US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Situation in the Baltic States
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpts from remarks by the President and
question-and- answer session upon his return from Camp David;
Washington, DC
Date: Jan 13, 19911/13/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, USSR (former)
Subject: Military Affairs, Regional/Civil Unrest,
Human Rights, Democratization
[TEXT]
I have been following the situation in Lithuania and the other Baltic
states closely. The turn of events there is deeply disturbing. There
is no justification for the use of force against peaceful and
democratically elected governments. And the brave people and the
leaders of the Baltic states have, indeed, acted with dignity and
restraint. The thoughts and prayers of the people of the United
States are with them, and particularly with the Lithuanian people
who have experienced a great tragedy.
For several years now, the Soviet Union has been on a course
of democratic and peaceful change. And we've supported that effort
and stated repeatedly how much we admire the Soviet leaders who
chose that path. Indeed, change in the Soviet Union has helped to
create a basis for unprecedented cooperation and partnership
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The events that we're witnessing now are completely
inconsistent with that course. The progress of reform in the USSR
has been an essential element in the improvement of
US-Soviet relations. Events like those now taking place in the
Baltic states threaten to set back or perhaps even reverse the
process of reform which is so important in the world and the
development of the new international order.
We condemn these acts, which could not help but affect our
relationship. At this hour, the United States and the West will
redouble our efforts to strengthen and encourage peaceful change in
the Soviet Union. Legitimacy is not built by force; it's earned by the
consensus of the people, by openness, and by the protection of basic
human and political rights. So I ask the Soviet leaders to refrain
from further acts that might lead to more violence and loss of life.
I urge the Soviet government to return to a peaceful course of
negotiations and dialogue with the legitimate governments of the
Baltic states.
And I did have an opportunity when I talked to President
Gorbachev not so many hours ago to encourage the peaceful change
there and not the use of force.
Q: Mr. President, was Gorbachev directly behind this military
crackdown? Is there any reason to believe the military acted
without complete presidential decree on this?
A: I cannot answer that question. I just don't know the facts
of--
Q. Is there any official explanation for what happened in
Lithuania?
A: Not an official explanation, but we have a good deal of
information on it.
Q. And what about the fallout here? Is the summit off at this
point?
A: Well, I've just expressed this statement here, and I just
expressed my sentiments in this statement I made, so I can't go
beyond that.
Q: And consideration of export credit guarantees or any other-
-
A: I'm just not going to go further than what I've said here.
I've just laid it out, and people can interpret it any way they want. .
. .
Q: Mr. President, if the crackdown continues in the Baltics,
will you go to Moscow on February 11th?
A: Well, I would simply--that's too hypothetical. What I'm
saying is I hope the crackdown will not continue.
Q: Sir, did you get assurances from Mr. Gorbachev about
whether he will continue or halt the--assurances about what he
will do next?
A: Well, I heard a statement I was just asking our Soviet
experts about in here where he was talking about curtailing the use
of force. I hope that's true, but I did not get direct affirmation
from them. . . .
Q: Mr. President, do you think that the Soviet Union is striking
out on Lithuania at this moment because they think our attention
and the attention of the world has been diverted by the Persian Gulf
crisis?
A: No.
Q: Are you concerned that by speaking out now that you may
jeopardize your support from Mr. Gorbachev in the Persian Gulf
crisis?
A: No, I believe the Soviet support for the UN approach is
solid and firm. And President Gorbachev told me that not so long
ago--just when I had the last conversation. . . .
Q: Mr. President, you remonstrated with Gorbachev last week
not to use force in the Baltics, and just yesterday Gorbachev said he
was sending emissaries from his Federation Council to mediate. A
few hours later the tanks were rolling. Are you afraid that he has
lost control in the Soviet Union?
A: Well, I am concerned about the internal affairs there, and
he, himself, is very much concerned about that. But let's hope that
there will be a peaceful--a return to peace, no more use of force,
and that they can peacefully negotiate their differences. That's
what I hope for. I think that's what President Gorbachev--I know
that's what he told me he wanted before, and I hope that still holds,
and I hope that will obtain. But I am very much concerned about the
loss of life there. . . .
Q: Mr. President, do you plan on trying to contact him
directly?
A: I always have that option. Our phone lines are open, and I
have no immediate plans of that, but I wouldn't rule that out. . . .
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: USSR Forces in the Baltics (box)
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan 8, 19911/8/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova,
Armenia, Georgia
Subject: Military Affairs
[TEXT]
The United States is monitoring carefully the Soviet government's
decision to send additional military forces to Moldavia, the Ukraine,
Georgia, Armenia, and the three Baltic states--Latvia, Lithuania,
and Estonia. This action represents a serious step toward an
escalation of tension within the USSR and makes the peaceful
evolution of relations among the peoples of the Soviet Union more
difficult.
The United States is especially concerned that the Soviet
decision to send military units into the Baltic states, which we
view as provocative and counterproductive, could damage the
prospects for peaceful and constructive negotiations on the future
of those states. The United States urges the USSR to cease
attempts at intimidation and turn back to negotiations that are
conducted free of pressure and the use of force.
The United States, which has never recognized the forcible
incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, supports
the aspirations of the Baltic people to control and determine their
own future. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Crisis in the Gulf
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Remarks at a White House news conference; Washington,
DC
Date: Jan 12, 19911/12/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
First, let me just say that I am gratified by the vote in the Congress
supporting the UN Security Council resolutions. This action by the
Congress unmistakably demonstrates the US commitment to the
international demand for a complete and unconditional withdrawal
of Iraq from Kuwait. This clear expression of the Congress
represents the last, best chance for peace.
As a democracy, we've debated this issue openly and in good
faith. And as President, I have held extensive consultation with the
Congress. We've now closed ranks behind a clear signal of our
determination and our resolve to implement the UN resolutions.
Those who may have mistaken our democratic process as a sign of
weakness now see the strength of democracy. And this sends the
clearest message to Iraq that it cannot scorn the January 15th
deadline.
Throughout our history we've been resolute in our support of
justice, freedom, and human dignity. The current situation in the
Persian Gulf demands no less of us and of the international
community. We did not plan for war, nor do we seek war. But if
conflict is thrust upon us we are ready and we are determined.
We've worked long and hard, as have others, including the Arab
League, the United Nations, the European Community, to achieve a
peaceful solution. Unfortunately, Iraq has thus far turned a deaf ear
to the voices of peace and reason.
Let there be no mistake: Peace is everyone's goal. Peace is in
everyone's prayers. But it is for Iraq to decide.
Q: Mr. President, does this mean now that war is inevitable--
A: No--
Q: --and have you made the decision in your own mind?
A: I have not because I still hope--hope--that there will be a
peaceful solution.
Q: Mr. President, there's only 3 days left until the deadline,
which isn't enough time for Saddam Hussein to pull out his troops.
In fact, you, yourself, wouldn't let [Secretary of State] Jim Baker go
to Baghdad on this date because there wouldn't be enough time. Do
you see the possibility of anything happening in these last few days
that could avert war or any chance that he will pull his troops out?
A: In terms of the chance, I'd have to say I don't know. And in
terms of what could avert war, you might say an instant
commencement of a large-scale removal of troops with no
condition, no concession, and just heading out could well be the best
and only way to avert war, even though it would be, at this date, I
would say, almost impossible to comply fully with the UN
resolutions.
Q: Have you heard from the UN Secretary General Perez de
Cuellar today, and is there any hope on that front?
A: No--well, I don't know whether there is hope on it, because
I haven't heard from him today.
Q: Are you satisfied that countries in the international
coalition like France, Syria, and Egypt will take part in offensive
operations in the event of hostilities in the Gulf?
A: Yes.
Q: The second part of that question: you've said that if
hostilities come, it will not be another Vietnam. What kind of
assumptions are you making about the duration of a conflict, and
can you assure the American people that hostilities would not
expand beyond the current theater of operations?
A: I am not making any assumptions in terms of numbers of
days, but I have said over and over again that the differences
between what is happening in the Gulf and what happened in
Vietnam are enormous in terms of the coalition aligned against the
Iraqis, in terms of the demographics, in terms of the UN action, and
I am convinced in terms of the force that is arrayed against Iraq.
So I just don't think there is a parallel.
But I would like to say that I have gone over all of this with
our Secretary of Defense and with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
and all three of us, and everybody else involved in this, are
determined to keep casualties to an absolute minimum. And that's
one of the reasons that I authorized [Defense] Secretary Cheney to
move the additional force several weeks ago.
Q: What about firebreaks to keep the war from expanding?
A: I don't worry too much about the war expanding. I have
said very clearly, and I'd like to repeat it here, that we will hold
Saddam Hussein directly responsible for any terrorist action that is
taken against US citizens, against citizens of others in the
coalition. So I must confess to some concern about terrorism. It's
not just that it relates to this crisis because I've always felt that
way. But if it is related to the crisis, if the terrorists' acts are
related to it, Saddam Hussein will be held directly responsible for
that, and the consequences will be on him.
Q: The pendulum of hope has swung back and forth, and you,
yourself, have said you didn't hold out tremendous hope for the last-
minute diplomatic efforts. What do you do on midnight on January
15th?
A: I can't tell you I know on midnight, but I do feel that the
action taken by the US Congress today is a very important step in,
hopefully, getting Saddam Hussein to realize what he's up against--
the determination of the American people. I have felt that the
support is there from the people, but I think now with the Congress,
the representatives of the people on record, it makes it much, much
clearer to Saddam Hussein.
Q: The polls have shown people's support moving fairly
quickly after the 15th. Would that be your intention?
A: I have said--and without trying to pin it down or in any
sense go beyond what I'm about to say, sooner rather than later.
And I got into a discussion--I know that's perhaps not of much help,
but I think the worst thing you'd want to do is, if a determination
was made to use force, to signal when you might be inclined to act.
That would, in my view, put the lives of coalition forces needlessly
at risk.
Q: I'm sure you're doing all these scenarios that are coming
out, the various peace scenarios. One has it that Saddam Hussein
will wait until after the 15th--we get into this face-saving again-
-wait until the 16th or the 17th possibly and then start to
withdraw, say, "Look, I stood up to George Bush, but I'm willing in
order to avoid war to pull my troops out now." Is that the type of
thing that would go into your calculations? Would that be
important to you? Would you say, well, let's give the guy a couple
of days and see if, indeed, that scenario is true?
A: I don't want to give any indication to Saddam Hussein that
we will be interested in anything that looks like delay or trying to
claim victory. It isn't a question of winning or losing. It's a
question of his getting out of Kuwait rapidly without concession.
And so I can't--I'd have to know a lot more about the situation, the
scenario, as you say, before I could give you a more definitive
response.
But I don't want anything here to be interpreted by him as
flexibility on our part. We have not been flexible. We have been
determined, and we are still determined to see that this is--that he
is--complies fully with the resolutions. Now, Rita raised the
question, is it logistically possible to fully comply? At this
moment, I'm not sure that you could--logistically possibly to fully
comply. But if he started now to do that what he should have done
weeks ago, clearly, that would make a difference. And I'm talking
about a rapid, massive withdrawal from Kuwait. But I still worry
about it, because it might not be in full compliance. So the
standard--full compliance with all these resolutions-- now, some
can't be complied with fully before the 15th. One of them relates to
reparations. And reparations are a very important part of this. It's
a very important part of what the United Nations has done. So I
don't think the whole question of reparations can be resolved before
the 15th.
