US Department of State Dispatch Supplement
VOL. 2, NO 3, July 1991
Title: President's 29th CSCE Report, "Implementation of the
Helsinki Final Act, April 1, 1990-March 31, 1991
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Text submitted to Congress, Washington DC
Date: Jun 3, 19916/3/91
Category: Reports
Region: Europe, E/C Europe, Eurasia
Country: Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia (former),
Czechoslovakia (former), Hungary, Poland,
USSR (former), Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Subject: Human Rights, Environment, Science/Technology,
Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales,
Trade/Economics, Democratization
[TEXT]
Preface
This Implementation Report on the commitment of certain
member countries to principles of the Final Act of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), is the first since the
law mandating the report (Public Law 94-304) was passed in 1976
to appear on an annual, rather than a semi-annual, basis. The Report
reflects the changing realities of Europe and, for the first time,
extensively focuses on economic and environmental issues in the
countries examined. The countries treated have also changed:
during the reporting period the CSCE lost a member with the
unification of Germany and there is, thus, no discussion of the
German Democratic Republic. In addition, for the first time,
Albania is included in the report. Although it is not a member of
CSCE, Albania was granted observer status during the reporting
period and has requested full membership. [Note: Albania became a
full member of CSCE on June 19, 1991.]
Chapter One--DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CSCE PROCESS
Implementation of CSCE principles continued to improve in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the reporting period.
Bulgaria held its first multi-party election, introduced economic
changes aimed at the creation of a market economy and virtually
ceased previous repressive measures, particularly against ethnic
Turks. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic built on the
achievements of the Velvet Revolution, with laws to implement
economic and political reforms. Germany was unified. Hungary held
democratic elections and began drafting and passing legislation to
help democracy put down roots. In Poland political groups competed
openly and democratically. Parliament asked President Lech Walesa
to call for parliamentary elections and began drafting a new
constitution based on democratic principles. The constitution will
likely be promulgated by the new parliament in late 1991. Despite
the country's hardships and a declining standard of living, the
government persisted in its economic reform efforts. Romania
moved haltingly toward a more open society with the loosening of
many controls, but the government's commitment to democracy and
its willingness to tolerate opposition was still in question. In
particular, the government used force against a June 1990
demonstration by miners and continued isolated beatings and forms
of harassment against the opposition. Yugoslavia, beset by internal
divisions and human rights abuses in Kosovo and Croatia,
nevertheless, attempted significant democratic and political
reform at both the republic and federal levels. The Soviet Union
took steps toward the withdrawal of its troops from Eastern and
Central Europe. However, advances in human rights were offset by
abuses in the Baltic states and elsewhere and the rolling back of
some press freedoms. Economic reform also remained problematic.
The CSCE process itself underwent vast changes during the
reporting period. The November 1990 Paris summit publicly
recognized the end of the Cold War and, for the first time, created
CSCE institutions. A busy schedule of experts meetings was
augmented with two additional specialized meetings for 1991. A
regular schedule of high-level political consultations among CSCE
states was inaugurated. For the first time ever the United States
hosted a CSCE meeting--the October 1990 ministerial in New York.
The Baltic states requested but did not receive observer status at
CSCE meetings due to a lack of consensus on the part of the member
states. Albania was granted observer status and sought, but did not
receive, full membership, as CSCE states continued to look for a
more consistent record of Albanian compliance with CSCE
standards.
Below is an overview of major CSCE activities, changes in the
CSCE process, and a summary of CSCE inter-sessional meetings
during the reporting period.
The Paris Summit
The highlight of CSCE activities for the reporting period was
the November 19-21 Paris summit, the first CSCE meeting at the
level of heads of state or government since the signing of the
Helsinki Final Act in 1975. President Bush led a US delegation of
more than 30 senior government officials and congressional
representatives, including Senator Claiborne Pell and US
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Chairman
Representative Steny Hoyer and Commissioner Representative Don
Ritter.
