Dispatch, Volume 2: 1991
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: Persian Gulf Crisis: Going the Extra Mile For Peace
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan 3, 19911/3/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
More than 1 month ago, on November 30, I proposed that Iraqi
Foreign Minister [Tariq] Aziz travel to Washington to meet with me
late in the week of December 10, to be followed shortly thereafter
by a trip to Baghdad by Secretary of State James Baker. I did so "to
go the extra mile for peace" and to demonstrate our commitment to
all aspects of UN Security Council Resolution 678, including its
"pause for goodwill" designed to give Iraq one final opportunity to
withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait on or before January 15.
While I offered 15 days during which Secretary Baker was
prepared to travel to Baghdad, including Christmas, Saddam Hussein
showed himself to be more interested in manipulating my offer to
his advantage than in a serious response. He was not too busy to
see on short notice a wide range of individuals, including Kurt
Waldheim, Willy Brandt, Muhammad Ali, Ted Heath, John Connolly,
and Ramsey Clark, but he was too busy to find even a few hours to
meet with the Secretary of State of the United States. Today marks
the last of the 15 dates we suggested, and that effort is, therefore,
at an end.
Secretary Baker is departing on January 6 for several days of
close consultation with coalition partners as the UNSC date of
January 15 approaches. While I am not prepared to repeat my
previous offer, rejected by Saddam Hussein, I am ready to make one
last attempt to go the extra mile for peace. I have, therefore,
offered through CDA [Charge d'Affaires] Joe Wilson in Baghdad to
have Secretary Baker meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in
Switzerland during the period January 7-9, while he is traveling on
his consultations.
This offer is being made subject to the same conditions as my
previous attempt: no negotiations, no compromises, no attempts at
face-saving, and no rewards for aggression. What there will be if
Iraq accepts this offer is, simply and importantly, an opportunity to
resolve this crisis peacefully. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: Radio Address to the Nation
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan 5, 19911/5/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
As the new year begins, new challenges unfold--challenges to
America and the future of our world. Simply put, 1990 saw Iraq
invade and occupy Kuwait. Nineteen ninety-one will see Iraq
withdraw--preferably by choice, by force if need be. It is my most
sincere hope 1991 is a year of peace.
I've seen the hideous face of war and counted the costs of
conflict in friends lost. I remember this all too well and have no
greater concern than the well-being of our men and women
stationed in the Persian Gulf. True, their morale is sky high. True,
if they are called upon to fight the aggressors, they will do their
job courageously, professionally, and, in the end, decisively. There
will be no more Vietnams.
Going the Extra Mile For Peace: Steps Taken
But we should go the extra mile before asking our servicemen
and women to stand in harm's way. We should, and we have. The
United Nations, with the full support of the United States, has
already tried to peacefully pressure Iraq out of Kuwait,
implementing economic sanctions and securing the condemnation of
the world in the form of no less than 12 resolutions of the UN
Security Council.
This week we've taken one more step. I have offered to have
Secretary of State James Baker meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz in Switzerland. Yesterday, we received word that Iraq
has accepted our offer to meet in Geneva. This will not be secret
diplomacy at work. Secretary Baker will restate, in person, a
message for Saddam Hussein: withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally
and immediately or face the terrible consequences.
Eleven days from today, Saddam Hussein will either have met
the UN deadline for a full and unconditional withdrawal, or he will
have, once again, defied the civilized world. This is a deadline for
Saddam Hussein to comply with the UN resolution, not a deadline for
our own armed forces. Still, time is running out. It's running out
because each day that passes bring real costs.
Strategic Threat
Saddam already poses a strategic threat to the capital cities
of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and Syria, as well as our own
men and women in the Gulf region. In fact, Saddam has used
chemical weapons of mass destruction against innocent villagers,
his own people. Each day that passes brings Saddam Hussein further
on the path to developing biological and nuclear weapons and the
missiles to deliver them. If Saddam corners the world energy
market, he can then finance further aggression, terror, and
blackmail. Each day that passes increases Saddam's worldwide
threat to democracy.
The struggling newborn democracies of Eastern Europe and
Latin America already face a staggering challenge in making the
transition to a free market, but the added weight of higher oil
prices is a crushing burden they cannot afford. And our own
economy is suffering, suffering the effects of higher oil prices and
lower growth stemming from Saddam's aggression.
Each day that passes, Saddam's forces also fortify and dig in
deeper into Kuwait. We risk paying a higher price in the most
precious currency of all--human life--if we give Saddam more time
to prepare for war. Each day that passes is another day of fear,
suffering, and terror for the people of Kuwait, many who risked
their lives to shelter and hide Americans from Iraqi soldiers. As
the Amir of Kuwait said to our Vice President just last week, those
who advocate waiting longer for sanctions to work do not have to
live under such brutal occupation.
As I have discussed with Members of Congress just 2 days ago
and in our many other consultations, economic sanctions are taking
a toll, but they are still not forcing Saddam out of Kuwait, nor do
we know when or even if they will be successful.
As a result, America and her partners in this unprecedented
coalition are sharing the burden of this important mission, and we
are ready to use force to defend a new order emerging among the
nations of the world, a world of sovereign nations living in peace.
We have seen too often in this century how quickly any threat
to one becomes a threat to all. At this critical moment in history,
at a time the Cold War is fading into the past, we cannot fail. At
stake is not simply some distant country called Kuwait. At stake is
the kind of world we will inhabit.
Last Thanksgiving, I broke bread with some of our men and
women on the front lines. They understand why we are in Saudi
Arabia and what we may have to do. I witnessed courage unfazed by
the closeness of danger and determination undiminished by the
harsh desert sun. These men and women are America's finest. We
owe each of them our gratitude and full support, and that is why we
must all stand together, not as Republicans or Democrats,
conservatives or liberals, but as Americans. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: Persian Gulf: Mission of Peace
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from an interview with ABC-TV's Sam Donaldson
on "Prime Time Live;" in Washington, DC
Date: Jan 3, 19911/3/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
(Mr. Donaldson also spoke with Dr. Gerald Post.)
