US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991

Title:

Fast Track and Trade Opportunities

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address before the Hispanic Free Trade Breakfast, Houston, Texas Date: Apr 8, 19914/8/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America, South America, Central America Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade [TEXT] I have been looking forward to meeting with you today, because I want to discuss two issues important to us all: America's ability to compete in the global marketplace and our ability to negotiate with our trading partners. I've said many times that the hard work of freedom awaits us. Now, I'm asking for your help in that challenge. Last month, I asked Congress to support our fast-track authority in trade negotiations. Fast track is a way of assuring our trading counterparts that the agreements they reach at the bargaining table with our negotiators will be the same ones reviewed by our Congress. Fast track doesn't affect Congress' power to accept or reject trade agreements. But it does prevent 11th-hour changes to agreements we have reached, changes that force everyone involved to start from scratch. We need fast-track authority to pursue vital trade objectives- -the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Uruguay Round, and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. If we lose our fast- track authority, we lose any hope of achieving these three agreements. We lose trade. We lose jobs and jeopardize economic growth. Here's the key: A vote against fast track is a vote against things we all hold dear--prosperity at home, growth in other lands. It ignores the dramatic and wonderful changes in the world economy. We want to play a leading role in that emerging, exciting world; we don't want to hide from it. We want to join in the thrilling business of innovation; we don't want to chain people to outmoded technologies and ideas. Right now, we have the chance to expand opportunity and economic growth from the Yukon to the Yucatan. Think of it: The North American Free Trade Agreement would link us with our largest trading partner, Canada, and our third-largest partner, Mexico. It would create the largest, richest trade zone on earth-- 360 million consumers in a market that generates $6 trillion in output a year. A unified North American market would let each of our countries build on our strengths. It would provide more and better jobs for US workers. It would stimulate price competition, lower consumer prices, improve product quality. The agreement would make necessities such as food and clothing more affordable and more available to our poorest citizens. It would raise productivity and produce a higher standard of living throughout the continent. Let me illustrate the stakes involved in the fast track debate by discussing the Mexican component of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Trade with Mexico has helped both our countries. Just 4 years ago, we had a $4.9 billion trade deficit with Mexico. Since then, we have cut that deficit by two-thirds, to $1.8 billion. This turnaround took place in part because Mexican President Carlos Salinas believes in free trade. He has slashed tariff rates for some goods from 100% to 10%. One result: Our exports to Mexico have increased 130% in the past 4 years. This export boom has created more than 300,000 new jobs in the United States. And each additional billion dollars in exports creates 20,000 new jobs here in the United States. Now, I don't have to tell anyone in this room about Mexico's market potential--85 million consumers who want to buy our goods. Nor do I have to tell you that as Mexico grows and prospers, it will need even more of the goods we're best at producing--computers, manufacturing equipment, high-tech and high-value products. Unfortunately, we have a tough fight ahead of us. Some members of Congress are concerned about the potential impact that any agreement may have on American jobs, American companies, and American exports. Other members of Congress say they worry about wage rates, environmental quality, and health and safety issues. I believe concern about those very same issues is the strongest argument for supporting fast track. Let's talk about those concerns. We've already seen what the reduction in Mexican tariffs has done for American exports. A free trade agreement would eliminate the remaining tariffs entirely. That would stimulate exports, create new jobs, generate wealth and hope on both sides of the border. Let's take a look at the impact on American companies. When trade barriers vanish, goods flow freely across borders. And everybody--businessmen and workers, farmers and consumers-- reaps the benefits of growth. Consider the environment: The North American Free Trade Agreement fits into a winning strategy for improving environmental quality. Opponents of fast track and the trade pacts forget that prosperity offers the surest road to worker safety, public health, and environmental quality. This Administration wants to ensure that Mexican economic growth goes hand-in-hand with environmental protection. Our Environmental Protection Agency is already assisting the Salinas government with its environmental programs. President Salinas has shown he's serious about cleaning up the environment by requiring all new cars to have catalytic converters and, recently, by shutting down Mexico's largest oil refinery because it was polluting the air. I believe that President Salinas cares deeply about his nation and its people and that he means business when he says he wants to clean up Mexico's air and water. Finally, consider the matter of working conditions in Mexico. As our trade with Mexico has grown, so have the wages of Mexican workers. Indeed, Mexican wages have risen very quickly in recent years, with no tangible impact on American pay scales. That being the case, someone ought to ask the opponents of fast track why they oppose prosperity in Mexico. Someone should ask why they oppose letting our neighbors enjoy the benefits of progress. Ask them what is wrong with increased productivity throughout the continent. And ask them what's wrong with a more stable Mexico. A free trade pact would encourage investment, create jobs, lift wages, and give talented Mexican citizens opportunities they don't enjoy today. A stronger Mexico, in turn, means a stronger United States and a stronger North American alliance. So you see, we have much to gain from extending fast track--a new era of open, free, and fair trade--a future of unprecedented economic growth and regional harmony. As with most good things in life, competition involves risk. But we always have been a nation of risk-takers, adventurers. Our forefathers transformed a rough wilderness into an industrial superpower. We have created technologies and products unlike any others produced in human history. We have placed the wisdom of the ages within reach of anyone who can operate a computer. The vote on fast track really is a vote on what kind of America we want to build. A "yes" vote expresses confidence in American know-how and ingenuity. It says we believe in ourselves. Indeed, as we prepare to join a world linked primarily by economic, not military, competition, we have nothing to fear but the fear-mongers themselves. They seem to be the only ones who haven't learned lately that defeatism produces defeat, while confidence and self-reliance produce greatness. We must seize the opportunities that the new world economy offers us. With your help, I know we will. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991 Title:

North American Free Trade Agreement; Extending Fast- Track Negotiating Authority

Zoellick Source: Robert B. Zoellick, Counselor of the Department Description: Prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Apr 11, 19914/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: Mexico, United States, Canada Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics, Environment, Immigration, Narcotics [TEXT] I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the importance of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the continuation of fast-track negotiating authority. Some have asked whether the North American Free Trade Agreement, particularly our negotiation of a free trade agreement with Mexico, is motivated by foreign or by economic policy interests. My answer is yes and yes. Indeed, if the free trade agreement were solely in our foreign policy interest, we would not recommend it. Economic policy is and must become an increasingly critical component of the United States' foreign policy strategy. And that is why this free trade agreement is so important. It is a rare strategic opportunity to secure, strengthen, and develop our continental base economically and politically in a way that will promote America's foreign policy agenda, our economic strength and leadership, and US global influence. Our ability to seize this historic moment depends on the Congress' willingness to maintain the special executive- congressional partnership on trade negotiations established 57 years ago in the wake of the Smoot-Hawley protectionist debacle. If the Congress now decides to reverse course, to abandon the strategy that Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Congress first set through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, the United States will no longer be able to exert international economic leadership. There should be no mistake--the stakes are that high. I have organized my statement as follows: -- The foreign policy benefits of the North American Free Trade Agreement; -- The economic significance, including general economic benefits, jobs, and labor standards; -- Environmental initiatives; and -- The need for the continuation of fast-track trade negotiating authority.
FOREIGN POLICY BENEFITS
There are five reasons why the North American Free Trade Agreement is definitely in the foreign policy interest of the United States.
First
, it will provide a unique opportunity to achieve a historic reconciliation with our two bordering neighbors.
Second
, it will give economic and political impetus to our current efforts to address a range of pressing North American problems.
Third
, it will help forge a US-Mexican partnership that could lead to closer cooperation on other foreign policy issues.
Fourth
, it will send an encouraging signal throughout all of Latin America.
Fifth
, it will strengthen the hand of US foreign economic policy. First, we are at the threshold of a unique opportunity to achieve a historic reconciliation with our two bordering neighbors. The word historic is often overused, but I do not employ it lightly. This generation of political leaders--all of you--has the opportunity to fulfill a lost promise of America's revolutionary generation. Our revolution won more than our independence; it was viewed at the time as a practical experiment emanating from the Age of Reason, the Spirit of Enlightenment. That's why Robert Middlekauff called it the "Glorious Cause"; that's how James McPherson has recently explained Lincoln viewed it and was moved by it. Our experiment inspired others, inspired the causes of Bolivar and San Martin. But while the revolutions against Spanish colonial authority in Latin America were victorious on the field of battle, their hopes were not fulfilled. Indeed, a traveler to Washington, DC, today will see the special place accorded statues of Latin American liberators--not European, not Asian--among the capital's memorials to our American heroes; mute statements of a dream not yet realized. The United States' hemispheric relations, starting at our Latin border with Mexico, were marked by disappointments and conflicts on both sides. A significant strain of Mexico's nationalism reflected anxiety and distrust of its large neighbor to the north. Mexicans remember that they lost about one-half of their new nation to the United States in the wars of the 19th century. As recently as the first two decades of this century, an American President, Woodrow Wilson, ordered major military incursions into Veracruz and northern Mexico. Mexican wariness contributed to policies that further eroded our relations. Mexico nationalized American investments. It retreated behind policies of economic autarky. But the original vision still survived, preserved by leaders with imagination on both sides of the border, people who understood the importance of US-Mexican relations. In the 1860s, during our Civil War, President Lincoln supported President Juarez in his struggle against French installation of an emperor in Mexico. In 1933, shortly after assuming office, FDR rose above preoccupation with the economy at home to chart a new course with Mexico: He called it the Good Neighbor Policy. He dismissed the special interests who argued that Mexico was "different" and not ready for such a special relationship. Almost 30 years later, in 1961, another new President, John F. Kennedy, called for an Alliance for Progress with Latin America. You, Mr. Chairman, like many other Americans, answered that call to reach out to our hemispheric neighbors, to rise above those who lament about what we cannot do, saying the Latins are poorer--or "different." Now, another 30 years later, we have the opportunity to sustain and invigorate that vision. After 200 years, history is coming full circle. This generation, on both sides of the border, has the opportunity to integrate North America in a way that will build a foundation for stronger cooperation, cohesion, and growth. The American people may take for granted our geopolitical good fortune. Unlike much of the rest of the world, our land borders with our neighbors, extending over 7,500 miles, are marked by the absence of military threat. But the challenges of the 21st century will be of economics, environment, narcotics, migration, as well as military. The security of our citizens will encompass this broader set of challenges. So we need to complete the North American reconciliation in a way that strengthens our ability to handle these challenges cooperatively. The North American Free Trade Agreement can be the cornerstone of this structure. The second foreign policy benefit is related to the first: The FTA [free trade agreement] will give important economic and political impetus to our current efforts to address a range of pressing North American problems. Unfortunately, some critics of the FTA disregard the intense efforts already begun by Mexico and the United States to address our sweeping agenda. To pull these multiple efforts together, to relate them to one another, the Bush and Salinas Administrations have reinvigorated the Binational Commission (BNC) that brings together many of the cabinet members of our two nations in regular working meetings. It may be a surprise to some that these meetings involve so many different agencies: State; Treasury, including Customs; Justice, including the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service], and DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration]; Agriculture; Commerce; USTR [US Trade Representative]; Education; EPA [Environmental Protection Agency]; and USIA [United States Information Agency]. And now our labor ministers will join us. The BNC convenes the senior-most officials of both nations to review our ongoing agenda in an integrated fashion. We also have begun a similar meeting of sub-ministerial officials to keep the momentum up between the annual BNC meetings. Then the respective agencies proceed on their work programs together throughout the course of the year. A staggering array of working groups and projects gives substance to this process, evidence that both sides recognize our common interest in addressing both traditional problems and the new challenges of the transnational agenda. An FTA would generate economic growth that would help both countries deal with the many other issues on our binational agenda. It would eliminate or reduce the economic barriers between the United States and Mexico that create inefficiencies and higher costs. A rejection of Mexico's request for an FTA, on the other hand, will be seen as a rebuff to the Mexican political leaders and people who have sought to reorient their country toward North America. The United States would be trying to isolate itself from its neighbors, something it cannot, in fact, do. We would do irreparable harm to our ability to work together, with mutual respect, on the numerous issues--migration, narcotics, environment, and others-- that do not recognize borders. We would repeat mistakes of the past. We would fail to answer the call for leadership. The third foreign policy benefit of the FTA is that it would help forge a US-Mexican partnership that could lead to closer cooperation on other foreign policy issues. It is no secret that the legacy of the past has been one of US and Mexican foreign policy outlooks that have frequently been at odds. But in recent years, as we have begun to work together more closely on our economic and transnational agenda, we have also begun to move closer on foreign policy issues. Let me give you just a few examples. Mexico and the United States--for years at odds over Central America--have worked together over the last 2 years to end the conflicts in Central America and to secure a new peace based on liberty, free markets, and regional integration. Mexico has joined with the United States and others to provide President Chamorro an extremely generous renegotiation of Nicaragua's oil debt, making possible renewed access to Mexican oil on concessionary terms. Mexico is working as one of the "friends" of the UN Secretary General to end the long conflict between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front]. Mexico has joined with the United States and other Latins, Europeans, and the Japanese to develop a multilateral Partnership for Democracy and Development in Central America, an idea similar to that recommended by the Sanford Commission. Together, we are encouraging a new generation of Central American leaders to support one another in their common effort to end bloodshed and spur economic growth. Nor do we only see Mexico's increasing cooperation in this hemisphere. In August of last year, immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Mexican government announced that it would increase oil production capacity by 100,000 barrels a day, despite capacity restraints, to demonstrate its solidarity. Fourth, including Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement will send a strong encouraging signal throughout all of Latin America. A new cadre of leaders throughout the hemisphere is struggling to transform our region into one pledged to democracy, market economics, and growth. These men and women are taking a totally new attitude toward the United States. They reject the excuses of "dependency theory." But the process of progress is still fragile; tremendous barriers must still be overcome. The governments of Latin America, and even more important, the people of Latin America, are trusting that the people of the United States will continue to stand for the ideals that we have espoused for so long. They know that the tasks of reform are theirs to perform--but they also know that their prospects for success depend on the willingness of the United States to preserve and promote international systems based on the free flow of capital, trade, and ideas. If there is to be a New World Order that unites security and economic policies, certainly these must be our objectives. But the Latins are troubled by the new echoes of the old nay- sayers in the United States who grumble that Latin America is in some way "different," or even a threat. In sum, this Administration cannot promote the same vision that Lincoln and FDR and JFK acted on, if this Congress abandons America's faith in bettering itself--and others. Fifth, this North American Free Trade Agreement would strengthen the hand of the United States' foreign economic policy. The United States is the only nation in the world today that ranks at the top of the scales of political, military, and economic power. We have just once again demonstrated our political and military leadership. But it is also important that we remain in the forefront of international economic policy. This agreement would be a key component of a network of global, regional, and bilateral arrangements that promote American interests. It can strengthen the capabilities of North America, enhancing our ability to compete globally. Attention to the challenges of regionalism is definitely not the same as the promotion of regional blocs. The United States, Mexico, and Canada intend to be outward-looking, promoting liberalization of trade and capital flows in our own hemisphere as a step in promoting them globally. The signal the United States wants to send the world is that we are committed to opening markets and that we will extend a hand to others who share that commitment. By doing so, we hope to build support globally for ongoing efforts through the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. We want to support the efforts of Mexico, and then the rest of Latin America, to leave the illogic of "dependency theory" and economic autarky behind. The new market-oriented leaders of Latin America want to do business with Asia and Europe as well as with North America. It is in our interest to support their transition to the global marketplace. Indeed, Mexico has already demonstrated the benefits of this approach. Since Mexico joined the GATT in 1986, it has become an important advocate of multilateral liberalization. The old, sterile chants about "Northern" domination of the "South" have given way to a new debate. Mexico has opened up its markets and intends to open them more. The Mexicans want trade, not aid. The United States should be leading this new movement in the realm of political economy.
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
