Dispatch, Volume 2: 1991

US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991


Persian Gulf Crisis: Going the Extra Mile For Peace

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 3, 19911/3/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] More than 1 month ago, on November 30, I proposed that Iraqi Foreign Minister [Tariq] Aziz travel to Washington to meet with me late in the week of December 10, to be followed shortly thereafter by a trip to Baghdad by Secretary of State James Baker. I did so "to go the extra mile for peace" and to demonstrate our commitment to all aspects of UN Security Council Resolution 678, including its "pause for goodwill" designed to give Iraq one final opportunity to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait on or before January 15. While I offered 15 days during which Secretary Baker was prepared to travel to Baghdad, including Christmas, Saddam Hussein showed himself to be more interested in manipulating my offer to his advantage than in a serious response. He was not too busy to see on short notice a wide range of individuals, including Kurt Waldheim, Willy Brandt, Muhammad Ali, Ted Heath, John Connolly, and Ramsey Clark, but he was too busy to find even a few hours to meet with the Secretary of State of the United States. Today marks the last of the 15 dates we suggested, and that effort is, therefore, at an end. Secretary Baker is departing on January 6 for several days of close consultation with coalition partners as the UNSC date of January 15 approaches. While I am not prepared to repeat my previous offer, rejected by Saddam Hussein, I am ready to make one last attempt to go the extra mile for peace. I have, therefore, offered through CDA [Charge d'Affaires] Joe Wilson in Baghdad to have Secretary Baker meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in Switzerland during the period January 7-9, while he is traveling on his consultations. This offer is being made subject to the same conditions as my previous attempt: no negotiations, no compromises, no attempts at face-saving, and no rewards for aggression. What there will be if Iraq accepts this offer is, simply and importantly, an opportunity to resolve this crisis peacefully. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

Radio Address to the Nation

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 5, 19911/5/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] As the new year begins, new challenges unfold--challenges to America and the future of our world. Simply put, 1990 saw Iraq invade and occupy Kuwait. Nineteen ninety-one will see Iraq withdraw--preferably by choice, by force if need be. It is my most sincere hope 1991 is a year of peace. I've seen the hideous face of war and counted the costs of conflict in friends lost. I remember this all too well and have no greater concern than the well-being of our men and women stationed in the Persian Gulf. True, their morale is sky high. True, if they are called upon to fight the aggressors, they will do their job courageously, professionally, and, in the end, decisively. There will be no more Vietnams.
Going the Extra Mile For Peace: Steps Taken
But we should go the extra mile before asking our servicemen and women to stand in harm's way. We should, and we have. The United Nations, with the full support of the United States, has already tried to peacefully pressure Iraq out of Kuwait, implementing economic sanctions and securing the condemnation of the world in the form of no less than 12 resolutions of the UN Security Council. This week we've taken one more step. I have offered to have Secretary of State James Baker meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Switzerland. Yesterday, we received word that Iraq has accepted our offer to meet in Geneva. This will not be secret diplomacy at work. Secretary Baker will restate, in person, a message for Saddam Hussein: withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally and immediately or face the terrible consequences. Eleven days from today, Saddam Hussein will either have met the UN deadline for a full and unconditional withdrawal, or he will have, once again, defied the civilized world. This is a deadline for Saddam Hussein to comply with the UN resolution, not a deadline for our own armed forces. Still, time is running out. It's running out because each day that passes bring real costs.
Strategic Threat
Saddam already poses a strategic threat to the capital cities of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and Syria, as well as our own men and women in the Gulf region. In fact, Saddam has used chemical weapons of mass destruction against innocent villagers, his own people. Each day that passes brings Saddam Hussein further on the path to developing biological and nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. If Saddam corners the world energy market, he can then finance further aggression, terror, and blackmail. Each day that passes increases Saddam's worldwide threat to democracy. The struggling newborn democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America already face a staggering challenge in making the transition to a free market, but the added weight of higher oil prices is a crushing burden they cannot afford. And our own economy is suffering, suffering the effects of higher oil prices and lower growth stemming from Saddam's aggression. Each day that passes, Saddam's forces also fortify and dig in deeper into Kuwait. We risk paying a higher price in the most precious currency of all--human life--if we give Saddam more time to prepare for war. Each day that passes is another day of fear, suffering, and terror for the people of Kuwait, many who risked their lives to shelter and hide Americans from Iraqi soldiers. As the Amir of Kuwait said to our Vice President just last week, those who advocate waiting longer for sanctions to work do not have to live under such brutal occupation. As I have discussed with Members of Congress just 2 days ago and in our many other consultations, economic sanctions are taking a toll, but they are still not forcing Saddam out of Kuwait, nor do we know when or even if they will be successful. As a result, America and her partners in this unprecedented coalition are sharing the burden of this important mission, and we are ready to use force to defend a new order emerging among the nations of the world, a world of sovereign nations living in peace. We have seen too often in this century how quickly any threat to one becomes a threat to all. At this critical moment in history, at a time the Cold War is fading into the past, we cannot fail. At stake is not simply some distant country called Kuwait. At stake is the kind of world we will inhabit. Last Thanksgiving, I broke bread with some of our men and women on the front lines. They understand why we are in Saudi Arabia and what we may have to do. I witnessed courage unfazed by the closeness of danger and determination undiminished by the harsh desert sun. These men and women are America's finest. We owe each of them our gratitude and full support, and that is why we must all stand together, not as Republicans or Democrats, conservatives or liberals, but as Americans. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

