US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991
Title: Kuwait Is Liberated
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address to the nation from the Oval Office; Washington,
DC
Date: Feb 27, 19912/27/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military
objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis in
control of their own destiny.
We share in their joy-a joy tempered only by our compassion
for their ordeal. Tonight, the Kuwaiti flag once again flies above
the capital of a free and sovereign nation, and the American flag
flies above our embassy.
Seven months ago, America and the world drew a line in the
sand. We declared that the aggression against Kuwait would not
stand. And tonight America and the world have kept their word.
This is not a time of euphoria; certainly not a time to gloat.
But it is a time of pride-pride in our troops; pride in the friends
who stood with us in the crisis; pride in our nation and the people
whose strength and resolve made victory quick, decisive, and just.
And soon we will open wide our arms to welcome back home
to America our magnificent fighting forces.
No one country can claim this victory as its own. It was not
only a victory for Kuwait but a victory for all the coalition
partners.
This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for
the rule of law, and for what is right.
After consulting with Secretary of Defense Cheney, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell, and our
coalition partners, I am pleased to announce that at midnight
tonight, Eastern Standard Time, exactly 100 hours since ground
operations commenced and 6 weeks since the start of Desert Storm,
all US and coalition forces will suspend offensive combat
operations.
It is up to Iraq whether this suspension on the part of the
coalition becomes a permanent cease-fire.
Cease-fire Terms
Coalition political and military terms for a formal cease-fire
include the following requirements.
Iraq must release immediately all coalition prisoners of war,
third-country nationals, and the remains of all who have fallen.
Iraq must release all Kuwaiti detainees. Iraq also must inform
Kuwaiti authorities of the location and nature of all land and sea
mines. Iraq must comply fully with all relevant UN Security Council
resolutions. This includes a rescinding of Iraq's August decision to
annex Kuwait and acceptance in principle of Iraq's responsibility to
pay compensation for the loss, damage, and injury its aggression
has caused.
The coalition calls upon the Iraqi government to designate
military commanders to meet within 48 hours with their coalition
counterparts at a place in the theater of operations to be specified
to arrange for military aspects of the cease-fire. Further, I have
asked Secretary of State Baker to request that the UN Security
Council meet to formulate the necessary arrangements for this war
to be ended.
This suspension of offensive combat operations is contingent
upon Iraq's not firing upon any coalition forces and not launching
Scud missiles against any other country. If Iraq violates these
terms, coalition forces will be free to resume military operations.
At every opportunity, I have said to the people of Iraq that our
quarrel was not with them but, instead, with their leadership-and
above all with Saddam Hussein. This remains the case. You, the
people of Iraq, are not our enemy. We do not seek your destruction.
We have treated your POWs with kindness. Coalition forces fought
this war only as a last resort and look forward to the day when Iraq
is led by people prepared to live in peace with their neighbors.
We must now begin to look beyond victory and war. We must
meet the challenge of securing the peace. In the future, as before,
we will consult with our coalition partners. We have already done a
good deal of thinking and planning for the postwar period, and
Secretary Baker has already begun to consult with our coalition
partners on the region's challenges. There can be, and will be, no
solely American answer to all these challenges. But we can assist
and support the countries of the region and be a catalyst for peace.
In this spirit, Secretary Baker will go to the region next week to
begin a new round of consultations.
This war is now behind us. Ahead of us is the difficult task of
securing a potentially historic peace. Tonight, though, let us be
proud of what we have accomplished. Let us give thanks to those
who risked their lives. Let us never forget those who gave their
lives. May God bless our valiant military forces and their families,
and let us all remember them in our prayers.
Good night, and may God bless the United States of America.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991
Title: United Nations Resolution 686 on Iraq
Description: New York, NY
Date: Mar 2, 19913/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations,
Democratization
[TEXT]
Resolution 686 (March 2, 1991)
The Security Council,
Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661
(1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667
(1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990), 677 (1990), and 678
(1990),
Recalling the obligations of Member States under Article 25
of the Charter,
Recalling paragraph 9 of resolution 661 (1990) regarding
assistance to the Government of Kuwait and paragraph 3(c) of that
resolution regarding supplies strictly for medical purposes and, in
humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs,
Taking note of the letters of the Foreign Minister of Iraq
confirming Iraq's agreement to comply fully with all of the
resolutions noted above (S/22275), and stating its intention to
release prisoners of war immediately (S/22273),
Taking note of the suspension of offensive combat operations
by the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with
Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990),
Bearing in mind the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful
intentions, and the objective in resolution 678 (1990) of restoring
international peace and security in the region,
Underlining the importance of Iraq taking the necessary
measures which would permit a definitive end to the hostilities,
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and
Kuwait, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States
cooperating under paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 678
(1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as
possible consistent with achieving the objectives of the resolution,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
1. Affirms that all twelve resolutions noted above continue
to have full force and effect;
2. Demands that Iraq implement its acceptance of all twelve
resolutions noted above and in particular that Iraq:
(a) Rescind immediately its actions purporting to annex
Kuwait;
(b) Accept in principle its liability under international law
for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third
States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;
(c) Immediately release under the auspices of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Red Cross Societies, or
Red Crescent Societies, all Kuwaiti and third country nationals
detained by Iraq and return the remains of any deceased Kuwaiti and
third country nationals so detained; and
(d) Immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized
by Iraq, to be completed in the shortest possible period;
3. Further demands that Iraq:
(a) Cease hostile or provocative actions by its forces against
all Member States, including missile attacks and flights of combat
aircraft;
(b) Designate military commanders to meet with counterparts
from the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with
Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) to arrange for the
military aspects of a cessation of hostilities at the earliest
possible time;
(c) Arrange for immediate access to and release of all
prisoners of war under the auspices of the International Committee
of the Red Cross, Red Cross Societies, or Red Crescent Societies,
and return the remains of any deceased personnel of the forces of
Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to
resolution 678 (1990); and
(d) Provide all information and assistance in identifying Iraqi
mines, booby traps and other explosives as well as any chemical and
biological weapons and material in Kuwait, in areas of Iraq where
forces of Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to
resolution 678 (1990) are present temporarily, and in the adjacent
waters;
4. Recognizes that during the period required for Iraq to
comply with paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the provisions of paragraph 2
of resolution 678 (1990) remain valid.
5. Welcomes the decision of Kuwait and the Member States
cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) to
provide access and to commence immediately the release of Iraqi
prisoners of war as required by the terms of the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949, under the auspices of the International
Committee of the Red Cross;
6. Requests all Member States, as well as the United Nations,
the specialized agencies and other international organizations in
the United Nations system, to take all appropriate action to
cooperate with the Government and people of Kuwait in the
reconstruction of their country;
7. Decides that Iraq shall notify the Secretary-General and
the Security Council when it has taken the actions set out above;
8. Decides that in order to secure the rapid establishment of
a definitive end to the hostilities, the Security Council remains
actively seized of the matter.
VOTE: 11 for, 1 against (Cuba), 3 abstentions (China, India,
Yemen). (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991
Title: UN Statements on the Persian Gulf
Source: Security Council President
Description: Statement; New York, New York
Date: Mar 3, 19913/3/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization,
United Nations
[TEXT]
The council welcomes the decisions taken to date relating to food
and medical needs by the committee established under Resolution
661 including those just taken to facilitate the provision of
humanitarian assistance including infant formula and water
purification material.
It urges the committee to pay particular attention to the
findings and recommendations on critical medical/public health and
nutritional conditions in Iraq which have been and will continue to
be submitted to it by the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, and other relevant
organizations, consistent with the relevant resolutions, and urges
these humanitarian agencies to play an active role in this process
and cooperate closely with the committee in its work.
It calls upon the committee to continue to act promptly on
requests submitted to it for humanitarian assistance.
The council welcomes the Secretary General's announcement
that he plans to send urgently a mission led by Under Secretary
General Martti Ahtisaari, comprising representatives of the
appropriate UN agencies, to Iraq and Kuwait to assess the
humanitarian needs arising in the immediate post crisis
environment. The council invites the Secretary General to keep it
informed in the shortest possible time on the progress of his
mission on which it pledges to take immediate action.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991
Title: Statements on the Persian Gulf
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Opening statement from a White House news conference;
Washington, DC
Date: Mar 1, 19913/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
In the hours since we suspended military operations in the Kuwaiti
theater of war, considerable progress has been made in moving
toward a cease-fire and post-war planning. As our forces moved
into Kuwait City, and as the faces of these jubilant Kuwaiti
citizens have warmed our hearts, the coalition leaders started the
arduous task of addressing the next stages of the Persian Gulf
situation.
As a first order of business this afternoon, I want to thank
the American people for the affection and support that they have
shown for our troops in the Middle East. In towns and cities across
this nation, our citizens have felt a sense of purpose and unity in
the accomplishment of our military that is a welcome addition to
the American spirit. And as our servicemen and women begin
coming home, as they will soon, I look forward to the many
celebrations of their achievement.
In the meantime, we are focused on the many diplomatic tasks
associated with ending this conflict. General Khalid, General
Schwarzkopf, and other coalition military leaders of our forces in
the Gulf will meet with representatives of Iraq tomorrow
afternoon, March 2, in the theater of operations to discuss the
return of POWs and other military matters related to the cease-
fire. We will not discuss the location of the meeting for obvious
security reasons. But this is an important step in securing the
victory that our forces have achieved.