The Paris summit included signature or endorsement of four
major agreements:
-- The Charter of Paris for a New Europe;
-- The Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures (CSBMs);
-- The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE--
negotiated within the framework of the CSCE process by members
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact); and
-- The Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, in which the
members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact welcomed the historic
changes in Europe and declared that they were no longer
adversaries.
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the
1990 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures established a secure foundation for relations among the
CSCE participating states. The summit, in turn, reaffirmed CSCE
principles and further enhanced the dignity of individuals and human
rights. It also focused on expectations for the new Europe in the
years ahead.
President Bush welcomed the summit as proof that "a
continent frozen in hostility for so long has become a continent of
revolutionary change." Looking to the future, the President
suggested that it was now time to "bring the CSCE down to earth,
making it a part of everyday politics, building and drawing on its
strength to address the new challenges."
Stressing the importance of balance among the three baskets
of the CSCE, he called for continued efforts in the areas of human
rights, security, and economics, and drew attention to the modest
but significant steps toward a new order which the CSCE
institutions represented. Other speakers shared the President's
reinforcement of CSCE principles and his expectations for the new
CSCE.
The Charter of Paris For a New Europe
Building upon the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter creates the
framework for a comprehensive European political dialogue. It is
the embodiment of President Bush's commitment to "a Europe whole
and free."
The 10-page Charter and its 14-page supplementary document
embrace an extraordinary range of subjects. The Charter is divided
into three parts: "a new era of democracy, peace and unity,"
"guidelines for the future," and "new structures and institutions of
the CSCE process." It calls for creation of a parliamentary
assembly for CSCE. The supplementary document sets out the new
institutional arrangements mandated by the Charter: a political
consultation process with a small administrative Secretariat in
Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an Office for
Free Elections in Warsaw. It also mandates two additional CSCE
Experts Meetings: a Seminar on Democratic Institutions (November
4-15, 1991 in Oslo), and an Experts Meeting on National Minorities
(July 1-19, 1991 in Geneva).
The Charter of Paris offers a powerful reaffirmation by the
participating states of the original Helsinki principles. The US
delegation to the Paris Summit Preparatory Committee which
negotiated the Charter worked to ensure that CSCE's traditional
emphasis on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
enjoyed pride of place in the document. The United States led the
effort to include the first-ever commitment by all CSCE heads of
state or government to democracy as "the only system of
government of our nations." Building upon commitments undertaken
at the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe to
replace command economies with market systems, the United
States advanced the concept of "economic liberty," which posits
individuals exercising their free will in a democratic society as the
"necessary basis for successful economic and social development."
In arms control, the Charter of Paris took a historic step
toward a new Europe. Building upon the CFE and CSBM negotiations,
the participating states agreed for the first time to establish new
negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building
by 1992. The talks will be open to all member states.
Institutional Arrangements
The modest institutions created by the Charter of Paris, and
the parliamentary assembly, set up by parliamentarians of
participating states, complement CSCE's new processes for
political dialogue.
The Charter of Paris established a cycle of regular, political
consultations at the summit, ministerial and senior official levels.
Biennial summits, meetings of foreign ministers at least once a
year, and periodic meetings of senior officials--usually senior
ambassadors with CSCE responsibilities--are now a strong point of
the CSCE process. Follow-up CSCE meetings will now be held, as a
rule, every 2 years and will not exceed 3 months, unless otherwise
agreed. These changes will allow CSCE to serve as a principal forum
for nearly continuous political discussion of developments in post-
Cold War Europe.
The mandate for the new political consultative process is
broad. Conceptually, these consultations are designed to afford
every participating state regular opportunities to discuss issues of
political interest with all others. The supreme decision-making
body of the CSCE will continue to be the meeting of CSCE heads of
state or government. However, practical management of the
consultative process resides with the Council of Ministers. Annual
meetings of the Council are, in turn, prepared by the Committee of
Senior Officials. All substantive decisions by these bodies will
continue to be taken by consensus.