Sam Donaldson: There are 12 days left before the United
States may go to war. Twelve days before the UN deadline for
Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait or face military force, and
suddenly, what President Bush is calling one last attempt to avoid
war rests on the shoulders of his Secretary of State, James Baker.
We talked to Baker tonight about his mission and its
prospects. The President has offered to send Baker to Switzerland
to meet with the Foreign Minister of Iraq next Monday, Tuesday, or
Wednesday. No acceptance yet from Baghdad. But if the meeting
takes place, the Iraqis will be facing in Baker one of the most
skillful political poker players Washington has produced in a long
time. The man who, as he told us, will be trying to get the message
through loud and clear.
James A. Baker, III, Texas born, Houston bred. Ronald Reagan's
Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Treasury. George Bush's long-
time friend and confidant. At 60, Secretary of State, a man who
represents the country's interests abroad and, now, a man perhaps
embarking on a mission that could make the difference between war
and peace. We talked to him about it this evening at the State
Department.
The President has put on the table an offer for you to meet
with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. What will be the
purpose of the meeting if it takes place?
Secretary Baker: Well, the purpose of that meeting
would be to deliver a message, a personal message from President
Bush to President Saddam Hussein and to make the case very clearly
that the United States is, indeed, committed to the full
implementation of all of the UN Security Council resolutions and all
of our coalition partners are committed to the full implementation
of those resolutions, and Iraq must unconditionally and completely
withdraw from Kuwait.
Mr. Donaldson: Do you think Saddam Hussein
still believes that the President is bluffing, that the United States
will not use force?
Secretary Baker: We tend to believe that because his
behavior so far would indicate that he doesn't believe that the
United States is serious.
Mr. Donaldson: And he's wrong on that?
Secretary Baker: He's wrong on that.
Mr. Donaldson: What's in the message from the
President to Saddam Hussein? I guess I'm trying to get a sense of
whether the President is going to take a tough line in that personal
message or whether it will be more in the way of an appeal.
Secretary Baker: No, I think the President will be very
candid and very frank. He will say there are 12 UN Security Council
resolutions calling upon you to do certain things, the primary one of
which is to withdraw from Kuwait completely and unconditionally,
and we and our coalition partners expect you to do that.
Mr. Donaldson: Baker has been George Bush's right-hand
man for years. He was his campaign manager in 1980 and 1988.
Now as his Secretary of State, he clearly helps make policy, not
just carry it out. Contentious congressional committees know he
can be persuasive. Now he must prove it where it counts.
This may be the most important meeting of your career. A lot
is riding on it.
Secretary Baker: A lot.
Mr. Donaldson: Do you sense that?
Secretary Baker: I think it's an important meeting.
Mr. Donaldson: How do you sit down with him? If you
do meet with him, what do you do? What kind of meeting is it? Do
you look him in the eye; do you pound the table? That's not really
your style.
Secretary Baker: No, no, no, you don't. I've met with
Tariq Aziz before. He's been here. He was here in the United States
--
Mr. Donaldson: What do you say to him? Nice to see
you again?
Secretary Baker: He was here in the United States. I
will say, when he begins to go into his litany of why they did what
they did, that's really not the issue before us. Let's talk about
where we go from here and how you fully comply with the UN
Security Council resolutions.
Mr. Donaldson: Whereas you are clearly a top
policymaker in this government, you have the President's
confidence, and you are more than just the Secretary of State to
him. Tariq Aziz is the messenger.
Secretary Baker: Well, let's hope, if that's the case,
Sam, that he's a good messenger.
Mr. Donaldson: Iraq's Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, is a
skilled diplomat but, unlike Baker, has no real power. It is the mind
of his President, Saddam Hussein, which must be unlocked.
Dr. Gerald Post: This man is not the madman of the Middle
East. In fact, he's a judicious political calculator, ruthless,
pragmatic, a survivor and dangerous to the extreme.
Mr. Donaldson: Dr. Gerald Post, professor of political
psychology at George Washington University, constructs
psychological profiles of world leaders for the US government. He
helped prepare President Carter to deal with Menahem Begin and
Anwar al-Sadat at Camp David by showing how best to handle each
man based on personality. Post says Saddam is reveling in his
sudden prominence on the world stage.
Dr. Post: Now, for the first time, he is at the very center of
world attention. His every word is fastened on; he's got his hands
metaphorically on the throat of the world. Moreover, he is standing
up bravely to the West, particularly to the United States; in
particular to George Bush.
Mr. Donaldson: How does Saddam Hussein react when
President Bush says something publicly like, "We're going to kick
his . . ." you know what?
Dr. Post: I think that if anything, it enhances Saddam
Hussein's stature that he is in this contest with George Bush.
Mr. Donaldson: If Saddam is so delighted with his
prominent role, particularly in the Arab world, is there no hope
then that he will back down? Post says there is.
Dr. Post: I am quite persuaded that Saddam is not a martyr;
does not wish to go down to the last flaming bunker. He is quite
capable at the 11th hour of reversing himself. He has done this on
any number of occasions.
Mr. Donaldson: Post says the key is to convince Saddam
the military force arrayed against him will be used to destroy him
unless he leaves Kuwait. But at the same time, reassure him that
he won't be pursued if he does.
Dr. Post: If he feels he is backed into a corner, with no way of
escape, this man will go to the "nth" degree and will use whatever
weapons are at his disposal, including biological and chemical
weapons, if needs be, and what could be a very bloody final act.
Mr. Donaldson: Does he care nothing about his people?
Does he care nothing about Iraq? You mean he wouldn't sacrifice his
own power base? He would much prefer to see Iraq destroyed?
