US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991


Situation in the Baltic States

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from remarks by the President and question-and- answer session upon his return from Camp David; Washington, DC Date: Jan 13, 19911/13/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, USSR (former) Subject: Military Affairs, Regional/Civil Unrest, Human Rights, Democratization [TEXT] I have been following the situation in Lithuania and the other Baltic states closely. The turn of events there is deeply disturbing. There is no justification for the use of force against peaceful and democratically elected governments. And the brave people and the leaders of the Baltic states have, indeed, acted with dignity and restraint. The thoughts and prayers of the people of the United States are with them, and particularly with the Lithuanian people who have experienced a great tragedy. For several years now, the Soviet Union has been on a course of democratic and peaceful change. And we've supported that effort and stated repeatedly how much we admire the Soviet leaders who chose that path. Indeed, change in the Soviet Union has helped to create a basis for unprecedented cooperation and partnership between the United States and the Soviet Union. The events that we're witnessing now are completely inconsistent with that course. The progress of reform in the USSR has been an essential element in the improvement of US-Soviet relations. Events like those now taking place in the Baltic states threaten to set back or perhaps even reverse the process of reform which is so important in the world and the development of the new international order. We condemn these acts, which could not help but affect our relationship. At this hour, the United States and the West will redouble our efforts to strengthen and encourage peaceful change in the Soviet Union. Legitimacy is not built by force; it's earned by the consensus of the people, by openness, and by the protection of basic human and political rights. So I ask the Soviet leaders to refrain from further acts that might lead to more violence and loss of life. I urge the Soviet government to return to a peaceful course of negotiations and dialogue with the legitimate governments of the Baltic states. And I did have an opportunity when I talked to President Gorbachev not so many hours ago to encourage the peaceful change there and not the use of force. Q: Mr. President, was Gorbachev directly behind this military crackdown? Is there any reason to believe the military acted without complete presidential decree on this? A: I cannot answer that question. I just don't know the facts of-- Q. Is there any official explanation for what happened in Lithuania? A: Not an official explanation, but we have a good deal of information on it. Q. And what about the fallout here? Is the summit off at this point? A: Well, I've just expressed this statement here, and I just expressed my sentiments in this statement I made, so I can't go beyond that. Q: And consideration of export credit guarantees or any other- - A: I'm just not going to go further than what I've said here. I've just laid it out, and people can interpret it any way they want. . . . Q: Mr. President, if the crackdown continues in the Baltics, will you go to Moscow on February 11th? A: Well, I would simply--that's too hypothetical. What I'm saying is I hope the crackdown will not continue. Q: Sir, did you get assurances from Mr. Gorbachev about whether he will continue or halt the--assurances about what he will do next? A: Well, I heard a statement I was just asking our Soviet experts about in here where he was talking about curtailing the use of force. I hope that's true, but I did not get direct affirmation from them. . . . Q: Mr. President, do you think that the Soviet Union is striking out on Lithuania at this moment because they think our attention and the attention of the world has been diverted by the Persian Gulf crisis? A: No. Q: Are you concerned that by speaking out now that you may jeopardize your support from Mr. Gorbachev in the Persian Gulf crisis? A: No, I believe the Soviet support for the UN approach is solid and firm. And President Gorbachev told me that not so long ago--just when I had the last conversation. . . . Q: Mr. President, you remonstrated with Gorbachev last week not to use force in the Baltics, and just yesterday Gorbachev said he was sending emissaries from his Federation Council to mediate. A few hours later the tanks were rolling. Are you afraid that he has lost control in the Soviet Union? A: Well, I am concerned about the internal affairs there, and he, himself, is very much concerned about that. But let's hope that there will be a peaceful--a return to peace, no more use of force, and that they can peacefully negotiate their differences. That's what I hope for. I think that's what President Gorbachev--I know that's what he told me he wanted before, and I hope that still holds, and I hope that will obtain. But I am very much concerned about the loss of life there. . . . Q: Mr. President, do you plan on trying to contact him directly? A: I always have that option. Our phone lines are open, and I have no immediate plans of that, but I wouldn't rule that out. . . .
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

USSR Forces in the Baltics (box)

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 8, 19911/8/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia Subject: Military Affairs [TEXT] The United States is monitoring carefully the Soviet government's decision to send additional military forces to Moldavia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and the three Baltic states--Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. This action represents a serious step toward an escalation of tension within the USSR and makes the peaceful evolution of relations among the peoples of the Soviet Union more difficult. The United States is especially concerned that the Soviet decision to send military units into the Baltic states, which we view as provocative and counterproductive, could damage the prospects for peaceful and constructive negotiations on the future of those states. The United States urges the USSR to cease attempts at intimidation and turn back to negotiations that are conducted free of pressure and the use of force. The United States, which has never recognized the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, supports the aspirations of the Baltic people to control and determine their own future. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Crisis in the Gulf

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks at a White House news conference; Washington, DC Date: Jan 12, 19911/12/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] First, let me just say that I am gratified by the vote in the Congress supporting the UN Security Council resolutions. This action by the Congress unmistakably demonstrates the US commitment to the international demand for a complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. This clear expression of the Congress represents the last, best chance for peace. As a democracy, we've debated this issue openly and in good faith. And as President, I have held extensive consultation with the Congress. We've now closed ranks behind a clear signal of our determination and our resolve to implement the UN resolutions. Those who may have mistaken our democratic process as a sign of weakness now see the strength of democracy. And this sends the clearest message to Iraq that it cannot scorn the January 15th deadline. Throughout our history we've been resolute in our support of justice, freedom, and human dignity. The current situation in the Persian Gulf demands no less of us and of the international community. We did not plan for war, nor do we seek war. But if conflict is thrust upon us we are ready and we are determined. We've worked long and hard, as have others, including the Arab League, the United Nations, the European Community, to achieve a peaceful solution. Unfortunately, Iraq has thus far turned a deaf ear to the voices of peace and reason. Let there be no mistake: Peace is everyone's goal. Peace is in everyone's prayers. But it is for Iraq to decide. Q: Mr. President, does this mean now that war is inevitable-- A: No-- Q: --and have you made the decision in your own mind? A: I have not because I still hope--hope--that there will be a peaceful solution. Q: Mr. President, there's only 3 days left until the deadline, which isn't enough time for Saddam Hussein to pull out his troops. In fact, you, yourself, wouldn't let [Secretary of State] Jim Baker go to Baghdad on this date because there wouldn't be enough time. Do you see the possibility of anything happening in these last few days that could avert war or any chance that he will pull his troops out? A: In terms of the chance, I'd have to say I don't know. And in terms of what could avert war, you might say an instant commencement of a large-scale removal of troops with no condition, no concession, and just heading out could well be the best and only way to avert war, even though it would be, at this date, I would say, almost impossible to comply fully with the UN resolutions. Q: Have you heard from the UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar today, and is there any hope on that front? A: No--well, I don't know whether there is hope on it, because I haven't heard from him today. Q: Are you satisfied that countries in the international coalition like France, Syria, and Egypt will take part in offensive operations in the event of hostilities in the Gulf? A: Yes. Q: The second part of that question: you've said that if hostilities come, it will not be another Vietnam. What kind of assumptions are you making about the duration of a conflict, and can you assure the American people that hostilities would not expand beyond the current theater of operations? A: I am not making any assumptions in terms of numbers of days, but I have said over and over again that the differences between what is happening in the Gulf and what happened in Vietnam are enormous in terms of the coalition aligned against the Iraqis, in terms of the demographics, in terms of the UN action, and I am convinced in terms of the force that is arrayed against Iraq. So I just don't think there is a parallel. But I would like to say that I have gone over all of this with our Secretary of Defense and with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and all three of us, and everybody else involved in this, are determined to keep casualties to an absolute minimum. And that's one of the reasons that I authorized [Defense] Secretary Cheney to move the additional force several weeks ago. Q: What about firebreaks to keep the war from expanding? A: I don't worry too much about the war expanding. I have said very clearly, and I'd like to repeat it here, that we will hold Saddam Hussein directly responsible for any terrorist action that is taken against US citizens, against citizens of others in the coalition. So I must confess to some concern about terrorism. It's not just that it relates to this crisis because I've always felt that way. But if it is related to the crisis, if the terrorists' acts are related to it, Saddam Hussein will be held directly responsible for that, and the consequences will be on him. Q: The pendulum of hope has swung back and forth, and you, yourself, have said you didn't hold out tremendous hope for the last- minute diplomatic efforts. What do you do on midnight on January 15th? A: I can't tell you I know on midnight, but I do feel that the action taken by the US Congress today is a very important step in, hopefully, getting Saddam Hussein to realize what he's up against-- the determination of the American people. I have felt that the support is there from the people, but I think now with the Congress, the representatives of the people on record, it makes it much, much clearer to Saddam Hussein. Q: The polls have shown people's support moving fairly quickly after the 15th. Would that be your intention? A: I have said--and without trying to pin it down or in any sense go beyond what I'm about to say, sooner rather than later. And I got into a discussion--I know that's perhaps not of much help, but I think the worst thing you'd want to do is, if a determination was made to use force, to signal when you might be inclined to act. That would, in my view, put the lives of coalition forces needlessly at risk. Q: I'm sure you're doing all these scenarios that are coming out, the various peace scenarios. One has it that Saddam Hussein will wait until after the 15th--we get into this face-saving again- -wait until the 16th or the 17th possibly and then start to withdraw, say, "Look, I stood up to George Bush, but I'm willing in order to avoid war to pull my troops out now." Is that the type of thing that would go into your calculations? Would that be important to you? Would you say, well, let's give the guy a couple of days and see if, indeed, that scenario is true? A: I don't want to give any indication to Saddam Hussein that we will be interested in anything that looks like delay or trying to claim victory. It isn't a question of winning or losing. It's a question of his getting out of Kuwait rapidly without concession. And so I can't--I'd have to know a lot more about the situation, the scenario, as you say, before I could give you a more definitive response. But I don't want anything here to be interpreted by him as flexibility on our part. We have not been flexible. We have been determined, and we are still determined to see that this is--that he is--complies fully with the resolutions. Now, Rita raised the question, is it logistically possible to fully comply? At this moment, I'm not sure that you could--logistically possibly to fully comply. But if he started now to do that what he should have done weeks ago, clearly, that would make a difference. And I'm talking about a rapid, massive withdrawal from Kuwait. But I still worry about it, because it might not be in full compliance. So the standard--full compliance with all these resolutions-- now, some can't be complied with fully before the 15th. One of them relates to reparations. And reparations are a very important part of this. It's a very important part of what the United Nations has done. So I don't think the whole question of reparations can be resolved before the 15th. Q: Can you explain why sooner is better than later? A: Yes, because I think it's--well, that's been a major part of the debate on the Hill. And I think it is very important that he knows that the United States and the United Nations are credible. I don't want to see further economic damage done to Third World economies or to this economy. I don't want to see further devastation done to Kuwait. This question of when was debated in the United Nations, and these countries came down saying this is the deadline. And I don't want to veer off from that for one single iota. And I certainly don't want to indicate that the United States will not do its part in the coalition to fulfill these resolutions. . . . Q: Let me follow Jerry's question, because the reports persist that the UN Secretary General, when he meets with Saddam Hussein, will lay out steps beyond compliance with the resolutions to include a UN peacekeeping force, to include an eventual Mideast peace conference. Given the demand for absolute compliance, are those within the Secretary General's mandate to advance further steps? A: What were the two? Q: Two of several that are out there are a UN peacekeeping force, also a timetable for your withdrawal, and then a Mideast peace conference. A: My view is that a withdrawal to the status quo ante is not satisfactory and thus there will have to be a peacekeeping force of some kind. In other words, we just can't--Saddam Hussein will not simply be able to go back to square one if he started that today. There would have to be further compliance with other resolutions and there would have to be a peacekeeping force. Secondly, I have said I don't want US ground forces to stay there a day longer than necessary. So I am not troubled with that. On the other question, I simply want to see us avoid what is known as linkage. And I think the American people more clearly see now what I mean by linkage because they watched the Aziz press conference where the whole question was shifting--trying to shift the onus away from the aggression and brutality against Kuwait and move it over and try to put the blame on Israel or try to shift the onus to the Palestinian question. So we have, along with the United Nations--other participants in the UN Security Council process, have avoided linkage. And so I think--I guess I'd say it depends how it is put forward. I, myself, at the United Nations when I presented the US position this fall, spoke up against--eventually wanting to see this question solved. And, indeed, everyone knows that Jim Baker tried very hard to have us be catalytic in bringing that age-old question to solution. So I think it's--I just think whatever is done, it has to be done in a way to preserve the US position that there be no linkage. . . .(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Crisis in the Gulf