The CSCE states sent experts to a January 14-18, 1991,
meeting in Vienna to discuss administrative arrangements for the
three new CSCE institutions. The meeting took place against the
backdrop of violent actions by the Soviet military in Latvia and
Lithuania. The United States and many other delegations used the
occasion to condemn these actions and to call for a settlement of
outstanding issues between the Baltic states and Soviet authorities
through peaceful means. An Austrian-led call for the convening of
an additional ad hoc meeting devoted to the Baltic situation was
blocked by the Soviets, a move criticized by the United States and
26 other countries present. Turning to their administrative agenda,
experts formulated recommendations on questions of personnel,
budget, premises, and other matters, all of which were passed along
for final decision to the first meeting of the Committee of Senior
Officials later that month. At the experts' meeting, the United
States took the lead in pressing for a rationalization of CSCE
expenses to ensure the most effective use of scarce resources in
the face of an increasing CSCE workload.
The Committee of Senior Officials met for the first time on
January 28-29, 1991, in Vienna. The US Representative to the
Committee was Ambassador John J. Maresca (also head of the US
Delegation to the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures in Vienna). The initial meeting of the Committee focused
on establishing a work program and other organizational matters.
However, the Committee also exercised its responsibility to review
current issues, and the situation in the Baltic states was
extensively discussed. The Committee's tasks include preparation
of the CSCE Council of Ministers meeting scheduled for June 19-20,
1991, in Berlin.
The CSCE Secretariat, which provides support to the political
consultation process, was opened in Prague on February 20, 1991,
by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, Foreign Minister Jiri
Dienstbier, and the Secretariat Director Nils Eliasson of Sweden.
The responsibilities of the Secretariat include providing
administrative support to Ministers and Senior Officials meetings,
maintaining an archive of CSCE documentation, providing
information on CSCE to individuals and interested groups as well as
non-participating states, and providing support as appropriate to
the Executive Secretaries of other CSCE meetings.
The Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) was created to assist the
Council of Ministers in reducing the risk of conflict by promoting
openness and transparency in military matters. Its primary
function, as laid out in the Charter, is to facilitate the
implementation of agreed CSBMs, the annual exchange of military
information, and the maintenance of a communications network
between CSCE states. It will also serve as the venue for annual
CSBM implementation meetings and seminars on military doctrine
and such other seminars as may be agreed by the participating
states. A Consultative Committee, composed of representatives
from all participating states, supervises the center's activities.
Since its creation by CSCE leaders in the Charter of Paris, the CPC
Consultative Committee has met twice. The agenda of these
meetings have covered implementation of agreed CSBMs, discussion
of recent developments in the European military security situation,
and administrative matters. A small Secretariat, under Director
Bent Rosenthal of Denmark, manages the CPC and reports to the
Consultative Committee. Located in Vienna, the CPC Secretariat
was officially opened by Austrian Foreign Minister Mock on March
18, 1991.
The Charter of Paris also set up an Office for Free Elections,
to be established in Warsaw, with Ambassador Luchino Cortese of
Italy as its first director. The United States is providing the
Deputy Director for the office. The function of the office is to
facilitate contacts and the exchange of information on elections
among participating states. To this end, the office will be
compiling information and reports of election observations on
elections within CSCE states; serve to facilitate contact among
governments, parliaments, or private organizations wishing to
observe elections and competent authorities in states holding
elections; and organize and serve as the venue for seminars or other
meetings related to election procedures and the building of
democratic institutions.
To promote involvement of parliamentarians in the CSCE
process, parliamentarians from the CSCE states met in Madrid on
April 2-3, and agreed to create a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, to
meet annually in a different CSCE country. The first meeting is
scheduled for early July 1992 in Budapest.
Inter-sessional Meetings
The reporting period included four meetings of CSCE experts:
the Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe, held in Bonn
from March 19 to April 13, 1990; the second Meeting of the
Conference on the Human Dimension, held in Copenhagen June 5-29,
1990; a meeting on the Mediterranean, held in Palma de Mallorca
from September 24 to October 19, 1990; and a meeting of Experts
on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, held in Valletta, from
January 14 to February 8, 1991.