Work is proceeding in New York at the United Nations on the
political aspects of ending the war. We've welcomed here in
Washington this week the envoys of several of our close friends and
allies. And shortly, Secretary Baker will be leaving for a new round
of consultations that I am confident will advance planning for the
war's aftermath. Again, and as I said Wednesday evening, the true
challenge before us will be securing the peace. . . .
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991
Title: Address to the Nation on Iraq
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address to the nation from the White House; Washington,
DC
Date: Feb 26, 19912/26/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
I have a brief statement to make today. Saddam's most recent
speech is an outrage. He is not withdrawing. His defeated forces
are retreating. He is trying to claim victory in the midst of a rout,
and he is not voluntarily giving up Kuwait. He is trying to save the
remnants of power and control in the Middle East by every means
possible. And here, too, Saddam Hussein will fail.
Saddam is not interested in peace but only to regroup and
fight another day, and he does not renounce Iraq's claim to Kuwait.
To the contrary, he makes clear that Iraq continues to claim Kuwait.
Nor is there any evidence of remorse for Iraq's aggression or any
indication that Saddam is prepared to accept the responsibility for
the awful consequences of that aggression.
He still does not accept UN Security Council resolutions or the
coalition terms of February 22, including the release of our POWs-
all POWs-third-country detainees, and an end to the pathological
destruction of Kuwait. The coalition will therefore continue to
prosecute the war with undiminished intensity.
As we announced last night, we will not attack unarmed
soldiers in retreat. We have no choice but to consider retreating
combat units as a threat and respond accordingly. Anything else
would risk additional US and coalition casualties.
The best way to avoid further casualties on both sides is for
the Iraqi soldiers to lay down their arms as nearly 30,000 Iraqis
already have. It is time for all Iraqi forces in the theater of
operation, those occupying Kuwait, those supporting the occupation
of Kuwait, to lay down their arms. And that will stop the bloodshed.
From the beginning of the air operation nearly 6 weeks ago, I
have said that our efforts are on course and on schedule. This
morning I am very pleased to say that coalition efforts are ahead of
schedule. The liberation of Kuwait is close at hand.
And let me just add that I share the pride of all of the
American people in the magnificent, heroic performance of our
armed forces. May God bless them and keep them.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991
Title: Soviet Disunion: The American Response
Zoellick
Source: Robert B. Zoellick, Counselor of the
Department
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on European Affairs
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Feb 28, 19912/28/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization, Regional/Civil Unrest,
Trade/Economics, Arms Control
[TEXT]
I am pleased to have this opportunity to report on recent events in
the Soviet Union and the American response. I have organized my
statement to cover four topics:
-- Key tenets of US policy toward the Soviet Union, 1989-90;
-- Analysis of recent events;
-- Outlook; and
-- Implications for US policy.
Key Tenets of US Policy Toward the Soviet Union, 1989-90
In analyzing our future course, it is useful to review the key
elements of our present policy. It establishes a baseline and
explains the reasoning behind our current path.
The President stated in May 1989 that it was time for us to
move "beyond containment." Given the break in traditional patterns
of Soviet behavior, we felt it was important to seize the possibility
to achieve long-term Western goals while also opening the way for
the USSR to play a constructive part in the international community.
Secretary Baker explained our approach toward the Soviet
Union in speeches he gave in April and October 1989; he then
reviewed our progress and explained our ongoing strategy in a third
speech in October of 1990.
In brief, our strategy has been to explore and develop possible
points of mutual advantage for both the United States and the
Soviet Union. Our logic has been to probe the "new thinking" in
Soviet foreign policy, seeking to shape and, where possible, to alter
Soviet policy calculations so that the Soviets might face up to the
contradictions between the new thinking and old habits. We sought
to formulate proposals in ways that emphasized benefits to both
parties. In doing so, we strove to escape from the old East-West,
zero-sum logic that a gain for one was a loss for the other.
Our strategy required us to broaden and deepen our agenda
with the Soviets. We added new items. We proposed new approaches.
Our first objective was to work with the Soviets to
overcome the division of Europe, the original cause of the Cold War.
After many decades, Western resolve and NATO's protection had led
to free and prosperous countries next door to dictatorship. When
the people behind the Iron Curtain-confronted with such disparity-
chose freedom, we sought to persuade the Soviets that the peaceful
emergence of democratic governments and market economies
throughout Central and Eastern Europe would benefit all of us-East
and West. The old illegitimate regimes were decaying because they
did not reflect the consent of the governed and could not tap the
free will of free men; their perpetuation would be costly both in
economic terms and in preventing the Soviet Union from achieving
the opening to the West that it sought. Our approach was
cooperative and reassuring, not threatening. This approach-an
effort not to singularize or isolate any party in Europe that
respected the moves toward freedom-was important in bringing
about German unification peacefully and democratically.
Second, we stressed our common interest in resolving
regional conflicts peacefully, often seeking to rely on elections as a
means of establishing legitimacy and the local popular will. To
create an appropriate context for elections, we sought to use our
respective influence to persuade conflicting parties that the use of
arms would not produce an enduring solution. This has been the
approximate formula for our cooperative efforts in Nicaragua,
Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan. The experience provided the
basis for the immediate joint US-Soviet denunciation of Iraq's
attack on Kuwait-the joint statement of Secretary Baker and
Minister Shevardnadze on August 3-which in turn provided the basis
for unprecedented UN and multinational action.
Third, we sought to demonstrate our support for
perestroika in practical ways. We expanded our human rights
agenda with the Soviets through an effort to institutionalize these
rights by building the rule of law. We started a program of
technical economic cooperation to encourage the development of
market reforms. We explored our common interest in addressing
transnational challenges, such as narcotics, terrorism, and the
environment.
Fourth, we expanded the arms control agenda with two
efforts: we pressed to address the imbalance in conventional
weapons in Europe, and we explored our mutual interest in halting
and reversing the build-up of new weapons of mass destruction.
These efforts produced the CFE [conventional armed forces in
Europe] and chemical weapons destruction agreements.
A Successful Record
I think this strategy has built a successful record, although there is
no doubt that our work is far from finished. The Red Army is
departing Central and Eastern Europe. The nations behind the old
Iron Curtain now have an opportunity to chart a new course of
democracy and market economics. We have taken significant steps
toward constraining and channeling the Soviet military threat
through arms control. We have seen the Soviet impulse toward
adventurism diminish, and we have also helped to foster Soviet
cooperation in regional conflicts around the globe. And we
demonstrated our good faith commitment to support political and
economic reform in the Soviet Union if that is a course to which the
Soviet leadership remains committed.
The increased uncertainty about the future course of the
Soviet Union has three major implications for this strategy.
One, we should seek to secure those benefits that we
have achieved over recent years.
Two, we should continue to explore the possibility of
finding new points of mutual advantage between the Soviet Union
and the United States, but do so in a way that recognizes the
changed context.
Three, we should try to manage uncertainty by
multiplying our channels of information and increasing our points of
access with a rapidly changing Soviet society.
Analysis of Recent Events
The Soviet Union is a vast country. The motivations, fears, and
interests of its diverse peoples are enormously complex. The
Kremlin is certainly not the sole locus of influence, but the
political scene has been dominated by the interplay of many forces
in Soviet society with the actions of a particular leader. Therefore,
I wanted to offer you one possible analysis of how recent changes
may have affected President Gorbachev's perspective and the path
of Soviet policy.
In October 1989, Secretary Baker made an observation on the
Soviet reform effort that is a useful point of departure for
reviewing the course of recent events there. He said:
"President Gorbachev wants to remake the Soviet Union. That's
what perestroika and glasnost are all about. That may not have been
his aim in 1985, but the failures of the early reform efforts
convinced him and his colleagues that change must dig deeper into
Soviet society. These are utilitarian, purposeful, and determined
men-we should recognize that they are not pursuing freedom for
freedom's sake. Their aim is to modernize the Soviet Union, but
their frame of reference is not the Age of Reason or the spirit of
the Enlightenment. They are the descendants of other great Russian
modernizers-like Peter the Great and Alexander II-fundamentally
rooted in the unique Russian experience."
As a modernizer and as a balancer of political forces, President
Gorbachev faced success, deterioration, and dilemmas in the late
summer of 1990.
By unleashing the truth, he had begun to expose the terrible
record of communism. The old system was discredited. Indeed, in
July, Gorbachev rallied popular resentment to inflict a stunning
defeat of the old guard at the Communist Party congress.
Yet he had nothing to substitute for the party's control of
state and society, and problems pressed in from all sides. The new
openness seemed to be dismantling institutional capabilities and
societal norms at a rapid pace. State institutions-executive and
legislative-appeared unable to step into the breach. There was an
erosion of executive power at all levels. Legislatures could debate,
but seemed unable to act coherently; their passage of laws did not
translate into action.
The economic situation continued to worsen. Movements
calling for increased autonomy, or even secession, complicated the
difficult tasks of creating a new civil society and new economic
relationships. All this disorder, however explicable and perhaps
unavoidable, tapped deep-seated Russian fears. The society and
economy seemed to be disintegrating, and yet no one seemed to be
able to do anything about it.
