are probably more bullish. Professor Dornbusch of MIT has
testified that he expects that each additional billion dollars of
merchandise exports will create approximately 20,000-30,000
jobs; he recently told a congressional forum that an FTA could
create 150,000 new US jobs over 3-4 years.
Any way you look at it--the evidence from experience, the
facts about whose market is already open, trade theory, US
competitiveness, adjustment history, or labor market analysis--the
arguments about job loss just do not stand up to scrutiny. In
addition to all the other benefits, the FTA will be good for American
workers. The FTA will help us keep and create good jobs at good
wages.
Mexican Labor Standards
Some have asked about the effect of Mexican labor standards on a
North American Free Trade Agreement. One strand of this concern
is that we will lose jobs because firms will relocate in Mexico
because of the labor standards. But as I have demonstrated above,
the FTA should produce jobs for the United States.
A second strand of the labor standards argument is that an
FTA would in some way do a disservice to the Mexicans whose
working conditions are not as good as those enjoyed by US workers.
But an FTA will, in fact, help Mexican workers by creating more
jobs and increasing Mexican wages.
As it turns out, the legal bases for Mexico's labor standards
are, for the most part, comparable to those in the United States,
Europe, and other industrialized countries. The problem is that
Mexico, a much poorer country than the United States and other
industrialized countries, cannot offer as good a material life to its
workers. The per capita income in the United States is $21,700; in
Mexico it is less than $3,000. So it is not surprising that the
compensation benefits of Mexican workers, even with a respectable
system in law, are not going to be as great as those in the United
States.
The fact that the appropriate battery of legal protections is
present, however, suggests that the best method of filling in the
economic benefits is to help the Mexican economy to grow. With
growth will come more resources for enforcement. And as more
jobs are created, and unemployment falls, Mexican workers would
be in a better position to negotiate better wages and working
conditions.
The Mexican constitution guarantees workers the right to
form unions of their own choosing and protects workers against
anti-union discrimination. Mexican unions may freely form
federations and belong to international associations. They have the
right to strike. Indeed, approximately 30% of the Mexican labor
force is unionized, as compared to about 16% in the United States.
The Mexican constitution provides for a minimum daily wage,
set by a tripartite body with labor and government representation
and adjusted by region. Mexico's child labor laws require children
to be 14 years old to work, and the work is limited to a maximum of
6 hours a day until they are 16 years old.
In some areas, Mexican labor laws exceed US standards. The
Mexican social security system, for example, provides medical and
maternity care, pensions, and payment for temporary and permanent
disability. This system serves as a guarantor of minimum benefits
and protection for all wage earners, leaving management and trade
unions to bargain about possible supplemental benefits.
Mexico has detailed and comprehensive occupational safety
and health regulations. Most firms are required to set up plant-
level health and safety monitoring bodies. Mexico has ratified 79
International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions dealing with
worker health and safety standards, including many that the United
States has not.
The Mexican procedures for enforcing health and safety
standards tend to rely on tripartite commissions at the workplace
involving labor, management, and the government. The practice is
to resolve differences through negotiations, as opposed to sanctions
or plant closures.
Of course, a number of workers, especially those in small
firms, do not get the benefit of this system. In addition, the
Mexicans recognize the need to improve enforcement practices.
The key question, however, is whether one believes that the
enforcement of rules will improve and that negotiated economic
benefits will likely be greater if we encourage Mexican growth and
development through the FTA. The "labor standards protectionists"
rely on Catch-22 logic: They believe we cannot have an FTA with
Mexico until the Mexicans become as prosperous as we are, even
though the FTA is a key means for Mexicans to achieve greater
prosperity.
I just do not see how we will be helping the Mexican worker
by making it harder for him or her to export goods to the United
States. And if the Mexican worker is impeded from exporting his or
her product to the United States, we should not be surprised to find
that he or she may seek to come to the United States to produce
goods here. It is strongly in our national interest to have a growing,
prosperous Mexico that can produce jobs, higher incomes, and better
working and living standards for its people.
Finally, to support the Mexican government's efforts to
improve the conditions of working people in Mexico, we have agreed
to begin a new dialogue on labor issues between the US Department
of Labor and the Mexican Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare.
We will provide additional details in the near future.
ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES
Mexico and the United States agree that our efforts to increase
growth and prosperity through economic integration and the
elimination of barriers need to be complemented by a cooperative
effort to enhance environmental protection. We know that
sustainable economic development and environmental safeguards
need to be mutually supportive.
Indeed, the Salinas Administration has made significant
strides in recent years to orient environmental policies, as well as
economic policies, toward the standards set by the United States
and other developed nations. President Salinas has made clear that
Mexico is taking these steps because it recognizes they are in its
own interest, not because we and other developed nations require
them as an "entry ticket" to the club of developed nations. Indeed,
without underestimating the tasks it faces, Mexico could become a
model for nations that believe economic growth and protection of
the environment are complements, not alternatives.
Nevertheless, in evaluating Mexico's commitment to the
environment, we also cannot ignore the relation between economic
prosperity and the ability to devote resources to environmental
protection. Mexico has about one-third the population of the United
States, but only 1/25th of our economic resources.
Our task, then, is twofold: (1) to build on the program of
environmental cooperation that we have already begun so as to
strengthen our future efforts and (2) to negotiate an FTA that will
help Mexico grow and give it new resources to fulfill its
environmental goals.
Mexico took a major step toward environmental protection in
1988 through enactment of its General Law for Ecological
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection. Much of this statute is
based on US law and experience. The law covers air, water, and soil
pollution; contamination by hazardous materials and waste;
pesticides and toxic substances; the conservation of ecosystems;
ecology reserves; and the rational use of natural resources.
A central element of the 1988 law is the requirement of
environmental impact assessments for all new investment projects
in both the public and private sectors. The law also establishes
administrative sanctions and criminal penalties for non-
compliance.
The Salinas Administration recognizes that laws on the books
will not be effective unless they are backed by proper enforcement.
So the Mexican government is acting to remedy its past problem of
inadequate enforcement. It sent a strong signal when it temporarily
imposed some 980 industrial closures for non-compliance. The
budget of SEDUE, Mexico's environmental agency, increased almost
eightfold between 1989 and 1991 (from $5 to $39 million); a large
part of this increase will go to develop regulations and enhance
enforcement.