Q: Can you explain why sooner is better than later?
A: Yes, because I think it's--well, that's been a major part of
the debate on the Hill. And I think it is very important that he
knows that the United States and the United Nations are credible. I
don't want to see further economic damage done to Third World
economies or to this economy. I don't want to see further
devastation done to Kuwait. This question of when was debated in
the United Nations, and these countries came down saying this is
the deadline. And I don't want to veer off from that for one single
iota. And I certainly don't want to indicate that the United States
will not do its part in the coalition to fulfill these resolutions. . . .
Q: Let me follow Jerry's question, because the reports persist
that the UN Secretary General, when he meets with Saddam Hussein,
will lay out steps beyond compliance with the resolutions to
include a UN peacekeeping force, to include an eventual Mideast
peace conference. Given the demand for absolute compliance, are
those within the Secretary General's mandate to advance further
steps?
A: What were the two?
Q: Two of several that are out there are a UN peacekeeping
force, also a timetable for your withdrawal, and then a Mideast
peace conference.
A: My view is that a withdrawal to the status quo ante is not
satisfactory and thus there will have to be a peacekeeping force of
some kind. In other words, we just can't--Saddam Hussein will not
simply be able to go back to square one if he started that today.
There would have to be further compliance with other resolutions
and there would have to be a peacekeeping force. Secondly, I have
said I don't want US ground forces to stay there a day longer than
necessary. So I am not troubled with that.
On the other question, I simply want to see us avoid what is
known as linkage. And I think the American people more clearly see
now what I mean by linkage because they watched the Aziz press
conference where the whole question was shifting--trying to shift
the onus away from the aggression and brutality against Kuwait and
move it over and try to put the blame on Israel or try to shift the
onus to the Palestinian question.
So we have, along with the United Nations--other participants
in the UN Security Council process, have avoided linkage. And so I
think--I guess I'd say it depends how it is put forward. I, myself, at
the United Nations when I presented the US position this fall, spoke
up against--eventually wanting to see this question solved. And,
indeed, everyone knows that Jim Baker tried very hard to have us be
catalytic in bringing that age-old question to solution.
So I think it's--I just think whatever is done, it has to be done
in a way to preserve the US position that there be no linkage. . .
.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Crisis in the Gulf
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks made to US troops during a visit to Saudi
Arabia
Date: Jan 11, 19911/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
I wanted to drop by to see you to thank you once again for what you
are doing for your country. I wanted to let you know that we will
continue to do all that we can to ensure that you come home safely
and peacefully. We hope and pray that this will be possible, that
Saddam Hussein will choose the path of peace and withdraw from
Kuwait in fulfillment of the UN [Security Council] resolutions.
Time is running out, but the path to peace remains open. There
is still time for Iraq to walk that path. In Geneva, I made clear to
Foreign Minister [Tariq] Aziz that should Iraq withdraw from
Kuwait, the United States would not attack Iraq or its forces. Nor
do we have any intention of maintaining a permanent ground
presence in this region once Iraq withdraws and the threat recedes.
Moreover, I reiterated our commitment to the Security
Council's call for Kuwait and Iraq to negotiate their differences
peacefully.
Regrettably, the Iraqi leadership has yet to show any
inclination whatsoever to follow the path of peace. They can still
choose peace and avert disaster. But the choice is theirs and theirs
alone.
But even as we hope, and we pray, and we work for peace,
America (and all the other nations of the international coalition)
must be prepared for a conflict that we do not seek but from which
we shall not shrink.
You are here, carrying out your mission with integrity and
courage, for one straightforward reason: We face a clear danger to
the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and the world. A
very dangerous dictator--armed to the teeth--is threatening this
critical region at a defining moment in history. He must be stopped
now--peacefully if possible but if necessary by force.
If he is stopped, if his aggression is undone, then together we
can all usher in a new era--a time for peace among nations. But if
we fail now, we will all surely pay later--as Saddam's ambitions
and conquests grow, and the world's will to resist aggression
weakens.
That's why, when I talked to you in September, I told you
there's a very important principle at stake: Unprovoked aggression
cannot be allowed to pay. The events of the last 4 months only
underscore how important that principle truly is.
And when I talked to you 4 months ago, some of you told me
that you wereready. But you also asked how long before you would
know whether you would be called into action to undo this terrible
aggression.
Now as the clock ticks down to midnight January 15, I cannot
give you a definitive answer. But I can tell you that you will not
have to wait much longer for an answer to that question.
The fact is that you are here and ready to stand fast for what
is good and right and for what, in the long term, is the only sure
guarantee of peace. Your presence here and your preparedness offer
the only real chance that a peaceful solution will come at the very
last moment.
As I said in Geneva, there have been too many Iraqi
miscalculations. And we fear another miscalculation, a truly
tragic one.
We believe that if Iraq is going to withdraw from Kuwait,
Saddam Hussein will probably wait until he is on the very brink
before he moves. And our worry is that in his usual style, he will
miscalculate where the brink exactly is.
Just so there is no misunderstanding, let me be absolutely
clear: We pass the brink at midnight, January 15.
Since November 30, the international community, through
Security Council Resolution 678, has made clear that January 15 is
a serious deadline. It is real. Efforts to extend it or postpone it
will not succeed. Saddam can believe that or not, but if he doesn't
he will have made his most tragic miscalculation.
In closing, I want you to know that if you are called into
action, I know you will complete your mission--bravely, honorably,
and successfully. And if you are called into action, I know you will
make your nation proud: you are the combat crews who will join in
the liberation of Kuwait. You are the fighting men and women who
will return to America with honor and dignity and the respect of a
grateful nation and a grateful world.
For you stand precisely where America has stood when she has
stood proudest: You stand against aggression, and you stand for
peace. You serve on the front lines of freedom for occupied Kuwait,
and you serve on the frontier of promise for a new world order--a
world based on peace among the nations, not on aggression and
contempt for civilized conduct.
The President thanks you, I thank you, and the American people
thank you for your commitment, your courage, and your service to
the nation. You are fulfilling a solemn duty for which you have the
unending gratitude of the American people. What you are doing will
never be forgotten.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Crisis in the Gulf
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks prior to meeting with the Kuwaiti Amir in Taif,
Saudi Arabia.
Date: Jan 11, 19911/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
Q: Mr. Baker, could I just ask you what your feelings are about the
proposals to send the UN force into Kuwait, the Perez de Cuellar plan?
Secretary Baker: You know we have been talking for quite
some time about the importance of considering security structures
in the aftermath of a resolution of this crisis. After an Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait--if there is a peaceful withdrawal--it
would be appropriate, I think, to give consideration to how security
will be maintained, and there's no reason why one part of that
consideration should not be consideration of a possible UN
peacekeeping force.
I also believe, though, that the states in the region are going
to have to make the greatest contribution to the security of the
region and must be in the forefront of the formation of the regional
security structure. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Crisis in the Gulf
Jabir
Source: Kuwaiti Amir Shaikh Jabir
Description: Remarks prior to meeting with Secretary Baker in Taif,
Saudi Arabia
Date: Jan 11, 19911/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
Q: Does your Majesty feel that there is any further chance for
peace, or is it now definitely war?
Shaikh Jabir: (Interpreted) If there's a chance for peace, we
welcome peace. And then we would have complete withdrawal and
the acceptance of the UN resolutions.
But if the call for peace will be rejected, there will be no
other way unless leaving by force.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Crisis in the Gulf
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpts from a White House news conference;
Washington, DC
Date: Jan 9, 19911/9/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
I have spoken with Secretary of State Jim Baker, who reported to
me on his nearly 7 hours of conversation with Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz. Secretary Baker made it clear that he discerned no
evidence whatsoever that Iraq was willing to comply with the
international community's demand to withdraw from Kuwait and
comply with the UN resolutions.
Secretary Baker also reported to me that the Iraqi Foreign
Minister rejected my letter to Saddam Hussein --refused to carry
this letter and give it to the President of Iraq. [See text of letter
in this Dispatch]. The Iraqi Ambassador here in Washington did the
same thing. This is but one more example that the Iraqi government is
not interested in direct communications designed to settle the
Persian Gulf situation.
The record shows that whether the diplomacy is initiated by
the United States, the United Nations, the Arab league, or the
European Community, the results are the same, unfortunately. The
conclusion is clear: Saddam Hussein continues to reject a
diplomatic solution.
I sent Secretary Jim Baker to Geneva not to negotiate but to
communicate. And I wanted Iraqi leaders to know just how
determined we are that the Iraqi forces leave Kuwait without
condition or further delay. Secretary Baker made clear that by its
full compliance with the 12 relevant UN Security Council
resolutions, Iraq would gain the opportunity to rejoin the
international community. And he also made clear how much Iraq
stands to lose if it does not comply.
Let me emphasize that I have not given up on a peaceful
outcome--it's not too late. I've just been on the phone, subsequent
to the Baker press conference, with [Saudi] King Fahd, with [French]
President Mitterrand--to whom I've talked twice today--[Canadian]
Prime Minister Mulroney, and others are contacting other coalition
partners to keep the matter under lively discussion. It isn't too
late. But now, as it's been before, the choice of peace or war is
really Saddam Hussein's to make.
Q. You said in an interview last month that you believe in
your gut that Saddam Hussein would withdraw from Kuwait by
January 15th. After the failure of this meeting today, what does
your gut tell you about that? And in your gut, do you believe that
there's going to be war or peace?
A. I can't misrepresent this to the American people. I am
discouraged. I watched much of the Aziz press conference, and
there was no discussion of withdrawal from Kuwait. The UN
resolutions are about the aggression against Kuwait. They're about
the invasion of Kuwait, about the liquidation of a lot of the people
in Kuwait, about the restoration of the legitimate government to
Kuwait. And here we were listening to a 45-minute press
conference after the Secretary of State of the United States had 6
hours worth of meetings over there, and there was not one single
sentence that has to relate to their willingness to get out of
Kuwait.
And so, I'd have to say I certainly am not encouraged by that,
but I'm not going to give up. I told this to our coalition partners--
and I'll be talking to more of them when I finish here--we've got to
keep trying. But this was a total stiff arm; this was a total rebuff.
Q. Let me follow up on that. Let me follow up. Have you
decided in your mind to go to war if he's not out of there by the
15th?
A. I have not made my decision on what and when to do. I am
more determined than ever that the UN resolutions, including 678,
is implemented fully.
Q. Aziz made a pledge that he would not make the first
attack. Would you match that? And also, what's wrong with a
Middle East conference
if it could avoid a bloody war?
A. No, I wouldn't make it, and we oppose linkage--the
coalition opposes linkage. The argument with Saddam Hussein is
about Kuwait. It is about the invasion of Kuwait, the liquidation of
a member of the United Nations, a member of the Arab League. It
has long been determined by not just the Security Council but by the
entire United Nations that this is about Kuwait. And that is the
point that was missing from his explanations here today. So there
will be no linkage on these items. That's been the firm position of
all of the allies, those with forces there, and, indeed, of the United
Nations--the General Assembly.
Q. Tariq Aziz, on the subject of the letter, suggested that it
was rude in its use of language and somehow inappropriate to a
diplomatic communication. I wonder if you are willing to release
the letter, now that it has been--it's run its course, apparently?