Despite the hopes and excitement the reformers generated,
they seemed unable to serve as an effective counterweight; they
could not yet help balance those forces in society that were
frightened and threatened by the changes. That is why [Foreign
Minister] Shevardnadze sought to give them a "wake-up call,"
warning of the need for reformers to pull themselves together.
Solutions From the Right
In contrast, the institutions on the right may have seemed to
Gorbachev to offer straightforward, understandable solutions to
these problems-even though they are not real answers. Moreover,
the army, the KGB, the defense industrial complex, and the
Communist Party all remain powerful constituencies. All felt
threatened by recent events. Just as important, these are all
national institutions, tools that the Soviet leadership might use to
counter the forces that it probably perceived as undermining its
modernization of the Soviet Union.
In sum, President Gorbachev may have perceived internal
economic and political problems that gave him less freedom to
maneuver; lack of support (or even a threat) from radical reformers
wanting to move quickly toward real democracy, capitalism, and
republic independence; and forces on the right that offered apparent
solutions and familiar tools to deal with their own anxieties and
those of the society at large.
So Gorbachev turned to the right, in his view, to preserve his
credibility as a leader and to preserve the union. In September
[1990], Gorbachev rejected Shatalin's "500 Day Plan" and spurned
the reformers. He retained Ryzhkov as his prime minister,
affirming his intention not to abandon the existing governmental
structure. In October, Gorbachev secured adoption of a more vaguely
worded compromise economic reform program. In December, he got
vast new presidential powers to implement this program. Also in
December, Gorbachev made key personnel changes at the interior and
justice ministries and secured stronger enforcement powers for the
KGB and military to act internally. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
resigned, warning of dictatorship. By the end of the year, almost all
of Gorbachev's perestroika team had departed. Finally, in January,
the Soviet leadership opted for intimidation in the Baltics, which
became a show of force and then violence.
Gorbachev may well believe that, given the pressures he
faces, he must act forcefully to restore order so as to "save"
reform. But it is important to underscore that this is his
conception of reform-of modernization of Soviet society-not the
conception of the radical reformers whom he freed to think for
themselves. Indeed, President Gorbachev has probably been honestly
surprised by the negative reaction in the Soviet Union and in the
West to these moves; he may have expected that people would trust
him, would give him leeway.
In the face of a strong negative reaction from the West,
President Gorbachev appears to have taken steps to limit his
responsibility for some of the particularly objectionable
characteristics of the rightward turn, most notably in the Baltics.
He probably recognizes that his long-range hopes for modernization
of the Soviet Union require maintaining an opening to the West. But
modernization, and the West, are not more important than survival.
Still, it is important not to lose sight of some fundamental
changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union over the course of
the past 6 years. Some reforms have planted roots, although it is
hard to tell how deep they run. People no longer fear challenging
the government and the old ways. Demonstrations of over 200,000
people in the streets of Moscow cannot be dismissed lightly. The
cooperative movement, facing incredible adversity, continues to
grow. (Over 6% of the Soviet labor force now works in cooperatives
or is self-employed.) There are reports that the Soviet military is
troubled by the prospect of being employed against its own people
in the event of civil unrest. And the new leaders of the republics,
although not operating from a common agenda, do seem to share a
mutual interest in establishing a more pluralistic system and a
more equitable distribution of power between the center and the
republics. These are changes we need to encourage; they offer some
chance of a different future for the Soviet Union.
Outlook
Perestroika has been a program of political and economic
liberalization that was supposed to modernize the Soviet Union.
President Gorbachev wanted to end stagnation. He wanted to open
the way for new people and fresh thinking. He wanted to lift
restraints on information to encourage the development of science
and technology. He thought that if he gave the Soviet people an
increased role in setting policy, increased freedom to speak and act,
that he would generate more energy and commitment to strengthen
the Soviet state.
It appears that the Soviet leadership never recognized that
increased freedom would enable people to choose how they would
focus their energies. Those freed forces moved Soviet society in
unforeseen directions. The leadership did not appreciate the long-
smoldering embers of nationalism that were ready to flare once the
empire loosened its grip of fear. They did not know that, once
allowed to express their disdain for the Communist Party, the
people would not devote their energies to invigorating state
institutions created by the communists. Soviet leaders could not
know that they were creating a crisis of legitimacy that threatened
the whole system through which they had risen and which they had
mastered.
The Soviet leadership is trying to cope with this crisis of
legitimacy by restoring "order." For them, order depends on
authority.
So I suspect that the Soviet Union is now in a period of what I
would label "authoritarian reform." The state will be willing to use
heavy-handed measures to restore what it considers to be the
necessary prerequisites for a continued program of economic and
social modernization. That program is likely to be marked by a
series of incremental changes and a pattern of fits and starts. The
greatest danger is that the "authoritarian" elements could
overwhelm the reform impulse.
The major issues that President Gorbachev now faces are,
first, to work out effective center-republic relations, and second,
to improve economic performance.
As the Soviet leadership focuses its attention on these two
key problems, it will certainly be willing to tamper with and limit
the new political and social freedom. For now, political groups
continue to operate within and outside the legislative process.
There is still an exchange of ideas that would have been
inconceivable 6 years ago. President Gorbachev may seek to avoid
significant limits on this exchange of ideas, because he still
believes it is essential for the modernization of the economy and
technological growth. But openness is a means to an end in the
Soviet Union; it could be curtailed significantly if it impedes the
center's ability to cope with those two overriding problems.
The problem of center-republic relations is fundamentally one
of negotiating arrangements that achieve satisfactory political
legitimacy between different levels of government and the people.
It is clear that the old authority of empire operates no longer, so
the center is beginning a halting process of determining the degree
of autonomy necessary to achieve legitimacy.
Nationalism in the USSR
As outsiders viewing this process, we need to be careful not to
examine it solely through the lens of our Western conceptions of the
nation-state. Nationalism, one of the momentous movements of the
l9th and 20th centuries in much of the rest of the world, has
followed a somewhat different course in the Soviet Union. Russian
nationalism has existed for some time, but it has been harnessed to
serve the ends of Soviet communism. Russian chauvinism has
antagonized many other peoples in the USSR. But the national
movements in the borderland republics have only recently been
freed to define their own national characters and their origins in
culture, literature, language, territory, and history; they are still
evolving and still exploring how they relate to one another. The
relation between nationalism and the state is frequently not yet
well defined.
Moreover, the national movements do not fit neatly within
republic boundaries. One in five Soviet citizens lives outside his
ethnic republic or area. So there is substantial potential for
friction and conflict among the central government, republic
governments, and national movements.
The search for political legitimacy, the balance between
central authority and autonomy, and the accommodation of
nationalism are all questions for the Soviet people to determine.
They are not, of course, something that we are in a position to
decide.
It may be the case that the new pattern of relations worked
out within the Soviet Union may not be easily described in terms of
traditional nation-state sovereignty. President Gorbachev has said
that the center may need to develop a different treaty relationship
with each republic, and that the transitions to these new
relationships might differ. It is clear, however, that the Soviet
Union has not progressed far in defining appropriate concepts of
power-sharing, federalism, or individual rights.
On the economic front, as in the case of center-republic
relations, I expect the primary objective will be to reestablish
order. Some may believe that order is a prerequisite for moving the
system toward market relations. The currency confiscation and the
attacks on the shadow economy are designed to foster order. The
price increases and compensation proposals are designed to reorder
price and wage relationships. Commands to fill state orders are
designed to ensure that basic supplier relationships remain in place.
These moves will be complemented with other incremental
actions, such as destatization, designed to restructure the
industrial organization of the economy to operate more effectively
in some type of competitive market format.
Worsening Economic Outlook
This economic program will almost certainly fail. The decline in
production will likely accelerate. So will inflation. Large
industrial enterprises are likely to move increasingly to barter
relationships, unless halted by an extensive discipline campaign.
Firms that can produce goods or raw materials for export in
exchange for real currencies will seize that opportunity. Firms that
produce products that can be bartered for food or other supplies
will do so, passing the benefits through to their workforce.
Enterprises that produce large, non-tradeable goods will be in
trouble. Labor that controls sensitive sectors, such as energy and
transport, may use its power to secure special benefits. If the
agricultural sector cannot get the necessary inputs and machinery,
this year's harvest could slip. The Soviet Union has a large amount
of debt coming due this year, which it cannot pay, adding to the
burden. The men and women at the end of the chain-the consumers-
are likely to suffer even more.
One of the greatest dangers of the emphasis on economic order
is that it will be particularly damaging to the nascent market
sector. Despite incredible obstacles, cooperatives have continued
to grow and employ more workers. But they are vulnerable because
they operate outside the understood rules of the command economy.
Similarly, black markets have arisen to supply goods and services
to people at market prices. But the association of some of these
activities with the criminal sector-either as victims of it or
supplied by it-leave them vulnerable to a discipline campaign. The
drive for order may also inhibit some of the barter arrangements
that are developing among enterprises. This proto-market system
is inefficient, handicapped by lack of competition and established
rules, but it is seeking to pick up where the broken-down command
economy left off.