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks made to US troops during a visit to Saudi Arabia Date: Jan 11, 19911/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] I wanted to drop by to see you to thank you once again for what you are doing for your country. I wanted to let you know that we will continue to do all that we can to ensure that you come home safely and peacefully. We hope and pray that this will be possible, that Saddam Hussein will choose the path of peace and withdraw from Kuwait in fulfillment of the UN [Security Council] resolutions. Time is running out, but the path to peace remains open. There is still time for Iraq to walk that path. In Geneva, I made clear to Foreign Minister [Tariq] Aziz that should Iraq withdraw from Kuwait, the United States would not attack Iraq or its forces. Nor do we have any intention of maintaining a permanent ground presence in this region once Iraq withdraws and the threat recedes. Moreover, I reiterated our commitment to the Security Council's call for Kuwait and Iraq to negotiate their differences peacefully. Regrettably, the Iraqi leadership has yet to show any inclination whatsoever to follow the path of peace. They can still choose peace and avert disaster. But the choice is theirs and theirs alone. But even as we hope, and we pray, and we work for peace, America (and all the other nations of the international coalition) must be prepared for a conflict that we do not seek but from which we shall not shrink. You are here, carrying out your mission with integrity and courage, for one straightforward reason: We face a clear danger to the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and the world. A very dangerous dictator--armed to the teeth--is threatening this critical region at a defining moment in history. He must be stopped now--peacefully if possible but if necessary by force. If he is stopped, if his aggression is undone, then together we can all usher in a new era--a time for peace among nations. But if we fail now, we will all surely pay later--as Saddam's ambitions and conquests grow, and the world's will to resist aggression weakens. That's why, when I talked to you in September, I told you there's a very important principle at stake: Unprovoked aggression cannot be allowed to pay. The events of the last 4 months only underscore how important that principle truly is. And when I talked to you 4 months ago, some of you told me that you wereready. But you also asked how long before you would know whether you would be called into action to undo this terrible aggression. Now as the clock ticks down to midnight January 15, I cannot give you a definitive answer. But I can tell you that you will not have to wait much longer for an answer to that question. The fact is that you are here and ready to stand fast for what is good and right and for what, in the long term, is the only sure guarantee of peace. Your presence here and your preparedness offer the only real chance that a peaceful solution will come at the very last moment. As I said in Geneva, there have been too many Iraqi miscalculations. And we fear another miscalculation, a truly tragic one. We believe that if Iraq is going to withdraw from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein will probably wait until he is on the very brink before he moves. And our worry is that in his usual style, he will miscalculate where the brink exactly is. Just so there is no misunderstanding, let me be absolutely clear: We pass the brink at midnight, January 15. Since November 30, the international community, through Security Council Resolution 678, has made clear that January 15 is a serious deadline. It is real. Efforts to extend it or postpone it will not succeed. Saddam can believe that or not, but if he doesn't he will have made his most tragic miscalculation. In closing, I want you to know that if you are called into action, I know you will complete your mission--bravely, honorably, and successfully. And if you are called into action, I know you will make your nation proud: you are the combat crews who will join in the liberation of Kuwait. You are the fighting men and women who will return to America with honor and dignity and the respect of a grateful nation and a grateful world. For you stand precisely where America has stood when she has stood proudest: You stand against aggression, and you stand for peace. You serve on the front lines of freedom for occupied Kuwait, and you serve on the frontier of promise for a new world order--a world based on peace among the nations, not on aggression and contempt for civilized conduct. The President thanks you, I thank you, and the American people thank you for your commitment, your courage, and your service to the nation. You are fulfilling a solemn duty for which you have the unending gratitude of the American people. What you are doing will never be forgotten.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Crisis in the Gulf

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks prior to meeting with the Kuwaiti Amir in Taif, Saudi Arabia. Date: Jan 11, 19911/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Q: Mr. Baker, could I just ask you what your feelings are about the proposals to send the UN force into Kuwait, the Perez de Cuellar plan? Secretary Baker: You know we have been talking for quite some time about the importance of considering security structures in the aftermath of a resolution of this crisis. After an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait--if there is a peaceful withdrawal--it would be appropriate, I think, to give consideration to how security will be maintained, and there's no reason why one part of that consideration should not be consideration of a possible UN peacekeeping force. I also believe, though, that the states in the region are going to have to make the greatest contribution to the security of the region and must be in the forefront of the formation of the regional security structure. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Crisis in the Gulf

Jabir Source: Kuwaiti Amir Shaikh Jabir Description: Remarks prior to meeting with Secretary Baker in Taif, Saudi Arabia Date: Jan 11, 19911/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Q: Does your Majesty feel that there is any further chance for peace, or is it now definitely war? Shaikh Jabir: (Interpreted) If there's a chance for peace, we welcome peace. And then we would have complete withdrawal and the acceptance of the UN resolutions. But if the call for peace will be rejected, there will be no other way unless leaving by force.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Crisis in the Gulf