And if, whether you are or not, would you characterize it for us and
tell us what it said?
A. Well, let me first describe why I wanted to send a letter.
It has been alleged, fairly or unfairly, that those around Saddam
Hussein refuse to bring him bad news or refuse to tell it to him
straight. And so I made the determination that I would write a
letter that would explain as clearly and forcefully as I could
exactly what the situation is that he faces. The letter was not
rude; the letter was direct. And the letter did exactly what I think
is necessary at this stage.
But to refuse to even pass a letter along seems to me to be
just one more manifestation of the stonewalling that has taken
place. We gave him 15 dates for the Secretary of State to meet
with him, and he's off meeting with Mr. A and Mr. B and Mr. C and
has no time for that.
So the letter was proper--I've been around the diplomatic
track for a long time--the letter was proper; it was direct; and it
was what I think would have been helpful to him to show him the
resolve of the rest of the world--certainly of the coalition.
In terms of releasing it, I haven't given much thought to that.
It was written as a letter to him. But let me think about it. I might
be willing to do it; I might not. I just don't know. If I thought it
would help get the message out to him in an indirect way, maybe it
makes some sense, although we've been saying essentially the same
thing over and over again that was in the letter. . . .
Q. You've said that the coalition is united against any linkage
on the Palestinian question. You've talked to Francois Mitterrand
twice today. But in public, he says he is for this international
peace conference, and he seems to have no objection at all if
Saddam Hussein wants to use that as a fig leaf to pull out of
Kuwait. You do have an objection. Mitterrand also says that
apparently the European Community foreign ministers are going to
meet with Aziz, apparently in Algiers. What if they go in there and
say, well, we have no objection to an international peace conference
on the Mideast?
A. The foreign ministers of the EC have been very solid, and
so has President Francois Mitterrand, that there will be no linkage.
So you're asking me a hypothetical question that I won't have to
answer because he's not going to do that.
Q. He said today he disagrees with you on the international
peace--
A. The French government and the US government over the
years have had some differences on the best way to bring peace to
the Middle East. We had a very active initiative underway by Jim
Baker. But that doesn't have anything to do with the invasion of
Kuwait. Francois Mitterrand knows that it doesn't have to do with
the invasion of Kuwait and the aggression against Kuwait. I know
he knows this. And he's been very forthright about it.
But yes, he's very frank in saying countries have a different
approach to how you solve another very important problem. And
we've never--I would simply refer you back to what I've said on that
subject. I think you were with us over in the joint press conference
with President Gorbachev when I addressed myself to this. But I am
going to avoid linkage.
I listened to that Aziz meeting, and all he tried to do is
obfuscate, to confuse, to make everybody think this had to do with
the West Bank, for example. And it doesn't. It has to do with the
aggression against Kuwait--the invasion of Kuwait, the brutalizing
of the people in Kuwait. It has to do with a new world order. And
that world order is only going to be enhanced if this newly
activated peacekeeping function of the United Nations proves to be
effective. That is the only way the new world order will be
enhanced. . . .
Q. Mr. President, you said that when you first proposed high-
level talks between Iraq and the United States that it was because
you were convinced the message had not gotten through, had not
gotten across. Are you now convinced that the message had gotten
across?
A. Well, I did listen carefully to Mr. Aziz, whom I thought
spoke quite well. I didn't agree with what he was trying to do,
obviously, to confuse the issue by refusing to discuss the point at
hand, which is the invasion of Kuwait, but I thought he did it well. I
thought he kind of sent a signal that they do understand what's up
against them, but I still don't believe that they think the world
coalition will use force against them. I may be wrong, but that's
what I think in here. And I also still believe, as I said earlier, that
he somehow has this feeling that he will prevail or that he will
prolong. This will not be. I've heard some wild predictions on this
horrible human equation that might be involved if force were used,
and I would say I don't agree with some who are arguing the loudest
because it's putting the worst case out in terms of loss of human
life; I must say that. I don't know. I think Aziz understands it, but
I'm not sure that Saddam Hussein does. . . . (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Crisis in the Gulf
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: News conference following bilateral meeting with Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz; Geneva, Switzerland
Date: Jan 9, 19911/9/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
I have just given President Bush a full report of our meeting today.
I told him that Minister Aziz and I had completed a serious and
extended diplomatic conversation in an effort to find a political
solution to the crisis in the Gulf.
I met with Minister Aziz today not to negotiate, as we have
made clear we would not do--that is, negotiate backward from UN
Security [Council] resolutions--but I met with him today to
communicate. And communicate means listening as well as talking,
and we did that--both of us.
The message that I conveyed from President Bush and our
coalition partners was that Iraq must either comply with the will
of the international community and withdraw peacefully from
Kuwait or be expelled by force. Regrettably, ladies and gentlemen, I
heard nothing today that--in over 6 hours, I heard nothing that
suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with
the UN Security Council resolutions.
There have been too many Iraqi miscalculations. The Iraqi
government miscalculated the international response to the
invasion of Kuwait, expecting the world community to stand idly by
while Iraqi forces systematically pillaged a peaceful neighbor.
It miscalculated the response, I think, to the barbaric policy
of holding thousands of foreign hostages, thinking that somehow
cynically doling them out a few at a time would somehow win
political advantage. And it miscalculated that it could divide the
international community and gain something thereby from its
aggression. So let us hope that Iraq does not miscalculate again.
The Iraqi leadership must have no doubt that the 28 nations
which have deployed forces to the Gulf in support of the United
Nations have both the power and the will to evict Iraq from Kuwait.
If it should choose--and the choice is Iraq's--if it should choose to
continue its brutal occupation of Kuwait, Iraq will be choosing a
military confrontation which it cannot win and which will have
devastating consequences for Iraq.
I made these points with Minister Aziz not to threaten but to
inform, and I did so with no sense of satisfaction, for we genuinely
desire a peaceful outcome, and, as both President Bush and I have
said on many occasions, the people of the United States have no
quarrel with the people of Iraq.
I simply wanted to leave as little room as possible for yet
another tragic miscalculation by the Iraqi leadership. And I would
suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this is still a
confrontation that Iraq can avoid.
The path of peace remains open, and that path is laid out very
clearly in 12 UN Security Council resolutions adopted over a period
of over 5 months.
But now the choice lies with the Iraqi leadership. The choice
really is theirs to make, and let us all hope that that leadership
will have the wisdom to choose the path of peace.
Q. What do your allies plan to do next to bring this message
home?
A. Well, you say, "What do the allies plan to do next?" and I
think it's important for everyone to note that this is a coalition.
This is not Iraq versus the United States. This is Iraq versus the
international community. This happens to have been the first time
that we've had an opportunity to find agreement on meeting--US and
Iraq.
So I don't know what the next steps are. I do know this: that
time is running on, as I said a day or so ago. After 5 months and 12
UN Security Council resolutions, it seems to me that it is almost
evident that the time for talk is running out. It's time for Iraq to
act and to act quickly by getting out of Kuwait.
But this is a coalition, and we are seeking to implement
solemn resolutions of the United Nations. And so perhaps there may
be a way that the Secretary General of the United Nations could use
his good offices here in the remaining 6 or so days that we have
left.
I will say that--I've already mentioned that I didn't hear
anything that to me demonstrated flexibility, nor did I hear any new
proposals. But I would like to take note of the fact that the
minister did restate their proposal that the United States pick a day
for him to come to the United States and Iraq pick a day for me to
go to Baghdad.
Those of you who have been traveling with us know what our
answer is to that. We've given it over the past 4 or 5 days, and I
gave it to the minister tonight. We offered 15 separate days for a
visit to Baghdad. The President of the United States made the
proposal for face-to-face discussions. We're glad that Iraq
accepted this one, because we did have 6 hours during which we
could make our position known to them, they could make their
position known to us.
But as far as next steps are concerned, it seems to me that
because we are talking about a coalition and we are talking about
implementing resolutions of the United Nations, that perhaps there
could be--I don't know what the position of the government of Iraq
would be on this--but perhaps there would be some room for us to
seek the use of the good offices of the Secretary General of the
United Nations.
Q. Did the Iraqi Foreign Minister reiterate his demands for
what he calls "justice and fairness" for the Palestinians? I mean,
was there any wavering in the US position, as you may have expressed
it to him, that the two issues are not related, are not linked?
A. No. There was--he expressed his position. There was no
change in our position, which is that the two issues are not linked.
I did make the point that I don't think many people believe that Iraq
invaded Kuwait in order to help the Palestinians, and, if they did, it
was another miscalculation, because it hasn't helped the
Palestinians.
I think most people believe that Iraq invaded Kuwait for Iraq's
own aggrandizement, and I think most people realize that Iraq is
trying to use the Palestinian issue to shield its aggression against
Kuwait, which in my view at least remains an obstacle to broader
peace in the region rather than a catalyst for achieving that broader
peace.
And I made the point as well that rewarding Iraq's aggression
with a link to the Arab-Israeli peace process would really send a
terrible signal not only to genuine peacemakers in the region but
also to other would-be aggressors at what we think is a defining
moment in history.
Q. Are you willing--is the United States willing to talk again
to Iraq before the January 15 deadline and did you discuss with the
President the possibility that you may still go to Baghdad?
A. I had already discussed that with President Bush, and I had
already told you what our view was. And the President himself, I
think, said, "There will be no trip to Baghdad." The proposal which
he originally made was in effect rejected by Iraq. We offered 15
separate days. They continued to insist upon only one--the 12th of
January--which we think was and still is an obvious effort to avoid
the deadline of January the 15th, and we're not interested in that.
We think this deadline is real, and our coalition partners think
the deadline is real.
Q. Did you discuss this with the President today?
A. I reported fully to the President, of course.
Q. Could you run through for us--you spoke for 6 hours--could
you give us a sense of how the discussions evolved over those 6
hours? What did you begin with? What did he counter with? Why
did you feel it necessary after 2 hours to call the President?
A. Well, we broke for lunch. [Laughter] And I think this
meeting is sufficiently important that I should call the President,
and so I did, just as I did as soon as we were finished.
Q. Did you begin by reading your letter--
A. But I began by saying that I was here to--not to negotiate
but to communicate, as I've just told you--that I was here for a
serious dialogue in an effort to find a political and peaceful
solution, but that they should not expect that we would be prepared
to walk backward from UN Security Council resolutions, that the
terms of those resolutions had already been set.
And I told the minister I wanted to handle the meeting in
whatever way he wanted. And I gave him the choice, and he chose
for me to go first, just as he--I gave him the choice as well as to
how to report to you, and he suggested that I come down here first.
So that's how we got where we are here tonight. But let me
say that I talked to him about how we saw the situation, about the
history of the Security Council resolutions, about what I thought
could happen in the event of observance of those resolutions, and
what I feared would happen in the event of Iraq's non-observance of
those resolutions.
He then presented the position of the government of Iraq, and
he will be down here in a few moments, and he can--now, we can't
run through 6 hours of dialogue here. Nobody else would get to ask
any questions.
Q. One quick follow-up: How detailed were you about the
extent of force that would be used against Iraq if it does not comply
with the UN resolutions by January 15?
A. Well, I didn't get into things that would properly be in the
realm of operational security matters. I hope I effectively made
the case with respect to what at least our opinion was of the 28-
nation multinational force that is there in the Gulf.