In the economic area, too, the Soviet Union needs to establish
a basic set of rules governing property rights, contracts, and
competition. This is a matter of creating legitimacy and confidence
in economic relations, roughly analogous to the task ahead in the
political realm. Of course the ability to establish such economic
rules of the game is fundamentally tied up with establishing the
respective authorities of political units. At present, there is a
"war of laws" that leaves producers, investors, workers, and
consumers befuddled. Furthermore, there could be a clash between
the need to establish efficient market ties over large areas and the
devolution of political authority. So these two questions-of
political and economic rules-will have to be resolved together.
The present course appears to be one of seeking to reestablish
the power of the center. This is the power system that the Soviet
leadership knows, and with which the national institutions like the
army, the KGB, and the Communist Party are comfortable. But
President Gorbachev may sincerely believe he is using this
reassertion of central authority to return to the course of
perestroika.
In part, the conflict is that President Gorbachev, who rose to
the top of the old Soviet system, cannot fully understand an irony:
that by initiating a new system he did not automatically ensure his
legitimate leadership within the new system. The Soviet
leadership's concept of legitimacy is limited by their own
experience. They may want to reach an end result for the Soviet
Union that both they and we can see would be in our mutual interest,
but they believe they cannot reach that result unless they are
permitted to operate with the power derived from the old system.
The forces they must unleash to modernize the Soviet Union
challenge their authority. Since they perceive these challenges as
threats to modernization, the leadership moves to restore the old
order. This could explain the increasing references by some Soviets
to models of development like the Republic of Korea or Chile.
We should try to persuade Soviet leaders that a reliance on
the methods of the old power system will create unintended
consequences that move them away from the very objectives they
seek. Both efficient market economics and stable democratic
politics depend on public confidence that government and the public
will operate according to a set of generally understood rules.
Arbitrary assertions of government power threaten such a rule-
based system. It is in our interest to urge all parties in the Soviet
Union to create and abide by such rules. Their own processes,
operating within those rules, will have to establish the legitimacy
of relations between the center and the republics, and between
governments and the people.
Implications for US Policy
Perhaps for some time, we will need to maintain a flexible approach
that can adjust to important problems raised by a major nation in
great flux. The Soviet Union remains a military superpower with
the capability to destroy the United States and, for that matter, the
world as we know it. It still has approximately 30,000 nuclear
warheads. Within the past two centuries, its armies have marched
from the shores of the Pacific to Paris and Berlin. It has 46 nuclear
power reactors of questionable construction that could erupt into
an environmental and human catastrophe. Its oil and gas reserves
are huge. Its borders mark an arc of other lands in transition: from
the struggling democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, through
the Islamic lands of the Mideast, on to South Asian countries
struggling with their own religious and national conflicts, and
extending to the communists of Eastern and Northern Asia who are
trying to bolster bankrupt regimes.
As I noted above, conditions in the Soviet Union are likely to
worsen, but the specific course of the future is highly uncertain.
Therefore, we need to secure the benefits we have achieved,
continue to probe for other points of mutual advantage while
recognizing the changed context, and seek to manage the uncertainty
by multiplying our points of access with a society that is
transforming itself.
We need to continue to stress, through both our diplomacy and
our foreign economic policy, the importance for East-West stability
of the success of the fragile democratic market economies of
Central and Eastern Europe. Economic decline and upheaval in the
Soviet Union add one more pressure on these countries. Our policies
should both help these nations achieve stable democracies and
sound market economies and also facilitate their connections with
the stabilizing network of Western political and economic
institutions. We must do so in a way that encourages the Soviet
Union to recognize that it is to its benefit to have successful
examples of democratic and market transformations on its borders.
In regional conflicts, it remains in our interest to work
constructively with the Soviet Union to resist a reversal of "new
thinking" that was designed to define and shape Soviet security
differently. That thinking makes it possible to develop cooperative
approaches to resolve conflicts peacefully and democratically.
Some of the fundamental internal circumstances that produced a
Soviet willingness to engage with us on regional issues remain.
Soviet involvement in these conflicts was expensive in terms of
economic and military resources and in terms of President
Gorbachev's desire to improve relations with the West.
We need to recognize, however, that the leadership's
preoccupation with internal troubles might lead to a lack of high-
level focus on some of these problems around the globe. Moreover,
given the strategic readjustment that the Soviet Union has made,
powerful groups are likely to be increasingly sensitive about
conflicts in regions in bordering areas. It is a geopolitical reality
that some in the Soviet Union will perceive that regional problems
closer to home involve greater political and security interests than
those at issue in Africa, Central America, or Southeast Asia.
The Arms Control Agenda
In arms control, it continues to make sense to reduce and constrain
the Soviet military threat by negotiating effectively verifiable
agreements. Of course the specific terms of any negotiations must
serve our own national interest. We need to send a strong signal
that we will not accept the rewriting of agreements already
entered into and that faithful implementation will be required.
We also should test whether the Soviet Union is interested in
cooperating with us and others on the proliferation agenda-an arms
control subject that is likely to be even more
important in the future than traditional East-West discussions. The
Soviet Union should have a strong interest in stopping and reversing
the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology,
because a number of those seeking to develop these destabilizing
weapons are on its own borders. In any case, as the Gulf crisis
highlights, we have a strong interest in vigorously pursuing the
proliferation challenge.
Our policy toward the Baltics should focus on two tracks.
First, we need to continue to demonstrate our unequivocal support
for their aspirations of independence. Of course, we never have
accepted their illegal incorporation into the Soviet Union. We have
demonstrated this support through words and deeds. We've met at
the highest political levels with officials and representatives of
the democratically elected governments of the Baltics. The
President has met with all of the four top Baltic officials who have
visited Washington since last May. We are maintaining a virtually
continuous diplomatic presence in all three Baltic capitals. Our
consul general in Leningrad supplements this presence with periodic
trips to meet top Baltic leaders. We welcome the visits of these
leaders to the United States. We are sending humanitarian medical
supplies directly to the Baltics. And we work with the other
nations of the West, through CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] and other multilateral bodies, to
demonstrate cohesive international support.
But these steps alone will not be sufficient unless we are
able to persuade the Soviet leadership to engage in peaceful
negotiations to resolve those issues that stand in the way of the
Baltics' goal. So our second track is to persuade Soviet leaders that
such a course is in their interest. At a minimum, this course
involves sending a strong, united Western signal that the use of
intimidation and force is unacceptable. It also needs to involve
frequent contact with Soviet leaders so we can urge them to
establish mechanisms that could achieve, step-by-step, a result
that satisfies the Baltic peoples. We have pointed out that the
Baltics involve special circumstances because of their illegal
annexation following the Nazi-Soviet pact that a commission of the
Supreme Soviet itself denounced. In addition to our contacts with
the center, we have sought out officials of the Soviet republics to
explore their perspective on events in the Baltics. A peaceful,
democratic result in the Baltics might establish a method that
could help the center develop legitimate, consensual ties with the
republics.
Finally, it remains in our interest, as well as that of the
Soviet leaders, to create a pluralistic society within the Soviet
Union. This is a vital step toward the democracy and market
economy that we hope will eventually result. We need to honestly
recognize that our influence in this historical process will be
marginal. But given the importance of the Soviet Union to the
world, we should look for ways that might help the process of
transformation.
Given the devolution that has already taken place in Soviet
society, it is in our interest to have an expanded range of contacts.
Of course, these should be with republic and local leaders as well
as the center. We have looked for ways to support democrats, free
trade unions, and market reformers. These are courageous and
admirable pioneers, people who reflect the universal human spirit
of freedom and dignity. We hope they can play a greater role in
their country's future.
Perhaps less obvious to some, we should also expand our range
of contacts with other important groups in the Soviet Union,
including the military and the defense industrial sector. These are
powerful groups, and we know they have been associated with the
rightward swing in Soviet policy-making. But these groups or
institutions also reflect the anxiety that has troubled much of
Soviet society. No Soviet leader will be able to ignore the
military's concern about housing and jobs for the troops withdrawn
from Central and Eastern Europe. No economic reform program will
be politically successful if it does not address the fears of the
skilled and influential workers in the defense industrial sector.
Perhaps contacts with us and others in the West can help lead some
of those not traditionally associated with the reform movement to
recognize the potential benefits of reform and the dim prospects
for a program based on old thinking.
We need to face the fact, however, that while it is useful to
maintain and expand these contacts, at times it will be exceedingly
difficult to do so. Given the turmoil in the Soviet Union, we should
expect actions, some accidental, some intentional, that offend and
outrage us. When those events occur, as they already have and
probably will again, we will need to send a strong message to the
people involved. We need to point out that internal conditions will
affect the willingness and capability of Western democracies to
ease the Soviet Union's self-imposed political and economic
isolation. In doing so, we need to make hard-nosed calculations
about maintaining relations that are in our own national interest
and could be in the long-term interest of a reformed Soviet Union.
We need to have the types of dialogue with the highest levels
of Soviet and republic governments that enable us to point out the
unintended negative consequences that may flow from certain
actions. These unintended consequences could block Soviet leaders'
abilities to achieve their own positive objectives. President
Gorbachev has achieved a significant legacy, but we need to explain
that he risks that legacy by his own actions.