Dr. Post: There is no separate caring for Iraq in his mind. His
only loyalty is to Saddam Hussein.
Mr. Donaldson: The signal that follows from that
analysis, that Saddam can retreat if he chooses, is a signal that
Secretary Baker sent unmistakably tonight.
Secretary Baker: If they fully comply with the UN
Security Council resolutions, they can expect that we will not
exercise force against them. To put it another way, we have been
pursuing a carrot-and-stick policy here. The carrot is, if he
withdraws completely and unconditionally from Kuwait, he doesn't
get the stick.
Mr. Donaldson: Let's talk about the congressional role
for a moment. Senator [George] Mitchell says the President does
not have the authority to go to war without a further congressional
mandate. Do you agree?
Mr. Donaldson: We have fought--I think we've
committed troops, something like 200 times, and there's been a
declaration of war five of those times.
Mr. Donaldson: That doesn't make it right, does it?
Secretary Baker: No, and I'm not arguing that it does.
But I'm saying that reasonable minds can and do differ with respect
to the question you've just asked.
Mr. Donaldson: So you're saying the executive--
Secretary Baker: Yes, the executive branch's view is
different.
Mr. Donaldson: You can go to war, you believe, without
a congressional mandate?
Secretary Baker: Only Congress can declare war.
Before you can answer that question of yours in a "yes" or "no," you
need to define what you mean by "going to war."
Clearly, the President can order US forces to respond to
provocations in order to protect American citizens.
Mr. Donaldson: This isn't a provocation. You're citing UN
resolutions and telling us that Saddam Hussein better pay attention
to them, suggesting that we'll go to war if he doesn't.
Secretary Baker: Let me say one thing, Sam, to make
sure everybody understands this. The President has not ruled out
going to the Congress. What he has ruled out is saying in advance,
under any and all circumstances--most of which we could not
foresee now--he will come to the Congress for authorization. He
has ruled that out.
Mr. Donaldson: Mr. Secretary, if there is a war, a lot of
Americans will die. Senator [Edward] Kennedy said the other day, in
arguing to allow the sanctions more time to work, that it is better
for our forces to sit under the sun in the desert than to die in the
sand.
Secretary Baker: I don't disagree with that, of course.
It is better if there is not one single US casualty. That is what we
would prefer, and that's why we strongly prefer a peaceful and
political solution. It's one reason I'm taking this trip and one
reason the President has made yet another proposal to Saddam
Hussein for face-to-face talks between the United States and Iraq.
We hope that the Iraqis pick up on this because this will be the last
such proposal we will make.
Mr. Donaldson: You've always been a good political
observer. What's your hunch? Will there be war?
Secretary Baker: Well, I really hope we can find a
peaceful and political solution. I really do. I'm frankly not as
optimistic about that possibility now as I was before Christmas.
Mr. Donaldson: Baker says he's growing pessimistic,
but he refused to discuss exactly when war might start if Saddam
doesn't budge by the 15th, and he refused to comment on recent
assertions from some US military commanders that US ground
troops wouldn't be completely ready until February.
But there is one more thing. Told that the latest ABC
News/Washington Post poll shows a rising majority of Americans
favoring war if necessary to free Kuwait, and favoring it quickly,
Baker said such public support is exactly what he expected. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: American Support For Desert Shield
Quayle
Source: Vice President Quayle
Description: Address before the US Gulf forces, Saudi Arabia
Date: Jan 1, 19911/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
The 48th Tactical Fighter Wing is one of the most distinguished
units in our Air Force. Time and again, you've brought honor to
yourselves, your unit, and your country. You've participated in many
missions requiring great skill and courage--not the least of which
was on April 14, 1986, when you taught Colonel [Muammar] Qadhafi
[of Libya] a lesson he'll long remember. Congratulations on a job
well done. You have truly lived up to your name--the "Statue of
Liberty Wing" of the US Air Force. And, once again, you are living up
to your name. With your rapid deployment to this theater, you have
put Saddam Hussein on notice that his aggression could not
continue. And, of course, you are now prepared to act to repel his
aggression if such action is needed.
Time and again in our history, Americans have been called
upon to stand up and be counted in defense of liberty. And time and
again, brave and patriotic Americans have answered their nation's
call. So it was with your grandfathers, so it was with your fathers,
and so it is with you today. Winston Churchill once said that
"Courage is the first of all human qualities, because it is the
quality which guarantees all others." I came here today to salute
your courage--because it's your courage, and your courage above all,
that guarantees the freedoms all Americans cherish.
Of course, what you're doing isn't easy. Some of you are
lonely; all of you miss your homes and your loved ones. But the
brave have always been lonely, and the courageous have never been
known to play it safe. Today, America's finest men and women are
to be found where Americans have always been found in times of
crisis: shielding the innocent, defying the dictators, and defending
the ramparts of liberty. You are not alone. The hopes and prayers of
the American people are with you, and they support you every step
of the way. The American people are clear about what's at stake
here in the Gulf. They know that unless Saddam Hussein is stopped
today, a nuclear-armed Iraq will control most of the world's energy
supply tomorrow, thereby threatening the security and welfare of
all nations. This is why the American people support you and
Operation Desert Shield.
At the beginning of this crisis, the President laid out our
goals: achieving the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all
Iraqi forces from Kuwait, restoring the legitimate government of
Kuwait, protecting American citizens, and maintaining the security
and stability of the Gulf region. The President is trying to solve
this crisis without the use of force. He is pursuing every possible
option to end this crisis now and to end it peacefully. Saddam
Hussein could end the crisis tomorrow if he wanted to. He could get
out of Kuwait, just as he invaded Kuwait, and allow the legitimate
government to return.
But Saddam Hussein may not withdraw unconditionally, and, if
he doesn't, then he will be forced out of Kuwait by military action.