Q. Is the United States interested in any sort of phased
withdrawal, be it one supervised by the United Nations? And if this
withdrawal began by January 15, will the United States guarantee
there will be no military attack on Iraq?
A. Let me say I should have said this in answer to Tom's
question. I assured the minister that if they implement the UN
resolutions, and if they withdraw from Iraq and permit the
restoration--from Kuwait and permit the restoration of the
legitimate government of Kuwait, that I could assure him that there
would be no military action by the United States. And that I felt
that there would, under those circumstances, be no military action
by any other elements of the international coalition.
Q. (Inaudible)
A. On the first question, the UN resolutions speak for
themselves. We are not here--after all, we are part of an
international coalition. We are part of 28 countries. Even more
countries that have been helping financially and economically. And
it is not up to us to walk backward from solemn resolutions of the
United Nations.
Q. You have said in the past that you would seek approval for
the use of force at the highest levels. Are you now at that stage in
the process in which you will be seeking the use of force from other
governments?
A. No. But the clock is ticking on, and I made that point to the
minister today. As far as we are concerned, we have not taken--the
President of the United States who alone under--who alone in our
executive branch under our system can make that decision has not
taken that decision, and I'm not aware that any other governments
have.
Q. In the remaining 6 days before the UN deadline, would you
welcome an initiative by some other European allies or even Arab
countries such as Algeria that would perhaps include sending a
European foreign minister to Baghdad to seek a peaceful resolution?
A. Well, this is an international coalition--let me say it one
more time--and, therefore, as I've just indicated to you, it's an
international coalition seeking to implement solemn resolutions of
the world's peacekeeping and security body. And, therefore, there
might, it seems to me, be some useful purpose served by perhaps
the Secretary General--Secretary General's good offices.
But I said last night, and I have said for months, we welcome
any and all diplomatic efforts to solve this crisis peacefully and
politically. We want it solved peacefully and politically. I'm
disappointed, of course, that we did not receive any indications
today whatsoever of any flexibility in the position of Iraq.
So we would welcome any and all diplomatic efforts. We do
think if there are efforts by members of the international coalition,
that the message should be uniform, as it has been for 5 months,
and it should not be a mixed message. But we want a peaceful and
political solution.
Q. Can you tell us--you keep saying you saw no indication of
flexibility. Did the Foreign Minister actually tell you that Iraq
intends to keep Kuwait and will not withdraw from Kuwait?
A. He did not make that statement, but he did not indicate
that there was any chance that they would withdraw. But I did not
see, frankly, any flexibility in their position. You can ask him
questions when he gets down here.
Q. Did you discuss--in answer to any of the discussion about
the problems raised elsewhere in the Middle East by the Iraqi
Foreign Minister, did you discuss the efforts the United States has
made in the past to seek Arab/Israeli peace--
A. Yes.
Q. --to persuade Iraq that the United States was serious,
genuinely interested, in resolving those problems?
A. Yes. We went through a good bit of the history of the
personal efforts that I made for 14 months to bring about a dialogue
between Arab--between Palestinians and Israelis. We went through
the experience of the United States in bringing about the Camp
David accords and in bringing about peace between Israel and Egypt,
and we had a full discussion of that issue--a complete discussion
of it.
I want to make it clear that I made it very clear throughout
that there would be no linkage here of that issue to Iraq's
withdrawal from Kuwait. And we would not agree as a condition of
their withdrawing to any subsequent specific steps to be taken with
respect to that. But we did have--they brought it up, and we had a
very full discussion.
Q. Well, what was their answer?
A. We disagree. We frankly disagree with respect to that, as I
think you know. And I've already told you why I think linkage is a
bad idea. I think that it would tend to be read as a reward for
aggressors, and it would jeopardize future peace in the region.
Q. What did you tell the Foreign Minister about the
willingness of the American people to go to war and the impact of
political pressure on the President's decisionmaking?
A. I said, "Don't miscalculate the resolve of the American
people, who are very slow to anger but who believe strongly in
principle and who believe that we should not reward aggression and
that big countries with powerful military machines should not be
permitted to invade, occupy, and brutalize their peaceful neighbors."
Q. You've told us what you didn't hear. You didn't hear any
flexibility, and you told us that there was quite a bit of discussion
of history. Could you tell us what you did hear? Did you hear
justifications from the Foreign Minister? Did you hear a repeat of
what they've been saying in public for some time?
A. I heard some things that I quite frankly found very hard to
believe, but I'll let him go into the detail here. I heard, for
instance, that their action in invading Kuwait was defensive in
nature; that they were being threatened by Kuwait. And I will tell
you the same thing I told the minister, which is I found it very hard
to believe that any nation in the world will believe that.
Q. Even though you did spend 6 hours here today talking to
Foreign Minister Aziz, in the past 51/2 months you haven't had
much contact with Iraq. What's to prevent the historians of this
conflict from concluding that there was a failure of diplomacy here,
and we slid toward war without trying?
A. There's been a lot of conversations with the leadership of
Iraq, all to no avail. The Secretary General has already had one
failed mission. There have been any number of Arab efforts to solve
this crisis, all to no avail. There have been efforts by other
Western governments. The Soviet Union has tried very hard. They've
had meetings. We have now had a meeting. So people can write
whatever they decide they might want to write.
But the truth of the matter is, we have been very, I think--the
international coalition--very responsible and measured in our
approach to this. We have not, as some might suggest, gone off
half-cocked. We have gone through the United Nations patiently,
working for consensus within the Security Council. And it is only
after 51/2 months and the passage of 12 Security Council
resolutions that we find ourselves at the point of use of force.
So I think that there's been more diplomacy exercised in this
crisis than in almost any that I can think of. The one thing I would
ask you all not to do is to equate diplomacy and appeasement. We
made that mistake in the thirties, at least, for our part. We don't
intend to make it again.
Q. In a sense, two questions: Did the Foreign Minister suggest
Iraq might withdraw from Kuwait if there were linkage as, let us
say, the French have suggested or others have suggested? And, if he
did, is linkage--the principle of linkage--a reason for the loss of--
and the insistence on that principle--a reason for the loss of lots of
lives?
A. Well, I don't think he said that explicitly. I think perhaps
it was implicit in his comments. But he'll be here, and you can ask
him. It's more than just the principle of linkage, as I understand
their position. There would have to be agreement to conferences
and that sort of thing, that get you beyond just the simple fact of
linkage.
Q. Did Minister Aziz make a specific proposal under which
Iraq would get out of Kuwait, however unacceptable it was to you?
Was there a specific proposal?
A. No. There was no specific proposal. He restated the
positions that Iraq has stated publicly in the past. He defended
their action in invading and occupying Kuwait. He explained how he
feels that was justified. Again, he'll be down here and you can ask
him yourselves.
Q. You made it clear that you were not going to Baghdad. But
did you and the Foreign Minister talk about future diplomatic
contacts at your level between the United States and Iraq? Or did
this one 61/2 hour meeting represent the conclusion of diplomatic
initiatives by the United States?
A. We will maintain our diplomatic contacts through our
charge [d'affaires] in Baghdad until the 12th of January. I asked for
and received the personal assurance of the minister that Joe Wilson
and the four other Americans in our embassy there will be
permitted to leave Baghdad on the 12th of January and will not be
restrained from so doing.
Q. Your mood, if I may say, seems pretty somber at this point.
Can you kind of describe your state of mind and your mood after
what has occurred today?
A. Somber.
Q. Somber?
A. You got it.
Q. Are you advising an evacuation?
A. I'm not saying that. I'm telling you that we have asked for
and received assurances for our remaining five diplomatic personnel
to leave on the 12th of January, which is a date that you well know
is very close to the January 15 deadline and happens to be the date
that Iraq has been insisting on for 3 weeks for the meeting.
Q. What about other Americans?
A. I think most all Americans are out of Iraq. All that want
to leave are gone, as far as I know.
Q. Can you tell us now about the letter from President Bush?
Was it, in fact, in Arabic? What was the tone of it? Did it contain
graphic military scenarios intended to intimidate?
A. I regret to inform you that the minister chose not to
receive the letter from President Bush. He read it very slowly and
very carefully, but he would not accept it nor would the Iraqi
embassy in Washington accept an Arabic courtesy translation. You
will have to ask the minister why he did not accept the letter.
My own opinion, for what it's worth--and it's only an opinion-
-was that he came here only authorized to accept a letter that
walked away from the UN resolutions, which is something that we
cannot and, of course, will not do.
Q. Have you discussed the possibility of convening the United
Nations again to discuss the Gulf crisis? You know that [French]
President Mitterrand--he has proposed that most probably a new
discussion is possible; it might be helpful. Have you discussed this
eventuality with the Iraqi minister?
A. No, it did not come up in my meeting today with the Iraqi
minister. I did speak to that question and that issue a day or so ago,
and I believe that President Bush has spoken to it as well.
I don't know what an additional Security Council meeting at
this stage could do. Because what we are talking about here is
faithful implementation of resolutions of the Council, the last one
of which says that if Iraq does not withdraw by midnight on January
15, force can be used to effect that withdrawal.
We have had 12 resolutions of the UN Security Council.
Q. President Mitterrand is suggesting this.
A. I can't answer your question. I would refer you to
President Mitterrand. But I have just said that perhaps there would
be some utility in trying to use the good offices of the Secretary
General.
Q. Do you have any reason to believe that there is any way to
avoid a war as of right now?
A. Yes, I hope there is. There has been no decision taken for
that eventuality. I would simply refer you to my opening statement
where I made the point that I hope we do not have yet one more
miscalculation by the government of Iraq.
I would also refer you to the statements which President Bush
and I and other members of the coalition have made over the course
of the last several days or weeks and which I repeated today to the
minister, not in a threatening way but simply so that he would know
where our head is and how we feel and what we think and that is
that this January 15 deadline, in our minds, is real.
Iraq can choose to believe that or not, but it is real in our
minds and in the minds of our coalition partners. We hope that they
will believe that we think it's real and that they will act to
implement the solemn resolutions of the United Nations.
Q. Do you regret that you would have still liked to go, even on
the 12th, and meet--instead of Mr. Tariq--Saddam himself? It's
still a difference of 3 days.
A. We've said for the last 3 weeks, the 12th of January was
unacceptable to us because it is just an effort to avoid the deadline.
It's obvious. That's why the 12th was originally suggested. We've
said for a long time that date is unacceptable to us. It remains
unacceptable to us.
Q. Did you spell out your vision of what the Gulf would look
like if they withdrew peacefully? In other words, some of the
restrictions that you have talked about that must be imposed upon
Iraq even if they did withdraw? Did you lay that plan out for him in
some way?
A. Yes, I did in my original presentation this morning. I don't
have time to go through all of that with you now. But that falls
right in the category of the assurance that there would not be
military force used against Iraq by the United States if they
withdrew from Kuwait and permitted the restoration of the
legitimate government of Kuwait.
Q. Did you talk about the nuclear weapons, the chemical
weapons, the size of the Iraqi military--things that are of concern
to many in the Western coalition beyond the occupation of Kuwait?
A. We had a full discussion of the questions about weapons of
mass destruction. I pointed out the interest of the United States,
as we have expressed before in addressing that issue and addressing
that subject. We talked about the the multinational presence there
and the fact that President Bush has said we do not desire nor want
a permanent military ground presence in the Middle East--I mean in
the Gulf. We want to see our troops come home just as fast as the
security situation will allow. Those are the kinds of things that we
discussed, as you might expect.