Persian Gulf: Mission of Peace

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from an interview with ABC-TV's Sam Donaldson on "Prime Time Live;" in Washington, DC Date: Jan 3, 19911/3/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] (Mr. Donaldson also spoke with Dr. Gerald Post.) Sam Donaldson: There are 12 days left before the United States may go to war. Twelve days before the UN deadline for Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait or face military force, and suddenly, what President Bush is calling one last attempt to avoid war rests on the shoulders of his Secretary of State, James Baker. We talked to Baker tonight about his mission and its prospects. The President has offered to send Baker to Switzerland to meet with the Foreign Minister of Iraq next Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday. No acceptance yet from Baghdad. But if the meeting takes place, the Iraqis will be facing in Baker one of the most skillful political poker players Washington has produced in a long time. The man who, as he told us, will be trying to get the message through loud and clear. James A. Baker, III, Texas born, Houston bred. Ronald Reagan's Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Treasury. George Bush's long- time friend and confidant. At 60, Secretary of State, a man who represents the country's interests abroad and, now, a man perhaps embarking on a mission that could make the difference between war and peace. We talked to him about it this evening at the State Department. The President has put on the table an offer for you to meet with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. What will be the purpose of the meeting if it takes place? Secretary Baker: Well, the purpose of that meeting would be to deliver a message, a personal message from President Bush to President Saddam Hussein and to make the case very clearly that the United States is, indeed, committed to the full implementation of all of the UN Security Council resolutions and all of our coalition partners are committed to the full implementation of those resolutions, and Iraq must unconditionally and completely withdraw from Kuwait. Mr. Donaldson: Do you think Saddam Hussein still believes that the President is bluffing, that the United States will not use force? Secretary Baker: We tend to believe that because his behavior so far would indicate that he doesn't believe that the United States is serious. Mr. Donaldson: And he's wrong on that? Secretary Baker: He's wrong on that. Mr. Donaldson: What's in the message from the President to Saddam Hussein? I guess I'm trying to get a sense of whether the President is going to take a tough line in that personal message or whether it will be more in the way of an appeal. Secretary Baker: No, I think the President will be very candid and very frank. He will say there are 12 UN Security Council resolutions calling upon you to do certain things, the primary one of which is to withdraw from Kuwait completely and unconditionally, and we and our coalition partners expect you to do that. Mr. Donaldson: Baker has been George Bush's right-hand man for years. He was his campaign manager in 1980 and 1988. Now as his Secretary of State, he clearly helps make policy, not just carry it out. Contentious congressional committees know he can be persuasive. Now he must prove it where it counts. This may be the most important meeting of your career. A lot is riding on it. Secretary Baker: A lot. Mr. Donaldson: Do you sense that? Secretary Baker: I think it's an important meeting. Mr. Donaldson: How do you sit down with him? If you do meet with him, what do you do? What kind of meeting is it? Do you look him in the eye; do you pound the table? That's not really your style. Secretary Baker: No, no, no, you don't. I've met with Tariq Aziz before. He's been here. He was here in the United States -- Mr. Donaldson: What do you say to him? Nice to see you again? Secretary Baker: He was here in the United States. I will say, when he begins to go into his litany of why they did what they did, that's really not the issue before us. Let's talk about where we go from here and how you fully comply with the UN Security Council resolutions. Mr. Donaldson: Whereas you are clearly a top policymaker in this government, you have the President's confidence, and you are more than just the Secretary of State to him. Tariq Aziz is the messenger. Secretary Baker: Well, let's hope, if that's the case, Sam, that he's a good messenger. Mr. Donaldson: Iraq's Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, is a skilled diplomat but, unlike Baker, has no real power. It is the mind of his President, Saddam Hussein, which must be unlocked. Dr. Gerald Post: This man is not the madman of the Middle East. In fact, he's a judicious political calculator, ruthless, pragmatic, a survivor and dangerous to the extreme. Mr. Donaldson: Dr. Gerald Post, professor of political psychology at George Washington University, constructs psychological profiles of world leaders for the US government. He helped prepare President Carter to deal with Menahem Begin and Anwar al-Sadat at Camp David by showing how best to handle each man based on personality. Post says Saddam is reveling in his sudden prominence on the world stage. Dr. Post: Now, for the first time, he is at the very center of world attention. His every word is fastened on; he's got his hands metaphorically on the throat of the world. Moreover, he is standing up bravely to the West, particularly to the United States; in particular to George Bush. Mr. Donaldson: How does Saddam Hussein react when President Bush says something publicly like, "We're going to kick his . . ." you know what? Dr. Post: I think that if anything, it enhances Saddam Hussein's stature that he is in this contest with George Bush. Mr. Donaldson: If Saddam is so delighted with his prominent role, particularly in the Arab world, is there no hope then that he will back down? Post says there is. Dr. Post: I am quite persuaded that Saddam is not a martyr; does not wish to go down to the last flaming bunker. He is quite capable at the 11th hour of reversing himself. He has done this on any number of occasions. Mr. Donaldson: Post says the key is to convince Saddam the military force arrayed against him will be used to destroy him unless he leaves Kuwait. But at the same time, reassure him that he won't be pursued if he does. Dr. Post: If he feels he is backed into a corner, with no way of escape, this man will go to the "nth" degree and will use whatever weapons are at his disposal, including biological and chemical weapons, if needs be, and what could be a very bloody final act. Mr. Donaldson: Does he care nothing about his people? Does he care nothing about Iraq? You mean he wouldn't sacrifice his own power base? He would much prefer to see Iraq destroyed? Dr. Post: There is no separate caring for Iraq in his mind. His only loyalty is to Saddam Hussein. Mr. Donaldson: The signal that follows from that analysis, that Saddam can retreat if he chooses, is a signal that Secretary Baker sent unmistakably tonight. Secretary Baker: If they fully comply with the UN Security Council resolutions, they can expect that we will not exercise force against them. To put it another way, we have been pursuing a carrot-and-stick policy here. The carrot is, if he withdraws completely and unconditionally from Kuwait, he doesn't get the stick. Mr. Donaldson: Let's talk about the congressional role for a moment. Senator [George] Mitchell says the President does not have the authority to go to war without a further congressional mandate. Do you agree? Mr. Donaldson: We have fought--I think we've committed troops, something like 200 times, and there's been a declaration of war five of those times. Mr. Donaldson: That doesn't make it right, does it? Secretary Baker: No, and I'm not arguing that it does. But I'm saying that reasonable minds can and do differ with respect to the question you've just asked. Mr. Donaldson: So you're saying the executive-- Secretary Baker: Yes, the executive branch's view is different. Mr. Donaldson: You can go to war, you believe, without a congressional mandate? Secretary Baker: Only Congress can declare war. Before you can answer that question of yours in a "yes" or "no," you need to define what you mean by "going to war." Clearly, the President can order US forces to respond to provocations in order to protect American citizens. Mr. Donaldson: This isn't a provocation. You're citing UN resolutions and telling us that Saddam Hussein better pay attention to them, suggesting that we'll go to war if he doesn't. Secretary Baker: Let me say one thing, Sam, to make sure everybody understands this. The President has not ruled out going to the Congress. What he has ruled out is saying in advance, under any and all circumstances--most of which we could not foresee now--he will come to the Congress for authorization. He has ruled that out. Mr. Donaldson: Mr. Secretary, if there is a war, a lot of Americans will die. Senator [Edward] Kennedy said the other day, in arguing to allow the sanctions more time to work, that it is better for our forces to sit under the sun in the desert than to die in the sand. Secretary Baker: I don't disagree with that, of course. It is better if there is not one single US casualty. That is what we would prefer, and that's why we strongly prefer a peaceful and political solution. It's one reason I'm taking this trip and one reason the President has made yet another proposal to Saddam Hussein for face-to-face talks between the United States and Iraq. We hope that the Iraqis pick up on this because this will be the last such proposal we will make. Mr. Donaldson: You've always been a good political observer. What's your hunch? Will there be war? Secretary Baker: Well, I really hope we can find a peaceful and political solution. I really do. I'm frankly not as optimistic about that possibility now as I was before Christmas. Mr. Donaldson: Baker says he's growing pessimistic, but he refused to discuss exactly when war might start if Saddam doesn't budge by the 15th, and he refused to comment on recent assertions from some US military commanders that US ground troops wouldn't be completely ready until February. But there is one more thing. Told that the latest ABC News/Washington Post poll shows a rising majority of Americans favoring war if necessary to free Kuwait, and favoring it quickly, Baker said such public support is exactly what he expected. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

