US Department of State Dispatch Supplement VOL. 2, NO 3, July 1991

Title:

President's 29th CSCE Report, "Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, April 1, 1990-March 31, 1991

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Text submitted to Congress, Washington DC Date: Jun 3, 19916/3/91 Category: Reports Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia Country: Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia (former), Czechoslovakia (former), Hungary, Poland, USSR (former), Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Subject: Human Rights, Environment, Science/Technology, Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales, Trade/Economics, Democratization [TEXT]

Preface

This Implementation Report on the commitment of certain member countries to principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), is the first since the law mandating the report (Public Law 94-304) was passed in 1976 to appear on an annual, rather than a semi-annual, basis. The Report reflects the changing realities of Europe and, for the first time, extensively focuses on economic and environmental issues in the countries examined. The countries treated have also changed: during the reporting period the CSCE lost a member with the unification of Germany and there is, thus, no discussion of the German Democratic Republic. In addition, for the first time, Albania is included in the report. Although it is not a member of CSCE, Albania was granted observer status during the reporting period and has requested full membership. [Note: Albania became a full member of CSCE on June 19, 1991.]

Chapter One--DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CSCE PROCESS

Implementation of CSCE principles continued to improve in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the reporting period. Bulgaria held its first multi-party election, introduced economic changes aimed at the creation of a market economy and virtually ceased previous repressive measures, particularly against ethnic Turks. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic built on the achievements of the Velvet Revolution, with laws to implement economic and political reforms. Germany was unified. Hungary held democratic elections and began drafting and passing legislation to help democracy put down roots. In Poland political groups competed openly and democratically. Parliament asked President Lech Walesa to call for parliamentary elections and began drafting a new constitution based on democratic principles. The constitution will likely be promulgated by the new parliament in late 1991. Despite the country's hardships and a declining standard of living, the government persisted in its economic reform efforts. Romania moved haltingly toward a more open society with the loosening of many controls, but the government's commitment to democracy and its willingness to tolerate opposition was still in question. In particular, the government used force against a June 1990 demonstration by miners and continued isolated beatings and forms of harassment against the opposition. Yugoslavia, beset by internal divisions and human rights abuses in Kosovo and Croatia, nevertheless, attempted significant democratic and political reform at both the republic and federal levels. The Soviet Union took steps toward the withdrawal of its troops from Eastern and Central Europe. However, advances in human rights were offset by abuses in the Baltic states and elsewhere and the rolling back of some press freedoms. Economic reform also remained problematic. The CSCE process itself underwent vast changes during the reporting period. The November 1990 Paris summit publicly recognized the end of the Cold War and, for the first time, created CSCE institutions. A busy schedule of experts meetings was augmented with two additional specialized meetings for 1991. A regular schedule of high-level political consultations among CSCE states was inaugurated. For the first time ever the United States hosted a CSCE meeting--the October 1990 ministerial in New York. The Baltic states requested but did not receive observer status at CSCE meetings due to a lack of consensus on the part of the member states. Albania was granted observer status and sought, but did not receive, full membership, as CSCE states continued to look for a more consistent record of Albanian compliance with CSCE standards. Below is an overview of major CSCE activities, changes in the CSCE process, and a summary of CSCE inter-sessional meetings during the reporting period.
The Paris Summit
The highlight of CSCE activities for the reporting period was the November 19-21 Paris summit, the first CSCE meeting at the level of heads of state or government since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. President Bush led a US delegation of more than 30 senior government officials and congressional representatives, including Senator Claiborne Pell and US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Chairman Representative Steny Hoyer and Commissioner Representative Don Ritter. The Paris summit included signature or endorsement of four major agreements: -- The Charter of Paris for a New Europe; -- The Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs); -- The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-- negotiated within the framework of the CSCE process by members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact); and -- The Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, in which the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact welcomed the historic changes in Europe and declared that they were no longer adversaries. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the 1990 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures established a secure foundation for relations among the CSCE participating states. The summit, in turn, reaffirmed CSCE principles and further enhanced the dignity of individuals and human rights. It also focused on expectations for the new Europe in the years ahead. President Bush welcomed the summit as proof that "a continent frozen in hostility for so long has become a continent of revolutionary change." Looking to the future, the President suggested that it was now time to "bring the CSCE down to earth, making it a part of everyday politics, building and drawing on its strength to address the new challenges." Stressing the importance of balance among the three baskets of the CSCE, he called for continued efforts in the areas of human rights, security, and economics, and drew attention to the modest but significant steps toward a new order which the CSCE institutions represented. Other speakers shared the President's reinforcement of CSCE principles and his expectations for the new CSCE.
The Charter of Paris For a New Europe
Building upon the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter creates the framework for a comprehensive European political dialogue. It is the embodiment of President Bush's commitment to "a Europe whole and free." The 10-page Charter and its 14-page supplementary document embrace an extraordinary range of subjects. The Charter is divided into three parts: "a new era of democracy, peace and unity," "guidelines for the future," and "new structures and institutions of the CSCE process." It calls for creation of a parliamentary assembly for CSCE. The supplementary document sets out the new institutional arrangements mandated by the Charter: a political consultation process with a small administrative Secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw. It also mandates two additional CSCE Experts Meetings: a Seminar on Democratic Institutions (November 4-15, 1991 in Oslo), and an Experts Meeting on National Minorities (July 1-19, 1991 in Geneva). The Charter of Paris offers a powerful reaffirmation by the participating states of the original Helsinki principles. The US delegation to the Paris Summit Preparatory Committee which negotiated the Charter worked to ensure that CSCE's traditional emphasis on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms enjoyed pride of place in the document. The United States led the effort to include the first-ever commitment by all CSCE heads of state or government to democracy as "the only system of government of our nations." Building upon commitments undertaken at the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe to replace command economies with market systems, the United States advanced the concept of "economic liberty," which posits individuals exercising their free will in a democratic society as the "necessary basis for successful economic and social development." In arms control, the Charter of Paris took a historic step toward a new Europe. Building upon the CFE and CSBM negotiations, the participating states agreed for the first time to establish new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building by 1992. The talks will be open to all member states.
Institutional Arrangements
The modest institutions created by the Charter of Paris, and the parliamentary assembly, set up by parliamentarians of participating states, complement CSCE's new processes for political dialogue. The Charter of Paris established a cycle of regular, political consultations at the summit, ministerial and senior official levels. Biennial summits, meetings of foreign ministers at least once a year, and periodic meetings of senior officials--usually senior ambassadors with CSCE responsibilities--are now a strong point of the CSCE process. Follow-up CSCE meetings will now be held, as a rule, every 2 years and will not exceed 3 months, unless otherwise agreed. These changes will allow CSCE to serve as a principal forum for nearly continuous political discussion of developments in post- Cold War Europe. The mandate for the new political consultative process is broad. Conceptually, these consultations are designed to afford every participating state regular opportunities to discuss issues of political interest with all others. The supreme decision-making body of the CSCE will continue to be the meeting of CSCE heads of state or government. However, practical management of the consultative process resides with the Council of Ministers. Annual meetings of the Council are, in turn, prepared by the Committee of Senior Officials. All substantive decisions by these bodies will continue to be taken by consensus. The CSCE states sent experts to a January 14-18, 1991, meeting in Vienna to discuss administrative arrangements for the three new CSCE institutions. The meeting took place against the backdrop of violent actions by the Soviet military in Latvia and Lithuania. The United States and many other delegations used the occasion to condemn these actions and to call for a settlement of outstanding issues between the Baltic states and Soviet authorities through peaceful means. An Austrian-led call for the convening of an additional ad hoc meeting devoted to the Baltic situation was blocked by the Soviets, a move criticized by the United States and 26 other countries present. Turning to their administrative agenda, experts formulated recommendations on questions of personnel, budget, premises, and other matters, all of which were passed along for final decision to the first meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials later that month. At the experts' meeting, the United States took the lead in pressing for a rationalization of CSCE expenses to ensure the most effective use of scarce resources in the face of an increasing CSCE workload. The Committee of Senior Officials met for the first time on January 28-29, 1991, in Vienna. The US Representative to the Committee was Ambassador John J. Maresca (also head of the US Delegation to the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Vienna). The initial meeting of the Committee focused on establishing a work program and other organizational matters. However, the Committee also exercised its responsibility to review current issues, and the situation in the Baltic states was extensively discussed. The Committee's tasks include preparation of the CSCE Council of Ministers meeting scheduled for June 19-20, 1991, in Berlin. The CSCE Secretariat, which provides support to the political consultation process, was opened in Prague on February 20, 1991, by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, and the Secretariat Director Nils Eliasson of Sweden. The responsibilities of the Secretariat include providing administrative support to Ministers and Senior Officials meetings, maintaining an archive of CSCE documentation, providing information on CSCE to individuals and interested groups as well as non-participating states, and providing support as appropriate to the Executive Secretaries of other CSCE meetings. The Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) was created to assist the Council of Ministers in reducing the risk of conflict by promoting openness and transparency in military matters. Its primary function, as laid out in the Charter, is to facilitate the implementation of agreed CSBMs, the annual exchange of military information, and the maintenance of a communications network between CSCE states. It will also serve as the venue for annual CSBM implementation meetings and seminars on military doctrine and such other seminars as may be agreed by the participating states. A Consultative Committee, composed of representatives from all participating states, supervises the center's activities. Since its creation by CSCE leaders in the Charter of Paris, the CPC Consultative Committee has met twice. The agenda of these meetings have covered implementation of agreed CSBMs, discussion of recent developments in the European military security situation, and administrative matters. A small Secretariat, under Director Bent Rosenthal of Denmark, manages the CPC and reports to the Consultative Committee. Located in Vienna, the CPC Secretariat was officially opened by Austrian Foreign Minister Mock on March 18, 1991. The Charter of Paris also set up an Office for Free Elections, to be established in Warsaw, with Ambassador Luchino Cortese of Italy as its first director. The United States is providing the Deputy Director for the office. The function of the office is to facilitate contacts and the exchange of information on elections among participating states. To this end, the office will be compiling information and reports of election observations on elections within CSCE states; serve to facilitate contact among governments, parliaments, or private organizations wishing to observe elections and competent authorities in states holding elections; and organize and serve as the venue for seminars or other meetings related to election procedures and the building of democratic institutions. To promote involvement of parliamentarians in the CSCE process, parliamentarians from the CSCE states met in Madrid on April 2-3, and agreed to create a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, to meet annually in a different CSCE country. The first meeting is scheduled for early July 1992 in Budapest.