The Soviet Union is in the midst of a political, economic, and
social crisis. But the Soviet Union cannot solve its problems
through rigid adherence to an old constitutional and political
system that never achieved political legitimacy. The old system of
central controls will not establish a basis of legitimacy for the
future; nor will the use of intimidation and force. The Soviet Union
needs to establish new relations between the government and the
people. It will have to devise the institutions and degrees of
autonomy that appropriately reflect the consent of the
governed.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991
Title: International Trade Agreements: Fast Track Procedures
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Mar 1, 19913/1/91
Category: Reports
Region: North America, South America, Central America
Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade
[TEXT]
Following is the foreword to a report submitted by President
Bush to Congress on March 1, 1991, requesting the extension of fast
track procedures to facilitate passage of foreign trade
legislation.
The Fast Track and Why It Is Essential
For the better part of this century, Congress and the executive have
recognized that the negotiation and implementation of trade
agreements require special cooperation between the two branches.
In the aftermath of the record-high rates of the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act of 1930 and the Depression that they helped fuel, both
Congress and the executive came to realize that only by working
closely together in the exercise of their constitutional
responsibilities could the two branches effectively bring down
foreign barriers to our trade and open opportunities for US products
and services in the international marketplace.
This new partnership was reflected in the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934, which gave the President authority not
only to conclude tariff-cutting agreements but also to implement
them by proclamation without the need for subsequent legislation.
During the following years, when the principal barriers to
trade were tariffs, this arrangement proved highly successful and
was responsible for the tariff reductions that promoted post-World
War II economic growth, particularly in successive rounds of
multilateral tariff-cutting negotiations.
As countries began to rely less on tariff protection and more
on non-tariff trade barriers, the scope of trade
negotiations broadened, and the "fast track" procedures were
created by Congress as the necessary complement to this broader
trade agenda.
Fast track procedures for approval of trade agreements were
included by Congress in trade legislation in 1974, 1979, and again
in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988 Act).
While giving Congress the assurance of meaningful participation
throughout the negotiating process, fast track also provides two
guarantees essential to the successful negotiation of trade
agreements:
-- A vote on implementing legislation within a fixed period
of time, and
-- No amendments to that legislation.
These procedures reflect an understanding that trade
agreements, in which results in one area are often linked to results
in others, are particularly vulnerable to multiple amendments that,
while possibly small in themselves, could unravel entire
agreements. Whether the balance of benefits contained in any trade
agreement is in the overall interest of the United States can only be
determined by looking at the whole package.
Through the fast track, Congress has given the President the
same bargaining power possessed by his counterparts: the ability to
assure his negotiating partners that the agreement reached
internationally would be the agreement voted on at home. Without
fast track, the President cannot give his negotiating partners that
assurance. Without that assurance, foreign governments are
reluctant to negotiate with the United States and will not make the
tough concessions necessary to reach agreements the United States
would be willing to sign. No negotiating partner will give its bottom
line knowing that the bargain could be re-opened.
On the basis of fast track procedures, the United States has
negotiated and implemented three remarkable trade agreements,
each of which was approved by an overwhelming majority in both
Houses of Congress. These agreements-the results of the Tokyo
Round of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
negotiations in 1979, the free-trade agreement (FTA) with Israel in
1985, and the FTA with Canada in 1988-have reduced barriers to
trade and provided a powerful engine for economic growth in the
United States and worldwide.
The United States has much to gain through trade agreements
that open markets and provide rules for free and fair trade.
Maintaining the fast track will preserve our ability to continue
efforts to liberalize trade and open markets through the GATT,
through other multilateral agreements, and through bilateral
agreements.
Extension of Fast Track Continues a Cooperative
Relationship
Fast track procedures preserve Congress' role during the
negotiation, approval, and implementation of trade agreements. To
ensure congressional and private sector input, the fast track
statute contains extensive notification and consultation
requirements. At each step along the way, from initiation through
implementation, Congress is an active partner.
To use the fast track for any agreement, bilateral or
multilateral, the President must notify Congress 90 calendar days
before signature. By the time the President gives his 90-day
notification, our many private sector advisory committees must
report their views on the agreement both to Congress and the
President. For bilateral agreements, Congress must be given
advance notice of the negotiations; during the following 60
legislative working days, either the Senate Finance or House Ways
and Means Committee can vote to deny fast track treatment.
Once an agreement is reached, Congress and the
Administration work in close consultation to formulate
implementing legislation. The process has involved the full
participation of all committees of jurisdiction, and not only those
committees traditionally consulted in setting trade negotiating
objectives. If the agreement and its implementing legislation are
still not acceptable, they can be rejected by majority vote of either
house. In fact, as a result of the extensive consultations with
Congress and the private sector, the agreements that have been
implemented under fast track procedures enjoyed widespread
support when they were presented to Congress.
We find ourselves today engaged in bilateral and multilateral
trade initiatives that hold unprecedented promise for the
advancement of US economic objectives. With such initiatives in the
balance, now is not the time to dissolve a partnership that has
endured for almost 60 years.
Continuing Fast Track Is Essential to Securing Economic Gains
In incorporating the fast track in the 1988 Act, Congress expressly
contemplated that an extension of the provision beyond June 1991
might be necessary and appropriate in order for the President to
pursue effectively the trade policy objectives set out in the law.
The continued availability of fast track procedures over the
next 2 years -during which we expect to complete the Uruguay
Round of multilateral negotiations, negotiate a North American Free
Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada, and pursue the trade
objectives of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative-will enable
our negotiators to bring to Congress for its consideration trade
agreements that will enhance the ability of the United States to
compete internationally. Supporting fast track now will allow
these important negotiations to go forward without in any way
detracting from Congress' ability to assess each agreement on its
merits when presented for approval.
The Uruguay Round.
These complex
negotiations with 107 other nations (many of which are not fully
integrated into the multilateral trading system) offer rich
opportunities to break down trade barriers and expand the scope of
international trade rules.
-- Since their inception in 1986, the Uruguay Round
negotiations have been conducted in 15 areas. Our objectives
include more open markets, internationally agreed rules in areas not
previously covered by multilateral agreements (services,
investment, intellectual property rights), and institutional
improvements in the GATT. The negotiations have been difficult,
and important issues remain, but there has been significant
progress overall toward our objectives. That progress should not be
abandoned.
-- The United States had hoped to conclude the Uruguay Round
last December at a ministerial level meeting in Brussels. However,
the status of the negotiations on several subjects at that time did
not warrant conclusion-particularly on agriculture. The
unwillingness of the European Community (EC), as well as Japan and
Korea, to accept a framework for agricultural reform impeded
progress in the negotiations in all areas.
-- We are encouraged by a recent statement of GATT
Director-General Arthur Dunkel that all participants have now
agreed to negotiate specific binding commitments in each of the key
areas of agricultural reform, thus clearing the way for the
resumption of negotiations. However, important differences in
agriculture and other areas remain. Much hard bargaining lies ahead.
-- The United States refused to accept a deficient Uruguay
Round package in Brussels. Our high standards have not changed.
Although ultimate success in the Uruguay Round cannot be
guaranteed, we believe the United States should continue
negotiations because a successful Round is overwhelmingly in our
long-term economic interests.
North American FTA
. We have a historic
opportunity to achieve a North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico. The Mexican government has been
pursuing a dramatic opening of its trading regime and has
introduced market-oriented domestic reforms that benefit both
Mexico and the United States. Building on those reforms and on the
existing FTA we have with Canada, we can create a NAFTA that
encompasses some 360 million people with almost $6 trillion in
output. A comprehensive NAFTA will create growth and better jobs
in all three countries, and will make us more competitive in the
global marketplace.
Extension of fast track will be essential for these
negotiations, which are expected to begin in late Spring.
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.
An
extension of fast track will also enable the United States to take
steps in the next 2 years toward fulfillment of the trade objectives
of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), announced in
June 1990. Although it is likely that few Latin American nations
will be in a position to enter into FTA negotiations with the United
States before June 1993, the United States must continue to be able
to respond to the increasing pace of economic liberalization in the
region.
The United States has an enormous stake in the future of the
global trading system. Exports have become a vital source of
strength to the US economy. In 1990, the nearly 8.5% growth in US
exports accounted for 88% of US GNP [gross national product]
growth. Since 1986, expanded exports have accounted for more than
40% of the growth in US GNP.
In order to sustain the expansion of exports and consequent
growth, we must continue our efforts to open world markets. We
must maintain our active
leadership role. Without an extension of fast track, those efforts
and that role are placed in jeopardy.
Preserving fast track procedures-and the partnership between
Congress and the executive branch which fast track represents-will
keep on course our joint efforts to liberalize trade and open
markets through the initiatives described above and through other
multilateral and bilateral agreements. No country stands to gain
more from those efforts than the United States.
As we approach the beginning of a new century, we should not
hesitate to pursue the opportunities for economic growth and
prosperity presented by successful trade negotiations. In order to
turn those opportunities into realities, Congress and the executive
must continue to work together in the manner envisioned by the fast
track.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991
Title: Human Rights in Yugoslavia
Schifter
Source: Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee; Washington, DC
Date: Feb 21, 19912/21/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Yugoslavia (former), Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro
Subject: Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights
[TEXT]
I am here to testify on the state of human rights in Yugoslavia.