Mexico is also turning to international sources to expand its
environmental resources. Mexico is negotiating an $84 million loan
from the World Bank that will be used in large part to enhance
industrial inspection. In anticipation of this loan, SEDUE recently
announced the commitment of Mexican counterpart funds to create
50 new inspector positions for Mexico City and 50 more for the US-
Mexican border.
SEDUE is also working with Mexican industry to encourage
compliance with the new law. It will begin by negotiating new
compliance agreements. For example, SEDUE has reached agreement
with the Maquiladora Association to encourage compliance efforts
by its members. To back up the cooperative approach, SEDUE is also
creating an Office of Environmental Inspection for Industry to
oversee, control, and impose punitive sanctions on industries
violating environmental standards.
To give you a fuller sense of the Mexican and US-Mexican
efforts underway in the environmental area, I would like to review
briefly three topics: Mexico City air pollution; the border
environment; and conservation cooperation.
Mexico City Air Pollution
President Salinas has demonstrated a strong personal commitment
to cleaning up Mexico City's air. President Salinas once explained to
President Bush that when the children of Mexico City were asked to
draw pictures of the sky, they used hues of gray, not of blue; there
were no pictures of bright suns. He wanted to be the president,
President Salinas continued, who made the skies of Mexico City blue
again for the school children.
In 1990, Mexico instituted interim plans to cut traffic and
industrial activities in Mexico City during periods of serious air
pollution. Then Mexico made the multi-billion dollar decisions to
phase out leaded gasoline and to order that all new cars, including
over 40,000 city taxis, be equipped with catalytic converters. The
government has also shut down all 24 military industrial
installations in the Mexico City area because of potential
environmental risks.
Just this month, President Salinas demonstrated dramatically
the depth of his commitment by shutting down permanently Mexico's
largest oil refinery. This one facility accounted for 8% of Mexico's
distillation capacity; without it, Mexico will even have to import
certain refined products. This move is estimated to cost Mexico
about $500 million and up to 5,000 jobs.
These are deeds, not just words. We should be helping Mexico
to acquire the wealth to continue the job, not slighting Mexico as
"different" just because it is still too poor to meet our standards.
To support these Mexico City efforts, the United States
entered into an agreement in 1989 to provide technical support.
Together, we have developed training and technical assistance
programs to deal with the problems of air and water pollution,
hazardous waste, and environmental health. This EPA program has
been supplemented by a US Department of Energy agreement with
the Mexican Petroleum Institute to prepare a multi-million dollar
computer model study of Mexico City's air pollution. We have been
working with Mexico and the Inter-American Development Bank to
put together a debt-for-nature swap to fund reforestation efforts
around Mexico City.
Border Environment
The border environment offers a second challenge for our two
nations. Our initial efforts have been built on programs of the 100-
year-old International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC).
Today the IBWC focuses heavily on cross-border water
pollution issues, coordinating with EPA and SEDUE on a number of
important projects. For example, the IBWC is currently
constructing major sewage collection and treatment systems, at an
estimated cost of over $234 million, at Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana/San
Diego, and Nogales.
In 1983, Mexico and the United States established a new
framework for cooperation on border environmental pollution,
supplementing the IBWC by tackling a broader range of pollution
problems. Under this framework, EPA and SEDUE established and
oversee work programs under five annexes on air and water
pollution, hazardous waste, and accidental spills.
In November 1990, Presidents Bush and Salinas decided to
meet the challenge of more rapid economic integration by
developing a comprehensive long-term plan to clean up the border
environment. This cooperative plan will parallel and complement
the FTA. (The transition period for our US-Canadian agreement was
10 years.)
Based on an evaluation of progress under the 1983 agreement,
this new plan will address problems of air and water pollution,
hazardous wastes, chemical spills, pesticides, and enforcement. We
hope to develop this new plan with the Mexicans by the end of this
year, before we complete negotiations on the FTA. And we intend to
involve nongovernmental organizations and the public in the
development and implementation of this plan.
Therefore, the United States and Mexico plan to complete two
parallel, mutually supportive long-term agreements--one on trade
and the other on environment--looking toward our cooperative
transition into the 21st century.
Both countries also will look for ways to involve multilateral
support for our bilateral efforts. For example, the Pan American
Health Organization (PAHO), in close cooperation with the US Public
Health Service and the Mexican Ministry of Health, is now
developing a plan to assess priority public health problems along
the border. Among these are environmental health issues related to
air pollution, water pollution, and hazardous waste.
Conservation Cooperation
A third example of US-Mexican cooperation is the area of
conservation. We have been partners in conservation since 1936.
And we want to accomplish even more on this topic in the future.
In the area of wildlife and parks, the US Fish and Wildlife
Service, the Forest Service, and the National Park Service each have
developed cooperative agreements with their Mexican counterparts.
For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service is currently pursuing
nearly 100 projects with SEDUE--ranging from conservation and
management of migratory bird habitats, to protecting endangered
species such as the jaguar, to research on tropical birds.
The Salinas Administration is well aware that Mexico has a
unique wealth of species that it needs to preserve. Mexico's
extensive domestic wildlife conservation programs include the
establishment of 44 national parks, 8 reserves, and 14 biosphere
reserves. The US National Park Service's cooperative arrangements
with SEDUE include eight joint projects, for example, studies of the
black bear and peregrine falcon and firefighter training. Moreover,
Mexico has announced that it intends to join CITES, an international
convention for the protection of endangered species.
In the area of tropical forest protection, the US Forest
Service and USAID [US Agency for International Development] have
developed a cooperative program with the Mexican government for
sustainable forest management. Cooperative work under the
auspices of the North American Forest Commission already involves
the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Joint projects include, for
example, cooperative research on insects and pest control,
protecting migratory bird habitats, and remote sensing inventories
of Mexico's forests.
In the area of marine resources, the United States and Mexico
are working together in multilateral forums to place stringent
restrictions on waste generated from ships in the Gulf of Mexico. In
addition, we are cooperating on programs to reduce the deaths of
dolphins and sea turtles. While not yet at our level, Mexico has
reduced by 58% the number of dolphins killed per net deployed
between 1986 and 1989. Last year, President Salinas announced
that Mexico would end its commercial harvest of endangered sea
turtles and employ methods to protect sea turtles in its fisheries.
The above description offers you just a brief sampling of the
intensive efforts by Mexico, and by Mexico and the United States
acting together, to develop a broad-based program of environmental
protection. Both Mexico and the United States intend to do more in
the future--to address problems and opportunities that respect no
borders.