American Support For Desert Shield

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Address before the US Gulf forces, Saudi Arabia Date: Jan 1, 19911/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization The 48th Tactical Fighter Wing is one of the most distinguished units in our Air Force. Time and again, you've brought honor to yourselves, your unit, and your country. You've participated in many missions requiring great skill and courage--not the least of which was on April 14, 1986, when you taught Colonel [Muammar] Qadhafi [of Libya] a lesson he'll long remember. Congratulations on a job well done. You have truly lived up to your name--the "Statue of Liberty Wing" of the US Air Force. And, once again, you are living up to your name. With your rapid deployment to this theater, you have put Saddam Hussein on notice that his aggression could not continue. And, of course, you are now prepared to act to repel his aggression if such action is needed. Time and again in our history, Americans have been called upon to stand up and be counted in defense of liberty. And time and again, brave and patriotic Americans have answered their nation's call. So it was with your grandfathers, so it was with your fathers, and so it is with you today. Winston Churchill once said that "Courage is the first of all human qualities, because it is the quality which guarantees all others." I came here today to salute your courage--because it's your courage, and your courage above all, that guarantees the freedoms all Americans cherish. Of course, what you're doing isn't easy. Some of you are lonely; all of you miss your homes and your loved ones. But the brave have always been lonely, and the courageous have never been known to play it safe. Today, America's finest men and women are to be found where Americans have always been found in times of crisis: shielding the innocent, defying the dictators, and defending the ramparts of liberty. You are not alone. The hopes and prayers of the American people are with you, and they support you every step of the way. The American people are clear about what's at stake here in the Gulf. They know that unless Saddam Hussein is stopped today, a nuclear-armed Iraq will control most of the world's energy supply tomorrow, thereby threatening the security and welfare of all nations. This is why the American people support you and Operation Desert Shield. At the beginning of this crisis, the President laid out our goals: achieving the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, restoring the legitimate government of Kuwait, protecting American citizens, and maintaining the security and stability of the Gulf region. The President is trying to solve this crisis without the use of force. He is pursuing every possible option to end this crisis now and to end it peacefully. Saddam Hussein could end the crisis tomorrow if he wanted to. He could get out of Kuwait, just as he invaded Kuwait, and allow the legitimate government to return. But Saddam Hussein may not withdraw unconditionally, and, if he doesn't, then he will be forced out of Kuwait by military action. And if force is required, President Bush has stated--and I repeat it- -this will not be another Vietnam. If force is necessary, it will be quick, massive, and decisive. You will do your job and then go home to your loved ones. You have heard some voices at home urging patience. They say, wait a year or two, let the sanctions work. But the sanctions have not gotten Saddam out of Kuwait. You have been patient enough and so has President Bush. But the fact is that a policy of indefinite patience could lead to a policy of appeasement. A policy of appeasement would make Saddam the victor. This cannot and will not happen. Please, don't pay attention to the nay- sayers. The American people overwhelmingly and enthusiastically support you and your mission. So our message is simple: Saddam Hussein--either get out of Kuwait peacefully or leave by force. It may turn out that the only language Saddam Hussein understands is the language of force. In that case, you will be called upon to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. And Saddam Hussein should understand that we will succeed in expelling him. We have the best people in the world, the best equipment, and, most importantly, the men and women of our armed forces are determined and ready. On my visits yesterday and today, I've found morale is sky high. We are ready, willing, and able to do what has to be done. Saddam Hussein has miscalculated before--when he started a war with Iran that he thought would end quickly and it lasted 8 years. He miscalculated when he invaded Kuwait. And he is miscalculating now if he still believes force isn't a credible option. It is. And if force is to be used, you will be using force to uphold our nation's most deeply held principles. You will be defending our vital national interests in the Gulf, first explained by President Truman and reaffirmed by all our Presidents since him. And you will carry with you the dreams of humanity for a safer, better world. When you have achieved the objective of getting Saddam out of Kuwait, the whole world will be grateful. And in the Middle East, in Europe, in the Soviet Union, in Asia, and in Africa, people all over the world will say "God bless America . . . and God bless the brave men and women who served our nation in the Gulf." Last week, I received a letter from Sergeant Jose Valdez, who is serving his country here in Saudi Arabia. He wrote: All of us here are proud to be Americans and soldiers serving our great nation. We are ready to do whatever it takes to protect and assist our allies. Well, Sergeant First Class Valdez, I and all of us at home are very proud of you. And we are very proud of all you serving here. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

