US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 6, February 11, 1991

Title:

Opportunities To Build a New World Order

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Statement as delivered to the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Washington, DC Date: Feb 6, 19912/6/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: United States, USSR (former), Iraq, Kuwait, Israel Subject: Arms Control, Mideast Peace Process, Environment, Science/Technology, Trade/Economics [TEXT] It's a privilege, again, to appear before the committee, this year even more so than most years. I think the funds that we are requesting in our budget submission should be seen [as] an investment in a better future, a world of secure nations, free peoples, and peaceful change. I realize that as armies fight in the Persian Gulf, such a world seems far distant. Yet, I believe it's vitally important to see the challenges that we face also as opportunities-opportunities to build a more secure and a more just world order. And, so today, I really would like to spend some time commenting before the committee, to and with the committee, about our ideas on post-crisis challenges and arrangements as we begin the process of examining what our policy should and will be in the aftermath of the crisis.
Persian Gulf War
The international coalition has now been waging war against Iraq for 3 weeks with what I think are very clear objectives: to expel Iraq from Kuwait, to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait, and to ensure the stability and security of this critical region. I would like to make several observations about the course of the conflict so far. First of all, I would note that the international coalition has held steadily to its purpose and steadily to its course. An outstanding achievement of the current crisis has been the ability, I think, of the United Nations to act as the founders intended. Before January 15, a dozen Security Council resolutions guided the United States and other nations as together we waged a concerted, diplomatic, political, and economic struggle against Iraqi aggression. We did so, of course, because we all share a conviction that this brutal and dangerous dictator must be stopped, and he must be stopped now. Since January 16, in actions authorized by Security Council Resolution 678, we have been able to wage war because we are equally convinced that all peaceful opportunities to end Saddam's aggression had been explored and had been exhausted. Let me give you, if I could, some idea of those exhaustive efforts, both by the United States and by other nations. In the 166 days between the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the expiration of the UN deadline for Iraq's withdrawal on January 15, 1991, I personally held over 200 meetings with foreign dignitaries, conducted 10 separate diplomatic missions, and traveled over 100,000 miles. For over 6 1/2 hours, as you know, I met with the Iraqi Foreign Minister- 6 1/2 hours-during the full course of which the Iraqi leadership rejected the very concept of withdrawal from Kuwait; even the mention of withdrawal. As you know, many others also tried. The Arab League tried; the European Community tried; the UN Secretary General tried, at least twice; kings, presidents, and prime ministers tried. None succeeded, because Saddam Hussein rejected each and every attempt. A second observation I would make is that the coalition is sharing responsibility for the economic burdens of this conflict. Support for US military outlays covers both 1990 commitments for Desert Shield and 1991 commitments for the period of January through March for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In addition, funds have also been forthcoming to offset the economic costs that are confronting some of the front-line states in the region. To date, we have pledges of over $50 billion to support our military efforts and over $14 billion to assist the front-line states and others with their economic needs. A third observation is that our unfolding military strategy fully reflects our political purposes. This is the place to restate, I think, as the President has done so often, that we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our goal is the liberation of Kuwait. It is not the destruction of Iraq. It is not changes in the borders of Iraq. A thoroughly professional and effective military campaign is underway. Our young men and women and the forces of our coalition partners are writing new annals of bravery and skill. But the task is formidable, and no one should underestimate Saddam Hussein's military capabilities. After all, Iraq is not a third-rate military power. Billions of dollars have been diverted from peaceful uses to give this small country the fourth largest army in the world. Iraq has more battle tanks than the United Kingdom and France combined. It has more combat aircraft than either Germany, France, or the United Kingdom. Ejecting Iraq from Kuwait will not be easy, but as the President said, "So that peace can prevail, we will prevail." We are also trying our best to wage a just war and to wage it in a just way. Our targets are military, and we are doing all that we can to minimize civilian casualties and to avoid damage to religious and cultural sites. As [allied commander] General [Norman] Schwarzkopf has pointed out, the coalition forces are even putting themselves in danger to minimize the risk to innocent lives. In shocking contrast, I think, Saddam Hussein's conduct of the war has been not unlike his conduct before the war. That is, a relentless assault on the values of civilization. He has launched missiles against Israeli cities and Saudi cities, missiles aimed not at targets of military value but fully intended to massacre civilians. He has abused and paraded prisoners of war. He says he's using them as human shields-actions totally in violation of the Geneva Convention. He has even attacked nature itself, attempting to poison the waters of the Persian Gulf with the petroleum that is the patrimony of the region's economic future. We've heard, and we take at face value, Saddam Hussein's threats to use chemical and biological weapons. We have warned him, and he would be well advised to heed our warning that we will not tolerate the use of such weapons. Any use of chemical or biological weapons will have the most severe consequences. We will continue to insist that Iraq fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Convention with respect to coalition prisoners of war. I think that our conduct of the war is, in itself, a great strength. It is the strength that comes from doing the right thing in the right way. Saddam's continuing brutality redoubles our resolve and the entire coalition's conviction about the rightness of our course. Ending Saddam's aggression will also be a blow to state- sponsored terrorism. This is also the place to note our deep appreciation and great admiration for the extraordinary restraint of the government of Israel. Israeli cities have been attacked by Saddam Hussein because part of his strategy has been to consolidate his aggression by turning the Gulf crisis into an Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite its clear right to respond, the Israeli government has acted with restraint and with responsibility. The United States has been, and it will continue to be, in close contact at the highest levels with Israel. We have offered, and Israel has accepted, batteries of Patriot missiles, some with American crews, to defend against Scud attacks. We continue to devote special military efforts to destroying the Scuds and to destroying their launchers. Everyone should know when we speak about our unshakable commitment to Israeli security, we mean it. The fourth observation I would make is this: The great international coalition that is now winning the war must also be strong enough to secure the peace. Winston Churchill once observed that, "We shall see how absolute is the need of a broad path of international action pursued by many states in common across the years, irrespective of the ebb and flow of national politics." If we are going to redeem the sacrifices now being made by the brave men and women who defend our freedom with their lives, then we must fashion a peace which is worthy of their struggle. That can be done if we can hold together in peace a coalition tempered by war. I believe that when Congress voted the President authority to use force in support of the UN resolutions, it voted also for peace, a peace that might prevent such wars in the future. I believe that the American people support our role in the coalition, not only to defeat an aggressor but to secure a measure of justice and security for the future. We and every nation involved in this conflict are thinking about the post-war situation and planning for the future. It would be irresponsible of us not to do so. At the same time, it would be both premature and unwise for us to lay out a detailed blueprint for the post-war Gulf or, for that matter, the region as a whole. The war itself and the way it ends will greatly influence both the security of the Gulf and the rest of the area. The deepest passions have been stirred. The military actions now underway necessarily involve many casualties, great hardships, and growing fears for the future. So tough times lie ahead. We should, therefore, approach the post-war problems with a due sense of modesty. Respect for the sovereignty of the peoples of the Gulf and the Middle East must be uppermost in our minds. In an event, modern history has shown that no single nation can long impose its will or remake the Middle East in its image. After all, that is partly why we are fighting Saddam Hussein. Yet, among all the difficulties we face, I think one fact stands out: The peoples of the Gulf and, indeed, the entire Middle East, desperately need peace. I truly believe that there must be a way, working in consultation with all of the affected nations, to set a course that brings greater security for all and that brings enduring peace. We should, therefore, make every effort not just to heal the Persian Gulf after this war but also to try to heal the rest of the region which needs it so badly. So I would like to discuss several challenges that I believe we should address in a post-war period.
Greater Security For the Persian Gulf
After two wars in 10 years, this vital region needs new and different security arrangements. In our view, there are three basic issues that have to be resolved: First, the purposes or principles of the security arrangements; Second, the role of the local states, regional organizations, and the international community; and Third, in the aftermath of the war, the military requirements until local stability is achieved, as well as thereafter. I think we would find already a wide measure of agreement on the principles. They would include deterrence of aggression from any quarter; territorial integrity. There has to be respect for existing sovereignty of all states and for the inviolability of borders. Peaceful resolution of disputes: Border problems and other disputes that have long histories-and there are many, many beyond the Iraq-Kuwait example-should be resolved by peaceful means as prescribed by the UN Charter. These principles must be put into action first and foremost by the local states so that conflicts can be prevented and aggression deterred. We would expect the states of the Gulf and regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to take the lead in building a reinforcing network of new and strengthened security ties. No regional state should be excluded from these arrangements. Post-war Iraq could have an important contribution to play, and so could Iran, as a major power in the Gulf. There is a role, too, for outside nations and the international community, including the United Nations, to encourage such arrangements and to stand behind them. As for the United States, we have deployed small naval forces in the Persian Gulf ever since the Truman Administration in 1949. We had, and we continue to have, strong bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia and other local states. And through the years, we have conducted joint exercises with and we have provided military equipment for our friends in the region. The President has said that we have no intention of maintaining a permanent ground presence on the Arabian Peninsula once Iraq is ejected from Kuwait and the threat recedes. Before security is assured, however, important questions must be answered. We will be going through an important transitional phase in the immediate aftermath of the war as we try to establish stability. Let me list just a few of the questions that need to be answered. Should there be a permanent locally stationed ground force made up of local troops under UN auspices or under regional auspices such as the GCC? How can the international community reinforce deterrence in the Gulf-whether by contributing forces or through other political arrangements such as resolutions or security commitments? No one yet has the answers to these and other questions. Some may never be answered, but we will eventually proceed. We will conduct extensive consultations among all of the concerned parties to such arrangements.
Regional Arms Proliferation and Control
A second challenge will surely be regional arms proliferation and control. This includes both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The terrible fact is that even the conventional arsenals of several Middle Eastern states dwarf those of most European powers. Five Middle Eastern countries have more main tanks than the United Kingdom or France. The time has come to try to change the destructive pattern of military competition and proliferation in this region and to reduce arms flow into an area that is already very over-militarized. That suggests that we and others and outside the region must consult on how best to address several dimensions of the problem: How can we cooperate to constrain Iraq's postwar ability to retain or rebuild its weapons of mass destruction and its most destabilizing conventional weapons? How can we work with others to encourage steps toward broader regional restraint in the acquisition and use of both conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction? What role might the kinds of confidence- building measures that have lessened conflict in Europe play in the Gulf and the Middle East? And, finally, what global actions would reinforce steps toward arms control in the Gulf and Middle East? These, for instance, could include rapid completion of pending international agreements, like the chemical weapons convention, as well as much tighter supply restraints on the flow of weapons and dual-use technology into the region. And what implication does that have for arms transfer and sales policy?
Economic Reconstruction and Recovery
A third challenge will be economic reconstruction and recovery. An economic catastrophe has befallen the Gulf and the nations trading with it. Kuwait has been looted and wrecked. Hundreds of thousands of workers have lost jobs and have fled. Trade flows and markets have been disrupted. I'm confident that the people of Kuwait will rebuild their country. As we have worked with the Kuwaitis in their moment of trial, so we shall look forward to cooperating with them in their hour of recovery. And no one should forget that for the second time in a decade the people of Iraq will be recovering from a disastrous conflict. The time of reconstruction and recovery should not be the occasion for vengeful actions against a nation forced to war as a result of a dictator's ambition. The secure and prosperous future everyone hopes to see in the Gulf has got to include Iraq. Of necessity, most of the resources for reconstruction will be drawn from the Gulf. Yet, should we not be thinking also of more than reconstruction? It might be possible for a coalition of countries, using both local and external resources, to transform the outlook for the region-in expanding free markets and investment, in assisting development, and in promoting growth-oriented economic development policies which have taken root across the globe. Any economic effort must have a special place for water development. Well over half the people living in the Middle East draw water from rivers that cross international boundaries or depend on desalinization plants. We have all been incensed by Saddam Hussein's deliberate poisoning of the Gulf waters, which could affect a large portion of Saudi Arabia's desalinized drinking water. Finally, we will want to consult with governments both from the Middle East and from other regions about specific arrangements that might best serve the purposes of region-wide economic cooperation. Such cooperation would surely be helpful in reinforcing our overall objective, reducing one by one the sources of conflict and removing one by one the barriers to security and prosperity throughout the area.
Search for Peace and Reconciliation in Middle East
A fourth challenge is to resume the search for a just peace and real reconciliation for Israel, the Arab states, and Palestinians. By reconciliation, I mean not simply peace as the absence of war but a peace based on enduring respect, tolerance, and mutual trust. As you know, I personally had devoted considerable effort before the war to facilitating a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians, which I think is an essential part of an overall peace process. Let's not fool ourselves, though. The course of this crisis has stirred emotions among Israelis and Palestinians that will not yield easily to conciliation. Yet, in the aftermath of this war, as in earlier wars, there may be real opportunities for peace if the parties are willing. And if they really are willing, we are committed to working closely with them to fashion a more effective peace process. The issues to be addressed are, of course, familiar and more challenging than ever: How do you go about reconciling Israelis and Palestinians? What concrete actions can be taken by each side? What will be the role of the Arab states in facilitating this process and their own negotiations for peace with Israel? How will regional arms-control arrangements affect this process? What is the best diplomatic vehicle for getting the process under way? Again, we will be consulting and working very closely with our friends and all parties who have a constructive role to play in settling this conflict.
Reduce US Energy Dependence
And a fifth and final challenge concerns the United States. We simply must do more to reduce our energy dependence. As the President has stressed, only a comprehensive strategy can achieve our goals. That strategy should involve energy conservation and efficiency, increased development, strengthened stockpiles and reserves, and greater use of alternative fuels. We must bring to this task the same determination that we are now bringing to the war itself. As you can see, some of these elements are political, some are economic, and some of necessity are related to security. That suggests that we should view security not just in military terms but as part and parcel of the broader outlook for the region. We are not going to have lasting peace and well-being in the absence of sound economic growth. We're not going to have sound economic growth if nations are threatened or invaded or if they are squandering precious resources on more and more arms. And, surely, finding a way for the peoples of the Middle East to work with each other will be crucial if we are going to lift our eyes to a better future.
US--Soviet Relations
Before closing I'd like to say few words on another challenge that we face, mentioned by Mr. [William] Broomfield [ranking minority member]: our relations with the Soviet Union. The President has spoken often of a new world order in which freedom and democracy might flourish, secure from the fears of the Cold War. We have been hopeful about such an order, partly because of the growing cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1989, I described that cooperation as "a search for points of mutual advantage." And this search has yielded good results. Three examples, I think, will suffice. First, over the past year, a democratic Germany, fully a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was united in peace. The Iron Curtain has vanished and with it the Cold War; Second, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have emerged in their own right once more, free to pursue democracy and economic liberty; and Third, the Soviet Union has joined the international coalition confronting Iraqi aggression. As Foreign Minister [Aleksandr] Bessmertnykh reiterated last week, the Soviet Union continues to completely support the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions. While we both have worked at finding these and other points of mutual advantage, it has long been clear to both sides that the potential for long-term cooperation, or even partnership, between our countries would depend ultimately on the course of the Soviet Union's domestic reform. That is why when last fall I called for "pathways of mutual advantage," not just discrete points. I also announced our desire to see a broader democratic dialogue with Soviet reformers. Not just economic reform but essential political reform could transform the Soviet Union into a very different society. Over the course of several summits and numerous meetings, we have become much more familiar with the ups and downs of perestroika, the enormous and daunting difficulties of changing after 70 years a society's basic direction and many of its values. In the last several months, however, we have seen a series of unsettling events. They include the tragic violence in the Baltics, an apparent turn toward economic recentralization, a less free media, extension of army and KGB authority, and the resignation or departure from the government of key reform advocates. These actions are completely inconsistent with the course of peaceful change, democratic principles, the rule of law, and real economic reform. There is simply no justification at all for the use of force against peaceful and democratically elected governments. Our hearts go out to the courageous people of the Baltic states who have acted throughout with dignity and with restraint. The President and I have had extensive discussions recently with President Gorbachev and other Soviet officials about these developments. We and our European allies have pointed out the inevitable consequences if the Soviet government continues on this path, and we have stated our belief that the Soviet Union cannot hope to succeed in meeting its own objectives if it should abandon perestroika, democratization, and glasnost. On the Baltics, I could do no better here than to quote the President's words from the State of the Union Address: "Our objective is to help the Baltic peoples achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union." We have had representations from the Soviet leadership about their continuing commitment to reform, to peaceful dialogue with the Baltics, and to creating a society ruled by law-not by force. We're going to watch this situation closely to see whether these representations become enduring realities. I hope that the Soviet Union will relearn quickly the lesson from its own hard experience. The old ways are not the right ways. Perestroika cannot succeed at gunpoint. Clearly, we cannot rule out the possibility that matters may still turn more for the worse, but at the same time we must be careful not to jump to premature conclusions. The Soviet leadership is at a crossroads. We have made clear that their first several steps have taken them down a path of no benefit for them or for us or for anyone else. For the sake of history and for the sake of the world, I hope they resume the march that has given the entire world hope for a better future.
The Need for US Leadership
I want to sum up these comments with this observation. When I appeared before you a year ago to review our overall foreign policy, we were well on the way to a whole and free Europe, secured by expanding US--Soviet cooperation in resolving the continent's outstanding political and military problems. The possibility-even the idea-of this terrible conflict in the Gulf was beyond anyone's imagination, yet now we face the challenges of hot war in the Gulf and growing uncertainty about the course of Soviet reform. There can be different views of how to handle this situation. I look forward to your counsel and good words on both issues, yet on one point I believe we are in very basic agreement-and that is on the need for American leadership. If we do not do our part, then Churchill's broad path, pursued by many states in common, will not be possible. And as Churchill warned, "The middle path adopted from desires for safety and a quiet life may be found to lead direct to the bull's-eye of disaster." More clearly than we could have ever imagined a year or even 6 months ago, the world emerging from the end of the postwar era will be shaped by the United States of America and by its international allies. Our constant purpose must be to make of that world a fitting place for free peoples to live.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 6, February 11, 1991 Title:

International Affairs Budget: Fulfilling Freedom's Challenge

Date: Feb 11, 19912/11/91 Country: United States Subject: State Department, Trade/Economics, Democratization, Human Rights, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] The United States is at the forefront of a world community increasingly receptive to democracy, market economics, and cooperation against aggression. Together with our allies and friends, we will continue to support those who share our values and interests. Effective diplomacy and foreign assistance are essential to a successful US foreign policy. The FY 1992 international affairs budget will advance US values and interests around the world through diplomatic initiatives, foreign economic and military assistance, information and cultural exchange, and support of international organizations. Rarely has US foreign policy operated amid such far-reaching and rapid international change, from supporting the peaceful transformation of Europe, to resolving long-festering regional conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to leading an unprecedented international coalition against the aggression of Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Accelerating economic interdependence and the global spread of new technologies are further blurring the lines between foreign and domestic affairs. Effectively coordinating and deploying the instruments of foreign policy under such highly volatile international conditions, while adhering to strict budget limits, require clarity of purpose and enhanced flexibility in managing the international affairs budget.
US Objectives
Five major and mutually reinforcing goals will guide American policy beyond the Cold War and through this defining moment in history.
Promoting and Consolidating Democratic Values
. This is our first and preeminent foreign policy challenge, affecting long-term US national security, economic prosperity, and social well-being. In an era of instant global communication, all nations are experiencing unprecedented degrees of political interdependence. Human rights have no frontiers and are indivisible. Transitions toward democracy, however difficult, cannot be accomplished in isolation from the rest of the world. The essential ingredients of democracy-respect for human rights, the rule of law, free and fair elections, and economic opportunity-are also the basic building blocks of the new world order. US foreign affairs programs, while adapting to local circumstances, will emphasize the strengthening of democratic institutions, such as effective electoral bodies, responsive public administrators, independent court systems, and a free press. Close cooperation with funding agencies of other democracies and broadening partnerships with US civic and educational organizations can improve the reach and effectiveness of US assistance.
Promoting Market Principles and Strengthening US Competitiveness
US diplomacy and assistance encourage economic policy reform and support market-oriented, sustainable development. Political and economic liberty go hand in hand. Fragile democracies are reinforced by strong economies. Open societies spur the creativity and entrepreneurship essential to economic success. Strategies of deregulation, privatization, and market-based structural adjustment work. Free and open markets are the key to broad-based and sustainable economic growth. The United States will continue to assist strong, adequately funded, multilateral economic institutions to foster more open and productive local and world markets. Trade liberalization also will remain a high foreign policy objective. In addition, bilateral assistance programs to improve the capacity and effectiveness of the private sector in democratizing countries should have greater participation by US private institutions. Universities can have a larger role in overseas business training. American business can take advantage of incentives in foreign capital projects to increase investment and trade. An expanding US business presence abroad can be an important complement to building democracy and promoting market-oriented development. Increased exports also mean more US jobs and a more efficient economy able to compete effectively in international markets.
Promoting Peace
Timely security assistance backed by skillful diplomacy continues to be a key tool of American foreign policy. Substantial resources will be required in the 1990s to achieve comprehensive and verifiable arms control; to deter the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the spread of advanced missile delivery systems; to help avoid and resolve regional conflicts; and to enhance UN peace-keeping capabilities. US assistance also is needed to sustain peaceful development and to ensure rapid reconstruction and recovery so that long-sought peace agreements do not unravel. International and regional security is necessary for democracy and free enterprise to flourish. Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait is a dramatic reminder of the continuing need to protect weaker countries. The world response to his aggression underscores the ability of the international community to join forces to oppose such threats. Today, most violent conflicts occur within-not among-nations. In an increasingly politically and economically interdependent world, efforts to promote international security must deal with racial, religious, and ethnic conflicts and the denial of human rights. Such "local" conflicts carry the risk of escalating suddenly in new and dangerous ways.
Protecting Against Transnational Threats
A major challenge in the 1990s is to work with allies, friends, and traditional adversaries to protect the world community against new global dangers. Traditional concepts of what constitutes a threat to national and global security are being updated and extended to such divergent concerns as environmental degradation, narcotics trafficking, terrorism, or other criminal actions by groups or individuals. All directly affect individual freedom and well-being and can ultimately be overcome only through conscientious and sustained citizen involvement. Government policy and assistance seek to promote such public action. Protecting and restoring the environment, in ways conducive to sustainable economic development and democracy, has become a widely shared concern of aid donors and recipients. At the global level the issues of climate change, the loss of bio-diversity, and the destruction of tropical rain forests are high on the international agenda. Addressing these and more limited transnational environmental issues also will require new bilateral, regional, and global arrangements, with extensive participation of private enterprise and nongovernmental organizations. Americans have a strong interest and much relevant experience and technology to share in protecting and restoring local environments and in demonstrating the effectiveness of market-based policies. The environment is a good example of the new challenges that cut across all five major foreign affairs objectives.
Meeting Urgent Humanitarian Needs
The United States has an unequaled record in responding quickly and substantially to alleviate suffering and the plight of refugees caused by natural or man-made disasters. Famine, environmental degradation, epidemics, and the flow of refugees caused by civil wars, repression, and unwise economic policies continue to demand our attention. US private voluntary agencies, reflecting the generosity of the American people, play a major role in this type of assistance. Private/public partnerships in this area should be expanded in the future. Humanitarian assistance responds to a wide variety of needs. Yet economic policy reform, democratization, and humanitarian assistance should reinforce each other whenever possible. This assistance can help alleviate many effects of radical economic restructuring and stem the flow of refugees and migrants by providing the necessary economic incentives not to leave home. Investing in diplomatic initiatives to resolve local conflicts can yield substantial returns by avoiding human suffering and the costs of providing humanitarian relief.
Revitalizing US Assistance
Current US foreign assistance programs and procedures cannot match the rapidly changing and unpredictable events of the post- Cold War era. The effectiveness of US foreign assistance has been constrained by the proliferation of many small "earmarked" programs, which are further restricted by rigid reporting requirements. Therefore, the Administration proposes to revitalize US assistance through new legislation that would revise and reduce the number of program objectives and provide for greater flexibility in the allocation of scarce resources. These reforms are essential if the United States is to take advantage of fast-breaking and often fragile opportunities to advance political and economic reforms within and among democratizing nations. Flexibility also brings other advantages, such as the ability to reach burden-sharing arrangements with other donors, to leverage support from the private sector, and to promote the activities of multilateral organizations, including peace-keeping operations. Restructuring and reintegrating economic, security, and humanitarian assistance will require a transition period of several years. This will allow the Administration and the Congress to assess better the long-term implications of major international changes underway or on the horizon. A high priority for the 1990s is building consensus and mutual trust between Congress and the executive bn assistance priorities and greater flexibility in aid disbursement.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 6, February 11, 1991 Title:

FY 1992 International Affairs Budget Overview

Date: Feb 11, 19912/11/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: North America Country: United States Subject: State Department
Summary
The President requests $34 billion in budget authority for international affairs programs in fiscal year (FY) 1992. Of this amount, $12.2 billion is for an increase in the US quota for the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such quota increases occur only once or twice in a decade and do not involve outlays. Excluding the IMF increase, the international affairs request is $21.9 billion. This is $1.7 billion in budget authority (the authority to commit funds) above the FY 1991 enacted level. Outlays (actual spending) amount to $19.6 billion-$874 million more than the 1991 enacted level. The request is within the limits on budget authority and outlays set by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. The President's budget proposes to increase the following key program areas:
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
. To support the process of democratic change and the movement toward free and open markets, the President's budget proposes $410 million for the debt restructuring and investment fund components of the initiative.
War on Drugs
. The budget requests $611 million for international counter-narcotics programs to combat the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. This is an increase of $155 million (34%) above the 1991 level. These programs help dismantle major drug-trafficking organizations, reduce illicit crop production, and interdict drugs as they move from source countries through transit countries to the United States.
Support for International Organizations.
At a time when the international community has shown unprecedented ability to stand against aggression and more foreign policy challenges require multilateral cooperation for solutions, restoring the financial stability of the United Nations and other international organizations is critical. The President's budget requests an increase of $417 million to make payments primarily on US arrears to these organizations.
Supporting Democracy, Promoting Economic Growth, and Meeting Urgent Humanitarian Needs
. In addition to the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the President's budget proposes a $443-million increase in budget authority for development and humanitarian assistance programs to support democratic change, movement toward free and open markets, and economic growth and development, and to alleviate human suffering. This includes an 8% increase in the bilateral assistance program for Eastern Europe.
Supporting and Protecting our Diplomatic Presence Overseas
. Now more than ever, we need to adequately maintain our diplomatic presence and leadership overseas to work effectively with the democratic forces at work in many countries and protect against transnational threats which may be directed at US citizens. The President's budget proposes a $342-million increase to reverse the alarming deterioration in the infrastructure that supports this presence and protects it from terrorist attacks.
Composition of Budget
About one-half of the FY 1992 international affairs budget (excluding the IMF increase) is for economic, development, and humanitarian programs (see chart on p. 1). Military assistance accounts for 22% of the budget and diplomatic activities for 13%. Of the $15.9 billion proposed for foreign assistance (economic, military, and humanitarian), $5.3 billion is requested for assistance to Israel and Egypt. The economic, development, and humanitarian assistance programs support a broad range of activities, from providing economic support for emerging democracies to combating malnutrition and famine in drought-stricken countries. Programs are being carried out in more than 70 countries around the world. Military assistance is concentrated in fewer countries, with the bulk of the assistance supporting military modernization in Israel, Egypt, and key NATO and regional allies (Turkey, Greece, Portugal, and Philippines), or to countries assisting in the war on drugs.
Program Highlights
International Development and Humanitarian Assistance
(Budget Subfunction 151) The United States continues to play a major role in alleviating suffering and promoting sound economic policies in the developing world. Programs in this category help promote the growth of market-oriented economies through budgetary support, finance development projects, and provide expert advice to foreign governments and private entities. They also provide relief supplies and funds to meet major natural and man-made disasters and to aid refugees abroad and to resettle them in the United States. International Development and Humanitarian Assistance: Discretionary
Budget Totals
($ million) 1990 1991 1992 Budget Authority 6,147 7,040 7,893 Outlays 5,744 5,717 6,724
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
. In support of the process of democratic change and the movement toward free markets and open economies in this hemisphere, the President announced on June 27, 1990, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, an integrated program to increase free and fair trade, promote capital flows, reduce debt burdens, and improve the environment. The budget includes $310 million in budget authority to cover the cost of the debt restructuring aspects of the initiative in 1992. As part of debt restructuring, environmental trust funds would be established to provide resources to support environmental programs and projects. The Administration also requests $100 million for a contribution to a multilateral investment fund to support market- oriented investment policy initiatives and reforms in Latin American countries. The fund would be managed by the Inter- American Development Bank.
Eastern Europe
. The Administration is requesting $470 million in assistance to Central and Eastern Europe in FY 1992, a $30-million increase from the 1991 enacted level, including $70 million for a contribution to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. These programs support the transition to democracy and market economies in the area and help improve the quality of life in these societies. In addition to special assistance programs in the budget, the US provides food aid to the region and is the major contributor to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which have committed significant resources to Central and Eastern Europe. US assistance programs complement other traditional programs carried out by various US agencies, such as the Department of Commerce and the US Information Agency.
Counter-narcotics
The budget requests $172 million for that part of the Administration's international counter- narcotics program implemented by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. These programs combat the entry of illicit drugs into the United States. Major emphasis will continue to be placed on narcotics programs that reduce illicit crop production, interdict drugs as they move from source countries through transit countries into the US, and build host country capabilities to deter drug traffickers. More than one-half of the total 1992 request ($100 million) will be used to implement the law enforcement aspects of the President's Andean strategy focusing on the coca-producing countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia and to help other Latin American governments dismantle trafficking organizations, seize drug shipments, and reduce illicit production. These programs complement military assistance and economic development counter-narcotics programs. The request will also maintain other important country programs worldwide, an inter-regional aviation support program, contributions to international organizations, and other inter-regional counter- narcotics programs.
Development Assistance
. The $2.8 billion development assistance request for the US Agency for International Development (excluding operating expenses) combines continued emphasis on sustainable, broad-based economic growth and humanitarian assistance with new initiatives aimed at emerging opportunities and needs in the rapidly changing international environment. These initiatives include support for democracy, establishing a partnership with American business to expand its involvement in development, and a new focus on the family's role in development.
Food Aid
. The $1.3 billion requested for the PL 480 Food for Peace program will support the export of 5.9 million metric tons of US commodities to meet the food needs of developing countries. The program provides emergency relief to counter the effects of drought and pestilence, direct-feeding programs to reduce the incidence of malnutrition among the poor, and import assistance for countries attempting to improve their food security. The program also promotes the expansion of overseas markets for US commodities.
Multilateral Development Banks.
The Administration requests $1.7 billion for contributions to the multilateral development banks (MDBs). The MDBs play a vital role in promoting economic reform and market-led growth in developing countries and Eastern Europe. US support for the MDBs is very cost effective. The US contribution of $72.1 million in paid-in capital for the World Bank leveraged a total World Bank lending program of more than $15 billion in lending in FY 1990. The World Bank expects to lend more than $9 billion during the next 3 years to aid the process of economic and political transformation in Eastern Europe. The new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development also will play an important role in this region.
Refugee Programs
. The $511 million request for refugee programs in 1992 includes $491 million for migration and refugee assistance and $20 million for the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund. Of the total amount, $233 million has been requested for assistance programs overseas which will give priority to basic life-sustaining activities and support for lasting solutions to refugee problems through opportunities for voluntary repatriation and local integration. The request also includes $192 million to finance the admission and initial resettlement of an estimated 120,000 refugees in this country, the majority of whom will come from the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The request also includes $40 million to assist in the resettlement of refugees in Israel and $15 million for contributions to the International Organization for Migration and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
International Security Assistance
(Budget Subfunction 152) The US pursues key national security and foreign policy objectives by helping friendly and allied countries to defend themselves and by promoting the development and growth of market-oriented economies. Programs in this category are intended to strengthen the ability of our friends and allies to deter and defend against aggression while promoting fundamental economic reforms which are essential for long-term economic and political stability. Programs in this category also provide funding for multilateral peace-keeping operations and international military education and training. International Security Assistance: Discretionary
Budget Totals
($ million) 1990 1991 1992 Budget Authority 8,884 7,945 7,986 Outlays 8,936 7,848 7,749
Middle East.
What we must now accomplish by force of arms, we intend to maintain by supporting friends that need our help. Establishing a secure and stable Middle East is among the most critical challenges that we now face. Accordingly, nearly three-fourths of security assistance resources are devoted to the countries in the region either directly participating in Operation Desert Storm or profoundly affected by the crisis, such as Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Oman, and Jordan.
Counter-narcotics
. A total of $425 million of our request for security assistance will support the military assistance and economic development aspects of the President's Andean counter-narcotics initiative. Two-thirds of this assistance will be provided in the form of Economic Support Funds to reduce economic dislocation and promote alternative development and income substitution in narcotics-producing areas. Military assistance to the Andean nations will assist the military forces of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia in carrying out counter-narcotics missions in support of national narcotics control programs.
Other Key Programs
. Other key components of the request include: -- About 6% of security assistance will support Greece and Portugal in the continued military modernization of these NATO and Persian Gulf coalition partners; -- Some 5% of security assistance is for Central America, of which three-quarters is in economic aid to promote broad-based, sustainable economic growth; and -- 4% of assistance helps promote the security and development of the Philippines, a key Asian friend.
Conduct of Foreign Affairs
(Budget Subfunction 153) The dramatic events of the last 2 years have created watershed challenges and opportunities for the United States abroad. State Department operations for the conduct of foreign affairs amount to less than one-half of 1% of the entire federal budget. Nonetheless, this relatively small budget has come under increasing pressure as our posts abroad protect American citizens and facilities, report on changing basic world realities, and cope with high rates of overseas inflation and a significant decline in the value of the dollar. The FY 1992 request aims to provide the Department of State with the resources necessary to meet ongoing obligations, including support for the UN and other multilateral organizations, and to respond to new requirements related to both recent and anticipated foreign policy developments. A partial list of important policy challenges that our request seeks to meet includes: the evolving crisis, and now war, in the Persian Gulf; continuing changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; efforts to consolidate the return to democracy in Panama and Nicaragua; growing demands for emergency consular services for American citizens abroad; and increased costs related to immigration processing. All of these challenges underscore the importance of a budget adequate to provide the nation with skilled professionals, operating out of appropriate facilities and supported by an effective infrastructure, including modern telecommunications and information systems. To manage these systems and ensure that our nation's foreign policy is implemented effectively and efficiently, the US government also must fund modern and functional financial and administrative support systems. Conduct of Foreign Affairs: Discretionary
Budget Totals
($ million) 1990 1991 1992 Budget Authority 2,928 3,161 4,117 Outlays 3,046 3,385 3,528
State Operations
. The 1992 request of $2,050 million for the Department's primary operational account (Salaries and Expenses) will provide the necessary resources to meet ongoing diplomatic and consular operations as well as fund increases to respond to the nation's highest priority foreign policy challenges. -- In response to continuing diplomatic, political, social, and economic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, we plan to expand and reorient our diplomatic presence in the area. This includes increasing resources devoted to various arms control verification operations and bilateral and multilateral cooperation, security, and disarmament efforts. -- The 1992 request also will provide the resources necessary to meet the increased immigrant visa workload resulting from the Immigration Act of 1990, and continue required investments to improve the Department's information management, internal control, and financial management systems -- In response to the crisis in the Persian Gulf, we are preparing to meet increased terrorist threats to the Department's overseas personnel by requesting increased funding for residential security measures and counter-terrorism research projects.
Foreign Buildings
. The $570 million request for 1992 is the beginning of a 5-year, $2.5 billion program to address the Department of State's most urgent facility replacement priorities including embassies in Bangkok, Bogota, and Moscow. Given the aging and rapidly deteriorating condition of the Department's valuable inventory of overseas facilities, this investment is essential to restore the safety, efficiency, and security of these buildings. In addition, the request includes funds for leased residential, office, and support facilities, as well as for critical maintenance and rehabilitation requirements of current facilities.
International Organizations
. The 1992 request recognizes our international obligations and reflects the President's strong commitment to restoring the financial stability of the UN and other international organizations. Events in the Gulf, combined with positive developments in Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia, confirm the important role multilateral organizations can play, with US leadership, in helping to create a new world order based on the rule of law. Continued success requires patience, including our ability to meet financial commitments. The 1992 request of $1,327 million, consistent with statutory and policy restrictions, represents: -- Full funding ($824 million) of our assessed contributions to 51 international organizations and 3 UN peace-keeping forces and for international conferences; and --$503 million to continue funding of cumulative arrearages in accordance with the President's plan for payments over a 5-year period (FY 1991-95). Under this plan, in 1992 we anticipate paying about $131 million in arrearages. Payment of these arrearages will be directed toward special activities that are mutually agreed upon by the United States and respective international organizations and would be conditional upon such agreements.
Foreign Information and Exchange
(Budget Subfunction 154) An important objective of the Administration is to increase international understanding of American society and US foreign policy. The United States Information Agency seeks to do this through personal contacts, academic and leadership exchanges, satellite television broadcasting, Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts by radio, distribution of books and periodicals, English- language teaching, and the operation of libraries and cultural centers abroad. The Board for International Broadcasting provides radio broadcasts to the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This category of spending also supports information and exchange activities between the US and Asia. Foreign Information and Exchange:
Discretionary Budget Totals
($ million) 1990 1991 1992 Budget Authority 1,315 1,227 1,294 Outlays 1,102 1,340 1,387
United States Information Agency
. The FY 1992 request of $1,059 million contains $16.7 million for initiatives in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East across a broad range of cultural and informational activities, including initial costs for establishing a new Moscow cultural center; augmenting staff in several key East European posts and in the Middle East; re-establishing a post in Kabul, Afghanistan; creating more Fulbright and other academic exchange and international visitor grants; providing additional VOA and television broadcasts to Eastern Europe; and providing more American lecturers and books. These increases will be funded partially through reductions in programming in Western Europe and in other activities. USIA will continue its support for Operation Desert Storm by broadcasting around the world important US speeches and announcements, such as President Bush's announcement of the beginning of military operations to liberate Kuwait.
Board for International Broadcasting
. With the establishment of democratic governments and the development of reliable, free media in Eastern Europe, the need for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty broadcasts to the region is diminishing. As recent events in the Baltic countries show, however, there remains continuing need for the surrogate domestic radio services that they provide. The budget of $218 million for this program represents a gradual phase-down.
International Financial Programs
(Subfunction 155) This category of international affairs spending includes funding for two major financial institutions, the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) and the International Monetary Fund, as well as a Presidential Contingency Fund. International Financial Programs:
Discretionary Budget Totals
($ million) 1990 1991 1992 Budget Authority 752 761 12,734 Outlays -513 449 225
Export-Import Bank of the United States
. Eximbank helps finance nearly $8 billion annually in US commercial export sales of American goods and services using loan, guarantee, and insurance programs. A pilot program to finance commercial sales of defense exports is being considered for inclusion in Eximbank's proposed FY 1992 budget of $9,525 million in loan and guarantee authority. Such a defense export financing program would enhance US exporters' ability to compete with foreign suppliers who already benefit from official subsidy programs for military exports. The proposed $110 million for the War Chest, a tied-aid credit fund, provides leverage in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) negotiations. Such assistance is targeted toward sectors and markets of commercial interest to US exporters where tied-aid credits are used extensively by foreign competitors. The War Chest allows US firms to offer more competitive terms on sales.
IMF Quota Increase
. The FY 1992 budget contains $12.2 billion in budget authority for the proposed increase in the US quota in the International Monetary Fund. The US quota increase is part of a general increase in all IMF quotas to help ensure that the Fund has the resources necessary to fulfill its responsibilities as the world's principal monetary institution. The IMF is critical to important US foreign economic policy interests, such as the strengthened debt strategy for less developed countries, economic reform in Eastern Europe, and responding to the effects of the Persian Gulf crisis.
Presidential Contingency Fund
. The budget requests $20 million in FY 1992 for the Presidential Contingency Fund. While this modest amount would be insufficient to meet major unanticipated demands of the magnitude encountered in 1990 supplemental appropriations for Panama and Nicaragua, it would allow the President to respond quickly to a number of smaller unexpected needs that may arise during the course of the year. In this time of dramatic changes in world events, this fund would allow some flexibility to address new requirements without diverting resources from other important programs.
International Affairs Discretionary Programs: FY 1990-92, Budget Authority
($ million) [Budget Authority 1990 1991 1992]
International Security Assistance
Foreign Military Financing 4,811 4,708 4,650 Economic Support Fund 3,957 3,145 3,240 Military Training and other 116 92 96 Subtotal 8,884 7,945 7,986
International Development and Humanitarian Assistance
Agency for International Development 2,559 3,196 3,275 Assistance for Eastern Europe (88) (370) (400) Enterprise for the Americas Initiative 0 * 410 Debt Restructuring (0) * (310) Multilateral Investment Fund (0) (0) (100) Multilateral Development Banks 1,469 1,619 1,685 Food Aid 978 1,011 1,301 Refugee Programs 513 521 511 Voluntary Contributions to Int'l. Orgs. 274 285 250 State Department Narcotics Assistance 130 150 172 Peace Corps 166 186 200 Other 58 72 89 Subtotal 6,147 7,040 7,893
Conduct of Foreign Affairs
State Dept.. Salaries and Expenses 1,792 1,870 2,050 Foreign Buildings 293 228 570 United Nations Programs 702 910 1,327 New Payments (702) (793) (824) Arrearage Payments (0) (117) (503) Other 141 153 170 Subtotal 2,928 3,161 4,117 Title:

Foreign Information and Exchange Activities

US Information Agency 927 1,006 1,059 Board for International Broadcasting 373 206 218 Other 15 15 17 Subtotal 1,315 1,227 1,294 Title:

International Financial Programs

Export-Import Bank 612 750 556 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 0 0 12,158 Other 139 11 20 Subtotal 752 761 12,734
TOTAL (excluding IMF quota)
20,026 20,134 21,864
GRAND TOTAL
20,026 20,134 34,022 * Under current budget law, the debt restructuring proposed in 1991 will require no budget authority or outlays. Under credit reform principles to be implemented in 1992, the 1991 program would be $98 million in budget authority and outlays. Source: The Budget of the United States Government, FY 1992
International Affairs Discretionary Programs: FY 1990-92. Budget Outlays
($ million) [Budget Outlays 1990 1991 1992]
International Security Assistance
Foreign Military Financing 4,704 4,248 4,223 Economic Support Fund 3,719 3,263 3,394 Military Training and other 513 337 132 Subtotal 8,936 7,848 7,749
International Development and Humanitarian Assistance
Agency for International Development 2,358 2,328 2,746 Assistance for Eastern Europe (12) (141) (274) Enterprise for the Americas Initiative 0 * 325 Debt Restructuring (0) * (310) Multilateral Investment Fund (0) (0) (15) Multilateral Development Banks 1,429 1,307 1,484 Food Aid 978 1,120 1,120 Refugee Programs 544 463 520 Voluntary Contributions to Int'l. Orgs 265 273 257 State Department Narcotics Assistance 111 128 146 Peace Corps 156 182 198 Other -98 -84 -72 Subtotal 5,744 5,717 6,724
Conduct of Foreign Affairs
State Dept.. Salaries and Expenses 1,822 1,898 2,005 Foreign Buildings 356 377 399 United Nations Programs 727 940 956 New Payments (727) (823) (825) Arrearage Payments (0) (117) (131) Other 141 170 168 Subtotal 3,046 3,385 3,528
Foreign Information and Exchange Activities
US Information Agency 888 1,034 1,056 Board for International Broadcasting 208 282 314 Other 6 24 17 Subtotal 1,102 1,340 1,387
International Financial Programs
Export-Import Bank 357 542 185 International Monetary Fund (IMF) -741 0 0 Other -129 -93 40 Subtotal -513 449 225
TOTAL (excluding IMF quota)
18,315 18,739 19,613
GRAND TOTAL
18,315 18,739 19,613 * Under current budget law, the debt restructuring proposed in 1991 will require no budget authority or outlays. Under credit reform principles to be implemented in 1992, the 1991 program would be $98 million in budget authority and outlays. Source: The Budget of the United States Government, FY 1992
Supplemental Information
(Charts and Graphs Omitted) The following information is taken from graphs and charts shown in the hard copy. Source: The Budget of the United States Government, FY 1992.
FY 1992 International Affairs Budget: $21.9 billion*
Economic Development and Humanitarian Assistance - 51% Military Assistance - 22% Diplomatic Activity - 13% International Organizations - 6% Information and Exchange - 6% Other - 2% * Excludes IMF quota increase.
FY 1992 International Affairs Programs* ($ million)
Budget Authority - 1991 Enacted - 20,134; - 1992 Request - 21,864 Outlays - 1991 Enacted - 18,739; - 1992 Request - 19,613 *Discretionary budget authority; excludes IMF quota increase
FY 1992 Economic, Development, and Humanitarian Assistance: $11.1 billion*
Israel - 11% Egypt - 8% Africa - 8% Eastern Europe - 4% Central America - 5% Enterprise for the Americas - 4% Food Aid - 12% Multilateral Development - 15% Other - 33% *Discretionary budget authority. Note: Food aid provides additional assistance to countries and regions identified separately. Eastern Europe includes $70 million for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
FY 1992 Request for Military Assistance: $5 billion*
Israel - 36% Egypt - 26% Turkey - 13% Greece - 7% Philippines - 4% Portugal - 2% Central America - 2% Andean countries - 3% Other - 7% *Program level; includes $314 million in loans, requiring only $40 million in budget authority.
FY 1992 Request for International Development and Humanitarian Assistance: $7.9 billion
($ million)\ US Agency for International Development - $2,875 (37%) Assistance for Eastern Europe - $400 (5%) Enterprise for the Americas Initiative - $410 (5%) Multilateral Development Banks - $1,685 (21%) Food Aid - $1,301 (17%) Refugee Programs - $511 (6%) Peace Corps - $200 (3%) Other - $511 (6%)
FY 1992 Request for International Security Assistance: $8 billion
($ million) Foreign Military Financing - $4,650 (58%) Economic Support Fund- $3,240 (41%) Military Training and Other- $96 (1%)
FY 1992 Request for Conduct of Foreign Affairs: $4.1 billion
($ million) State Department Salaries and Expenses - $2,050 (50%) UN Programs - $1,327 (32%) Foreign Buildings - $570 (14%) Other - $170 (4%)
FY 1992 Request for Foreign Information and Exchange Activities: $1.3 billion
($ million) US Information Agency - $1,059 (82%) Board for International Broadcasting - $218 (17%) Other - $17 (1%) (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 6, February 11, 1991 Title:

News Conference: North American Free Trade Agreement/Persian Gulf

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Opening statement and question-and-answer session; Washington, DC Date: Feb 5, 19912/5/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: Canada, Mexico, Turkey Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] This morning, I spoke with President Salinas [of Mexico] and Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada, and together we intend to pursue a trilateral free trade agreement that would link our three economies in bold and far-reaching ways. Successful conclusion of the free trade agreement will expand market opportunities, increase prosperity, and help our three countries meet the economic challenges of the future. A free trade area encompassing all three countries would create a North American market of 360 million people, with annual production of more than $6 trillion. This agreement would be a dramatic first step toward the realization of a hemispheric free trade zone, stretching from Point Barrow in Alaska to the Straits of Magellan. I've informed the Congress of this decision and notified them of my intent to use the fast-track procedure for this North American Free Trade Zone. In cooperation with Mexico and Canada, we will work actively to conclude these negotiations expeditiously. And I am-let me shift to the budget for a second-I am very pleased at the generally constructive reception that our budget is receiving and, in particular, am pleased at the positive receptions that the governors gave yesterday concerning our budget proposal for transferring $15 billion-worth of government programs to the states-fully funded, I might add. It will put the states at the forefront of problem-solving and provide the necessary flexibility for administrating government programs. And I believe this can open up a whole new era of cooperation, as well as state responsibility that can only have a beneficial impact. This morning I also spoke with President Ozal of Turkey, regarding the coalition efforts in the Persian Gulf. We're nearing the end of the third week of Operation Desert Storm-almost 21 days to the hour. And I'm pleased to report that we remain on course and on schedule. US and coalition forces continue to perform their assigned missions with great professionalism and, thankfully, with only modest casualties on our side. I'd like to emphasize that we're going to extraordinary, and, I would venture to say, unprecedented lengths to avoid damage to civilians and holy places. We do not seek Iraq's destruction, nor do we seek to punish the Iraqi people for the decisions and policies of their leaders. In addition, we are doing everything possible-and with great success- to minimize collateral damage, despite the fact that Saddam is now relocating some military functions, such as command and control headquarters, in civilian areas such as schools. I'd also emphasize that our goals have not changed. We continue to seek Iraq's full compliance with the 12 relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Our soldiers have performed with courage and bravery that should make all Americans proud. And I believe our country is giving them the support that they need and deserve. As we move into the fourth week of this conflict, I ask all Americans to continue their prayers for our valiant men and women in the Gulf. And just let me end with this-that I have asked Dick Cheney, the Secretary of Defense, and General [Colin] Powell [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] to travel to Saudi Arabia late this week to meet directly with [Desert Storm forces Commander General] Norm Schwarzkopf and his staff. The purpose of this trip, which will be a short one, will be for them to get a firsthand status report. And I would then look forward to their returning here quickly and meeting with me and my other senior advisers. Q. Mr. President, your new budget contains relatively little money for the Persian Gulf war, which some analysts think could cost as high as $1 billion a day if it goes into a ground conflict. If the war goes on for months, how will you pay for it with an economy that's in a recession and a deficit that's climbing past $300 billion? A. Well, I think that in the budget some $15 billion is included. I think what people that are concerned about this have not realized is that we are getting significant support committed from overseas. And I'm confident that what we have in there will take care of it-[there] will be testimony on this up on the Hill, but we're talking about having commitments of close to, I think it's $50 or $51 billion from others added to the $15 billion that we have budgeted. That's $66 billion, and we believe it should be sufficient. Q. Would you under any circumstances consider a surtax to pay for the war if it goes on? A. Too hypothetical, but I can see no reason for a war surtax. I don't think it's necessary, and I've heard very little call for that, as a matter of fact, because I think people realize that these cost estimates are pretty accurate. Q. I think that you showed today that you are a little disturbed that people might think the goals have changed. But you don't deny, do you, that in addition to driving the Iraqis out of Kuwait, there is a sort of systematic destruction of the infrastructure-the essentials of daily living in Iraq? I mean, and that may be- A. No, that's not what we're doing. No, we are not trying to systematically destroy the functions of daily living in Iraq. That's not what we're trying to do, nor are we doing it. Q. No water, no electricity, no fuel. A. Well, I would say that our effort, our main goal, is to get this man to comply with the resolutions. But we are not trying to systematically destroy the infrastructure or to destroy Iraq. For example, I can tell you about-on targeting petroleum resources, we're not trying to wipe out all their ability to produce oil. We're not trying to wipe out all their ability to refine oil. We are trying to wipe out and keep them from resupplying their military machine. Q. May I follow up? A. Yes. Q. You say everything is on schedule, on course. What is the schedule for ending this war? A. Well, we'll have to just wait and see. That's a very complicated question. Q. Is it all a secret? A. But the war has been going on for something less than 21 days now, fully, and I think it is going very well, indeed. And so we will keep going, and I will avoid making- Q. Do you have an end in sight? A. I will avoid making predictions as to when it will end, but it won't be-I've said this over and over again-it will not be a Vietnam. I don't believe it's going to be long and drawn out. And it is going as we planned. It is going on schedule. It is going very well. Q. Does the Cheney-Powell visit over there signal that a decision is at hand on the commencement of a ground war? A. No, it doesn't signal that. Q. Well, let me follow by asking you, there is a perceptible increase in anti-American sentiment in the streets of a number of capitals in the Middle East. Does this add to the pressure on you to wrap this war up and get it over with? A. No, it doesn't because what we overlook when we see the demonstrations on the television is the fact that there's strong support in many Arab countries. And I am staying in very close touch with our coalition partners, and I am always encouraged when I talk to them about the support in their countries and in other parts of the Arab world for what we're doing. Yes, it's divided, and, yes, we've seen-I've seen the demonstrations in Amman, I've seen some of the demonstrations in the Magreb. But to get back to your question, they will not influence my decisionmaking on the timing involved, say, for the use of ground forces. Saddam Hussein will not set the timing for what comes next. We will do that. And I will have to make that decision if we go to ground forces, and I will do it upon serious consideration of the recommendations of our military, including our Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, of course, but also of our commanders in the field. But I see those demonstrations and I understand that some look at this and-some in the-more in the fundamentalist [countries], particularly-differently. But I also am gratified with the support in the Arab world, and I think it's strong. I think a lot of them want to see this man comply with these resolutions fully and not see this aggression rewarded, no matter what's happening in the streets. Q. The White House and the State Department were cool, even indifferent, to the Iranian peace initiative. Why so? Why would you not encourage an initiative which called for the full withdrawal from Kuwait by Saddam? A. I don't think that there was an initial-I don't think there is an Iranian proposal. I have not seen it. I just hung up talking to President Ozal of Turkey, and he doesn't think there is a specific Iranian proposal because-and I think the reason is that people realize that this man has to comply with these resolutions without equivocation; that he has to go forward, no concession, no compromise and do what the world has called on him to do. And at that point, then there can be some cessation of hostilities. But I have not seen a specific five-point program out of Tehran. Q. Well, there are reports from Tehran that do give several points. But beyond that- A. They did what? Q. There are reports out of Tehran that, in fact, do include several points which do include the withdrawal from Iraq. But the problem- A. Let me stop you there if I could, and then I'll get back to your question. If that were the case, it would seem to me that Iran would have conveyed such a proposal to the United States, and that is not the case. Q. The problem seems to be an impression is being given that you will be disappointed if the war ends with Saddam Hussein still in power. A. I see. No, I don't think that's the case, but the war will not end with Saddam Hussein standing with his view that he will not withdraw from Kuwait. I believe one of the things we'll see that came out of these recent meetings with Hammadi-the Iraqi [Deputy Prime Minister Sa'dun Hammadi]-in Iran is that Iraq is showing no flexibility whatsoever in terms of withdrawing from Kuwait. So we get right back to square one. There's nothing to negotiate about. There's nothing to be conciliatory about when you have a person who is steadfast in his refusal to comply with the fundamental purpose, and that is to get him out of Kuwait. But we haven't shifted our objectives on this. Now, would I weep? Would I mourn if somehow Saddam Hussein did not remain as head of his country? I thought [British] Prime Minister Major spoke very well about it-spoke very convincingly about it, and he reflected my view that there will be no sorrow if he's not there. In fact, it would be a lot easier to see a successful conclusion because I don't believe anybody other than Saddam Hussein is going to want to continue to subject his army to the pounding they are taking or his people to the pounding that is going on. So I would like to think that somehow, some way that would happen. But I have no evidence that it will. Q. Back on the timing of the ground offensive: You said last week at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and again here today that the United States and its allies and not Saddam Hussein would determine that. Three weeks into the war, what are the prospects for avoiding ground warfare in the Gulf? A. Well, I think one of the things that I look forward to hearing from General Powell and Dick Cheney is the answer to that question. And I guess you could rephrase it and say, would air power alone get the job done? And I-my own view is I'm somewhat skeptical that it would, but I'm very interested to hear from our Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Q. Well, we've heard conflicting reports about what happened in Khafji last week. Some reports have it that it was a skirmish, others that it was a major engagement, some that the Iraqis fought very poorly, and some that they put up quite a bit of resistance. What is your reading of that? A. My reading is to refer to General Schwarzkopf and the Pentagon briefing on that, which I thought were very clear. And, obviously, there were devastating losses on the Iraqi side. No question about the amounts of armor that were killed and, regrettably, the loss of life. But there's no question that this was a humiliating defeat. But I'd rather leave the details of that to the Pentagon briefers or to the briefers out in Saudi Arabia-who, incidentally, both of whom are doing a superb job of keeping the American people informed, keeping the world informed. And they have my full support for the way in which they're briefing. Q. You just mentioned the pounding that these Iraqi troops are taking. And I wonder how you have approached the decision where you obviously, if you continue this aerial bombardment like this, run the chance of slaughtering, literally, tens of thousands of Iraqi troops. The two-part question is, first, do you draw any conclusion that Saddam is either out of control of that decision or lost his senses? A. On what decision? Q. On allowing the United States, basically, to pound his troops who are virtually defenseless from the air. A. I'm not sure he has the full-I've never known for [a] fact, [for] certain, how much he's told. You mentioned Khafji; the question was raised. I don't know how much information he has about what happened there in spite of the full coverage that takes place. But let me be very clear. What concerns me are the lives of our troops. What concerns me are the lives of our coalition forces, the Saudi and the Qatar forces that went into Khafji very courageously. My first worries are about them. And Saddam Hussein should be concerned about the Iraqi forces. But how concerned he is, I don't know. Because when you shove people into battle, pushing them from behind to be defeated clearly and surely; or when you send your airplanes up, and the score is totally one- sided-in fact, every engagement in the air, the Iraqi planes and pilots have gone down-you have to wonder how he looks at what you're asking about, how he feels about that. But here's a man that used chemical weapons on his own people. Here's a man that gassed the Kurds. Here's a man who has no hesitancy to recklessly throw city-busting Scuds, population- killing Scuds, into Israel or into Saudi Arabia. Here's a man that brutally parades prisoners of war. Here's a man that has launched environmental terrorism. I can't figure out what he's thinking, and neither do the coalition partners with whom I am in touch; neither can they figure it out. But we're going to pursue this to achieve our objectives. And clearly, I want those objectives achieved with the most limited loss of life possible. It works on my mind every day. And I want to be sure that we pursue our ends with that in mind. But we are going to prevail, and I'm going to do whatever is necessary to be sure that we do and be sure we do it in relatively timely fashion. Q. It's already been suggested, though, that he is willing to suffer that level of casualties to his forces to increase a wave of anti-American sentiment in the region after the war, to hurt you politically after the war. Is that a consideration? A. I wouldn't be surprised if that's what he's trying to do. But I think that after the war, when we prevail-and we will-and when the coalition prevails-and it will-there will be a renewed credibility for the United States, a renewed credibility for the United Nations. And, thus, I worry far less about that than about other things because I think we then have an enormous potential to join with others in being the peacemakers. Q. On the question posed about Iran, is the problem with any Iranian peace effort simply the fact that it is Iran and your relations with Iran themselves are not good? A. No, not at all. And there are other-let's be fair about it, there are other countries that have offered up a willingness to try to bring peace to the area. I think of my friend, [President] Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria; I think of what the Arab League early on tried to do; I think of the Secretary General of the United Nations. There's a lot of people who are obviously concerned about peace, would like to find a way to bring this to a conclusion. So the fact that Iran would like to see the war end is encouraging. And Iran is conducting itself, in my view, in a very credible way here. They've said that those airplanes that come in there are going to be impounded, and we take them at their word on that. They have not been violators of the sanctions that we're aware of. They have wanted to remain neutral. They are concerned about continued US ground force presence in the Gulf, and I keep saying, not just to reassure Iran but everybody else, we have no intention of leaving forces in that area. We are there as part of a coalition under the UN resolutions to get this job done. So I have no argument with the way Iran is conducting itself. The only thing I was disputing a little is whether there was a specific peace proposal. And I don't think there is because, I think, Iran knows that he has to-that Saddam has to comply fully with these resolutions and start a credible, visible withdrawal; then the new regime of legitimate leaders comes back to Kuwait. And that's the way it could end if Saddam could come to his senses. But I keep coming back to the point that in all these talks there is no indication that he is prepared to get out of Kuwait. It's always the bottom line. They talk and talk and talk and then: "But this is Province 19, we're going to stay there." Q. If I could follow quickly, just to touch on a second neighbor. The reports are that Syria is now engaged in fighting and shelling on the ground. Do you have a full commitment from Syria to go with you on a ground war, and is that representative- A. Well, I again would refer that out. I have no reason to be dissatisfied with the commitment there, but I just can't tell you- I'm not going to go into the game plan as to who is supposed to be doing what. Q. You sound very much like you've come to the conclusion in your own mind that Saddam Hussein will never surrender-never. Have you come to that conclusion, and what does that mean about the length of the war and ferocity of his fighting forces? A. No, I haven't put it in terms of surrender; I've been putting it in terms of compliance with the resolutions. But I don't know. As I've said, it is very difficult to read somebody who is doing these horrible things that he is doing to civilian populations, to prisoners, to the environment, and to many other things. So I just can't predict it, but all I know is, we are going to prevail. The coalition will prevail. He will comply with the UN resolutions, and that means he will be totally out of Kuwait one way or another. But I don't know-I can't give you a clear picture of exactly which way will achieve that result. Q. Well, there has been quite a lot of denigrating of his forces early in this war. That is, they won't fight. If they're not supplied in time, they'll give up in large numbers. Have you changed your view of his ground forces? A. No. The one serious engagement on the ground forces is they've been obliterated. So I haven't changed my view on it. But having said that, we will conduct ourselves in such a way as to minimize-I mean, to see that the risk to coalition forces is minimum. And that is what I've asked our Chairman and our Secretary to do and to look into when they go out there. Q. I'm wondering if you could tell us the latest you've heard from the International Red Cross or anyone else who is trying to find out the fate of the POWs [prisoners of war] and the personnel who are missing there? A. So far all I've heard is a frustrating silence of his willingness to permit people to do what should be done, and that is to inspect and talk to the people involved. That's all I've heard. Q. As a follow-up, do you, following your experience in World War II, feel any personal kinship with these pilots who were shot down? A. Well, it doesn't have anything to do with my experience, particularly, many, many years ago. It has a lot to do with the fact that they are courageous Americans. And the answer to your question is, yes, I feel very strongly about it. And I had a chance to say that to some of the spouses and I-but it's not some kind of psychological tie into the fact that 50 years ago I was flying airplanes. It's the fact that I'm just-you see that, and you see these prisoners paraded, and it just turns my stomach. It just says something about the brutality of this person. And that's what really motivates me. Q. I'd like to change the subject briefly and ask you about the Soviet Union-whether you feel that [President] Mikhail Gorbachev is still in charge and is still a person with whom the United States should be dealing and placing its trust? A. Well, he is still in charge, and he is still the President of the Soviet Union, and thus we will deal with the President of the Soviet Union. He has enormous problems at home, and we've discussed them. His new Foreign Minister was here and said they were going to do certain things. We're watching to see if they will all be done. Some have been done. And so it's a very troubling situation inside the Soviet Union right now. But he's the President and I'm the President of this country, and, of course, we will deal with the authorities there. You don't set up 25 other diplomatic initiatives with a country; it's not the way you treat somebody. You deal in normal ways. And I'm going to do that. But we are looking for-that does not diminish my desire to see the people of the Baltics, for example, fulfill their destiny. Q. If I could follow, do you feel the era of glasnost and perestroika is over? A. The era of it? No. I think it will never go back, no matter what happens, to the totalitarian, closed society days of the Cold War. Q. You've made the point many times that the world needs to stop Saddam now, unlike in the 1930s when it failed to stop Hitler. In retrospect, do you ever think that this war might have been avoided if the United States had been tougher with Saddam long before he invaded Kuwait? A. Yes, yes. Q. Is there any lesson to be drawn from that, in other words? A. Well, we tried the peaceful route. We tried working with him and changing through contact. I don't know what the lesson is. The lesson is clear in this case that that didn't work. But whether there's a lesson in the future that you reach out to regimes--I think it was proper that we have reached out to the Soviet Union, when you look at the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, you look at the changes in the unification of Germany, you look at the withdrawal of Soviet forces from a lot of Eastern Europe. I mean, at times you want to try to go forward with regimes. I think [former US President Richard] Nixon's going to China was a very appropriate and courageous diplomatic move that has made the world a little better in spite of setbacks. That's the way I approach it. Q. Saddam Hussein has not yet used chemical weapons on the battlefield, but some analysts believe that may be something that we will face in the future. Have you made a decision on what the US response would be if he does turn to chemical weapons? And have you ruled out the idea that the United States might in turn use weapons of mass destruction? A. Well, I think it's better to never say what option you may be considering or may or may not do. But, yes, he has used chemical weapons on his own people, so the only way--I would like to take the opportunity in responding to your question to say he ought to think very carefully about doing that--very, very carefully. And I will leave that up to a very fuzzy interpretation because I would like to have every possible chance that he decides not to do this. And you talk about turning world opinion further against this brutal man, that would do it. But how we will respond or something, I would wait for recommendations, and I would not discuss options ahead of time one way or another. Q. I understand that you're not going to tell us what you would do, but have you in your own mind made a decision on what you would do, even though you can't reveal it? A. No. Q. Can you say with 100% presidential guarantee that you will not reinstate the draft? A. I have absolutely no intention of reinstating the draft. I've heard no discussion from any of our people about the need to reinstate the draft. We have an all-volunteer army that is totally capable of getting this job done. Q. So the answer is, no, you will not? A. No, I will not what? Q. Reinstate the draft? A. You're right-no, I will not reinstate the draft. Q. In an interview published this morning, General Schwarzkopf spoke rather eloquently of the emotional burden he carries sending-giving orders to troops that may cause combat casualties. As Commander in Chief, is that a nagging concern of yours that might lead you to extend the air war longer before committing land troops? A. Well, I would think-in the first place-and Norm Schwarzkopf understands, Powell understands, Cheney understands- that that's a decision the President has to make. But I don't feel any loneliness about that or-the loneliness at the top. I have very able people to depend on. And it is a decision that I'm perfectly prepared to make upon recommendation of these people in whom I have so much confidence. But I wouldn't go against sound military dogma-or doctrine, I mean-in order to just delay for the sake of delay-hoping that it would save lives. Q. There seems to be an increasing-- A. I said at the beginning-let me finish just one more thought and then I'll get back-I said at the beginning I am not going to second-guess. Now, there may be times when I have to say we're not going to do it this way or we may have to do something that way, but I don't think that this would be one of those cases at all. And I would bear the full responsibility for that very difficult decision. But I feel rather calm about it because we have a game plan, and we've stayed with the game plan, and we are on target. And unless I get recommendations from these men in whom I have so much trust, we're going to remain on the plan. Q. There seems to be an increasing feeling on the Hill among Republicans as well as Democrats that we should wait longer; some say even up to June. What's the downside of waiting that long and continuing to pound away at targets? A. I would simply say that I want to let this be determined by people that understand the military plan and that are prepared to implement it. And I remember before January 16th there was the same feeling-please let the sanctions work. I mean, I can understand the feeling on the Hill. I can understand those who say let air power do it alone. But I'm going to make these calls. These are the responsibilities of the Commander In Chief-that kind of decision. And I will make that decision after full consultation with the chief out there and the two main military people upon whom I depend here-Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. So I'm not trying to say it wouldn't be a difficult decision, but I am saying, one, I'm prepared to make it, and, two, I have total confidence that this decision will not be recommended to me unless the people that I've just mentioned know that it's the right thing to do. Q. There are some reports circulating that if Saddam Hussein were to begin a withdrawal from Kuwait you would still continue to prosecute this war at least for a while until you were satisfied certain conditions were met. Now, obviously, this is semi- hypothetical. He hasn't gotten out, of course. But could you tell us something about your conditions for agreeing to a cease-fire in the event that he did begin a withdrawal? A. It would have to be a credible, visible, totally convincing withdrawal. There would be other things that I will not state here that I would want to see happen. That would mean immediate supervision of the withdrawal. It would mean a return of the legitimate government right away. And so there are several things. But the reason I want to pull back a little and not give you a 10- point program is that he's got to say, I'm going to get out of Kuwait now, and I'm going to get out fast, and I'm going to do it so everybody knows that I'm not making this up, that I'm going to go forward. No trust, no concession--"I'll get out if you'll get out"- we've passed that. We tried that--diplomatic effort after diplomatic effort. Now we're in a war with this man. And he will comply with these resolutions fully, without concession. And then we can determine what niceties or what little details need to be done. But what has to happen to begin with is a credible withdrawal from Kuwait without concession, without condition. And all the rest of this then can fall into place. Q. We've heard from your wife recently that you haven't been sleeping so well, and we've also heard that the drums outside are keeping you awake. My question is, if you could just share with us what kind of personal toll this war has taken on you as far as your routine, your moods, your emotions? A. Look, my wife-normally I stick by everything she says, but I'm sleeping very well. The drums have ceased, oddly enough. And there was a slight hyperbole there because the drums could only be heard from one side of the White House. However, when they got up over the 60-decibel count limit, a protest was raised by a hotel over here because they were on the wrong side and they heard the drums. And, lo, people went forth with decibel count auditors-and they found the man got-the incessant drummers got to over 60, and they were moved out of there. And I hope they stay out of there because I don't want the people in the hotel to not have a good night's sleep. I'm sleeping quite well, as a matter of fact. And I say this not frivolously, because you ask a more serious question. And I can't tell you that I don't worry a lot about our families of the troops. I'll tell you what was emotional for me-and I don't think I've had a press conference since then-was this visit down to the three bases I went to. It was very, very moving. But what I came back with was this sense of wonder at the way these spouses stand together, totally supportive of their spouses across the way. So when I said I got lifted up, my morale was not down; it's been good. And I'm just so confident of how this thing is going to work out. But it was better-my morale was better when I saw these families. And when I talked to some who had loved ones missing or held prisoner, I just wondered at their strength. And I have had some other contacts with people that are in that description. One most beautiful letter from a wife of a pilot who is killed in action, and her spirit and the way she approached this whole conflict over there in the face of her own loss has been inspiring-it has been totally inspiring to me. So my own feeling is, I know what I've got to do. I've got very good people helping me do it. I really don't lose sleep. I can't tell you I don't shed a tear for families and for those that might be lost in combat. We've had very few losses, and yet I've got to tell you I feel each one. But we're going to continue this, and we're going to prevail.( ###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 6, February 11, 1991 Title:

North American Free Trade Agreement

Date: Feb 5, 19912/5/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Country: Mexico, United States, Canada Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] Joint statement issued by the United States, Canada, and Mexico The President of the United States, George Bush; the President of the United Mexican States, Carlos Salinas de Gortari; and the Prime Minister of Canada, Brian Mulroney, announced today their intention to pursue a North American free trade agreement creating one of the world's largest liberalized markets. Following consultations among their ministers responsible for international trade, the three leaders concluded that a North American free trade agreement would foster sustained economic growth through expanded trade and investment in a market comprising over 360 million people and $6 trillion in output. In so doing, the agreement would help all three countries meet the economic challenges they will face over the next decade. Accordingly, the three leaders have agreed that their trade ministers should proceed as soon as possible, in accordance with each country's domestic procedures, with trilateral negotiations aimed at a comprehensive North American free trade agreement. The goal would be to progressively eliminate obstacles to the flow of goods and services and to investment, provide for the protection of intellectual property rights, and establish a fair and expeditious dispute settlement mechanism. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 6, February 11, 1991 Title:

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990

Source: Bureau of Human Rights/Humanitarian Affairs Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 30, 19911/30/91 Subject: Human Rights [TEXT] Following is the text of the overview to the State Department's report to Congress "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990." Electronic text of the full report is available through the State Department's Computer Information Delivery Service. (For information on how to subscribe to the service, call the CIDS Information Center at 703-802-5700.) It also is available on some database services, such as Lexis-Nexis. You may obtain hard copies of the full report after March 1, 1991, from the Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20402-9325 (stock no. 052-070-06712-8).
1990 Human Rights Report Overview
This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in compliance with Sections 116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. (See box on p. 103.) The legislation requires human rights reports on all countries that receive aid from the United States and all countries that are members of the United Nations. In the belief that the information would be useful to the Congress and other readers, we have also included reports on the few countries which do not fall into either of these categories and which thus are not covered by the congressional requirement. Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act with the foregoing sections of law so as to be able to consult these reports when considering assistance programs for specific foreign countries. One of the very important consequences-perhaps unintended-of these legislative provisions is that they have made human rights concerns an integral part of the State Department's daily reporting and daily decisionmaking. A human rights officer in an embassy overseas who wants to write a good annual human rights report on the country in which he or she works must carefully monitor and observe human rights developments throughout the year on a daily basis. As a consequence, he or she will report on such developments whenever something of human rights significance happens in the country of assignment. In the past 12 years, the State Department has become decidedly better informed on and sensitized to human rights violations as they occur around the globe. A year ago in this space we posed the question whether the human rights gains of 1989 in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world would be lasting achievements or whether there was danger of relapse. For most of 1990, the gains of 1989 were being largely consolidated, in spite of major problems encountered by the countries making difficult transitions from command to market economies and from totalitarian communism to democracy. Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, initiated a reign of terror and human rights abuses that reminded the world of the dangers that repressive regimes can pose to regional security and international order.
Europe
. In Europe, multi-party elections had taken place in the countries which had been joined to the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact. Following such elections, the former German Democratic Republic had, by decision of a democratically elected government, joined the Federal Republic of Germany. Freely contested elections had also taken place in all of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia. Even in hard-line Albania, there was evidence of increasing popular pressure for greater freedom. Across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the process of democratization was in some areas hampered by the totalitarian legacy and by interethnic antagonisms that had been suppressed for decades. The United States expressed concern about violence against social and ethnic groups in Romania. The repressive measures taken by the Serbian republic against ethnic Albanians were among the worst in Europe in 1990. Yet, there were also some positive developments in interethnic relations in the region. Under the impact of democratization and increasing concern for human rights, Bulgaria was able to improve significantly the treatment of its ethnic and religious minorities. In the Soviet Union in 1990, vast numbers of citizens continued to exercise newly won political rights, including freedoms of expression, assembly, and religion. Hundreds of thousands were permitted to emigrate. However, reforms were unevenly implemented in the country as a whole, and many are not yet secured by law or buttressed by an independent judiciary. Toward the end of the year and in early 1991, the central government's moves to reassert authority over the republics, particularly the use of military force in Latvia and Lithuania, raised concern over the future of the recent reforms, with dangerous implications for the entire country.
Africa
. While Europe was struggling to consolidate its democratic gains, new democratic ferment was most clearly in evidence in Africa. There was significant movement away from apartheid in South Africa, and in many other Sub-Saharan African countries, important steps were taken toward democratic rule. Following multi-party elections, Namibia joined the ranks of independent states in March. A government pledged to democracy and human rights succeeded the regime of Benin. Laws authorizing new political parties, which would thus allow for free, contested elections, were enacted in Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, and Zambia. Contested elections were, indeed, held in Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire. In Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, the one-party governments lost free elections and have said they will honor the results. However, the intergroup rivalries that beset many parts of the continent resulted in large-scale death and devastation. The hostilities surrounding the fall of President Doe of Liberia, clan- based or intratribal warfare in Somalia, civil strife in Ethiopia with Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents, the civil war in Sudan, the measures taken by Mauritania against its black population in the south, and the violence in South Africa among black groups caused many hundreds of deaths in some countries and thousands in others. The Sudanese government's failure to cooperate in food deliveries may lead to widespread starvation in southern Sudan in 1991.
Western Hemisphere
. In the Western hemisphere, the election and inauguration of a democratic government in Nicaragua left the repressive dictatorship of Fidel Castro the only Marxist-Leninist regime in the region. After close to 17 years of military rule, a democratically elected president and congress took office in Chile. A new president was elected in Haiti in a free and fair election. Democratic government and respect for human rights were further consolidated in other countries of the hemisphere, though the struggle for democracy continued in Suriname. In four democratic countries-Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru-leftist insurgencies (in Colombia and Peru at times in alliance with narco-traffickers) and excessive responses by government security forces have resulted in scores of noncombat deaths in El Salvador, hundreds in both Colombia and Guatemala, and 3,000 to 4,000 in Peru.
Asia
. Cultural patterns and political systems differ widely on the huge Asian continent. Yet some of the developments, both positive and negative, which could be noticed elsewhere in the world affected a number of Asian countries as well. Two widely different countries, Marxist-Leninist Mongolia and the traditional monarchy of Nepal, moved toward democracy in the course of the year. There is hope now that democracy will gain a foothold in Bangladesh. In China, North Korea, Vietnam, and, to a lesser extent, in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, Marxism- Leninism continues to be the official political ideology. North Korea remains one of the most severely repressive regimes in the world. In China, serious human rights abuses continued in 1990. As the year ended, hundreds of Chinese people remained imprisoned for their role in the democracy movement, while students and intellectuals who took leadership roles in the 1989 protests were being brought to trial and sentenced to prison terms. Severe and brutal repression of all forms of political dissent characterizes the situation in Burma. There a military government had allowed free elections and then refused to accept the outcome, thus rejecting the overwhelming desire of the people to return to parliamentary democracy. Two South Asian democracies, India and Sri Lanka, were beset by domestic conflict based on ethnic, religious, and political differences, leading to thousands of deaths in each of these countries.
Middle East
. In the Occupied Territories, the Palestinian intifada continues. In both Israel and the Occupied Territories, a total of 148 Palestinians and 17 Israelis were killed in violence between Palestinians and Israelis, while 165 people were killed in intra-Palestinian violence. As the human rights balance sheet for 1990 is drawn and as we look for further progress in 1991, one of the key questions will be posed by the Soviet Union. Will the combination of entrenched conservative forces, economic turmoil, and social upheaval bring the reform era to an end? Or, alternatively, will the disparate democratic forces and proponents of the free market overcome the counterattack of the hardliners and solidify and institutionalize the human rights progress thus far achieved? If they do, their success will be felt not only in the Soviet Union but elsewhere in the world as well. Another important region to watch is Sub-Saharan Africa. Will the initial democratic stirrings ripen into further significant political movements? Will the region's authoritarian regimes allow free and fair elections to be held and then surrender power peacefully to the choices of the people? And, finally, there is the question of the aftermath of the world community's move to halt the international outlawry perpetrated by Saddam Hussein. What will be the spillover effect for international support for human rights principles? This year, as last, there are 168 separate reports. The guidelines followed in preparing the reports are explained in detail in Appendix A. In Appendix B is a discussion of reporting on worker rights, as required by Section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by Title V of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984).* Although the legislation requires reports on worker rights only in developing countries that have been beneficiaries under the Generalized System of Preferences, in the interest of uniformity and to provide a ready basis for comparison we have here applied the same reporting standards that we have applied to all countries on which we prepare reports. Appendix C contains a list of 12 international human rights covenants and agreements and indicates which countries have ratified them. Appendix D contains explanatory notes on the statistical table in Appendix E, which shows the amounts obligated for US economic and military assistance for fiscal year 1989.
Definition of Human Rights
Human rights, as defined in Section 116(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, include freedom from: torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; disappearance due to abduction or clandestine detention; and other flagrant denial of the rights to life, liberty, and the security of the person. Internationally recognized worker rights, as defined in Section 502(a) of the Trade Act, include the right of association; the right to organize and bargain collectively; prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; a minimum age for the employment of children; and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. In addition to discussing the topics specified in the legislation, our reports, as in previous years, cover other internationally recognized political and civil rights and describe the political system of each country. In applying these internationally recognized standards, we seek to be objective. But the reports unashamedly reflect the US view that the right of self-government is a basic political right, that government is legitimate only when grounded on the consent of the governed, and that government thus grounded should not be used to deny life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Individuals in a society have the inalienable right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the person; to enjoy civil liberties such as freedom of expression, assembly, religion, and movement, without discrimination based on race, ancestry, or sex; and to change their government by peaceful means. The reports also take into account the fact that terrorists and guerrilla groups often kill, torture, or maim citizens or deprive them of their liberties; such violations are no less reprehensible if committed by violent opponents of the government than if committed by the government itself. We have found that the concept of economic, social, and cultural rights is often confused, sometimes willfully, by repressive governments claiming that in order to promote these "rights" they may deny their citizens the right to integrity of the person as well as political and civil rights. There exists a profound connection between human rights and economic development. Experience demonstrates that it is individual freedom that sets the stage for economic and social development; it is repression that stifles it. Those who try to justify subordinating political and civil rights on the ground that they are concentrating on economic aspirations invariably deliver neither. That is why we consider it imperative to focus urgent attention on violations of basic political and civil rights. If these basic rights are not secured, experience has shown, the goals of economic development are not reached either. This is a point which the Soviet Union's reformers seem to have recognized.
US Human Rights Policy
From this premise, that basic human rights may not be abridged or denied, it follows that our human rights policy is concerned with the limitations on the powers of government that are required to protect the integrity and dignity of the individual. Further, it is in our national interest to promote democratic processes in order to help build a world environment more favorable to respect for human rights and hence more conducive to stability and peace. We have developed, therefore, a dual policy, reactive in the sense that we continue to oppose specific human rights violations wherever they occur but at the same time active in working over the long term to strengthen democracy. In much of the world, the United States has a variety of means at its disposal to respond to human rights violations. We engage in traditional diplomacy, particularly with friendly governments, where frank diplomatic exchanges are possible and productive. Where we find limited opportunities for the United States to exert significant influence through bilateral relations, we resort to public statements of our concerns, calling attention to countries where respect for human rights is lacking. In a number of instances, we employ a mixture of traditional diplomacy and public affirmation of American interest in the issue. The United States also employs a variety of means to encourage greater respect for human rights over the long term. Since 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy has been carrying out programs designed to promote democratic practices abroad, involving the two major US political parties, labor unions, business groups, and many private institutions. Also, through Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, funds are disbursed by the Agency for International Development for programs designed to promote civil and political rights abroad. We also seek greater international commitment to the protection of human rights and respect for democracy through our efforts in the United Nations and other international organizations and in the process devised by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Preparation of these annual reports constitutes an important element of our human rights policy. The process, since it involves continuous and well-publicized attention to human rights, has contributed to the strengthening of an international human rights agenda. Many countries that are strong supporters of human rights are taking steps of their own to engage in human rights reporting and have established offices specifically responsible for international human rights policy. Even among countries without strong human rights records, sensitivity to these reports increasingly takes the form of constructive response or at least a willingness to engage in a discussion of human rights policy. In calling upon the Department of State to prepare these reports, Congress has created a useful instrument for advancing the cause of human rights. [signed] Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Relevant Sections of the Foreign Assistance Act
[pertaining to the annual Human Rights Report] Section 116(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides as follows: The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by January 31 of each year, a full and complete report regarding . . . (1) the status of internationally recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (a) . . . (A) in countries that received assistance under this part, and (B) in all other foreign countries which are members of the United Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human rights report under this Act. Section 502(B)(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides as follows: The Secretary of State shall transmit to Congress, as part of the presentation materials for security assistance programs proposed for each fiscal year, a full and complete report, prepared with the assistance of the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, with respect to practices regarding the observance of and respect for internationally recognized human rights in each country proposed as a recipient of security assistance. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 6, February 11, 1991 Title:

The Last Glacier: The Korean Peninsula and the Post- Cold War Era

Solomon Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Description: Address before the Korea Society, New York, New York Date: Jan 17, 19911/17/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: North Korea, South Korea Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization, Security Assistance and Sales [TEXT] Four decades after the Korean war began, Korea remains the last glacier of Cold War confrontation. Forty-six years since a line was drawn across the peninsula at the 38th parallel, Korea remains a nation divided by an undiminished military confrontation and a chasm of political mistrust. The Korean anachronism stands in stark contrast to the stunning events of the past year in Europe which have broken down the alignments of the Cold War era: the evaporation of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, and new forms of US-Soviet cooperation. New international patterns and new prospects for the world order of the 21st century are emerging at a pace that is almost beyond the influence of political leadership. Yet even divided Korea has not been immune to these global trends. South Korean President Roh Tae Woo's historic visit to Moscow a month ago follows on the normalization of Soviet-Korean relations last September. We also have seen the agreement on trade offices between China and South Korea in December, a reflection of a booming $3 billion bilateral commercial relationship. And the process of normalizing Japanese-North Korean relations, initiated last October, indicates that even North Korea is not beyond the reach of these trends. Perhaps most important for the future of the peninsula, a series of prime minister-level talks between North and South Korea is opening up prospects for reconciliation between the two Korean states. Thus, history's reckoning may also be approaching in Northeast Asia. Yet a fundamental reality has yet to change: the heavily armed standoff on the Korean Peninsula. Nearly 1 million troops in the North-two-thirds of which are forward deployed near the demilitarized zone-confront some 650,000 counterparts on the other side of the line, with each side possessing increasingly sophisticated weaponry. North Korea, for its part, seems trapped in a Stalinist time warp of Cold War confrontation and ideological rigidity and is only now beginning to inch beyond its self-imposed isolation. Yet the combined weight of changes in the Soviet Union, the stagnation of the North Korean economy, and generational changes within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is likely to draw North Korea toward the mainstream of history, however haltingly. The Republic of Korea (ROK), faced with an undiminished military threat, thus straddles this time of profound transformations, one foot still frozen in confrontation with the North, the other firmly planted in the global mainstream as a result of its dazzling economic success and its impressive democratic reforms. What are US objectives on the Korean Peninsula? We have no higher priority than maintaining our commitment to the security and economic well-being of the Republic of Korea. A central goal of our policy is to forge a new, more equal security and economic partnership with South Korea that reflects its dynamism and the requirements of a new era. At the same time, we seek to encourage dialogue and reconciliation between North and South, in part by urging the North to move away from confrontation and self- isolation. For the longer term, we look to reunification of the peninsula-on terms acceptable to all Koreans. In short, we seek a secure and developing Korean Peninsula that is an integral part of the emerging international system and a dynamic force in the Pacific.
Toward a New US-Republic of Korea Partnership: Dilemmas of Success
The new global realities we face, and South Korea's admirable economic and political achievements, pose new challenges to stability and economic growth on the peninsula and to our relationship with the South. In the broadest sense, the challenge ahead for US-ROK relations is that of transforming what has been primarily a military alliance into a more equal political, defense, and economic partnership. An important principle in achieving a new mutuality is what Secretary Baker has called "creative responsibility-sharing." In the realm of US-ROK security cooperation, Secretary of Defense [Richard] Cheney's consultations with South Korean leaders in Seoul last February marked the beginning of a process of restructuring the ROK-US defense relationship. Our goal, as outlined in the East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI) presented to the Congress last April, is to see that US forces make the transition from a leading role to a supporting posture in the defense of Korea by the year 2000. Toward that goal, we have begun a modest reduction of the 43,000 US forces in South Korea by 7,000 personnel. This will come, in the first phase of the adjustment process, through force rationalization and the assumption by the ROK armed forces of some roles and missions now performed by American forces. The EASI program reflects the impact of several factors: US force modernization efforts, an assessment of the current North Korean threat, the enhanced military capabilities of the ROK armed forces, and budgetary considerations. Let me stress that these changes in no way reduce our commitment to the defense of the ROK or the combat capabilities of our combined forces. The United States intends to maintain appropriate forces in Korea so long as our two governments agree that the US presence is necessary to deter a renewed outbreak of hostilities. By restructuring our security relationship to reflect South Korea's enhanced strengths and capacity for leadership, we believe that our long-term commitment to the security of the ROK is reinforced. In this regard, we have been pleased with progress in cost- sharing and with the recently completed review of our Status of Forces Agreement. Sustained progress in these areas, and in the ROK's force modernization efforts, will be essential to maintaining a credible deterrent and for the ROK assuming greater responsibility for its own defense. I also want to take this opportunity to give recognition to the Republic of Korea for its timely and significant contribution to the allied effort in the Persian Gulf. South Korea was the first government to provide airlift support for Operation Desert Shield and has offered $220 million in financial support to the military effort in the Gulf and in economic assistance to countries affected by the crisis. In addition, Seoul has deployed a military medical group in the Gulf theater, thus further demonstrating its solidarity with the UN coalition by way of a physical presence on the ground.
Meeting the Challenge of Engaging the North
For the long term, security in Korea and stability in Northeast Asia must be based on the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. As Secretary Baker observed in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last February: We believe that the key to a reduction of tension and eventual reunification lies in a productive South-North dialogue. In this regard, we firmly support President Roh's initiatives to draw the North out of its isolation. Since October 1988, we have opened a dialogue and taken other steps toward Pyongyang. We are looking for a steady, reciprocal process toward better relations between North and South Korea and between the US and North Korea. In our view, the Korean Peninsula is the one place in East Asia where European-style confidence-building measures-and, in time, arms reduction initiatives-seem relevant. In Korea, as in Europe, heavily armed ground forces confront each other across a clearly demarcated land border. As the North-South dialogue proceeds, there is great potential for the Koreans to apply to their circumstances the arms control experience gained in Europe. The successful CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] accords offer the Koreans an important example of the progress that is possible when mutual self-interest is pursued through good faith negotiations in a spirit of realism. We are encouraged by the three meetings which have taken place over the past 6 months between the Prime Ministers of North and South Korea. These are the highest level encounters ever held between the two governments. They have provided the two sides an authoritative forum to discuss a range of issues of immediate concern to the Korean people: tension-reduction measures, exchanges of goods, reunion of families, intra-Korean communications, and the issue of UN membership-to mention the most significant. We recognize that for the governments of both North and South Korea-and, indeed, for all the Korean people-these continuing high- level talks bring not only new hopes but also new uncertainties. Both Seoul and Pyongyang are sailing into uncharted waters as they seek to build mutual confidence, enhance security, and remove the barriers to eventual reunification. Seoul and Pyongyang alone will decide how and when the two Koreas shall become one; and the fact of the prime minister-level meetings after four decades of frozen hostility must be viewed as a step in the right direction, despite the modest achievements to date. This new stage in the North-South dialogue could, with goodwill on both sides, become an important forum for reconciliation. And as President Bush told the ROK National Assembly in 1989, "The American people share your goal of peaceful unification on terms acceptable to the Korean people." This is clear, this is simple, and this is American policy. In his speech before the UN General Assembly last October, President Bush expressed another aspect of our Korea policy: "....Universal UN membership for all states is central to the future of this organization. . . . In support of this principle, and in conjunction with UN efforts to reduce regional tensions, the United States fully supports UN membership for the Republic of Korea. We do so without prejudice to the ultimate objective of reunification of the Korean Peninsula, and without opposition to simultaneous membership for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." I want to underscore our view that acknowledging the reality of the two governments of a divided Korea as UN member states is not an impediment to unification. Indeed, the examples of the reunification of Germany and Yemen just last year give reality to this point. Given the United Nations' renewed importance in global security affairs, the ascension to membership by Seoul and Pyongyang would clearly serve the interests of regional stability and national reconciliation. While the reunification of Korea is a matter to be worked out by the Koreans themselves, the major powers-the United States, the USSR, China, and Japan-can support this process. All four powers have important interests that intersect on the peninsula. And all four powers have a compelling interest in seeing tensions reduced and stability maintained. As the North-South dialogue begins to make substantive progress, we believe there are good prospects for increasing cooperation among the major powers to facilitate the easing of tensions on the peninsula and, ultimately, to guarantee outcomes. In October 1988, the United States initiated a direct dialogue with North Korea in hopes of facilitating the North-South dialogue, clarifying any misunderstandings that might exist, and laying the basis for improving US-DPRK relations. Thus far we have held 13 meetings with the DPRK in Beijing. We also have encouraged unofficial academic, sports, and cultural exchanges; eased travel restrictions to the DPRK; and permitted commercial exports of goods that meet basic human needs. In our exchanges with the North, we have suggested a number of areas in which the DPRK could reciprocate our initiative and build confidence: progress in the South-North dialogue, concluding an NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] safeguards agreement, returning Korean war remains, ending anti-US propaganda, agreeing to military confidence-building measures, including restraint in the sale of arms abroad, and ceasing support for terrorism. While these are not preconditions, we and our South Korean ally do expect clear signs that North Korea is prepared to take steps conducive to building confidence, so that, as Secretary Baker has said, we can move ahead on a reciprocal basis. We acknowledge the beginnings of DPRK cooperation on the return of remains from the Korean war. The North has turned over five remains from among the 8,177 US servicemen listed as missing in the North and has offered to return more in the near future. This is an issue of serious concern to the American people, and we now are seeking ways of regularizing and accelerating the pace of recovering MIAs [missing in action]. Thus, the challenge before us is the need for substantive progress to reinforce the beginnings of a more positive mood. South Korea must be assured that the North is approaching the dialogue in good faith, not seeking to instigate unrest in the South. And we must see positive steps on one security issue of common concern to the major powers and the entire international community: North Korea's reluctance to sign and implement a full-scope nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This is an obligation Pyongyang committed itself to undertake within 18 months after acceding in 1985 to the NPT. This is a unilateral commitment that goes to the integrity of the NPT. North Korea has insisted, at various times, that fulfilling its NPT obligations depends on preconditions being met. The assertion that fulfillment of obligations under the NPT should be subject to extraneous conditions has been rejected not only by us but by virtually all other NPT signatories. The NPT's safeguards requirement is without condition. No other NPT party has set conditions for the acceptance of safeguards. To allow one country to set conditions would undermine the integrity of the NPT. Pyongyang's continuing refusal to conclude a safeguards agreement quite naturally fuels suspicion about the objectives of its unsafeguarded nuclear program, casting doubt among North Korea's neighbors about its intentions. These doubts and suspicions can only increase tensions in Northeast Asia and limit Pyongyang's welcome in the international community. For our part, I can say without reservation that we pose no nuclear threat to North Korea. The United States has provided a solemn assurance that it will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT. This assurance applies except in the case of an armed attack on the United States or its allies by such a state associated with a nuclear weapons state. We have stated that the assurance applies to all non-nuclear- weapon state parties to the NPT, including the DPRK, if they meet the assurance's criteria. Pyongyang's own interests are not served by continuing uncertainty on the nuclear issue. Nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula would benefit no one and could only have a highly destabilizing effect in Northeast Asia. Despite enduring concerns, we are determined to do our part to encourage reconciliation in Korea. We want to see the last glacier melt away, and, to this end, we will continue to seek initiatives which would build mutual confidence. Dialogue is essential to this process, as is evident in our strong support for the primary channel for national reconciliation-the North-South talks. Yet we will also sustain our direct contacts with DPRK officials, primarily through the established channel in Beijing. And, when enhanced contact is warranted by positive developments, we are prepared to consider other alternatives.
The Economic Dimension
Our contacts with North Korea, as with our security commitment to the Republic of Korea, are aimed at lessening tensions and providing a stable environment in which economic development can flourish. An economically strong South Korea has always been a US policy goal, and by any measure South Korea has proven itself to be one of the most dynamic economies in the world. Indeed, in the multi- polar era we are entering, an independent, economically dynamic, unified Korea will be an important factor for stability and growth in Northeast Asia. South Korea's remarkable economic productivity has attracted North Korea's principal allies to the South. Indeed, there is no more dramatic example of the oft-told Pacific Rim success story than the Republic of Korea. Its annual GNP growth-averaging more than 8% a year for a generation-has lifted South Korea from the ranks of the world's poorest nations, with an $82 per capita annual GNP in 1960, to an emerging industrial power in 1990 with a GNP per capita of more than $5,000 a year and total economic output of $210 billion. In the stable environment sustained by our security cooperation, US aid, investment, and technical assistance have given full play to the hard work and entrepreneurial spirit of the Korean people, facilitating the ROK's remarkable advance to become the world's 13th largest economy. Korea is now our seventh largest trading partner, with two-way trade exceeding $33 billion annually. The United States absorbs about one-third of Korea's exports, from the Hyundais on our highways to the VCRs and TVs of Samsung and Lucky Goldstar in our living rooms. Our two economies are increasingly linked by a network of joint ventures, financial ties, and licensing arrangements. These robust economic ties have become a fundamental pillar of our relationship that will endure long after the confrontation between North and South is resolved. And just as we now seek a more equal security relationship with the ROK, a vital and enduring economic partnership must be based on equal market access. Open markets cannot be a one-way street. As the frontiers of free markets expand into Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China, countries with successful development experiences such as South Korea must help set the standards for free trade and open markets. Over one-third of current world commerce-agricultural goods and such dynamic growth sectors as services, investment, and intellectual property-do not fall under current GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] rules. If trade is to continue to be an engine of world growth, we need new multilateral arrangements to address these neglected but tremendously important sectors. South Korea's support for these initiatives will be an important demonstration of its sense of responsibility and commitment to the international trading regime. In this regard, I would be less than candid if I did not mention what we view as a troubling aspect of our economic relationship. We have seen in recent months an inward-looking and defensive tendency in South Korean popular-and on occasion, official- attitudes. Seoul's failure to meet previous economic commitments has been a great disappointment. Consequently, some of the goodwill that South Korea has built up over many years has begun to dissipate. Of late, we have seen a number of incidents that are simply inconsistent with the open market access which has been- and continues to be-vital to Korea's own economic success. Americans are frustrated by what is seen as an anti-import campaign directed against foreign goods and services. Incidents of intimidation against US exporters and their Korean partners can only further stimulate a protectionist mood in the United States. Economic issues between our countries urgently need a positive and constructive response; protectionism in Korea can only lead to pressure in the United States to restrict the access of Korean goods to the American market. Korea's inward-looking mood comes at a time when the future of the world's open trading system is at risk. The Uruguay Round of the GATT is at an impasse and in danger of failing. Economies such as that of South Korea have a tremendous stake in a system of relatively open trade. If the Uruguay Round fails, we will not simply return to the status quo. International economic tensions would fester, the world could fragment into competing trade blocks, and protectionist tendencies will mount. During his recent New Year's news conference, President Roh Tae Woo said it quite clearly: "Koreans must understand what the Uruguay Round is. . . . Korea lives on exports, and the Uruguay Round is designed to ensure that the free trade system that guarantees Korea's overseas markets is expanded." In the event of a failure to update the rules of the road for world trade, the economies of such rapidly developing trading nations as South Korea will suffer the most. Despite these concerns of the moment, Seoul can be a significant leader on international economic issues. This is clearly demonstrated by the important role South Korea is playing in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process. APEC is the recently formed and pioneering effort to enhance cooperation among the dynamic trading partners of the Pacific Rim. Its objectives are to foster shared growth in the region based on free-market principles and to reinforce a global system of open trade and investment. We hope and expect that the next APEC ministerial meeting, which will be held in Seoul this fall, will advance these common goals.
Conclusion
In an era of profound international transformations, Korea now bridges the past and the future. It is time for the last remaining confrontation of the Cold War era to give way to dialogue, to measures that will end the military stalemate and promote national reconciliation. American policy, which is closely coordinated with that of our staunch South Korean ally, is designed to achieve these ends. Korea's future is being charted by South Korea's democratization and by its foreign and economic policies. President Roh's Nordpolitik and the North-South dialogue are helping to melt the frozen boundaries of four decades of confrontation. And the economic dynamism of the South is showing many nations the path to export-led growth. If these political and economic trends can be consolidated-through substantial progress in the North-South talks and a successful Uruguay Round-Korea will have positioned itself at the forefront of the global trends that are shaping the world of the coming century. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 6, February 11, 1991 Title:

Claims for Property Located in the Territory of the Former GDR

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washingotn, DC Date: Feb 6, 19912/6/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: Germany Subject: International Law, State Department [TEXT] In July 1990, prior to German unification, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) published a law providing for the registration of certain claims of individuals and corporations (including claims of non-German nationals) to property expropriated or placed under state administration by the communist government of the GDR. This law remains in effect in the united Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Since that time, new German laws have come into effect modifying and expanding upon the initial claims registration law. As revised, the domestic German claims program covers the following three additional categories of property claims with the filing deadlines noted below. 1. Claims of persons who were persecuted in the period from January 30, 1933, through May 8, 1945, for racial, political, religious, or ideological reasons, and who lost property in the territory of the former GDR as a result of forced sales or expropriations. The deadline for filing claims falling within this category is March 31, 1991. 2. Claims for assets which were seized in connection with criminal proceedings not in conformity with the principle of a state based on the rule of law, provided that the claimant has applied under governing German law for review of the criminal verdict or other prosecution measures. The deadline for filing claims falling within this category is March 31, 1991. 3. Claims for residential properties which were transferred to state ownership by expropriation, relinquishment of ownership, donation, or renunciation of inheritance, on the basis of rents that did not cover costs and consequent over-indebtedness. The deadline for filing claims falling within this category was October 13, 1990. Additionally, it is our understanding that any property claims filed with the GDR before July 15, 1990, must be resubmitted. The deadline for claims filed under the original registration decree for certain claims to property expropriated or placed under state administration after 1949 by the communist government of the GDR remains October 13, 1990. Potential claimants should understand, however, that failure to file a claim by the relevant deadline does not automatically terminate all potential rights under the German claims program. Although certain rights may be waived if a claimant does not file before the relevant deadline, late declarations of claims will be considered. A claimant who files after the relevant deadline is still eligible for financial compensation. Moreover, so long as the administrative agency responsible for disposing of expropriated property has not sold the property in question or entered into other long-term legal obligations, a claimant who files after the relevant deadline may still seek restitution of the property. Within these limits, the German government has not yet established a final filing deadline for its claims program. The US government continues to pursue a lump-sum settlement with the FRG of claims adjudicated by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in its GDR program. Since such a settlement may not preclude persons with such claims from having the option of recovering under the domestic German claims program, all individuals with property claims may wish to consider filing under the domestic German claims program. Anyone who wishes to receive more information, including information on how and where to file a claim, should contact the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington, DC, or regional German consulates. The German Embassy in Washington, DC, may be reached at 4645 Reservoir Road, NW, Washington, DC 20007 (tel: 202-298-4000). In addition, persons may obtain further information from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, Washington, DC 20579, Attn: David Bradley, Chief Counsel (tel: 202-653-5883), or the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and Investment Disputes, 2100 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037-7180 (tel: 202-632-5040). (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 6, February 11, 1991 Title:

Statement: South Africa

Tutwiler Source: State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler Description: Washington, DC Date: Feb 1, 19912/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Subsaharan Africa Country: South Africa Subject: Human Rights, Democratization [TEXT] We welcome President De Klerk's historic announcement that his government will introduce legislation to repeal the Group Areas Act, the Land Acts, and the Population Registration Act. We also welcome his proposals to begin working toward unified non-racial local governments. This is further evidence of President De Klerk's courageous statesmanship. Once enacted, these dramatic and far-reaching measures will abolish the remaining legislative pillars of apartheid. They are the latest evidence that an irreversible process of change is underway and that substantial progress continues to be made toward dismantling the system of apartheid and establishing a non-racial democracy in South Africa. The focus for all parties must now shift to negotiations on a new political order. We are pleased that the De Klerk government, the African National Congress, and others have committed themselves to an all-party conference which is intended to advance this process further. We urge those organizations which have not yet accepted this call to do so. We are also pleased that during this week Mr. Mandela and Chief Buthelezi began an important process designed to lower the level of violence so the work of building a new non-racial and democratic South Africa can proceed in earnest. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 6, February 11, 1991 Title:

Country Profile: Germany

Date: Feb 11, 19912/11/91 Category: Country Data Region: Europe Country: Germany Subject: History, Trade/Economics, International Organizations [TEXT] Official Name: Federal Republic of Germany
Geography
Area: 357,000 sq. km. (137,838 sq. mi.); about the size of Montana. Cities: Capital-Berlin (pop. about 3.4 million). Seat of Government-Bonn (pop. 287,000). The permanent seat of government for a unified Germany will be addressed by the all-German parliament elected on December 2, 1990. Other cities-Hamburg (1.6 million), Munich (1.2 million), Cologne (946,000), Frankfurt (635,000). (All estimates are from December 1990.) Terrain: Low plain in the north; high plains, hills, and basins in the center and east; mountainous alpine region in the south. Climate: Temperate; cooler and rainier than much of the US.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective-German(s). Population (1990): About 79 million (December 1990 est.). Ethnic groups: Primarily German; Danish minority in the north, Serbian (Slavic) minority in the east. Religions: Almost evenly divided between Protestant and Roman Catholic. Language: German. Education: Years compulsory-10. Attendance-100%. Literacy-99%. Health: (in the original 11 states): Infant mortality rate (1990)-6/1,000. Life expectancy at birth (1990)-women 81 yrs., men 73 yrs. Work force: 38.9 million (1990 est., including the 10.6 million workers in the former GDR).
Government
Type: Federal Republic. Founded: 1949. (Basic Law, i.e., constitution, promulgated on May 23, 1949). On October 3, 1990, the FRG and the GDR unified in accordance with Article 23 of the FRG Basic Law. Branches: Executive-president (titular chief of state), chancellor (executive head of government). Legislative-bicameral parliament. Judicial-independent, Federal Constitutional Court. Subdivisions: 16 Laender (states). Major political parties: Christian Democratic Union (CDU); Christian Social Union (CSU); Social Democratic Party (SPD); Free Democratic Party (FDP); Greens/Alliance 90; Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). Suffrage: Universal at 18. Defense (original 11 states, 1990): 2.2% of GNP. Flag: Three horizontal bands: black, red, and gold, from top to bottom.
Economy
(for original 11 states) GNP (1989): $1.2 trillion. Annual growth rate (1989): 4%. Per capita income: $19,317. Inflation rate (1988): 2.8%. Natural resources: Iron, hard coal, lignite, potash, natural gas. Agriculture (1.5% of GNP): Products-corn, wheat, potatoes, sugar beets, hops, viniculture, forestry, fisheries. Industry (40% of GNP): Types-iron and steel, coal, chemicals, electrical products, ships, vehicles, construction. Trade (1989): Exports-$367 billion: chemicals, motor vehicles, iron and steel products, manufactured goods, electrical products. Major markets (1988)-European Community (EC) 54.3%, other European countries 18.7%, US 8%, developing countries 6.8%, USSR 1.6%. Imports-$269 billion: food, petroleum products, manufactured goods, electrical products, automobiles, apparel. Major suppliers (1988)-EC countries 51.7%, other European countries 15.9%, US 6.6%, developing countries 10%, USSR 1.6%.
Membership in International Organizations
Council of Europe, NATO, INTELSAT, European Community, Western European Union (WEU), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the UN and related agencies, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, International Atomic Energy Agency, IBRD, International Monetary Fund. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 6, February 11, 1991 Title:

Current Treaty Actions

Date: Jan 30, 19911/30/91 Category: Treaties/Agreements Region: South America, E/C Europe, Central America, Europe, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Caribbean Country: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia (former), Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Jamaica, South Korea, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela Subject: Science/Technology, Environment, Military Affairs, Trade/Economics, Resource Management, International Law, Human Rights [TEXT]
Multilateral
Aviation
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea, Jan. 2, 1991. Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1981. TIAS 7192. Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea, Jan. 2, 1991.
Conservation
Convention on wetlands of international importance especially as waterfowl habitat, as amended by the Protocol of Paris (Dec. 3, 1982). Done at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. Entered into force Dec. 21, 1971; for the U.S. Dec. 18, 1986. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 99-28. Accessions deposited: Burkina Faso, June 27, 1990; Chad, June 13, 1990; Czechoslovakia, July 2, 1990; Ecuador, Sept. 7, 1990; Guatemala, June 26, 1990; Guinea-Bisseau, May 14, 1990; Kenya, June 5, 1990; Sri Lanka, June 15, 1990.
Defense
Memorandum of understanding concerning a cooperative program for full integration of a radar in the AV-8B weapon system and the production of life cycle support of a radar-equipped AV-8B (AV-8B Harrier II Plus), with annexes. Signed at Rome, Washington, and Madrid Aug. 8 and 31 and Sept. 28, 1990. Entered into force Sept. 28, 1990. Signatures: Italy, Aug. 8, 1990; Spain, Sept. 28, 1990; United States, Aug. 31, 1990.
Finance
UNIDROIT convention on international factoring. Done at Ottawa May 28, 1988. Enters into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of 6 months after the date of deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. Signature: United States, Dec. 28, 1990. UNIDROIT convention on international financial leasing. Done at Ottawa May 28, 1988. Enters into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of 6 months after the date of deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. Signature: United States, Dec. 28, 1990.
Maritime Matters
International convention on standards of training, certification, and watchkeeping for seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 1978. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1984.1 Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, Nov. 29, 1990.
Pollution
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1983. Accession deposited: Seychelles, Nov. 28, 1990. Convention for the protection and development of the marine environment of the wider Caribbean region, with annex, with protocol concerning cooperation in combating oil spills in the wider Caribbean region, with annex. Done at Cartagena Mar. 24, 1983. Entered into force Oct. 11, 1986. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 98-13. Accessions deposited: Dominica, Oct. 5, 1990; St. Vincent and the Grenadines, July 11, 1990. Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22, 1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 99-9. Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, October 1, 1990; Malawi, Jan. 9, 1991. Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1989. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 100-10. Ratification deposited: Argentina, Sept. 18, 1990. Accessions deposited: Czechoslovakia, Oct. 1, 1990; Yugoslavia, Jan. 3, 1991; Malawi, Jan. 9, 1991.
Rubber
International natural rubber agreement, 1987, with annexes. Done at Geneva Mar. 20, 1987. Entered into force provisionally Dec. 29, 1988; definitively Apr. 3, 1989. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 100-9. Ratification deposited: Thailand, Sept. 24, 1990.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700. Accessions deposited: Iraq, Dec. 14, 1990.
Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.1 Ratification deposited: Grenada, Aug. 30, 1990.
Bilateral
Argentina
Agreement on the development and facilitation of tourism. Signed at Buenos Aires Sept. 25, 1990. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1990. Memorandum of understanding for the exchange of technical information directly applicable to the safety of operating civil power and research reactors, with appendix. Signed at Buenos Aires Nov. 30, 1990. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1990. Agreement regarding mutual assistance between customs services. Signed at Buenos Aires Dec. 4, 1990. Entered into force provisionally Dec. 4, 1990; definitively, upon notification by the parties that national legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Bolivia
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at La Paz Nov. 27, 1990. Enters into force upon receipt by Bolivia of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Brazil
Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of May 8, 1984, as extended, concerning the Landsat system. Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia Sept. 3 and Oct. 18, 1990. Entered into force Oct. 18, 1990; effective May 8, 1990.
Brunei
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Bandar Seri Begawan and Washington Dec. 15, 1990 and Jan. 8, 1991. Enters into force Feb. 18, 1991.
Bulgaria
Agreement concerning the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Bulgaria. Signed at Washington Sept. 27, 1990. Entered in force Sept. 27, 1990.
Chile
Agreement concerning the reciprocal exemption from income tax of income derived from the international operation of aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington and Santiago Aug. 6 and December 4, 1990. Entered into force Dec. 4, 1990; effective with respect to taxable years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 1987.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement on trade relations, with related exchanges of letters. Signed at Washington April 12, 1990. Entered into force: Nov. 17, 1990. Agreement on the program of the United States Peace Corps in Czechoslovakia. Signed at Prague June 25, 1990. Entered into force June 25, 1990.
Dominican Republic
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Santo Domingo ∧ Washington Dec. 3, 1990 and Jan. 8, 1991. Enters into force Feb. 18, 1991.
Finland
Memorandum of understanding for cooperation in energy research and development. Signed at Washington Oct. 23, 1990. Entered into force Oct. 23, 1990.
France
Agreement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in the regulation of nuclear safety, with patent addendum. Signed at Paris Sept. 4, 1990. Entered into force Sept. 4, 1990. Agreement extending the agreement of Dec. 12 and 19, 1988, for cooperation in high energy laser-matter interaction physics research and development. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Paris Nov. 6 and Dec. 6, 1990. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1990.
Germany
Agreement extending the technical exchange and cooperative arrangement of Dec. 20, 1974, as amended and extended (TIAS 9067, 10040), in the field of management of radioactive wastes. Effected by exchange of letters at Bonn and Washington Sept. 3 and Oct. 10, 1990. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1990; effective Dec. 3, 1989.
Haiti
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Sept. 26 and 30, 1986, as amended, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man- made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince July 18, Nov. 19 and 28, 1990. Entered into force Nov. 28, 1990; effective Jan. 1, 1990.
Honduras
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Tegucigalpa Dec. 20, 1990. Enters into force upon receipt by Honduras of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Hungary
Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with patent addendum. Signed at Budapest Sept. 24, 1990. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1990.
Jamaica
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 27, 1986, as amended and extended, relating to trade in textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston Oct. 29 and 31, 1990. Entered into force Oct. 31, 1990. Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Kingston Dec. 20, 1990. Enters into force upon receipt by Jamaica of written notice from the US that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Korea
Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 21 and Dec. 4, 1986, as amended and extended, concerning trade in certain textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Nov. 30 and Dec. 3, 1990. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1990.
Mexico
Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 13, 1988, as amended, concerning trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico April 20, July 25, and Aug. 1, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1990. Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 28, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7438), to eradicate screw-worms. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico Oct. 19 and Dec. 7, 1990. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1990.
Mongolia
Agreement relating to scientific and technical cooperation, with annex. Signed at Washington January 23, 1991. Entered into force January 23, 1991.
Nepal
Agreement, with memorandum of understanding, amending the agreement of May 30 and June 1, 1986, relating to trade in cotton textiles and the administrative arrangement of July 28 and Aug. 18, 1986, relating to a visa system for exports of Nepalese textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Kathmandu Nov. 19 and 28, 1990. Entered into force Nov. 28, 1990; effective Jan. 1, 1991.
Pakistan
Agreement amending the agreement of May 20 and June 11, 1987, as amended, concerning trade in textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 30 and Dec. 20, 1990. Entered into force Dec. 20, 1990.
Peru
Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 3, 1985, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 11 and Oct. 4, 1990. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1990. International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Lima and Washington Oct. 29 and Nov. 30, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 14, 1991.
Thailand
Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of Oct. 3, 1985, on logistic support. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok Sept. 26 and Oct. 3, 1990. Entered into force Oct. 3, 1990. Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their station in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok Oct. 11 and 30, 1990. Entered into force Dec. 14, 1990. Memorandum of understanding concerning interoperability management of tactical command and control procedural standards, with annex. Signed at Bangkok Dec. 3, 1990. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1990.
Trinidad ∧ Tobago
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Oct. 15 and 23, 1986, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au- Spain Dec. 5, 1989 and Nov. 8 and Dec. 14, 1990. Entered into force Dec. 14, 1990.
Venezuela
Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation, with annex. Signed at Caracas Dec. 8, 1990. Enters into force on the date on which the parties notify each other that they have complied with the necessary constitutional and statutory requirements. 1 Not in force for the US. (###)