Bonn. The Bonn Conference marked a revolutionary point in
East-West economic relations. It saw the formal renunciation of
the old communist system of planned economies by Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union in a final document elaborating free market
principles. The Bonn Document, for the first time, gives real
content to Basket II and offers a foundation on which all member
states can build stronger economic relations based explicitly on
market economics. Politically, the document commits CSCE states
to multi-party democracy based on free elections, rule of law and
non-discrimination, and the right of workers to engage in union
activity. Economically, the document endorses fiscal and monetary
policies to enhance the functioning of the market; expansion of the
free flow of trade, repatriation of profits in convertible currencies;
prices based on supply and demand; policies that promote social
justice; environmentally sustainable growth; recognition and
protection of intellectual and private property; prompt and fair
compensation for expropriation; and direct contact between
suppliers and consumers in domestic and international markets.
The US delegation was headed by Ambassador Alan F. Holmer
and included representatives the US Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe and the business community. The United
States played an important role in fashioning the conference's
outcome through its proposed "Bonn Principles for Economic
Cooperation," which became an integral part of the Final Document.
Copenhagen. The Copenhagen meeting adopted an historic
document placing the CSCE process unequivocally at the forefront of
efforts to make democracy the common possession of all
participating CSCE states. Most noteworthy was the document's
inclusion of language on free and fair elections: all CSCE states
committed themselves to hold genuinely free elections on a multi-
party basis and to admit government and non-governmental
organizations (NGO) observers to national-level elections. Another
major gain was in the rule of law. CSCE states affirmed that the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the
basic purposes of government and set forth the fundamental
principles of justice that form the basis of the rule of law in a
democracy. These principles include the inalienable rights of man,
representative government, measures against torture, and the
rights of national minorities.
Other sections of the document encourage CSCE states to allow
for foreign states and NGO observers at trials. Copenhagen also
produced agreement to impose time limits within which
governments must respond to other states' human rights inquiries
raised through the CSCE's Human Dimension Mechanism.
The US delegation to the Copenhagen meeting was headed by
Max Kampelman and included public members, members of the US
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and members of
the US Government's executive branch.
Palma. In the midst of worldwide concern over the
environment, the CSCE meeting on the Mediterranean was a useful
opportunity for member states to discuss environmental problems
affecting the Mediterranean. The meeting adopted a final document
promoting environmental cooperation in the region among CSCE
states and with the non-participating Mediterranean States
(Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia).
The final report stressed the desire of participating states to
promote favorable political, cultural, and economic conditions in
the region and emphasized the shared responsibility to protect the
environment. It also noted the need to enhance trade and economic
cooperation in order to promote development in the Mediterranean
region. The largest portion of the document sets out areas of
potential cooperation on the environment, including energy, cultural
preservation, water use, pollution, the fight against
desertification, prevention of forest fires, tourism, and information
exchanges.
The United States, while not a Mediterranean littoral state,
shared its expertise on issues relevant to the Mediterranean. US
presentations underscored areas in which Mediterranean littoral
states could benefit from American experience in handling water
and air pollution. Of special note was a presentation on US
cooperation with Canada to resolve problems involving the Great
Lakes. The US delegation also stressed the utility of market
principles in environmental decision-making. The Palma Final
Report included a US proposal that CSCE member states establish
toxic emissions reporting programs modeled after the US Toxic
Release Inventory.