And if force is required, President Bush has stated--and I repeat it-
-this will not be another Vietnam. If force is necessary, it will be
quick, massive, and decisive. You will do your job and then go home
to your loved ones. You have heard some voices at home urging
patience. They say, wait a year or two, let the sanctions work. But
the sanctions have not gotten Saddam out of Kuwait. You have been
patient enough and so has President Bush. But the fact is that a
policy of indefinite patience could lead to a policy of appeasement.
A policy of appeasement would make Saddam the victor. This
cannot and will not happen. Please, don't pay attention to the nay-
sayers. The American people overwhelmingly and enthusiastically
support you and your mission.
So our message is simple: Saddam Hussein--either get out of
Kuwait peacefully or leave by force. It may turn out that the only
language Saddam Hussein understands is the language of force. In
that case, you will be called upon to expel Saddam Hussein from
Kuwait. And Saddam Hussein should understand that we will
succeed in expelling him. We have the best people in the world, the
best equipment, and, most importantly, the men and women of our
armed forces are determined and ready.
On my visits yesterday and today, I've found morale is sky
high. We are ready, willing, and able to do what has to be done.
Saddam Hussein has miscalculated before--when he started a war
with Iran that he thought would end quickly and it lasted 8 years.
He miscalculated when he invaded Kuwait. And he is miscalculating
now if he still believes force isn't a credible option. It is. And if
force is to be used, you will be using force to uphold our nation's
most deeply held principles. You will be defending our vital
national interests in the Gulf, first explained by President Truman
and reaffirmed by all our Presidents since him. And you will carry
with you the dreams of humanity for a safer, better world.
When you have achieved the objective of getting Saddam out of
Kuwait, the whole world will be grateful. And in the Middle East, in
Europe, in the Soviet Union, in Asia, and in Africa, people all over
the world will say "God bless America . . . and God bless the brave
men and women who served our nation in the Gulf."
Last week, I received a letter from Sergeant Jose Valdez, who
is serving his country here in Saudi Arabia. He wrote:
All of us here are proud to be Americans and soldiers serving our
great nation. We are ready to do whatever it takes to protect and
assist our allies.
Well, Sergeant First Class Valdez, I and all of us at home are
very proud of you. And we are very proud of all you serving here.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: Gulf Crisis Update
Date: Jan 7, 19911/7/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
The following is an overview of US objectives in the Persian Gulf
crisis based on statements by President Bush and Secretary Baker
and actions of the UN Security Council. It will be updated
periodically.
US Objectives
US objectives in the Persian Gulf call for the:
-- Immediate implementation of all relevant UN Security
Council resolutions;
-- Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all
Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
-- Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
-- Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian
Gulf;
-- Protection of American citizens held hostage by Iraq,
both in Iraq and Kuwait.
The Stakes
-- Saddam is a very dangerous dictator--armed to the teeth--who
is threatening a critical region at a defining moment in history.
Saddam has invaded two neighbors, harbors terrorists, and now is
systematically exterminating Kuwait. Saddam uses poisonous gas,
brandishes deadly toxins, and tries relentlessly to acquire nuclear
bombs. He has built the world's sixth largest army, has acquired the
fourth largest tank army, and has deployed ballistic missiles.
-- Iraq's aggression against Kuwait challenges world peace
and threatens the vision of a better world in the aftermath of the
Cold War. As Presidents Bush and Gorbachev stated jointly in
Helsinki: "No peaceful international order is possible if larger
states can devour their smaller neighbors." Saddam Hussein's
aggression is a challenge to the rest of the international
community. If we reverse his aggression, we will help define the
world that lies beyond the Cold War as a place where civilized rules
of conduct apply.
-- Iraq's aggression is a regional challenge. The Middle East
is an area of unresolved conflicts, sectarian and social strife, and
economic disparities. A peaceful solution to these problems is the
only way to preserve the security of our friends.
-- Iraq's aggression challenges the global economy. If an
aggressive state is allowed to sit astride the economic lifeline of
the industrial world, everyone will suffer profound setbacks to
economic growth. As Secretary Baker stated, "If [Saddam] is not
stopped now, if his aggressive designs are not frustrated,
peacefully, if possible or, if necessary, by force, we will all pay a
higher price later."
-- We must stand with the people of Kuwait so that the
annexation of Kuwait does not become the first reality that mars
our vision of a new world order.
Solutions
-- UN Security Council Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990,
authorizes "member states cooperating with the government of
Kuwait" to use "all necessary means" to uphold the above
resolutions, while giving Iraq "one final opportunity, as a pause of
good will" to abide by the resolutions by January 15, 1991. This
"pause for peace" gives the international community "a better
opportunity" to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. The UN
Security Council resolution authorizes the use of all necessary
means but certainly does not require it. It should be crystal clear
to Iraq that force is not going to be ruled out as an option. It is a
real, live, credible option.
-- President Bush and Secretary Baker have devoted great
personal efforts to find a diplomatic, political, and peaceful
solution to this problem. The United States does not intend to leave
any stones unturned in our search for a solution.
-- The President invited Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to
meet with him between December 20 and January 3. The President
also suggested that Secretary Baker meet with Saddam Hussein in
Baghdad during that period. The Iraqis failed to agree to the offer.
-- On January 3, 1991, the President stated that he was
"ready to make one last attempt to go the extra mile for peace."
Therefore, he offered to have Secretary Baker meet with Iraqi
Foreign Minister Aziz in Switzerland during the period January 7-9,
while the Secretary travels in Europe and the Gulf for consultations
with coalition partners.
-- The President made his offer subject to the same
conditions as his previous attempt, in his words: "No negotiations,
no compromises, no attempts at face-saving, and no rewards for
aggression."
-- The President and Secretary Baker will not discuss
anything less than Iraq's complete withdrawal from Kuwait,
restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and freedom for all
hostages.
Sanctions
-- After 4 months of a stringent embargo, sanctions are having
some effect on the Iraqi economy, but no one can say that sanctions
alone can impose a high enough cost on Saddam Hussein to get him
to withdraw.