Inter-sessional Meetings
The reporting period included four meetings of CSCE experts: the Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe, held in Bonn from March 19 to April 13, 1990; the second Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, held in Copenhagen June 5-29, 1990; a meeting on the Mediterranean, held in Palma de Mallorca from September 24 to October 19, 1990; and a meeting of Experts on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, held in Valletta, from January 14 to February 8, 1991. Bonn. The Bonn Conference marked a revolutionary point in East-West economic relations. It saw the formal renunciation of the old communist system of planned economies by Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in a final document elaborating free market principles. The Bonn Document, for the first time, gives real content to Basket II and offers a foundation on which all member states can build stronger economic relations based explicitly on market economics. Politically, the document commits CSCE states to multi-party democracy based on free elections, rule of law and non-discrimination, and the right of workers to engage in union activity. Economically, the document endorses fiscal and monetary policies to enhance the functioning of the market; expansion of the free flow of trade, repatriation of profits in convertible currencies; prices based on supply and demand; policies that promote social justice; environmentally sustainable growth; recognition and protection of intellectual and private property; prompt and fair compensation for expropriation; and direct contact between suppliers and consumers in domestic and international markets. The US delegation was headed by Ambassador Alan F. Holmer and included representatives the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the business community. The United States played an important role in fashioning the conference's outcome through its proposed "Bonn Principles for Economic Cooperation," which became an integral part of the Final Document. Copenhagen. The Copenhagen meeting adopted an historic document placing the CSCE process unequivocally at the forefront of efforts to make democracy the common possession of all participating CSCE states. Most noteworthy was the document's inclusion of language on free and fair elections: all CSCE states committed themselves to hold genuinely free elections on a multi- party basis and to admit government and non-governmental organizations (NGO) observers to national-level elections. Another major gain was in the rule of law. CSCE states affirmed that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the basic purposes of government and set forth the fundamental principles of justice that form the basis of the rule of law in a democracy. These principles include the inalienable rights of man, representative government, measures against torture, and the rights of national minorities. Other sections of the document encourage CSCE states to allow for foreign states and NGO observers at trials. Copenhagen also produced agreement to impose time limits within which governments must respond to other states' human rights inquiries raised through the CSCE's Human Dimension Mechanism. The US delegation to the Copenhagen meeting was headed by Max Kampelman and included public members, members of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and members of the US Government's executive branch. Palma. In the midst of worldwide concern over the environment, the CSCE meeting on the Mediterranean was a useful opportunity for member states to discuss environmental problems affecting the Mediterranean. The meeting adopted a final document promoting environmental cooperation in the region among CSCE states and with the non-participating Mediterranean States (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia). The final report stressed the desire of participating states to promote favorable political, cultural, and economic conditions in the region and emphasized the shared responsibility to protect the environment. It also noted the need to enhance trade and economic cooperation in order to promote development in the Mediterranean region. The largest portion of the document sets out areas of potential cooperation on the environment, including energy, cultural preservation, water use, pollution, the fight against desertification, prevention of forest fires, tourism, and information exchanges. The United States, while not a Mediterranean littoral state, shared its expertise on issues relevant to the Mediterranean. US presentations underscored areas in which Mediterranean littoral states could benefit from American experience in handling water and air pollution. Of special note was a presentation on US cooperation with Canada to resolve problems involving the Great Lakes. The US delegation also stressed the utility of market principles in environmental decision-making. The Palma Final Report included a US proposal that CSCE member states establish toxic emissions reporting programs modeled after the US Toxic Release Inventory. The United States delegation was headed by Ambassador John R. Davis, Jr., and included experts on pollution, tourism, and reforestation and members of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Valletta. The Valletta meeting took place amidst hopes that CSCE might play a greater role in preserving stability in a changing Europe. During the meeting, war broke out in the Persian Gulf, and the Soviet Union cracked down on the Baltic states, provoking formal protests from many of the meeting's participants, including the United States. Despite this, Valletta was able to make a useful contribution to ongoing efforts within CSCE to find ways of managing conflicts and their sources. The Valletta Final Document reinforces the commitment of CSCE states to try to prevent, manage, and settle disputes by peaceful means. It contains two parts: general principles on dispute settlement and a CSCE-specific dispute settlement procedure. The general principles address the prevention, management, and resolution of disputes. The dispute settlement procedure calls for mandatory third-party involvement should CSCE states be unable to settle a dispute among themselves or to agree on a settlement method. In the first stage of the procedure, the CSCE third party--selected from a CSCE roster of mediators--helps disputants find an appropriate settlement method. If this is unsuccessful, either party can invoke the second stage and ask the CSCE third party to assist in finding a substantive settlement. The procedure calls for a "nominating institution" to maintain the CSCE roster of mediators and to select the mediators when the parties are unable to do so. The Valletta meeting left to the Berlin ministerial to decide whether the nominating institution should be the CPC, the Secretariat or another body. The US delegation was headed by Michael K. Young, a Deputy Legal Adviser at the State Department, and included a leading public expert in dispute settlement, as well as a member of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Chapter Two--GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF CSCE IMPLEMENTATION

The 10 principles of the Helsinki Act and additional commitments elaborated over the years define the basic code of conduct that CSCE states have adopted. These Helsinki principles, reaffirmed in the Charter of Paris, include: -- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; -- Refraining from the threat or use of force; -- Inviolability of frontiers; -- Territorial integrity of states; -- Peaceful settlement of disputes; -- Non-intervention in internal affairs; -- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief; -- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; -- Co-operation among states; and -- Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law. The following general assessments provide an overview of certain member countries and Albania where further progress on meeting CSCE standards appears necessary or where remarkable progress has recently been achieved.
Albania
During the reporting period Albania, which refused the invitation to participate in CSCE in the early 1970s, requested and was granted observer status. It is, therefore, significant that Albania took some cautious but important steps toward implementing the Helsinki principles, including the holding of multi-party legislative elections on March 31, 1991--the first since 1920. The electoral process fell short in several key areas of CSCE standards for free and fair elections, including limited access to the media for opposition parties, intimidation of opposition party candidates and activists, and delayed issuance of election results. Much remains to be done to ensure Albania's complete and continuing observance of the Helsinki principles. During the reporting period, the ruling Albanian Party of Labor (PLA) declared its intent to depoliticize the army, security forces, and courts and took measures to decentralize the economy and reform the penal code and electoral law. In December 1990, the Albanian leadership announced that the formation of independent political organizations would be permitted and that a number of political parties and organizations would be allowed to register officially. Some of these groups also were allowed to publish their own newspapers. In human rights, the Albanian Government took some initial steps to correct past repressive practices. In 1990, Albanian authorities eased some restrictions on citizens' right to travel abroad but, at the same time, reportedly shot asylum seekers. Albania eased its persecution of religious activity, which resulted in the celebration of some religious services without official interference. Amendments to the penal code adopted in 1990 include the right to counsel, the right of appeal, and the right to a speedy trial. The government also re-established the Ministry of Justice, which had been abolished in 1967, as part of a judicial reform program. The government has published drafts for a new constitution incorporating safeguards, in principle, of many basic human rights, including freedom of religion, press, movement, association, and the presumption of innocence. The new multi-party legislature will begin debate on the constitution in late 1991. The government stopped jamming foreign broadcasts, including those of the Voice of America. The UN Secretary General visited Albania in 1990 to discuss human rights, among other topics. Albania, which is not a member of the CSCE, was granted observer status at each of the CSCE meetings held in the reporting period since June 1990. In October 1990, Albania hosted a gathering of Balkan foreign ministers. On March 15, 1991, the United States and Albania resumed relations. On March 20, 1991, an official US delegation arrived in Tirana to lay the foundations for this new relationship.
Bulgaria
Bulgaria's adherence to Helsinki principles dramatically improved during the reporting period. The current reporting period was a year of significant political transformation, including the country's first free and democratic elections in June 1990, and the implementation of wide-ranging political and economic reform. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), as the Communist Party was renamed, won the June parliamentary elections, with a small majority over the opposition coalition Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). In August, Bulgaria's Parliament elected Zhelyu Zhelev, the former UDF chairman, as president. The main political forces entered into a coalition government in December, after a general strike brought down the second all-socialist government of Andrey Lukanov. Political reforms begun in the fall were followed by an ambitious economic reforms in January and February. A new constitution is to be drafted by the Grand National Assembly during the spring of 1991. New local and parliamentary elections will be held sometime thereafter. The Bulgarian Government made great strides in the area of human rights. The human rights abuses for which the former communist regime was criticized virtually disappeared. The government claimed that all monitoring of mail and telephone conversations had stopped, although some opposition activists charged abuses continued during and after the election campaign. A wide array of opposition and independent newspapers emerged despite frequent shortages in newsprint and the state-run printing and distribution networks. Freedom of speech and association were no longer challenged. Additionally, the Bulgarian Government made progress in redressing human rights violations committed during the forced assimilation campaign aimed against Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish and Pomak (ethnically Bulgarian Muslim) minorities during the late 1980s. Freedom of religion also blossomed, as semi- official bans on church attendance were lifted and Bulgarians could freely attend church services and ceremonies. Several of the measures taken to prevent or discourage the practice of Islam were ended. A school for Imams was opened as was an Islamic cultural center. Several Protestant and evangelical churches were registered and have established offices and begun importing Bibles written in the Bulgarian language. Although many of the reforms have only recently been set in motion, a clear pattern of democratization and a new openness of Bulgarian society was established during the reporting period. Nationalism remains a difficult problem for Bulgaria, however, and tensions on this question are still high. Moreover, the need to overhaul totally the societal structure imposed by the communist regime requires a massive amount of work. That process, while well underway, was not yet complete, and remnants of the totalitarian system had still to be overcome.
Czechoslovakia
At the end of the reporting period, Czechoslovakia made significant progress in establishing democratic institutions and civil liberties since November 1989. Economic reform moved more slowly, hampered by bureaucratic caution and public fears of inflation and unemployment. Problems during the reporting period included the controversy over vetting public servants who may have collaborated with the old regime; the devolution of power from the federal government to the Slovak and Czech Republic Governments; and the knotty economic challenge of property rights (restitution), privatization, and elimination of distortions in the economy. In the longer term, Czechoslovakia, led by President Vaclav Havel and his allies, has an excellent chance of maintaining the advances it has made in the last year and of forging closer political and economic ties with the West. Czechoslovakia is strongly committed to the CSCE process, not only because many of its current leaders were active in monitoring CSCE compliance in the past, but also because the Czechs and Slovaks, hoping to establish themselves as a constructive presence in the heart of Europe, see the CSCE process as serving an integrative function for Europe and North America. The CSCE Secretariat is located in Prague, and the Czechoslovak government has been particularly active in presenting proposals to enhance and expand the CSCE's role in multi-lateral politics.
Hungary
Hungary continued its implementation of CSCE principles by taking further steps to consolidate the political and economic reforms of the past few years. The Antall Government made genuine progress in creating democratic institutions, in re-orienting its foreign policy toward the West, and in moving toward a free market economy. Hungary is now a working parliamentary democracy and is embarking on the second stage of its political transformation--the drafting and passage of numerous pieces of legislation to help establish democracy. In February 1991, the government presented a 4-year economic reform program aimed at reducing constraints on private business, accelerating privatization, continuing economic liberalization, and reducing inflation. Hungary continues to play an active role in the CSCE and views its participation as a way to strengthen ties with the West and help influence the shape of a new Europe.