I believe all of us want to do more to improve environmental
conditions in Mexico. Economic growth is the essential ingredient
in helping us to do so. So I have been deeply disappointed by the
statements of some who seem willing to sacrifice the FTA and US
support for increased growth in Mexico to make their unilateral
point. If they kill the FTA, the price of their actions will be paid by
poor people in Mexico. It will be paid in the form of a degraded, not
improved, environment in Mexico. And it will also hurt the cause of
environmentalists who want to blend growth and environmental
protection through sustainable development. The word will race
throughout Latin America that some North America
environmentalists act like latter-day colonialists; they offer a new
justification for keeping the Latins down.
For in the final analysis, I would hope people will answer this
question honestly: Do you really believe killing the FTA will
improve Mexico's efforts to clean up the environment?
The answer must be no.
First, it is a practical fact of life that the Salinas
Administration's innovative efforts to improve the environment are
far less likely to win popular support if the Mexican people are
struggling to find jobs or eking out a minimal existence. The
economic growth associated with the free trade agreement will
strengthen the government's efforts to upgrade environmental
safeguards.
Second, the rejection of an FTA on environmental grounds will
lend great support to those in Mexico who argue that the United
States and other developed nations are only pressing environmental
topics so as to perpetuate the developing world's dependency. The
Salinas Administration has rejected this excuse; instead, it is
seeking to demonstrate that Mexico's sustainable economic
development depends on prudent use of resources and attention to
Mexico's national natural heritage. It is in our interest that the
Salinas Administration succeed.
Third, our joint efforts with Mexico on environment and
conservation questions have been based on a spirit of cooperation,
reciprocity, and respect. We have avoided self-defeating actions
that might appear to Mexicans like the hectoring commands of
gringos who have in the past inserted themselves into Mexican
sovereignty and decision-making. It would be a great mistake, I
believe, to replace our increasingly successful approach with
Yankee environmental mandates that establish a new admission
price for economic cooperation. Such a demand will have the
opposite effect from what we hope. The Mexican people, who today
want to clean up their own environment because they recognize it is
in their own interest, will resent environmental dictates that they
may perceive as an insult to their own commitment and as a new
form of eco-protectionism.
In sum, I hope this committee shares my vision of a new and
strengthened US-Mexican relationship, founded on the FTA and
economic integration but also extended to address a whole series of
transnational problems, including the environment, that neighboring
states will have to face together in the 21st century.
NEED FOR THE CONTINUATION OF FAST-TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY
My testimony has focused on the benefits to the United States of
the North American Free Trade Agreement. Yet the issue facing the
Senate right now is whether to vote for a resolution that would deal
a death blow to the so-called fast-track authority that enables us
to negotiate trade agreements. As the committee knows, either
body of Congress can stop us dead in our tracks by passing a
resolution prior to June 1 that yanks this authority.
I would like to close by giving five reasons why the Senate
should reject any move to end the fast-track negotiating authority.
First, as Chairman Bentsen has pointed out, a rejection of the
fast-track process would be a historic shift away from a
partnership between the Congress and the executive on trade
negotiations dating back to 1934. As you know, for the first 140
years of US history, general tariff bills were one of Congress' major
items of business. The high watermark (or low watermark,
depending on your point of view) of this process was the infamous
Smoot-Hawley bill, the Tariff Act of 1930, the last general tariff
law enacted by Congress. Smoot-Hawley made trade policy through
"log rolling" of special interests, with no appreciation of the
overall result. This bill amended tariff schedules for more than
20,000 items, establishing the nation's highest tariff structure.
The protectionist disaster of Smoot-Hawley, for the United
States and the world, led President Roosevelt and Secretary of
State Cordell Hull to press a new approach shortly after assuming
office. The new congressional-executive partnership took the form
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Under this act,
Congress authorized the President to negotiate and implement
substantial tariff reductions (of up to 50%) and most-favored-
nation (MFN) tariff treatment--without further approval by the
Congress. By 1945, the United States had negotiated 32 agreements
with 27 countries, granting tariff concessions on 64% of all
dutiable imports and reducing rates by an average of 44%. The
"Wise Men" who created the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] and the post-World War II system of trade liberalization
worked from this valuable bilateral precedent.
In the decades that followed, the Congress continued to grant
the executive the ability to negotiate tariff reductions without
specific congressional approvals. As trade agreements became
more complicated, involving the reduction of barriers other than
tariffs, the Congress authorized fast-track authority in order to
adapt and continue this successful congressional-executive
partnership. Since receiving this authority in 1974, the executive
has brought back an agreement from the Tokyo GATT Round and
bilateral agreements with Israel and Canada.
If the Congress now refuses to extend this fast-track
negotiating authority, it would signal a return to the days of 1930,
to the logic that Congress should freely adjust and amend trade
arrangements around the globe without consideration of the
benefits of the package as a whole.
This reversal of 57 years of success would take the United
States out of the trade negotiating game. The other nations of the
world will pin the blame on us for walking away from real
bargaining. They will argue that they cannot offer their bottom line
positions if we are free to reopen agreements.
Second, this is a terrible time to signal to the rest of the
world that the United States will abandon its leadership role in the
field of international trade. The United States has just again
demonstrated its capacity to lead the world politically and
militarily. Some critics ask whether the United States can
complement these achievements with international economic
leadership. They want to know if the New World Order will have a
place for economics, and if it doesn't, they wonder if it can be
meaningful.
In the field of trade, the United States has a good answer. We
are pursuing an ambitious agenda in the Uruguay Round, through the
North American Free Trade Agreement, and through the prospects
for trade agreements under the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative. This is what is at stake if the Congress fails to extend
fast-track authority.
Third, it is economic folly for the United States to signal its
withdrawal from the world trading system at exactly the time when
US exports are playing a more critical role for the US economy.
Over the last 4 years, US merchandise exports expanded by 75%.
Over those 4 years, exports accounted for 40% of US GNP growth.
Last year, our exports grew 8.5%, producing 88% of US growth.
US manufacturing is in a highly competitive condition. In
1988, manufacturing represented 23% of our GNP, a post-World War
II high. Given the efficiencies and streamlining that took place
through the 1980s, American manufacturers are now well
positioned to compete around the globe. C. Fred Bergsten of the
Institute for International Economics recently wrote that US
exports could readily contribute $50 billion annually in real
economic growth over the next 5 years.
It just does not make sense to put our export power at risk by
taking the Administration out of the trade negotiating game.