Gulf Crisis Update

Date: Jan 7, 19911/7/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] The following is an overview of US objectives in the Persian Gulf crisis based on statements by President Bush and Secretary Baker and actions of the UN Security Council. It will be updated periodically.
US Objectives
US objectives in the Persian Gulf call for the: -- Immediate implementation of all relevant UN Security Council resolutions; -- Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; -- Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; -- Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; -- Protection of American citizens held hostage by Iraq, both in Iraq and Kuwait.
The Stakes
-- Saddam is a very dangerous dictator--armed to the teeth--who is threatening a critical region at a defining moment in history. Saddam has invaded two neighbors, harbors terrorists, and now is systematically exterminating Kuwait. Saddam uses poisonous gas, brandishes deadly toxins, and tries relentlessly to acquire nuclear bombs. He has built the world's sixth largest army, has acquired the fourth largest tank army, and has deployed ballistic missiles. -- Iraq's aggression against Kuwait challenges world peace and threatens the vision of a better world in the aftermath of the Cold War. As Presidents Bush and Gorbachev stated jointly in Helsinki: "No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors." Saddam Hussein's aggression is a challenge to the rest of the international community. If we reverse his aggression, we will help define the world that lies beyond the Cold War as a place where civilized rules of conduct apply. -- Iraq's aggression is a regional challenge. The Middle East is an area of unresolved conflicts, sectarian and social strife, and economic disparities. A peaceful solution to these problems is the only way to preserve the security of our friends. -- Iraq's aggression challenges the global economy. If an aggressive state is allowed to sit astride the economic lifeline of the industrial world, everyone will suffer profound setbacks to economic growth. As Secretary Baker stated, "If [Saddam] is not stopped now, if his aggressive designs are not frustrated, peacefully, if possible or, if necessary, by force, we will all pay a higher price later." -- We must stand with the people of Kuwait so that the annexation of Kuwait does not become the first reality that mars our vision of a new world order.
-- UN Security Council Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, authorizes "member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait" to use "all necessary means" to uphold the above resolutions, while giving Iraq "one final opportunity, as a pause of good will" to abide by the resolutions by January 15, 1991. This "pause for peace" gives the international community "a better opportunity" to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. The UN Security Council resolution authorizes the use of all necessary means but certainly does not require it. It should be crystal clear to Iraq that force is not going to be ruled out as an option. It is a real, live, credible option. -- President Bush and Secretary Baker have devoted great personal efforts to find a diplomatic, political, and peaceful solution to this problem. The United States does not intend to leave any stones unturned in our search for a solution. -- The President invited Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to meet with him between December 20 and January 3. The President also suggested that Secretary Baker meet with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad during that period. The Iraqis failed to agree to the offer. -- On January 3, 1991, the President stated that he was "ready to make one last attempt to go the extra mile for peace." Therefore, he offered to have Secretary Baker meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in Switzerland during the period January 7-9, while the Secretary travels in Europe and the Gulf for consultations with coalition partners. -- The President made his offer subject to the same conditions as his previous attempt, in his words: "No negotiations, no compromises, no attempts at face-saving, and no rewards for aggression." -- The President and Secretary Baker will not discuss anything less than Iraq's complete withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and freedom for all hostages.
-- After 4 months of a stringent embargo, sanctions are having some effect on the Iraqi economy, but no one can say that sanctions alone can impose a high enough cost on Saddam Hussein to get him to withdraw. -- Adverse economic impact on Iraq is not the way to measure success. Success is Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. -- Saddam believes that he can endure economic sanctions. In part, that is because he can, to a considerable extent, decide who in Iraq gets hurt by them. He continues to impose economic sacrifices on the Iraqi people to support his army and ambitions. -- Waiting for sanctions to work effectively gives Saddam time to break them but also imposes enormous costs. He will continue to grind up Kuwait, to fortify it, to build chemical and biological weapons, to acquire nuclear capability, and to generate other issues aimed at dissolving the coalition arrayed against him. -- That is why the US must make credible military preparations aimed at achieving peace. Our diplomatic efforts will continue, but full support for our military preparations will make credible our offensive option to liberate Kuwait. -- Failure to continue military preparations would have at least three dangerous consequences. 1) It would undercut our diplomatic leverage by removing the new option to use force. 2) It would tend to reaffirm the status quo and to legitimize to some extent Iraq's brutal occupation of Kuwait. 3) Finally, it would mean risking greater casualties, should conflict occur.
International Response
-- The international coalition has had considerable success in isolating Iraq and making it pay high costs for its occupation and rape of Kuwait. Twenty-seven nations have joined in a truly unprecedented multinational force, deploying a substantial number of troops in the region to deter further aggression and to support UN Security Council resolutions. -- At the request of the Ankara government, the air component of NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force is being deployed to Turkey. These NATO forces from Belgium, Germany, and Italy will help defend Turkey's border with Iraq. -- For calendar year 1990, the Saudis and the smaller gulf states have pledged more than $6 billion toward US direct defense costs. They also have pledged $6 billion in aid to front-line states and $2.5 billion to other affected nations to resettle refugees, subsidize higher oil bills, and defray other costs. -- In 1991, additional responsibility-sharing will be required. All of our coalition partners recognize this fact.
State Department Gulf Crisis Information
Emergencies: 202-647-0900 (24 hours) Questions or comments about the Administration's Persian Gulf policy: 202-647-6575 or 6576 Monday-Friday, 8:30 am-5 pm (Eastern Standard Time) (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