The United States delegation was headed by Ambassador John
R. Davis, Jr., and included experts on pollution, tourism, and
reforestation and members of the US Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
Valletta. The Valletta meeting took place amidst hopes that
CSCE might play a greater role in preserving stability in a changing
Europe. During the meeting, war broke out in the Persian Gulf, and
the Soviet Union cracked down on the Baltic states, provoking
formal protests from many of the meeting's participants, including
the United States. Despite this, Valletta was able to make a useful
contribution to ongoing efforts within CSCE to find ways of
managing conflicts and their sources. The Valletta Final Document
reinforces the commitment of CSCE states to try to prevent,
manage, and settle disputes by peaceful means. It contains two
parts: general principles on dispute settlement and a CSCE-specific
dispute settlement procedure. The general principles address the
prevention, management, and resolution of disputes. The dispute
settlement procedure calls for mandatory third-party involvement
should CSCE states be unable to settle a dispute among themselves
or to agree on a settlement method. In the first stage of the
procedure, the CSCE third party--selected from a CSCE roster of
mediators--helps disputants find an appropriate settlement method.
If this is unsuccessful, either party can invoke the second stage and
ask the CSCE third party to assist in finding a substantive
settlement. The procedure calls for a "nominating institution" to
maintain the CSCE roster of mediators and to select the mediators
when the parties are unable to do so. The Valletta meeting left to
the Berlin ministerial to decide whether the nominating institution
should be the CPC, the Secretariat or another body.
The US delegation was headed by Michael K. Young, a Deputy
Legal Adviser at the State Department, and included a leading public
expert in dispute settlement, as well as a member of the US
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Chapter Two--GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF CSCE IMPLEMENTATION
The 10 principles of the Helsinki Act and additional
commitments elaborated over the years define the basic code of
conduct that CSCE states have adopted. These Helsinki principles,
reaffirmed in the Charter of Paris, include:
-- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in
sovereignty;
-- Refraining from the threat or use of force;
-- Inviolability of frontiers;
-- Territorial integrity of states;
-- Peaceful settlement of disputes;
-- Non-intervention in internal affairs;
-- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;
-- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
-- Co-operation among states; and
-- Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international
law.
The following general assessments provide an overview of
certain member countries and Albania where further progress on
meeting CSCE standards appears necessary or where remarkable
progress has recently been achieved.
Albania
During the reporting period Albania, which refused the
invitation to participate in CSCE in the early 1970s, requested and
was granted observer status. It is, therefore, significant that
Albania took some cautious but important steps toward
implementing the Helsinki principles, including the holding of
multi-party legislative elections on March 31, 1991--the first
since 1920. The electoral process fell short in several key areas of
CSCE standards for free and fair elections, including limited access
to the media for opposition parties, intimidation of opposition party
candidates and activists, and delayed issuance of election results.
Much remains to be done to ensure Albania's complete and
continuing observance of the Helsinki principles. During the
reporting period, the ruling Albanian Party of Labor (PLA) declared
its intent to depoliticize the army, security forces, and courts and
took measures to decentralize the economy and reform the penal
code and electoral law. In December 1990, the Albanian leadership
announced that the formation of independent political organizations
would be permitted and that a number of political parties and
organizations would be allowed to register officially. Some of
these groups also were allowed to publish their own newspapers.
In human rights, the Albanian Government took some initial
steps to correct past repressive practices. In 1990, Albanian
authorities eased some restrictions on citizens' right to travel
abroad but, at the same time, reportedly shot asylum seekers.
Albania eased its persecution of religious activity, which resulted
in the celebration of some religious services without official
interference. Amendments to the penal code adopted in 1990
include the right to counsel, the right of appeal, and the right to a
speedy trial. The government also re-established the Ministry of
Justice, which had been abolished in 1967, as part of a judicial
reform program. The government has published drafts for a new
constitution incorporating safeguards, in principle, of many basic
human rights, including freedom of religion, press, movement,
association, and the presumption of innocence. The new multi-party
legislature will begin debate on the constitution in late 1991. The
government stopped jamming foreign broadcasts, including those of
the Voice of America. The UN Secretary General visited Albania in
1990 to discuss human rights, among other topics.
Albania, which is not a member of the CSCE, was granted
observer status at each of the CSCE meetings held in the reporting
period since June 1990. In October 1990, Albania hosted a
gathering of Balkan foreign ministers. On March 15, 1991, the
United States and Albania resumed relations. On March 20, 1991, an
official US delegation arrived in Tirana to lay the foundations for
this new relationship.