Because the Congress would have effectively removed our ability to
settle disagreements through market-opening negotiations, our only
recourse would be tools of threat and retaliation, which would
certainly generate counter-threats and counter-retaliation.
Fourth, it is important to underscore that Congress' continued
authorization of fast-track negotiating authority does not forgo any
of Congress' rights to vote against the agreements we bring back. It
is one thing to vote against an agreement because you believe that,
taken as a whole, it does not serve US interests. But it is quite
another thing not to even authorize the executive to negotiate
packages to bring back for your consideration. If you have doubts
about the Uruguay Round, or the North American Free Trade
Agreement, please do not tell the Administration that we cannot
even attempt to meet your standards; at least give us the chance to
negotiate a good agreement for the United States.
Finally, it is simply not the case that the agreements that we
bring back offer no time or opportunity for congressional input. In
fact, the "fast-track" is really neither "fast" nor a "track." It's not
"fast"--the process is actually deliberate; and it's not a "track"--no
one is being railroaded into approving agreements that might be
negotiated.
Fast-track procedures have absolutely nothing to do with the
pace at which we conduct negotiations. Ambassador Hills [US Trade
Representative Carla Hills] has assured the Congress on a number of
occasions that we will not rush to conclude any agreement--Mexico,
Uruguay Round, or otherwise--merely for the sake of agreement. We
will take the time needed to consider all relevant issues and to
consult fully with you and the private sector. Until we arrive at
good agreements--ones that we believe you will agree are good--
there will be no agreements. We proved that in the Brussels
negotiations of the Uruguay Round.
Furthermore, Congress has a full role throughout the entire
process: in formulating negotiating objectives; in close
consultation as the negotiations proceed (in the Uruguay Round, the
Congress reviewed each and every one of our proposals and many
members were with the negotiators in Brussels); in close
consultation before any agreement is signed; and in full
participation in drafting implementing legislation. As the US-
Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988 substantiated, there is ample
opportunity to meet many particular congressional interests
through the drafting of this implementing legislation with the
appropriate committees of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
I would like to conclude by thanking you for scheduling these
important hearings. With all the other events in the news, it has
been difficult for the proponents of fast-track negotiating
authority and of the North American Free Trade Agreement to get
the attention of the public and the Congress so as to make the
overall and detailed case for this historic economic and political
opportunity. Instead, special interests have defined these questions
narrowly, obscuring America's national interest.
Your colleagues will be looking to this committee's members
for leadership on these issues. I hope this committee will let them
know that the foreign relations of the United States need to
promote the economic leadership and economic interests of the
United States. I hope this committee will tell them that the North
American FTA will produce growth, jobs, higher incomes,
competitiveness, and economic strength for America. I hope this
committee will stand for progress for Mexico and our hemisphere--
because it will work to our benefit.
Working together, we can realize that long-unfulfilled
American vision. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991
Title: North American Free Trade Agreement: A Historic Task
Bush; Salinas
Source: President Bush; Mexican President Carlos
Salinas
Description: Remarks in Houston, Texas
Date: Apr 7, 19914/7/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States, Mexico, Canada
Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
President Bush: Well, as always, it is a great pleasure to meet with
my good friend, President Carlos Salinas. He's en route to Canada
for a state visit, but this refueling stop has given us a chance to
discuss very important issues of mutual concern and interest.
The United States has embarked on a historic task with Mexico
and Canada--the creation of a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA),
which would establish the largest free trade area in the world. It
would involve some 360 million people and a total of $6 trillion in
combined annual output. President Salinas and I are certain that
this FTA, this trade agreement will create jobs and provide
opportunities for the citizens of both our countries.
To move forward, we need the US Congress to extend the fast-
track authority. That authority allows the President to assure our
negotiating partners that the free trade agreement which we
conclude at the negotiating table will be the one that will be voted
on by the Congress. The Congress has a say. They can vote yes or
they can vote no. But we need to negotiate in a way so that the
people with whom we are negotiating know that that is not going to
be amended and changed.
I told President Salinas that I am absolutely committed
personally, that our Administration is committed totally to the free
trade agreement with Mexico and Canada. And I also told him that I
am going to work tirelessly to assure favorable action by Congress
on fast-track authority.
The credibility of the United States as a trading partner is on
the line here. And I am doing this because I believe firmly that it is
in the best interest of the United States of America. I also believe
it is in Mexico's interest, but I am convinced that it is best for
America.
President Salinas and I have agreed to take a few questions,
but I'd now turn the floor over to him.
Once again, sir, welcome.
President Salinas: Thank you very much for the
hospitality extended to us, Mr. President. I would like to say that
the bilateral agenda is quite wide, and we took up diverse topics.
One of these issues, no doubt, was a free trade agreement. We
ratified our firm decision to forge ahead and come afloat with a
treaty. The area that would then be created would be the main, the
major, mover in order to promote the economies of the whole
continent, and, at the same time, it would be an extraordinary
means in order to increase and raise our competitiveness to reach
levels of the Pacific Basin and Europe.
But this will not be easy. It is a battle between visionary men
and women living in sovereign nations with protectionist interests
or visionary views.
We reach the conclusion that studies tend to confirm that the
benefits that will be derived and that will stem from the free trade
agreement broadly go beyond the disadvantages that one could have.
For example, in the United States, thanks to freer trade activities
with Mexico, in the last 3 years exports have increased to my
country, to Mexico. In the United States, additional jobs have been
created of over one-quarter of a million jobs.
Mexico is already growing and developing with stability, and
that will now lead to having to export goods from Mexico, not
people. That will prevent thousands and millions of Mexicans from
having to come to the United States looking for a job. Our objective
is to have economic recovery with employment that will not harm
the environment and with an increase, a raise in real salaries.
And I would simply like to conclude by saying that the good
climate that we found in Houston 21/2 years ago has now been
confirmed here today. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991
Title: Mexican Initiatives and Cooperation With the United States
Date: Apr 15, 19914/15/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: North America
Country: Mexico
Subject: North America Free Trade, Narcotics,
Environment, Immigration, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Mexico's Commitment To the War on Drugs
Recognizing that illegal narcotics pose a national security and
public health threat to the Mexican people, President Carlos Salinas
has committed his government to an aggressive campaign against
drugs.
President Salinas has instructed his attorney general to
ensure that counter-narcotics operations are conducted with
respect for human rights and the law.
Taking the Initiative
. In 1990, Mexico took
unprecedented steps to further the effectiveness of the war on
drugs, which included passing new drug laws with stiffer penalties
for traffickers and corrupt officials.