Having rejected Soviet domination as long ago as 1948,
Yugoslavia embarked earlier than some of its neighbors on the road
to a more open society and greater respect for human rights. But it
has not as yet completed the process. In fact, as distinct from its
neighbors, Yugoslavia has not made a clean break with its
communist past. It appears, instead, to work its way out of it
gradually, with differing rates of progress in different parts of the
country.
The democratic revolutionary fervor which swept the region
in 1989 did, indeed, have its effect on Yugoslavia. The year 1990
saw significant movement toward increased respect for freedom of
speech and freedom of religion. The League of Communists lost its
monopoly on power, and freely contested multi-party elections took
place in all the republics. Toward the end of the year, the Federal
Assembly adopted a new press law which guaranteed freedom of
information and ended the subordination of the press to the
Socialist Alliance of Working People, an arm of the League of
Communists.
Though the ideological commitment to communism is now a
matter of the past, the forms of repression which were the
hallmark of Leninist governmental systems have outlasted it.
Moreover, the evaporation of communist ideology in Yugoslavia has,
in many parts of the country, been followed by the re-emergence of
rabid forms of nationalism. Even where elections were free and
fair, the parties associated with democratic freedoms, respect for
the individual, and equal rights for all did not fare particularly
well. The utter failure of communism is vividly demonstrated by
the resurgence of extreme forms of nationalism which had been
repressed rather than eliminated and which are now a threat not
only to the basic rights of national minorities in the various
republics but are also a threat to the Yugoslav state as an entity.
Credit must, under the circumstances, be given to the
political leaders who continue to appeal to reason, who speak up for
principles of democracy, respect for human rights, for cooperation
among the republics, for a unified Yugoslavia in which equal rights
would be accorded to all, irrespective of their ethnic background
and their place of residence. We wish these leaders well and hope
for their success.
Ethnic Problems in Kosovo
As I mentioned earlier, freely contested multi-party elections
took place in all of Yugoslavia's republics in 1990. In five of these
republics, one could not quarrel with the manner in which these
elections were conducted. But in one republic, Serbia, in which
about 40% of Yugoslavia's population reside, the process was
marred by late changes in election laws, the boycott of most
Albanians in the autonomous province of Kosovo (which contains
about 20% of Serbia's population), the intimidation of voters, and
the manipulation of election procedures by the ruling party.
Although the actual voting in most of Serbia appeared to have
been conducted correctly, Serbian authorities manipulated the
media, which ignored, trivialized, and disparaged opposition
candidates and denied them equal access during the electoral
campaign. The authorities also denied the opposition equal access
to office space and financial resources and harassed opposition
leaders by charging them with misdemeanors. The harassment by
the authorities extended beyond opposition leaders to voters, who
were warned not to vote for the opposition or risk dismissal from
their jobs. The Serbian elections also were marred by the ethnic
Albanian boycott of the process, which was brought about by the
repressive measures undertaken earlier against the ethnic Albanian
population.
In Serbia it has been the Communist Party, now renamed,
which has adopted a platform of nationalist extremism and has
made Kosovo the issue which it now is. Kosovo plays a unique role
in Serbian history. It was the Serbian heartland. In the battle of
Kosovo on June 15, 1389, the Serbian kingdom lost its last major
stand against the Ottoman Empire. The historic memory of the
battle of Kosovo has been a part of Serbian national traditions, the
subject of songs, for more than 600 years.
But in recent decades, the Serbian population of Kosovo has
been on the decline and the ethnic Albanian population on the
increase. Serbs in Kosovo increasingly felt that they were being
overrun. Many of them emigrated. Those who stayed appealed to
Belgrade for help. Given the Serbian historic attachment to Kosovo,
that help came in the form of repression of Albanian aspirations.
The question at issue is what these aspirations are. Kosovo is
now, as I noted earlier, an autonomous province within Serbia,
though its autonomy has de facto been suspended. Many Albanians
want more than mere autonomy. Some support the creation of a
Kosovo Republic within the Yugoslav Federation. Others may
advocate secession and incorporation of the area into a greater
Albania. Serbians oppose the notion of a Kosovo Republic, first,
because it would separate the Serbian historic heartland from the
Republic of Serbia and, second, because they see it as a first step to
complete secession.
Tension between Serbians and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has
been on the increase for the last 10 years. Conditions have
worsened significantly during the last year.
In 1990, there were thousands of arrests of ethnic Albanians
for political advocacy, tens of thousands of politically related job
dismissals, and widespread police violence. Local self-government
was effectively eliminated in July of last year, when the Serbian
government suspended the activities of governing bodies at the
provincial and district level. Later in the year, delegates of the
Kosovo legislature in an ex camera meeting approved a new
constitution which declared Kosovo separate and sovereign within
Yugoslavia. In reaction, Serbian authorities arrested 4 of the
delegates and sought to arrest the other 107, who avoided that fate
by fleeing from Serbia to other republics of Yugoslavia or leaving
the country altogether. They also began legal proceedings against
former Kosovo government officials.
Serbian authorities also routinely and summarily sentenced
thousands of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo from 30 to 60 days in jail,
often on misdemeanor charges of "disturbing public order."
Demonstrations by ethnic Albanians in protest of the Serb measures
were broken up by police using tear gas, water cannon, and lethal
gunfire. As Serbian authorities broadly define "violence" to include
virtually any public advocacy of political change, political speech in
Kosovo that calls for republic or independent status for the
province is viewed an incitement to violence and inevitably results
in prosecution and prison sentences.
In contrast to other republics, restrictions on freedom of the
press in Kosovo were especially severe. Almost all of Kosovo's
Albanian-language media were completely suppressed, and all local
Albanian-language radio and television news broadcasts were
halted. The largest Albanian-language newspaper was shut down.
To the human rights problems which I have just described, we
need to add the growing problem of hunger among the families of
some 60,000 unemployed workers and the almost complete collapse
of the Albanian-language school system. Many of the workers lost
their livelihood for refusing to take oaths of allegiance to Serbia as
a condition for employment. Many others were dismissed for
participating in the strikes of September last year. Schools,
especially high schools, are being hit hard as teachers are fired for
refusing to accept Serbia's new education plan. A number of schools
have been closed completely, and Albanians in Kosovo expect more
to follow.
Meetings of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, the largest
independent political group in the province, are regularly broken up
by the police and the organizers often harassed and beaten up. A
particularly troublesome aspect of these developments is the
growing feeling among Kosovo Albanians that they have no future
within Yugoslavia.
Conflict Between the Serbs and Croats
The problem posed by the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo and their
treatment at the hands of the government of the Republic of Serbia
is not the only problem of inter-ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia.
A problem involving larger population groups is the conflict
between Serbs and Croats. Croatia has a substantial Serbian
population which considers itself deprived of its cultural rights and
of equal opportunity in an increasingly nationalist Republic of
Croatia. Serbs and Croats constitute significant percentages of the
population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order for
there to be civil peace in these two republics, ways must be found
for the two ethnic groups to live together. Here, too, the historic
memory of a much more recent date stands in the way. Serbs
suffered severely during World War II from the brutalities visited
upon them by the Ustashi, the paramilitary force of the pro-Nazi
Croatian wartime regime.
Our response to the problems which I have here described has
been to call attention to them, express our concern to the Yugoslav
authorities, and, as my testimony shows, to offer support to those
who are trying so hard to steer Yugoslavia toward democracy, the
free market, and respect for the dignity of every single individual.
Whether these leaders will succeed will depend on the support that
they receive from the people of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs
themselves will have to set their house in order. To the extent to
which we can do, so we shall try to be of help. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991
Title: United States Stands With Colombia In the War Against
Narcotics
Bush,.Gaviria
Source: President Bush and Colombian President Cesar
Trujillo Gaviria
Description: Remarks by following their meeting at the White House,
Washington, DC
Date: Feb 26, 19912/26/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: South America
Country: Colombia
Subject: Narcotics
[TEXT]
President Bush
Mr. President, it has been a privilege to meet with you and to share
our thoughts on critical challenges that our countries must face
together. You're a man of courage-the worthy political heir of your
nation's General Santander, who said, "If the sword gave us
independence, the law will give us liberty." You're a man devoted to
law and to liberty, and for that, you have our admiration and
respect.
Today, we held a thorough and frank discussion on a range of
issues of mutual concern, particularly the drug war and joint
economic matters. I view this as a vital meeting. For although
there is a crisis demanding our attention halfway around there
world, we will not neglect the very pressing needs and
opportunities in our own hemisphere.
One of the most urgent of these is the fierce battle that we're
waging against the scourge of drugs. President Gaviria talked to me
in great detail of the efforts, the heroic efforts that Colombia is
making in this fight. We honor him and his countrymen-knowing
they've borne a very difficult burden in this war, and knowing that
it is their survival that's at stake every day.
Our hearts are with the Colombian people who have suffered
so much from drug-related outlaw violence. This has included the
murder of President Gaviria's own cousin only days ago by these
narco-terrorists. We want to tell Colombians that they inspire us
by standing up-despite intimidation, despite the costs-for justice
and for law.