New Year's Greetings

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Videotaped messages exchanged between the Presidents of the Soviet Union and the United States; Washington, DC Date: Jan 1, 19911/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Democratization [TEXT] President Bush: It's a great pleasure to wish President and Mrs. Gorbachev and all the peoples of the Soviet Union a happy and healthy New Year. In your country and in mine, the start of a New Year is a good time to reflect on the many achievements of the past and to look ahead with hope. This year, our two countries as well as those around the world, have much to be grateful for. First and foremost, the improved and strengthened relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Our countries have made great progress, particularly in important political and arms control areas. And we've taken a common approach to a new challenge in the name of stability and peace. I applaud, the world applauds, the decisive action of the Soviet Union in strongly opposing Saddam Hussein's brutal aggression in the Gulf. But just as important as these new areas of cooperation between our two nations are the increased contacts between the Americans and Soviet peoples. Tens of thousands of Soviets have had contact with Americans now, and the numbers are growing. Barbara and I are thrilled to see our two peoples meeting and getting to know one another as friendly neighbors. On this New Year's Day, as you celebrate with your friends and family, I also want to applaud the Soviet Union for the important steps you've taken in building a new society, for the determination with which you are pressing forward with difficult political and economic reforms. It's an arduous journey, but one well worth making, for it is a path that leads to a brighter future for your nation. The American people look with hope to the year ahead. Our two nations have set out on a new course making a better life for both our peoples and a better world of peace and understanding. On behalf of the American people, I wish President Gorbachev and all the wonderful people of the Soviet Union a happy, prosperous New Year. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

New Year's Greetings

Gorbachev Source: President Gorbachev Description: Videotaped messages exchanged between the Presidents of the Soviet Union and the United States; Moscow, USSR Date: Jan 1, 19911/1/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Democratization President Gorbachev:Esteemed citizens of the United States of America: on behalf of the Soviet people, I send you New Year's greetings. The year 1990 is over, and with it the 1980s. They have been full of events of enormous importance. The Cold War has gone. Gone, too, is the direct threat of nuclear disaster. Horizons of peace have begun to open. And Europe, together with the United States and Canada, has been first to take advantage of this by collectively agreeing on how it will enter the 21st century. Much has yet to be completed. Many questions still worry both Europeans and Asians, everyone in this world--in a world awakened to the quest for its future. The nations and states have moved toward new shores. That path will not be without danger or pain. At its very beginning, this world community is facing a serious test--aggression in the Persian Gulf. And it must find in itself the strength to overcome it in such a way as not to wreck the movement, which has begun, toward a peaceful period of civilization. The main thing now, at this turning point in history, is to achieve a firmer realization that only by joint efforts, only through cooperation and by taking account of the mutual dependence of interests, can we expect progress and security for all and, therefore, also for ourselves. The many encouraging things which have occurred in the world during these years and in the outgoing year are connected with the improvement in Soviet-American relations. The trust and mutual understanding between the leaderships of our two states have led to an improvement in the international situation. I will soon meet again with President George Bush, and I am confident that it will strengthen the constructive beginning of our relations even more. Not all the old obstacles have been eliminated. Economic and scientific-technical ties still do not meet with the spirit of the times. Nevertheless, Soviet-American interaction is gaining an ever more reliable basis in contacts between the peoples. In the past, it was only our politicians, and sometimes sportsmen, who went to each other's countries. Now, the mood is changing in the business world. Contacts between business people have become regular. Those in the military are conducting a dialogue in a frank manner. Trips by scientists, performers, artists, and writers, and just travel itself are becoming the norm. We have begun to get to know each other better. That is why a beneficial feeling of solidarity is emerging. The past year has been a hard one for the Soviet people. But this has been a year of fundamental changes in society, and a year of the most difficult, but the most necessary, decisions. They will enable our great country--and it will remain great--to overcome the crisis situation and march confidently along the path of steady democratic progress. Life for us all now is no carefree stroll. In greeting the citizens of America, I wish you a happy New Year, and I wish you success in everything you do, prosperity to your families, and peace to your great country. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