More than 500 government employees, including several high-
ranking officials, have been removed from office for corruption.
Major trafficking figures, previously believed above the law,
were arrested, convicted, and jailed. Rafael Caro Quintero,
implicated in the murder of US Drug Enforcement Agency agent
Enrique Camarena, remains imprisoned after a Mexican court upheld
his conviction on other criminal charges.
Mexico created the elite Operation Falcon Force, a rapid
response force that uses helicopters and sophisticated aircraft
acquired from the United States. It has effectively deterred cocaine
smugglers.
Forty-six Mexican police officers and 24 military personnel
have lost their lives in the fight against drugs.
Increasing Cooperation
.
Although marijuana and opium production and cocaine transshipment
constitute a major concern, cooperation between the United States
and Mexico has improved significantly in the last year.
President Bush's drug control strategy for 1991 recognizes
Mexico's contribution to stemming the flow of drugs into the United
States and proposes additional US bilateral counter-narcotics
assistance to Mexico and enhanced US drug interdiction on the
border.
Joint US-Mexican surveillance and enforcement efforts have
resulted in record seizures of cocaine. Cocaine seizures in 1990,
almost 50 metric tons, were up 43% from 1989, which itself was a
record year.
Mexico approved overflight of its territory by US Customs P-3
surveillance aircraft, greatly increasing their time on-station and
their effectiveness against smugglers.
The Mexican government signed leases for US helicopters,
agreeing to use them exclusively for counter-narcotics operations.
US Customs Cessna Citation surveillance aircraft currently
track cocaine smugglers inside Mexican airspace. Later this year,
these will be replaced by Mexican-piloted Citations purchased by
the Mexican government.
The United States and Mexico have signed a general agreement
on narcotics cooperation, and the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
awaits the exchange of instruments of ratification.
Cooperation Brings Results
.
Concrete steps to improve eradication programs produced a major
reduction in marijuana production and increased opium eradication.
Operation Falcon forces intercepted a major Colombian cartel
convoy in October 1990, capturing 10 tons of cocaine. Following the
bust, cocaine transshipments dropped off for the remainder of the
year.
Demonstrating range and flexibility, an Operation Falcon UH-
1H Helicopter Response team in Oaxaca interdicted a Colombian drug
flight attempting to use a new southern Mexico route as a transit
point.
Much more can be done, and the United States and Mexico have
forged an effective partnership that has produced, and will continue
to produce, concrete results in the war on drugs.
Mexico's Efforts On the Environment
Mexico's 1988 General Law for Ecological Equilibrium and
Environmental Protection is sweeping legislation that establishes a
firm commitment to protect the environment.
Much of Mexico's 1988 law is based on US law and experience.
It sets national policy on ecology reserves, rational use of natural
resources, and environmental protection. It establishes
administrative sanctions and criminal penalties for non-
compliance. Since 1988, each new investment project must include
a detailed study assessing its environmental impact.
Some private companies already have responded to the
Mexican government's urging that they consider environmental
issues as part of overall business strategy by creating special
offices to analyze environmental impacts of proposed business
activities.
Commitment to Enforcement
.
Mexico has committed itself to enforcing its new law, regulations,
and standards. It has not hesitated to close several industrial
plants, but enforcement efforts are constrained by limited funds.
However, the budget of the Mexican Ministry of Urban Development
and Ecology (SEDUE) has grown significantly in recent years, and it
will be doubled by an anticipated World Bank loan. A significant
portion of the increase may be devoted to enforcement.
Anticipating early approval of the loan, SEDUE recently
announced the commitment of Mexican counterpart funds to create
50 new inspector positions for Mexico City and 50 for the US-
Mexico border.
In a unique initiative, the Mexican government has negotiated
agreements with environmental and industrial with environmental
and industrial groups in an effort to assure compliance with the
law. For example, agreements have been reached with the
Maquiladora Association, which includes most maquilas, to
encourage environmental compliance by its members. (Maquila
industries are assembly plants owned by US or foreign investors
along the border.)
Combating Air Pollution in Mexico City.
In October 1990, with strong international support, including
promises of significant Japanese financing and US technical
assistance, Mexico announced an ambitious master plan to resolve
air pollution problems in greater Mexico City. In the interim,
Mexico City has a contingency plan which results in drastic
reductions in traffic and industrial activity during the most serious
pollution periods.
A 1989 US-Mexico agreement provides for technical support
to help Mexico resolve the pollution problems in Mexico City. Under
it, action programs and training and technical assistance programs
have been developed to deal with problems of air and water
pollution, hazardous waste, and environmental health issues.
In addition, the US Department of Energy and the Mexican
Petroleum Institute have agreed to begin a computer model study of
Mexico City air pollution.
In other programs, Mexico and the International Development
Bank are devising a debt-for-nature swap to fund reforestation
efforts around Mexico City. In other wildlife programs:
-- There has been substantial cooperation between the United
States and Mexico on wildlife protection and natural resource
management;
-- Cooperative dolphin and sea turtle protection programs
have been established. As a result, dolphins killed (per net
deployed) decreased by 58% in 1986-89;
-- Joint efforts are underway through SEDUE and the US
Department of the Interior on wetlands management to improve the
"flyway system" for migratory game fowl; and
-- Mexico has announced plans to join CITES, an international
convention for protection of endangered species.
Border Environment
.
Mexico works with the United States to resolve pollution problems
along the border, through action programs under the 1983 border
environment agreement, for which Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and SEDUE are national coordinators.
At their November 1990 meeting, Presidents Bush and Salinas
agreed that their environmental authorities should develop an
integrated plan to deal with border environmental problems over the
next decade. It will address border environmental problems of air
and water pollution, hazardous waste, chemical spills, pesticides
and enforcement.
The Pan American Health Organization, in close cooperation
with US Public Health Service and the Mexican Ministry of Health, is
developing a plan to deal with priority public health problems along
the border including air and water pollution and hazardous wastes.
The 100-year old International Boundary and Water
Commission (IBWC), in cooperation with EPA and SEDUE, is actively
engaged in cross-border water pollution issues. The commission is
constructing major joint sewage collection and treatment systems
at Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana/San Diego, and Nogales and is planning
joint improvements in sewage collection and treatment facilities
for a long-term solution to pollution of the New River at
Mexicali/Calexico.
US-Mexican Cooperation on Immigration Laws
The US and Mexican governments are improving their cooperation on
immigration issues, both in terms of Mexicans and third-country
nationals.