General Economic Benefits
The North American Free Trade Agreement would create the largest market in the world: 360 million consumers with a total output of $6 trillion. The agreement would eliminate economic barriers and inefficiencies with our first and third largest trading partners. In 1990, our three-way trade amounted to $236 billion. The independent International Trade Commission (ITC), in a 1991 study requested by Chairmen Bentsen and Rostenkowski, found that this FTA would benefit the US economy by "expanding trade opportunities, lowering prices, increasing competition, and improving the ability of US firms to exploit economies of scale." The study stated that "[t]otal real income in the United States would increase because of the trade creating effects of the FTA." The ITC went on to explain: "Real income for US skilled workers and capital service owners is expected to rise." And after the release of this report, the ITC has even concluded that unskilled workers will also probably enjoy a slight increase in real income (although the effect is so small as to be indiscernible). The FTA is likely to increase sales opportunities for US firms, improve their operating efficiency, and spur growth in Mexico and Canada. This growth multiplies benefits for the United States. For each dollar of growth in Mexico, about 15% is spent on US goods. As Mexico grows more, it will import more. Seventy cents of each Mexican import dollar is spent on goods from the United States. This is an important point, often overlooked by critics: Trade is not a "you-win, I-lose" proposition. By generating growth, trade multiplies the purchasing power of our trading partners. The United States gets a special benefit from these dynamic "multiplier" effects because the United States supplies such a large portion of our neighbors' imports. Of course, Mexico's economy is relatively small compared to that of the United States. Its GNP, approximately $225 billion, is about the same as Florida's. Because Mexico's economy is only about 1/25th the size of the US economy and its exports only amount to about 6% of US imports, the scare stories of mass dislocations from reducing barriers simply are not credible. Moreover, the factual record since 1986, when Mexico began a major opening of its economy, tells a very encouraging story. US exports to Mexico have increased from $12.4 to $28.4 billion. Of this total, US manufacturing exports increased from $10.4 to $24 billion, almost twice the rate of our overall growth in manufacturing exports during this period. Capital goods exports increased from $4.6 to $9.1 billion. Consumer goods exports tripled from $1 to $3 billion. Exports of corn tripled. Exports of autos and autoparts doubled. Exports of telecommunications equipment doubled. Our trade deficit shrank from $4.9 billion in 1986 to $1.8 billion in 1990; if one excludes petroleum imports, the United States would have a $2.7 billion surplus with Mexico. I will take just a moment to cite some sectors of special concern to the United States in recent years. (Even a recent favorable editorial in The New York Times opined that the FTA would lead to layoffs of steel and textile workers when the evidence suggests the opposite may be the case.) -- In 1990, steel exports to Mexico amounted to about $500 million, about 18% of total US steel exports. And our exports were about 75% higher than our imports from Mexico, a sharp shift from our deficit of 4 years ago. Indeed, our steel sector has been in surplus with Mexico for a number of years. So it should not be a surprise that the American Iron and Steel Institute, representing about 80% of US steel production capacity, supports the FTA with Mexico. -- The US textile, fiber, and apparel industry, with nearly $1 billion of exports to Mexico in 1990, has been in slight surplus with Mexico for the past couple of years. Indeed, US textile and apparel exports to Mexico have increased at an average annual rate of 25% since 1986. This industry may offer an opportunity for complementary production that will benefit both nations, strengthening our ability to compete globally. -- Our agricultural exports to Mexico have grown over 130% since 1986, from $1.1 to $2.5 billion. Mexico was our third largest agricultural customer in 1989; we supply about 80% of its agricultural imports. (Indeed, Mexico accounted for 20%-50% of our world-wide dairy sales between 1986 and 1989.) As the ITC study reported, the overall benefits for the US economy will be positive. Moreover, the potential benefits for the future, as our three economies improve their integration and efficiency, should be striking. Of course, some US sectors will face increased competition, so the trade agreement needs to be structured to ease the transition. The United States has much to gain because our economy is already relatively open. Right now Mexico has relatively good access to our economy; an FTA will help us secure reciprocal access to Mexico's economy. To take just one example, our already sizable agricultural exports to Mexico are still less than they could be because restrictive Mexican import licenses still apply to about 40% of the value of US agricultural exports. The overall effect of Mexican tariffs and non-tariff barriers has been estimated to result in effective protection for Mexican producers of grains and oilseeds of at least 30%-35%. Finally, in deciding whether to proceed with an FTA with Mexico, I think it is a serious miscalculation to assume that the alternative is Mexican barriers as they exist today. Those lower barriers are a recent phenomenon, a 4-year-long policy shift by Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas away from the historical Mexican reliance on high protectionism and economic autarky. At the end of 1985, Mexican tariffs ranged up to 100%, the average tariff was about 30%, and licenses for imports protected 47% of domestic output (down from 92% earlier in the year); today Mexico's maximum tariff is 20%, its average trade-weighted tariff is about 10%, and many more licensing restrictions have been removed. If the United States sends a signal to the Mexican people that we intend to reject this historic opening, I could easily see a return to the old ways. This is a rare window of opportunity. The choice faced by the Congress is either yes or no--this decision cannot be put off without risking all that has occurred and all we might build. Politics and economics are dynamic, not static, systems. There are political forces in Mexico, as in the United States, that are afraid of competition. In Mexico, these forces usually are strongly associated with antipathy to the United States. Our rejection would fuel their animosity for decades. If we explain that the United States cannot proceed now because Mexico is still "different," we will give these negative protectionists the upper hand. Therefore, I believe an FTA would not only further reduce higher Mexican barriers and create growth that will benefit the United States and Mexico, but it would also help secure significant unilateral reductions and openings already made by the Mexicans.
An FTA Will Create Jobs
One of the most frequent assertions made by opponents of the FTA is that it will lead to job flight from the United States. This argument just does not stand up to scrutiny. But since the claim is repeated so frequently, I think it is worth noting in some detail six reasons why people concerned about good jobs at good wages should support the FTA.
One
, jobs don't flee to places just because wages are lower. If they did, I imagine Haiti--which already has the benefit of duty-free entry into the United States under the CBI [Caribbean Basin Initiative]--would be the manufacturing center of the world. In fact, firms' decisions on locations of investments and their ability to pay higher wages depend significantly on the productivity of the labor force. Productivity, in turn, depends on the education, skills, capital, technology, management, and overall infrastructure (including financial and communication systems) that can be brought to bear. We have two good experiments to substantiate my point. In 1982, the AFL-CIO fiercely resisted the extension of trade preferences to over 20 Caribbean Basin nations. Indeed, the AFL- CIO used many of the same arguments that it is using against Mexico. Let's examine the prophecy and the reality. In 1982, Mr. Stephen Koplan, the Legislative Representative of the AFL-CIO, testified before the House Ways and Means Committee that: "The CBI incentives will only serve to further weaken the US industrial base by encouraging new runaways by US industries to the Caribbean region, result in a quickening of lost US jobs--skilled as well as unskilled. . . ." He went on to forecast that if the CBI bill were adopted, "a flood of imports world-wide" would be funneled through the CBI countries. So what actually happened after the CBI was enacted? Our trade balance with the CBI nations soared from a deficit of over $200 million in 1986 to a surplus of $1.8 billion in 1990. We enjoy surpluses with 20 of the 24 CBI nations. These gains were driven by an increase in US exports from $5.6 to $9.3 billion, an average annual rate of increase of 12.1%. (Imports grew from $6.1 to $7.5 billion, a 5.3% annual rate.) Therefore, our export increase was more than double the rate of the import increase. And during this period, the US economy added over 8 million jobs. Puerto Rico offers another test case. Despite an average industrial wage of $6.19 per hour, significant tax advantages, and free trade access to the 50 states, we have not seen a massive flight of jobs and investment to Puerto Rico.
Two
, the logic of the job-loss argument is severely undercut by the fact that the United States is relatively open to Mexican imports now--yet we have not seen the flight of jobs and investment. The average trade-weighted US tariff for Mexican goods is about 3%-4% and about 45% of Mexico's goods already enter the United States duty free. In contrast, the average Mexican trade-weighted tariff is about 10%, and Mexico still applies quotas, licenses, performance requirements, and other restrictions that limit many US exports. As long as our market is already relatively open, certainly it makes sense to lower the higher Mexican barriers so as to increase opportunities for US firms to export.
Three
, the job-loss claimants make the mistaken assumption that trade liberalization is a zero-sum exchange, in which the benefit for one side must involve a loss for the other. In fact, the history of the post-World War II era provides ample evidence that trade liberalization creates a dynamic that produces jobs and higher incomes for all parties. Indeed, as I mentioned above, Mexican growth has an especially high payback for the United States because 70% of every Mexican import dollar are spent in the United States, and 15% of each dollar of Mexican income growth flow back to the United States. (A one percentage point increase in Mexico's growth rate means an additional $300 million of US exports.)
Four
, the reduction of barriers on both sides of the border will spur economic integration that should make US firms more competitive globally. Japanese firms increase their competitiveness and keep high-paying jobs by sourcing components in Asia. EC [European Community] firms are doing the same with inputs from southern Europe. A North American Free Trade Agreement is likely to channel any additional shifts of lower wage, low value-added, often assembly jobs to locations in Mexico that would be integrated with higher wage US manufacturing operations. If these jobs leave the continent, they are likely to end up in locations that feed into Japanese or other nations' high wage manufacturing operations. By increasing efficiency and lowering the cost of inputs, higher value and higher wage US manufacturing operations are likely to be better positioned to take on competition from Europe and Asia. The 1991 ITC study expected the FTA to increase real income for all US workers. Indeed, a 1988 survey by the ITC found that the vast majority of responses from 323 US firms stated that their Mexican assembly operations increased the competitiveness of their US production. More than 100,000 jobs have been created on the US side of the border to support the Maquiladora facilities.
Five
, while the reduction of remaining US barriers to competition would require adjustment by US firms and workers, it is important not to overstate the scope of these changes. Since Mexico's economy is about 4% the size of ours, it is not likely to overwhelm us. In addition, I would expect that this agreement, like our current agreement with Canada, will involve a long transition period. (The Canadian FTA involves a 10-year transition and some "snapback" protections that extend 20 years.) The agreement could include safeguards that ease the transition if the import flows become too disruptive. Moreover, to place this adjustment in context, it is useful to recall that about 10% of the US labor force changes jobs annually (90% of them voluntarily); clearly, a lengthy transition period, plus safeguards, should ease the process. We also need to be frank about the alternative. If Mexicans cannot find work at home, they will keep trying to come to the United States (as did many of our ancestors). Job changes can also be expedited and eased through the financial assistance of the EDWAA [Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act] program. EDWAA is a flexible, comprehensive program that Congress created in 1988 with broad bipartisan and Administration support. During its first 3 years, EDWAA will serve approximately 700,000 workers in industries including auto, timber, electronics, copper, food processing, aerospace, defense, and steel. EDWAA's concentration on job training and placement has produced a much higher record of success (66% placement rate at an average wage of $7.50 per hour) than earlier programs. Based on its successful record, the Administration and the Congress have increased its funding for program year 1991 to $527 million, up from $284 million in 1989.
Six