As we spoke today, I made it clear that Colombia is not alone
in this fight. Both our countries recognize that drug production and
drug use threaten our futures and our very lives. We are determined
to defeat this enemy. Together, I am more and more convinced,
especially after these talks, that we will win this war.
At the Cartagena summit, we said that we accepted our
responsibility to cut drug demand in the United States. I told the
President today that our work is succeeding-drug use here in the
United States is on the decline. And also at that summit, we
pledged to help Colombia and her neighbors in their struggle to
reduce production and interrupt the transportation of drugs.
And we know that battling the drug war has, indeed, meant
high costs to the Colombian people. And so I'm glad to report that
on February 25, our countries signed an agreement providing the
first $20 million of a total $41 million to help ease the financial
damage that the drug war has meant to his government's programs.
And second, we've signed an innovative agreement on mutual
judicial cooperation to more effectively prosecute the drug
traffickers. And I told the President that we will sign a multi-
million-dollar, long-term agreement expanding our support for his
bold initiative to strengthen the Colombian judicial system.
In addition, we know we need to offer the people of the Andes
viable economic alternatives to coca production. A team led by
Ambassador Ed Corr has just completed a report on how we can
strengthen our cooperation on agricultural issues and make our
market more accessible to legal exports.
Most importantly, we've proposed the Andean Trade Initiative
providing special and vitally important benefits for the Colombian
producers. And I hope Congress will pass this legislation speedily.
As we look ahead to the coming century, President Gaviria and
I agree that we must also make trade and economic development
essential priorities.
Our hemisphere must see that its future lies with free
markets as well as free governments. And that's why we must
forge a genuine economic partnership for the future. Last year, we
proposed the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, offering the
hope of greater international investment, freer trade, and greatly
reduced debt burdens.
Colombia was the first nation to take up our offer to
negotiate bilateral trade and investment framework agreements. I
told the President today that we are sending to Congress legislation
necessary to implement the investment, debt, and environmental
aspects of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. And I assured
him that I am absolutely committed to securing its passage.
The people of our two nations are united as neighbors. And we
are united as societies threatened by the human misery brought by
drugs. But we're also united as people who believe in human rights
and in the creative power of liberty. We're members of what is
almost the world's first fully free hemisphere.
We're battling some powerful enemies: drugs, poverty, forces
opposed to democracy. But we have even more powerful resources.
Simon Bolivar wrote in exile: "The veil has been torn asunder.
We've already seen the light and it is not our desire to be thrust
back into darkness." Well, our nations have seen the light. And our
meeting today was just one more joint step in the direction of that
light. I might add that we will always be grateful to Colombia for
their role at the United Nations as we formulated common
opposition to the forces of evil halfway around the world in the Gulf
as we stood up to the aggressor, Iraq.
But that proved to me that the goals are clear. Together we
will succeed. And so, may God bless your wonderful people, and
thank you for coming our way.
President Gaviria
Thank you, Mr. President. I want, first of all, to express in the name
of the Colombian people how glad we are all because of the new
order we're building with the coalition, with the cooperation of the
United Nations. We are very happy for the success you have had in
the Persian Gulf and the way we have built in this new order that
will help all the countries, all humanity, to fight poverty, to fight
narco-trafficking, and to fight the new problems we really have in
our agenda.
You have really told the journalists how we have talked about
our common problems. First of all, narco-trafficking, and the way
Colombia and the United States are committed against narco-
trafficking in the world. We have been tracing the Cartagena
meeting you had with [former] President [Virgilio] Barco, and we are
really aware of how the United States has got results about
reducing demand. That's good news for Colombian people.
I have told you, and you have recognized how we have been
fighting narco-trafficking; how we have improved this year the
interdiction efforts Colombia is doing. We have told you about the
Colombian policy, the new Colombian judicial policy. And we are
very grateful for the cooperation you are giving us with this mutual
judicial agreement we have got . . . yesterday.
With all of the efforts, I am sure we are going to dismantle
the cartels. We are going to fight narco-trafficking. We are really
committed to that, and you can be sure that this scourge of
humanity will end someday with the kind of effort we have been
doing. We thank you for your offer to have--through this Andean
initiative--and we hope, too, that someday very soon Colombia can
have a free trade agreement with the United States of America.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991
Title: Observing Black History Month
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address given at the White House, Washington, DC
Date: Feb 25, 19912/25/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: Human Rights
[TEXT]
I know that the issue on all of our minds is the war in the Gulf. And
I'm glad to report, after consultation a few minutes ago with
Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin] Powell, General
Powell, that the news is good. Coalition air and ground forces are
advancing on their objectives. Enemy prisoners are surrendering in
large numbers-large numbers. And thus far, thank God, US and
coalition casualties are few.
The liberation of Kuwait is on course and on schedule. We
have the initiative. We intend to keep it. We must guard against
euphoria. There are battles yet to come and casualties to be borne.
But make no mistake. We will prevail. Kuwait will soon be free,
and America's men and women in uniform will return home to the
thanks and respect of a grateful nation.
This was a war thrust upon us, not a war that we sought. But
naked aggression, such as we have seen, must be resisted if it is
not to become a pattern. Our success in the Gulf will bring with it
not just a new opportunity for peace and stability in a critical part
of the world, but a chance to build a new world order based upon the
principles of collective security and the rule of law.
But today we're here to celebrate the proud spectrum of black
achievement. For we recognize that black history, this rich tale of
roots and purpose and pride, is really everyone's history. And
something else, too. You know, in the midst of war we find
ourselves thinking about heroes. Well, this is the time to especially
think of black heroes. Those who, by their fierce conviction,
showed no race has a monopoly on idealism or excellence. And we
must tell stories of black successes to every child in our country
because we need heroes. We need them as much as we need our
dreams. And black Americans have always provided both.
A few nights ago, General Tony McPeak, the Chief of Staff of
our Air Force, and an old friend many of you know, Ben Payton,
President of the Tuskegee University, and Judge [David] Souter of
the Supreme Court, and I, the four of us-men's night out on the
town-went over to Ford's Theater to see a play called the "Black
Eagles." And for those who aren't aware of that, it's a play about
the Tuskegee airmen of World War II, who were led by the legendary
General Benjamin Davis. An incredible story of men who took their
places among a very special group of heroes-black Americans who
have fought for this country for over 200 years.
They never received the credit; they never received the credit
that they deserve for their devoted patriotism, for their vision, and
their sacrifices. And America owes a long-overdue tribute to these
men and women who, long before they had rights, believed in what
was right.
For two centuries, black soldiers have established a record of
pride in the face of incredible obstacles. For not only did they risk
their lives fighting for freedom for their own and for other
countries, but they did it at the same time that they were being
denied their own God-given freedoms at home. And think about how
much they must have loved this country, how they believed in its
dreams. It's an astounding devotion. It's in a league by itself.
You can feel that love of country just as strongly out there in
the Gulf today. Yes, we've made great progress in righting the
wrongs of the past; but, tragically, racism and bigotry, illiteracy,
and poverty still exist. America, of course, is not without its
problems, and black Americans serving in the Gulf understand that.
Yet they've chosen to serve because they fundamentally believe in
this country. When these Gulf heroes come home, they'll continue to
fight injustice by fighting discrimination and despair with the same
commitment. And we will stand with them.
So to those who question the proportion of blacks in the armed
services today, my answer is simple. The military of the United
States is the greatest equal opportunity employer around. Every
soldier, sailor, airman, Coast Guardsman, and Marine have enlisted
because they want to be a part of the American armed services,
because they know it is a place of openness and true meritocracy
and because they know that every serviceman and woman receives
equal training, and the finest training, and equal treatment every
step of the way-with education funding and technical skills which
will open up unlimited futures.
If anyone thinks that the military is not the place for equal
opportunity and advancement, they talk to General Waller, Lt.
General Waller, our Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Central
Command; or Colonel Hopper, Deputy Commander of the 63rd Airlift
Wing; or Air Force Colonel Randolph from Langley-Langley Air Force
Base; or listen to the man sitting over my right shoulder here, who
answers those who criticize the proportion of blacks by challenging
all of America.
Here's what General Powell-his answer-challenged the rest of
this country to create the same paths of opportunity which we have
in the military.
Look at those brave men and women putting their lives on the
line for us. And you don't see colors or creed. All you see are
Americans: good, brave, dedicated Americans; Americans who
volunteered, each and every single one of them, who put their
devotion to country first; Americans with dignity and pride calling
America back to her better self: Americans serving as equals,
measured only by their abilities; America's heroes-the real thing.
Thank God we have them-every single one.
Today, we thank God for those who went before, for our new
heroes are a part of a long tradition. The airmen in "Black Eagles"
talk about it, for they made their own very special mark in the roll
call of generations who battled not only their country's enemy but
also their countrymen's prejudice. In the play these brave warriors
explain they were "paving the way, paving the way."
And it was more than two centuries ago that the first black
patriots started to pave the way of freedom road. In 1774, slaves
sent a plea to the royal governor of Massachusetts saying: "We have
in common with all other men a natural right to our freedoms
without being deprived of them by our fellow men." Seems like
these sentiments might have inspired the words that Thomas
Jefferson wrote 2 years later: "That all men are created equal and
that they are endowed with the inalienable rights of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness."