Q. Could you just please describe to us the point at which the
meeting broke off? Why and how did it happen? Was it that you
finished off? Did Mr. Aziz finish off? Or was there just nothing to
talk about anymore? Please describe that.
A. It was simply a case, I think, that over 6 hours of
discussion, we had both had pretty well made the points that we had
come to make, and that was it. I don't believe that there was
anything left unsaid. He said everything, I think, he came to say and
I had said everything that I had come to say.
I think, frankly, it lasted longer than many of you might have
anticipated at the beginning.
Q. You mentioned that you are going to call back the American
diplomats. Are you also asking the Iraqi diplomats to leave the
United States on January 12th?
A. No. We will ask the Iraqi government to draw down their
diplomatic presence in the United States on the 12th. As I indicated
to the minister, we would be willing to permit the presence of a
small diplomatic contingent in Washington.
Q. Do you feel that if you would have accepted the fact of the
linkage, there could have been a proposition of Iraq retiring from
Kuwait?
A. I don't know. Why don't you ask the minister that?
Because when you say "accepted linkage," I'm not entirely sure
exactly what you mean. Do you mean if we had accepted--if we had
indicated a willingness to go to an international conference to
handle the question of the Middle East? Ask him the question. It
would be very interesting.
You know what our position has been for a long time. It would
set an extraordinarily unfortunate precedent, we think, and would
not, in the long run, contribute to peace in the region but would
contribute to instability because aggressors would be seen to be
rewarded for their aggression. It's something we simply cannot
consider.
Q. Was there any single issue on which the difference
between the United States and Iraq was narrowed during this 61/2
hours?
A. Well, let me say that I think that the discussions--I've
already indicated it was a serious one. I think that the tone of it
was good, as good as you could expect under the circumstances. We
weren't pounding the table and shouting at each other. It was a very
reasoned and, I think, responsible discussion by two diplomats who
really would like to find a peaceful and political solution to this
problem.
I've already said to you, I did not detect flexibility in the
position of Iraq as they have stated it over the past several days.
Again, I invite you to my opening statement. We still have 6
days. I just hope that they will think about this meeting, that they
will focus on it, that when Foreign Minister Aziz gets back and
reports to his President, that perhaps there could be some change in
their position.
There cannot be a negotiation here because the terms of the
UN Security Council resolutions were worked out in the debate in
the United Nations, and the international coalition is bound to those
resolutions.
Q. Would you be willing to meet Saddam somewhere else,
apart from Baghdad? And was that suggested?
A. That was not discussed. It has never been proposed by Iraq.
The Iraqi proposal, as you know, for some weeks has been, we pick a
date for Baker to come to Baghdad, you pick a date for Aziz to come
to Washington, and we'll work it that way. That's been out there for
a long, long time. There's never been any suggestion of the other.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Letter to Congress
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan 8, 19911/8/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
Text of President Bush's letter to Speaker of the House of
Representatives Thomas Foley. Identical letters were sent
to Senator George Mitchell, Senator Robert Dole, and Representative
Robert Michel.
Dear Mr. Speaker:
The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought
about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation
of Kuwait, threatens vital US interests. The situation also threatens
the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace
if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted
by the UN Security Council on 12 separate occasions. Such an action
would underline that the United States stands with the international
community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help
dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that
the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in
response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.
Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign
Minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive if he
could have presented the Iraqi government a resolution passed by
both houses of Congress supporting the UN position and in particular
Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently
stated my desire for such a resolution. Nevertheless, there is still
opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for
peace and safeguard this country's vital interests.
I therefore request that the House of Representatives and the
Senate adopt a resolution stating that Congress supports the use of
all necessary means to implement UN Security Council Resolution
678. Such action would send the clearest possible message to
Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay
from Kuwait. Anything less would only encourage Iraqi
intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the
international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression.
Mr. Speaker, I am determined to do whatever is necessary to
protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this
task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its
support for the President at this critical time. This truly is the
last best chance for peace.
Sincerely,
GEORGE BUSH
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Letter to Saddam Hussein
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan 5, 19911/5/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
Text of the letter dated January 5, 1991, from
President Bush to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Iraqi Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz refused to accept this letter from Secretary
Baker during their meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, January 9, 1991.
The Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, Muhammad Sadiq Al-
Mashat, also refused to deliver the letter.
Mr. President:
We stand today at the brink of war between Iraq and the world. This
is a war that began with your invasion of Kuwait; this is a war that
can be ended only by Iraq's full and unconditional compliance with
UN Security Council Resolution 678.
I am writing you now, directly, because what is at stake
demands that no opportunity be lost to avoid what would be a
certain calamity for the people of Iraq. I am writing, as well,
because it is said by some that you do not understand just how
isolated Iraq is and what Iraq faces as a result.
I am not in a position to judge whether this impression is correct;
what I can do, though, is try in this letter to reinforce what
Secretary of State Baker told your Foreign Minister and eliminate
any uncertainty or ambiguity that might exist in your mind about
where we stand and what we are prepared to do.
The international community is united in its call for Iraq to
leave all of Kuwait without condition and without further delay.
This is not simply the policy of the United States; it is the position
of the world community as expressed in no less than twelve
Security Council resolutions.
We prefer a peaceful outcome. However, anything less than
full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 678 and its
predecessors is unacceptable. There can be no reward for
aggression. Nor will there be any negotiation. Principle cannot be
compromised. However, by its full compliance, Iraq will gain the
opportunity to rejoin the international community. More
immediately, the Iraqi military establishment will escape
destruction. But unless you withdraw from Kuwait completely and
without condition, you will lose more than
Kuwait. What is at issue here is not the future of Kuwait--it will
be free, its government will be restored--but rather the future of
Iraq. This choice is yours to make.
The United States will not be separated from its coalition
partners. Twelve Security Council resolutions, 28 countries
providing military units to enforce them, more than one hundred
governments complying with sanctions--all highlight the fact that
it is not Iraq against the United States, but Iraq against the world.
That most Arab and Muslim countries are arrayed against you as
well should reinforce what I am saying. Iraq cannot and will not be
able to hold onto Kuwait or exact a price for leaving.
You may be tempted to find solace in the diversity of opinion
that is American democracy. You should resist any such temptation.
Diversity ought not to be confused with division. Nor should you
underestimate, as others have before you, America's will.
Iraq is already feeling the effects of the sanctions mandated
by the United Nations. Should war come, it will be a far greater
tragedy for you and your country. Let me state, too, that the United
States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons
or the destruction of Kuwait's oil fields and installations. Further,
you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions against
any member of the coalition. The American people would demand
the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a
terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort.
I write this letter not to threaten, but to inform. I do so with
no sense of satisfaction, for the people of the United States have no
quarrel with the people of Iraq. Mr. President, UN Security Council
Resolution 678 establishes the period before January 15 of this
year as a "pause of good will" so that this crisis may end without
further violence. Whether this pause is used as intended, or merely
becomes a prelude to further violence, is in your hands, and your
alone. I hope you weigh your choice carefully and choose wisely, for
much will depend upon it.
Sincerely,
GEORGE BUSH(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Department Statement on Iraq and Terrorism
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan 11, 19911/11/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Terrorism, Travel
[TEXT]
As January 15 approaches, Iraq shows no sign of respecting UN
Security Council resolutions demanding that it withdraw from
Kuwait or face possible military force.
Since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Department of State has
issued three public statements warning Americans of the
possibility of Iraqi-sponsored terrorist attacks. These notices
were general in nature; no specific targets were mentioned. They
remain in effect.
The US government has evidence that terrorists supported by
Iraq are planning to mount attacks in most regions of the world. We
believe the Middle East and Europe are the most likely locations. We
also have reports of terrorist planning in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. The American public should be aware that, in the event of
military action involving the United States in the Persian Gulf, the
threat of terrorism against American citizens would increase
significantly. The Department of State recommends that Americans
take the following action to minimize the threat:
-- All Americans traveling abroad should review existing
travel advisories concerning the country or region to which they
plan to travel.
-- Americans overseas should stay in close touch with the
nearest US embassy or consulate.
-- They should be alert and pay attention to anyone who may
be observing them. If they become concerned about something
unusual, they should contact the local police.
-- Americans overseas should exercise caution when in or
near US military or civilian facilities.
-- Should hostilities begin, Americans should keep informed
through radio and television broadcasts.
While it is likely that terrorist events may occur for which
we have no forewarning, should specific and credible information on
a threat to the American public be received, the Department of
State will provide information for travelers and other concerned
parties.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Text of Joint Congressional Resolution
US Congress
Description: Text of Joint Congressional Resolution; Washington, DC
Date: Jan 12, 19911/12/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
Whereas the Government of Iraq without provocation invaded and
occupied the territory of Kuwait on August 2, 1990;
Whereas both the House of Representatives (in H.J. Res. 658 of
the 101st Congress) and the Senate (in S. Con. Res. 147 of the 101st
Congress) have condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and declared
their support for international action to reverse Iraq's aggression;
Whereas Iraq's conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile programs and its demonstrated
willingness to use weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat
to world peace;
Whereas the international community has demanded that Iraq
withdraw unconditionally and immediately from Kuwait and that
Kuwait's independence and legitimate government be restored;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council repeatedly
affirmed the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait in
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;
Whereas in the absence of full compliance by Iraq with its
resolutions, the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 678
has authorized member states of the United Nations to use all
necessary means, after January 15, 1991, to uphold and implement
all relevant Security Council resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area; and
Whereas Iraq has persisted in its illegal occupation of, and
brutal aggression against Kuwait:
Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
Assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution."
SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED
FORCES
(a) AUTHORIZATION
--The President is
authorized, subject to
subsection (b) to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United
Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve
implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664,
665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677.
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF
MILITARY FORCE IS NECESSARY.
--Before exercising the
authority granted in subsection (a), the President shall make
available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that--
(1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic
and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the
United Nations Security Council resolutions cited in subsection (a);
and
(2) that those efforts have not been and would not be
successful in obtaining such compliance.
(c) WAR POWER RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.--
(1) Specific Statutory Authorization.--Consistent with
section 8(aX1) of the War Powers Resolutions, the Congress
declares that this section is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the
War Powers Resolution.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.--Nothing in
this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers
Resolution.
SEC. 3. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
At least once every 60 days, the President shall submit to the
Congress a summary on the status of efforts to obtain compliance
by Iraq with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security
Council in response to Iraq's aggression. (vote: 250-183)
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Gulf Crisis Information
Date: Jan 14, 19911/14/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
Emergencies: 202-647-0900 (24 hours)
Questions or comments about the Administration's Persian Gulf
policy:
202-647-6575 or 6576
Monday-Friday, 8:30 am-5 pm
(Eastern Standard Time)(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: America's Forces in the Gulf Are Ready
Quayle
Source: Vice President Quayle
Description: Address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los
Angeles, California
Date: Jan 8, 19911/8/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
As some of you may know, over the New Year I had the opportunity
to visit our marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen in Saudi Arabia.
The 2 days I spent with our troops brought home to me again that
our armed forces are the best in the world. Our volunteer army is
working, and our troops are determined to achieve our objectives.
Today, I'd like to give you a report on my trip. I'd also like to tell
you about the brave men and women who are serving our country
with great courage in the Gulf.