Poland
April 1, 1990 to March 31, 1991, witnessed sustained and significant progress in Poland's implementation of its CSCE commitments. The two governments in power during this period continued Poland's democratic and free market transformation and moved the country toward full compliance with CSCE standards. During the reporting period, Poland transformed itself from a one- party state into a functioning democracy in which the legal scope for private ownership and initiative approaches that of Western parliamentary democracies. Poland's political and economic transition is, by no means, complete. The parliamentary process for dismantling the legislative framework of the previous era has proven tedious. Poland has yet to hold fully free parliamentary elections, but the Polish Parliament and President Walesa agreed to hold elections before October 31. The government remains committed to the rule of law, arguing that democracy assures the durability of economic and other reforms.
Romania
Romania made some progress in implementing CSCE provisions in the current review period. Restrictions on travel and emigration were lifted; there are no longer bars to the free practice of religious belief; and the rights of free speech, association and political expression generally are respected. The internal security apparatus was scaled down but still plays a troubling role in society. Progressive reforms of the legal code, designed to ensure the rights of the individual vis-a-vis the state, were adopted or proposed. There were, however, some notable exceptions to these positive developments. An outbreak of violence in June 1990 left several dead. Hundreds were injured as coal miners rampaged through the streets of Bucharest in response to an official appeal to counteract anti-government protests. This and other events marred Romania's progress toward greater compliance with CSCE standards. On May 20, 1990, Romania held its first multi-party election since 1946. Ion Iliescu, the candidate of the National Salvation Front (NSF, the successor to the Communist Party) was overwhelmingly elected president, while NSF candidates won about two-thirds of the seats in each of the new parliament's two chambers. The voting was judged by domestic and international election observers to have been essentially free and unfettered. The same was not true of the campaign, which was marred by violence, intimidation, state control of the media, and the overwhelming imbalance of state resources in favor of the ruling party. Citizens remain unable to express their political opinions through the ballot at a sub-national level, as local elections have been repeatedly delayed, and local officials are appointed by the central government. Romania has continued to make progress under Basket II during the past year. The government has promulgated an extensive array of laws that form a legal basis for private agricultural land ownership, creation of private-sector economic units, privatization of the bulk of state-owned enterprises, foreign investment, expansion of foreign trade, and a new social security system. Under an economic stabilization program negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), prices were raised substantially. Measures also were taken to restrain inflation, make the national currency partially convertible, halt the decline in gross national product, and restrain the current account deficit. Romania's post- revolution buying spree contributed to a $148-million US trade surplus with Romania in 1990, after several years of large deficits. Romania has been opened to foreign businessmen and investors. However, the changing legal environment, political uncertainty, and economic decline have left most foreign investors cautious about the country. Inter-ethnic tensions remain high, particularly between ethnic Hungarians, who constitute approximately 8% of the population, and ethnic Romanians. The violent clashes between these two groups that took place in March 1990, were not repeated in the reporting period, but the treatment of Hungarians and other minorities, including Gypsies, is a potentially explosive issue. Freedom of religion and expression is now unhindered. The print media is not censored, but complaints continued to be made about government manipulation of newsprint supplies and distribution. Television remains essentially under government control, although a smattering of independent television stations, limited by poor equipment, lack of financing, and very limited access to the airwaves, were established. The official decision to reduce television air time for political parties and for minority language programing was greeted with skepticism.
USSR
In its external relations, the Soviet Union generally sought to abide by the Helsinki principles, at a time when dramatic changes in Eastern Europe seriously challenged all CSCE signatories, but especially the USSR. The Soviet Union largely respected the sovereignty of neighboring CSCE states--although the Soviets removed former German Democratic Republic (GDR) leader Erich Honecker from Germany in March 1991--refrained from official threats of force, and supported the inviolability of existing borders and the peaceful settlement of disputes arising between states. It took steps to withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe, although negotiations on withdrawal continue with some countries. There has been continued progress in Soviet respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, though that trend stalled momentarily beginning in the fall of 1990. Landmark religious and press freedom laws were passed in 1990, and a new emigration law continued to move forward in the Soviet legislature as the review period drew to a close. Trade declined during the review period, hampered by the inconvertibility of the ruble and the absence of private property rights. Cultural exchanges expanded but were impeded by the poor state of the Soviet economy. The forced annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1939 by the Soviet Union, never recognized by the United States, led to tensions and escalating violence in the area. The Soviet Union's observance of the Helsinki principles was marred by actions in the Baltic states, prompting invocation of the CSCE Human Dimension Mechanism by a majority of CSCE states. In January 1991 the Soviets used force, leaving at least 14 dead in Lithuania and five dead in Latvia. There also was violence in Azerbaijan, and accusations of participation by Soviet army forces in actions against Armenians in disputed areas in Azerbaijan. In other respects, however, the Soviet Union has been an active and constructive participant in a variety of European and international fora.
Yugoslavia
During the reporting period, Yugoslavia suffered a deepening political crisis, significantly affecting its performance under the Helsinki principles. While in many parts of the country, there was a significant broadening of the democratic process, rising ethnic tensions, most notably in Serbian-dominated Kosovo, led to repression and violence. Overall, Yugoslavia's adherence to Helsinki principles expanded during the reporting period, but in Kosovo the reverse was true, leading fellow CSCE states to invoke the Human Dimension Mechanism. The one-party communist system that ruled Yugoslavia since World War II largely disappeared in 1990. For the first time since before World War II, Yugoslavia experienced multi- party elections in all six constituent republics. Balloting procedures in most republics generally were fair, but in Serbia, the ruling Communist Party used its control of the media and financial resources to the detriment of the opposition parties. The federal government, under Prime Minister Ante Markovic, attempted a sweeping program of political and economic reforms. After initial progress, this program fell afoul of inter-republican differences, which have, for example, blocked a number of proposed amendments to the federal constitution intended to eliminate remnants of the one-party system and allow multi-party elections at the federal level. Rising ethnic tensions and the persistence of old anti- democratic structures in Yugoslavia reached the point where they threatened the existence of a unified federal state. Conflict deepened, especially in parts of Croatia and Bosnia. Ethnic conflict in Kosovo between majority Albanians and Serbs, who consider the province the "heart of Serbia," has led to massive violations of human rights, including scores of deaths at the hands of police, thousands of arrests for the expression of political opinions, and the firing of tens of thousands for political strikes. Serbian/Croat tension also reached dangerous levels. The Yugoslav military is highly secretive and provides little information about its activities to the Yugoslav government or public, let alone the country's CSCE partners. As the Yugoslav crisis deepened, the Yugoslav military played an increasingly assertive political role, feeding concerns that it would not act impartially in support of federal objectives if events led to conflict.

Chapter Three--IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY-RELATED PRINCIPLES AND OF BASKET I

(CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT) The security aspects of the CSCE process, known as Basket I, were first enshrined in Section 2 of the Helsinki Final Act, entitled the "Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament." CSCE participating states agreed to prior notification of major military maneuvers and movements, exchanges of observers and other confidence-building measures. Subsequent to Helsinki, the 34 CSCE states endorsed two additional agreements--the Stockholm Document of 1986 and the Vienna Document of 1990--which expanded and deepened the CSBMs regime. The 34 also have, under various principles and agreements, committed to promoting disarmament. Following are assessments of the performance of certain CSCE member states.
Bulgaria
The overall improvement in relations between Bulgaria and the United States and Western Europe was reflected in Bulgaria's approach to security issues. The Bulgarian People's Army has been receptive to the idea of increased military contacts but currently is constrained by severe economic problems from responding favorably to proposals in this area offered by the United States. Bulgaria has accepted, in principle, a US naval ship visit (originally scheduled for the summer of 1990, but, subsequently, canceled due to the Persian Gulf crisis), a US military band visit, an Air Force Academy cadet exchange, a visit to the United States by eight mid-level line officers, and increased medical team visits. The Deputy Surgeon General of the US- European Command visited Bulgaria in July 1990, as part of a humanitarian support mission and established contact with the Bulgarian Minister of Health and Bulgarian People's Army military medical academy-hospital. The Bulgarian Government and People's Army have repeatedly voiced their eagerness to fulfill all requirements of the 1990 Vienna Document, including military inspections, and have provided detailed information regarding their force structure and equipment, as required by the Vienna Document. Particularly since the current coalition government came to power in December 1990, Bulgaria has expressed deep interest in closer relations with NATO. In an attempt to establish a dialogue facilitating a decrease in traditional tensions, better understanding of each other's military forces, and resolution of other longstanding problems, the Bulgarian Government and People's Army have initiated significant new contacts with their Turkish counterparts, to include exchange visits with chiefs of the general staffs. This dialogue also will encompass exchanges of instructors from military academies, sports teams, medical personnel, and possibly naval vessels. Sofia also has called on its Greek and Turkish neighbors to implement aspects of the CFE verification regime, even before the treaty enters into force as a confidence-building measure in the Balkans. The new Bulgarian Government has expressed its willingness to cooperate bilaterally with the United States and other states to combat international terrorism. It worked closely with the United States and other Western countries in the prevention of terrorism during the Persian Gulf crisis. Stringent measures were taken to protect diplomatic missions and residences against potential threats. Bulgaria's relations with states that support terrorism have declined markedly under the new political system, though it maintains relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, Iran, and Libya, among other traditional Bulgarian allies. The Bulgarian Government has initiated investigations into allegations of Bulgarian involvement in the 1981 assassination attempt against the Pope and the 1978 London killing of dissident writer Georgi Markov, and is cooperating with international authorities in these investigations. Bulgaria ratified the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation on January 5, 1991.
Romania
Romania has moved from its position prior to the revolution in which it actively helped train and support international terrorists within its borders, to acting in relative harmony with Western governments to stop the movement of terrorists. The official Romanian training of terrorists affiliated with radical Arab groups appears to have stopped. The government also has entered into limited, but cooperative information-sharing arrangements with several neighboring states to combat the movement of terrorists and associated support, including arms, across its borders. Some informal counter-terrorist information-sharing arrangements also have been entered into with Western countries. Because of the presence of a large number of students from countries that support international terrorism and the relaxation of border controls, the movement of terrorists within Romania is often difficult to detect, control, and interdict. This difficulty is compounded by the continuing existence of remnants of the support structure terrorists had established in East European countries. A possible exception to Romania's new anti-terrorist stance is the reported continuation of sales of Romanian-made armaments to states that have traditionally supported terrorism. In May, Romania concluded a bilateral Open Skies agreement with Hungary to build mutual confidence, and the Romanian military has had a useful and growing dialogue with its Hungarian counterparts.
USSR
The Soviet Union has continued to support means for settling disputes in the CSCE region. In its relations with the Baltics and with Soviet republics, the All-Union Government has expressed its desire to resolve tensions through dialogue. However, the behavior of its organs has not always reflected this commitment in practice: in the Baltic states, the Soviet Government instigated or acquiesced in the use of deadly force in January 1991. During the last reporting period, the Soviet Union maintained a constructive approach toward terrorism. Assistance to states linked to terrorist activities has declined during the past year, albeit for economic as well as political reasons. The Soviet Union also increased its level of cooperation with the United States and other nations, and bilateral counter-terrorism policy discussions have been increasingly constructive. Soviet representatives have expressed particular concern over the linkage between international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime, and have sought increased international cooperation to address these problems. Soviet authorities cooperated closely with the United States to counter the terrorist threat posed by the Persian Gulf crisis.