US and Mexican immigration officials participate in several
joint working groups that deal with such issues as labor and
migration, consular and migratory issues, and third-country
nationals.
Legal Changes Slow Illegal Immigration
.
The reforms and increased enforcement resulting from the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) have helped reduce the
flow of illegal immigrants from and through Mexico.
In 1986, the US Border Patrol apprehended 1.7 million persons
attempting to cross the US-Mexican border illegally. By 1989, that
number had dropped to 900,000. Although the number rose again to
1.1 million in fiscal year (FY) 1990, the number highly correlates
with the size of border patrol resources and economic conditions in
Mexico. First quarter FY 1991 apprehensions are down from FY 1990
levels.
The US Immigration Act of 1990, which becomes effective in
October 1991, will increase by 40% the number of immigrants
legally admitted each year. Although the act is not specifically
aimed at Mexico, Mexican nationals will benefit from the increase
in family preference numbers, which will reduce some of the
pressure for illegal migration.
In 1990, Mexico apprehended 125,000 third-country nationals,
up from 13,000 in 1988. Since the US government has not had to
apprehend and detain these illegal immigrants, the increased
Mexican effort has saved the United States tens of millions of
dollars in detention costs.
The United States will continue to work closely with Mexican
officials to build on the progress already made.
Economic Growth Reduces Migration Pressure
.
In 1990, the Commission for the Study of International Migration
and Cooperative Economic Development reported to Congress and the
President that economic growth in the home countries of migrants
is the single most important long-term remedy to the problem of
unauthorized migration to the United States. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991
Title: Country Profile: Mexico
Date: Apr 15, 19914/15/91
Category: Country Data
Region: North America
Country: Mexico
Subject: North America Free Trade, History,
International Organizations, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Official Name: The United Mexican States
Geography
Area: 1.98 million sq. km. (764,000 sq. mi.); about three times the
size of Texas.
Cities: Capital--Mexico City (pop.
20 million, est. 1989). Other cities--Guadalajara, Monterrey,
Ciudad Juarez, Puebla de Zaragoza, Leon.
Terrain: Varies from coastal lowlands to high mountains.
Climate: Varies from tropical to desert.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Mexican(s).
Population (1990): 88 million.
Annual growth rate (1989 est.): 2.2%.
Ethnic groups: Indian-Spanish (mestizo) 60%, American Indian 30%,
Caucasian 9%, other 1%.
Religions: Roman Catholic 97%, Protestant 3%.
Language: Spanish.
Education: Years compulsory--10.
Literacy --88%.
Health: Infant morality rate (1989) --
42 /1,000. Life expectancy (1989)--70 yrs.
Work force (26.3 million, 1989): Agriculture, forestry, hunting,
fishing--26%. Manufacturing--12.8%. Commerce--13.9%.
Services--31.4%. Mining and quarrying--1.3%. Construction--9.5%.
Transportation and communication--4.8%. Electricity--0.3%.
Government
Type: Federal Republic.
Independence: First proclaimed, September 16, 1810; Republic
established 1822.
Constitution: February 5, 1917.
Branches: Executive--president (chief of state and head of
government). Legislative--bicameral. Judicial--supreme court,
local and federal systems.
Political parties: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National
Action Party (PAN), Mexican Socialist Party (PMS), Mexican
Democratic Party (PDM), Popular Socialist Party (PPS), the
Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), Mexican Workers
Party (PMT), Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), Party of the
Cardenist Front of National Reconstruction (PFCRN).
Suffrage: Universal over 18.
Administrative subdivisions: 31 states and the federal district.
Flag: Green, white, and red vertical bands. An eagle holding a snake
in its beak and perching on a cactus is centered.
Economy
GDP (1990 est.): $228 billion.
Per capita GDP (1990 est.): $2,657.
Annual real GDP growth (1990 est.): 3%.
Avg. inflation rate (1990 est.): 28%.
Natural resources: Petroleum, silver, copper, gold, lead, zinc,
natural gas, timber.
Agriculture: Products--corn, beans, oilseeds, feedgrains, fruit,
cotton, coffee, sugarcane, winter vegetables.
Industry: Types--manufacturing, services, commerce,
transportation and communications, petroleum, and mining.
Trade (1990 est.): Exports--$24.6 billion: manufacturing 55.3%,
petroleum and derivatives 33.8%, agriculture 8.2%, mining 2.7%.
Imports--$25.7 billion: intermediate goods 66.4%, capital goods
19.3%, consumer goods 14.3%. Major trading partners--US, EC,
Japan.
Membership in International Organizations
UN and some of its specialized and related agencies, including the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT); Seabeds Committee; Inter-American
Defense Board (IADB); Organization of American States (OAS); Latin
American Integration Association (ALADI); INTELSAT. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991
Title: Country Profile: Canada
Date: Apr 15, 19914/15/91
Category: Country Data
Region: North America
Country: Canada
Subject: North America Free Trade, History,
Trade/Economics, International Organizations
[TEXT]
Official Name: Canada
Geography
Area: 9.97 million sq. km. (3.8 million
sq. mi.); second largest country in the world.
Cities: Capital--Ottawa (pop. 833,000). Other cities--Toronto (3.5
million), Montreal (2.9 million), Vancouver (1.4 million).
Terrain: Varied.
Climate: Temperate to arctic.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Canadian(s).
Population (1989): 26.3 million.
Annual growth rate (1988-89): 1%.
Ethnic groups: British 25%, French 24%, other European 16%,
indigenous Indian and Eskimo 1.5%, mixed background 28%.
Religions: Roman Catholic 47%, United Church 16%, Anglican 10%.
Languages: English, French.
Literacy: 98% of population aged 15 and over have at least a ninth
grade education.
Health: Infant mortality rate--
7.3/1,000 (US=11.2/1,000). Life expectancy--73 yrs. male, 80 yrs.
female.
Work force (13.5 million, 1989): Agriculture--0.4 million.
Manufacturing--2.1 million. Trade--2.2 million.
Community/business/personal service--4.1 million. Public
administration--0.8 million.
Government
Type: Confederation with parliamentary democracy.
Independence: July 1, 1867.
Constitution: The amended British North America Act of 1867,
charter of rights, and unwritten custom.
Branches: Executive--Queen Elizabeth II (head of state, represented
by a governor general), prime minister (head of government),
cabinet. Legislative--bicameral parliament (104-member Senate,
295-member House of Commons). Judicial--Supreme Court.