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Excerpts from a White House news conference; Washington, DC Date: Jan 9, 19911/9/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization I have spoken with Secretary of State Jim Baker, who reported to me on his nearly 7 hours of conversation with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Secretary Baker made it clear that he discerned no evidence whatsoever that Iraq was willing to comply with the international community's demand to withdraw from Kuwait and comply with the UN resolutions. Secretary Baker also reported to me that the Iraqi Foreign Minister rejected my letter to Saddam Hussein --refused to carry this letter and give it to the President of Iraq. [See text of letter in this Dispatch]. The Iraqi Ambassador here in Washington did the same thing. This is but one more example that the Iraqi government is not interested in direct communications designed to settle the Persian Gulf situation. The record shows that whether the diplomacy is initiated by the United States, the United Nations, the Arab league, or the European Community, the results are the same, unfortunately. The conclusion is clear: Saddam Hussein continues to reject a diplomatic solution. I sent Secretary Jim Baker to Geneva not to negotiate but to communicate. And I wanted Iraqi leaders to know just how determined we are that the Iraqi forces leave Kuwait without condition or further delay. Secretary Baker made clear that by its full compliance with the 12 relevant UN Security Council resolutions, Iraq would gain the opportunity to rejoin the international community. And he also made clear how much Iraq stands to lose if it does not comply. Let me emphasize that I have not given up on a peaceful outcome--it's not too late. I've just been on the phone, subsequent to the Baker press conference, with [Saudi] King Fahd, with [French] President Mitterrand--to whom I've talked twice today--[Canadian] Prime Minister Mulroney, and others are contacting other coalition partners to keep the matter under lively discussion. It isn't too late. But now, as it's been before, the choice of peace or war is really Saddam Hussein's to make. Q. You said in an interview last month that you believe in your gut that Saddam Hussein would withdraw from Kuwait by January 15th. After the failure of this meeting today, what does your gut tell you about that? And in your gut, do you believe that there's going to be war or peace? A. I can't misrepresent this to the American people. I am discouraged. I watched much of the Aziz press conference, and there was no discussion of withdrawal from Kuwait. The UN resolutions are about the aggression against Kuwait. They're about the invasion of Kuwait, about the liquidation of a lot of the people in Kuwait, about the restoration of the legitimate government to Kuwait. And here we were listening to a 45-minute press conference after the Secretary of State of the United States had 6 hours worth of meetings over there, and there was not one single sentence that has to relate to their willingness to get out of Kuwait. And so, I'd have to say I certainly am not encouraged by that, but I'm not going to give up. I told this to our coalition partners-- and I'll be talking to more of them when I finish here--we've got to keep trying. But this was a total stiff arm; this was a total rebuff. Q. Let me follow up on that. Let me follow up. Have you decided in your mind to go to war if he's not out of there by the 15th? A. I have not made my decision on what and when to do. I am more determined than ever that the UN resolutions, including 678, is implemented fully. Q. Aziz made a pledge that he would not make the first attack. Would you match that? And also, what's wrong with a Middle East conference if it could avoid a bloody war? A. No, I wouldn't make it, and we oppose linkage--the coalition opposes linkage. The argument with Saddam Hussein is about Kuwait. It is about the invasion of Kuwait, the liquidation of a member of the United Nations, a member of the Arab League. It has long been determined by not just the Security Council but by the entire United Nations that this is about Kuwait. And that is the point that was missing from his explanations here today. So there will be no linkage on these items. That's been the firm position of all of the allies, those with forces there, and, indeed, of the United Nations--the General Assembly. Q. Tariq Aziz, on the subject of the letter, suggested that it was rude in its use of language and somehow inappropriate to a diplomatic communication. I wonder if you are willing to release the letter, now that it has been--it's run its course, apparently? And if, whether you are or not, would you characterize it for us and tell us what it said? A. Well, let me first describe why I wanted to send a letter. It has been alleged, fairly or unfairly, that those around Saddam Hussein refuse to bring him bad news or refuse to tell it to him straight. And so I made the determination that I would write a letter that would explain as clearly and forcefully as I could exactly what the situation is that he faces. The letter was not rude; the letter was direct. And the letter did exactly what I think is necessary at this stage. But to refuse to even pass a letter along seems to me to be just one more manifestation of the stonewalling that has taken place. We gave him 15 dates for the Secretary of State to meet with him, and he's off meeting with Mr. A and Mr. B and Mr. C and has no time for that. So the letter was proper--I've been around the diplomatic track for a long time--the letter was proper; it was direct; and it was what I think would have been helpful to him to show him the resolve of the rest of the world--certainly of the coalition. In terms of releasing it, I haven't given much thought to that. It was written as a letter to him. But let me think about it. I might be willing to do it; I might not. I just don't know. If I thought it would help get the message out to him in an indirect way, maybe it makes some sense, although we've been saying essentially the same thing over and over again that was in the letter. . . . Q. You've said that the coalition is united against any linkage on the Palestinian question. You've talked to Francois Mitterrand twice today. But in public, he says he is for this international peace conference, and he seems to have no objection at all if Saddam Hussein wants to use that as a fig leaf to pull out of Kuwait. You do have an objection. Mitterrand also says that apparently the European Community foreign ministers are going to meet with Aziz, apparently in Algiers. What if they go in there and say, well, we have no objection to an international peace conference on the Mideast? A. The foreign ministers of the EC have been very solid, and so has President Francois Mitterrand, that there will be no linkage. So you're asking me a hypothetical question that I won't have to answer because he's not going to do that. Q. He said today he disagrees with you on the international peace-- A. The French government and the US government over the years have had some differences on the best way to bring peace to the Middle East. We had a very active initiative underway by Jim Baker. But that doesn't have anything to do with the invasion of Kuwait. Francois Mitterrand knows that it doesn't have to do with the invasion of Kuwait and the aggression against Kuwait. I know he knows this. And he's been very forthright about it. But yes, he's very frank in saying countries have a different approach to how you solve another very important problem. And we've never--I would simply refer you back to what I've said on that subject. I think you were with us over in the joint press conference with President Gorbachev when I addressed myself to this. But I am going to avoid linkage. I listened to that Aziz meeting, and all he tried to do is obfuscate, to confuse, to make everybody think this had to do with the West Bank, for example. And it doesn't. It has to do with the aggression against Kuwait--the invasion of Kuwait, the brutalizing of the people in Kuwait. It has to do with a new world order. And that world order is only going to be enhanced if this newly activated peacekeeping function of the United Nations proves to be effective. That is the only way the new world order will be enhanced. . . . Q. Mr. President, you said that when you first proposed high- level talks between Iraq and the United States that it was because you were convinced the message had not gotten through, had not gotten across. Are you now convinced that the message had gotten across? A. Well, I did listen carefully to Mr. Aziz, whom I thought spoke quite well. I didn't agree with what he was trying to do, obviously, to confuse the issue by refusing to discuss the point at hand, which is the invasion of Kuwait, but I thought he did it well. I thought he kind of sent a signal that they do understand what's up against them, but I still don't believe that they think the world coalition will use force against them. I may be wrong, but that's what I think in here. And I also still believe, as I said earlier, that he somehow has this feeling that he will prevail or that he will prolong. This will not be. I've heard some wild predictions on this horrible human equation that might be involved if force were used, and I would say I don't agree with some who are arguing the loudest because it's putting the worst case out in terms of loss of human life; I must say that. I don't know. I think Aziz understands it, but I'm not sure that Saddam Hussein does. . . . (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Crisis in the Gulf