Bulgaria
Bulgaria's adherence to Helsinki principles dramatically
improved during the reporting period. The current reporting period
was a year of significant political transformation, including the
country's first free and democratic elections in June 1990, and the
implementation of wide-ranging political and economic reform.
The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), as the Communist Party was
renamed, won the June parliamentary elections, with a small
majority over the opposition coalition Union of Democratic Forces
(UDF). In August, Bulgaria's Parliament elected Zhelyu Zhelev, the
former UDF chairman, as president. The main political forces
entered into a coalition government in December, after a general
strike brought down the second all-socialist government of Andrey
Lukanov. Political reforms begun in the fall were followed by an
ambitious economic reforms in January and February. A new
constitution is to be drafted by the Grand National Assembly during
the spring of 1991. New local and parliamentary elections will be
held sometime thereafter.
The Bulgarian Government made great strides in the area of
human rights. The human rights abuses for which the former
communist regime was criticized virtually disappeared. The
government claimed that all monitoring of mail and telephone
conversations had stopped, although some opposition activists
charged abuses continued during and after the election campaign. A
wide array of opposition and independent newspapers emerged
despite frequent shortages in newsprint and the state-run printing
and distribution networks. Freedom of speech and association were
no longer challenged. Additionally, the Bulgarian Government made
progress in redressing human rights violations committed during
the forced assimilation campaign aimed against Bulgaria's ethnic
Turkish and Pomak (ethnically Bulgarian Muslim) minorities during
the late 1980s. Freedom of religion also blossomed, as semi-
official bans on church attendance were lifted and Bulgarians could
freely attend church services and ceremonies. Several of the
measures taken to prevent or discourage the practice of Islam were
ended. A school for Imams was opened as was an Islamic cultural
center. Several Protestant and evangelical churches were
registered and have established offices and begun importing Bibles
written in the Bulgarian language.
Although many of the reforms have only recently been set in
motion, a clear pattern of democratization and a new openness of
Bulgarian society was established during the reporting period.
Nationalism remains a difficult problem for Bulgaria, however, and
tensions on this question are still high. Moreover, the need to
overhaul totally the societal structure imposed by the communist
regime requires a massive amount of work. That process, while
well underway, was not yet complete, and remnants of the
totalitarian system had still to be overcome.
Czechoslovakia
At the end of the reporting period, Czechoslovakia made
significant progress in establishing democratic institutions and
civil liberties since November 1989. Economic reform moved more
slowly, hampered by bureaucratic caution and public fears of
inflation and unemployment. Problems during the reporting period
included the controversy over vetting public servants who may have
collaborated with the old regime; the devolution of power from the
federal government to the Slovak and Czech Republic Governments;
and the knotty economic challenge of property rights (restitution),
privatization, and elimination of distortions in the economy. In the
longer term, Czechoslovakia, led by President Vaclav Havel and his
allies, has an excellent chance of maintaining the advances it has
made in the last year and of forging closer political and economic
ties with the West.
Czechoslovakia is strongly committed to the CSCE process, not
only because many of its current leaders were active in monitoring
CSCE compliance in the past, but also because the Czechs and
Slovaks, hoping to establish themselves as a constructive presence
in the heart of Europe, see the CSCE process as serving an
integrative function for Europe and North America. The CSCE
Secretariat is located in Prague, and the Czechoslovak government
has been particularly active in presenting proposals to enhance and
expand the CSCE's role in multi-lateral politics.
Hungary
Hungary continued its implementation of CSCE principles by
taking further steps to consolidate the political and economic
reforms of the past few years. The Antall Government made genuine
progress in creating democratic institutions, in re-orienting its
foreign policy toward the West, and in moving toward a free market
economy. Hungary is now a working parliamentary democracy and is
embarking on the second stage of its political transformation--the
drafting and passage of numerous pieces of legislation to help
establish democracy. In February 1991, the government presented a
4-year economic reform program aimed at reducing constraints on
private business, accelerating privatization, continuing economic
liberalization, and reducing inflation. Hungary continues to play an
active role in the CSCE and views its participation as a way to
strengthen ties with the West and help influence the shape of a new
Europe.