What these men sent was a message from the heart to those
who would follow: Stand up for freedom; cry out for freedom; risk
all for freedom.
And that's what blacks have done in every war in this nation's
history. They've done it with heroes like Crispus Attucks, the first
American to die for the cause of his country's liberty, with heroes
like the 5,000 blacks who fought in the Revolutionary War-loyal,
courageous men who will at long last be honored with a memorial
out here on the Mall thanks to the Patriot Foundation, which I hope
we'll all support .
Freedom road led nearly one-quarter million newly-freed
slaves into the Civil War. Heroes emerged like the men of Fort
Wagner charge-so powerfully reenacted in the movie "Glory" The
black regiment lost half its men-imagine that, half its men-but won
the dignity and respect that it rightfully deserved. Freedom road
took black heroes up San Juan Hill with Teddy Roosevelt. And, by
the way, Colin Powell has a painting of them in his office. He says
he likes to look up from his desk, see them, and remember the
contributions of those who went before, and, he says, reflect on
what he must do to help those yet to come. Black heroes also paved
freedom road on the French fields and Rhine river of World War I.
But when their sons joined up 25 years later, they found there
was much work left to do. And I heard a shocking story that took
place right here in America in 1943, in the middle of World War II.
Black soldiers stopped and tried to eat at a restaurant. Inside,
German prisoners-German prisoners of war-were being served a
meal, but the restaurant refused to admit the black soldiers.
By the end of the war, American black soldiers had paved a
victorious path, paved it in bravery and in blood. They won battles
and medals. They won respect as men and acceptance as Americans.
And at long last they won the integration of the armed forces.
These generations of heroes risked their lives so that their
grandchildren could realize a dream: the dream of having the
freedom to choose to serve their country; the dream that America
would be a place where the only limits on a man would be the limits
of his own vision; the dream of a nation where none would be called
the first black but, rather, simply the best. For, as Booker T.
Washington said:
"No greater injury can be done to any youth than to let him feel that
because he belongs to this or that race he will be advanced
regardless of his own merit or efforts."
But let's face it-the dream is not yet fully realized, and there
is today too much crime and too much crack and too much despair.
Yet, there is also today too much faith and too much pride and too
much human dignity to give up or to give in.
And that's why we urgently need to turn to the tradition of
black heroes today, to inspire a new generation to believe in itself
and in the future. Homegrown heroes like Frederick Douglass, who
fought for dignity; Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who fought for the
rights of millions; Jackie Robinson, who fought just to do what he
did best; like Ralph Bunche, who won the Nobel Prize; Gwendolyn
Brooks, who won the Pulitzer; Jesse Owens, who won Olympic
medals and the respect of the world; humanitarians and leaders
from George Washington Carver to Rosa Parks to the late Mickey
Leland; pioneers like Dr. Charles Drew and astronaut Ron McNair;
and, of course, the man who has brought inspiration, strength, and
true spirit of heroism to the world's current struggle for humanity-
the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs. [Applause.] Exactly the way we
all feel.
But they're not the only ones. It is up to each of us. Together,
we must write a new chapter in the history of civil rights, a
chapter that says: Opportunity must replace despair. For
opportunity means education-equipping kids with the tools they
need to compete in a new century. It means freedom from drugs.
Opportunity means jobs, the dignity of work. It means owning your
own home-and being safe in it. Opportunity means social programs
to keep families together and health care to keep them strong. And,
above all, opportunity means we must treasure and defend the value
of every human life. For as Langston Hughes wrote, "There's a dream
in this land with its back against the wall; to save the dream for
one, it must be saved for all.
This is an ideal place for us to commit ourselves to writing
that chapter. For in this very room, 27 years ago, the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 became law-a long overdue payment on a promissory
note of equality signed two centuries before.
But as long as discrimination-borne of ignorance and
inhumanity-still exists, our work is not yet finished. And as long
as the four horsemen of the American night-illiteracy, inequality,
indigence, and fear-threaten any of us, our work is not yet finished.
And so we must, as a nation, pledge that never again will the
individual be degraded and devalued, that we will remember the
Black Eagles, who soared from bigotry on earth to equality in the
skies.
I am committed to civil rights and opportunity for every
person in this great country. And I will simply say to all of you: I
salute you. I thank you for coming here to share this very special
day with all of America. At this special time in our history, may
God bless those who are serving us halfway around the world. May
they be treated with respect and the dignity that they deserve when
they come back home having freed another country. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 9, March 4, 1991
Title: Observing Black History Month
Eagleburger
Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Address before State Department employees at the
Department of State,Washington, DC
Date: Feb 26, 19912/26/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Country: United States
Subject: State Department
[TEXT]
I am pleased to be able to join you today for the Department's
annual observance of Black History Month. This occasion is just as
important for non-black Americans as it is for African-Americans.
All Americans, no matter what their color, bear the burden of a
terrible legacy, one that cannot be overcome simply by changing
laws. Only by changing minds can we put that legacy behind us once
and for all. And so Black History Month-American Black History
Month-is an occasion for all of us to do justice to the silent and
long-neglected contributions of African-Americans to our nation's
history and their contributions toward making America the rich,
tolerant, and multicultural example that we want it to be.
This year's theme-"Educating America: Black Colleges and
Universities, Strengths and Crises"-honors the many and
distinguished contributions of black academia to our nation's
intellectual and cultural patrimony. It is particularly fitting that
we address this theme at a time when restoring excellence in
education has been recognized as one of our nation's highest
priorities: first, because the black institutions already have a
track record of excellence which has gone unrecognized for far too
long; second, because they will play a major role in developing
future generations of leaders; and, third, because the black colleges
and universities are a focal point of our own efforts to build a more
diverse Department of State.
The historically black colleges and universities, schools like
Spelman, Morehouse, Howard, and Lincoln, have served as the
launching pad for meaningful black participation in the mainstream
of American society. In the past, when the collective American
vision was blighted by racism and prejudice, when blacks did not
have other educational opportunities, these schools educated some
of America's best and brightest. They have given us cabinet
secretaries, chief executive officers, Supreme Court Justices, and
leaders in the arts. Not to bore you with statistics, but 75% of all
black Americans with doctoral degrees, 75% of all black military
officers, and 85% of all black physicians are graduates of black
colleges and universities. Not only have many black Americans
received their primary training at such institutions, but they have
then competed successfully at America's most elite graduate and
professional schools. Black colleges are important not only for
black Americans but for all Americans, because they have helped us
to build a more diverse America and because they have helped us to
build a more competent and competitive America.
Last year, I addressed the annual conference of the National
Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, an umbrella
group for many black colleges and universities. I spoke of the need
for the Department of State to reflect our nation's heterogeneity. I
also noted that black Americans who have sacrificed so much to
build and defend this country-and we need no better reminder of
this than to think of all our young men and women in the Gulf today-
must be given a truly equal opportunity to serve as the architects of
US foreign policy and the voice and personification of America
abroad. We are making progress toward this end, but it is still much
too slow. In spite of improvements over the past 5 years, the
percentage of black Americans in the Department's professional
work force is still not what it should be. The Foreign Service will
not be able to represent America overseas as it should until it
becomes representative of all Americans, as it must.
In order to become truly representative, we are going to need
the assistance of the historically black colleges and universities.
We have before us a unique opportunity to work with these schools
to sell careers in the State Department and the Foreign Service to
young black Americans. I am glad to report that, under the
leadership of our Director General, we are pursuing this partnership
aggressively.
This year, under the Diplomat-in-Residence Program, five
senior US diplomats have been assigned to black colleges. While
teaching is an important part of their responsibilities, they know
that their mission is to go further: to provide an example, to stir an
interest, to help promising young students see that a career in
foreign affairs can be theirs. As concrete follow-up to the
Diplomat-in-Residence Program, the Department has increased
dramatically its recruitment efforts. In the last year, our officers
have made 46 recruiting trips to 46 black colleges to seek
undergraduates for the Department's summer internship programs
and encourage them to apply for permanent Foreign and Civil Service
career positions. Finally, our FY 1990 and 1991 authorizing
legislation gave us authority to make grants for international
affairs programs and scholarships which would directly benefit
minority individuals and institutions. You all know how tight our
budget situation is these days, but we are making a major effort to
identify seed money to start these programs on a trial basis.
I should also note that the Agency for International
Development has on-going relationships with a number of
historically black colleges and universities and has provided over
$29 million to these schools for development-related activities.
Moreover, university faculty members have come to the Department
in recent years on sabbatical, and we will be looking to expand this
program to the historically black colleges as well.
In closing, I want to salute the many black Americans who in
their own ways, great and small, have helped make America what it
is today. Their legacy is being writ anew by the thousands of black
Americans in uniform who, as we gather here this morning, are once
again defending the best of what America stands for.
I also want to pay tribute to the many black colleges and
universities which, by educating generations of American leaders,
not only opened doors but also opened this country's eyes to the
rightness and richness of real equal opportunity for all.
Finally, I pledge that we will continue to work closely and
creatively with the black colleges and universities in our efforts to
achieve a diverse Department of State-truly representative of the
American people and worthy of the values for which we stand.
(###)