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: News conference following bilateral meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz; Geneva, Switzerland Date: Jan 9, 19911/9/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] I have just given President Bush a full report of our meeting today. I told him that Minister Aziz and I had completed a serious and extended diplomatic conversation in an effort to find a political solution to the crisis in the Gulf. I met with Minister Aziz today not to negotiate, as we have made clear we would not do--that is, negotiate backward from UN Security [Council] resolutions--but I met with him today to communicate. And communicate means listening as well as talking, and we did that--both of us. The message that I conveyed from President Bush and our coalition partners was that Iraq must either comply with the will of the international community and withdraw peacefully from Kuwait or be expelled by force. Regrettably, ladies and gentlemen, I heard nothing today that--in over 6 hours, I heard nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with the UN Security Council resolutions. There have been too many Iraqi miscalculations. The Iraqi government miscalculated the international response to the invasion of Kuwait, expecting the world community to stand idly by while Iraqi forces systematically pillaged a peaceful neighbor. It miscalculated the response, I think, to the barbaric policy of holding thousands of foreign hostages, thinking that somehow cynically doling them out a few at a time would somehow win political advantage. And it miscalculated that it could divide the international community and gain something thereby from its aggression. So let us hope that Iraq does not miscalculate again. The Iraqi leadership must have no doubt that the 28 nations which have deployed forces to the Gulf in support of the United Nations have both the power and the will to evict Iraq from Kuwait. If it should choose--and the choice is Iraq's--if it should choose to continue its brutal occupation of Kuwait, Iraq will be choosing a military confrontation which it cannot win and which will have devastating consequences for Iraq. I made these points with Minister Aziz not to threaten but to inform, and I did so with no sense of satisfaction, for we genuinely desire a peaceful outcome, and, as both President Bush and I have said on many occasions, the people of the United States have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. I simply wanted to leave as little room as possible for yet another tragic miscalculation by the Iraqi leadership. And I would suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this is still a confrontation that Iraq can avoid. The path of peace remains open, and that path is laid out very clearly in 12 UN Security Council resolutions adopted over a period of over 5 months. But now the choice lies with the Iraqi leadership. The choice really is theirs to make, and let us all hope that that leadership will have the wisdom to choose the path of peace. Q. What do your allies plan to do next to bring this message home? A. Well, you say, "What do the allies plan to do next?" and I think it's important for everyone to note that this is a coalition. This is not Iraq versus the United States. This is Iraq versus the international community. This happens to have been the first time that we've had an opportunity to find agreement on meeting--US and Iraq. So I don't know what the next steps are. I do know this: that time is running on, as I said a day or so ago. After 5 months and 12 UN Security Council resolutions, it seems to me that it is almost evident that the time for talk is running out. It's time for Iraq to act and to act quickly by getting out of Kuwait. But this is a coalition, and we are seeking to implement solemn resolutions of the United Nations. And so perhaps there may be a way that the Secretary General of the United Nations could use his good offices here in the remaining 6 or so days that we have left. I will say that--I've already mentioned that I didn't hear anything that to me demonstrated flexibility, nor did I hear any new proposals. But I would like to take note of the fact that the minister did restate their proposal that the United States pick a day for him to come to the United States and Iraq pick a day for me to go to Baghdad. Those of you who have been traveling with us know what our answer is to that. We've given it over the past 4 or 5 days, and I gave it to the minister tonight. We offered 15 separate days for a visit to Baghdad. The President of the United States made the proposal for face-to-face discussions. We're glad that Iraq accepted this one, because we did have 6 hours during which we could make our position known to them, they could make their position known to us. But as far as next steps are concerned, it seems to me that because we are talking about a coalition and we are talking about implementing resolutions of the United Nations, that perhaps there could be--I don't know what the position of the government of Iraq would be on this--but perhaps there would be some room for us to seek the use of the good offices of the Secretary General of the United Nations. Q. Did the Iraqi Foreign Minister reiterate his demands for what he calls "justice and fairness" for the Palestinians? I mean, was there any wavering in the US position, as you may have expressed it to him, that the two issues are not related, are not linked? A. No. There was--he expressed his position. There was no change in our position, which is that the two issues are not linked. I did make the point that I don't think many people believe that Iraq invaded Kuwait in order to help the Palestinians, and, if they did, it was another miscalculation, because it hasn't helped the Palestinians. I think most people believe that Iraq invaded Kuwait for Iraq's own aggrandizement, and I think most people realize that Iraq is trying to use the Palestinian issue to shield its aggression against Kuwait, which in my view at least remains an obstacle to broader peace in the region rather than a catalyst for achieving that broader peace. And I made the point as well that rewarding Iraq's aggression with a link to the Arab-Israeli peace process would really send a terrible signal not only to genuine peacemakers in the region but also to other would-be aggressors at what we think is a defining moment in history. Q. Are you willing--is the United States willing to talk again to Iraq before the January 15 deadline and did you discuss with the President the possibility that you may still go to Baghdad? A. I had already discussed that with President Bush, and I had already told you what our view was. And the President himself, I think, said, "There will be no trip to Baghdad." The proposal which he originally made was in effect rejected by Iraq. We offered 15 separate days. They continued to insist upon only one--the 12th of January--which we think was and still is an obvious effort to avoid the deadline of January the 15th, and we're not interested in that. We think this deadline is real, and our coalition partners think the deadline is real. Q. Did you discuss this with the President today? A. I reported fully to the President, of course. Q. Could you run through for us--you spoke for 6 hours--could you give us a sense of how the discussions evolved over those 6 hours? What did you begin with? What did he counter with? Why did you feel it necessary after 2 hours to call the President? A. Well, we broke for lunch. [Laughter] And I think this meeting is sufficiently important that I should call the President, and so I did, just as I did as soon as we were finished. Q. Did you begin by reading your letter-- A. But I began by saying that I was here to--not to negotiate but to communicate, as I've just told you--that I was here for a serious dialogue in an effort to find a political and peaceful solution, but that they should not expect that we would be prepared to walk backward from UN Security Council resolutions, that the terms of those resolutions had already been set. And I told the minister I wanted to handle the meeting in whatever way he wanted. And I gave him the choice, and he chose for me to go first, just as he--I gave him the choice as well as to how to report to you, and he suggested that I come down here first. So that's how we got where we are here tonight. But let me say that I talked to him about how we saw the situation, about the history of the Security Council resolutions, about what I thought could happen in the event of observance of those resolutions, and what I feared would happen in the event of Iraq's non-observance of those resolutions. He then presented the position of the government of Iraq, and he will be down here in a few moments, and he can--now, we can't run through 6 hours of dialogue here. Nobody else would get to ask any questions. Q. One quick follow-up: How detailed were you about the extent of force that would be used against Iraq if it does not comply with the UN resolutions by January 15? A. Well, I didn't get into things that would properly be in the realm of operational security matters. I hope I effectively made the case with respect to what at least our opinion was of the 28- nation multinational force that is there in the Gulf. Q. Is the United States interested in any sort of phased withdrawal, be it one supervised by the United Nations? And if this withdrawal began by January 15, will the United States guarantee there will be no military attack on Iraq? A. Let me say I should have said this in answer to Tom's question. I assured the minister that if they implement the UN resolutions, and if they withdraw from Iraq and permit the restoration--from Kuwait and permit the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait, that I could assure him that there would be no military action by the United States. And that I felt that there would, under those circumstances, be no military action by any other elements of the international coalition. Q. (Inaudible) A. On the first question, the UN resolutions speak for themselves. We are not here--after all, we are part of an international coalition. We are part of 28 countries. Even more countries that have been helping financially and economically. And it is not up to us to walk backward from solemn resolutions of the United Nations. Q. You have said in the past that you would seek approval for the use of force at the highest levels. Are you now at that stage in the process in which you will be seeking the use of force from other governments? A. No. But the clock is ticking on, and I made that point to the minister today. As far as we are concerned, we have not taken--the President of the United States who alone under--who alone in our executive branch under our system can make that decision has not taken that decision, and I'm not aware that any other governments have. Q. In the remaining 6 days before the UN deadline, would you welcome an initiative by some other European allies or even Arab countries such as Algeria that would perhaps include sending a European foreign minister to Baghdad to seek a peaceful resolution? A. Well, this is an international coalition--let me say it one more time--and, therefore, as I've just indicated to you, it's an international coalition seeking to implement solemn resolutions of the world's peacekeeping and security body. And, therefore, there might, it seems to me, be some useful purpose served by perhaps the Secretary General--Secretary General's good offices. But I said last night, and I have said for months, we welcome any and all diplomatic efforts to solve this crisis peacefully and politically. We want it solved peacefully and politically. I'm disappointed, of course, that we did not receive any indications today whatsoever of any flexibility in the position of Iraq. So we would welcome any and all diplomatic efforts. We do think if there are efforts by members of the international coalition, that the message should be uniform, as it has been for 5 months, and it should not be a mixed message. But we want a peaceful and political solution. Q. Can you tell us--you keep saying you saw no indication of flexibility. Did the Foreign Minister actually tell you that Iraq intends to keep Kuwait and will not withdraw from Kuwait? A. He did not make that statement, but he did not indicate that there was any chance that they would withdraw. But I did not see, frankly, any flexibility in their position. You can ask him questions when he gets down here. Q. Did you discuss--in answer to any of the discussion about the problems raised elsewhere in the Middle East by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, did you discuss the efforts the United States has made in the past to seek Arab/Israeli peace-- A. Yes. Q. --to persuade Iraq that the United States was serious, genuinely interested, in resolving those problems? A. Yes. We went through a good bit of the history of the personal efforts that I made for 14 months to bring about a dialogue between Arab--between Palestinians and Israelis. We went through the experience of the United States in bringing about the Camp David accords and in bringing about peace between Israel and Egypt, and we had a full discussion of that issue--a complete discussion of it. I want to make it clear that I made it very clear throughout that there would be no linkage here of that issue to Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. And we would not agree as a condition of their withdrawing to any subsequent specific steps to be taken with respect to that. But we did have--they brought it up, and we had a very full discussion. Q. Well, what was their answer? A. We disagree. We frankly disagree with respect to that, as I think you know. And I've already told you why I think linkage is a bad idea. I think that it would tend to be read as a reward for aggressors, and it would jeopardize future peace in the region. Q. What did you tell the Foreign Minister about the willingness of the American people to go to war and the impact of political pressure on the President's decisionmaking? A. I said, "Don't miscalculate the resolve of the American people, who are very slow to anger but who believe strongly in principle and who believe that we should not reward aggression and that big countries with powerful military machines should not be permitted to invade, occupy, and brutalize their peaceful neighbors." Q. You've told us what you didn't hear. You didn't hear any flexibility, and you told us that there was quite a bit of discussion of history. Could you tell us what you did hear? Did you hear justifications from the Foreign Minister? Did you hear a repeat of what they've been saying in public for some time? A. I heard some things that I quite frankly found very hard to believe, but I'll let him go into the detail here. I heard, for instance, that their action in invading Kuwait was defensive in nature; that they were being threatened by Kuwait. And I will tell you the same thing I told the minister, which is I found it very hard to believe that any nation in the world will believe that. Q. Even though you did spend 6 hours here today talking to Foreign Minister Aziz, in the past 51/2 months you haven't had much contact with Iraq. What's to prevent the historians of this conflict from concluding that there was a failure of diplomacy here, and we slid toward war without trying? A. There's been a lot of conversations with the leadership of Iraq, all to no avail. The Secretary General has already had one failed mission. There have been any number of Arab efforts to solve this crisis, all to no avail. There have been efforts by other Western governments. The Soviet Union has tried very hard. They've had meetings. We have now had a meeting. So people can write whatever they decide they might want to write. But the truth of the matter is, we have been very, I think--the international coalition--very responsible and measured in our approach to this. We have not, as some might suggest, gone off half-cocked. We have gone through the United Nations patiently, working for consensus within the Security Council. And it is only after 51/2 months and the passage of 12 Security Council resolutions that we find ourselves at the point of use of force. So I think that there's been more diplomacy exercised in this crisis than in almost any that I can think of. The one thing I would ask you all not to do is to equate diplomacy and appeasement. We made that mistake in the thirties, at least, for our part. We don't intend to make it again. Q. In a sense, two questions: Did the Foreign Minister suggest Iraq might withdraw from Kuwait if there were linkage as, let us say, the French have suggested or others have suggested? And, if he did, is linkage--the principle of linkage--a reason for the loss of-- and the insistence on that principle--a reason for the loss of lots of lives? A. Well, I don't think he said that explicitly. I think perhaps it was implicit in his comments. But he'll be here, and you can ask him. It's more than just the principle of linkage, as I understand their position. There would have to be agreement to conferences and that sort of thing, that get you beyond just the simple fact of linkage. Q. Did Minister Aziz make a specific proposal under which Iraq would get out of Kuwait, however unacceptable it was to you? Was there a specific proposal? A. No. There was no specific proposal. He restated the positions that Iraq has stated publicly in the past. He defended their action in invading and occupying Kuwait. He explained how he feels that was justified. Again, he'll be down here and you can ask him yourselves. Q. You made it clear that you were not going to Baghdad. But did you and the Foreign Minister talk about future diplomatic contacts at your level between the United States and Iraq? Or did this one 61/2 hour meeting represent the conclusion of diplomatic initiatives by the United States? A. We will maintain our diplomatic contacts through our charge [d'affaires] in Baghdad until the 12th of January. I asked for and received the personal assurance of the minister that Joe Wilson and the four other Americans in our embassy there will be permitted to leave Baghdad on the 12th of January and will not be restrained from so doing. Q. Your mood, if I may say, seems pretty somber at this point. Can you kind of describe your state of mind and your mood after what has occurred today? A. Somber. Q. Somber? A. You got it. Q. Are you advising an evacuation? A. I'm not saying that. I'm telling you that we have asked for and received assurances for our remaining five diplomatic personnel to leave on the 12th of January, which is a date that you well know is very close to the January 15 deadline and happens to be the date that Iraq has been insisting on for 3 weeks for the meeting. Q. What about other Americans? A. I think most all Americans are out of Iraq. All that want to leave are gone, as far as I know. Q. Can you tell us now about the letter from President Bush? Was it, in fact, in Arabic? What was the tone of it? Did it contain graphic military scenarios intended to intimidate? A. I regret to inform you that the minister chose not to receive the letter from President Bush. He read it very slowly and very carefully, but he would not accept it nor would the Iraqi embassy in Washington accept an Arabic courtesy translation. You will have to ask the minister why he did not accept the letter. My own opinion, for what it's worth--and it's only an opinion- -was that he came here only authorized to accept a letter that walked away from the UN resolutions, which is something that we cannot and, of course, will not do. Q. Have you discussed the possibility of convening the United Nations again to discuss the Gulf crisis? You know that [French] President Mitterrand--he has proposed that most probably a new discussion is possible; it might be helpful. Have you discussed this eventuality with the Iraqi minister? A. No, it did not come up in my meeting today with the Iraqi minister. I did speak to that question and that issue a day or so ago, and I believe that President Bush has spoken to it as well. I don't know what an additional Security Council meeting at this stage could do. Because what we are talking about here is faithful implementation of resolutions of the Council, the last one of which says that if Iraq does not withdraw by midnight on January 15, force can be used to effect that withdrawal. We have had 12 resolutions of the UN Security Council. Q. President Mitterrand is suggesting this. A. I can't answer your question. I would refer you to President Mitterrand. But I have just said that perhaps there would be some utility in trying to use the good offices of the Secretary General. Q. Do you have any reason to believe that there is any way to avoid a war as of right now? A. Yes, I hope there is. There has been no decision taken for that eventuality. I would simply refer you to my opening statement where I made the point that I hope we do not have yet one more miscalculation by the government of Iraq. I would also refer you to the statements which President Bush and I and other members of the coalition have made over the course of the last several days or weeks and which I repeated today to the minister, not in a threatening way but simply so that he would know where our head is and how we feel and what we think and that is that this January 15 deadline, in our minds, is real. Iraq can choose to believe that or not, but it is real in our minds and in the minds of our coalition partners. We hope that they will believe that we think it's real and that they will act to implement the solemn resolutions of the United Nations. Q. Do you regret that you would have still liked to go, even on the 12th, and meet--instead of Mr. Tariq--Saddam himself? It's still a difference of 3 days. A. We've said for the last 3 weeks, the 12th of January was unacceptable to us because it is just an effort to avoid the deadline. It's obvious. That's why the 12th was originally suggested. We've said for a long time that date is unacceptable to us. It remains unacceptable to us. Q. Did you spell out your vision of what the Gulf would look like if they withdrew peacefully? In other words, some of the restrictions that you have talked about that must be imposed upon Iraq even if they did withdraw? Did you lay that plan out for him in some way? A. Yes, I did in my original presentation this morning. I don't have time to go through all of that with you now. But that falls right in the category of the assurance that there would not be military force used against Iraq by the United States if they withdrew from Kuwait and permitted the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait. Q. Did you talk about the nuclear weapons, the chemical weapons, the size of the Iraqi military--things that are of concern to many in the Western coalition beyond the occupation of Kuwait? A. We had a full discussion of the questions about weapons of mass destruction. I pointed out the interest of the United States, as we have expressed before in addressing that issue and addressing that subject. We talked about the the multinational presence there and the fact that President Bush has said we do not desire nor want a permanent military ground presence in the Middle East--I mean in the Gulf. We want to see our troops come home just as fast as the security situation will allow. Those are the kinds of things that we discussed, as you might expect. Q. Could you just please describe to us the point at which the meeting broke off? Why and how did it happen? Was it that you finished off? Did Mr. Aziz finish off? Or was there just nothing to talk about anymore? Please describe that. A. It was simply a case, I think, that over 6 hours of discussion, we had both had pretty well made the points that we had come to make, and that was it. I don't believe that there was anything left unsaid. He said everything, I think, he came to say and I had said everything that I had come to say. I think, frankly, it lasted longer than many of you might have anticipated at the beginning. Q. You mentioned that you are going to call back the American diplomats. Are you also asking the Iraqi diplomats to leave the United States on January 12th? A. No. We will ask the Iraqi government to draw down their diplomatic presence in the United States on the 12th. As I indicated to the minister, we would be willing to permit the presence of a small diplomatic contingent in Washington. Q. Do you feel that if you would have accepted the fact of the linkage, there could have been a proposition of Iraq retiring from Kuwait? A. I don't know. Why don't you ask the minister that? Because when you say "accepted linkage," I'm not entirely sure exactly what you mean. Do you mean if we had accepted--if we had indicated a willingness to go to an international conference to handle the question of the Middle East? Ask him the question. It would be very interesting. You know what our position has been for a long time. It would set an extraordinarily unfortunate precedent, we think, and would not, in the long run, contribute to peace in the region but would contribute to instability because aggressors would be seen to be rewarded for their aggression. It's something we simply cannot consider. Q. Was there any single issue on which the difference between the United States and Iraq was narrowed during this 61/2 hours? A. Well, let me say that I think that the discussions--I've already indicated it was a serious one. I think that the tone of it was good, as good as you could expect under the circumstances. We weren't pounding the table and shouting at each other. It was a very reasoned and, I think, responsible discussion by two diplomats who really would like to find a peaceful and political solution to this problem. I've already said to you, I did not detect flexibility in the position of Iraq as they have stated it over the past several days. Again, I invite you to my opening statement. We still have 6 days. I just hope that they will think about this meeting, that they will focus on it, that when Foreign Minister Aziz gets back and reports to his President, that perhaps there could be some change in their position. There cannot be a negotiation here because the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions were worked out in the debate in the United Nations, and the international coalition is bound to those resolutions. Q. Would you be willing to meet Saddam somewhere else, apart from Baghdad? And was that suggested? A. That was not discussed. It has never been proposed by Iraq. The Iraqi proposal, as you know, for some weeks has been, we pick a date for Baker to come to Baghdad, you pick a date for Aziz to come to Washington, and we'll work it that way. That's been out there for a long, long time. There's never been any suggestion of the other. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Letter to Congress