Deployment of NATO Rapid Reaction Force

Fitzwater Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 2, 19911/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Turkey Subject: NATO, Military Affairs [TEXT] NATO decided today, at a meeting of its Defense Planning Committee, to deploy the air component of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force to Turkey. Turkey asked the alliance for this help in order to deter the threat posed by Iraq and demonstrate NATO's solidarity with Turkey in this crisis. The NATO unit that will go to Turkey includes squadrons of aircraft from Germany, Italy, and Belgium. This alliance move is significant in three respects. First, the Allies Command Europe Mobile Force has never before been deployed in a crisis to defend an ally. Second, the decision demonstrates the alliance's support for the coalition effort and Turkey's part in it against Saddam Hussein. Third, the deployment confirms the importance and effectiveness of the alliance in the post-Cold War era. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

Deployment of NATO Rapid Reaction Force

Boucher Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher Description: Washington, DC Date: Jan 2, 19911/2/91 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Turkey Subject: NATO, Military Affairs [TEXT] NATO today took another important step in response to the crisis in the Persian Gulf. At the request of Turkey, the alliance's Defense Planning Council (DPC) has decided to deploy the air component of the ACE Mobile Force to that country for defensive and deterrent purposes. This action is another firm signal of Western resolve and solidarity in response to a clear threat to the security of a member country, and thus to the alliance as a whole. We strongly welcome this decision, which follows a reaffirmation of NATO's mutual defense commitment by alliance foreign ministers on December 17. The ACE Mobile Force will comprise air force elements from Germany, Belgium, and Italy. This is the first ever deployment of the ACE Mobile Force. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

Fact Sheet: Deployment of NATO Rapid Reaction Force

Date: Jan 2, 19911/2/91 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Europe, MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Turkey Subject: NATO, Military Affairs
The ACE Mobile Force is an alliance rapid reaction force, comprised of units from several countries. It was created by NATO in 1960 as a multinational force that could be sent at short notice to any threatened part of allied Europe to demonstrate the solidarity of the alliance and its ability and determination to defend itself against aggression. It has never been deployed in a crisis. The force, as a whole, is composed of land and air forces from Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The air component is comprised of some 40 fighter aircraft from Belgium, Germany, and Italy. Until assembled at the request of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), most units assigned to the mobile force are stationed in their home countries.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

