US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991

Title:

Kuwait Is Liberated

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address to the nation from the Oval Office; Washington, DC Date: Feb 27, 19912/27/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis in control of their own destiny. We share in their joy-a joy tempered only by our compassion for their ordeal. Tonight, the Kuwaiti flag once again flies above the capital of a free and sovereign nation, and the American flag flies above our embassy. Seven months ago, America and the world drew a line in the sand. We declared that the aggression against Kuwait would not stand. And tonight America and the world have kept their word. This is not a time of euphoria; certainly not a time to gloat. But it is a time of pride-pride in our troops; pride in the friends who stood with us in the crisis; pride in our nation and the people whose strength and resolve made victory quick, decisive, and just. And soon we will open wide our arms to welcome back home to America our magnificent fighting forces. No one country can claim this victory as its own. It was not only a victory for Kuwait but a victory for all the coalition partners. This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law, and for what is right. After consulting with Secretary of Defense Cheney, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell, and our coalition partners, I am pleased to announce that at midnight tonight, Eastern Standard Time, exactly 100 hours since ground operations commenced and 6 weeks since the start of Desert Storm, all US and coalition forces will suspend offensive combat operations. It is up to Iraq whether this suspension on the part of the coalition becomes a permanent cease-fire.
Cease-fire Terms
Coalition political and military terms for a formal cease-fire include the following requirements. Iraq must release immediately all coalition prisoners of war, third-country nationals, and the remains of all who have fallen. Iraq must release all Kuwaiti detainees. Iraq also must inform Kuwaiti authorities of the location and nature of all land and sea mines. Iraq must comply fully with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This includes a rescinding of Iraq's August decision to annex Kuwait and acceptance in principle of Iraq's responsibility to pay compensation for the loss, damage, and injury its aggression has caused. The coalition calls upon the Iraqi government to designate military commanders to meet within 48 hours with their coalition counterparts at a place in the theater of operations to be specified to arrange for military aspects of the cease-fire. Further, I have asked Secretary of State Baker to request that the UN Security Council meet to formulate the necessary arrangements for this war to be ended. This suspension of offensive combat operations is contingent upon Iraq's not firing upon any coalition forces and not launching Scud missiles against any other country. If Iraq violates these terms, coalition forces will be free to resume military operations. At every opportunity, I have said to the people of Iraq that our quarrel was not with them but, instead, with their leadership-and above all with Saddam Hussein. This remains the case. You, the people of Iraq, are not our enemy. We do not seek your destruction. We have treated your POWs with kindness. Coalition forces fought this war only as a last resort and look forward to the day when Iraq is led by people prepared to live in peace with their neighbors. We must now begin to look beyond victory and war. We must meet the challenge of securing the peace. In the future, as before, we will consult with our coalition partners. We have already done a good deal of thinking and planning for the postwar period, and Secretary Baker has already begun to consult with our coalition partners on the region's challenges. There can be, and will be, no solely American answer to all these challenges. But we can assist and support the countries of the region and be a catalyst for peace. In this spirit, Secretary Baker will go to the region next week to begin a new round of consultations. This war is now behind us. Ahead of us is the difficult task of securing a potentially historic peace. Tonight, though, let us be proud of what we have accomplished. Let us give thanks to those who risked their lives. Let us never forget those who gave their lives. May God bless our valiant military forces and their families, and let us all remember them in our prayers. Good night, and may God bless the United States of America.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991 Title:

United Nations Resolution 686 on Iraq

Description: New York, NY Date: Mar 2, 19913/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations, Democratization [TEXT]
Resolution 686 (March 2, 1991)
The Security Council, Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990), 677 (1990), and 678 (1990), Recalling the obligations of Member States under Article 25 of the Charter, Recalling paragraph 9 of resolution 661 (1990) regarding assistance to the Government of Kuwait and paragraph 3(c) of that resolution regarding supplies strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, Taking note of the letters of the Foreign Minister of Iraq confirming Iraq's agreement to comply fully with all of the resolutions noted above (S/22275), and stating its intention to release prisoners of war immediately (S/22273), Taking note of the suspension of offensive combat operations by the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990), Bearing in mind the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions, and the objective in resolution 678 (1990) of restoring international peace and security in the region, Underlining the importance of Iraq taking the necessary measures which would permit a definitive end to the hostilities, Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and Kuwait, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating under paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives of the resolution, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 1. Affirms that all twelve resolutions noted above continue to have full force and effect; 2. Demands that Iraq implement its acceptance of all twelve resolutions noted above and in particular that Iraq: (a) Rescind immediately its actions purporting to annex Kuwait; (b) Accept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq; (c) Immediately release under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Red Cross Societies, or Red Crescent Societies, all Kuwaiti and third country nationals detained by Iraq and return the remains of any deceased Kuwaiti and third country nationals so detained; and (d) Immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, to be completed in the shortest possible period; 3. Further demands that Iraq: (a) Cease hostile or provocative actions by its forces against all Member States, including missile attacks and flights of combat aircraft; (b) Designate military commanders to meet with counterparts from the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) to arrange for the military aspects of a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible time; (c) Arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Red Cross Societies, or Red Crescent Societies, and return the remains of any deceased personnel of the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990); and (d) Provide all information and assistance in identifying Iraqi mines, booby traps and other explosives as well as any chemical and biological weapons and material in Kuwait, in areas of Iraq where forces of Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) are present temporarily, and in the adjacent waters; 4. Recognizes that during the period required for Iraq to comply with paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the provisions of paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) remain valid. 5. Welcomes the decision of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) to provide access and to commence immediately the release of Iraqi prisoners of war as required by the terms of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross; 6. Requests all Member States, as well as the United Nations, the specialized agencies and other international organizations in the United Nations system, to take all appropriate action to cooperate with the Government and people of Kuwait in the reconstruction of their country; 7. Decides that Iraq shall notify the Secretary-General and the Security Council when it has taken the actions set out above; 8. Decides that in order to secure the rapid establishment of a definitive end to the hostilities, the Security Council remains actively seized of the matter. VOTE: 11 for, 1 against (Cuba), 3 abstentions (China, India, Yemen). (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991 Title:

UN Statements on the Persian Gulf

Source: Security Council President Description: Statement; New York, New York Date: Mar 3, 19913/3/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization, United Nations [TEXT] The council welcomes the decisions taken to date relating to food and medical needs by the committee established under Resolution 661 including those just taken to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance including infant formula and water purification material. It urges the committee to pay particular attention to the findings and recommendations on critical medical/public health and nutritional conditions in Iraq which have been and will continue to be submitted to it by the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other relevant organizations, consistent with the relevant resolutions, and urges these humanitarian agencies to play an active role in this process and cooperate closely with the committee in its work. It calls upon the committee to continue to act promptly on requests submitted to it for humanitarian assistance. The council welcomes the Secretary General's announcement that he plans to send urgently a mission led by Under Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari, comprising representatives of the appropriate UN agencies, to Iraq and Kuwait to assess the humanitarian needs arising in the immediate post crisis environment. The council invites the Secretary General to keep it informed in the shortest possible time on the progress of his mission on which it pledges to take immediate action.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991 Title:

Statements on the Persian Gulf

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Opening statement from a White House news conference; Washington, DC Date: Mar 1, 19913/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] In the hours since we suspended military operations in the Kuwaiti theater of war, considerable progress has been made in moving toward a cease-fire and post-war planning. As our forces moved into Kuwait City, and as the faces of these jubilant Kuwaiti citizens have warmed our hearts, the coalition leaders started the arduous task of addressing the next stages of the Persian Gulf situation. As a first order of business this afternoon, I want to thank the American people for the affection and support that they have shown for our troops in the Middle East. In towns and cities across this nation, our citizens have felt a sense of purpose and unity in the accomplishment of our military that is a welcome addition to the American spirit. And as our servicemen and women begin coming home, as they will soon, I look forward to the many celebrations of their achievement. In the meantime, we are focused on the many diplomatic tasks associated with ending this conflict. General Khalid, General Schwarzkopf, and other coalition military leaders of our forces in the Gulf will meet with representatives of Iraq tomorrow afternoon, March 2, in the theater of operations to discuss the return of POWs and other military matters related to the cease- fire. We will not discuss the location of the meeting for obvious security reasons. But this is an important step in securing the victory that our forces have achieved. Work is proceeding in New York at the United Nations on the political aspects of ending the war. We've welcomed here in Washington this week the envoys of several of our close friends and allies. And shortly, Secretary Baker will be leaving for a new round of consultations that I am confident will advance planning for the war's aftermath. Again, and as I said Wednesday evening, the true challenge before us will be securing the peace. . . .
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991 Title:

Address to the Nation on Iraq

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address to the nation from the White House; Washington, DC Date: Feb 26, 19912/26/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] I have a brief statement to make today. Saddam's most recent speech is an outrage. He is not withdrawing. His defeated forces are retreating. He is trying to claim victory in the midst of a rout, and he is not voluntarily giving up Kuwait. He is trying to save the remnants of power and control in the Middle East by every means possible. And here, too, Saddam Hussein will fail. Saddam is not interested in peace but only to regroup and fight another day, and he does not renounce Iraq's claim to Kuwait. To the contrary, he makes clear that Iraq continues to claim Kuwait. Nor is there any evidence of remorse for Iraq's aggression or any indication that Saddam is prepared to accept the responsibility for the awful consequences of that aggression. He still does not accept UN Security Council resolutions or the coalition terms of February 22, including the release of our POWs- all POWs-third-country detainees, and an end to the pathological destruction of Kuwait. The coalition will therefore continue to prosecute the war with undiminished intensity. As we announced last night, we will not attack unarmed soldiers in retreat. We have no choice but to consider retreating combat units as a threat and respond accordingly. Anything else would risk additional US and coalition casualties. The best way to avoid further casualties on both sides is for the Iraqi soldiers to lay down their arms as nearly 30,000 Iraqis already have. It is time for all Iraqi forces in the theater of operation, those occupying Kuwait, those supporting the occupation of Kuwait, to lay down their arms. And that will stop the bloodshed. From the beginning of the air operation nearly 6 weeks ago, I have said that our efforts are on course and on schedule. This morning I am very pleased to say that coalition efforts are ahead of schedule. The liberation of Kuwait is close at hand. And let me just add that I share the pride of all of the American people in the magnificent, heroic performance of our armed forces. May God bless them and keep them.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991 Title:

Soviet Disunion: The American Response

Zoellick Source: Robert B. Zoellick, Counselor of the Department Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Feb 28, 19912/28/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest, Trade/Economics, Arms Control [TEXT] I am pleased to have this opportunity to report on recent events in the Soviet Union and the American response. I have organized my statement to cover four topics: -- Key tenets of US policy toward the Soviet Union, 1989-90; -- Analysis of recent events; -- Outlook; and -- Implications for US policy. Key Tenets of US Policy Toward the Soviet Union, 1989-90 In analyzing our future course, it is useful to review the key elements of our present policy. It establishes a baseline and explains the reasoning behind our current path. The President stated in May 1989 that it was time for us to move "beyond containment." Given the break in traditional patterns of Soviet behavior, we felt it was important to seize the possibility to achieve long-term Western goals while also opening the way for the USSR to play a constructive part in the international community. Secretary Baker explained our approach toward the Soviet Union in speeches he gave in April and October 1989; he then reviewed our progress and explained our ongoing strategy in a third speech in October of 1990. In brief, our strategy has been to explore and develop possible points of mutual advantage for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Our logic has been to probe the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy, seeking to shape and, where possible, to alter Soviet policy calculations so that the Soviets might face up to the contradictions between the new thinking and old habits. We sought to formulate proposals in ways that emphasized benefits to both parties. In doing so, we strove to escape from the old East-West, zero-sum logic that a gain for one was a loss for the other. Our strategy required us to broaden and deepen our agenda with the Soviets. We added new items. We proposed new approaches. Our first objective was to work with the Soviets to overcome the division of Europe, the original cause of the Cold War. After many decades, Western resolve and NATO's protection had led to free and prosperous countries next door to dictatorship. When the people behind the Iron Curtain-confronted with such disparity- chose freedom, we sought to persuade the Soviets that the peaceful emergence of democratic governments and market economies throughout Central and Eastern Europe would benefit all of us-East and West. The old illegitimate regimes were decaying because they did not reflect the consent of the governed and could not tap the free will of free men; their perpetuation would be costly both in economic terms and in preventing the Soviet Union from achieving the opening to the West that it sought. Our approach was cooperative and reassuring, not threatening. This approach-an effort not to singularize or isolate any party in Europe that respected the moves toward freedom-was important in bringing about German unification peacefully and democratically. Second, we stressed our common interest in resolving regional conflicts peacefully, often seeking to rely on elections as a means of establishing legitimacy and the local popular will. To create an appropriate context for elections, we sought to use our respective influence to persuade conflicting parties that the use of arms would not produce an enduring solution. This has been the approximate formula for our cooperative efforts in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan. The experience provided the basis for the immediate joint US-Soviet denunciation of Iraq's attack on Kuwait-the joint statement of Secretary Baker and Minister Shevardnadze on August 3-which in turn provided the basis for unprecedented UN and multinational action. Third, we sought to demonstrate our support for perestroika in practical ways. We expanded our human rights agenda with the Soviets through an effort to institutionalize these rights by building the rule of law. We started a program of technical economic cooperation to encourage the development of market reforms. We explored our common interest in addressing transnational challenges, such as narcotics, terrorism, and the environment. Fourth, we expanded the arms control agenda with two efforts: we pressed to address the imbalance in conventional weapons in Europe, and we explored our mutual interest in halting and reversing the build-up of new weapons of mass destruction. These efforts produced the CFE [conventional armed forces in Europe] and chemical weapons destruction agreements.
A Successful Record
I think this strategy has built a successful record, although there is no doubt that our work is far from finished. The Red Army is departing Central and Eastern Europe. The nations behind the old Iron Curtain now have an opportunity to chart a new course of democracy and market economics. We have taken significant steps toward constraining and channeling the Soviet military threat through arms control. We have seen the Soviet impulse toward adventurism diminish, and we have also helped to foster Soviet cooperation in regional conflicts around the globe. And we demonstrated our good faith commitment to support political and economic reform in the Soviet Union if that is a course to which the Soviet leadership remains committed. The increased uncertainty about the future course of the Soviet Union has three major implications for this strategy. One, we should seek to secure those benefits that we have achieved over recent years. Two, we should continue to explore the possibility of finding new points of mutual advantage between the Soviet Union and the United States, but do so in a way that recognizes the changed context. Three, we should try to manage uncertainty by multiplying our channels of information and increasing our points of access with a rapidly changing Soviet society.
Analysis of Recent Events
The Soviet Union is a vast country. The motivations, fears, and interests of its diverse peoples are enormously complex. The Kremlin is certainly not the sole locus of influence, but the political scene has been dominated by the interplay of many forces in Soviet society with the actions of a particular leader. Therefore, I wanted to offer you one possible analysis of how recent changes may have affected President Gorbachev's perspective and the path of Soviet policy. In October 1989, Secretary Baker made an observation on the Soviet reform effort that is a useful point of departure for reviewing the course of recent events there. He said: "President Gorbachev wants to remake the Soviet Union. That's what perestroika and glasnost are all about. That may not have been his aim in 1985, but the failures of the early reform efforts convinced him and his colleagues that change must dig deeper into Soviet society. These are utilitarian, purposeful, and determined men-we should recognize that they are not pursuing freedom for freedom's sake. Their aim is to modernize the Soviet Union, but their frame of reference is not the Age of Reason or the spirit of the Enlightenment. They are the descendants of other great Russian modernizers-like Peter the Great and Alexander II-fundamentally rooted in the unique Russian experience." As a modernizer and as a balancer of political forces, President Gorbachev faced success, deterioration, and dilemmas in the late summer of 1990. By unleashing the truth, he had begun to expose the terrible record of communism. The old system was discredited. Indeed, in July, Gorbachev rallied popular resentment to inflict a stunning defeat of the old guard at the Communist Party congress. Yet he had nothing to substitute for the party's control of state and society, and problems pressed in from all sides. The new openness seemed to be dismantling institutional capabilities and societal norms at a rapid pace. State institutions-executive and legislative-appeared unable to step into the breach. There was an erosion of executive power at all levels. Legislatures could debate, but seemed unable to act coherently; their passage of laws did not translate into action. The economic situation continued to worsen. Movements calling for increased autonomy, or even secession, complicated the difficult tasks of creating a new civil society and new economic relationships. All this disorder, however explicable and perhaps unavoidable, tapped deep-seated Russian fears. The society and economy seemed to be disintegrating, and yet no one seemed to be able to do anything about it. Despite the hopes and excitement the reformers generated, they seemed unable to serve as an effective counterweight; they could not yet help balance those forces in society that were frightened and threatened by the changes. That is why [Foreign Minister] Shevardnadze sought to give them a "wake-up call," warning of the need for reformers to pull themselves together.
Solutions From the Right
In contrast, the institutions on the right may have seemed to Gorbachev to offer straightforward, understandable solutions to these problems-even though they are not real answers. Moreover, the army, the KGB, the defense industrial complex, and the Communist Party all remain powerful constituencies. All felt threatened by recent events. Just as important, these are all national institutions, tools that the Soviet leadership might use to counter the forces that it probably perceived as undermining its modernization of the Soviet Union. In sum, President Gorbachev may have perceived internal economic and political problems that gave him less freedom to maneuver; lack of support (or even a threat) from radical reformers wanting to move quickly toward real democracy, capitalism, and republic independence; and forces on the right that offered apparent solutions and familiar tools to deal with their own anxieties and those of the society at large. So Gorbachev turned to the right, in his view, to preserve his credibility as a leader and to preserve the union. In September [1990], Gorbachev rejected Shatalin's "500 Day Plan" and spurned the reformers. He retained Ryzhkov as his prime minister, affirming his intention not to abandon the existing governmental structure. In October, Gorbachev secured adoption of a more vaguely worded compromise economic reform program. In December, he got vast new presidential powers to implement this program. Also in December, Gorbachev made key personnel changes at the interior and justice ministries and secured stronger enforcement powers for the KGB and military to act internally. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze resigned, warning of dictatorship. By the end of the year, almost all of Gorbachev's perestroika team had departed. Finally, in January, the Soviet leadership opted for intimidation in the Baltics, which became a show of force and then violence. Gorbachev may well believe that, given the pressures he faces, he must act forcefully to restore order so as to "save" reform. But it is important to underscore that this is his conception of reform-of modernization of Soviet society-not the conception of the radical reformers whom he freed to think for themselves. Indeed, President Gorbachev has probably been honestly surprised by the negative reaction in the Soviet Union and in the West to these moves; he may have expected that people would trust him, would give him leeway. In the face of a strong negative reaction from the West, President Gorbachev appears to have taken steps to limit his responsibility for some of the particularly objectionable characteristics of the rightward turn, most notably in the Baltics. He probably recognizes that his long-range hopes for modernization of the Soviet Union require maintaining an opening to the West. But modernization, and the West, are not more important than survival. Still, it is important not to lose sight of some fundamental changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union over the course of the past 6 years. Some reforms have planted roots, although it is hard to tell how deep they run. People no longer fear challenging the government and the old ways. Demonstrations of over 200,000 people in the streets of Moscow cannot be dismissed lightly. The cooperative movement, facing incredible adversity, continues to grow. (Over 6% of the Soviet labor force now works in cooperatives or is self-employed.) There are reports that the Soviet military is troubled by the prospect of being employed against its own people in the event of civil unrest. And the new leaders of the republics, although not operating from a common agenda, do seem to share a mutual interest in establishing a more pluralistic system and a more equitable distribution of power between the center and the republics. These are changes we need to encourage; they offer some chance of a different future for the Soviet Union.
Outlook
Perestroika has been a program of political and economic liberalization that was supposed to modernize the Soviet Union. President Gorbachev wanted to end stagnation. He wanted to open the way for new people and fresh thinking. He wanted to lift restraints on information to encourage the development of science and technology. He thought that if he gave the Soviet people an increased role in setting policy, increased freedom to speak and act, that he would generate more energy and commitment to strengthen the Soviet state. It appears that the Soviet leadership never recognized that increased freedom would enable people to choose how they would focus their energies. Those freed forces moved Soviet society in unforeseen directions. The leadership did not appreciate the long- smoldering embers of nationalism that were ready to flare once the empire loosened its grip of fear. They did not know that, once allowed to express their disdain for the Communist Party, the people would not devote their energies to invigorating state institutions created by the communists. Soviet leaders could not know that they were creating a crisis of legitimacy that threatened the whole system through which they had risen and which they had mastered. The Soviet leadership is trying to cope with this crisis of legitimacy by restoring "order." For them, order depends on authority. So I suspect that the Soviet Union is now in a period of what I would label "authoritarian reform." The state will be willing to use heavy-handed measures to restore what it considers to be the necessary prerequisites for a continued program of economic and social modernization. That program is likely to be marked by a series of incremental changes and a pattern of fits and starts. The greatest danger is that the "authoritarian" elements could overwhelm the reform impulse. The major issues that President Gorbachev now faces are, first, to work out effective center-republic relations, and second, to improve economic performance. As the Soviet leadership focuses its attention on these two key problems, it will certainly be willing to tamper with and limit the new political and social freedom. For now, political groups continue to operate within and outside the legislative process. There is still an exchange of ideas that would have been inconceivable 6 years ago. President Gorbachev may seek to avoid significant limits on this exchange of ideas, because he still believes it is essential for the modernization of the economy and technological growth. But openness is a means to an end in the Soviet Union; it could be curtailed significantly if it impedes the center's ability to cope with those two overriding problems. The problem of center-republic relations is fundamentally one of negotiating arrangements that achieve satisfactory political legitimacy between different levels of government and the people. It is clear that the old authority of empire operates no longer, so the center is beginning a halting process of determining the degree of autonomy necessary to achieve legitimacy.
Nationalism in the USSR