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia continues to try to shed its old image as a terrorist crossroads, both in its public pronouncements in support of the battle against international terrorism and in growing cooperation with foreign police services. The Yugoslav policy of granting entry to citizens of nearly all countries without visas, combined with relatively inefficient frontier controls, limits its effectiveness in stopping terrorists from transiting Yugoslavia, but authorities seem increasingly inclined to discourage or expel those seeking to establish support infrastructure there. During the Gulf war, numerous diplomatic representations established new relationships with the internal security service to discuss the protection of embassies from terrorist attacks. The United States worked with Yugoslav security services closely throughout the crisis. Although the results were uneven in terms of the actual effectiveness of the extra security provided, the dialogue between Yugoslav terrorist specialists and foreign embassies has expanded. Yugoslavia adheres to the Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft; the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation; the 1987 Protocol to the Montreal Convention; and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. The Yugoslav military's traditional obsession with secrecy with regard to military contacts, can be seen in its approach toward the foreign military attaches in Belgrade. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) does not encourage contacts between senior Yugoslav military leaders and attaches, and provides foreign attaches with very little information about its activities. It limits access to military facilities to a small number of carefully stage-managed visits for attaches each year. Foreign military attaches are required to inform the JNA 48 hours in advance about travel outside Belgrade.
Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CSBMs)
The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe was originally mandated in 1983 by the Madrid CSCE Follow-Up Meeting as an integral part of the CSCE process. The aim of the CSBM talks was to establish concrete measures to increase military transparency and predictability as a means of achieving greater security and military stability in Europe. The first CSBM talks--from 1984 to 1986, in Stockholm-- produced the Stockholm Document; a set of CSBMs that called for forecasts, notifications, and observations of major military exercises; and established on-site inspections to assist in verifying compliance. In accordance with the terms of the Madrid Mandate that governed these talks, the Stockholm CSBMs were militarily significant, politically binding, and verifiable. Further, the CSBMs were to apply only to land-based military exercises taking place within the whole of Europe as defined in the mandate. The provisions of the Stockholm Document follow. Forecasting. The exchange of annual forecasts of all notifiable military activities, with large-scale activities (more than 40,000 troops) prohibited unless announced 1 year in advance and activities over 75,000 prohibited unless forecast 2 years in advance. Notification. Forty-two-day advance notification of activities when these involve at least 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments. In the case of amphibious and airborne activities, the notification threshold is 3,000 troops. Observations. Invitations to observe must be extended when notifiable military activities meet or exceed 17,000 troops. In the case of amphibious and airborne activities, the observation threshold is 5,000 troops. Inspection. On-site inspections from the air or ground, or both, to verify compliance with the agreed measures, with no right of refusal. No country need accept more than three inspections on its territory per calendar year nor more than one from any one participating state. As agreed at the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting, a new set of CSBM negotiations began in 1989 to expand the measures of the Stockholm Document. These talks, guided by the Madrid Mandate, will continue until the Helsinki Follow-Up Conference in March 1992 under the same mandate as the one governing the Stockholm Document. In July 1990, NATO leaders at the London summit called for a meaningful package of CSBMs to be ready for endorsement by the 34 CSCE nations at the Paris summit in November 1990. This call quickened the pace of negotiations and helped produce a new, expanded CSBM agreement--the Vienna Document of 1990--which leaders of the 34 CSCE nations endorsed in Paris. The Vienna Document builds upon the Stockholm Document and entered into force January 1, 1991 (its provisions on the military data exchange enter into force on April 15, and the evaluation visits to verify this data enter into force on July 1). The Vienna Document adds the following measures to the Stockholm Document: -- Military data exchange requires yearly exchange of data on military forces, equipment, and budgets. Military force and equipment data will be verified by on-site evaluation visits. -- Risk reduction permits any state to require an explanation from any other state of unusual and unscheduled military activities that cause security concerns and establishes points of contact to report or receive information on hazardous military incidents to prevent misunderstandings, and mitigate the effects of such incidents. -- Contacts call for increased military contacts among the 34 nations at all levels and for visits to air bases once in a 5-year period. Sets up a CSBM communication network for the states to transmit and receive required and relevant information. -- The annual assessment meeting establishes a yearly implementation review of the Vienna Document CSBMs.
Implementation
The implementation record for the reporting period demonstrates a reduction in the level of CSBM-related activity as compared with earlier years. This is largely due to the fact that 1990 activity forecasts (submitted by NATO, East European states, neutral and non-aligned states (NNA) and the USSR) included a limited number of notifiable military activities. Furthermore, during the year, a number of these activities were subsequently canceled or reduced below notifiable levels. East European and Soviet practices were in accord with the provisions of the Stockholm Document. Most East European states now have open and constructive approaches to CSBM implementation. For the most part, the Soviet Union maintains a narrow interpretation of the Stockholm provisions. As of March 31, 1991, 45 inspections--under CSBM and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) terms-- had been conducted. Of these, 44 were carried out under the 1986 Stockholm Document, and one was carried out under the 1990 Vienna Document. During 1990, 10 CDE inspections were carried out. Inspections have been viewed by both East and West not only as an element of verification but as an instrument that can make a contribution to confidence-building. Eastern states, the GDR, and the Soviet Union forecast six activities for 1990, three of which were national and three combined. Three of these forecast activities met the notification threshold. During the year, one was canceled, and one was reduced below notification thresholds. As a result, four activities were notified: USSR/GDR on February 5-11, 1990 in the GDR, with 16,000 troops; USSR on March 16-23, 1991 in the Kiev Military District, with 17,000 troops; USSR/GDR in the GDR on August 10-17, 1991, with 15,000 troops; and USSR on September 10-15, 1990, within the Byelorussia Military District, with 9,800 troops. There also was one observation program in Kiev in March. The Soviet Union forecast four notifiable activities for 1991, two of which will require observation programs. East European states provided notice that they had no notifiable military activities planned for 1991. The NNA states forecast a total of five notifiable military activities for 1990, one of which met the observation threshold. Consequently, two of these activities were canceled, and two were reduced below notification thresholds. As a result, one activity (not observable) was notified in 1990. Of the NNA states, only Sweden submitted an activity forecast (including one activity) for 1991. For 1990, NATO states forecast 10 notifiable activities, eight of which met the observation threshold. Subsequently, five of these activities were canceled, and one was reduced below notification thresholds. As a result, four activities were notified in 1990; two of these included observation programs. NATO states forecast five activities for 1991, one of which will require an observation program. During the reporting period, East European countries notified two activities under the Stockholm Document. One of these was a combined activity in the GDR, and one was a national activity in the USSR; neither met the threshold for observation. NATO countries notified four military activities. Two of them included observation programs. One activity, an amphibious exercise in Norway called "Adger 91," was notified under the Vienna Document. Among the NNA states, Finland provided notification of its military activity "Harjoitus 90." Sweden provided a notification and observation program, under the Vienna Document, for its activity "Nordanvind 91." During the reporting period, seven inspections were conducted. The Soviet Union conducted four inspections: in Italy in May 1990; in the United Kingdom in September 1990; in the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1990; and in Norway in March 1991. The Soviet inspection in Norway was carried out under the provisions of the Vienna Document. NATO members conducted three inspections during the reporting period. The United Kingdom conducted an inspection of an unnotified activity that took place in the GDR in April 1990, as well as a previously notified activity in the Soviet Union in September 1990. Norway inspected an unnotified activity in the Soviet Union in September 1990. Bulgaria did not forecast activities for 1990 and did not receive or conduct CDE inspections in 1990. Czechoslovakia did not forecast activities for 1990, nor did it receive or conduct any CDE inspections. Hungary did not forecast activities for 1990, nor did it receive or conduct any on-site inspections in 1990. Poland did not forecast activities for 1990, nor did it receive or conduct any CDE inspections in 1990. Romania did not forecast activities for 1990, nor did it receive or conduct any CDE inspections. To date, Romania has not implemented any agreed CSBMs, other than sending observers to observable exercises (a practice that only started in 1988). USSR has carried out its obligations under the CSBMs of the Stockholm Document, as well as the recently adopted Vienna Document. During the reporting period, the Soviet Union provided notification of two activities, one of which took place in the GDR and the other on the territory of the USSR. The latter was provided on a voluntary basis as the activity was scaled back below notification levels. The notifications were provided in a timely manner and included, at least the minimum information required under notification provisions. The exercise calendar for 1991 also was provided in a timely manner and included all required information on four ground force exercises scheduled for the last half of the year. The Soviet Union conducted four inspections and received two during the reporting period. Yugoslavia forecast one activity, "Pester '90," but the exercise was canceled in January 1990. Yugoslavia did not receive or conduct any CDE inspections in 1990.

Chapter Four--IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET II

(ECONOMICS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT) Basket II of the Helsinki Final Act calls for the promotion of cooperation in economics, science and technology, and the environment. During this reporting period, Basket II activities made the most significant advances since CSCE's launching in 1973. The Bonn Document committed member states to market economic principles and opened the way for true economic cooperation among CSCE countries. Its signature occurred at a time when such cooperation became critical to the successful transition to democracy among the reforming states of Central and Eastern Europe. The Sofia Document on the Protection of the Environment, negotiated in 1989 and formally adopted at Vienna in 1990, provided guidance on the need to protect both the environment and environmentalists. Following are assessments of the performance of certain CSCE countries and Albania in Basket II.
Albania
Faced with a declining growth rate in what is already the poorest country in Europe, the Albanian leadership in 1990 moved in a very limited way to decentralize the economy by encouraging the emergence of small-scale private enterprises, providing some agricultural workers with larger plots of land for private use, and granting enterprises the power to set their own wage levels and bonuses for workers who exceed production targets. Hoping to attract outside assistance to save its failing economy, the government removed the ban on foreign credits and liberalized the foreign investment law to provide for repatriation of profits by foreign investors. While some foreign businesses have expressed an interest in Albania, most still are wary of investing substantial amounts until the country has made a stronger commitment to creating a stable economy backed by a democratic government. Moreover, the lack of an adequate infrastructure for conducting business may discourage the development of commercial ties.