-- Adverse economic impact on Iraq is not the way to
measure success. Success is Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
-- Saddam believes that he can endure economic sanctions. In
part, that is because he can, to a considerable extent, decide who in
Iraq gets hurt by them. He continues to impose economic sacrifices
on the Iraqi people to support his army and ambitions.
-- Waiting for sanctions to work effectively gives Saddam
time to break them but also imposes enormous costs. He will
continue to grind up Kuwait, to fortify it, to build chemical and
biological weapons, to acquire nuclear capability, and to generate
other issues aimed at dissolving the coalition arrayed against him.
-- That is why the US must make credible military
preparations aimed at achieving peace. Our diplomatic efforts will
continue, but full support for our military preparations will make
credible our offensive option to liberate Kuwait.
-- Failure to continue military preparations would have at
least three dangerous consequences.
1) It would undercut our diplomatic leverage by removing the
new option to use force.
2) It would tend to reaffirm the status quo and to legitimize
to some extent Iraq's brutal occupation of Kuwait.
3) Finally, it would mean risking greater casualties, should
conflict occur.
International Response
-- The international coalition has had considerable success in
isolating Iraq and making it pay high costs for its occupation and
rape of Kuwait. Twenty-seven nations have joined in a truly
unprecedented multinational force, deploying a substantial number
of troops in the region to deter further aggression and to support UN
Security Council resolutions.
-- At the request of the Ankara government, the air
component of NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force is
being deployed to Turkey. These NATO forces from Belgium,
Germany, and Italy will help defend Turkey's border with Iraq.
-- For calendar year 1990, the Saudis and the smaller gulf
states have pledged more than $6 billion toward US direct defense
costs. They also have pledged $6 billion in aid to front-line states
and $2.5 billion to other affected nations to resettle refugees,
subsidize higher oil bills, and defray other costs.
-- In 1991, additional responsibility-sharing will be
required. All of our coalition partners recognize this fact.
State Department Gulf Crisis Information
Emergencies: 202-647-0900 (24 hours)
Questions or comments about the Administration's Persian Gulf
policy:
202-647-6575 or 6576
Monday-Friday, 8:30 am-5 pm
(Eastern Standard Time) (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: New Year's Greetings
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Videotaped messages exchanged between the Presidents of
the Soviet Union and the United States; Washington, DC
Date: Jan 1, 19911/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
President Bush: It's a great pleasure to wish President and
Mrs. Gorbachev and all the peoples of the Soviet Union a happy and
healthy New Year. In your country and in mine, the start of a New
Year is a good time to reflect on the many achievements of the past
and to look ahead with hope.
This year, our two countries as well as those around the
world, have much to be grateful for. First and foremost, the
improved and strengthened relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Our countries have made great progress,
particularly in important political and arms control areas. And
we've taken a common approach to a new challenge in the name of
stability and peace. I applaud, the world applauds, the decisive
action of the Soviet Union in strongly opposing Saddam Hussein's
brutal aggression in the Gulf.
But just as important as these new areas of cooperation
between our two nations are the increased contacts between the
Americans and Soviet peoples. Tens of thousands of Soviets have
had contact with Americans now, and the numbers are growing.
Barbara and I are thrilled to see our two peoples meeting and
getting to know one another as friendly neighbors.
On this New Year's Day, as you celebrate with your friends and
family, I also want to applaud the Soviet Union for the important
steps you've taken in building a new society, for the determination
with which you are pressing forward with difficult political and
economic reforms. It's an arduous journey, but one well worth
making, for it is a path that leads to a brighter future for your
nation.
The American people look with hope to the year ahead. Our
two nations have set out on a new course making a better life for
both our peoples and a better world of peace and understanding.
On behalf of the American people, I wish President Gorbachev
and all the wonderful people of the Soviet Union a happy, prosperous
New Year. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: New Year's Greetings
Gorbachev
Source: President Gorbachev
Description: Videotaped messages exchanged between the Presidents of
the Soviet Union and the United States; Moscow, USSR
Date: Jan 1, 19911/1/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization
President Gorbachev:Esteemed citizens of the United States
of America: on behalf of the Soviet people, I send you New Year's
greetings.
The year 1990 is over, and with it the 1980s. They have been
full of events of enormous importance. The Cold War has gone.
Gone, too, is the direct threat of nuclear disaster. Horizons of
peace have begun to open. And Europe, together with the United
States and Canada, has been first to take advantage of this by
collectively agreeing on how it will enter the 21st century.
Much has yet to be completed. Many questions still worry both
Europeans and Asians, everyone in this world--in a world awakened
to the quest for its future. The nations and states have moved
toward new shores. That path will not be without danger or pain.
At its very beginning, this world community is facing a
serious test--aggression in the Persian Gulf. And it must find in
itself the strength to overcome it in such a way as not to wreck the
movement, which has begun, toward a peaceful period of
civilization.
The main thing now, at this turning point in history, is to
achieve a firmer realization that only by joint efforts, only through
cooperation and by taking account of the mutual dependence of
interests, can we expect progress and security for all and,
therefore, also for ourselves.
The many encouraging things which have occurred in the world
during these years and in the outgoing year are connected with the
improvement in Soviet-American relations. The trust and mutual
understanding between the leaderships of our two states have led to
an improvement in the international situation. I will soon meet
again with President George Bush, and I am confident that it will
strengthen the constructive beginning of our relations even more.
Not all the old obstacles have been eliminated. Economic and
scientific-technical ties still do not meet with the spirit of the
times. Nevertheless, Soviet-American interaction is gaining an
ever more reliable basis in contacts between the peoples. In the
past, it was only our politicians, and sometimes sportsmen, who
went to each other's countries. Now, the mood is changing in the
business world.