Hemisphere United Against Suriname Coup

Einaudi Source: Luigi R. Einaudi, US Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States Description: Statement to the Special Session of the OAS Permanent Council; Washington, DC Date: Dec 28, 199012/28/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America, South America Country: Suriname, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, Argentina, Brazil Subject: OAS, Military Affairs, Democratization, Human Rights [TEXT]
Suriname Coup
On the night of December 24, the leaders of the armed forces of Suriname forced the Surinamese executive and cabinet to "turn in their portfolios." At the same time, they ordered the Surinamese people to stay in their homes. In doublespeak worthy of [George] Orwell's worst nightmare, a military spokesman accused the constitutionally elected government of failing to hold free elections and, in a clumsy attempt to break the inevitable wave of repudiation from within Suriname and from abroad, promised free elections to the Surinamese people in "100 days." Soldiers armed under constitutional authority and sworn to uphold the constitution have arrogated to themselves the right to interpret the constitution unilaterally and abrogate it in the process. We have seen this all before. I do not believe there is a person in this chamber who wants to see it again. The history of our hemisphere has long been written as a history of civil-military conflicts. Yet despite recurring rumors and even outright coup attempts, the last successful coup d'etat took place in Guatemala in 1982, 8 years ago; last use of military force to seize power from civilians took place in 1980 in Bolivia and in Suriname. Ten years without a coup against civilian rule had led many of us to hope that a new era was dawning. As President Bush said in Buenos Aires on December 5: "Too many brave people sacrificed and died to bring democracy back to Latin America. Let those who would attack constitutional democracy understand: In Latin America the day of the dictator is over.
The Day of the Dictator is Over
There is, of course, the possibility that with the end of the Cold War, the day of the dictator is ending throughout the world. As we meet here today, 28 nations, including some from this hemisphere, have military units on duty in the Persian Gulf supporting the United Nations against a military dictator who has sought to impose the law of the bully (la ley del maton) on his people and his neighbors. In the Americas, the situation is both clearer and better. Anachronisms aside, the day of the dictator is indeed over. Moreover, substantial progress is taking place to build the foundation of civil-military cooperation in fundamental areas of human rights, security, and national development in a new democratic era. Argentina and Brazil have moved forward to give effect to the Treaty of Tlatelolco by agreeing to negotiate an agreement on nuclear safeguards. Lauding the decisions of these states to bring the Tlatelolco Treaty on nuclear nonproliferation into force, President Bush said on December 3 in Brasilia: We hope that all countries in this hemisphere will follow Brazil's and Argentina's recent decision to bring the nonproliferation treaty . . . into force. In Central America, the Esquipulas process has contributed decisively to a reduction of military tensions. The Central American Security Commission, created by the June 1990 Antigua accords, is bringing senior political and military leaders together to discuss shifting resources from military to humanitarian needs and is looking ahead to negotiating real reductions in conventional arms. In Nicaragua and in Haiti, the Organization of American States has over the past year--and yes, it is only a year since representatives of the Secretary General were fully engaged in monitoring the election campaign in Nicaragua--helped to shape an environment of peaceful conflict resolution. The successful elections in Haiti earlier this month were marked by the impartiality and confidence generated by international observers. The OAS International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV) is still bringing essential impartiality and confidence to the processes of repatriation and national reconciliation in Nicaragua. In short, real progress--generating tangible results--has been made in our hemisphere toward new levels of international cooperation to achieve regional peace and security. This progress is uneven. Narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and clandestine arms smuggling are still major obstacles to regional peace and security. The December 4-5, 1990, rebellion in Panama demonstrates that much remains to be done to advance professionalism even in a case where major advances have taken place. Economic achievements and opportunities are still too often obscured by poverty and lack of competitiveness. Perhaps most importantly, human rights concerns remain a top priority for us in far too many countries. This said, my government believes we have a major opportunity to build a new era of civil-military cooperation in changing, newly democratic societies. On balance, we are seeing unprecedented respect on the part of military leaders and institutions for the democratic process. On balance, we are seeing an appreciation on the part of civilian political leaders for the institutional interests of the military and a recognition of the important place reserved for the armed forces in a democratic society.
A Call to Restore Power
And now, like an ominous and spiteful rejection of this future to which we are all committed, we have the events that have occasioned this meeting. For 5 years following independence from the Netherlands in 1975, Suriname was a functioning democracy with an excellent human rights record. Then, in 1980, the legitimate government was overthrown. By late 1982, the Bouterse junta institutionalized repression of civilian opposition, culminating in the murders of 15 civic leaders. Some were beaten to death, others tortured and shot in cold blood. Because of the appalling Bouterse human rights record, in 1982 both the United States and the Netherlands suspended economic and military aid to Suriname. Suriname's 1988 return to civilian rule was not respected by military leaders. Continuing human rights abuses, military harassment of civilians, interference with government activities and with shipments of food and medicine outside the capital, together with other "emergency powers" with no apparent legal basis, are powerful reminders of the Surinamese military's callous disregard for civilian authority and human rights. On June 4, 1990, President Ramsewak Shankar of Suriname addressed the OAS General Assembly in Asuncion, Paraguay. He said, among other things: "The process of peace which is taking place in Suriname, which I have been called upon to lead, aims, in the first place, at putting an end to the armed approach of settling disputes and is, furthermore, geared toward guaranteeing the participation of every subgroup at the national level, as well as realizing the integral development of the nation." We cannot be silent about the events in Suriname that deprive the Surinamese people of their rights. We cannot allow these illegal acts to threaten the post-Cold War democratic equilibrium now developing. The United States condemns the violation of constitutional order in Suriname and calls on the Surinamese military to restore power immediately to the democratically elected authorities of that country. The United States is proud to cosponsor the resolution drafted by Venezuela and the other members of the Group of Rio. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

OAS Resolution 554 on Suriname

Date: Dec 28, 199012/28/90 Category: Fact Sheets Region: South America Country: Suriname Subject: OAS, Democratization [TEXT] Following is the text of Resolution 554 of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, December 28, 1990--Present Political Situation in Suriname. The resolution was adopted by a consensus of 26 of the 27 members present; Suriname did not join the consensus.
The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Considering:
That the Charter of the Organization establishes that "the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man"; That democratically elected President Mr. Ramsewak Shankar was deposed by a military coup on December 24, 1990; and That this act of force violently disturbs the democratic institutional order of a member state, violates the right of its people to elect its governors freely, and deals a severe setback to the democratization process in the Hemisphere, Resolves: 1. To categorically repudiate the military coup in Suriname, which thwarts the fundamental right of the people of that country to live in a system of freedom and democracy. 2. To issue an appeal for reestablishment of the democratic institutional order and the avoidance of any act that could aggravate the situation and impair the full enjoyment of human rights. 3. To keep the situation in Suriname under review, without violation of the principle of nonintervention, and to request the Secretary General to inform the Permanent Council on the course of events in that member state.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