Poland
April 1, 1990 to March 31, 1991, witnessed sustained and
significant progress in Poland's implementation of its CSCE
commitments. The two governments in power during this period
continued Poland's democratic and free market transformation and
moved the country toward full compliance with CSCE standards.
During the reporting period, Poland transformed itself from a one-
party state into a functioning democracy in which the legal scope
for private ownership and initiative approaches that of Western
parliamentary democracies.
Poland's political and economic transition is, by no means,
complete. The parliamentary process for dismantling the
legislative framework of the previous era has proven tedious.
Poland has yet to hold fully free parliamentary elections, but the
Polish Parliament and President Walesa agreed to hold elections
before October 31. The government remains committed to the rule
of law, arguing that democracy assures the durability of economic
and other reforms.
Romania
Romania made some progress in implementing CSCE provisions
in the current review period. Restrictions on travel and emigration
were lifted; there are no longer bars to the free practice of
religious belief; and the rights of free speech, association and
political expression generally are respected. The internal security
apparatus was scaled down but still plays a troubling role in
society. Progressive reforms of the legal code, designed to ensure
the rights of the individual vis-a-vis the state, were adopted or
proposed. There were, however, some notable exceptions to these
positive developments. An outbreak of violence in June 1990 left
several dead. Hundreds were injured as coal miners rampaged
through the streets of Bucharest in response to an official appeal to
counteract anti-government protests. This and other events marred
Romania's progress toward greater compliance with CSCE standards.
On May 20, 1990, Romania held its first multi-party election
since 1946. Ion Iliescu, the candidate of the National Salvation
Front (NSF, the successor to the Communist Party) was
overwhelmingly elected president, while NSF candidates won about
two-thirds of the seats in each of the new parliament's two
chambers. The voting was judged by domestic and international
election observers to have been essentially free and unfettered.
The same was not true of the campaign, which was marred by
violence, intimidation, state control of the media, and the
overwhelming imbalance of state resources in favor of the ruling
party. Citizens remain unable to express their political opinions
through the ballot at a sub-national level, as local elections have
been repeatedly delayed, and local officials are appointed by the
central government.
Romania has continued to make progress under Basket II during
the past year. The government has promulgated an extensive array
of laws that form a legal basis for private agricultural land
ownership, creation of private-sector economic units, privatization
of the bulk of state-owned enterprises, foreign investment,
expansion of foreign trade, and a new social security system. Under
an economic stabilization program negotiated with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), prices were raised substantially.
Measures also were taken to restrain inflation, make the national
currency partially convertible, halt the decline in gross national
product, and restrain the current account deficit. Romania's post-
revolution buying spree contributed to a $148-million US trade
surplus with Romania in 1990, after several years of large deficits.
Romania has been opened to foreign businessmen and investors.
However, the changing legal environment, political uncertainty, and
economic decline have left most foreign investors cautious about
the country.
Inter-ethnic tensions remain high, particularly between ethnic
Hungarians, who constitute approximately 8% of the population, and
ethnic Romanians. The violent clashes between these two groups
that took place in March 1990, were not repeated in the reporting
period, but the treatment of Hungarians and other minorities,
including Gypsies, is a potentially explosive issue.
Freedom of religion and expression is now unhindered. The
print media is not censored, but complaints continued to be made
about government manipulation of newsprint supplies and
distribution. Television remains essentially under government
control, although a smattering of independent television stations,
limited by poor equipment, lack of financing, and very limited
access to the airwaves, were established. The official decision to
reduce television air time for political parties and for minority
language programing was greeted with skepticism.