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 8, 19911/8/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Text of President Bush's letter to Speaker of the House of Representatives Thomas Foley. Identical letters were sent to Senator George Mitchell, Senator Robert Dole, and Representative Robert Michel. Dear Mr. Speaker: The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital US interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the UN Security Council on 12 separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait. Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive if he could have presented the Iraqi government a resolution passed by both houses of Congress supporting the UN position and in particular Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a resolution. Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for peace and safeguard this country's vital interests. I therefore request that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement UN Security Council Resolution 678. Such action would send the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression. Mr. Speaker, I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time. This truly is the last best chance for peace. Sincerely, GEORGE BUSH
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Letter to Saddam Hussein

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 5, 19911/5/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Text of the letter dated January 5, 1991, from President Bush to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz refused to accept this letter from Secretary Baker during their meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, January 9, 1991. The Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, Muhammad Sadiq Al- Mashat, also refused to deliver the letter. Mr. President: We stand today at the brink of war between Iraq and the world. This is a war that began with your invasion of Kuwait; this is a war that can be ended only by Iraq's full and unconditional compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 678. I am writing you now, directly, because what is at stake demands that no opportunity be lost to avoid what would be a certain calamity for the people of Iraq. I am writing, as well, because it is said by some that you do not understand just how isolated Iraq is and what Iraq faces as a result. I am not in a position to judge whether this impression is correct; what I can do, though, is try in this letter to reinforce what Secretary of State Baker told your Foreign Minister and eliminate any uncertainty or ambiguity that might exist in your mind about where we stand and what we are prepared to do. The international community is united in its call for Iraq to leave all of Kuwait without condition and without further delay. This is not simply the policy of the United States; it is the position of the world community as expressed in no less than twelve Security Council resolutions. We prefer a peaceful outcome. However, anything less than full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 678 and its predecessors is unacceptable. There can be no reward for aggression. Nor will there be any negotiation. Principle cannot be compromised. However, by its full compliance, Iraq will gain the opportunity to rejoin the international community. More immediately, the Iraqi military establishment will escape destruction. But unless you withdraw from Kuwait completely and without condition, you will lose more than Kuwait. What is at issue here is not the future of Kuwait--it will be free, its government will be restored--but rather the future of Iraq. This choice is yours to make. The United States will not be separated from its coalition partners. Twelve Security Council resolutions, 28 countries providing military units to enforce them, more than one hundred governments complying with sanctions--all highlight the fact that it is not Iraq against the United States, but Iraq against the world. That most Arab and Muslim countries are arrayed against you as well should reinforce what I am saying. Iraq cannot and will not be able to hold onto Kuwait or exact a price for leaving. You may be tempted to find solace in the diversity of opinion that is American democracy. You should resist any such temptation. Diversity ought not to be confused with division. Nor should you underestimate, as others have before you, America's will. Iraq is already feeling the effects of the sanctions mandated by the United Nations. Should war come, it will be a far greater tragedy for you and your country. Let me state, too, that the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction of Kuwait's oil fields and installations. Further, you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions against any member of the coalition. The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort. I write this letter not to threaten, but to inform. I do so with no sense of satisfaction, for the people of the United States have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. Mr. President, UN Security Council Resolution 678 establishes the period before January 15 of this year as a "pause of good will" so that this crisis may end without further violence. Whether this pause is used as intended, or merely becomes a prelude to further violence, is in your hands, and your alone. I hope you weigh your choice carefully and choose wisely, for much will depend upon it. Sincerely, GEORGE BUSH(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Department Statement on Iraq and Terrorism

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 11, 19911/11/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Terrorism, Travel [TEXT] As January 15 approaches, Iraq shows no sign of respecting UN Security Council resolutions demanding that it withdraw from Kuwait or face possible military force. Since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Department of State has issued three public statements warning Americans of the possibility of Iraqi-sponsored terrorist attacks. These notices were general in nature; no specific targets were mentioned. They remain in effect. The US government has evidence that terrorists supported by Iraq are planning to mount attacks in most regions of the world. We believe the Middle East and Europe are the most likely locations. We also have reports of terrorist planning in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The American public should be aware that, in the event of military action involving the United States in the Persian Gulf, the threat of terrorism against American citizens would increase significantly. The Department of State recommends that Americans take the following action to minimize the threat: -- All Americans traveling abroad should review existing travel advisories concerning the country or region to which they plan to travel. -- Americans overseas should stay in close touch with the nearest US embassy or consulate. -- They should be alert and pay attention to anyone who may be observing them. If they become concerned about something unusual, they should contact the local police. -- Americans overseas should exercise caution when in or near US military or civilian facilities. -- Should hostilities begin, Americans should keep informed through radio and television broadcasts. While it is likely that terrorist events may occur for which we have no forewarning, should specific and credible information on a threat to the American public be received, the Department of State will provide information for travelers and other concerned parties.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Text of Joint Congressional Resolution

US Congress Description: Text of Joint Congressional Resolution; Washington, DC Date: Jan 12, 19911/12/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Whereas the Government of Iraq without provocation invaded and occupied the territory of Kuwait on August 2, 1990; Whereas both the House of Representatives (in H.J. Res. 658 of the 101st Congress) and the Senate (in S. Con. Res. 147 of the 101st Congress) have condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and declared their support for international action to reverse Iraq's aggression; Whereas Iraq's conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to world peace; Whereas the international community has demanded that Iraq withdraw unconditionally and immediately from Kuwait and that Kuwait's independence and legitimate government be restored; Whereas the United Nations Security Council repeatedly affirmed the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; Whereas in the absence of full compliance by Iraq with its resolutions, the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 678 has authorized member states of the United Nations to use all necessary means, after January 15, 1991, to uphold and implement all relevant Security Council resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area; and Whereas Iraq has persisted in its illegal occupation of, and brutal aggression against Kuwait: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled,
This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution."
--The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b) to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677.
--Before exercising the authority granted in subsection (a), the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that-- (1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions cited in subsection (a); and (2) that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.
(1) Specific Statutory Authorization.--Consistent with section 8(aX1) of the War Powers Resolutions, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. (2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.--Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
At least once every 60 days, the President shall submit to the Congress a summary on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in response to Iraq's aggression. (vote: 250-183) (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Gulf Crisis Information

Date: Jan 14, 19911/14/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Emergencies: 202-647-0900 (24 hours) Questions or comments about the Administration's Persian Gulf policy: 202-647-6575 or 6576 Monday-Friday, 8:30 am-5 pm (Eastern Standard Time)(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