Bulgaria
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. An economic reform program, introduced in early 1991, is designed to move Bulgaria rapidly in the direction of a market-oriented economy. As a part of that reform, the government introduced, and the National Assembly adopted, a budget aimed at a smaller deficit funded by borrowing rather than by issuing new money. Excess government spending is being trimmed, and subsidies to enterprises and consumers are being sharply reduced. As of February 1, 1991, all prices were liberalized, with the exception of several energy sources (coal, electricity, heat, gasoline). Prices of 14 basic foodstuffs are under observation, and the government may intervene to counter sharp rises in prices. Interest rates were readjusted to a more realistic rate. A foreign investment law draft is before the National Assembly, and a revision in the economic statutes allows all firms to engage in international economic activity, provided they register with the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Trade unions have operated more vigorously in the last year, and three trade union groups now exist. The two larger confederations participate with representatives of government and employers in considering some economic measures, although they are now entirely independent of the government and varied in their political sympathies. A general strike led by the "Podkrepa" trade union brought down the all-Socialist government of Andrey Lukanov in late November 1990. The new agricultural land law, passed February 22, 1991, recognized the rights of former owners of rural land to receive equivalent amounts of land again if they wish. Full implementation will likely take several years, but the law is the first step toward reprivatizing property. Commercial exchanges have been facilitated by more liberal rules for foreign businessmen. For example, US businessmen and tourists no longer require a visa for stays up to 30 days. Businesses are allowed to open their own offices, and a number have done so. Foreign trade statistics published for 1990, for the first time in many years, included data on import and export of crude oil and some petroleum products. Balance-of-payments information has become more accessible, and a new accounting convention was established to make government data conform more closely to international standards. Science and Technology. Bulgaria continued to encourage expansion of free exchange of scientists and information with the United States and other developed Western nations during the reporting period. In mid-1990, Bulgaria hosted the International Council of Scientific Unions Conference and invited representatives of the US National Science Foundation to visit Bulgaria. Bulgarian scientists have made a concerted and consistent effort to expand contacts at all levels, both privately and through governmental organizations (chiefly the Ministry of Science and Higher Education and the National Academy of Sciences), and to encourage development of joint projects in a variety of fields. Environment. Environmental issues were of primary concern to the government throughout 1990-91. It continued to permit a variety of environmental organizations to operate unhindered and invited international environmental inspection teams to visit the country. Numerous representatives of Ecoglasnost and the Green Party were elected to Parliament and have become prominent national political leaders. There is an active parliamentary commission on environmental policy, led by a member of Ecoglasnost. The government has actively pursued contacts and cooperation with international entities regarding environmental protection. Bulgaria signed the Charter of the Regional Environmental Center based in Budapest and is pursuing the possibility of establishing two or three sub-centers of that organization in Bulgaria. In November 1990, Bulgaria invited international inspections by the UN Environmental Program of the Ruse-Georghiu region, and by the International Atomic Energy Agency of the Kozlodui nuclear power station on the Danube, in an effort to resolve conflicting claims of environmental negligence between Bulgaria and Romania. The Bulgarians also are pursuing possible cooperation with other states on resolving pollution problems in the Black Sea and the Danube, and have agreed to form a joint commission with Greece to study pollution in the Mestos River system. Bulgaria participated in the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change and in the first session of the International Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change. Bulgaria is a signatory to the Montreal Protocol. In early 1991, Bulgaria hosted the visit of a high-ranking official of the US Environmental Protection Agency to discuss future cooperation and assistance in environmental issues. The European Community (EC) has agreed to assist in the establishment of a national environmental monitoring system.
Czechoslovakia
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. Czechoslovakia is moving steadily toward a free market economy. To keep the economy balanced during the difficult transition period, the government is pursuing a stringent fiscal and monetary policy. To soften the effects of rising prices and unemployment, the government has enacted social legislation, including an increase in the minimum wage, increased pensions, and an unemployment benefits program. Unions are free and are consulted by the government on social and economic issues. Major economic reform legislation which has been passed include: -- Legalization of private enterprise; -- Liberalization of foreign investment to allow both joint ventures and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries in virtually all sectors of the economy; -- Liberalization of foreign trade to remove obstacles for private individuals and organizations to engage in foreign trade; -- Privatization of small and state-owned enterprises; -- Restitution of businesses and other personal property nationalized by communist authorities beginning in 1948; -- Price liberalization (covers 80% of prices); -- Foreign exchange liberalization ; -- Safeguards legislation to prevent illegal transfer of sensitive technology; and -- Strengthening protection of intellectual property rights. The Government of Czechoslovakia welcomes and encourages foreign investment, cooperation, and trade. Working-level officials are open and accessible to business representatives. Economic statistics are published, but at times are difficult to find and are not all calculated according to Western standards. Economic legislation and business information is available, often in English, but due to the rapid changes that the Czechoslovak economy is undergoing, businessmen often have difficulty obtaining timely and accurate information. Numerous trade fairs are held annually, and businesses can freely organize seminars, exhibitions, and other promotional events as well as advertise in local newspapers. However, because of the tremendous increase of interest in Czechoslovakia, the availability of local facilities--hotel space, conference rooms, and office space--has not kept up with demand. Finally, bureaucratic reform in Czechoslovakia is incomplete. The competencies of various federal or republic offices have not yet been definitively decided. Thus, some businesses have had plans stymied by red tape and indecision. Czechoslovakia welcomes foreign investment and trade. Both joint ventures and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries are permitted; joint ventures with private CSFR partners or wholly owned foreign subsidiaries no longer need government permission to be established. The Foreign Exchange Act permits repatriation of dividends and profits and allows Czechoslovak businesses (including joint ventures and foreign subsidiaries) to exchange local currency for hard currency for ordinary business transactions. However, capital account transactions are still regulated and some businesses have complained about delays in obtaining foreign exchange. A new law on intellectual property rights increases some protections. With the completion of the Bilateral Investment Treaty, American investors will have other investment guarantees in place. The treaty is expected to be signed in mid-1991. Science and Technology. The United States and Czechoslovakia initialed a science and technology agreement that was signed in mid-1991. The agreement provides for joint research by US and Czechoslovak scientists across a broad range of disciplines including basic science, energy, health and medicine, the environment, engineering research, earth and atmospheric sciences, mining research, and agriculture. Joint research will be funded by contributions from both governments. Cooperation in a number of these areas is already taking place between the US National Science Foundation, the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US Department of Agriculture, and others with their Czechoslovak counterparts. A science attache position at the American Embassy in Prague has been added in recognition of the expanding interest in both countries of closer collaboration in science and technology. Environment. The Government of Czechoslovakia has signed and ratified the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its subsequent protocols, as well as the Vienna Convention on Protecting the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol to it. Czechoslovakia is interested in cooperating with its neighbors on specific regional environmental projects and, generally, in exchanging information and cooperating with the international community. Specifically, the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland have agreed to work together to address regional air pollution problems in the northern Bohemian region of Czechoslovakia, the Upper Silesian region of southern Poland, and the former German Democratic Republic. Czechoslovakia attended the first session of the International Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change. In early 1991, a joint environmental study was carried out in cooperation with the federal and republic governments in Czechoslovakia with the active participation of the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US Agency for International Development, and the World Bank, to create a strategic plan and set priorities for environmental assistance to Czechoslovakia. The mission was the first such joint assistance effort in Central and Eastern Europe, and was designed to avoid duplication and maximize the efficient use of foreign assistance.
Hungary
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. In 1990-91, Hungary's economy continued the process of transformation from state to private market regulation. Government leaders committed themselves to privatization and economic restructuring along market lines, while struggling with the mechanics of those processes. Major external issues were Hungary's $21-billion external gross debt and the radical re-orientation of its trade from its former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) partners to Western countries, in part, as a result of a switch on January 1 from CEMA clearing arrangements to hard-currency accounting. Internally, the government grappled to control the budget deficit, rising inflation fueled by subsidy cuts, and the specter of increasing unemployment as inefficient state industries were shut down or privatized. In September 1990, the government announced its new 3-year economic program for national renewal. The program emphasizes privatization, import liberalization, deregulation, curbing inflation, achieving currency convertibility, reforms in public finance, welfare reform, as well as encouraging increased foreign investment. To facilitate privatization efforts, in 1990, the government created the State Property Agency. This body supervises the privatization process and can also initiate the privatization of enterprises unable or unwilling to privatize on their own. Ten percent to 15% of state assets already have undergone privatization, with a government goal of reaching 50% by the end of 1992. Additionally, a government announcement in February 1991 described the establishment of a new organization called the Privatization Holding--which will concentrate on purchasing unprofitable and inefficient companies from the State Property Agency--with the aim of restructuring them for resale to investors. The government considers foreign investment to be one of the most important means of encouraging economic development, modernization, and competitiveness. In May 1990, a law on securities was passed, and on June 21, the first stock exchange in East-Central Europe officially opened. Parliament has passed several acts to facilitate foreign investment, of which the Economics Association Act, the Companies Act, and the Investment Act are the most noteworthy. All three concentrate on developing the framework for foreign direct investment in Hungary. The Investment Act, which came into effect in January 1989 and was amended by Parliament in January 1991, deals with the establishment and operation of joint ventures with foreign participation. According to government statistics, as of January 1991, approximately 5,000 joint ventures were in operation, of which 2,000 were formed in 1990. To further encourage foreign investment, generous tax reductions are available to joint ventures that involve a substantial level of capital and foreign participation. Although the forint is not yet convertible, (the government plans to make it convertible between 1992 and 1994) foreign investors may repatriate both profits and capital in hard currency. The poor state of the transport and telecommunications infrastructures, as well as the housing and general real estate situation, are among the most serious barriers to foreign investment. Recognizing that these weaknesses undermine Hungary's endeavors to attract foreign investment, the government is undertaking costly improvements. In general, the tax structure is designed to promote private business. The tax on profits in 1990 decreased from 50% to 40%, while taxes on small businesses are only 30%. State enterprises pay an additional 25% tax for the use of state assets. In the autumn of 1990, the Small Business Administration was created to help foster private business. Hungary's estimated budget deficit for 1991 is 78 billion forints, an estimated 4% of gross domestic product. The government has drastically cut back subsidies in areas such as housing and agriculture (40% from 1989 levels). It also has initiated several price increases on food, gas, electricity, transportation, and household items. As of January 1, 1991, free market prices apply to 90% of goods. In the past year, foreign trade has been liberalized substantially. CEMA--and its ruble clearing account trading system--has been abolished, and Hungary now conducts all of its foreign trade on a hard currency basis using world prices. Beginning in January 1991, all Hungarian companies could conduct their own foreign trade without the assistance of state trading companies. The number of products subject to import licensing has been greatly reduced. As of this year, 93% of imported products can be imported without prior approval, with a government goal set for abolishing all import licenses by 1992. In 1990, the EC provided Hungary with several concessions, such as the lifting of discriminatory barriers, suspension of non- discriminatory barriers, extension of Generalized System of Preferences benefits, and the lifting of all self-restraint quotas. It is expected that during 1991, Hungary's relationship with the EC will progress further. The EC and Hungary are negotiating an association agreement which could become effective as early as January 1, 1992. Hungary is a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In February 1991, the government announced that Hungary would maintain its GATT obligations and would reduce the average tariff to around 8%. Following this announcement, however, the government proceeded to raise the tariffs on automobiles from 10% to 18% (13% on environmentally less harmful automobiles). In the area of intellectual property, Hungary provides process patent protection but not product patent protection. This has been a particular problems in the pharmaceutical sector. Hungary is drafting a new patent law, but enactment could be delayed depending on other parliamentary business and pressure from the politically powerful pharmaceutical industry. A controversial issue which remains unresolved is the question of ownership of assets and compensation for properties seized during the communist period. The government is preparing a bill for parliamentary approval through which it hopes to settle this aspect of ownership rights. It seeks to remove one of the major areas of uncertainty that has, hitherto, hampered the sale of real estate and businesses and the transition to a genuine market economy. The field of labor relations remains unsettled. While workers are free to join labor unions, the independent trade unions allege that workers feel pressured to join or maintain membership in the successor unions to the former communist unions. Additionally, the dispute among unions over how to divide property formerly owned by the communist unions remains unresolved. Nevertheless, major labor unrest is rare, in part due to consultations held at the Interest Coordinating Council (ICC) among the representatives of the employers, labor, and the government. Legislation passed in 1990 gives all workers, excluding judicial, military, and police personnel, the right to strike. Unions are free to form confederations and affiliate with international labor organizations. Hungarian unions now maintain extensive relationships with such bodies as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The legal minimum wage was raised in 1991 to approximately $100 per month, and the average work week is 40 hours, with workers receiving overtime and a minimum of 15 days paid leave per year, free health care, and pensions. Federal labor courts enforce occupational safety standards for work places, but specific safety conditions are not always up to internationally accepted standards. Science and Technology. Hungary continues to expand its scientific and technical contacts, eagerly seeking new sources of cooperation and funding in Western Europe and the United States. In late March 1991, the second annual board meeting of the US-Hungary Science and Technology Agreement convened in Washington to approve 28 joint research projects in such areas as the environment, energy, agriculture, basic science, engineering research, and earth and atmospheric sciences. Joint research is funded by contributions from each government. At this meeting the Hungarians emphasized how significant the joint research program was in promoting the concept of a competitive scientific peer review and the grants process in Hungary. The Hungarian science community also is cementing participation in such cooperative European scientific activities as EUREKA and the programs supported by the Council of Europe. There also is keen interest in taking advantage of science and technology programs that Italy is sponsoring under the aegis of the "Pentagonale" group of countries (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia). The Pentagonale is seen as a bridgehead to more active participation in future EC programs. Environment. The Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern [Europe], based in Budapest, began operations in September 1990, with support from the United States, the EC, and a number of other countries. Although the center is physically located in Hungary, it has a regional constituency. Through activities such as information collection and dissemination, institution-building, environmental education, and clearinghouse functions, the center will work in environmental health, energy efficiency, pollution prevention, and the environmental effects of agriculture. The center has awarded nearly 50 grants to environmental organizations in the region and has sponsored several important conferences that have brought experts together to discuss important issues and address common environmental problems. During the reporting period, the Hungarian Ministry of Environment was reorganized and began a review of its legislation and ways to implement an environmental assessment requirement for new investment. Although Hungary has limited research and personnel resources to follow a wide range of world environmental problems, government representatives attended both the Second World Climate Conference in November 1990 and the first session of the Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change in February 1991. Hungary also is a member of the Montreal Protocol. With the introduction of democracy and the formation of political parties, environmental organizations have lost some of their status as mass pressure groups on behalf of political change. Support for environmental causes, within the various political parties, is more individualized now. More dedicated environmentalists are now settling down to work on basic problems. Industries and local governments also are seeking direct assistance in tackling long-neglected environmental disasters that can no longer be overlooked. At the same time, international exchanges with the United States and Western Europe are expanding and increasingly are supported by private organizations.