Contacts between business people have become regular. Those
in the military are conducting a dialogue in a frank manner. Trips
by scientists, performers, artists, and writers, and just travel
itself are becoming the norm. We have begun to get to know each
other better. That is why a beneficial feeling of solidarity is
emerging.
The past year has been a hard one for the Soviet people. But
this has been a year of fundamental changes in society, and a year
of the most difficult, but the most necessary, decisions. They will
enable our great country--and it will remain great--to overcome
the crisis situation and march confidently along the path of steady
democratic progress.
Life for us all now is no carefree stroll.
In greeting the citizens of America, I wish you a happy New
Year, and I wish you success in everything you do, prosperity to your
families, and peace to your great country. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: Deployment of NATO Rapid Reaction Force
Fitzwater
Source: White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan 2, 19911/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Turkey
Subject: NATO, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
NATO decided today, at a meeting of its Defense Planning
Committee, to deploy the air component of the Allied Command
Europe (ACE) Mobile Force to Turkey. Turkey asked the alliance for
this help in order to deter the threat posed by Iraq and demonstrate
NATO's solidarity with Turkey in this crisis. The NATO unit that
will go to Turkey includes squadrons of aircraft from Germany,
Italy, and Belgium. This alliance move is significant in three
respects.
First, the Allies Command Europe Mobile Force has never
before been deployed in a crisis to defend an ally.
Second, the decision demonstrates the alliance's support for
the coalition effort and Turkey's part in it against Saddam Hussein.
Third, the deployment confirms the importance and
effectiveness of the alliance in the post-Cold War era. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: Deployment of NATO Rapid Reaction Force
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Jan 2, 19911/2/91
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Turkey
Subject: NATO, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
NATO today took another important step in response to the crisis in
the Persian Gulf. At the request of Turkey, the alliance's Defense
Planning Council (DPC) has decided to deploy the air component of
the ACE Mobile Force to that country for defensive and deterrent
purposes.
This action is another firm signal of Western resolve and
solidarity in response to a clear threat to the security of a member
country, and thus to the alliance as a whole. We strongly welcome
this decision, which follows a reaffirmation of NATO's mutual
defense commitment by alliance foreign ministers on December 17.
The ACE Mobile Force will comprise air force elements from
Germany, Belgium, and Italy. This is the first ever deployment of
the ACE Mobile Force. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: Fact Sheet: Deployment of NATO Rapid Reaction Force
Date: Jan 2, 19911/2/91
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Europe, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Turkey
Subject: NATO, Military Affairs
ACE MOBILE FORCE
The ACE Mobile Force is an alliance rapid reaction force, comprised
of units from several countries. It was created by NATO in 1960 as
a multinational force that could be sent at short notice to any
threatened part of allied Europe to demonstrate the solidarity of
the alliance and its ability and determination to defend itself
against aggression. It has never been deployed in a crisis.
The force, as a whole, is composed of land and air forces from
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. The air component is
comprised of some 40 fighter aircraft from Belgium, Germany, and
Italy. Until assembled at the request of the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR), most units assigned to the mobile
force are stationed in their home countries.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: Hemisphere United Against Suriname Coup
Einaudi
Source: Luigi R. Einaudi, US Permanent Representative to
the Organization of American States
Description: Statement to the Special Session of the OAS Permanent
Council; Washington, DC
Date: Dec 28, 199012/28/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America, South America
Country: Suriname, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti,
Argentina, Brazil
Subject: OAS, Military Affairs, Democratization,
Human Rights
[TEXT]
Suriname Coup
On the night of December 24, the leaders of the armed forces of
Suriname forced the Surinamese executive and cabinet to "turn in
their portfolios." At the same time, they ordered the Surinamese
people to stay in their homes.
In doublespeak worthy of [George] Orwell's worst nightmare,
a military spokesman accused the constitutionally elected
government of failing to hold free elections and, in a clumsy
attempt to break the inevitable wave of repudiation from within
Suriname and from abroad, promised free elections to the
Surinamese people in "100 days." Soldiers armed under
constitutional authority and sworn to uphold the constitution have
arrogated to themselves the right to interpret the constitution
unilaterally and abrogate it in the process.
We have seen this all before. I do not believe there is a person
in this chamber who wants to see it again. The history of our
hemisphere has long been written as a history of civil-military
conflicts. Yet despite recurring rumors and even outright coup
attempts, the last successful coup d'etat took place in Guatemala in
1982, 8 years ago; last use of military force to seize power from
civilians took place in 1980 in Bolivia and in Suriname.
Ten years without a coup against civilian rule had led many of
us to hope that a new era was dawning. As President Bush said in
Buenos Aires on December 5:
"Too many brave people sacrificed and died to bring democracy
back to Latin America. Let those who would attack
constitutional democracy understand: In Latin America the
day of the dictator is over.
The Day of the Dictator is Over
There is, of course, the possibility that with the end of the
Cold War, the day of the dictator is ending throughout the world. As
we meet here today, 28 nations, including some from this
hemisphere, have military units on duty in the Persian Gulf
supporting the United Nations against a military dictator who has
sought to impose the law of the bully (la ley del maton) on his
people and his neighbors.
In the Americas, the situation is both clearer and better.
Anachronisms aside, the day of the dictator is indeed over.
Moreover, substantial progress is taking place to build the
foundation of civil-military cooperation in fundamental areas of
human rights, security, and national development in a new
democratic era.
Argentina and Brazil have moved forward to give effect to the
Treaty of Tlatelolco by agreeing to negotiate an agreement on
nuclear safeguards. Lauding the decisions of these states to bring
the Tlatelolco Treaty on nuclear nonproliferation into force,
President Bush said on December 3 in Brasilia:
We hope that all countries in this hemisphere will follow Brazil's
and Argentina's recent decision to bring the nonproliferation treaty
. . . into force.