America's Forces in the Gulf Are Ready

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, California Date: Jan 8, 19911/8/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] As some of you may know, over the New Year I had the opportunity to visit our marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen in Saudi Arabia. The 2 days I spent with our troops brought home to me again that our armed forces are the best in the world. Our volunteer army is working, and our troops are determined to achieve our objectives. Today, I'd like to give you a report on my trip. I'd also like to tell you about the brave men and women who are serving our country with great courage in the Gulf. My first stop was a visit to Marine Air Group 13. They are the most forward-deployed of any American fixed-wing aircraft unit in the region. Their mission is to provide close air support and airborne fire. Their confidence, their sense of purpose, and their expertise was both inspiring and reassuring. I asked Captain Don Peros, an Arizonan from Yuma, how things were going. He replied, in a soft-spoken Western drawl, "The sky is quiet. They know we are here." Later that day, we helicoptered out to the most forward- deployed of any American forces, the Army's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Their motto is "Brave Rifles"--and brave they most certainly are. Commanded by Colonel Doug Starr, a Vietnam hero whose awards include two Silver Stars and five Bronze Stars, they are deployed less than 60 miles from the Kuwaiti border. One of the first American units to deploy in August of last year, they have been away from home for nearly 5 months. They live in tents in the middle of the desert, enduring the heat, the sand storms, and the tension of knowing they are the first line of defense in Saudi Arabia. Yet their spirit remains high, and their professionalism is evident in every move they make. They are ready to do whatever their President asks. Their biggest concern is domestic political considerations. They are concerned their mission may not be finished, and they'll go home-- only to be called back again in a year or two to finish the job. On board the aircraft carrier, the USS John F. Kennedy, which I visited the next day, our sailors were equally ready. Their F-14 pilots, like Lieutenant Kevin McHugh of Carmel, Indiana, are prepared to do to Saddam Hussein's air force what they did to [Libyan leader] Qadhafi's MIG-23s in 1989--clear them out of the skies. The last unit I visited, the Air Force's 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, also has had experience against Qadhafi. In 1986, they participated in our retaliation against Libyan terrorism. And when I asked the officers and men of the "Statue of Liberty" wing if there was any doubt that we could force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, their answer was a resounding "No!" In sum, the brave men and women of our armed forces stand ready to protect the vital interests of America. They will do their duty and they will do it well. They deserve our total and enthusiastic support. When I visited the Marine base, on the walls of one of the tents I saw a series of letters to the Marines from someone named Colleen. I asked who Colleen was, and the Marines told me that she was a 7-year-old girl with cancer who took the time every day to write them and express her support for what they are doing. The Marines also wrote back to her to encourage her in her fight. And Colleen sent them a sign, made on her home computer, which said, "You are my heroes." Colleen's words are proudly displayed on their tent wall. Well, Colleen has it exactly right. Those men and women on duty in the Gulf are America's heroes. The President and I are proud of them--and I know you are, too. And let me assure you: Their morale is sky high, and they are ready! Of course, the main reason that morale among our troops is so high is because they know that the people at home overwhelmingly support them--and support their mission. The American people understand that Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait poses a long-term threat, not just to his neighbors but to the entire world. They know that over the past decade, Saddam Hussein has bankrupted his people to bankroll his army. They know that he has launched two wars of aggression, against Iran and against Kuwait, at the cost of some 1 million casualties. They know that he is acquiring a stockpile of chemical and biological agents and has used chemical weapons against both Iran and his own people. They know he has launched an intensive campaign to acquire nuclear weapons. And they know that unless he is stopped today, nuclear-armed Iraq will control the bulk of the world's energy supply tomorrow, thereby holding a gun to all our heads.
Saddam Fools No One
Saddam should make no mistake about it: the American people are not in the least bit naive about his intentions. They know that Saddam's ambitions are not confined to Kuwait. Rather, his goal is to dominate the Middle East as the leader of an aggressive superpower, armed to the teeth with weapons of mass destruction. The American people are equally clear about what's at stake in the Gulf: our long-term security, the future of the Middle East, and the nature of the post-Cold War world. They remember the Carter Doctrine--reinforced by Presidents Reagan and Bush--which warned that, "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." The American people know that if Saddam Hussein wins, all our friends in the middle East will be in grave danger. They know that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is the first crisis of the post-Cold War era. One way or another, it is bound to set a precedent, either on behalf of greater world order, or on behalf of greater chaos. If Saddam Hussein succeeds in his aggression, it is likely that his success will embolden other dictators to emulate his example. But if he fails--and believe me, he will fail--others will draw the lesson that might does not make right and that aggression will not be allowed to succeed. For all these reasons, the American people are prepared to use force, if they have to, should Saddam Hussein not get out of Kuwait. The American people support the goals laid out by President Bush at the start of this crisis, goals endorsed in 12 UN Security Council Resolutions. These goals are clear: The immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait; the security of American citizens; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; and a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. These are moral goals. These are legitimate goals. And these goals are not subject to negotiations. Of course, in every crisis, there are always some critics and armchair strategists who are convinced that they know better than the President--and the Gulf crisis is no exception. Today, these critics argue for patience. They say: "Wait a year or two, be patient, act with caution." Well, George Bush is a cautious man. And he has been patient. Our armed forces have been patient. That is why, despite the use of American hostages as human shields, despite the outrages against the people of Kuwait, despite Iraq's continued defiance of the world community, we have refrained, so far, from military action against Saddam Hussein. And that is why the President went the extra mile for peace last week by proposing that Secretary Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz meet in Geneva. I am pleased that meeting will be taking place tomorrow. We hope Secretary Baker's meeting will get the message across to Saddam Hussein: You must withdraw from Kuwait. Your withdrawal must be complete, immediate, and unconditional. There will be no negotiations over the terms of your withdrawal. There will be no linkage between your withdrawal and any other issues. There will be no reward for your aggression. Your only chance for a peaceful resolution of this conflict is to heed the call of the international community, as expressed in 12 UN Security Council Resolutions, and leave Kuwait now. I truly hope that tomorrow's meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Aziz helps Iraq understand the gravity of the situation and the determination of the entire world to undo its aggression. I truly hope that force can be averted. I truly hope that Saddam Hussein does not allow this last chance for peace to fail. The United Nations has given Saddam Hussein until January 15th to leave Kuwait. If he refuses, UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes UN member states to use "all necessary means" to achieve Iraq's unconditional withdrawal. We need to hold Saddam Hussein to this deadline. We will not permit him to manipulate the deadline or to try to extend it through offers to negotiate--when there is nothing to negotiate. Talking about patience will take the pressure off Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. It is only the probability of the imminent use of force against Saddam Hussein that may convince him to resolve the crisis peacefully by withdrawing from Kuwait.
Time for Patience Running Out
But in addition to keeping the pressure on Saddam Hussein, there are other reasons for not being excessively patient with Iraq. For at some point, the costs of prolonged patience outweigh the benefits. As the President argued in his radio address on Saturday, we are fast approaching that point. Consider the impact of prolonged patience on the people of Kuwait. A recent report by Amnesty International documents, in considerable detail, the ongoing agony of the Kuwaiti people. The report contains eye-witness accounts of how Iraqi forces have tortured and killed many hundreds of victims, taken several thousand prisoners, and left more than 300 premature babies to die after looting incubators from Kuwaiti hospitals. The report catalogs 38 methods of torture used by the Iraqi military. Iraqi forces have gouged out people's eyes, cut off their tongues and ears, shot people in the arms and legs, used electric shocks, and raped many victims. Moreover, the Amnesty International report notes that, "The massive scale of destruction and looting . . . suggests that such incidents were neither arbitrary nor isolated, but rather reflected a policy adopted by the government of Iraq." The Amnesty report was based on medical evidence and on in- depth interviews with more than 100 people from about a dozen countries. Its findings completely coincide with testimony given before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. As Congressman Tom Lantos, the Democratic co-chairman of the caucus, put it back in October: "In the 8-year history of the . . . caucus, we have never had the degree of ghoulish and nightmarish horror stories coming from totally credible eyewitnesses that we have had this time." It seems to me that those who advocate endless patience with Saddam Hussein should think long and hard about what Congressman Lantos and Amnesty International have said. And they should ask themselves a few simple questions: Is it moral to prolong the agony of the Kuwaiti people indefinitely? After all, brave Kuwaitis helped and sheltered Americans as they were being hunted down by Iraqis and put their own lives at risk by hiding many of our citizens in their homes. Is it right for Americans to stand by as Kuwaitis are being tortured and raped and brutalized? And would there even be a Kuwait left to save in a year or two years' time? Advocates of prolonged patience should also consider the impact of the crisis on nations such as Turkey, Egypt, and the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. These friends of ours, who are among the hardest hit by the economic impact of increased oil prices, are also the least able to afford it. With every day that the crisis is allowed to continue, their economic plight worsens and their hopes for a better future recede. Under these circumstances, is patience with Saddam Hussein a wise course of action? Is it a moral course of action? Or consider the effects of the Persian Gulf crisis on our own economy. Even though world oil prices have declined from their post-invasion peak, they are 40% to 50% higher than they were before the invasion. The resulting $1.5 billion per month added to our own oil import bills constitutes a "tax" on the American and world economies at a time of growing recessionary pressure. And, with the passage of time, the costs of maintaining American troops in the Gulf would mount. Or consider Iraq's drive for nuclear weapons, which Saddam Hussein plans to add to his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. As President Bush told American troops in Saudi Arabia during Thanksgiving, "Each day that passes brings Saddam Hussein 1 day closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal . . . And we do know this for sure: he has never possessed a weapon that he didn't use." Would indefinite patience with Iraq result in a world more vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by Saddam Hussein? And if so, would this be a worse course of action? Would this be a moral course of action? Or consider the effects of indefinite patience on Saddam Hussein's military ability. The longer we refrain from military action against Iraq, the more time Saddam Hussein has to tighten his grip on Kuwait. As President Bush said on Saturday, "Each day that passes, Saddam's forces also fortify and dig in deeper into Kuwait. We risk paying a high price in the most precious currency of all, human life, if we give Saddam more time to prepare for war . . . ." Thus, the longer we wait, the harder it may be to prevail if force must be used. Does not patience today risk greater American and allied casualties tomorrow? And if so, is this a wise course of action? A moral course of action? Or consider the impact of prolonged patience on the international coalition arrayed against Saddam Hussein. Today, we and our allies have more than 500,000 troops in the Persian Gulf. Twenty-eight nations have committed support to the allied effort, including 11 Moslem nations. But holding such a broadly based coalition together is not easy. And the internal situation of our partners could be tested. The presence of foreign troops might become a contentious issue. Can we really afford to give Saddam Hussein a lengthy breathing space--a pause he could exploit to undermine the embargo and break up the multinational coalition? We must remember that, rightly or wrongly, the world would attribute such patience--a lack of resolve. Unlimited patience with Saddam Hussein would, therefore, all too likely lead to appeasement of Saddam Hussein. This is unacceptable. Finally, advocates of endless patience should talk to our troops in the Gulf. When I spoke to those men and women a few days ago, their views came across loud and clear. They feel they have been patient. They want to get the job done and then come home to their loved ones. They don't look forward to spending the next couple of years waiting around in the Saudi desert while Congress debates what to do next. As the President has said, "This will not be another Vietnam."
Action Must Be Quick, Decisive
I am convinced that if force is necessary, it will be quick, massive, and decisive. President Bush knows full well the lessons of Vietnam. He knows that the policy of "gradual escalation" that we pursued in Southeast Asia turned out to be a recipe for stalemate. He knows that trying to fight "on the cheap" only results in higher costs over the long run. He knows that war is a terrible thing--but if we must use force, there can be no half measures: Either we go in to win quickly and decisively, or we shouldn't go in at all. The real question is: Have the President's critics learned the lessons of Vietnam? Aren't their recommendations for relying solely on sanctions yet another flawed attempt to deflate aggression "on the cheap"? Aren't their calls for endless patience a sure fire formula for getting us bogged down in the Gulf indefinitely? And aren't their arguments against the use of force an example of wishful thinking masquerading as statesmanship? When Secretary Baker meets Iraq's Foreign Minister [Tariq Aziz] tomorrow, he will call on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally. It is important that he be able to deliver this message as forcefully and convincingly as possible. Unfortunately, Saddam may still not believe that force is a credible option. He may have a difficult time understanding our political system. Democracy is by far the best political system ever created, but it is complex and, at times, messy. This is one of the messy moments. When a senator or congressman criticizes the President's policy, the media deem it newsworthy. Therefore, the critics have a direct line to Saddam Hussein, because, we are told, he is an avid watcher of CNN. Thus, when he sees our congressional critics getting world media coverage, the message to Saddam may well be that the President cannot and will not use force because the Congress will not let him. Let me set the record straight: unless Congress denies funds for Operation Desert Shield, as suggested by Democratic Majority Leader [Richard] Gephardt, Saddam Hussein should understand that his aggression will not stand. Saddam Hussein should understand that we will use force, if necessary, to expel him from Kuwait. Congress could help Saddam Hussein understand this. It could pass a favorable resolution in support of the UN resolutions. President Bush has today asked that Congress pass such a resolution. This would be helpful. On the other hand, Congress could choose to pass resolutions that would be harmful. Any resolution that suggested to Saddam Hussein that the threat of force is not credible would, in fact, undermine the chances for a peaceful solution. Simply put, it would take the pressure off Saddam Hussein to pull out now. Finally, Congress could do nothing, knowing full well that the President will act within constitutional guidelines, and that Congress will be consulted and informed of all important decisions. Thus, Congress has the following choices: To support the President, to dispute the President, or not to act at all. We hope the Congress will join the American people in supporting the President. What Congress must know is that the world watches and interprets every move it makes. This is our political system. If Congress supports the President, we may at this 11th hour be able to convince Saddam Hussein that the threat of force is not an idle one. I hope Saddam Hussein comes to understand this. If he does understand, I think he will withdraw his forces from Kuwait before January 15. But if he does not understand, then we and our partners will have to expel him from Kuwait. One way or another, I am certain that Saddam Hussein will yield: either to the force of logic, or the logic of force. Why am I so confident? Let me answer that question by reading you part of a letter I recently received. It's from Brian Scocchio, a sailor serving aboard the USS Saratoga: I have been away from home for 4 months now. I would very much like to get home as soon as possible, but not until Iraq has released Kuwait and we have removed Hussein's ability to use his army as an offensive weapon. . . . If this means fighting, and possibly giving up my life, then that is a small price to pay for ensuring that my children will grow up in a world that is safe from madmen like Hussein. I have never been in battle, and I know it is easy to say things when you may never have to back up your words, but I truly believe in what we are doing out here and that I will serve my country with honor. Please relay to Congress that everyone that I have talked to believes pretty much the same way that I do. We are ready to do whatever is necessary. These are the words of a brave and wise American. They complement the words of President Bush, who has pledged that "there will not be any murky ending. If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to win." These are difficult times. The President knows the gravity of the crisis. He has been patient, he is a cautious man--but he is more determined now than ever to achieve his objectives. The President wants peace more than anyone. He prays for peace. He has worked for peace. But if peace may be established only by the use of force, so be it. Let us as a nation, in this time of peril, support our President and support our brave men and women in the Persian Gulf. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