Poland
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. Poland's former centrally planned economy is undergoing a profound, historically unprecedented, and difficult transformation to a market economic system based on private ownership and full integration with the international trading system. The government's economic transformation program aims to stabilize and restructure an economy plagued in 1989 and early 1990 by near hyper-inflation, severe consumer goods shortages, a highly unstable currency, and inefficient industrial monopolies. The government managed to rein in inflation by withdrawing subsidies and limiting wage increases while balancing the budget and restricting money supply growth; inflation now hovers around 4%-6% a month. Poland's currency, the zloty, is internally convertible and remained stable in 1991, while goods and services are much more widely available. After an initially slow start, privatization of the Polish industrial sector has begun, with the first five companies privatized by public offer and many more due for privatization in 1991. A stock market is getting underway, which will further support the government's privatization policies. The real standard of living fell in 1990. Measured production declined as well. Unemployment, previously disguised, has grown to nearly 1.5 million persons, about 7% of the industrial work force, and is continuing to rise. The average family now spends about 75% of its income on food and shelter. Major bright spots in the Polish economy include an export boom and a rapidly growing (23%-26% in 1990) private non-agricultural sector. Despite the hardships outlined above, Poland has been free of prolonged and/or massive worker protests, although strikes have occurred. However, public grumbling about rising economic hardship has been growing. The Polish Government welcomes and encourages both direct and indirect foreign investment and trade. President Walesa has made the attraction of foreign trade and investment a central pillar of his presidency. The government is committed to improving the flow of information available to foreign businesses in Poland. Senior Polish officials routinely make themselves available to visiting businessmen and frequently travel abroad on trade and investment missions. Poland's decision to unify the exchange rate and to make the Polish zloty convertible has greatly clarified the business climate for foreign investors and traders. Poland also has substantially reduced tariff rates and has worked to liberalize the overall trading regime, including eliminating most non-tariff barriers. Science and Technology. US scientific and technical cooperation takes place with Poland under a Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement signed in 1987. It provides for cooperation across a number of disciplines, including basic science, earth, and atmospheric sciences; engineering research; agriculture; health and medicine; the environment; energy, forestry, and wildlife; and mining research. Poland established a new State Committee for Scientific Research in January 1991 to oversee the organization and funding of all scientific research in the country. Environment. Poland's air and water environment was greatly damaged during the decades under communism. In view of the critical need to address such environmental degradation, the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 authorized the US Environmental Protection Agency to establish an air- monitoring network and provide equipment for monitoring, analysis, and treatment of wastewater and drinking water in Krakow. Initial shipments of equipment for both the air and water projects are expected in the first half of 1991. Since 1989 and especially in 1990, the Polish Government has moved aggressively to sign and ratify international agreements such as the Montreal Protocol and Vienna Convention on Protecting the Ozone and the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution. Poland attended the first session of the Inter- governmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change. It is working with the United States to assess emissions of greenhouse gases from Poland. Poland also is working closely with other countries in the region, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries to address common environmental problems caused by industrial waste.
Romania
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. Romania's performance under Basket II has continued to improve over the past year. Shortly after the May 20, 1990, elections, the Romanian Government prepared an extensive package of economic reform legislation to create a legal basis on which to build a market economy. The highlights of the legislation are the laws on land reform, privatization of state enterprises, private enterprise creation and foreign investment. The reform package addresses liberalization of internal prices, convertibility of the leu, budget deficit control, and external account balance. Bureaucratic obstructionism and legal ambiguities, however, have impeded implementation of significant reforms and private sector development. Consequently, this has raised questions about the sincerity of the government's commitment to the establishment of a true market economy. Romania is in a state of transition from a highly centralized, public sector-dominated economy to a market economy, with expanding private sector activity. In September 1990, Parliament passed a privatization law which established that all state enterprises, excluding the railroad; post office; telecommunications; and enterprises in the defense, nuclear, extractive, and energy-producing sectors should be reformed as corporations. These corporations will have autonomous management and will be privatized via the distribution and sale of shares to Romanian citizens and foreign investors. How to assure equality of access to newly privatized enterprises (especially to prevent unfair access by members of the former nomenklatura) remains a subject of concern. In November 1990, Parliament passed the Commercial Societies Law which established the legal basis for the formation of corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships. Most state enterprises, including foreign trade companies, have now reconstituted themselves as corporations, though the government still owns all the shares. A law governing the implementation of the initial distribution to Romanian citizens of the first 30% of the shares, as well as subsequent sale of the remaining shares, currently is under consideration. In addition to the recognition of private property in the draft constitution, a land reform law was promulgated in February 1991, which established private ownership of agricultural land. Romanian citizens--but not foreigners--are now theoretically able to have title to, sell, buy, will, and inherit land, but there are still restrictions on the amount of land that can be owned and how it can be used. The monopoly on foreign trade previously held by state-owned foreign trade organizations has been abolished. Import and export licenses are now granted automatically to all importers/exporters unless they want to trade in shortage commodities such as processed foods or in items controlled for non-proliferation reasons. The tariff system has been revised to conform to GATT rules and the use of quotas has been abolished except for instances in which temporary quotas can be justified to protect infant industries. Government procurement practices have been changed as well. Now tenders are published and competitive bids are solicited. The most important stimulus to private sector development has been price liberalization. In February 1990, prices for food products produced on individual plots were decontrolled. On November 1, 1990, prices of all but essential commodities--basic food items and residential energy and communications--were liberalized. Prices were decontrolled for those goods for which there exist three or more competing suppliers. However, prices for most goods were raised to cover what the government deemed to be reasonable production costs plus some profit. Romania has adopted an IMF stabilization program with stringent monetary and fiscal policies in order to try to reverse the post-revolution decline in GNP. In addition to raising domestic prices in order to stay within budget deficit limits, the government has removed controls on interest rates, imposed money supply and credit growth ceilings in order to avoid dangerous levels of inflation, and devalued the leu for the third time to help stimulate Romanian exports. It also has launched an inter-bank exchange rate system in order to facilitate the importation of raw materials and capital goods, and to squeeze the black market. The plan is to expand the range of transactions carried out on this market until the leu can be made fully convertible. Inconvertibility of the leu has been a major disincentive to the foreign investment needed to rebuild an economy run down after 10 years of harsh austerity imposed by the Ceaucescu regime in order to repay all of Romania's foreign debt. The Romanian Government is committed to minimizing the social costs associated with economic restructuring. A new social security system, funded by a payroll tax, has been created to finance expanded retirement and disability benefits. Over the past year, unemployment benefits have been paid to people who lost their jobs due to enterprise closings and layoffs. A new worker retraining program is being developed. Both the November 1990 and the April 1991 price increases were accompanied by salary and pension increases. In April 1991, student allowances, new mothers, and families with children, also were increased. However, in order to avoid an inflationary spiral, these payments are taxable and are not indexed to the consumer price index. Unfortunately, the government has used the issue of social responsibility to move slowly in dismantling its dominant position as the producer and distributor of both consumption and production goods. Romanian receptivity to foreign businesses continued to improve during the reporting period. As a general rule, businessmen are treated well, as Romania seeks to expand its commercial ties internationally. Although most foreign visitors, including all those from Western Europe and the United States, are still required to obtain entry visas, these may be obtained without difficulty at Bucharest's international airport. Visas are not, however, issued to travelers entering the country by train. Businessmen are free to travel anywhere in Romania and visit factories and places of business at will. Since September 1990, Chambers of Commerce have been established in many provincial cities and are slowly starting to develop programs to attract foreign businessmen. There are no laws that prohibit the establishment and operation of foreign businesses in Romania. There are, however, practical impediments that hinder the efficient operation of such businesses. Access to Romanian officials and private businessmen is virtually unlimited, and business discussions are open and detailed. On the other hand, Romanian commercial laws, as well as the persons administering them, are constantly changing, and it is difficult to get concise answers to such questions as how to open a checking account. Legal interpretations of more technical issues vary widely. The Chamber of Commerce in Bucharest is technically the organization to which foreign businessmen should turn to obtain assistance, but the Chamber has proved to be an inept player in business development. No general system for locating rental space yet exists, and rents and means of payment vary, although payments from foreign businessmen generally are demanded in hard currency instead of Romanian lei. Visiting American businessmen have been the subject of direct and indirect bribery solicitations in order to rent offices. The Romanian Government has taken steps to improve its statistical economic reporting. Work is being done to correct the false data presented during the Ceaucescu years. The National Commission for Statistics publishes a monthly review of key economic indicators, and a 1990 statistical yearbook was published in February 1991. Bilateral trade statistics are available upon request from the Ministry of Trade and Tourism. As the government works to put into place a market economy, Romanian businesses are beginning to recognize the benefits of advertising and promotion, both of which were ignored under the Ceaucescu regime. Romanian television now carries commercial advertisements for foreign and domestic businesses as well as spot promotions for government and privately sponsored events. The amount of print and billboard advertising continues to increase. The Bucharest Chamber of Commerce continues to organize the Bucharest International Fair, which, held annually in October, is the nation's premier trade show event. A spring fair, devoted to consumer goods, will be reinstated in 1991 after an 11-year hiatus. Approximately 12 smaller, specialized trade exhibits also are planned for 1991. Publicom, the advertising arm of the Chamber, is responsible for promoting all these events and is approaching the task in a more sophisticated, Western-style. The Romanian Government is eager to receive management training assistance. The most frequently expressed desire is for mid-level management training, but government representatives also show a keen interest in technical business skills, finance and banking, trade administration, and similar subjects. Romanian invitees to government or privately sponsored programs and events in the United States now appear to have no problems receiving permission to attend, and American sponsors of programs in Romania are openly encouraged. In March 1990, Romania revised its 1972 foreign investment law to make it more attractive. The changes, however, were not sufficient to attract the desired level of foreign business. As a result, in October a new organization to promote foreign investment, the Romanian Agency for the Promotion of Foreign Investment and Coordination of Economic Assistance (ARPIS), was created and charged with drafting a new foreign investment law. The new version will increase the amount of annual local currency profit that may be repatriated in hard currency from a flat 8% of capital investment to between 8% and 15%, depending upon industry sector. Agriculture, food processing, and tourism are priority sectors receiving the highest