In Central America, the Esquipulas process has contributed
decisively to a reduction of military tensions. The Central
American Security Commission, created by the June 1990 Antigua
accords, is bringing senior political and military leaders together
to discuss shifting resources from military to humanitarian needs
and is looking ahead to negotiating real reductions in conventional
arms.
In Nicaragua and in Haiti, the Organization of American States
has over the past year--and yes, it is only a year since
representatives of the Secretary General were fully engaged in
monitoring the election campaign in Nicaragua--helped to shape an
environment of peaceful conflict resolution. The successful
elections in Haiti earlier this month were marked by the
impartiality and confidence generated by international observers.
The OAS International Commission for Support and Verification
(CIAV) is still bringing essential impartiality and confidence to the
processes of repatriation and national reconciliation in Nicaragua.
In short, real progress--generating tangible results--has been
made in our hemisphere toward new levels of international
cooperation to achieve regional peace and security. This progress is
uneven. Narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and clandestine arms
smuggling are still major obstacles to regional peace and security.
The December 4-5, 1990, rebellion in Panama demonstrates that
much remains to be done to advance professionalism even in a case
where major advances have taken place. Economic achievements
and opportunities are still too often obscured by poverty and lack of
competitiveness. Perhaps most importantly, human rights concerns
remain a top priority for us in far too many countries.
This said, my government believes we have a major
opportunity to build a new era of civil-military cooperation in
changing, newly democratic societies. On balance, we are seeing
unprecedented respect on the part of military leaders and
institutions for the democratic process. On balance, we are seeing
an appreciation on the part of civilian political leaders for the
institutional interests of the military and a recognition of the
important place reserved for the armed forces in a democratic
society.
A Call to Restore Power
And now, like an ominous and spiteful rejection of this future
to which we are all committed, we have the events that have
occasioned this meeting. For 5 years following independence from
the Netherlands in 1975, Suriname was a functioning democracy
with an excellent human rights record. Then, in 1980, the
legitimate government was overthrown.
By late 1982, the Bouterse junta institutionalized repression
of civilian opposition, culminating in the murders of 15 civic
leaders. Some were beaten to death, others tortured and shot in
cold blood. Because of the appalling Bouterse human rights record,
in 1982 both the United States and the Netherlands suspended
economic and military aid to Suriname.
Suriname's 1988 return to civilian rule was not respected by
military leaders. Continuing human rights abuses, military
harassment of civilians, interference with government activities
and with shipments of food and medicine outside the capital,
together with other "emergency powers" with no apparent legal
basis, are powerful reminders of the Surinamese military's callous
disregard for civilian authority and human rights.
On June 4, 1990, President Ramsewak Shankar of Suriname
addressed the OAS General Assembly in Asuncion, Paraguay. He
said, among other things:
"The process of peace which is taking place in Suriname,
which I have been called upon to lead, aims, in the first place,
at putting an end to the armed approach of settling disputes
and is, furthermore, geared toward guaranteeing the
participation of every subgroup at the national level, as well
as realizing the integral development of the nation."
We cannot be silent about the events in Suriname that deprive
the Surinamese people of their rights. We cannot allow these
illegal acts to threaten the post-Cold War democratic equilibrium
now developing. The United States condemns the violation of
constitutional order in Suriname and calls on the Surinamese
military to restore power immediately to the democratically
elected authorities of that country. The United States is proud to
cosponsor the resolution drafted by Venezuela and the other
members of the Group of Rio. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: OAS Resolution 554 on Suriname
Date: Dec 28, 199012/28/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: South America
Country: Suriname
Subject: OAS, Democratization
[TEXT]
Following is the text of Resolution 554 of the Permanent Council of
the Organization of American States, December 28, 1990--Present
Political Situation in Suriname. The resolution was adopted by a
consensus of 26 of the 27 members present; Suriname did not join
the consensus.
The Permanent Council of the Organization of American
States, Considering:
That the Charter of the Organization establishes that "the true
significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can
only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the
framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual
liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights
of man";
That democratically elected President Mr. Ramsewak Shankar
was deposed by a military coup on December 24, 1990; and
That this act of force violently disturbs the democratic
institutional order of a member state, violates the right of its
people to elect its governors freely, and deals a severe setback to
the democratization process in the Hemisphere,
Resolves:
1. To categorically repudiate the military coup in Suriname,
which thwarts the fundamental right of the people of that country
to live in a system of freedom and democracy.
2. To issue an appeal for reestablishment of the democratic
institutional order and the avoidance of any act that could
aggravate the situation and impair the full enjoyment of human
rights.
3. To keep the situation in Suriname under review, without
violation of the principle of nonintervention, and to request the
Secretary General to inform the Permanent Council on the course of
events in that member state.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: Country Profile: Suriname
Date: Jan 7, 19901/7/90
Category: Country Data
Region: South America
Country: Suriname
Subject: History
[TEXT]
Official Name: Republic of Suriname
People
Nationality: Noun--Surinamer(s). Adjective--Surinamese.
Population (July 1989 est): 421,571. Annual growth rate (Jan 1989
est): 2%. Ethnic groups: Hindustani (East Indian) 37%, Creole 31%,
Javanese 15.3%, Bush Negro 10.3%, Amerindians 2.7%, Chinese 1.7%
(percentages date from 1972 census, the last in which ethnicity
data was collected).
Religions: Hindu, Muslim, Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed, Moravian,
and several other Christian groups, Jewish, Baha'i.
Languages: Dutch (official), English, Sranang Tongo (Creole
language), Hindustani, Javanese.
Education: Compulsory--ages 6-12. Literacy--85%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--35/1,000, Life expectancy--68 years.
Work force (100,000): Agriculture--28%, industry and commerce--
15%, government--43%.
Geography
Area: 163,265 sq. km. (63,037 sq. mi.); slightly larger than Georgia.
Cities: Capital--Paramaribo (pop. 180,000). Other towns--Nieuw
Nickerie, Albina, Moengo.