My first stop was a visit to Marine Air Group 13. They are the
most forward-deployed of any American fixed-wing aircraft unit in
the region. Their mission is to provide close air support and
airborne fire. Their confidence, their sense of purpose, and their
expertise was both inspiring and reassuring. I asked Captain Don
Peros, an Arizonan from Yuma, how things were going. He replied, in
a soft-spoken Western drawl, "The sky is quiet. They know we are
here."
Later that day, we helicoptered out to the most forward-
deployed of any American forces, the Army's 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiment. Their motto is "Brave Rifles"--and brave they most
certainly are. Commanded by Colonel Doug Starr, a Vietnam hero
whose awards include two Silver Stars and five Bronze Stars, they
are deployed less than 60 miles from the Kuwaiti border. One of the
first American units to deploy in August of last year, they have
been away from home for nearly 5 months. They live in tents in the
middle of the desert, enduring the heat, the sand storms, and the
tension of knowing they are the first line of defense in Saudi
Arabia. Yet their spirit remains high, and their professionalism is
evident in every move they make.
They are ready to do whatever their President asks. Their
biggest concern is domestic political considerations. They are
concerned their mission may not be finished, and they'll go home--
only to be called back again in a year or two to finish the job.
On board the aircraft carrier, the USS John F. Kennedy, which I
visited the next day, our sailors were equally ready. Their F-14
pilots, like Lieutenant Kevin McHugh of Carmel, Indiana, are
prepared to do to Saddam Hussein's air force what they did to
[Libyan leader] Qadhafi's MIG-23s in 1989--clear them out of the
skies. The last unit I visited, the Air Force's 48th Tactical Fighter
Wing, also has had experience against Qadhafi. In 1986, they
participated in our retaliation against Libyan terrorism. And when I
asked the officers and men of the "Statue of Liberty" wing if there
was any doubt that we could force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait,
their answer was a resounding "No!"
In sum, the brave men and women of our armed forces stand
ready to protect the vital interests of America. They will do their
duty and they will do it well. They deserve our total and
enthusiastic support.
When I visited the Marine base, on the walls of one of the
tents I saw a series of letters to the Marines from someone named
Colleen. I asked who Colleen was, and the Marines told me that she
was a 7-year-old girl with cancer who took the time every day to
write them and express her support for what they are doing. The
Marines also wrote back to her to encourage her in her fight. And
Colleen sent them a sign, made on her home computer, which said,
"You are my heroes." Colleen's words are proudly displayed on their
tent wall.
Well, Colleen has it exactly right. Those men and women on
duty in the Gulf are America's heroes. The President and I are proud
of them--and I know you are, too. And let me assure you: Their
morale is sky high, and they are ready!
Of course, the main reason that morale among our troops is so
high is because they know that the people at home overwhelmingly
support them--and support their mission. The American people
understand that Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait poses a
long-term threat, not just to his neighbors but to the entire world.
They know that over the past decade, Saddam Hussein has
bankrupted his people to bankroll his army. They know that he has
launched two wars of aggression, against Iran and against Kuwait,
at the cost of some 1 million casualties. They know that he is
acquiring a stockpile of chemical and biological agents and has used
chemical weapons against both Iran and his own people. They know
he has launched an intensive campaign to acquire nuclear weapons.
And they know that unless he is stopped today, nuclear-armed Iraq
will control the bulk of the world's energy supply tomorrow,
thereby holding a gun to all our heads.
Saddam Fools No One
Saddam should make no mistake about it: the American people are
not in the least bit naive about his intentions. They know that
Saddam's ambitions are not confined to Kuwait. Rather, his goal is
to dominate the Middle East as the leader of an aggressive
superpower, armed to the teeth with weapons of mass destruction.
The American people are equally clear about what's at stake in
the Gulf: our long-term security, the future of the Middle East, and
the nature of the post-Cold War world. They remember the Carter
Doctrine--reinforced by Presidents Reagan and Bush--which warned
that, "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of
the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled
by any means necessary, including military force."
The American people know that if Saddam Hussein wins, all
our friends in the middle East will be in grave danger. They know
that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is the first crisis of the post-Cold
War era. One way or another, it is bound to set a precedent, either
on behalf of greater world order, or on behalf of greater chaos. If
Saddam Hussein succeeds in his aggression, it is likely that his
success will embolden other dictators to emulate his example. But
if he fails--and believe me, he will fail--others will draw the
lesson that might does not make right and that aggression will not
be allowed to succeed.
For all these reasons, the American people are prepared to use
force, if they have to, should Saddam Hussein not get out of Kuwait.
The American people support the goals laid out by President Bush at
the start of this crisis, goals endorsed in 12 UN Security Council
Resolutions. These goals are clear: The immediate, complete, and
unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait; the security of
American citizens; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate
government; and a commitment to the security and stability of the
Persian Gulf. These are moral goals. These are legitimate goals.
And these goals are not subject to negotiations.
Of course, in every crisis, there are always some critics and
armchair strategists who are convinced that they know better than
the President--and the Gulf crisis is no exception. Today, these
critics argue for patience. They say: "Wait a year or two, be
patient, act with caution." Well, George Bush is a cautious man.
And he has been patient. Our armed forces have been patient. That
is why, despite the use of American hostages as human shields,
despite the outrages against the people of Kuwait, despite Iraq's
continued defiance of the world community, we have refrained, so
far, from military action against Saddam Hussein. And that is why
the President went the extra mile for peace last week by proposing
that Secretary Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz meet in Geneva.
I am pleased that meeting will be taking place tomorrow.
We hope Secretary Baker's meeting will get the message
across to Saddam Hussein: You must withdraw from Kuwait. Your
withdrawal must be complete, immediate, and unconditional. There
will be no negotiations over the terms of your withdrawal. There
will be no linkage between your withdrawal and any other issues.
There will be no reward for your aggression. Your only chance for a
peaceful resolution of this conflict is to heed the call of the
international community, as expressed in 12 UN Security Council
Resolutions, and leave Kuwait now.
I truly hope that tomorrow's meeting between Secretary Baker
and Foreign Minister Aziz helps Iraq understand the gravity of the
situation and the determination of the entire world to undo its
aggression. I truly hope that force can be averted. I truly hope that
Saddam Hussein does not allow this last chance for peace to fail.
The United Nations has given Saddam Hussein until January
15th to leave Kuwait. If he refuses, UN Security Council Resolution
678 authorizes UN member states to use "all necessary means" to
achieve Iraq's unconditional withdrawal. We need to hold Saddam
Hussein to this deadline. We will not permit him to manipulate the
deadline or to try to extend it through offers to negotiate--when
there is nothing to negotiate. Talking about patience will take the
pressure off Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. It is only
the probability of the imminent use of force against Saddam
Hussein that may convince him to resolve the crisis peacefully by
withdrawing from Kuwait.
Time for Patience Running Out
But in addition to keeping the pressure on Saddam Hussein, there are
other reasons for not being excessively patient with Iraq. For at
some point, the costs of prolonged patience outweigh the benefits.
As the President argued in his radio address on Saturday, we are
fast approaching that point.
Consider the impact of prolonged patience on the people of
Kuwait. A recent report by Amnesty International documents, in
considerable detail, the ongoing agony of the Kuwaiti people. The
report contains eye-witness accounts of how Iraqi forces have
tortured and killed many hundreds of victims, taken several
thousand prisoners, and left more than 300 premature babies to die
after looting incubators from Kuwaiti hospitals. The report
catalogs 38 methods of torture used by the Iraqi military. Iraqi
forces have gouged out people's eyes, cut off their tongues and ears,
shot people in the arms and legs, used electric shocks, and raped
many victims. Moreover, the Amnesty International report notes
that, "The massive scale of destruction and looting . . . suggests
that such incidents were neither arbitrary nor isolated, but rather
reflected a policy adopted by the government of Iraq."
The Amnesty report was based on medical evidence and on in-
depth interviews with more than 100 people from about a dozen
countries. Its findings completely coincide with testimony given
before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. As Congressman
Tom Lantos, the Democratic co-chairman of the caucus, put it back
in October: "In the 8-year history of the . . . caucus, we have never
had the degree of ghoulish and nightmarish horror stories coming
from totally credible eyewitnesses that we have had this time."
It seems to me that those who advocate endless patience with
Saddam Hussein should think long and hard about what Congressman
Lantos and Amnesty International have said. And they should ask
themselves a few simple questions: Is it moral to prolong the agony
of the Kuwaiti people indefinitely? After all, brave Kuwaitis
helped and sheltered Americans as they were being hunted down by
Iraqis and put their own lives at risk by hiding many of our citizens
in their homes. Is it right for Americans to stand by as Kuwaitis
are being tortured and raped and brutalized? And would there even
be a Kuwait left to save in a year or two years' time?
Advocates of prolonged patience should also consider the
impact of the crisis on nations such as Turkey, Egypt, and the
emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. These friends of ours,
who are among the hardest hit by the economic impact of increased
oil prices, are also the least able to afford it. With every day that
the crisis is allowed to continue, their economic plight worsens and
their hopes for a better future recede. Under these circumstances,
is patience with Saddam Hussein a wise course of action? Is it a
moral course of action?
Or consider the effects of the Persian Gulf crisis on our own
economy. Even though world oil prices have declined from their
post-invasion peak, they are 40% to 50% higher than they were
before the invasion. The resulting $1.5 billion per month added to
our own oil import bills constitutes a "tax" on the American and
world economies at a time of growing recessionary pressure. And,
with the passage of time, the costs of maintaining American troops
in the Gulf would mount.
Or consider Iraq's drive for nuclear weapons, which Saddam
Hussein plans to add to his arsenal of chemical and biological
weapons. As President Bush told American troops in Saudi Arabia
during Thanksgiving, "Each day that passes brings Saddam Hussein 1
day closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal . . . And
we do know this for sure: he has never possessed a weapon that he
didn't use." Would indefinite patience with Iraq result in a world
more vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by Saddam Hussein? And if
so, would this be a worse course of action? Would this be a moral
course of action?
Or consider the effects of indefinite patience on Saddam
Hussein's military ability. The longer we refrain from military
action against Iraq, the more time Saddam Hussein has to tighten
his grip on Kuwait. As President Bush said on Saturday, "Each day
that passes, Saddam's forces also fortify and dig in deeper into
Kuwait. We risk paying a high price in the most precious currency
of all, human life, if we give Saddam more time to prepare for war .
. . ." Thus, the longer we wait, the harder it may be to prevail if
force must be used. Does not patience today risk greater American
and allied casualties tomorrow? And if so, is this a wise course of
action? A moral course of action?
Or consider the impact of prolonged patience on the
international coalition arrayed against Saddam Hussein. Today, we
and our allies have more than 500,000 troops in the Persian Gulf.
Twenty-eight nations have committed support to the allied effort,
including 11 Moslem nations. But holding such a broadly based
coalition together is not easy. And the internal situation of our
partners could be tested. The presence of foreign troops might
become a contentious issue.
Can we really afford to give Saddam Hussein a lengthy
breathing space--a pause he could exploit to undermine the embargo
and break up the multinational coalition? We must remember that,
rightly or wrongly, the world would attribute such patience--a lack
of resolve. Unlimited patience with Saddam Hussein would,
therefore, all too likely lead to appeasement of Saddam Hussein.
This is unacceptable.