Political parties: Progressive Conservative, Liberal, New
Democratic, Reform, Social Credit.
Suffrage: Universal over 18.
Government budget (FY 1990--91): Expenditures--US$127.1 billion.
Revenues--US$102.6 billion. Deficit--US$24.5 billion.
Defense: 2% of GDP.
Subdivisions: 10 provinces, 2 territories.
Flag: A red maple leaf on a white background flanked by vertical red
bands.
Economy
GNP (1989): US$500.3 billion.
Annual real GNP growth rate (1990): 1.1%.
Per capita GNP (1989): US$19,020.
Avg. inflation rate (1990): 5.0%.
Natural resources: Petroleum and natural gas, hydroelectric power,
metals and minerals, fish, forests, wildlife.
Agriculture: Products--wheat, livestock and meat, feedgrains,
oilseeds, dairy products, tobacco, fruits, vegetables.
Industry: Types--motor vehicles and parts, fish and forest
products, processed and unprocessed minerals.
Trade (1990): Canada had a record current account deficit of
US$15.9 billion in 1990. Exports--US$123 billion: motor vehicles
and parts, lumber, woodpulp and newsprint, crude and fabricated
metals, natural gas, crude petroleum, wheat. Partners--US 75%, EC
18%, Japan 5%. Imports--US$116.1 billion: motor vehicles and
parts, industrial machinery, crude petroleum, chemicals,
agricultural machinery. Partners--US 69%, EC 8%, Japan 6%.
Fiscal year: April 1-March 31.
Development assistance (FY 1987--88): $2 billion or 0.4% of GDP.
Membership in International Organizations
UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), North Atlantic
Fisheries Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Commonwealth, La Franco-phonie, Agency for
Cultural and Technical Cooperation, International Energy Agency
(IEA), INTELSAT. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991
Title: US-Japan Relations: Strengthening Ties
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statement at meeting with Japanese Prime Minister
Toshiki Kaifu, Newport Beach, California
Date: Apr 4, 19914/4/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: Japan
Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales
[TEXT]
I think back to when I met with Prime Minister Kaifu in Palm
Springs last March--1 year [ago] and a world of change. Since then,
we closed the last chapter on the Cold War. We built a coalition
that rescued a tiny nation from a terrible fate. We defended an
ideal that is good and right and just.
But our work is far from finished. With change come new
challenges--for both our nations--with global implications for
growth, stability, and peace. Our two nations must work to forge a
global partnership. And since last year's meeting in Palm Springs,
we have made very real progress. In the past year, we have resolved
significant trade disputes, and we've moved to ease trade tensions.
We've made solid progress--opening new markets to
satellites, telecommunications, and wood products. We need to
move ahead now in construction services, autos and auto parts,
semiconductors, and other areas. We need to prove that our efforts
under the Structural Impediments Initiatives produce real results.
It remains our best hope of fending off those who advocate managed
trade between our nations. Today let us reaffirm our commitment
to tear down the walls to free and fair trade and build on the open
exchange that helps both our nations.
Our efforts to expand free trade have produced real results. In
1990, the US trade deficit with Japan fell for the third straight
year. American exports to Japan continued to rise--up more than
75% since 1987. In fact, many Americans would be surprised to
learn that Japan buys more goods from the United States per capita
than we buy from Japan.
Together, our two nations share a special responsibility to
maintain and strengthen the multilateral trading system. Japan and
the United States are powerful forces for global prosperity. But we
cannot promote continued growth in a world system where free
market forces are in retreat. That is why the success of the
Uruguay Round trade talks is critical. Along with other nations,
Japan and the United States must assume strong leadership roles in
knocking down barriers to free trade in all areas, including
agriculture. And, once again, I call on the US Congress to take
decisive action. Send a clear signal that America stands for free
trade by extending fast-track procedures.
Trade is just one dimension of our relationship. Last year, our
two nations marked the 30th anniversary of our mutual security
treaty. Our commitment to common defense has never been
stronger, and yet here, too, our long-standing alliance continues to
adjust to new challenges and new realities. Just this January, in
keeping with its growing economic might, Japan agreed to increase
its share of the costs as host nation to American forces.
Let me be clear: The United States welcomes the broadest
possible participation by Japan in world affairs. In the past year,
we've seen a significant easing of tensions in Europe. I call on
Japan to join with us in seeking solutions to regional conflicts that
threaten stability in the Pacific. And I thank Japan as a key member
of the coalition that triumphed over the forces of aggression in the
Persian Gulf. For the first time, Japan contributed to a
multinational peacekeeping effort, and it is providing a substantial
level of financial support for Operation Desert Storm.
I welcome the visit of Prime Minister Kaifu. We must do all
we can to build public support for our relationship and to promote
contacts of every kind between the American and Japanese people.
Just this last year, Japan's distinguished former Foreign Minister
Abe announced the creation of a new foundation to promote
exchanges that bring together academics and artists, that encourage
tourism and travel.
For more than 40 years, Japan and the United States have been
partners--partners in democracy, partners in prosperity, partners
in peace. I am convinced that our meeting today proves that this
partnership remains strong--that together we will constitute a
source of stability, now and into the next century. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991
Title: Iraqi Refugees: The Need For International Assistance
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks by upon arrival at Esenboga International
Airport, Ankara, Turkey
Date: Apr 7, 19914/7/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey
Subject: Refugees
[TEXT]
First, let me say that I'm pleased to be back in Ankara. This is my
fifth visit since Iraq invaded Kuwait. I think it highlights the
significance of the relationship between the United States of
America and Turkey.
But once again, the world and the Iraqi people are being
subjected to the utter brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime. Once
again, the world finds it necessary to respond to Saddam's savage
and indecent use of force. Only this time, the victim is not a
neighboring country. This time, Iraq's forces are killing,
threatening, and committing crimes against the Iraqi people. [UN]
Security Council Resolution 688 condemns the repression of the
Kurds and other Iraqi citizens, it demands that Iraq end the
repression, and it insists that Iraq allow immediate access by
international organizations to all of those in need of assistance
throughout the country.
We are not prepared to go down the slippery slope of being
sucked into a civil war. We cannot police what goes on inside Iraq,
and we cannot be the arbiters of who shall govern Iraq. As the
President has made repeatedly clear, including, I think, at our press
conference yesterday, our objective was the liberation of Kuwait.
It never extended to the re-making of Iraq. We repeatedly said that
could only be done by the Iraqi people.