New Ambassador to Kuwait at a "Pivotal Juncture"

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks at the swearing-in ceremony of Edward W. Gnehm, Jr., US Ambassador to Kuwait; Washington, DC Date: Jan 3, 19911/3/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization, State Department [TEXT] Let me start by saying how pleased Susan [Baker, the Secretary's wife] and I are to welcome all of you to the State Department this morning to join with us in congratulating the Gnehm family on Skip's [Mr. Gnehm's] swearing-in as the next US Ambassador to Kuwait. A swearing-in is always an occasion, I think, to recognize and to celebrate achievement, and it's certainly so in this case. Skip Gnehm is one of our most distinguished and dedicated Foreign Service officers with extensive experience in the Middle East, in general, and the Arabian Peninsula, in particular. If there was ever a man who was made for this pivotal juncture in US-Kuwaiti relations, the President and I believe it's Skip Gnehm. Skip was the right choice 5 months ago before the current crisis began when he was named Ambassador-designate, and we know Skip will do a tremendous job of running our embassy when, I'm confident, in the not-too-far-distant future, American personnel will once again have the privilege of serving in a free Kuwait. By swearing in Skip Gnehm today, America renews its pledge to the Kuwaiti people and to the future of their besieged yet unbowed nation that Iraq's aggression will not stand. Kuwait will re-emerge from the horrors of occupation. Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place among the world community of sovereign nations, and Kuwait will endure and live to see many bright days ahead. The dark days, though, of Iraq's cruel occupation are numbered. January 15 looms before us and before Saddam Hussein, the date which the international community declared in UN Security Council Resolution 678 its willingness to use all necessary means if Iraq did not peacefully withdraw from Kuwait. Despite Saddam's cynical efforts to delay the day of reckoning and to divert world attention from the true cause of the Gulf crisis, the civilized world agrees that his brutal occupation of Kuwait is neither legitimate nor justified. As the President's announcement this morning again demonstrates, I think, that we are prepared to go the last mile to achieve a peaceful Iraqi withdrawal. We hope that Iraq will respond positively to our new offer for me to meet with [Iraqi] Foreign Minister Aziz next week in Europe. But as the President and our coalition partners have stated before, I think with stark clarity, we do remain prepared to act upon the expressed will of the world community. Iraq must now choose to quit the soil of its peaceful neighbor or risk devastating consequences. And so as January 15 approaches, we are closer and closer to restoring Kuwait's sovereignty, whether by peace or whether by force. But Kuwait's sovereignty is going to be restored. And when it is, Skip and his embassy will face the awesome challenge of helping to rebuild a liberated land. There is no one, I don't think, better prepared to meet that challenge. Beginning with the early days of the invasion when the legitimate government of Kuwait was reconstituted in Saudi Arabia, and Ambassador [Nathaniel] Howell and his intrepid staff on the embassy compound in Kuwait were surrounded by--and I should add, harassed by--Iraqi troops, Skip began a grueling regime of travel between the Gulf and Washington. His task was to sustain US- Kuwaiti bilateral relations at a time of unprecedented crisis in the entire Gulf region. Skip drew upon a lifetime of professional experience in the Middle East, and he drew great strength from the stalwart support of members of his family, who are no strangers to the demands, risks, separations, and sacrifices of a Foreign Service life. So, Skip, you have been a consummate representative of the American people to Kuwait at its time of trial. In these months of tragedy, you have stood with the Kuwaiti people, and you have stood with their government. So, too, I think will you stand with them at their time of triumph. So it's not "if" but rather "when" you arrive at your new post--and I have every confidence that it will be soon-- I want you to be sure and send me the traditional snapshot that you mail home to your relatives. You know, the one with our embassy folks in the compound and their ambassador standing there by them proudly with Old Glory waving above your head. So, Skip, you have the President's and my congratulations. You have our strongest support, as I think you know. Welcome aboard.
Edward W. Gnehm, Jr., the new US Ambassador to Kuwait, most recently was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, where he was responsible for coordinating US foreign policy for the Arabian Peninsula and for Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. He also was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Ambassador Gnehm, a career Foreign Service officer, served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Amman, Jordan, and in Sanaa, Yemen. In 1976, he opened the US Liaison Office in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and was among the first group of American diplomats to reopen the US mission in Damascus, Syria, in 1974. He also has served in Lebanon, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Nepal.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Gulf Crisis Update

Date: Jan 14, 19911/14/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Following is an overview of US objectives in the Persian Gulf crisis based on statements by President Bush and Secretary Baker and actions of the UN Security Council. It will be updated periodically.
International Response
-- For only the second time in its history, and for the first time with the Soviet Union's support, the United Nations formally has authorized the use of force against an aggressor nation. -- As Secretary Baker reiterated on January 9, 1991, the path of peace remains open and is very clearly laid out in 12 UN Security Council resolutions adopted over a period of more than 5 months. These resolutions demand that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait, establish an economic embargo backed by force, and authorize the use of all necessary means to expel Iraq from Kuwait if the Iraqis have not withdrawn by January 15, 1991. -- Specifically, UN Security Council Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, authorizes "member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait" to use "all necessary means" to uphold these resolutions, while giving Iraq "one final opportunity, as a pause of good will" to abide by the resolutions by January 15, 1991. Going the Extra Mile for Peace -- The President invited Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to meet with him between December 20 and January 3. The President also suggested that Secretary Baker meet with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad during that period. The Iraqis failed to agree to the offer. -- On January 3, 1991, the President stated that he was "ready to make one last attempt to go the extra mile for peace." Therefore, Secretary Baker met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in Switzerland on January 9 while traveling in Europe and the Gulf for consultations with coalition partners. -- On January 9, Secretary Baker assured Foreign Minister Aziz that if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait and permits the restoration of its legitimate government, there would be no military action by the United States. He further stated that he felt that there would, under those circumstances, be no military action by any other elements of the international coalition. -- Regrettably, Secretary Baker heard nothing that suggested any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with the UN Security Council resolutions. -- UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar made an 11th hour visit to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein on January 13, but his efforts were rejected. Secretary Baker called this "one more act of defiance of the rest of the world" by the Iraqi leader.
The Coalition: Sharing Responsibility
-- The US has incurred additional costs for its military effort in the Gulf. Allies are supporting this effort with both cash and material supplies. -- As President Bush has stated: "There has never been a clearer demonstration of a world united against appeasement and aggression." Military forces from 28 countries and economic assistance from more than 50 states have been mobilized in the Persian Gulf to underscore the shared resolve that Saddam Hussein's aggression must not stand. -- By the end of 1990, our partners in the coalition have contributed about 245,000 troops to the Gulf region. -- In the last 3 months of 1990, 26 nations comprising the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group pledged $13.5 billion in economic aid to the "front-line states" of Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, and other affected states. Efforts to address the needs of these nations, including the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, will continue. -- Up to November 1990, the international community contributed more than $320 million in humanitarian aid to assist those people displaced from Iraq and Kuwait as a result of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.
US Objectives Since August 1990
-- Immediate implementation of all relevant UN Security Council resolutions; -- Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; -- Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; -- Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; -- Protection of American citizens held hostage by Iraq, both in Iraq and Kuwait.
The Stakes
-- Iraq's aggression against Kuwait threatens regional security and world peace. It challenges the vision of a better world in the aftermath of the Cold War. As Presidents Bush and Gorbachev stated: "No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors." -- Iraq has invaded two neighbors, harbors terrorists, and now is systematically exterminating Kuwait. Saddam Hussein uses poisonous gas, brandishes deadly toxins, and relentlessly tries to acquire nuclear bombs. He has built the world's sixth largest army and the fourth largest tank army and has deployed ballistic missiles. -- Iraq's aggression threatens the global economy. If it is allowed to sit astride the world's economic lifeline, everyone will suffer profound setbacks to economic growth. -- The United States and the international community must stand with the people of Kuwait so that the annexation of Kuwait does not become the first reality that mars our vision of a new world order.
-- After more than 4 months of a stringent embargo, sanctions are having some effect on the Iraqi economy, but sanctions alone cannot impose a high enough cost on Saddam Hussein to force him to withdraw. -- Success is not measured by adverse economic impact on Iraq; success is Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. -- Saddam Hussein believes that he can endure economic sanctions. He will continue to impose economic sacrifices on the Iraqi people to support his army and ambitions. -- Waiting for sanctions to work imposes enormous costs and increases the chances that Hussein can overcome them. He will continue to grind up Kuwait, to fortify it, to build chemical and biological weapons, to acquire nuclear capability, and to generate other issues aimed at dissolving the coalition arrayed against him. -- Full support for Operation Desert Shield will make credible our offensive option to liberate Kuwait. Military preparations: 1) Increase our diplomatic leverage; 2) Demonstrate that we will not tolerate the status quo and legitimize to some extent Iraq's brutal occupation of Kuwait; 3) Reduce the risk of incurring greater casualties, should conflict occur.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Sudan Releases Terrorists