, the bottom-line analysis is that the FTA will increase jobs for the United States. An outside study prepared for the Department of Labor found that the FTA will help the United States add between 44,500 jobs over 5 years and 64,000 jobs over 10 years, the bulk of them in manufacturing. Frankly, other analysts are probably more bullish. Professor Dornbusch of MIT has testified that he expects that each additional billion dollars of merchandise exports will create approximately 20,000-30,000 jobs; he recently told a congressional forum that an FTA could create 150,000 new US jobs over 3-4 years. Any way you look at it--the evidence from experience, the facts about whose market is already open, trade theory, US competitiveness, adjustment history, or labor market analysis--the arguments about job loss just do not stand up to scrutiny. In addition to all the other benefits, the FTA will be good for American workers. The FTA will help us keep and create good jobs at good wages.
Mexican Labor Standards
Some have asked about the effect of Mexican labor standards on a North American Free Trade Agreement. One strand of this concern is that we will lose jobs because firms will relocate in Mexico because of the labor standards. But as I have demonstrated above, the FTA should produce jobs for the United States. A second strand of the labor standards argument is that an FTA would in some way do a disservice to the Mexicans whose working conditions are not as good as those enjoyed by US workers. But an FTA will, in fact, help Mexican workers by creating more jobs and increasing Mexican wages. As it turns out, the legal bases for Mexico's labor standards are, for the most part, comparable to those in the United States, Europe, and other industrialized countries. The problem is that Mexico, a much poorer country than the United States and other industrialized countries, cannot offer as good a material life to its workers. The per capita income in the United States is $21,700; in Mexico it is less than $3,000. So it is not surprising that the compensation benefits of Mexican workers, even with a respectable system in law, are not going to be as great as those in the United States. The fact that the appropriate battery of legal protections is present, however, suggests that the best method of filling in the economic benefits is to help the Mexican economy to grow. With growth will come more resources for enforcement. And as more jobs are created, and unemployment falls, Mexican workers would be in a better position to negotiate better wages and working conditions. The Mexican constitution guarantees workers the right to form unions of their own choosing and protects workers against anti-union discrimination. Mexican unions may freely form federations and belong to international associations. They have the right to strike. Indeed, approximately 30% of the Mexican labor force is unionized, as compared to about 16% in the United States. The Mexican constitution provides for a minimum daily wage, set by a tripartite body with labor and government representation and adjusted by region. Mexico's child labor laws require children to be 14 years old to work, and the work is limited to a maximum of 6 hours a day until they are 16 years old. In some areas, Mexican labor laws exceed US standards. The Mexican social security system, for example, provides medical and maternity care, pensions, and payment for temporary and permanent disability. This system serves as a guarantor of minimum benefits and protection for all wage earners, leaving management and trade unions to bargain about possible supplemental benefits. Mexico has detailed and comprehensive occupational safety and health regulations. Most firms are required to set up plant- level health and safety monitoring bodies. Mexico has ratified 79 International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions dealing with worker health and safety standards, including many that the United States has not. The Mexican procedures for enforcing health and safety standards tend to rely on tripartite commissions at the workplace involving labor, management, and the government. The practice is to resolve differences through negotiations, as opposed to sanctions or plant closures. Of course, a number of workers, especially those in small firms, do not get the benefit of this system. In addition, the Mexicans recognize the need to improve enforcement practices. The key question, however, is whether one believes that the enforcement of rules will improve and that negotiated economic benefits will likely be greater if we encourage Mexican growth and development through the FTA. The "labor standards protectionists" rely on Catch-22 logic: They believe we cannot have an FTA with Mexico until the Mexicans become as prosperous as we are, even though the FTA is a key means for Mexicans to achieve greater prosperity. I just do not see how we will be helping the Mexican worker by making it harder for him or her to export goods to the United States. And if the Mexican worker is impeded from exporting his or her product to the United States, we should not be surprised to find that he or she may seek to come to the United States to produce goods here. It is strongly in our national interest to have a growing, prosperous Mexico that can produce jobs, higher incomes, and better working and living standards for its people. Finally, to support the Mexican government's efforts to improve the conditions of working people in Mexico, we have agreed to begin a new dialogue on labor issues between the US Department of Labor and the Mexican Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare. We will provide additional details in the near future.
ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES
Mexico and the United States agree that our efforts to increase growth and prosperity through economic integration and the elimination of barriers need to be complemented by a cooperative effort to enhance environmental protection. We know that sustainable economic development and environmental safeguards need to be mutually supportive. Indeed, the Salinas Administration has made significant strides in recent years to orient environmental policies, as well as economic policies, toward the standards set by the United States and other developed nations. President Salinas has made clear that Mexico is taking these steps because it recognizes they are in its own interest, not because we and other developed nations require them as an "entry ticket" to the club of developed nations. Indeed, without underestimating the tasks it faces, Mexico could become a model for nations that believe economic growth and protection of the environment are complements, not alternatives. Nevertheless, in evaluating Mexico's commitment to the environment, we also cannot ignore the relation between economic prosperity and the ability to devote resources to environmental protection. Mexico has about one-third the population of the United States, but only 1/25th of our economic resources. Our task, then, is twofold: (1) to build on the program of environmental cooperation that we have already begun so as to strengthen our future efforts and (2) to negotiate an FTA that will help Mexico grow and give it new resources to fulfill its environmental goals. Mexico took a major step toward environmental protection in 1988 through enactment of its General Law for Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection. Much of this statute is based on US law and experience. The law covers air, water, and soil pollution; contamination by hazardous materials and waste; pesticides and toxic substances; the conservation of ecosystems; ecology reserves; and the rational use of natural resources. A central element of the 1988 law is the requirement of environmental impact assessments for all new investment projects in both the public and private sectors. The law also establishes administrative sanctions and criminal penalties for non- compliance. The Salinas Administration recognizes that laws on the books will not be effective unless they are backed by proper enforcement. So the Mexican government is acting to remedy its past problem of inadequate enforcement. It sent a strong signal when it temporarily imposed some 980 industrial closures for non-compliance. The budget of SEDUE, Mexico's environmental agency, increased almost eightfold between 1989 and 1991 (from $5 to $39 million); a large part of this increase will go to develop regulations and enhance enforcement. Mexico is also turning to international sources to expand its environmental resources. Mexico is negotiating an $84 million loan from the World Bank that will be used in large part to enhance industrial inspection. In anticipation of this loan, SEDUE recently announced the commitment of Mexican counterpart funds to create 50 new inspector positions for Mexico City and 50 more for the US- Mexican border. SEDUE is also working with Mexican industry to encourage compliance with the new law. It will begin by negotiating new compliance agreements. For example, SEDUE has reached agreement with the Maquiladora Association to encourage compliance efforts by its members. To back up the cooperative approach, SEDUE is also creating an Office of Environmental Inspection for Industry to oversee, control, and impose punitive sanctions on industries violating environmental standards. To give you a fuller sense of the Mexican and US-Mexican efforts underway in the environmental area, I would like to review briefly three topics: Mexico City air pollution; the border environment; and conservation cooperation.
Mexico City Air Pollution
President Salinas has demonstrated a strong personal commitment to cleaning up Mexico City's air. President Salinas once explained to President Bush that when the children of Mexico City were asked to draw pictures of the sky, they used hues of gray, not of blue; there were no pictures of bright suns. He wanted to be the president, President Salinas continued, who made the skies of Mexico City blue again for the school children. In 1990, Mexico instituted interim plans to cut traffic and industrial activities in Mexico City during periods of serious air pollution. Then Mexico made the multi-billion dollar decisions to phase out leaded gasoline and to order that all new cars, including over 40,000 city taxis, be equipped with catalytic converters. The government has also shut down all 24 military industrial installations in the Mexico City area because of potential environmental risks. Just this month, President Salinas demonstrated dramatically the depth of his commitment by shutting down permanently Mexico's largest oil refinery. This one facility accounted for 8% of Mexico's distillation capacity; without it, Mexico will even have to import certain refined products. This move is estimated to cost Mexico about $500 million and up to 5,000 jobs. These are deeds, not just words. We should be helping Mexico to acquire the wealth to continue the job, not slighting Mexico as "different" just because it is still too poor to meet our standards. To support these Mexico City efforts, the United States entered into an agreement in 1989 to provide technical support. Together, we have developed training and technical assistance programs to deal with the problems of air and water pollution, hazardous waste, and environmental health. This EPA program has been supplemented by a US Department of Energy agreement with the Mexican Petroleum Institute to prepare a multi-million dollar computer model study of Mexico City's air pollution. We have been working with Mexico and the Inter-American Development Bank to put together a debt-for-nature swap to fund reforestation efforts around Mexico City.
Border Environment
The border environment offers a second challenge for our two nations. Our initial efforts have been built on programs of the 100- year-old International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). Today the IBWC focuses heavily on cross-border water pollution issues, coordinating with EPA and SEDUE on a number of important projects. For example, the IBWC is currently constructing major sewage collection and treatment systems, at an estimated cost of over $234 million, at Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana/San Diego, and Nogales. In 1983, Mexico and the United States established a new framework for cooperation on border environmental pollution, supplementing the IBWC by tackling a broader range of pollution problems. Under this framework, EPA and SEDUE established and oversee work programs under five annexes on air and water pollution, hazardous waste, and accidental spills. In November 1990, Presidents Bush and Salinas decided to meet the challenge of more rapid economic integration by developing a comprehensive long-term plan to clean up the border environment. This cooperative plan will parallel and complement the FTA. (The transition period for our US-Canadian agreement was 10 years.) Based on an evaluation of progress under the 1983 agreement, this new plan will address problems of air and water pollution, hazardous wastes, chemical spills, pesticides, and enforcement. We hope to develop this new plan with the Mexicans by the end of this year, before we complete negotiations on the FTA. And we intend to involve nongovernmental organizations and the public in the development and implementation of this plan. Therefore, the United States and Mexico plan to complete two parallel, mutually supportive long-term agreements--one on trade and the other on environment--looking toward our cooperative transition into the 21st century. Both countries also will look for ways to involve multilateral support for our bilateral efforts. For example, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), in close cooperation with the US Public Health Service and the Mexican Ministry of Health, is now developing a plan to assess priority public health problems along the border. Among these are environmental health issues related to air pollution, water pollution, and hazardous waste.
Conservation Cooperation