benefits. The law also provides tax benefits to investors. The government states that 700 new joint ventures have been established since the revolution, 132 of them with US participation. The vast majority of these, however, are small operations with limited capital participation. No major American companies have concluded equity joint ventures in Romania since the revolution, although many Fortune 500 companies have expressed interest in investing in Romania. Most potential American investors are reluctant to commit resources to operations in Romania due to the uncertainty of the Romanian political and economic situation and the inconvertibility of the leu. The situation in regard to small- and medium-sized enterprises is somewhat brighter. Since the passage in February 1990 of a law authorizing the creation of small companies (those employing 20 persons or less), some 50,000 such enterprises have been registered, but most are service oriented, have limited financial means, and have yet to make any substantial in-roads into the state-dominated production or distribution systems. Business operating conditions in Romania are still far from ideal. Business amenities such as hotels, restaurants, vehicle rentals, foreign- language newspapers, typing and copying services, and telecommunications facilities have improved little since the revolution, and foreigners are still generally charged dollars for these services. As of November 1990, air travel within Romania by foreigners has to be paid for in hard currency as well. Availability of office space, equipment and furnishings also is limited, making the setting up and supplying of an office difficult. Science and Technology. An agreement between the US National Science Foundation and Romania's National Committee for Science and Technology (NCST) expired. Since then, the NCST has been abolished. The Ministry of Education and Science has expressed interest in negotiating a new agreement. Romanian scientists have been active in re-establishing international contacts. Currently, scientific exchanges are made by a variety of non- and quasi-governmental organizations. Exchanges and contacts are free from interference by the Romanian government. In early 1991, agreement was reached to convert the US- provided Triga research reactor from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel use. The agreement calls for the US Department of Energy to convert the fuel and to provide technical assistance for reloading the reactor. Environment. Environmental groups have formed several ecological political parties and are represented in the Parliament. The new Ministry of Environment is an active participant in regional and global environmental meetings. Romania is active in both the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change and the International Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Ecological University of Bucharest, the first of its kind in Eastern Europe, opened in September 1990. A private academic institution, it will grant degrees in medicine, engineering, natural sciences, and law, and will carry out scientific research in relevant environmental fields.
USSR
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. Until recently, the Soviet Union had no free, democratically organized trade unions. The official trade union movement, which officially embraced nearly all Soviet workers, acted largely as a "transmission belt" for management, rather than representing workers' interests. The unions were effectively controlled by the Communist Party and included as members both management and workers. As a result, workers' wage, health, and safety interests were poorly served. In response to this situation, Soviet coal mines in 1989 staged several long-running strikes and organized a loose network of strike committees to represent their interests. These strike committees have since coalesced into the first major free, independent, and democratic trade union in Soviet history--the Independent Miners' Union (Russian initials: NPG), founded in October 1990 at the Second Independent Congress of Soviet Miners in the Ukrainian coal mining center of Donetsk. The Soviet authorities have, to date, permitted this new union to organize, develop, and establish contacts with trade unions abroad. In addition, the coal miners of the Western Siberian Kuzbass region have joined with workers in other industries there and in several other regions of the Russian republic to form the Confederation of Labor (COL), an independent labor movement espousing economic reform and democratic political change. The NPG and COL are closely linked and cooperate with each other. In addition, several other smaller independent labor movements exist. Forced labor is not a major element of the Soviet economy, although Siberian convicts are reported to work in the logging industry and perform other tasks. Employment discrimination on the basis of race and language is not presently a serious problem, although exacerbated ethnic tensions in some republics may influence hiring practices. Job discrimination on the basis of gender is a more serious problem, and there are very few women on the higher rungs of the economic and political ladders. Until recently, religious believers reported significant discrimination in the work place. While anti-religious prejudice continues to exist, the strong revival of religious activity has apparently lessened harassment of believers. While not an official requirement for holding a leading position in trade or industry, Communist Party membership remains a de facto requirement for advancement in many cases, and the upper ranks of key branches of the Soviet economy are still dominated by party members. Currently, Soviet fiscal and monetary policies do not encourage workable, sustainable economic growth, due to the inability and refusal of the Soviet Government to take meaningful steps away from centralized planned economy. Repeated attempts by the government to devise a balanced economic reform program have failed, with the economy entering a severe recession in 1990, according to official Soviet economic statistics. Important sectors such as coal and petroleum showed decline in output, while much of the best harvest in years went uncollected due to poor organization and lack of resources. Due to a severe housing shortage, labor mobility in the Soviet Union is very low, making it difficult to allocate labor resources from old, outmoded industries and industrial centers to areas and industries of potential growth. As in the past, the Soviet industrial economy remains dominated by the military-industrial complex. Efforts at conversion of defense industrial capacity to civilian production have been fitful, uncoordinated, and largely ineffective so far. Although the Soviet leadership is publicly committed to adopting policies designed to stimulate trade and foreign investment, in fact, only limited progress has been achieved in this area. Moreover, Soviet economic legislation regulating foreign investment, which appears to be evolving in the right direction, still contains ambiguities. Regulation of capital flow is complex and contradictory. Laws in both areas are subject to constant change on both the national and republic level. The quick succession of impractical and poorly conceived economic reform plans also has damaged the investment climate. The Soviet currency, the ruble, is inconvertible externally and increasingly inconvertible internally. As a result, internal barter trade has been growing rapidly, while the increasing internal inconvertibility of the currency has pushed individual regions, cities, and even enterprises into economic autarky and isolation. This has further strengthened the tendency toward economic contraction. In the absence of an externally convertible currency, the Soviet Government has been hard-pressed to define effective and meaningful policies on the repatriation of profits. Essentially, companies establishing manufacturing operations in the USSR can achieve a hard-currency profit only by exporting a portion of their output to Western markets. Given this state of affairs, significant foreign investment is unlikely outside the energy sector, where hard currency profits can easily be generated by oil and gas exports. Despite several years of attempted economic reform, most prices in the Soviet economy are set by the central government, rather than by the market place. Prices on mostly unregulated farmers markets are high and effectively beyond the reach of most Soviet consumers. Heavy monopolization of industry, trade, and services and excess liquidity make price decontrol difficult in the case of many industries and sectors. Although social equity is a prime official concern of the Soviet government's economic policy, its inability, so far, even to stabilize the economy has led to declining living standards for most Soviet citizens. Consequently, this has helped to generate great frustration, rising social tensions, and a growing number of strikes and disturbances. Despite the passage of landmark legislation on property and land in 1990, private ownership of most productive assets, land, and housing remains insignificant. Most land is considered state property under the jurisdiction of local councils of people's deputies. Recent reform legislation allows small-scale, long-term leasing of farm land and of plots for cottage construction. The concept of intellectual property rights is undeveloped in the Soviet economy. While the top Soviet leadership has repeatedly stated its intention to open the country to foreign investment, progress in this area has been slow. The inconvertibility of the ruble is one major obstacle, since it hinders arrangements for the orderly repatriation of profits earned by foreign investors. Yet another key obstacle to greater foreign investment is the continued absence of legally recognized land ownership rights in the Soviet economy. Both the central and republic governments continue to assert that most key industrial assets and natural resources should be state property, and that their exploitation should be regulated by state bureaucracies rather than the market place. The center and the republics are struggling for control of key resources and this "war of laws" has had a chilling effect on the development of foreign investment in the USSR. For example, the division of hard- currency profits derived from the exploitation of mineral resources between the central and republic governments has been a subject of intense controversy. In such a confused environment, it has been difficult for a foreign investor to know which signature makes a contract valid. The absence of land ownership rights also means that foreign investment by private firms in the USSR acquires the character of an enclave within the Soviet economy, rather than fitting organically into the economic scene, as is the case in free market countries. Moreover, Soviet commercial legislation on foreign investment, in general, and joint ventures, in particular, has often been criticized for vagueness, impracticality, and a lack of internal consistency. Soviet commercial legislation has been in a state of constant flux in recent years due to numerous legislative revisions in the all-union and republic legislatures. In addition, the attempted assertion of greater economic sovereignty by union and autonomous republics in the USSR has meant that republic and local regulations and laws regarding business activity can differ from all-union legislation. Some steps have been taken improve the access of foreign businessmen to Soviet businessmen. Some US businessmen not resident in Moscow have been given Soviet multiple-entry visas. However, it is still necessary for most US businessmen applying for a business visa to receive support from a sponsoring Soviet organization. This naturally hampers most US businessmen wishing to enter the Soviet market for the first time and who have no established Soviet contacts. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations maintains that it has already implemented a promise made in connection with the new US-Soviet trade agreement to afford US businessmen an accelerated process in applying for accreditation for a representative office in the USSR, which should lead to a decision on accreditation within 60 days of application. During the past year, a number of US firms have received accreditation and, currently, there are 43 US firms with accredited offices in Moscow. A number of additional US firms have applications for accreditation pending. Current statistics published by the Soviets are readily accessible but are inadequate for use in making commercial decisions and business judgment, primarily because they lack enough detail. Other types of commercial information, such as lists of Soviet enterprises and identification of their activities, are still their infancy. For example, more than 20,000 firms have been authorized to enter into foreign trade, but the list of such firms published by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations mentions only several thousand. Access to business contacts and commercial officials continues to be without official hindrance. Due to poor communications and Soviet business practices, however, attempts to reach and set up appointments are frequently frustrating. Poor international telecommunications links make it especially difficult to arrange meetings on short notice from the United States. The hotel infrastructure in Moscow and other Soviet cities is still inadequate, and it is frequently difficult to obtain hotel reservations. Any major improvement in this situation and in the present unavailability of suitable office and residential space for Western businessmen will depend on further Western investment in the Soviet infrastructure and, thus, will take time. The Soviet transport system is a complex mixture of economically available air transport--tickets are very cheap, if a reservation can be had; an inadequate road system; and an aging rail network which is the principal cargo carrier for the country. The dimensions of the problem are so large that speedy progress is unlikely. Trade promotion and other marketing activities, including advertising, consulting, and other business services, as well as the organizing of seminars, fairs, and exhibitions, are now possible, although very expensive. A number of Western trade fair authorities and other firms specializing in trade fairs and exhibits have been able to organize trade fairs and