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 8, 19911/8/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Sudan Subject: Terrorism [TEXT]
Statement: Sudanese Acropole Terrorists Freed January 8, 1991
Five terrorists convicted of the 1988 attacks on the Acropole Hotel and the Sudan Club in Khartoum, Sudan, which killed seven people, including two children, were released yesterday by the Sudanese Supreme Court. Four British nationals were among those killed, and three Americans were injured in the attacks. The five terrorists are members of the Abu Nidal Organization, one of the world's most notorious terrorist groups. According to news reports, one of the terrorists said he "would do it again, elsewhere. . ." We take this statement very seriously, especially since the Abu Nidal Organization has aligned itself with Iraq. The release of these convicted terrorists is reprehensible, serving less than a 3-year prison term is not suitable punishment for the terrorist murder of seven people. Their grossly premature release is an insult to those whom they murdered and to their families.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Dissident Trails in China

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 9, 19911/9/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia Country: China Subject: Human Rights [TEXT]
Statement: Dissident Trials in China January 9, 1991
We are deeply concerned over the news of the conviction and sentencing in the People's Republic of China of seven persons who, as far as we know, were guilty of nothing other than the peaceful advocacy of democracy. We are concerned that these persons were apparently charged, tried, and convicted for actions which, under the [UN] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, any person should be allowed to take without fear of punishment. We are concerned about the secretive process under which the trials were conducted, which raises serious questions about whether they were afforded the opportunity of even-handed justice as provided for in the Universal Declaration. Finally, we are concerned over the length of the prison sentences. No sentence of any length on purely political charges can be characterized as lenient. The American people feel nothing other than friendship toward the Chinese people. That is why the American public is greatly concerned about the fate of those who exercised internationally recognized rights. That is why we sincerely hope that the facts behind the sentences which were handed down last week will be fully explained, and anyone convicted solely for the exercise of their right to express peacefully their views will be released. We hope that the other political prisoners now held for non-violent activities protected by the Universal Declaration will be released without having to stand trial.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Diplomatic Activities: 1989-Present

Date: Jan 14, 19911/14/91 Category: Fact Sheets Subject: State Department
Secretary of State Baker's Diplomatic Activities: 1989-Present
Contacts With Foreign Dignitaries
Bilaterals/Meetings/Events (1991) 35 (1990) 584 (1989) 416
Congressional Testimony
(1991) -- (1990) 16 (1989) 12
International Flights
Miles (1991) 18,240 (1990) 208,069 (1989) 42,923 In the air (1991) 37 hrs (1990) 403 hrs (1989) 307 hrs Longest flight was 7 hours 30 minutes (Shannon to Manama Nov. 3, 1990)(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Current US Treaty Actions December 1990

Date: Dec 30, 199012/30/90 Category: Treaties/Agreements Country: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom Subject: Environment, Science/Technology, Media/Telecommunications, Immigration, International Law, International Organizations, Refugees, Trade/Economics, Terrorism
Convention on the inter-American institute for cooperation on agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 8, 1980. TIAS 9919. Ratification deposited: St. Kitts and Nevis, July 27, 1990.
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Buenos Aires Sept. 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. Adherence deposited: Belize, Dec. 7, 1990.
Convention on wetlands of international importance especially as waterfowl habitat. Done at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. Entered into force Dec. 21, 1975; for the US Dec. 18, 1986. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 99-28. Accessions deposited: Chad, June 13, 1990; Ecuador, Sept. 7, 1990; Guatemala, June 26, 1990; Guinea Bissau, May 14, 1990; Kenya, June 5, 1990; Sri Lanka, June 15, 1990.
Convention establishing a customs cooperation council, with annex. Done at Brussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1952; for the US Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. Accession deposited: Angola, Sept. 26, 1990.
Convention for the establishment of an inter-American tropical tuna commission. Signed at Washington May 31, 1949. Entered into force Mar. 3, 1950. TIAS 2044. Notification of adherence: Vanuatu, Sept. 10, 1990.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the US July 1, 1988. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 99-11. Signature: Ireland, May 23, 1990. Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, June 12, 1990.1,2
Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22, 1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 99-9. Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1989. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 100-10. Accession deposited: Bulgaria, Nov. 20, 1990. Protocol to the 1979 convention on long-range transboundary air pollution (TIAS 10541) concerning the control of emissions of nitrogen oxides or their trans-boundary flukes, with annex. Done at Sofia Oct. 31, 1988. Enters into force Feb. 14, 1991. Ratification deposited: Spain, Dec. 4, 1990.
Red Cross
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.3 Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (protocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.3 Ratifications deposited: Ukrainian Soviet SSR, Jan. 25, 1990;4 Czechoslovakia, Feb. 14, 1990; Yemen Arab Republic, Apr. 17, 1990. Accession deposited: Barbados, Feb. 19, 1990.
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the US Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577. Accession deposited: Belize, June 27, 1990.
Satellite Communications Systems
Convention on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. Accession deposited: Monaco, Oct. 1, 1990; Romania, Yugoslavia, Sept. 27, 1990. Ratification deposited: Cameroon, Oct. 23, 1990. Operating agreement on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. Signatures: Monaco, Oct. 1, 1990; Romania, Yugoslavia, Sept. 27, 1990.
International sugar agreement, 1987, with annexes. Done at London Sept. 11, 1987. Entered into force provisionally Mar. 24, 1988. Accession deposited: Switzerland, Nov. 20, 1990.
International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the US Jan. 6, 1985. Accession deposited: Grenada, Dec. 10, 1990.
International tropical timber agreement, 1983, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 18, 1983. Entered into force provisionally Apr. 1, 1985; for the US Apr. 26, 1985. Accession deposited: Nepal, July 3, 1990; Zaire, Nov. 20, 1990.
United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262] Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Dec. 13, 1990.
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with attachments. Signed at Buenos Aires Dec. 4, 1990. Enters into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.
Memorandum of understanding concerning environmental cooperation. Signed at Washington Nov. 16, 1990. Entered into force Nov. 16, 1990.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of forestry-related programs. Signed at Washington May 17, 1990. Entered into force May 17, 1990. Agreement extending the agreement of Oct. 28 and Dec. 5, 1980, relating to coordination between the United States and Canadian Coast Guards of icebreaking operations in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway system (TIAS 9950; 32 UST 4334). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 4, 1990. Entered into force Dec. 5, 1990.
Hong Kong
Agreement concerning the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumentalities of drug trafficking. Signed at Hong Kong Nov. 23, 1990. Enters into force on the date on which the parties have notified each other in writing that their respective requirements have been complied with.
Agreement concerning the free pursuit of gainful employment by dependents of employees of diplomatic missions, consular posts, or missions to international organizations, with exchange of notes. Signed at Madrid July 25, 1990. Entered into force provisionally July 25, 1990; definitively, when each party has notified the other of the fulfillment of its internal requirements.
Air transport agreement, with annexes. Signed at Washington on Nov. 7, 1990. Enters into force after fulfillment of the constitutional requirements by each party, on the date of an exchange of notes.
United Kingdom
Agreement extending the agreement of May 14, 1987, as extended concerning Montserrat and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 29, 1990. Entered into force Nov. 29, 1990; effective Dec. 1, 1990. Agreement amending the memorandum of understanding of Oct. 5 and 11, 1984, concerning the provision of mutual logistic support, supplies, and services. Signed at London and Stuttgart-Vaihingen June 29 and Aug. 9, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 9, 1990. 1 With reservations. 2 Applicable to the Kingdom in Europe. 3 Not in force for US. 4 With declaration to protocol I.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991 Title:

Ambassadorial Appointments October-December 1990

Date: Dec 30, 199012/30/90 Category: Ambassadorial Appointments Country: Belize, Burkina Faso, Cyprus, Gambia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mali, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia Subject: State Department Barbados (also to Dominica, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)-G. Philip Hughes, October 30, 1990 Belize--Eugene L. Scassa, October 22, 1990 Burkina Faso--Edward P. Brynn, October 22, 1990 Cyprus--Robert E. Lamb, October 30, 1990 Gambia--Arlene Render, October 22, 1990 Lebanon--Ryan Clark Crocker, October 30, 1990 Lesotho--Leonard H.O. Spearman Sr., October 22, 1990 Mali--Herbert Donald Gelber, October 22, 1990 Rwanda--Robert A. Flaten, October 30, 1990 Suriname--John P. Leonard, October 30, 1990 Swaziland--Stephen H. Rogers, October 22, 1990 Togo--Harmon Elwood Kirby, October 22, 1990 Uruguay--Richard C. Brown, October 22, 1990 Venezuela--Michael Martin Skol, October 22, 1990 (###)