A third example of US-Mexican cooperation is the area of conservation. We have been partners in conservation since 1936. And we want to accomplish even more on this topic in the future. In the area of wildlife and parks, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, the Forest Service, and the National Park Service each have developed cooperative agreements with their Mexican counterparts. For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service is currently pursuing nearly 100 projects with SEDUE--ranging from conservation and management of migratory bird habitats, to protecting endangered species such as the jaguar, to research on tropical birds. The Salinas Administration is well aware that Mexico has a unique wealth of species that it needs to preserve. Mexico's extensive domestic wildlife conservation programs include the establishment of 44 national parks, 8 reserves, and 14 biosphere reserves. The US National Park Service's cooperative arrangements with SEDUE include eight joint projects, for example, studies of the black bear and peregrine falcon and firefighter training. Moreover, Mexico has announced that it intends to join CITES, an international convention for the protection of endangered species. In the area of tropical forest protection, the US Forest Service and USAID [US Agency for International Development] have developed a cooperative program with the Mexican government for sustainable forest management. Cooperative work under the auspices of the North American Forest Commission already involves the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Joint projects include, for example, cooperative research on insects and pest control, protecting migratory bird habitats, and remote sensing inventories of Mexico's forests. In the area of marine resources, the United States and Mexico are working together in multilateral forums to place stringent restrictions on waste generated from ships in the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, we are cooperating on programs to reduce the deaths of dolphins and sea turtles. While not yet at our level, Mexico has reduced by 58% the number of dolphins killed per net deployed between 1986 and 1989. Last year, President Salinas announced that Mexico would end its commercial harvest of endangered sea turtles and employ methods to protect sea turtles in its fisheries. The above description offers you just a brief sampling of the intensive efforts by Mexico, and by Mexico and the United States acting together, to develop a broad-based program of environmental protection. Both Mexico and the United States intend to do more in the future--to address problems and opportunities that respect no borders. I believe all of us want to do more to improve environmental conditions in Mexico. Economic growth is the essential ingredient in helping us to do so. So I have been deeply disappointed by the statements of some who seem willing to sacrifice the FTA and US support for increased growth in Mexico to make their unilateral point. If they kill the FTA, the price of their actions will be paid by poor people in Mexico. It will be paid in the form of a degraded, not improved, environment in Mexico. And it will also hurt the cause of environmentalists who want to blend growth and environmental protection through sustainable development. The word will race throughout Latin America that some North America environmentalists act like latter-day colonialists; they offer a new justification for keeping the Latins down. For in the final analysis, I would hope people will answer this question honestly: Do you really believe killing the FTA will improve Mexico's efforts to clean up the environment? The answer must be no. First, it is a practical fact of life that the Salinas Administration's innovative efforts to improve the environment are far less likely to win popular support if the Mexican people are struggling to find jobs or eking out a minimal existence. The economic growth associated with the free trade agreement will strengthen the government's efforts to upgrade environmental safeguards. Second, the rejection of an FTA on environmental grounds will lend great support to those in Mexico who argue that the United States and other developed nations are only pressing environmental topics so as to perpetuate the developing world's dependency. The Salinas Administration has rejected this excuse; instead, it is seeking to demonstrate that Mexico's sustainable economic development depends on prudent use of resources and attention to Mexico's national natural heritage. It is in our interest that the Salinas Administration succeed. Third, our joint efforts with Mexico on environment and conservation questions have been based on a spirit of cooperation, reciprocity, and respect. We have avoided self-defeating actions that might appear to Mexicans like the hectoring commands of gringos who have in the past inserted themselves into Mexican sovereignty and decision-making. It would be a great mistake, I believe, to replace our increasingly successful approach with Yankee environmental mandates that establish a new admission price for economic cooperation. Such a demand will have the opposite effect from what we hope. The Mexican people, who today want to clean up their own environment because they recognize it is in their own interest, will resent environmental dictates that they may perceive as an insult to their own commitment and as a new form of eco-protectionism. In sum, I hope this committee shares my vision of a new and strengthened US-Mexican relationship, founded on the FTA and economic integration but also extended to address a whole series of transnational problems, including the environment, that neighboring states will have to face together in the 21st century.
NEED FOR THE CONTINUATION OF FAST-TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY
My testimony has focused on the benefits to the United States of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Yet the issue facing the Senate right now is whether to vote for a resolution that would deal a death blow to the so-called fast-track authority that enables us to negotiate trade agreements. As the committee knows, either body of Congress can stop us dead in our tracks by passing a resolution prior to June 1 that yanks this authority. I would like to close by giving five reasons why the Senate should reject any move to end the fast-track negotiating authority. First, as Chairman Bentsen has pointed out, a rejection of the fast-track process would be a historic shift away from a partnership between the Congress and the executive on trade negotiations dating back to 1934. As you know, for the first 140 years of US history, general tariff bills were one of Congress' major items of business. The high watermark (or low watermark, depending on your point of view) of this process was the infamous Smoot-Hawley bill, the Tariff Act of 1930, the last general tariff law enacted by Congress. Smoot-Hawley made trade policy through "log rolling" of special interests, with no appreciation of the overall result. This bill amended tariff schedules for more than 20,000 items, establishing the nation's highest tariff structure. The protectionist disaster of Smoot-Hawley, for the United States and the world, led President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull to press a new approach shortly after assuming office. The new congressional-executive partnership took the form of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Under this act, Congress authorized the President to negotiate and implement substantial tariff reductions (of up to 50%) and most-favored- nation (MFN) tariff treatment--without further approval by the Congress. By 1945, the United States had negotiated 32 agreements with 27 countries, granting tariff concessions on 64% of all dutiable imports and reducing rates by an average of 44%. The "Wise Men" who created the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and the post-World War II system of trade liberalization worked from this valuable bilateral precedent. In the decades that followed, the Congress continued to grant the executive the ability to negotiate tariff reductions without specific congressional approvals. As trade agreements became more complicated, involving the reduction of barriers other than tariffs, the Congress authorized fast-track authority in order to adapt and continue this successful congressional-executive partnership. Since receiving this authority in 1974, the executive has brought back an agreement from the Tokyo GATT Round and bilateral agreements with Israel and Canada. If the Congress now refuses to extend this fast-track negotiating authority, it would signal a return to the days of 1930, to the logic that Congress should freely adjust and amend trade arrangements around the globe without consideration of the benefits of the package as a whole. This reversal of 57 years of success would take the United States out of the trade negotiating game. The other nations of the world will pin the blame on us for walking away from real bargaining. They will argue that they cannot offer their bottom line positions if we are free to reopen agreements. Second, this is a terrible time to signal to the rest of the world that the United States will abandon its leadership role in the field of international trade. The United States has just again demonstrated its capacity to lead the world politically and militarily. Some critics ask whether the United States can complement these achievements with international economic leadership. They want to know if the New World Order will have a place for economics, and if it doesn't, they wonder if it can be meaningful. In the field of trade, the United States has a good answer. We are pursuing an ambitious agenda in the Uruguay Round, through the North American Free Trade Agreement, and through the prospects for trade agreements under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. This is what is at stake if the Congress fails to extend fast-track authority. Third, it is economic folly for the United States to signal its withdrawal from the world trading system at exactly the time when US exports are playing a more critical role for the US economy. Over the last 4 years, US merchandise exports expanded by 75%. Over those 4 years, exports accounted for 40% of US GNP growth. Last year, our exports grew 8.5%, producing 88% of US growth. US manufacturing is in a highly competitive condition. In 1988, manufacturing represented 23% of our GNP, a post-World War II high. Given the efficiencies and streamlining that took place through the 1980s, American manufacturers are now well positioned to compete around the globe. C. Fred Bergsten of the Institute for International Economics recently wrote that US exports could readily contribute $50 billion annually in real economic growth over the next 5 years. It just does not make sense to put our export power at risk by taking the Administration out of the trade negotiating game. Because the Congress would have effectively removed our ability to settle disagreements through market-opening negotiations, our only recourse would be tools of threat and retaliation, which would certainly generate counter-threats and counter-retaliation. Fourth, it is important to underscore that Congress' continued authorization of fast-track negotiating authority does not forgo any of Congress' rights to vote against the agreements we bring back. It is one thing to vote against an agreement because you believe that, taken as a whole, it does not serve US interests. But it is quite another thing not to even authorize the executive to negotiate packages to bring back for your consideration. If you have doubts about the Uruguay Round, or the North American Free Trade Agreement, please do not tell the Administration that we cannot even attempt to meet your standards; at least give us the chance to negotiate a good agreement for the United States. Finally, it is simply not the case that the agreements that we bring back offer no time or opportunity for congressional input. In fact, the "fast-track" is really neither "fast" nor a "track." It's not "fast"--the process is actually deliberate; and it's not a "track"--no one is being railroaded into approving agreements that might be negotiated. Fast-track procedures have absolutely nothing to do with the pace at which we conduct negotiations. Ambassador Hills [US Trade Representative Carla Hills] has assured the Congress on a number of occasions that we will not rush to conclude any agreement--Mexico, Uruguay Round, or otherwise--merely for the sake of agreement. We will take the time needed to consider all relevant issues and to consult fully with you and the private sector. Until we arrive at good agreements--ones that we believe you will agree are good-- there will be no agreements. We proved that in the Brussels negotiations of the Uruguay Round. Furthermore, Congress has a full role throughout the entire process: in formulating negotiating objectives; in close consultation as the negotiations proceed (in the Uruguay Round, the Congress reviewed each and every one of our proposals and many members were with the negotiators in Brussels); in close consultation before any agreement is signed; and in full participation in drafting implementing legislation. As the US- Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988 substantiated, there is ample opportunity to meet many particular congressional interests through the drafting of this implementing legislation with the appropriate committees of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
I would like to conclude by thanking you for scheduling these important hearings. With all the other events in the news, it has been difficult for the proponents of fast-track negotiating authority and of the North American Free Trade Agreement to get the attention of the public and the Congress so as to make the overall and detailed case for this historic economic and political opportunity. Instead, special interests have defined these questions narrowly, obscuring America's national interest. Your colleagues will be looking to this committee's members for leadership on these issues. I hope this committee will let them know that the foreign relations of the United States need to promote the economic leadership and economic interests of the United States. I hope this committee will tell them that the North American FTA will produce growth, jobs, higher incomes, competitiveness, and economic strength for America. I hope this committee will stand for progress for Mexico and our hemisphere-- because it will work to our benefit. Working together, we can realize that long-unfulfilled American vision. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991 Title:

North American Free Trade Agreement: A Historic Task

Bush; Salinas Source: President Bush; Mexican President Carlos Salinas Description: Remarks in Houston, Texas Date: Apr 7, 19914/7/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States, Mexico, Canada Subject: North America Free Trade, Trade/Economics [TEXT] President Bush: Well, as always, it is a great pleasure to meet with my good friend, President Carlos Salinas. He's en route to Canada for a state visit, but this refueling stop has given us a chance to discuss very important issues of mutual concern and interest. The United States has embarked on a historic task with Mexico and Canada--the creation of a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA), which would establish the largest free trade area in the world. It would involve some 360 million people and a total of $6 trillion in combined annual output. President Salinas and I are certain that this FTA, this trade agreement will create jobs and provide opportunities for the citizens of both our countries. To move forward, we need the US Congress to extend the fast- track authority. That authority allows the President to assure our negotiating partners that the free trade agreement which we conclude at the negotiating table will be the one that will be voted on by the Congress. The Congress has a say. They can vote yes or they can vote no. But we need to negotiate in a way so that the people with whom we are negotiating know that that is not going to be amended and changed. I told President Salinas that I am absolutely committed personally, that our Administration is committed totally to the free trade agreement with Mexico and Canada. And I also told him that I am going to work tirelessly to assure favorable action by Congress on fast-track authority. The credibility of the United States as a trading partner is on the line here. And I am doing this because I believe firmly that it is in the best interest of the United States of America. I also believe it is in Mexico's interest, but I am convinced that it is best for America. President Salinas and I have agreed to take a few questions, but I'd now turn the floor over to him. Once again, sir, welcome. President Salinas: Thank you very much for the hospitality extended to us, Mr. President. I would like to say that the bilateral agenda is quite wide, and we took up diverse topics. One of these issues, no doubt, was a free trade agreement. We ratified our firm decision to forge ahead and come afloat with a treaty. The area that would then be created would be the main, the major, mover in order to promote the economies of the whole continent, and, at the same time, it would be an extraordinary means in order to increase and raise our competitiveness to reach levels of the Pacific Basin and Europe. But this will not be easy. It is a battle between visionary men and women living in sovereign nations with protectionist interests or visionary views. We reach the conclusion that studies tend to confirm that the benefits that will be derived and that will stem from the free trade agreement broadly go beyond the disadvantages that one could have. For example, in the United States, thanks to freer trade activities with Mexico, in the last 3 years exports have increased to my country, to Mexico. In the United States, additional jobs have been created of over one-quarter of a million jobs. Mexico is already growing and developing with stability, and that will now lead to having to export goods from Mexico, not people. That will prevent thousands and millions of Mexicans from having to come to the United States looking for a job. Our objective is to have economic recovery with employment that will not harm the environment and with an increase, a raise in real salaries. And I would simply like to conclude by saying that the good climate that we found in Houston 21/2 years ago has now been confirmed here today. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991 Title:

Mexican Initiatives and Cooperation With the United States

Date: Apr 15, 19914/15/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: North America Country: Mexico Subject: North America Free Trade, Narcotics, Environment, Immigration, Trade/Economics [TEXT]
Mexico's Commitment To the War on Drugs
Recognizing that illegal narcotics pose a national security and public health threat to the Mexican people, President Carlos Salinas has committed his government to an aggressive campaign against drugs. President Salinas has instructed his attorney general to ensure that counter-narcotics operations are conducted with respect for human rights and the law.
Taking the Initiative
. In 1990, Mexico took unprecedented steps to further the effectiveness of the war on drugs, which included passing new drug laws with stiffer penalties for traffickers and corrupt officials. More than 500 government employees, including several high- ranking officials, have been removed from office for corruption. Major trafficking figures, previously believed above the law, were arrested, convicted, and jailed. Rafael Caro Quintero, implicated in the murder of US Drug Enforcement Agency agent Enrique Camarena, remains imprisoned after a Mexican court upheld his conviction on other criminal charges. Mexico created the elite Operation Falcon Force, a rapid response force that uses helicopters and sophisticated aircraft acquired from the United States. It has effectively deterred cocaine smugglers. Forty-six Mexican police officers and 24 military personnel have lost their lives in the fight against drugs.
Increasing Cooperation
. Although marijuana and opium production and cocaine transshipment constitute a major concern, cooperation between the United States and Mexico has improved significantly in the last year. President Bush's drug control strategy for 1991 recognizes Mexico's contribution to stemming the flow of drugs into the United States and proposes additional US bilateral counter-narcotics assistance to Mexico and enhanced US drug interdiction on the border. Joint US-Mexican surveillance and enforcement efforts have resulted in record seizures of cocaine. Cocaine seizures in 1990, almost 50 metric tons, were up 43% from 1989, which itself was a record year. Mexico approved overflight of its territory by US Customs P-3 surveillance aircraft, greatly increasing their time on-station and their effectiveness against smugglers. The Mexican government signed leases for US helicopters, agreeing to use them exclusively for counter-narcotics operations. US Customs Cessna Citation surveillance aircraft currently track cocaine smugglers inside Mexican airspace. Later this year, these will be replaced by Mexican-piloted Citations purchased by the Mexican government. The United States and Mexico have signed a general agreement on narcotics cooperation, and the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty awaits the exchange of instruments of ratification.
Cooperation Brings Results
. Concrete steps to improve eradication programs produced a major reduction in marijuana production and increased opium eradication. Operation Falcon forces intercepted a major Colombian cartel convoy in October 1990, capturing 10 tons of cocaine. Following the bust, cocaine transshipments dropped off for the remainder of the year. Demonstrating range and flexibility, an Operation Falcon UH- 1H Helicopter Response team in Oaxaca interdicted a Colombian drug flight attempting to use a new southern Mexico route as a transit point. Much more can be done, and the United States and Mexico have forged an effective partnership that has produced, and will continue to produce, concrete results in the war on drugs.
Mexico's Efforts On the Environment
Mexico's 1988 General Law for Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection is sweeping legislation that establishes a firm commitment to protect the environment. Much of Mexico's 1988 law is based on US law and experience. It sets national policy on ecology reserves, rational use of natural resources, and environmental protection. It establishes administrative sanctions and criminal penalties for non- compliance. Since 1988, each new investment project must include a detailed study assessing its environmental impact. Some private companies already have responded to the Mexican government's urging that they consider environmental issues as part of overall business strategy by creating special offices to analyze environmental impacts of proposed business activities.
Commitment to Enforcement
. Mexico has committed itself to enforcing its new law, regulations, and standards. It has not hesitated to close several industrial plants, but enforcement efforts are constrained by limited funds. However, the budget of the Mexican Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE) has grown significantly in recent years, and it will be doubled by an anticipated World Bank loan. A significant portion of the increase may be devoted to enforcement. Anticipating early approval of the loan, SEDUE recently announced the commitment of Mexican counterpart funds to create 50 new inspector positions for Mexico City and 50 for the US- Mexico border. In a unique initiative, the Mexican government has negotiated agreements with environmental and industrial with environmental and industrial groups in an effort to assure compliance with the law. For example, agreements have been reached with the Maquiladora Association, which includes most maquilas, to encourage environmental compliance by its members. (Maquila industries are assembly plants owned by US or foreign investors along the border.)
Combating Air Pollution in Mexico City.
In October 1990, with strong international support, including promises of significant Japanese financing and US technical assistance, Mexico announced an ambitious master plan to resolve air pollution problems in greater Mexico City. In the interim, Mexico City has a contingency plan which results in drastic reductions in traffic and industrial activity during the most serious pollution periods. A 1989 US-Mexico agreement provides for technical support to help Mexico resolve the pollution problems in Mexico City. Under it, action programs and training and technical assistance programs have been developed to deal with problems of air and water pollution, hazardous waste, and environmental health issues. In addition, the US Department of Energy and the Mexican Petroleum Institute have agreed to begin a computer model study of Mexico City air pollution. In other programs, Mexico and the International Development Bank are devising a debt-for-nature swap to fund reforestation efforts around Mexico City. In other wildlife programs: -- There has been substantial cooperation between the United States and Mexico on wildlife protection and natural resource management; -- Cooperative dolphin and sea turtle protection programs have been established. As a result, dolphins killed (per net deployed) decreased by 58% in 1986-89; -- Joint efforts are underway through SEDUE and the US Department of the Interior on wetlands management to improve the "flyway system" for migratory game fowl; and -- Mexico has announced plans to join CITES, an international convention for protection of endangered species.
Border Environment
. Mexico works with the United States to resolve pollution problems along the border, through action programs under the 1983 border environment agreement, for which Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and SEDUE are national coordinators. At their November 1990 meeting, Presidents Bush and Salinas agreed that their environmental authorities should develop an integrated plan to deal with border environmental problems over the next decade. It will address border environmental problems of air and water pollution, hazardous waste, chemical spills, pesticides and enforcement. The Pan American Health Organization, in close cooperation with US Public Health Service and the Mexican Ministry of Health, is developing a plan to deal with priority public health problems along the border including air and water pollution and hazardous wastes. The 100-year old International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), in cooperation with EPA and SEDUE, is actively engaged in cross-border water pollution issues. The commission is constructing major joint sewage collection and treatment systems at Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana/San Diego, and Nogales and is planning joint improvements in sewage collection and treatment facilities for a long-term solution to pollution of the New River at Mexicali/Calexico.
US-Mexican Cooperation on Immigration Laws
The US and Mexican governments are improving their cooperation on immigration issues, both in terms of Mexicans and third-country nationals. US and Mexican immigration officials participate in several joint working groups that deal with such issues as labor and migration, consular and migratory issues, and third-country nationals.
Legal Changes Slow Illegal Immigration
. The reforms and increased enforcement resulting from the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) have helped reduce the flow of illegal immigrants from and through Mexico. In 1986, the US Border Patrol apprehended 1.7 million persons attempting to cross the US-Mexican border illegally. By 1989, that number had dropped to 900,000. Although the number rose again to 1.1 million in fiscal year (FY) 1990, the number highly correlates with the size of border patrol resources and economic conditions in Mexico. First quarter FY 1991 apprehensions are down from FY 1990 levels. The US Immigration Act of 1990, which becomes effective in October 1991, will increase by 40% the number of immigrants legally admitted each year. Although the act is not specifically aimed at Mexico, Mexican nationals will benefit from the increase in family preference numbers, which will reduce some of the pressure for illegal migration. In 1990, Mexico apprehended 125,000 third-country nationals, up from 13,000 in 1988. Since the US government has not had to apprehend and detain these illegal immigrants, the increased Mexican effort has saved the United States tens of millions of dollars in detention costs. The United States will continue to work closely with Mexican officials to build on the progress already made.
Economic Growth Reduces Migration Pressure
. In 1990, the Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development reported to Congress and the President that economic growth in the home countries of migrants is the single most important long-term remedy to the problem of unauthorized migration to the United States. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991 Title:

Country Profile: Mexico

Date: Apr 15, 19914/15/91 Category: Country Data Region: North America Country: Mexico Subject: North America Free Trade, History, International Organizations, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Official Name: The United Mexican States
Geography
Area: 1.98 million sq. km. (764,000 sq. mi.); about three times the size of Texas. Cities: Capital--Mexico City (pop. 20 million, est. 1989). Other cities--Guadalajara, Monterrey, Ciudad Juarez, Puebla de Zaragoza, Leon. Terrain: Varies from coastal lowlands to high mountains. Climate: Varies from tropical to desert.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Mexican(s). Population (1990): 88 million. Annual growth rate (1989 est.): 2.2%. Ethnic groups: Indian-Spanish (mestizo) 60%, American Indian 30%, Caucasian 9%, other 1%. Religions: Roman Catholic 97%, Protestant 3%. Language: Spanish. Education: Years compulsory--10. Literacy --88%. Health: Infant morality rate (1989) -- 42 /1,000. Life expectancy (1989)--70 yrs. Work force (26.3 million, 1989): Agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing--26%. Manufacturing--12.8%. Commerce--13.9%. Services--31.4%. Mining and quarrying--1.3%. Construction--9.5%. Transportation and communication--4.8%. Electricity--0.3%.
Government
Type: Federal Republic. Independence: First proclaimed, September 16, 1810; Republic established 1822. Constitution: February 5, 1917. Branches: Executive--president (chief of state and head of government). Legislative--bicameral. Judicial--supreme court, local and federal systems. Political parties: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN), Mexican Socialist Party (PMS), Mexican Democratic Party (PDM), Popular Socialist Party (PPS), the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), Mexican Workers Party (PMT), Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), Party of the Cardenist Front of National Reconstruction (PFCRN). Suffrage: Universal over 18. Administrative subdivisions: 31 states and the federal district. Flag: Green, white, and red vertical bands. An eagle holding a snake in its beak and perching on a cactus is centered.
Economy
GDP (1990 est.): $228 billion. Per capita GDP (1990 est.): $2,657. Annual real GDP growth (1990 est.): 3%. Avg. inflation rate (1990 est.): 28%. Natural resources: Petroleum, silver, copper, gold, lead, zinc, natural gas, timber. Agriculture: Products--corn, beans, oilseeds, feedgrains, fruit, cotton, coffee, sugarcane, winter vegetables. Industry: Types--manufacturing, services, commerce, transportation and communications, petroleum, and mining. Trade (1990 est.): Exports--$24.6 billion: manufacturing 55.3%, petroleum and derivatives 33.8%, agriculture 8.2%, mining 2.7%. Imports--$25.7 billion: intermediate goods 66.4%, capital goods 19.3%, consumer goods 14.3%. Major trading partners--US, EC, Japan.
Membership in International Organizations
UN and some of its specialized and related agencies, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); Seabeds Committee; Inter-American Defense Board (IADB); Organization of American States (OAS); Latin American Integration Association (ALADI); INTELSAT. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991 Title:

Country Profile: Canada

Date: Apr 15, 19914/15/91 Category: Country Data Region: North America Country: Canada Subject: North America Free Trade, History, Trade/Economics, International Organizations [TEXT] Official Name: Canada
Geography
Area: 9.97 million sq. km. (3.8 million sq. mi.); second largest country in the world. Cities: Capital--Ottawa (pop. 833,000). Other cities--Toronto (3.5 million), Montreal (2.9 million), Vancouver (1.4 million). Terrain: Varied. Climate: Temperate to arctic.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Canadian(s). Population (1989): 26.3 million. Annual growth rate (1988-89): 1%. Ethnic groups: British 25%, French 24%, other European 16%, indigenous Indian and Eskimo 1.5%, mixed background 28%. Religions: Roman Catholic 47%, United Church 16%, Anglican 10%. Languages: English, French. Literacy: 98% of population aged 15 and over have at least a ninth grade education. Health: Infant mortality rate-- 7.3/1,000 (US=11.2/1,000). Life expectancy--73 yrs. male, 80 yrs. female. Work force (13.5 million, 1989): Agriculture--0.4 million. Manufacturing--2.1 million. Trade--2.2 million. Community/business/personal service--4.1 million. Public administration--0.8 million.
Government
Type: Confederation with parliamentary democracy. Independence: July 1, 1867. Constitution: The amended British North America Act of 1867, charter of rights, and unwritten custom. Branches: Executive--Queen Elizabeth II (head of state, represented by a governor general), prime minister (head of government), cabinet. Legislative--bicameral parliament (104-member Senate, 295-member House of Commons). Judicial--Supreme Court. Political parties: Progressive Conservative, Liberal, New Democratic, Reform, Social Credit. Suffrage: Universal over 18. Government budget (FY 1990--91): Expenditures--US$127.1 billion. Revenues--US$102.6 billion. Deficit--US$24.5 billion. Defense: 2% of GDP. Subdivisions: 10 provinces, 2 territories. Flag: A red maple leaf on a white background flanked by vertical red bands.
Economy
GNP (1989): US$500.3 billion. Annual real GNP growth rate (1990): 1.1%. Per capita GNP (1989): US$19,020. Avg. inflation rate (1990): 5.0%. Natural resources: Petroleum and natural gas, hydroelectric power, metals and minerals, fish, forests, wildlife. Agriculture: Products--wheat, livestock and meat, feedgrains, oilseeds, dairy products, tobacco, fruits, vegetables. Industry: Types--motor vehicles and parts, fish and forest products, processed and unprocessed minerals. Trade (1990): Canada had a record current account deficit of US$15.9 billion in 1990. Exports--US$123 billion: motor vehicles and parts, lumber, woodpulp and newsprint, crude and fabricated metals, natural gas, crude petroleum, wheat. Partners--US 75%, EC 18%, Japan 5%. Imports--US$116.1 billion: motor vehicles and parts, industrial machinery, crude petroleum, chemicals, agricultural machinery. Partners--US 69%, EC 8%, Japan 6%. Fiscal year: April 1-March 31. Development assistance (FY 1987--88): $2 billion or 0.4% of GDP.
Membership in International Organizations
UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), North Atlantic Fisheries Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Commonwealth, La Franco-phonie, Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation, International Energy Agency (IEA), INTELSAT. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991 Title:

US-Japan Relations: Strengthening Ties

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Statement at meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, Newport Beach, California Date: Apr 4, 19914/4/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: Japan Subject: Trade/Economics, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] I think back to when I met with Prime Minister Kaifu in Palm Springs last March--1 year [ago] and a world of change. Since then, we closed the last chapter on the Cold War. We built a coalition that rescued a tiny nation from a terrible fate. We defended an ideal that is good and right and just. But our work is far from finished. With change come new challenges--for both our nations--with global implications for growth, stability, and peace. Our two nations must work to forge a global partnership. And since last year's meeting in Palm Springs, we have made very real progress. In the past year, we have resolved significant trade disputes, and we've moved to ease trade tensions. We've made solid progress--opening new markets to satellites, telecommunications, and wood products. We need to move ahead now in construction services, autos and auto parts, semiconductors, and other areas. We need to prove that our efforts under the Structural Impediments Initiatives produce real results. It remains our best hope of fending off those who advocate managed trade between our nations. Today let us reaffirm our commitment to tear down the walls to free and fair trade and build on the open exchange that helps both our nations. Our efforts to expand free trade have produced real results. In 1990, the US trade deficit with Japan fell for the third straight year. American exports to Japan continued to rise--up more than 75% since 1987. In fact, many Americans would be surprised to learn that Japan buys more goods from the United States per capita than we buy from Japan. Together, our two nations share a special responsibility to maintain and strengthen the multilateral trading system. Japan and the United States are powerful forces for global prosperity. But we cannot promote continued growth in a world system where free market forces are in retreat. That is why the success of the Uruguay Round trade talks is critical. Along with other nations, Japan and the United States must assume strong leadership roles in knocking down barriers to free trade in all areas, including agriculture. And, once again, I call on the US Congress to take decisive action. Send a clear signal that America stands for free trade by extending fast-track procedures. Trade is just one dimension of our relationship. Last year, our two nations marked the 30th anniversary of our mutual security treaty. Our commitment to common defense has never been stronger, and yet here, too, our long-standing alliance continues to adjust to new challenges and new realities. Just this January, in keeping with its growing economic might, Japan agreed to increase its share of the costs as host nation to American forces. Let me be clear: The United States welcomes the broadest possible participation by Japan in world affairs. In the past year, we've seen a significant easing of tensions in Europe. I call on Japan to join with us in seeking solutions to regional conflicts that threaten stability in the Pacific. And I thank Japan as a key member of the coalition that triumphed over the forces of aggression in the Persian Gulf. For the first time, Japan contributed to a multinational peacekeeping effort, and it is providing a substantial level of financial support for Operation Desert Storm. I welcome the visit of Prime Minister Kaifu. We must do all we can to build public support for our relationship and to promote contacts of every kind between the American and Japanese people. Just this last year, Japan's distinguished former Foreign Minister Abe announced the creation of a new foundation to promote exchanges that bring together academics and artists, that encourage tourism and travel. For more than 40 years, Japan and the United States have been partners--partners in democracy, partners in prosperity, partners in peace. I am convinced that our meeting today proves that this partnership remains strong--that together we will constitute a source of stability, now and into the next century. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991 Title:

Iraqi Refugees: The Need For International Assistance

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks by upon arrival at Esenboga International Airport, Ankara, Turkey Date: Apr 7, 19914/7/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey Subject: Refugees [TEXT] First, let me say that I'm pleased to be back in Ankara. This is my fifth visit since Iraq invaded Kuwait. I think it highlights the significance of the relationship between the United States of America and Turkey. But once again, the world and the Iraqi people are being subjected to the utter brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime. Once again, the world finds it necessary to respond to Saddam's savage and indecent use of force. Only this time, the victim is not a neighboring country. This time, Iraq's forces are killing, threatening, and committing crimes against the Iraqi people. [UN] Security Council Resolution 688 condemns the repression of the Kurds and other Iraqi citizens, it demands that Iraq end the repression, and it insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international organizations to all of those in need of assistance throughout the country. We are not prepared to go down the slippery slope of being sucked into a civil war. We cannot police what goes on inside Iraq, and we cannot be the arbiters of who shall govern Iraq. As the President has made repeatedly clear, including, I think, at our press conference yesterday, our objective was the liberation of Kuwait. It never extended to the re-making of Iraq. We repeatedly said that could only be done by the Iraqi people. However, we cannot be indifferent to atrocities and human suffering in Iraq, and we haven't been. Working with the international community, we will make certain that humanitarian assistance in both northern and southern Iraq gets to those who most need it. And we will not tolerate any interference with this humanitarian relief effort. . . . Q. What will be the US reaction in case there's military intervention--a Turkish military intervention--into Iraq? What will be the US reaction? Secretary Baker. Well, that's a decision, of course, for the Turkish government to take. I've just given you the position of the US government with respect to this. We are commencing, as you know, a major airlift of humanitarian supplies to the people who are being repressed. And we will not brook any interference with that humanitarian effort. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991 Title:

Iraqi Refugees: The Need For International Assistance

Baker; Alptemocin Source: Secretary Baker; Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Alptemocin Description: Remarks; Diyarbakir, Turkey Date: Apr 7, 19914/7/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey Subject: Refugees [TEXT]
Foreign Minister Alptemocin.
We've just come back from the border area where we observed with Secretary Baker the tragedy inflicted by Iraq on its own people. What we are seeing is inhuman and totally unacceptable. It is a challenge that defies the international community to stand together and act effectively. [inaudible] That is what Turkey and the United States are doing. We have decided to issue a joint statement with Secretary Baker. It reflects our impressions of the situation which continues to worsen. It reflects our position and our resolve to do everything in our power to contribute first, to the alleviation and, then, to the solution of this massive human tragedy. It also confirms our appeal to the world to join in efforts to ensure the safe return of the Iraqi people amassed on our borders to their hometowns without fearing further repression by Saddam Hussein. The civilized world is duty bound not to permit the Iraqi regime to get away with what it is doing to its own civilian people and the threat that it constitutes for peace, security, and stability in the region. Thank you.
Secretary Baker
. As the Minister has just indicated, we have a written statement that will be distributed. But before that's done, let me simply say that today we have witnessed the suffering and despair of the Iraqi people. We have seen examples of cruelty and human anguish that really do defy description. Women and children up there are battling hunger, thirst, and the elements to escape repression in Iraq. And as you heard up there--those of you who were in the briefing--may have heard, many of those innocents [are] losing this battle. People are suffering, and, tragically, some of them are dying. Only the generosity and the humanity of the American and Turkish people, as well as the international community, stands between these souls and complete despair and complete tragedy. President Bush, of course, has asked that I come here and see this human drama and report back first hand on the situation. I will be doing that as soon as I can reach him by telephone. Our relief efforts, including air drops of supplies, have begun, but they alone are not going to be enough. We cannot do this alone. We cannot do this alone with the Turkish government. Together, we simply cannot cope with this mounting human tragedy. So the international community, as the Minister has indicated, has to respond. And it must respond quickly and effectively. Basic supplies are going to have to arrive soon to sustain these people. And the organization and distribution that are required are going to have to be provided both in Turkey as well as in northern Iraq. Most importantly, as the Minister indicated, hope of returning home has got to be given to these people. And that means freedom from threat by the Iraqi government and safety from further repression. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991 Title:

Iraqi Refugees: The Need For International Assistance

Baker; Alptemocin Source: Secretary Baker; Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Alptemocin Description: Joint statement; Diyarbakir, Turkey Date: Apr 8, 19914/8/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey Subject: Refugees [TEXT] We have just returned from a tour of areas where we witnessed the great tragedy suffered by the Iraqi people, most of whom are women and children who have been forcibly uprooted from their homes and villages. The dimension of this tragedy require the urgent and generous compassion and contribution of the international community. It is with the aim of bringing this situation to the attention of the world that we decided to issue the present statement. Once again, the brutality and folly of the Iraqi regime has created yet another gruesome tragedy: hundreds of thousands of refugees and many deaths among Iraqi citizens who sought only their democratic rights. The Saddam regime has not contented itself with more repression but has acted with excessive force, driving its own citizens out of their own land. And, once again, the world is reacting swiftly and with determination to counter Saddam's indecent use of force. On Friday [April 5, 1991], the [UN] Security Council, acting at Turkish and French request, condemned Iraq in Resolution 688 and called for a large program of international relief. The international community has once again closed ranks in insisting that Iraq end its repression and allow immediate and unimpeded access by international organizations to all in need of aid throughout the country. Turkey and the United States will cooperate closely to give effect to this resolution. We do not propose armed intervention in a civil war, but we will not tolerate any interference of our humanitarian relief efforts. From the initial stages of the arrival in areas on both sides of the Turkish-Iraqi border of the cold and hungry men, women, and children, Turkey has offered generous humanitarian aid in the form of food, shelter, and medical care within the limits of her capabilities. These capabilities obviously cannot match the vast dimensions and requirements of the situation. To raise the large sums that are needed, the United States is working closely with the EC [European Community] and others and with the UN Secretary General. So far--in the last few days--$67 million has been pledged to support relief efforts in Turkey and elsewhere. In addition, working with Turkey, the United States is now moving quickly to provide tents, food, medicine, and other supplies by a dramatic air-drop to groups inside Iraq. Turkey will also cooperate with a relief effort by international organizations to supply food along and across its borders into Iraq--where the greatest and most vulnerable population of displaced persons is located. Turkey and the United States agree that the goal of relief efforts should be to enable these people to return to their homes. The plight of these refugees creates--as the Security Council Resolution says--a threat to international peace and security and has thus become another important issue in the full implementation of the cease-fire resolution. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 15, April 15, 1991 Title:

UN Resolution 689 on Cease-Fire Observer Mission

Date: Apr 9, 19914/9/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization, United Nations [TEXT] UN Resolution 689 on Iraq-Juwait Cease-Fire Observer Mission (April 9, 1991) The Security Council, Recalling its resolution 687 (1991), Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) contained in document S/22454 and Add. 1-3 of 5 and 9 April 1991, respectively; 2. Notes that the decision to set up the observer unit was taken in paragraph 5 of resolution 687 (1991) and can only be terminated by a decision of the Council; the Council shall therefore review the question of termination or continuation every six months; 3. Decides that the modalities for the initial six-month period of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission shall be in accordance with the above-mentioned report and shall also be reviewed every six months. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).(###)