Country Profile: Suriname

Date: Jan 7, 19901/7/90 Category: Country Data Region: South America Country: Suriname Subject: History [TEXT] Official Name: Republic of Suriname
Nationality: Noun--Surinamer(s). Adjective--Surinamese. Population (July 1989 est): 421,571. Annual growth rate (Jan 1989 est): 2%. Ethnic groups: Hindustani (East Indian) 37%, Creole 31%, Javanese 15.3%, Bush Negro 10.3%, Amerindians 2.7%, Chinese 1.7% (percentages date from 1972 census, the last in which ethnicity data was collected). Religions: Hindu, Muslim, Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed, Moravian, and several other Christian groups, Jewish, Baha'i. Languages: Dutch (official), English, Sranang Tongo (Creole language), Hindustani, Javanese. Education: Compulsory--ages 6-12. Literacy--85%. Health: Infant mortality rate--35/1,000, Life expectancy--68 years. Work force (100,000): Agriculture--28%, industry and commerce-- 15%, government--43%.
Area: 163,265 sq. km. (63,037 sq. mi.); slightly larger than Georgia. Cities: Capital--Paramaribo (pop. 180,000). Other towns--Nieuw Nickerie, Albina, Moengo. Terrain: Varies from coastal swamps to savanna to hills. Climate: Tropical.
Type: Constitutional democracy. Constitution: September 1987. Independence: November 25, 1975. Branches: Executive--president, vice president, council of ministers. Legislative--elected 51-member national assembly made up of representatives of political parties. Judicial--Court of Justice. Administrative subdivisions: 11 districts. Political parties: Progressive Reformed Party (VHP), National Party of Suriname (NPS), Indonesian Peasants' Party (KTPI), Progressive Workers' and Farmers' Party (PALU), New Democratic Party of Suriname (NDP). Suffrage: Universal at 18. Central government expenditures (1988): $640 million. Flag: Green, white, red, white, green horizontal stripes with yellow star in the middle of the red bar.
GDP (1988): $ 1,233 million. Per capita GDP (1988): $3,000 (at official exchange rate). Average inflation rate (1988 est.): 51%. Natural resources: Bauxite, iron ore, and other minerals; forests; hydroelectric potential; fish and shrimp. Agriculture: Product--rice, palm oil, bananas, timber, sugarcane, and citrus fruits. Arable land--2 million hectares. Cultivated land- -80,000 hectares. Industry: Types--aluminum, alumina, processed food, lumber, bricks, tiles, cigarettes. Trade (1988): Exports--$358 million: bauxite, alumina, aluminum, wood and wood products, rice, bananas, and shrimp. Major markets- -US, Netherlands, EC, and other European countries. Imports--$238 million: capital equipment, petroleum, iron and steel products, agricultural products. Major suppliers--US, Netherlands, EC, Brazil, Caribbean countries.
Membership in International Organizations
UN and some of its specialized and related agencies, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Health Organization (WHO); International Labor Organization (ILO); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); Organization of American States (OAS); Nonaligned Movement; Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA); CARICOM (observer); International Bauxite Association, associated with the EC through the Lome Convention, Inter- American Development Bank (IDB); International Finance Corporation (IFC). (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991 Title:

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Date: Jan 7, 19901/7/90 Category: Fact Sheets Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control [TEXT] Since its entry into force in March 1970, the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been a cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Successive US administrations have worked to achieve universal adherence to the treaty. With more than 140 parties, it has the largest number of adherents of any arms control agreement. Three of the nuclear weapon states--the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union--are parties to the treaty. France and China are not, although France has indicated it will act as though it is. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, designated as depository governments in the treaty, continue to encourage the few remaining non-parties to adhere to this important arms control treaty.
Treaty Goals and Undertakings
The treaty's substantive articles have been drawn carefully to serve three major goals (see below). Under terms of the treaty, nuclear weapon states are obligated not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state to acquire nuclear explosive devices (Article I). Correspondingly, non-nuclear weapon states party to the treaty are obligated not to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices (Article II). The treaty provides for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to apply international safeguards, including on-site inspection, to all nuclear material in the peaceful programs of non- nuclear weapon state parties (Article III). This article also obligates the parties to require IAEA safeguards on nuclear materials and certain equipment exported to non-nuclear weapon states. The safeguards system helps to verify compliance and is designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear explosive devices. Article IV recognizes the right of parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and calls for the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties also are to have access to any benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions (Article V). Article VI enjoins all parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to ending the nuclear arms race, with a view to general and complete disarmament. The NPT embodies a broadly supported international norm of non-proliferation: increasingly, world opinion has come to view acquisition of nuclear explosives as no longer legitimate and a world of many nuclear powers as undesirable.
Review Conference
Under the treaty, a review conference can be held every 5 years. Four such conferences have been held, in 1975, 1980, 1985, and August-September 1990. Each of these conferences successfully undertook an article-by-article review of the treaty's implementation, with the debate focusing on cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Article IV) and, to an even greater degree, on efforts to negotiate arms control agreements (Article VI). At the 1990 conference, participants generally recognized the treaty's important contribution to international peace and security, and a great majority of the parties attending reaffirmed their commitment to it. Agreement was reached on most of the issues discussed, including, for example, the vital role of international safeguards in preventing nuclear proliferation, the necessity of tighter export controls on nuclear technology, the need for scrupulous adherence to the obligations of the treaty, and the potential importance of the IAEA conducting "special inspections." However, no final consensus declaration emerged because a small number of nonaligned countries, led by Mexico, insisted on language linking extension of the treaty to negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty.
1995 Extension Conference
The NPT calls for a conference in 1995 to decide whether to extend the treaty indefinitely beyond its initial 25-year duration or for a fixed period or periods. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR favor an indefinite extension of the treaty. Many other NPT parties share this view. The United States strongly opposes linking the future of the treaty to a comprehensive test ban treaty or a specific arms control measure. Such linkage could undermine the treaty and the broad security benefits that derive from it.
Looking Ahead
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is vital to a safer and more secure world. The success of the 1995 conference will depend on many factors, particularly on recognition by the parties that the NPT contributes greatly to international security and stability. A world without NPT would lead to diminished political constraints on the spread of nuclear explosives, increase regional suspicion and tension, and jeopardize international peace and stability.
Three Major Goals of the NPT
To prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons (the driving force behind the initial push for the NPT); To foster peaceful nuclear cooperation under safeguards; and To encourage negotiations to end the nuclear arms race with a view to general and complete disarmament (a goal added during the multilateral negotiations on the treaty).(###)