However, we cannot be indifferent to atrocities and human
suffering in Iraq, and we haven't been. Working with the
international community, we will make certain that humanitarian
assistance in both northern and southern Iraq gets to those who
most need it. And we will not tolerate any interference with this
humanitarian relief effort. . . .
Q. What will be the US reaction in case there's military
intervention--a Turkish military intervention--into Iraq? What
will be the US reaction?
Secretary Baker. Well, that's a decision, of course, for the
Turkish government to take. I've just given you the position of the
US government with respect to this. We are commencing, as you
know, a major airlift of humanitarian supplies to the people who
are being repressed. And we will not brook any interference with
that humanitarian effort. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991
Title: Iraqi Refugees: The Need For International Assistance
Baker; Alptemocin
Source: Secretary Baker; Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Alptemocin
Description: Remarks; Diyarbakir, Turkey
Date: Apr 7, 19914/7/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey
Subject: Refugees
[TEXT]
Foreign Minister Alptemocin.
We've just come back
from the border area where we observed with Secretary Baker the
tragedy inflicted by Iraq on its own people. What we are seeing is
inhuman and totally unacceptable. It is a challenge that defies the
international community to stand together and act effectively.
[inaudible] That is what Turkey and the United States are doing.
We have decided to issue a joint statement with Secretary
Baker. It reflects our impressions of the situation which continues
to worsen. It reflects our position and our resolve to do everything
in our power to contribute first, to the alleviation and, then, to the
solution of this massive human tragedy. It also confirms our appeal
to the world to join in efforts to ensure the safe return of the Iraqi
people amassed on our borders to their hometowns without fearing
further repression by Saddam Hussein. The civilized world is duty
bound not to permit the Iraqi regime to get away with what it is
doing to its own civilian people and the threat that it constitutes
for peace, security, and stability in the region. Thank you.
Secretary Baker
. As the Minister has just
indicated, we have a written statement that will be distributed.
But before that's done, let me simply say that today we have
witnessed the suffering and despair of the Iraqi people. We have
seen examples of cruelty and human anguish that really do defy
description. Women and children up there are battling hunger,
thirst, and the elements to escape repression in Iraq. And as you
heard up there--those of you who were in the briefing--may have
heard, many of those innocents [are] losing this battle. People are
suffering, and, tragically, some of them are dying. Only the
generosity and the humanity of the American and Turkish people, as
well as the international community, stands between these souls
and complete despair and complete tragedy.
President Bush, of course, has asked that I come here and see
this human drama and report back first hand on the situation. I will
be doing that as soon as I can reach him by telephone.
Our relief efforts, including air drops of supplies, have begun,
but they alone are not going to be enough. We cannot do this alone.
We cannot do this alone with the Turkish government. Together, we
simply cannot cope with this mounting human tragedy.
So the international community, as the Minister has indicated,
has to respond. And it must respond quickly and effectively. Basic
supplies are going to have to arrive soon to sustain these people.
And the organization and distribution that are required are going to
have to be provided both in Turkey as well as in northern Iraq. Most
importantly, as the Minister indicated, hope of returning home has
got to be given to these people. And that means freedom from
threat by the Iraqi government and safety from further repression.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991
Title: Iraqi Refugees: The Need For International Assistance
Baker; Alptemocin
Source: Secretary Baker; Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Alptemocin
Description: Joint statement; Diyarbakir, Turkey
Date: Apr 8, 19914/8/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey
Subject: Refugees
[TEXT]
We have just returned from a tour of areas where we witnessed the
great tragedy suffered by the Iraqi people, most of whom are women
and children who have been forcibly uprooted from their homes and
villages. The dimension of this tragedy require the urgent and
generous compassion and contribution of the international
community. It is with the aim of bringing this situation to the
attention of the world that we decided to issue the present
statement.
Once again, the brutality and folly of the Iraqi regime has
created yet another gruesome tragedy: hundreds of thousands of
refugees and many deaths among Iraqi citizens who sought only
their democratic rights. The Saddam regime has not contented
itself with more repression but has acted with excessive force,
driving its own citizens out of their own land.
And, once again, the world is reacting swiftly and with
determination to counter Saddam's indecent use of force. On Friday
[April 5, 1991], the [UN] Security Council, acting at Turkish and
French request, condemned Iraq in Resolution 688 and called for a
large program of international relief. The international community
has once again closed ranks in insisting that Iraq end its repression
and allow immediate and unimpeded access by international
organizations to all in need of aid throughout the country.
Turkey and the United States will cooperate closely to give
effect to this resolution. We do not propose armed intervention in a
civil war, but we will not tolerate any interference of our
humanitarian relief efforts.
From the initial stages of the arrival in areas on both sides of
the Turkish-Iraqi border of the cold and hungry men, women, and
children, Turkey has offered generous humanitarian aid in the form
of food, shelter, and medical care within the limits of her
capabilities. These capabilities obviously cannot match the vast
dimensions and requirements of the situation. To raise the large
sums that are needed, the United States is working closely with the
EC [European Community] and others and with the UN Secretary
General. So far--in the last few days--$67 million has been
pledged to support relief efforts in Turkey and elsewhere.
In addition, working with Turkey, the United States is now
moving quickly to provide tents, food, medicine, and other supplies
by a dramatic air-drop to groups inside Iraq. Turkey will also
cooperate with a relief effort by international organizations to
supply food along and across its borders into Iraq--where the
greatest and most vulnerable population of displaced persons is
located.
Turkey and the United States agree that the goal of relief
efforts should be to enable these people to return to their homes.
The plight of these refugees creates--as the Security Council
Resolution says--a threat to international peace and security and
has thus become another important issue in the full implementation
of the cease-fire resolution. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991
Title: UN Resolution 689 on Cease-Fire Observer Mission
Date: Apr 9, 19914/9/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization,
United Nations
[TEXT]
UN Resolution 689 on Iraq-Juwait Cease-Fire Observer Mission
(April 9, 1991)
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution 687 (1991),
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the
implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 687
(1991) contained in document S/22454 and Add. 1-3 of 5 and 9 April
1991, respectively;
2. Notes that the decision to set up the observer unit was
taken in paragraph 5 of resolution 687 (1991) and can only be
terminated by a decision of the Council; the Council shall therefore
review the question of termination or continuation every six
months;
3. Decides that the modalities for the initial six-month
period of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission shall
be in accordance with the above-mentioned report and shall also be
reviewed every six months.
VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).(###)