As outsiders viewing this process, we need to be careful not to examine it solely through the lens of our Western conceptions of the nation-state. Nationalism, one of the momentous movements of the l9th and 20th centuries in much of the rest of the world, has followed a somewhat different course in the Soviet Union. Russian nationalism has existed for some time, but it has been harnessed to serve the ends of Soviet communism. Russian chauvinism has antagonized many other peoples in the USSR. But the national movements in the borderland republics have only recently been freed to define their own national characters and their origins in culture, literature, language, territory, and history; they are still evolving and still exploring how they relate to one another. The relation between nationalism and the state is frequently not yet well defined. Moreover, the national movements do not fit neatly within republic boundaries. One in five Soviet citizens lives outside his ethnic republic or area. So there is substantial potential for friction and conflict among the central government, republic governments, and national movements. The search for political legitimacy, the balance between central authority and autonomy, and the accommodation of nationalism are all questions for the Soviet people to determine. They are not, of course, something that we are in a position to decide. It may be the case that the new pattern of relations worked out within the Soviet Union may not be easily described in terms of traditional nation-state sovereignty. President Gorbachev has said that the center may need to develop a different treaty relationship with each republic, and that the transitions to these new relationships might differ. It is clear, however, that the Soviet Union has not progressed far in defining appropriate concepts of power-sharing, federalism, or individual rights. On the economic front, as in the case of center-republic relations, I expect the primary objective will be to reestablish order. Some may believe that order is a prerequisite for moving the system toward market relations. The currency confiscation and the attacks on the shadow economy are designed to foster order. The price increases and compensation proposals are designed to reorder price and wage relationships. Commands to fill state orders are designed to ensure that basic supplier relationships remain in place. These moves will be complemented with other incremental actions, such as destatization, designed to restructure the industrial organization of the economy to operate more effectively in some type of competitive market format.
Worsening Economic Outlook
This economic program will almost certainly fail. The decline in production will likely accelerate. So will inflation. Large industrial enterprises are likely to move increasingly to barter relationships, unless halted by an extensive discipline campaign. Firms that can produce goods or raw materials for export in exchange for real currencies will seize that opportunity. Firms that produce products that can be bartered for food or other supplies will do so, passing the benefits through to their workforce. Enterprises that produce large, non-tradeable goods will be in trouble. Labor that controls sensitive sectors, such as energy and transport, may use its power to secure special benefits. If the agricultural sector cannot get the necessary inputs and machinery, this year's harvest could slip. The Soviet Union has a large amount of debt coming due this year, which it cannot pay, adding to the burden. The men and women at the end of the chain-the consumers- are likely to suffer even more. One of the greatest dangers of the emphasis on economic order is that it will be particularly damaging to the nascent market sector. Despite incredible obstacles, cooperatives have continued to grow and employ more workers. But they are vulnerable because they operate outside the understood rules of the command economy. Similarly, black markets have arisen to supply goods and services to people at market prices. But the association of some of these activities with the criminal sector-either as victims of it or supplied by it-leave them vulnerable to a discipline campaign. The drive for order may also inhibit some of the barter arrangements that are developing among enterprises. This proto-market system is inefficient, handicapped by lack of competition and established rules, but it is seeking to pick up where the broken-down command economy left off. In the economic area, too, the Soviet Union needs to establish a basic set of rules governing property rights, contracts, and competition. This is a matter of creating legitimacy and confidence in economic relations, roughly analogous to the task ahead in the political realm. Of course the ability to establish such economic rules of the game is fundamentally tied up with establishing the respective authorities of political units. At present, there is a "war of laws" that leaves producers, investors, workers, and consumers befuddled. Furthermore, there could be a clash between the need to establish efficient market ties over large areas and the devolution of political authority. So these two questions-of political and economic rules-will have to be resolved together. The present course appears to be one of seeking to reestablish the power of the center. This is the power system that the Soviet leadership knows, and with which the national institutions like the army, the KGB, and the Communist Party are comfortable. But President Gorbachev may sincerely believe he is using this reassertion of central authority to return to the course of perestroika. In part, the conflict is that President Gorbachev, who rose to the top of the old Soviet system, cannot fully understand an irony: that by initiating a new system he did not automatically ensure his legitimate leadership within the new system. The Soviet leadership's concept of legitimacy is limited by their own experience. They may want to reach an end result for the Soviet Union that both they and we can see would be in our mutual interest, but they believe they cannot reach that result unless they are permitted to operate with the power derived from the old system. The forces they must unleash to modernize the Soviet Union challenge their authority. Since they perceive these challenges as threats to modernization, the leadership moves to restore the old order. This could explain the increasing references by some Soviets to models of development like the Republic of Korea or Chile. We should try to persuade Soviet leaders that a reliance on the methods of the old power system will create unintended consequences that move them away from the very objectives they seek. Both efficient market economics and stable democratic politics depend on public confidence that government and the public will operate according to a set of generally understood rules. Arbitrary assertions of government power threaten such a rule- based system. It is in our interest to urge all parties in the Soviet Union to create and abide by such rules. Their own processes, operating within those rules, will have to establish the legitimacy of relations between the center and the republics, and between governments and the people.
Implications for US Policy
Perhaps for some time, we will need to maintain a flexible approach that can adjust to important problems raised by a major nation in great flux. The Soviet Union remains a military superpower with the capability to destroy the United States and, for that matter, the world as we know it. It still has approximately 30,000 nuclear warheads. Within the past two centuries, its armies have marched from the shores of the Pacific to Paris and Berlin. It has 46 nuclear power reactors of questionable construction that could erupt into an environmental and human catastrophe. Its oil and gas reserves are huge. Its borders mark an arc of other lands in transition: from the struggling democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, through the Islamic lands of the Mideast, on to South Asian countries struggling with their own religious and national conflicts, and extending to the communists of Eastern and Northern Asia who are trying to bolster bankrupt regimes. As I noted above, conditions in the Soviet Union are likely to worsen, but the specific course of the future is highly uncertain. Therefore, we need to secure the benefits we have achieved, continue to probe for other points of mutual advantage while recognizing the changed context, and seek to manage the uncertainty by multiplying our points of access with a society that is transforming itself. We need to continue to stress, through both our diplomacy and our foreign economic policy, the importance for East-West stability of the success of the fragile democratic market economies of Central and Eastern Europe. Economic decline and upheaval in the Soviet Union add one more pressure on these countries. Our policies should both help these nations achieve stable democracies and sound market economies and also facilitate their connections with the stabilizing network of Western political and economic institutions. We must do so in a way that encourages the Soviet Union to recognize that it is to its benefit to have successful examples of democratic and market transformations on its borders. In regional conflicts, it remains in our interest to work constructively with the Soviet Union to resist a reversal of "new thinking" that was designed to define and shape Soviet security differently. That thinking makes it possible to develop cooperative approaches to resolve conflicts peacefully and democratically. Some of the fundamental internal circumstances that produced a Soviet willingness to engage with us on regional issues remain. Soviet involvement in these conflicts was expensive in terms of economic and military resources and in terms of President Gorbachev's desire to improve relations with the West. We need to recognize, however, that the leadership's preoccupation with internal troubles might lead to a lack of high- level focus on some of these problems around the globe. Moreover, given the strategic readjustment that the Soviet Union has made, powerful groups are likely to be increasingly sensitive about conflicts in regions in bordering areas. It is a geopolitical reality that some in the Soviet Union will perceive that regional problems closer to home involve greater political and security interests than those at issue in Africa, Central America, or Southeast Asia.
The Arms Control Agenda
In arms control, it continues to make sense to reduce and constrain the Soviet military threat by negotiating effectively verifiable agreements. Of course the specific terms of any negotiations must serve our own national interest. We need to send a strong signal that we will not accept the rewriting of agreements already entered into and that faithful implementation will be required. We also should test whether the Soviet Union is interested in cooperating with us and others on the proliferation agenda-an arms control subject that is likely to be even more important in the future than traditional East-West discussions. The Soviet Union should have a strong interest in stopping and reversing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, because a number of those seeking to develop these destabilizing weapons are on its own borders. In any case, as the Gulf crisis highlights, we have a strong interest in vigorously pursuing the proliferation challenge. Our policy toward the Baltics should focus on two tracks. First, we need to continue to demonstrate our unequivocal support for their aspirations of independence. Of course, we never have accepted their illegal incorporation into the Soviet Union. We have demonstrated this support through words and deeds. We've met at the highest political levels with officials and representatives of the democratically elected governments of the Baltics. The President has met with all of the four top Baltic officials who have visited Washington since last May. We are maintaining a virtually continuous diplomatic presence in all three Baltic capitals. Our consul general in Leningrad supplements this presence with periodic trips to meet top Baltic leaders. We welcome the visits of these leaders to the United States. We are sending humanitarian medical supplies directly to the Baltics. And we work with the other nations of the West, through CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and other multilateral bodies, to demonstrate cohesive international support. But these steps alone will not be sufficient unless we are able to persuade the Soviet leadership to engage in peaceful negotiations to resolve those issues that stand in the way of the Baltics' goal. So our second track is to persuade Soviet leaders that such a course is in their interest. At a minimum, this course involves sending a strong, united Western signal that the use of intimidation and force is unacceptable. It also needs to involve frequent contact with Soviet leaders so we can urge them to establish mechanisms that could achieve, step-by-step, a result that satisfies the Baltic peoples. We have pointed out that the Baltics involve special circumstances because of their illegal annexation following the Nazi-Soviet pact that a commission of the Supreme Soviet itself denounced. In addition to our contacts with the center, we have sought out officials of the Soviet republics to explore their perspective on events in the Baltics. A peaceful, democratic result in the Baltics might establish a method that could help the center develop legitimate, consensual ties with the republics. Finally, it remains in our interest, as well as that of the Soviet leaders, to create a pluralistic society within the Soviet Union. This is a vital step toward the democracy and market economy that we hope will eventually result. We need to honestly recognize that our influence in this historical process will be marginal. But given the importance of the Soviet Union to the world, we should look for ways that might help the process of transformation. Given the devolution that has already taken place in Soviet society, it is in our interest to have an expanded range of contacts. Of course, these should be with republic and local leaders as well as the center. We have looked for ways to support democrats, free trade unions, and market reformers. These are courageous and admirable pioneers, people who reflect the universal human spirit of freedom and dignity. We hope they can play a greater role in their country's future. Perhaps less obvious to some, we should also expand our range of contacts with other important groups in the Soviet Union, including the military and the defense industrial sector. These are powerful groups, and we know they have been associated with the rightward swing in Soviet policy-making. But these groups or institutions also reflect the anxiety that has troubled much of Soviet society. No Soviet leader will be able to ignore the military's concern about housing and jobs for the troops withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe. No economic reform program will be politically successful if it does not address the fears of the skilled and influential workers in the defense industrial sector. Perhaps contacts with us and others in the West can help lead some of those not traditionally associated with the reform movement to recognize the potential benefits of reform and the dim prospects for a program based on old thinking. We need to face the fact, however, that while it is useful to maintain and expand these contacts, at times it will be exceedingly difficult to do so. Given the turmoil in the Soviet Union, we should expect actions, some accidental, some intentional, that offend and outrage us. When those events occur, as they already have and probably will again, we will need to send a strong message to the people involved. We need to point out that internal conditions will affect the willingness and capability of Western democracies to ease the Soviet Union's self-imposed political and economic isolation. In doing so, we need to make hard-nosed calculations about maintaining relations that are in our own national interest and could be in the long-term interest of a reformed Soviet Union. We need to have the types of dialogue with the highest levels of Soviet and republic governments that enable us to point out the unintended negative consequences that may flow from certain actions. These unintended consequences could block Soviet leaders' abilities to achieve their own positive objectives. President Gorbachev has achieved a significant legacy, but we need to explain that he risks that legacy by his own actions. The Soviet Union is in the midst of a political, economic, and social crisis. But the Soviet Union cannot solve its problems through rigid adherence to an old constitutional and political system that never achieved political legitimacy. The old system of central controls will not establish a basis of legitimacy for the future; nor will the use of intimidation and force. The Soviet Union needs to establish new relations between the government and the people. It will have to devise the institutions and degrees of autonomy that appropriately reflect the consent of the governed.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991 Title:

International Trade Agreements: Fast Track Procedures

Description: Washington, DC Date: Mar 1, 19913/1/91 Category: Reports Region: North America, South America, Central America Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade [TEXT] Following is the foreword to a report submitted by President Bush to Congress on March 1, 1991, requesting the extension of fast track procedures to facilitate passage of foreign trade legislation.
The Fast Track and Why It Is Essential
For the better part of this century, Congress and the executive have recognized that the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements require special cooperation between the two branches. In the aftermath of the record-high rates of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 and the Depression that they helped fuel, both Congress and the executive came to realize that only by working closely together in the exercise of their constitutional responsibilities could the two branches effectively bring down foreign barriers to our trade and open opportunities for US products and services in the international marketplace. This new partnership was reflected in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, which gave the President authority not only to conclude tariff-cutting agreements but also to implement them by proclamation without the need for subsequent legislation. During the following years, when the principal barriers to trade were tariffs, this arrangement proved highly successful and was responsible for the tariff reductions that promoted post-World War II economic growth, particularly in successive rounds of multilateral tariff-cutting negotiations. As countries began to rely less on tariff protection and more on non-tariff trade barriers, the scope of trade negotiations broadened, and the "fast track" procedures were created by Congress as the necessary complement to this broader trade agenda. Fast track procedures for approval of trade agreements were included by Congress in trade legislation in 1974, 1979, and again in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988 Act). While giving Congress the assurance of meaningful participation throughout the negotiating process, fast track also provides two guarantees essential to the successful negotiation of trade agreements: -- A vote on implementing legislation within a fixed period of time, and -- No amendments to that legislation. These procedures reflect an understanding that trade agreements, in which results in one area are often linked to results in others, are particularly vulnerable to multiple amendments that, while possibly small in themselves, could unravel entire agreements. Whether the balance of benefits contained in any trade agreement is in the overall interest of the United States can only be determined by looking at the whole package. Through the fast track, Congress has given the President the same bargaining power possessed by his counterparts: the ability to assure his negotiating partners that the agreement reached internationally would be the agreement voted on at home. Without fast track, the President cannot give his negotiating partners that assurance. Without that assurance, foreign governments are reluctant to negotiate with the United States and will not make the tough concessions necessary to reach agreements the United States would be willing to sign. No negotiating partner will give its bottom line knowing that the bargain could be re-opened. On the basis of fast track procedures, the United States has negotiated and implemented three remarkable trade agreements, each of which was approved by an overwhelming majority in both Houses of Congress. These agreements-the results of the Tokyo Round of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations in 1979, the free-trade agreement (FTA) with Israel in 1985, and the FTA with Canada in 1988-have reduced barriers to trade and provided a powerful engine for economic growth in the United States and worldwide. The United States has much to gain through trade agreements that open markets and provide rules for free and fair trade. Maintaining the fast track will preserve our ability to continue efforts to liberalize trade and open markets through the GATT, through other multilateral agreements, and through bilateral agreements.
Extension of Fast Track Continues a Cooperative Relationship
Fast track procedures preserve Congress' role during the negotiation, approval, and implementation of trade agreements. To ensure congressional and private sector input, the fast track statute contains extensive notification and consultation requirements. At each step along the way, from initiation through implementation, Congress is an active partner. To use the fast track for any agreement, bilateral or multilateral, the President must notify Congress 90 calendar days before signature. By the time the President gives his 90-day notification, our many private sector advisory committees must report their views on the agreement both to Congress and the President. For bilateral agreements, Congress must be given advance notice of the negotiations; during the following 60 legislative working days, either the Senate Finance or House Ways and Means Committee can vote to deny fast track treatment. Once an agreement is reached, Congress and the Administration work in close consultation to formulate implementing legislation. The process has involved the full participation of all committees of jurisdiction, and not only those committees traditionally consulted in setting trade negotiating objectives. If the agreement and its implementing legislation are still not acceptable, they can be rejected by majority vote of either house. In fact, as a result of the extensive consultations with Congress and the private sector, the agreements that have been implemented under fast track procedures enjoyed widespread support when they were presented to Congress. We find ourselves today engaged in bilateral and multilateral trade initiatives that hold unprecedented promise for the advancement of US economic objectives. With such initiatives in the balance, now is not the time to dissolve a partnership that has endured for almost 60 years.
Continuing Fast Track Is Essential to Securing Economic Gains
In incorporating the fast track in the 1988 Act, Congress expressly contemplated that an extension of the provision beyond June 1991 might be necessary and appropriate in order for the President to pursue effectively the trade policy objectives set out in the law. The continued availability of fast track procedures over the next 2 years -during which we expect to complete the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations, negotiate a North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada, and pursue the trade objectives of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative-will enable our negotiators to bring to Congress for its consideration trade agreements that will enhance the ability of the United States to compete internationally. Supporting fast track now will allow these important negotiations to go forward without in any way detracting from Congress' ability to assess each agreement on its merits when presented for approval.
The Uruguay Round.
These complex negotiations with 107 other nations (many of which are not fully integrated into the multilateral trading system) offer rich opportunities to break down trade barriers and expand the scope of international trade rules. -- Since their inception in 1986, the Uruguay Round negotiations have been conducted in 15 areas. Our objectives include more open markets, internationally agreed rules in areas not previously covered by multilateral agreements (services, investment, intellectual property rights), and institutional improvements in the GATT. The negotiations have been difficult, and important issues remain, but there has been significant progress overall toward our objectives. That progress should not be abandoned. -- The United States had hoped to conclude the Uruguay Round last December at a ministerial level meeting in Brussels. However, the status of the negotiations on several subjects at that time did not warrant conclusion-particularly on agriculture. The unwillingness of the European Community (EC), as well as Japan and Korea, to accept a framework for agricultural reform impeded progress in the negotiations in all areas. -- We are encouraged by a recent statement of GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel that all participants have now agreed to negotiate specific binding commitments in each of the key areas of agricultural reform, thus clearing the way for the resumption of negotiations. However, important differences in agriculture and other areas remain. Much hard bargaining lies ahead. -- The United States refused to accept a deficient Uruguay Round package in Brussels. Our high standards have not changed. Although ultimate success in the Uruguay Round cannot be guaranteed, we believe the United States should continue negotiations because a successful Round is overwhelmingly in our long-term economic interests.
North American FTA
. We have a historic opportunity to achieve a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico. The Mexican government has been pursuing a dramatic opening of its trading regime and has introduced market-oriented domestic reforms that benefit both Mexico and the United States. Building on those reforms and on the existing FTA we have with Canada, we can create a NAFTA that encompasses some 360 million people with almost $6 trillion in output. A comprehensive NAFTA will create growth and better jobs in all three countries, and will make us more competitive in the global marketplace. Extension of fast track will be essential for these negotiations, which are expected to begin in late Spring.
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.
An extension of fast track will also enable the United States to take steps in the next 2 years toward fulfillment of the trade objectives of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), announced in June 1990. Although it is likely that few Latin American nations will be in a position to enter into FTA negotiations with the United States before June 1993, the United States must continue to be able to respond to the increasing pace of economic liberalization in the region. The United States has an enormous stake in the future of the global trading system. Exports have become a vital source of strength to the US economy. In 1990, the nearly 8.5% growth in US exports accounted for 88% of US GNP [gross national product] growth. Since 1986, expanded exports have accounted for more than 40% of the growth in US GNP. In order to sustain the expansion of exports and consequent growth, we must continue our efforts to open world markets. We must maintain our active leadership role. Without an extension of fast track, those efforts and that role are placed in jeopardy. Preserving fast track procedures-and the partnership between Congress and the executive branch which fast track represents-will keep on course our joint efforts to liberalize trade and open markets through the initiatives described above and through other multilateral and bilateral agreements. No country stands to gain more from those efforts than the United States. As we approach the beginning of a new century, we should not hesitate to pursue the opportunities for economic growth and prosperity presented by successful trade negotiations. In order to turn those opportunities into realities, Congress and the executive must continue to work together in the manner envisioned by the fast track.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991 Title:

Human Rights in Yugoslavia

Schifter Source: Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Washington, DC Date: Feb 21, 19912/21/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Yugoslavia (former), Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights [TEXT] I am here to testify on the state of human rights in Yugoslavia. Having rejected Soviet domination as long ago as 1948, Yugoslavia embarked earlier than some of its neighbors on the road to a more open society and greater respect for human rights. But it has not as yet completed the process. In fact, as distinct from its neighbors, Yugoslavia has not made a clean break with its communist past. It appears, instead, to work its way out of it gradually, with differing rates of progress in different parts of the country. The democratic revolutionary fervor which swept the region in 1989 did, indeed, have its effect on Yugoslavia. The year 1990 saw significant movement toward increased respect for freedom of speech and freedom of religion. The League of Communists lost its monopoly on power, and freely contested multi-party elections took place in all the republics. Toward the end of the year, the Federal Assembly adopted a new press law which guaranteed freedom of information and ended the subordination of the press to the Socialist Alliance of Working People, an arm of the League of Communists. Though the ideological commitment to communism is now a matter of the past, the forms of repression which were the hallmark of Leninist governmental systems have outlasted it. Moreover, the evaporation of communist ideology in Yugoslavia has, in many parts of the country, been followed by the re-emergence of rabid forms of nationalism. Even where elections were free and fair, the parties associated with democratic freedoms, respect for the individual, and equal rights for all did not fare particularly well. The utter failure of communism is vividly demonstrated by the resurgence of extreme forms of nationalism which had been repressed rather than eliminated and which are now a threat not only to the basic rights of national minorities in the various republics but are also a threat to the Yugoslav state as an entity. Credit must, under the circumstances, be given to the political leaders who continue to appeal to reason, who speak up for principles of democracy, respect for human rights, for cooperation among the republics, for a unified Yugoslavia in which equal rights would be accorded to all, irrespective of their ethnic background and their place of residence. We wish these leaders well and hope for their success.
Ethnic Problems in Kosovo
As I mentioned earlier, freely contested multi-party elections took place in all of Yugoslavia's republics in 1990. In five of these republics, one could not quarrel with the manner in which these elections were conducted. But in one republic, Serbia, in which about 40% of Yugoslavia's population reside, the process was marred by late changes in election laws, the boycott of most Albanians in the autonomous province of Kosovo (which contains about 20% of Serbia's population), the intimidation of voters, and the manipulation of election procedures by the ruling party. Although the actual voting in most of Serbia appeared to have been conducted correctly, Serbian authorities manipulated the media, which ignored, trivialized, and disparaged opposition candidates and denied them equal access during the electoral campaign. The authorities also denied the opposition equal access to office space and financial resources and harassed opposition leaders by charging them with misdemeanors. The harassment by the authorities extended beyond opposition leaders to voters, who were warned not to vote for the opposition or risk dismissal from their jobs. The Serbian elections also were marred by the ethnic Albanian boycott of the process, which was brought about by the repressive measures undertaken earlier against the ethnic Albanian population. In Serbia it has been the Communist Party, now renamed, which has adopted a platform of nationalist extremism and has made Kosovo the issue which it now is. Kosovo plays a unique role in Serbian history. It was the Serbian heartland. In the battle of Kosovo on June 15, 1389, the Serbian kingdom lost its last major stand against the Ottoman Empire. The historic memory of the battle of Kosovo has been a part of Serbian national traditions, the subject of songs, for more than 600 years. But in recent decades, the Serbian population of Kosovo has been on the decline and the ethnic Albanian population on the increase. Serbs in Kosovo increasingly felt that they were being overrun. Many of them emigrated. Those who stayed appealed to Belgrade for help. Given the Serbian historic attachment to Kosovo, that help came in the form of repression of Albanian aspirations. The question at issue is what these aspirations are. Kosovo is now, as I noted earlier, an autonomous province within Serbia, though its autonomy has de facto been suspended. Many Albanians want more than mere autonomy. Some support the creation of a Kosovo Republic within the Yugoslav Federation. Others may advocate secession and incorporation of the area into a greater Albania. Serbians oppose the notion of a Kosovo Republic, first, because it would separate the Serbian historic heartland from the Republic of Serbia and, second, because they see it as a first step to complete secession. Tension between Serbians and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has been on the increase for the last 10 years. Conditions have worsened significantly during the last year. In 1990, there were thousands of arrests of ethnic Albanians for political advocacy, tens of thousands of politically related job dismissals, and widespread police violence. Local self-government was effectively eliminated in July of last year, when the Serbian government suspended the activities of governing bodies at the provincial and district level. Later in the year, delegates of the Kosovo legislature in an ex camera meeting approved a new constitution which declared Kosovo separate and sovereign within Yugoslavia. In reaction, Serbian authorities arrested 4 of the delegates and sought to arrest the other 107, who avoided that fate by fleeing from Serbia to other republics of Yugoslavia or leaving the country altogether. They also began legal proceedings against former Kosovo government officials. Serbian authorities also routinely and summarily sentenced thousands of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo from 30 to 60 days in jail, often on misdemeanor charges of "disturbing public order." Demonstrations by ethnic Albanians in protest of the Serb measures were broken up by police using tear gas, water cannon, and lethal gunfire. As Serbian authorities broadly define "violence" to include virtually any public advocacy of political change, political speech in Kosovo that calls for republic or independent status for the province is viewed an incitement to violence and inevitably results in prosecution and prison sentences. In contrast to other republics, restrictions on freedom of the press in Kosovo were especially severe. Almost all of Kosovo's Albanian-language media were completely suppressed, and all local Albanian-language radio and television news broadcasts were halted. The largest Albanian-language newspaper was shut down. To the human rights problems which I have just described, we need to add the growing problem of hunger among the families of some 60,000 unemployed workers and the almost complete collapse of the Albanian-language school system. Many of the workers lost their livelihood for refusing to take oaths of allegiance to Serbia as a condition for employment. Many others were dismissed for participating in the strikes of September last year. Schools, especially high schools, are being hit hard as teachers are fired for refusing to accept Serbia's new education plan. A number of schools have been closed completely, and Albanians in Kosovo expect more to follow. Meetings of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, the largest independent political group in the province, are regularly broken up by the police and the organizers often harassed and beaten up. A particularly troublesome aspect of these developments is the growing feeling among Kosovo Albanians that they have no future within Yugoslavia.
Conflict Between the Serbs and Croats
The problem posed by the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo and their treatment at the hands of the government of the Republic of Serbia is not the only problem of inter-ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia. A problem involving larger population groups is the conflict between Serbs and Croats. Croatia has a substantial Serbian population which considers itself deprived of its cultural rights and of equal opportunity in an increasingly nationalist Republic of Croatia. Serbs and Croats constitute significant percentages of the population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order for there to be civil peace in these two republics, ways must be found for the two ethnic groups to live together. Here, too, the historic memory of a much more recent date stands in the way. Serbs suffered severely during World War II from the brutalities visited upon them by the Ustashi, the paramilitary force of the pro-Nazi Croatian wartime regime. Our response to the problems which I have here described has been to call attention to them, express our concern to the Yugoslav authorities, and, as my testimony shows, to offer support to those who are trying so hard to steer Yugoslavia toward democracy, the free market, and respect for the dignity of every single individual. Whether these leaders will succeed will depend on the support that they receive from the people of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs themselves will have to set their house in order. To the extent to which we can do, so we shall try to be of help. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991 Title:

United States Stands With Colombia In the War Against Narcotics

Bush,.Gaviria Source: President Bush and Colombian President Cesar Trujillo Gaviria Description: Remarks by following their meeting at the White House, Washington, DC Date: Feb 26, 19912/26/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: South America Country: Colombia Subject: Narcotics [TEXT]
President Bush
Mr. President, it has been a privilege to meet with you and to share our thoughts on critical challenges that our countries must face together. You're a man of courage-the worthy political heir of your nation's General Santander, who said, "If the sword gave us independence, the law will give us liberty." You're a man devoted to law and to liberty, and for that, you have our admiration and respect. Today, we held a thorough and frank discussion on a range of issues of mutual concern, particularly the drug war and joint economic matters. I view this as a vital meeting. For although there is a crisis demanding our attention halfway around there world, we will not neglect the very pressing needs and opportunities in our own hemisphere. One of the most urgent of these is the fierce battle that we're waging against the scourge of drugs. President Gaviria talked to me in great detail of the efforts, the heroic efforts that Colombia is making in this fight. We honor him and his countrymen-knowing they've borne a very difficult burden in this war, and knowing that it is their survival that's at stake every day. Our hearts are with the Colombian people who have suffered so much from drug-related outlaw violence. This has included the murder of President Gaviria's own cousin only days ago by these narco-terrorists. We want to tell Colombians that they inspire us by standing up-despite intimidation, despite the costs-for justice and for law. As we spoke today, I made it clear that Colombia is not alone in this fight. Both our countries recognize that drug production and drug use threaten our futures and our very lives. We are determined to defeat this enemy. Together, I am more and more convinced, especially after these talks, that we will win this war. At the Cartagena summit, we said that we accepted our responsibility to cut drug demand in the United States. I told the President today that our work is succeeding-drug use here in the United States is on the decline. And also at that summit, we pledged to help Colombia and her neighbors in their struggle to reduce production and interrupt the transportation of drugs. And we know that battling the drug war has, indeed, meant high costs to the Colombian people. And so I'm glad to report that on February 25, our countries signed an agreement providing the first $20 million of a total $41 million to help ease the financial damage that the drug war has meant to his government's programs. And second, we've signed an innovative agreement on mutual judicial cooperation to more effectively prosecute the drug traffickers. And I told the President that we will sign a multi- million-dollar, long-term agreement expanding our support for his bold initiative to strengthen the Colombian judicial system. In addition, we know we need to offer the people of the Andes viable economic alternatives to coca production. A team led by Ambassador Ed Corr has just completed a report on how we can strengthen our cooperation on agricultural issues and make our market more accessible to legal exports. Most importantly, we've proposed the Andean Trade Initiative providing special and vitally important benefits for the Colombian producers. And I hope Congress will pass this legislation speedily. As we look ahead to the coming century, President Gaviria and I agree that we must also make trade and economic development essential priorities. Our hemisphere must see that its future lies with free markets as well as free governments. And that's why we must forge a genuine economic partnership for the future. Last year, we proposed the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, offering the hope of greater international investment, freer trade, and greatly reduced debt burdens. Colombia was the first nation to take up our offer to negotiate bilateral trade and investment framework agreements. I told the President today that we are sending to Congress legislation necessary to implement the investment, debt, and environmental aspects of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. And I assured him that I am absolutely committed to securing its passage. The people of our two nations are united as neighbors. And we are united as societies threatened by the human misery brought by drugs. But we're also united as people who believe in human rights and in the creative power of liberty. We're members of what is almost the world's first fully free hemisphere. We're battling some powerful enemies: drugs, poverty, forces opposed to democracy. But we have even more powerful resources. Simon Bolivar wrote in exile: "The veil has been torn asunder. We've already seen the light and it is not our desire to be thrust back into darkness." Well, our nations have seen the light. And our meeting today was just one more joint step in the direction of that light. I might add that we will always be grateful to Colombia for their role at the United Nations as we formulated common opposition to the forces of evil halfway around the world in the Gulf as we stood up to the aggressor, Iraq. But that proved to me that the goals are clear. Together we will succeed. And so, may God bless your wonderful people, and thank you for coming our way.
President Gaviria
Thank you, Mr. President. I want, first of all, to express in the name of the Colombian people how glad we are all because of the new order we're building with the coalition, with the cooperation of the United Nations. We are very happy for the success you have had in the Persian Gulf and the way we have built in this new order that will help all the countries, all humanity, to fight poverty, to fight narco-trafficking, and to fight the new problems we really have in our agenda. You have really told the journalists how we have talked about our common problems. First of all, narco-trafficking, and the way Colombia and the United States are committed against narco- trafficking in the world. We have been tracing the Cartagena meeting you had with [former] President [Virgilio] Barco, and we are really aware of how the United States has got results about reducing demand. That's good news for Colombian people. I have told you, and you have recognized how we have been fighting narco-trafficking; how we have improved this year the interdiction efforts Colombia is doing. We have told you about the Colombian policy, the new Colombian judicial policy. And we are very grateful for the cooperation you are giving us with this mutual judicial agreement we have got . . . yesterday. With all of the efforts, I am sure we are going to dismantle the cartels. We are going to fight narco-trafficking. We are really committed to that, and you can be sure that this scourge of humanity will end someday with the kind of effort we have been doing. We thank you for your offer to have--through this Andean initiative--and we hope, too, that someday very soon Colombia can have a free trade agreement with the United States of America.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991 Title:

Observing Black History Month

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address given at the White House, Washington, DC Date: Feb 25, 19912/25/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] I know that the issue on all of our minds is the war in the Gulf. And I'm glad to report, after consultation a few minutes ago with Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin] Powell, General Powell, that the news is good. Coalition air and ground forces are advancing on their objectives. Enemy prisoners are surrendering in large numbers-large numbers. And thus far, thank God, US and coalition casualties are few. The liberation of Kuwait is on course and on schedule. We have the initiative. We intend to keep it. We must guard against euphoria. There are battles yet to come and casualties to be borne. But make no mistake. We will prevail. Kuwait will soon be free, and America's men and women in uniform will return home to the thanks and respect of a grateful nation. This was a war thrust upon us, not a war that we sought. But naked aggression, such as we have seen, must be resisted if it is not to become a pattern. Our success in the Gulf will bring with it not just a new opportunity for peace and stability in a critical part of the world, but a chance to build a new world order based upon the principles of collective security and the rule of law. But today we're here to celebrate the proud spectrum of black achievement. For we recognize that black history, this rich tale of roots and purpose and pride, is really everyone's history. And something else, too. You know, in the midst of war we find ourselves thinking about heroes. Well, this is the time to especially think of black heroes. Those who, by their fierce conviction, showed no race has a monopoly on idealism or excellence. And we must tell stories of black successes to every child in our country because we need heroes. We need them as much as we need our dreams. And black Americans have always provided both. A few nights ago, General Tony McPeak, the Chief of Staff of our Air Force, and an old friend many of you know, Ben Payton, President of the Tuskegee University, and Judge [David] Souter of the Supreme Court, and I, the four of us-men's night out on the town-went over to Ford's Theater to see a play called the "Black Eagles." And for those who aren't aware of that, it's a play about the Tuskegee airmen of World War II, who were led by the legendary General Benjamin Davis. An incredible story of men who took their places among a very special group of heroes-black Americans who have fought for this country for over 200 years. They never received the credit; they never received the credit that they deserve for their devoted patriotism, for their vision, and their sacrifices. And America owes a long-overdue tribute to these men and women who, long before they had rights, believed in what was right. For two centuries, black soldiers have established a record of pride in the face of incredible obstacles. For not only did they risk their lives fighting for freedom for their own and for other countries, but they did it at the same time that they were being denied their own God-given freedoms at home. And think about how much they must have loved this country, how they believed in its dreams. It's an astounding devotion. It's in a league by itself. You can feel that love of country just as strongly out there in the Gulf today. Yes, we've made great progress in righting the wrongs of the past; but, tragically, racism and bigotry, illiteracy, and poverty still exist. America, of course, is not without its problems, and black Americans serving in the Gulf understand that. Yet they've chosen to serve because they fundamentally believe in this country. When these Gulf heroes come home, they'll continue to fight injustice by fighting discrimination and despair with the same commitment. And we will stand with them. So to those who question the proportion of blacks in the armed services today, my answer is simple. The military of the United States is the greatest equal opportunity employer around. Every soldier, sailor, airman, Coast Guardsman, and Marine have enlisted because they want to be a part of the American armed services, because they know it is a place of openness and true meritocracy and because they know that every serviceman and woman receives equal training, and the finest training, and equal treatment every step of the way-with education funding and technical skills which will open up unlimited futures. If anyone thinks that the military is not the place for equal opportunity and advancement, they talk to General Waller, Lt. General Waller, our Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Central Command; or Colonel Hopper, Deputy Commander of the 63rd Airlift Wing; or Air Force Colonel Randolph from Langley-Langley Air Force Base; or listen to the man sitting over my right shoulder here, who answers those who criticize the proportion of blacks by challenging all of America. Here's what General Powell-his answer-challenged the rest of this country to create the same paths of opportunity which we have in the military. Look at those brave men and women putting their lives on the line for us. And you don't see colors or creed. All you see are Americans: good, brave, dedicated Americans; Americans who volunteered, each and every single one of them, who put their devotion to country first; Americans with dignity and pride calling America back to her better self: Americans serving as equals, measured only by their abilities; America's heroes-the real thing. Thank God we have them-every single one. Today, we thank God for those who went before, for our new heroes are a part of a long tradition. The airmen in "Black Eagles" talk about it, for they made their own very special mark in the roll call of generations who battled not only their country's enemy but also their countrymen's prejudice. In the play these brave warriors explain they were "paving the way, paving the way." And it was more than two centuries ago that the first black patriots started to pave the way of freedom road. In 1774, slaves sent a plea to the royal governor of Massachusetts saying: "We have in common with all other men a natural right to our freedoms without being deprived of them by our fellow men." Seems like these sentiments might have inspired the words that Thomas Jefferson wrote 2 years later: "That all men are created equal and that they are endowed with the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." What these men sent was a message from the heart to those who would follow: Stand up for freedom; cry out for freedom; risk all for freedom. And that's what blacks have done in every war in this nation's history. They've done it with heroes like Crispus Attucks, the first American to die for the cause of his country's liberty, with heroes like the 5,000 blacks who fought in the Revolutionary War-loyal, courageous men who will at long last be honored with a memorial out here on the Mall thanks to the Patriot Foundation, which I hope we'll all support . Freedom road led nearly one-quarter million newly-freed slaves into the Civil War. Heroes emerged like the men of Fort Wagner charge-so powerfully reenacted in the movie "Glory" The black regiment lost half its men-imagine that, half its men-but won the dignity and respect that it rightfully deserved. Freedom road took black heroes up San Juan Hill with Teddy Roosevelt. And, by the way, Colin Powell has a painting of them in his office. He says he likes to look up from his desk, see them, and remember the contributions of those who went before, and, he says, reflect on what he must do to help those yet to come. Black heroes also paved freedom road on the French fields and Rhine river of World War I. But when their sons joined up 25 years later, they found there was much work left to do. And I heard a shocking story that took place right here in America in 1943, in the middle of World War II. Black soldiers stopped and tried to eat at a restaurant. Inside, German prisoners-German prisoners of war-were being served a meal, but the restaurant refused to admit the black soldiers. By the end of the war, American black soldiers had paved a victorious path, paved it in bravery and in blood. They won battles and medals. They won respect as men and acceptance as Americans. And at long last they won the integration of the armed forces. These generations of heroes risked their lives so that their grandchildren could realize a dream: the dream of having the freedom to choose to serve their country; the dream that America would be a place where the only limits on a man would be the limits of his own vision; the dream of a nation where none would be called the first black but, rather, simply the best. For, as Booker T. Washington said: "No greater injury can be done to any youth than to let him feel that because he belongs to this or that race he will be advanced regardless of his own merit or efforts." But let's face it-the dream is not yet fully realized, and there is today too much crime and too much crack and too much despair. Yet, there is also today too much faith and too much pride and too much human dignity to give up or to give in. And that's why we urgently need to turn to the tradition of black heroes today, to inspire a new generation to believe in itself and in the future. Homegrown heroes like Frederick Douglass, who fought for dignity; Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who fought for the rights of millions; Jackie Robinson, who fought just to do what he did best; like Ralph Bunche, who won the Nobel Prize; Gwendolyn Brooks, who won the Pulitzer; Jesse Owens, who won Olympic medals and the respect of the world; humanitarians and leaders from George Washington Carver to Rosa Parks to the late Mickey Leland; pioneers like Dr. Charles Drew and astronaut Ron McNair; and, of course, the man who has brought inspiration, strength, and true spirit of heroism to the world's current struggle for humanity- the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs. [Applause.] Exactly the way we all feel. But they're not the only ones. It is up to each of us. Together, we must write a new chapter in the history of civil rights, a chapter that says: Opportunity must replace despair. For opportunity means education-equipping kids with the tools they need to compete in a new century. It means freedom from drugs. Opportunity means jobs, the dignity of work. It means owning your own home-and being safe in it. Opportunity means social programs to keep families together and health care to keep them strong. And, above all, opportunity means we must treasure and defend the value of every human life. For as Langston Hughes wrote, "There's a dream in this land with its back against the wall; to save the dream for one, it must be saved for all. This is an ideal place for us to commit ourselves to writing that chapter. For in this very room, 27 years ago, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became law-a long overdue payment on a promissory note of equality signed two centuries before. But as long as discrimination-borne of ignorance and inhumanity-still exists, our work is not yet finished. And as long as the four horsemen of the American night-illiteracy, inequality, indigence, and fear-threaten any of us, our work is not yet finished. And so we must, as a nation, pledge that never again will the individual be degraded and devalued, that we will remember the Black Eagles, who soared from bigotry on earth to equality in the skies. I am committed to civil rights and opportunity for every person in this great country. And I will simply say to all of you: I salute you. I thank you for coming here to share this very special day with all of America. At this special time in our history, may God bless those who are serving us halfway around the world. May they be treated with respect and the dignity that they deserve when they come back home having freed another country. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991 Title:

Observing Black History Month

Eagleburger Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger Description: Address before State Department employees at the Department of State,Washington, DC Date: Feb 26, 19912/26/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department [TEXT] I am pleased to be able to join you today for the Department's annual observance of Black History Month. This occasion is just as important for non-black Americans as it is for African-Americans. All Americans, no matter what their color, bear the burden of a terrible legacy, one that cannot be overcome simply by changing laws. Only by changing minds can we put that legacy behind us once and for all. And so Black History Month-American Black History Month-is an occasion for all of us to do justice to the silent and long-neglected contributions of African-Americans to our nation's history and their contributions toward making America the rich, tolerant, and multicultural example that we want it to be. This year's theme-"Educating America: Black Colleges and Universities, Strengths and Crises"-honors the many and distinguished contributions of black academia to our nation's intellectual and cultural patrimony. It is particularly fitting that we address this theme at a time when restoring excellence in education has been recognized as one of our nation's highest priorities: first, because the black institutions already have a track record of excellence which has gone unrecognized for far too long; second, because they will play a major role in developing future generations of leaders; and, third, because the black colleges and universities are a focal point of our own efforts to build a more diverse Department of State. The historically black colleges and universities, schools like Spelman, Morehouse, Howard, and Lincoln, have served as the launching pad for meaningful black participation in the mainstream of American society. In the past, when the collective American vision was blighted by racism and prejudice, when blacks did not have other educational opportunities, these schools educated some of America's best and brightest. They have given us cabinet secretaries, chief executive officers, Supreme Court Justices, and leaders in the arts. Not to bore you with statistics, but 75% of all black Americans with doctoral degrees, 75% of all black military officers, and 85% of all black physicians are graduates of black colleges and universities. Not only have many black Americans received their primary training at such institutions, but they have then competed successfully at America's most elite graduate and professional schools. Black colleges are important not only for black Americans but for all Americans, because they have helped us to build a more diverse America and because they have helped us to build a more competent and competitive America. Last year, I addressed the annual conference of the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, an umbrella group for many black colleges and universities. I spoke of the need for the Department of State to reflect our nation's heterogeneity. I also noted that black Americans who have sacrificed so much to build and defend this country-and we need no better reminder of this than to think of all our young men and women in the Gulf today- must be given a truly equal opportunity to serve as the architects of US foreign policy and the voice and personification of America abroad. We are making progress toward this end, but it is still much too slow. In spite of improvements over the past 5 years, the percentage of black Americans in the Department's professional work force is still not what it should be. The Foreign Service will not be able to represent America overseas as it should until it becomes representative of all Americans, as it must. In order to become truly representative, we are going to need the assistance of the historically black colleges and universities. We have before us a unique opportunity to work with these schools to sell careers in the State Department and the Foreign Service to young black Americans. I am glad to report that, under the leadership of our Director General, we are pursuing this partnership aggressively. This year, under the Diplomat-in-Residence Program, five senior US diplomats have been assigned to black colleges. While teaching is an important part of their responsibilities, they know that their mission is to go further: to provide an example, to stir an interest, to help promising young students see that a career in foreign affairs can be theirs. As concrete follow-up to the Diplomat-in-Residence Program, the Department has increased dramatically its recruitment efforts. In the last year, our officers have made 46 recruiting trips to 46 black colleges to seek undergraduates for the Department's summer internship programs and encourage them to apply for permanent Foreign and Civil Service career positions. Finally, our FY 1990 and 1991 authorizing legislation gave us authority to make grants for international affairs programs and scholarships which would directly benefit minority individuals and institutions. You all know how tight our budget situation is these days, but we are making a major effort to identify seed money to start these programs on a trial basis. I should also note that the Agency for International Development has on-going relationships with a number of historically black colleges and universities and has provided over $29 million to these schools for development-related activities. Moreover, university faculty members have come to the Department in recent years on sabbatical, and we will be looking to expand this program to the historically black colleges as well. In closing, I want to salute the many black Americans who in their own ways, great and small, have helped make America what it is today. Their legacy is being writ anew by the thousands of black Americans in uniform who, as we gather here this morning, are once again defending the best of what America stands for. I also want to pay tribute to the many black colleges and universities which, by educating generations of American leaders, not only opened doors but also opened this country's eyes to the rightness and richness of real equal opportunity for all. Finally, I pledge that we will continue to work closely and creatively with the black colleges and universities in our efforts to achieve a diverse Department of State-truly representative of the American people and worthy of the values for which we stand. (###)