Finally, advocates of endless patience should talk to our
troops in the Gulf. When I spoke to those men and women a few days
ago, their views came across loud and clear. They feel they have
been patient. They want to get the job done and then come home to
their loved ones. They don't look forward to spending the next
couple of years waiting around in the Saudi desert while Congress
debates what to do next. As the President has said, "This will not
be another Vietnam."
Action Must Be Quick, Decisive
I am convinced that if force is necessary, it will be quick, massive,
and decisive. President Bush knows full well the lessons of
Vietnam. He knows that the policy of "gradual escalation" that we
pursued in Southeast Asia turned out to be a recipe for stalemate.
He knows that trying to fight "on the cheap" only results in higher
costs over the long run. He knows that war is a terrible thing--but
if we must use force, there can be no half measures: Either we go
in to win quickly and decisively, or we shouldn't go in at all.
The real question is: Have the President's critics learned the
lessons of Vietnam? Aren't their recommendations for relying
solely on sanctions yet another flawed attempt to deflate
aggression "on the cheap"? Aren't their calls for endless patience a
sure fire formula for getting us bogged down in the Gulf
indefinitely? And aren't their arguments against the use of force an
example of wishful thinking masquerading as statesmanship?
When Secretary Baker meets Iraq's Foreign Minister [Tariq
Aziz] tomorrow, he will call on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait
immediately and unconditionally. It is important that he be able to
deliver this message as forcefully and convincingly as possible.
Unfortunately, Saddam may still not believe that force is a credible
option. He may have a difficult time understanding our political
system. Democracy is by far the best political system ever created,
but it is complex and, at times, messy. This is one of the messy
moments.
When a senator or congressman criticizes the President's
policy, the media deem it newsworthy. Therefore, the critics have a
direct line to Saddam Hussein, because, we are told, he is an avid
watcher of CNN. Thus, when he sees our congressional critics
getting world media coverage, the message to Saddam may well be
that the President cannot and will not use force because the
Congress will not let him.
Let me set the record straight: unless Congress denies funds
for Operation Desert Shield, as suggested by Democratic Majority
Leader [Richard] Gephardt, Saddam Hussein should understand that
his aggression will not stand. Saddam Hussein should understand
that we will use force, if necessary, to expel him from Kuwait.
Congress could help Saddam Hussein understand this. It could
pass a favorable resolution in support of the UN resolutions.
President Bush has today asked that Congress pass such a
resolution. This would be helpful.
On the other hand, Congress could choose to pass resolutions
that would be harmful. Any resolution that suggested to Saddam
Hussein that the threat of force is not credible would, in fact,
undermine the chances for a peaceful solution. Simply put, it would
take the pressure off Saddam Hussein to pull out now.
Finally, Congress could do nothing, knowing full well that the
President will act within constitutional guidelines, and that
Congress will be consulted and informed of all important decisions.
Thus, Congress has the following choices: To support the
President, to dispute the President, or not to act at all. We hope the
Congress will join the American people in supporting the President.
What Congress must know is that the world watches and interprets
every move it makes. This is our political system.
If Congress supports the President, we may at this 11th hour
be able to convince Saddam Hussein that the threat of force is not
an idle one. I hope Saddam Hussein comes to understand this.
If he does understand, I think he will withdraw his forces
from Kuwait before January 15. But if he does not understand, then
we and our partners will have to expel him from Kuwait. One way or
another, I am certain that Saddam Hussein will yield: either to the
force of logic, or the logic of force.
Why am I so confident? Let me answer that question by
reading you part of a letter I recently received. It's from Brian
Scocchio, a sailor serving aboard the USS Saratoga:
I have been away from home for 4 months now. I would very
much like to get home as soon as possible, but not until Iraq has
released Kuwait and we have removed Hussein's ability to use his
army as an offensive weapon. . . . If this means fighting, and
possibly giving up my life, then that is a small price to pay for
ensuring that my children will grow up in a world that is safe from
madmen like Hussein.
I have never been in battle, and I know it is easy to say things
when you may never have to back up your words, but I truly believe
in what we are doing out here and that I will serve my country with
honor.
Please relay to Congress that everyone that I have talked to
believes pretty much the same way that I do. We are ready to do
whatever is necessary.
These are the words of a brave and wise American. They
complement the words of President Bush, who has pledged that
"there will not be any murky ending. If one American soldier has to
go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to
win."
These are difficult times. The President knows the gravity of
the crisis. He has been patient, he is a cautious man--but he is
more determined now than ever to achieve his objectives.
The President wants peace more than anyone. He prays for
peace. He has worked for peace. But if peace may be established
only by the use of force, so be it.
Let us as a nation, in this time of peril, support our President
and support our brave men and women in the Persian Gulf. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: New Ambassador to Kuwait at a "Pivotal Juncture"
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks at the swearing-in ceremony of Edward W. Gnehm,
Jr., US Ambassador to Kuwait; Washington, DC
Date: Jan 3, 19911/3/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization,
State Department
[TEXT]
Let me start by saying how pleased Susan [Baker, the Secretary's
wife] and I are to welcome all of you to the State Department this
morning to join with us in congratulating the Gnehm family on
Skip's [Mr. Gnehm's] swearing-in as the next US Ambassador to
Kuwait.
A swearing-in is always an occasion, I think, to recognize and
to celebrate achievement, and it's certainly so in this case. Skip
Gnehm is one of our most distinguished and dedicated Foreign
Service officers with extensive experience in the Middle East, in
general, and the Arabian Peninsula, in particular.
If there was ever a man who was made for this pivotal
juncture in US-Kuwaiti relations, the President and I believe it's
Skip Gnehm. Skip was the right choice 5 months ago before the
current crisis began when he was named Ambassador-designate, and
we know Skip will do a tremendous job of running our embassy
when, I'm confident, in the not-too-far-distant future, American
personnel will once again have the privilege of serving in a free
Kuwait.
By swearing in Skip Gnehm today, America renews its pledge
to the Kuwaiti people and to the future of their besieged yet
unbowed nation that Iraq's aggression will not stand. Kuwait will
re-emerge from the horrors of occupation. Kuwait will be restored
to its rightful place among the world community of sovereign
nations, and Kuwait will endure and live to see many bright days
ahead.
The dark days, though, of Iraq's cruel occupation are numbered.
January 15 looms before us and before Saddam Hussein, the date
which the international community declared in UN Security Council
Resolution 678 its willingness to use all necessary means if Iraq
did not peacefully withdraw from Kuwait.
Despite Saddam's cynical efforts to delay the day of reckoning
and to divert world attention from the true cause of the Gulf crisis,
the civilized world agrees that his brutal occupation of Kuwait is
neither legitimate nor justified.
As the President's announcement this morning again
demonstrates, I think, that we are prepared to go the last mile to
achieve a peaceful Iraqi withdrawal. We hope that Iraq will respond
positively to our new offer for me to meet with [Iraqi] Foreign
Minister Aziz next week in Europe. But as the President and our
coalition partners have stated before, I think with stark clarity, we
do remain prepared to act upon the expressed will of the world
community.
Iraq must now choose to quit the soil of its peaceful neighbor
or risk devastating consequences. And so as January 15 approaches,
we are closer and closer to restoring Kuwait's sovereignty, whether
by peace or whether by force. But Kuwait's sovereignty is going to
be restored. And when it is, Skip and his embassy will face the
awesome challenge of helping to rebuild a liberated land. There is
no one, I don't think, better prepared to meet that challenge.
Beginning with the early days of the invasion when the
legitimate government of Kuwait was reconstituted in Saudi Arabia,
and Ambassador [Nathaniel] Howell and his intrepid staff on the
embassy compound in Kuwait were surrounded by--and I should add,
harassed by--Iraqi troops, Skip began a grueling regime of travel
between the Gulf and Washington. His task was to sustain US-
Kuwaiti bilateral relations at a time of unprecedented crisis in the
entire Gulf region. Skip drew upon a lifetime of professional
experience in the Middle East, and he drew great strength from the
stalwart support of members of his family, who are no strangers to
the demands, risks, separations, and sacrifices of a Foreign Service
life.
So, Skip, you have been a consummate representative of the
American people to Kuwait at its time of trial. In these months of
tragedy, you have stood with the Kuwaiti people, and you have stood
with their government. So, too, I think will you stand with them at
their time of triumph. So it's not "if" but rather "when" you arrive
at your new post--and I have every confidence that it will be soon--
I want you to be sure and send me the traditional snapshot that you
mail home to your relatives. You know, the one with our embassy
folks in the compound and their ambassador standing there by them
proudly with Old Glory waving above your head.
So, Skip, you have the President's and my congratulations. You
have our strongest support, as I think you know. Welcome aboard.
BOX: EDWARD W. GNEHM, JR.
Edward W. Gnehm, Jr., the new US Ambassador to Kuwait, most
recently was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and
South Asian Affairs, where he was responsible for coordinating US
foreign policy for the Arabian Peninsula and for Iraq, Iran, Jordan,
Syria, and Lebanon. He also was Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
Ambassador Gnehm, a career Foreign Service officer, served
as Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Amman, Jordan, and
in Sanaa, Yemen. In 1976, he opened the US Liaison Office in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, and was among the first group of American diplomats
to reopen the US mission in Damascus, Syria, in 1974. He also has
served in Lebanon, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Nepal.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Gulf Crisis Update
Date: Jan 14, 19911/14/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
Following is an overview of US objectives in the Persian Gulf crisis
based on statements by President Bush and Secretary Baker and
actions of the UN Security Council. It will be updated periodically.
International Response
-- For only the second time in its history, and for the first
time with the Soviet Union's support, the United Nations formally
has authorized the use of force against an aggressor nation.
-- As Secretary Baker reiterated on January 9, 1991, the path
of peace remains open and is very clearly laid out in 12 UN Security
Council resolutions adopted over a period of more than 5 months.
These resolutions demand that Iraq withdraw immediately and
unconditionally from Kuwait, establish an economic embargo backed
by force, and authorize the use of all necessary means to expel Iraq
from Kuwait if the Iraqis have not withdrawn by January 15, 1991.
-- Specifically, UN Security Council Resolution 678 of
November 29, 1990, authorizes "member states cooperating with
the government of Kuwait" to use "all necessary means" to uphold
these resolutions, while giving Iraq "one final opportunity, as a
pause of good will" to abide by the resolutions by January 15, 1991.
Going the Extra Mile for Peace
-- The President invited Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to
meet with him between December 20 and January 3. The President
also suggested that Secretary Baker meet with Saddam Hussein in
Baghdad during that period. The Iraqis failed to agree to the offer.
-- On January 3, 1991, the President stated that he was
"ready to make one last attempt to go the extra mile for peace."
Therefore, Secretary Baker met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in
Switzerland on January 9 while traveling in Europe and the Gulf for
consultations with coalition partners.
-- On January 9, Secretary Baker assured Foreign Minister
Aziz that if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait and permits the
restoration of its legitimate government, there would be no
military action by the United States. He further stated that he felt
that there would, under those circumstances, be no military action
by any other elements of the international coalition.
-- Regrettably, Secretary Baker heard nothing that suggested
any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with the UN Security
Council resolutions.
-- UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar made an 11th hour
visit to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein on January 13, but
his efforts were rejected. Secretary Baker called this "one more
act of defiance of the rest of the world" by the Iraqi leader.