exhibits in the USSR. Numerous seminars also are now being organized to take place in the Soviet Union. Science and Technology. The Soviet Government continues to make available increasing amounts and types of scientific and technical data, and the trend appears to be to allow such decisions to be made at a lower bureaucratic level. Generally, cooperation is willing and open; however, in the effort to find hard currency to supplement diminishing budgets, Soviet science organizations of all kinds are trying to market their data and may require pre-payment. No incidents were reported during the period under review of deliberate, official denial to Soviet scientists of the freedom to establish and maintain direct contacts with professional colleagues in other countries. Indeed, access to computer "bit-net" and "E- mail" - type networks, for example, may be becoming easier, even for non-official groups. However, continued official requirements for exit approval, and logistical and technical--computer, telephonic, and postal-- communications difficulties, ensure that Soviet scientists cannot establish and maintain direct contacts with their colleagues in the same sense as their Western counterparts. To the extent that exit permission is speeded by bribes and the judicious use of influence, corruption is also a hindrance. However, obstacles to free scientific interchange appear to be primarily technical and logistical, rather than political. Environment. The USSR is a party to the Convention on Long- Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Vienna Convention For the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Soviets participate in the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change and are active in the International Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change. The responsible Soviet organizations have stepped up their participation in numerous multi-lateral fora and continue to give international environmental issues a high profile. The Soviet Government has recently raised the State Committee for Environmental Protection to the level of a ministry, the Ministry for Utilization of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection. However, more significant than this elevation in status will be the type of environmental legislation passed by the Supreme Soviet. In the past, organizations have been beset by funding problems and lack of legislation defining jurisdiction or enforcement mechanisms; should this situation continue, the elevation of the environmental organization will not make a difference. Similarly, while the USSR is party to about 50 international environmental agreements, the country's lead environmental agency has direct responsibility for only a small number of them. A well- functioning mechanism for effective environmental policy-making and enforcement is lacking. At present, the USSR is unprepared to implement pollution reduction targets and accelerated reductions in the production or consumption of various pollutants, including chloroflouro-carbons (CFCs) and will not be able to meet international environmental commitments while experiencing political and economic changes and crises. Soviet authorities generally tolerate and encourage independent environmental activism. A semi-formal "public" council, sponsored by the governmental body responsible for environmental protection--and chaired by a prominent environmental activist who is the incumbent deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Ecology Committee--serves as a clearinghouse for citizen and community concerns about the environment. A number of other, less "official" organizations exist and function without apparent governmental hindrance; during recent official bilateral environmental discussions, both US and Soviet environmental NGO's freely participated. Moscow was the site in late March of an international non-governmental environmental conference. Environmental data, which began to be published in 1988, continues to become more and more available to the public. A large proportion of members of the Soviet and republic parliaments campaign on environmental issues, but the strength of these sentiments has not yet been truly tested against economic and political concerns. In the case of the Aral Sea, for example, the various republic officials concerned appear unable to formulate a cohesive environmental strategy in the face of economic concerns (agricultural irrigation demands) and inter-ethnic rivalry. Environmental concerns appear to carry the most weight when they are allied with other forces, such as nationalism, in the various republics.
Yugoslavia
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. Yugoslavia has long been an active participant in world markets, although the internal political problems of the reporting period adversely affected the Yugoslav economy and business activity. Since the Yugoslav-Soviet split in 1948, Yugoslavia has followed a fundamentally different course than the other socialist countries in the region. This is most evident in the breadth of the country's international economic relations. Yugoslavs have traveled, worked, and studied in the West for more than 30 years, providing them with a generation of exposure to Western business practices, education, culture, and products. Such exposure has influenced Yugoslavia's decentralized economic system, within which enterprises make independent business decisions on all matters, including those dealing with foreign investors and exporters. In the agricultural sector, private farmers own 85% of the country's agricultural land, and there has always existed an active, if small, private sector economy. No other East European socialist republic in the region could claim these market credentials. The Yugoslav Government's 2- year-old economic reform program has focused on eliminating hyper-inflation, introducing a convertible dinar, rehabilitating the banking system, and privatizing enterprises. To reach these goals, the government of Prime Minister Ante Markovic devoted its efforts in 1989 to laying the legislative groundwork for the transformation of a socialist economy to one based on market principles. In 1989, the Federal Assembly enacted legislation that opened the way for greater foreign investment in the country, liberalized trade, established a program of ownership restructuring, and loosened restrictions on private sector businessmen. The fruits of these efforts were realized in 1990 as foreign businessmen concluded more than 2,000 new investments with Yugoslav firms and Yugoslavs established some 50,000 new private companies. In fact, the first half of 1990 saw the Yugoslav Government reach significant economic achievements, including the virtual elimination of inflation, strong growth in foreign exchange reserves, and the establishment of an internally convertible dinar that increased public confidence in the economy. A June 1990 loosening of monetary controls and wage restraints, however, released a new surge in wage bills and inflation. A double blow from Gulf war sanctions (damaging to Yugoslav firms working in Iraq and Kuwait, and to Yugoslav oil supplies) and a drought that severely reduced agricultural output took even more air out of the federal government's reform program. By December 1990, foreign exchange reserves were falling by $1 billion each month, forcing the National Bank of Yugoslavia to pull out of the foreign exchange market. Controls put on withdrawals from Yugoslavia's foreign currency accounts have led to a sharp decline in remittances from workers employed abroad, while political instability has destroyed the country's normally lucrative tourist industry. Privatization was slowed by conflicting republican policies which, in practice, overrode federal law. The pillars of the reform program--convertibility, privatization, and control of inflation--were seriously damaged. Further national reform awaits a political consensus among the country's six republics, though some progress is being made on reform issues at the republican level. Although the federal government's reform program is stalled, the government remains committed to a prudent economic strategy that includes cutting public expenditures and maintaining control over the monetary system, efforts that are vital to economic reform and securing Western assistance. Furthermore, the government has stressed freer pricing of goods and a more open trade policy that has greatly expanded access to Yugoslavia's markets. All types of property now have equal legal status in Yugoslavia, and increased protection of intellectual property has been the result of amendments to existing legislation made in early 1990. Science and Technology. US science and technology cooperation with Yugoslavia is carried out under a bilateral scientific and technological cooperation agreement signed in 1988. The United States and Yugoslavia have had a joint research program in effect continuously since 1972. Each government contributes in generally equal amounts to fund joint research activities. The joint program provides for cooperation across a number of disciplines, including basic science, earth and atmospheric sciences engineering research, agriculture, health and medicine, the environment, energy, and mining research. The scientific and technical cooperation program is structured particularly to respond to the interests of each of Yugoslavia's republics, and joint work proceeded during the reporting period without significant interruption despite political and ethnic tensions. Environment. In January 1991, the United States participated in a Group of 24 (G-24) environmental fact-finding mission to Yugoslavia organized by the European Community to identify programs and projects in the environment sector that could be considered for possible funding by the G-24 and/or the PHARE (EC) program. Projects in three main categories (policy/institution- building, feasibility studies for large investment projects, and pilot projects with near-term mitigation impact) were submitted to the mission by the Yugoslav authorities. The numerous senior Yugoslav participants from various republics representing government, academia, and the private sector reflected a strong interest in environmental issues. Yugoslavia is a signatory to the Montreal Protocol. It attended the first session of the International Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change and participated in the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change.

Chapter Five--IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS-RELATED PRINCIPLES AND OF BASKET III

(HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER FIELDS OF COOPERATION) Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields is covered under Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act. In this Basket, CSCE states have committed themselves to respect human rights and to further human contacts, information flow, and cooperation and exchanges in the fields of culture and education. The Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension marked a significant step forward in Basket III, elaborating freedoms such as free and fair elections and rule of law as part of basic human rights. Copenhagen reflected the changing climate in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as the continuing improvement in East-West relations. Following are assessments of the performance of certain CSCE countries and Albania regarding Basket III commitments.
ALBANIA
Human Rights Freedom of Religion or Belief. In May 1990 the legislature, declaring that religion was separate from the state and that the question of religious belief would be a matter of conscience for every individual, amended the 1967 ban on all religious practices. The law permits Albanians to practice their religion individually but left a ban on collective worship. The government also decriminalized "religious propaganda," thereby allowing some religious services to be held without official interference. While in 1990, Albanian officials told a US delegation that nobody in Albania wanted to open places of worship, an increasing number of mosques and churches have been re-opened and reportedly are being used with or without official approval. Freedom of Expression. During 1990, all news media continued to be government-controlled, and the government prohibited criticism of the state and party leadership or their policies. However, there were indications that media criticism of some aspects of Albanian society, such as the pervasive problem of corruption, did increase. In December 1990, the government announced that newly registered political parties would be able to publish their own newspapers; both the Democratic Party of Albania and Republican Party began publishing papers in early 1991. Nonetheless, these papers only received limited allocations of newsprint and encountered problems with circulation. Journalists and opposition figures also contended with threats, intimidation, and physical violence attributable to the government. During the spring 1991 election campaign, the opposition parties were allowed only limited access to the government-controlled media. Art and literature remained subject to state control and censorship, and the authorities continued to manipulate scholarly inquiry and publications for political purposes. Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly. On July 31, 1990, a legislative decree established the freedom to assemble but with strict limits on meetings and sanctions against violators. A few independent associations and organizations began to organize in December. On December 9, 1990, Tirana University students demonstrated against electricity shortages and demanded political liberalization. The government responded by agreeing to the formation of independent political organizations. In mid-December, the Democratic Party of Albania, comprised mostly of intellectuals, students, and urban workers, was founded and legally registered. Other parties and organizations have since been allowed to form. Participation in these groups, however, has not been without retribution or free of threats and intimidation. The government reacted more harshly against other demonstrators in other areas of the country. Reports indicated that in Kavalje, Elbasan, and other cities, the army was used to stop demonstrations. Some demonstrations reportedly included attacks on public buildings, the looting of stores, and the burning of police cars and other vehicles; others we