Terrain: Varies from coastal swamps to savanna to hills.
Climate: Tropical.
Government
Type: Constitutional democracy. Constitution: September 1987.
Independence: November 25, 1975.
Branches: Executive--president, vice president, council of
ministers. Legislative--elected 51-member national assembly
made up of representatives of political parties. Judicial--Court of
Justice.
Administrative subdivisions: 11 districts.
Political parties: Progressive Reformed Party (VHP), National Party
of Suriname (NPS), Indonesian Peasants' Party (KTPI), Progressive
Workers' and Farmers' Party (PALU), New Democratic Party of
Suriname (NDP).
Suffrage: Universal at 18.
Central government expenditures (1988): $640 million.
Flag: Green, white, red, white, green horizontal stripes with yellow
star in the middle of the red bar.
Economy
GDP (1988): $ 1,233 million.
Per capita GDP (1988): $3,000 (at official exchange rate).
Average inflation rate (1988 est.): 51%.
Natural resources: Bauxite, iron ore, and other minerals; forests;
hydroelectric potential; fish and shrimp.
Agriculture: Product--rice, palm oil, bananas, timber, sugarcane,
and citrus fruits. Arable land--2 million hectares. Cultivated land-
-80,000 hectares.
Industry: Types--aluminum, alumina, processed food, lumber,
bricks, tiles, cigarettes.
Trade (1988): Exports--$358 million: bauxite, alumina, aluminum,
wood and wood products, rice, bananas, and shrimp. Major markets-
-US, Netherlands, EC, and other European countries. Imports--$238
million: capital equipment, petroleum, iron and steel products,
agricultural products. Major suppliers--US, Netherlands, EC, Brazil,
Caribbean countries.
Membership in International Organizations
UN and some of its specialized and related agencies, including the
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Health
Organization (WHO); International Labor Organization (ILO); Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO); UN Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO); UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD); Organization of American States (OAS);
Nonaligned Movement; Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA); CARICOM (observer); International Bauxite Association,
associated with the EC through the Lome Convention, Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB); International Finance Corporation
(IFC). (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 2, No 1, January 7, 1991
Title: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Date: Jan 7, 19901/7/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Subject: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control
[TEXT]
Since its entry into force in March 1970, the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been a cornerstone of
international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear
weapons. Successive US administrations have worked to achieve
universal adherence to the treaty. With more than 140 parties, it
has the largest number of adherents of any arms control agreement.
Three of the nuclear weapon states--the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union--are parties to the treaty. France
and China are not, although France has indicated it will act as
though it is. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union, designated as depository governments in the treaty, continue
to encourage the few remaining non-parties to adhere to this
important arms control treaty.
Treaty Goals and Undertakings
The treaty's substantive articles have been drawn carefully to serve
three major goals (see below).
Under terms of the treaty, nuclear weapon states are
obligated not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state to acquire
nuclear explosive devices (Article I). Correspondingly, non-nuclear
weapon states party to the treaty are obligated not to manufacture
or otherwise acquire such devices (Article II).
The treaty provides for the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to apply international safeguards, including on-site
inspection, to all nuclear material in the peaceful programs of non-
nuclear weapon state parties (Article III). This article also
obligates the parties to require IAEA safeguards on nuclear
materials and certain equipment exported to non-nuclear weapon
states. The safeguards system helps to verify compliance and is
designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material from
peaceful uses to nuclear explosive devices.
Article IV recognizes the right of parties to develop nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes and calls for the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials, and information for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Parties also are to have access to any
benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions (Article
V). Article VI enjoins all parties to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to ending the nuclear arms
race, with a view to general and complete disarmament.
The NPT embodies a broadly supported international norm of
non-proliferation: increasingly, world opinion has come to view
acquisition of nuclear explosives as no longer legitimate and a
world of many nuclear powers as undesirable.
Review Conference
Under the treaty, a review conference can be held every 5 years.
Four such conferences have been held, in 1975, 1980, 1985, and
August-September 1990. Each of these conferences successfully
undertook an article-by-article review of the treaty's
implementation, with the debate focusing on cooperation on
peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Article IV) and, to an even greater
degree, on efforts to negotiate arms control agreements (Article VI).
At the 1990 conference, participants generally recognized
the treaty's important contribution to international peace and
security, and a great majority of the parties attending reaffirmed
their commitment to it. Agreement was reached on most of the
issues discussed, including, for example, the vital role of
international safeguards in preventing nuclear proliferation, the
necessity of tighter export controls on nuclear technology, the need
for scrupulous adherence to the obligations of the treaty, and the
potential importance of the IAEA conducting "special inspections."
However, no final consensus declaration emerged because a small
number of nonaligned countries, led by Mexico, insisted on language
linking extension of the treaty to negotiation of a comprehensive
test ban treaty.
1995 Extension Conference
The NPT calls for a conference in 1995 to decide whether to extend
the treaty indefinitely beyond its initial 25-year duration or for a
fixed period or periods. The United States, the United Kingdom, and
the USSR favor an indefinite extension of the treaty. Many other
NPT parties share this view. The United States strongly opposes
linking the future of the treaty to a comprehensive test ban treaty
or a specific arms control measure. Such linkage could undermine
the treaty and the broad security benefits that derive from it.
Looking Ahead
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is vital to a safer and more secure
world. The success of the 1995 conference will depend on many
factors, particularly on recognition by the parties that the NPT
contributes greatly to international security and stability. A world
without NPT would lead to diminished political constraints on the
spread of nuclear explosives, increase regional suspicion and
tension, and jeopardize international peace and stability.
Three Major Goals of the NPT
To prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons (the
driving force behind the initial push for the NPT);
To foster peaceful nuclear cooperation under safeguards; and
To encourage negotiations to end the nuclear arms race with
a view to general and complete disarmament (a goal added
during the multilateral negotiations on the
treaty).(###)