The Coalition: Sharing Responsibility
-- The US has incurred additional costs for its military
effort in the Gulf. Allies are supporting this effort with both cash
and material supplies.
-- As President Bush has stated: "There has never been a
clearer demonstration of a world united against appeasement and
aggression." Military forces from 28 countries and economic
assistance from more than 50 states have been mobilized in the
Persian Gulf to underscore the shared resolve that Saddam Hussein's
aggression must not stand.
-- By the end of 1990, our partners in the coalition have
contributed about 245,000 troops to the Gulf region.
-- In the last 3 months of 1990, 26 nations comprising the
Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group pledged $13.5 billion in
economic aid to the "front-line states" of Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, and
other affected states. Efforts to address the needs of these
nations, including the new democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe, will continue.
-- Up to November 1990, the international community
contributed more than $320 million in humanitarian aid to assist
those people displaced from Iraq and Kuwait as a result of Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait.
US Objectives Since August 1990
-- Immediate implementation of all relevant UN Security
Council resolutions;
-- Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all
Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
-- Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
-- Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian
Gulf;
-- Protection of American citizens held hostage by Iraq, both
in Iraq and Kuwait.
The Stakes
-- Iraq's aggression against Kuwait threatens regional
security and world peace. It challenges the vision of a better world
in the aftermath of the Cold War. As Presidents Bush and Gorbachev
stated: "No peaceful international order is possible if larger states
can devour their smaller neighbors."
-- Iraq has invaded two neighbors, harbors terrorists, and
now is systematically exterminating Kuwait. Saddam Hussein uses
poisonous gas, brandishes deadly toxins, and relentlessly tries to
acquire nuclear bombs. He has built the world's sixth largest army
and the fourth largest tank army and has deployed ballistic
missiles.
-- Iraq's aggression threatens the global economy. If it is
allowed to sit astride the world's economic lifeline, everyone will
suffer profound setbacks to economic growth.
-- The United States and the international community must
stand with the people of Kuwait so that the annexation of Kuwait
does not become the first reality that mars our vision of a new
world order.
Sanctions
-- After more than 4 months of a stringent embargo,
sanctions are having some effect on the Iraqi economy, but
sanctions alone cannot impose a high enough cost on Saddam
Hussein to force him to withdraw.
-- Success is not measured by adverse economic impact on
Iraq; success is Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
-- Saddam Hussein believes that he can endure economic
sanctions. He will continue to impose economic sacrifices on the
Iraqi people to support his army and ambitions.
-- Waiting for sanctions to work imposes enormous costs and
increases the chances that Hussein can overcome them. He will
continue to grind up Kuwait, to fortify it, to build chemical and
biological weapons, to acquire nuclear capability, and to generate
other issues aimed at dissolving the coalition arrayed against him.
-- Full support for Operation Desert Shield will make
credible our offensive option to liberate Kuwait. Military
preparations:
1) Increase our diplomatic leverage;
2) Demonstrate that we will not tolerate the status quo and
legitimize to some extent Iraq's brutal occupation of Kuwait;
3) Reduce the risk of incurring greater casualties, should
conflict occur.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Sudan Releases Terrorists
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan 8, 19911/8/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Sudan
Subject: Terrorism
[TEXT]
Statement: Sudanese Acropole Terrorists Freed January 8,
1991
Five terrorists convicted of the 1988 attacks on the Acropole Hotel
and the Sudan Club in Khartoum, Sudan, which killed seven people,
including two children, were released yesterday by the Sudanese
Supreme Court. Four British nationals were among those killed, and
three Americans were injured in the attacks. The five terrorists
are members of the Abu Nidal Organization, one of the world's most
notorious terrorist groups.
According to news reports, one of the terrorists said he
"would do it again, elsewhere. . ." We take this statement very
seriously, especially since the Abu Nidal Organization has aligned
itself with Iraq.
The release of these convicted terrorists is reprehensible,
serving less than a 3-year prison term is not suitable punishment
for the terrorist murder of seven people. Their grossly premature
release is an insult to those whom they murdered and to their
families.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Dissident Trails in China
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan 9, 19911/9/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia
Country: China
Subject: Human Rights
[TEXT]
Statement: Dissident Trials in China January 9,
1991
We are deeply concerned over the news of the conviction and
sentencing in the People's Republic of China of seven persons who,
as far as we know, were guilty of nothing other than the peaceful
advocacy of democracy. We are concerned that these persons were
apparently charged, tried, and convicted for actions which, under
the [UN] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, any person should be
allowed to take without fear of punishment. We are concerned
about the secretive process under which the trials were conducted,
which raises serious questions about whether they were afforded
the opportunity of even-handed justice as provided for in the
Universal Declaration. Finally, we are concerned over the length of
the prison sentences. No sentence of any length on purely political
charges can be characterized as lenient.
The American people feel nothing other than friendship toward
the Chinese people. That is why the American public is greatly
concerned about the fate of those who exercised internationally
recognized rights. That is why we sincerely hope that the facts
behind the sentences which were handed down last week will be
fully explained, and anyone convicted solely for the exercise of
their right to express peacefully their views will be released. We
hope that the other political prisoners now held for non-violent
activities protected by the Universal Declaration will be released
without having to stand trial.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Diplomatic Activities: 1989-Present
Date: Jan 14, 19911/14/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Subject: State Department
Secretary of State Baker's Diplomatic Activities: 1989-Present
Contacts With Foreign Dignitaries
Bilaterals/Meetings/Events
(1991) 35
(1990) 584
(1989) 416
Congressional Testimony
(1991) --
(1990) 16
(1989) 12
International Flights
Miles
(1991) 18,240
(1990) 208,069
(1989) 42,923
In the air
(1991) 37 hrs
(1990) 403 hrs (1989) 307 hrs
Longest flight was 7 hours 30 minutes (Shannon to Manama Nov. 3, 1990)(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 2, January 14, 1991
Title: Current US Treaty Actions December 1990
Date: Dec 30, 199012/30/90
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Country: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Spain,
Turkey, United Kingdom
Subject: Environment, Science/Technology,
Media/Telecommunications, Immigration,
International Law, International Organizations,
Refugees, Trade/Economics, Terrorism
Multilateral
Agriculture
Convention on the inter-American institute for cooperation on
agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979. Entered into force
Dec. 8, 1980. TIAS 9919.
Ratification deposited: St. Kitts and Nevis, July 27, 1990.
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7,
1944. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the convention on
international civil aviation (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at
Buenos Aires Sept. 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.
Adherence deposited: Belize, Dec. 7, 1990.
Conservation
Convention on wetlands of international importance especially as
waterfowl habitat. Done at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. Entered into force
Dec. 21, 1975; for the US Dec. 18, 1986. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 99-28.
Accessions deposited: Chad, June 13, 1990; Ecuador, Sept. 7, 1990;
Guatemala, June 26, 1990; Guinea Bissau, May 14, 1990; Kenya, June
5, 1990; Sri Lanka, June 15, 1990.
Customs
Convention establishing a customs cooperation council, with annex.
Done at Brussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1952; for
the US Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.
Accession deposited: Angola, Sept. 26, 1990.
Fisheries
Convention for the establishment of an inter-American tropical
tuna commission. Signed at Washington May 31, 1949. Entered into
force Mar. 3, 1950. TIAS 2044.
Notification of adherence: Vanuatu, Sept. 10, 1990.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction.
Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983;
for the US July 1, 1988. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 99-11.
Signature: Ireland, May 23, 1990.
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, June 12, 1990.1,2
Pollution
Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, with annexes.
Done at Vienna Mar. 22, 1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988.
(Senate) Treaty Doc. 99-9.
Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, with
annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1989. (Senate) Treaty Doc. 100-10.
Accession deposited: Bulgaria, Nov. 20, 1990.
Protocol to the 1979 convention on long-range transboundary air
pollution (TIAS 10541) concerning the control of emissions of
nitrogen oxides or their trans-boundary flukes, with annex. Done at
Sofia Oct. 31, 1988. Enters into force Feb. 14, 1991.
Ratification deposited: Spain, Dec. 4, 1990.
Red Cross
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949
(TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of
victims of international armed conflicts (protocol I), with annexes.
Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.3
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949
(TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of
victims of non-international armed conflicts (protocol II). Adopted
at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.3
Ratifications deposited: Ukrainian Soviet SSR, Jan. 25, 1990;4
Czechoslovakia, Feb. 14, 1990; Yemen Arab Republic, Apr. 17, 1990.
Accession deposited: Barbados, Feb. 19, 1990.
Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan.
31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the US Nov. 1, 1968.
TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Belize, June 27, 1990.
Satellite Communications Systems
Convention on the international maritime satellite organization
(INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into
force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
Accession deposited: Monaco, Oct. 1, 1990; Romania, Yugoslavia,
Sept. 27, 1990.
Ratification deposited: Cameroon, Oct. 23, 1990.
Operating agreement on the international maritime satellite
organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976.
Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
Signatures: Monaco, Oct. 1, 1990; Romania, Yugoslavia, Sept. 27,
1990.
Sugar
International sugar agreement, 1987, with annexes. Done at London
Sept. 11, 1987. Entered into force provisionally Mar. 24, 1988.
Accession deposited: Switzerland, Nov. 20, 1990.
Terrorism
International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at
New York Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the US
Jan. 6, 1985.
Accession deposited: Grenada, Dec. 10, 1990.
Timber
International tropical timber agreement, 1983, with annexes. Done
at Geneva Nov. 18, 1983. Entered into force provisionally Apr. 1,
1985; for the US Apr. 26, 1985.
Accession deposited: Nepal, July 3, 1990; Zaire, Nov. 20, 1990.
Trade
United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of
goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262]
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Dec. 13, 1990.
Bilateral
Argentina
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with
attachments. Signed at Buenos Aires Dec. 4, 1990. Enters into
force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.
Brazil
Memorandum of understanding concerning environmental
cooperation. Signed at Washington Nov. 16, 1990. Entered into
force Nov. 16, 1990.
Canada
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of
forestry-related programs. Signed at Washington May 17, 1990.
Entered into force May 17, 1990.
Agreement extending the agreement of Oct. 28 and Dec. 5, 1980,
relating to coordination between the United States and Canadian
Coast Guards of icebreaking operations in the Great Lakes and St.
Lawrence Seaway system (TIAS 9950; 32 UST 4334). Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 4, 1990. Entered into force
Dec. 5, 1990.
Hong Kong
Agreement concerning the confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds and instrumentalities of drug trafficking. Signed at Hong
Kong Nov. 23, 1990. Enters into force on the date on which the
parties have notified each other in writing that their respective
requirements have been complied with.
Spain
Agreement concerning the free pursuit of gainful employment by
dependents of employees of diplomatic missions, consular posts, or
missions to international organizations, with exchange of notes.
Signed at Madrid July 25, 1990. Entered into force provisionally
July 25, 1990; definitively, when each party has notified the other
of the fulfillment of its internal requirements.
Turkey
Air transport agreement, with annexes. Signed at Washington on
Nov. 7, 1990. Enters into force after fulfillment of the
constitutional requirements by each party, on the date of an
exchange of notes.
United Kingdom
Agreement extending the agreement of May 14, 1987, as extended
concerning Montserrat and narcotics activities. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 29, 1990. Entered into force
Nov. 29, 1990; effective Dec. 1, 1990.
Agreement a