USSR
In its external relations, the Soviet Union generally sought to
abide by the Helsinki principles, at a time when dramatic changes in
Eastern Europe seriously challenged all CSCE signatories, but
especially the USSR. The Soviet Union largely respected the
sovereignty of neighboring CSCE states--although the Soviets
removed former German Democratic Republic (GDR) leader Erich
Honecker from Germany in March 1991--refrained from official
threats of force, and supported the inviolability of existing borders
and the peaceful settlement of disputes arising between states. It
took steps to withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe, although
negotiations on withdrawal continue with some countries.
There has been continued progress in Soviet respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, though that trend stalled
momentarily beginning in the fall of 1990. Landmark religious and
press freedom laws were passed in 1990, and a new emigration law
continued to move forward in the Soviet legislature as the review
period drew to a close. Trade declined during the review period,
hampered by the inconvertibility of the ruble and the absence of
private property rights. Cultural exchanges expanded but were
impeded by the poor state of the Soviet economy.
The forced annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1939
by the Soviet Union, never recognized by the United States, led to
tensions and escalating violence in the area. The Soviet Union's
observance of the Helsinki principles was marred by actions in the
Baltic states, prompting invocation of the CSCE Human Dimension
Mechanism by a majority of CSCE states. In January 1991 the
Soviets used force, leaving at least 14 dead in Lithuania and five
dead in Latvia. There also was violence in Azerbaijan, and
accusations of participation by Soviet army forces in actions
against Armenians in disputed areas in Azerbaijan. In other
respects, however, the Soviet Union has been an active and
constructive participant in a variety of European and international
fora.
Yugoslavia
During the reporting period, Yugoslavia suffered a deepening
political crisis, significantly affecting its performance under the
Helsinki principles. While in many parts of the country, there was a
significant broadening of the democratic process, rising ethnic
tensions, most notably in Serbian-dominated Kosovo, led to
repression and violence. Overall, Yugoslavia's adherence to Helsinki
principles expanded during the reporting period, but in Kosovo the
reverse was true, leading fellow CSCE states to invoke the Human
Dimension Mechanism. The one-party communist system that ruled
Yugoslavia since World War II largely disappeared in 1990. For the
first time since before World War II, Yugoslavia experienced multi-
party elections in all six constituent republics. Balloting
procedures in most republics generally were fair, but in Serbia, the
ruling Communist Party used its control of the media and financial
resources to the detriment of the opposition parties. The federal
government, under Prime Minister Ante Markovic, attempted a
sweeping program of political and economic reforms. After initial
progress, this program fell afoul of inter-republican differences,
which have, for example, blocked a number of proposed amendments
to the federal constitution intended to eliminate remnants of the
one-party system and allow multi-party elections at the federal
level.
Rising ethnic tensions and the persistence of old anti-
democratic structures in Yugoslavia reached the point where they
threatened the existence of a unified federal state. Conflict
deepened, especially in parts of Croatia and Bosnia. Ethnic conflict
in Kosovo between majority Albanians and Serbs, who consider the
province the "heart of Serbia," has led to massive violations of
human rights, including scores of deaths at the hands of police,
thousands of arrests for the expression of political opinions, and
the firing of tens of thousands for political strikes. Serbian/Croat
tension also reached dangerous levels.
The Yugoslav military is highly secretive and provides little
information about its activities to the Yugoslav government or
public, let alone the country's CSCE partners. As the Yugoslav crisis
deepened, the Yugoslav military played an increasingly assertive
political role, feeding concerns that it would not act impartially in
support of federal objectives if events led to conflict.
Chapter Three--IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY-RELATED
PRINCIPLES AND OF BASKET I
(CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF
SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT)
The security aspects of the CSCE process, known as Basket I,
were first enshrined in Section 2 of the Helsinki Final Act, entitled
the "Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects
of Security and Disarmament." CSCE participating states agreed to
prior notification of major military maneuvers and movements,
exchanges of observers and other confidence-building measures.
Subsequent to Helsinki, the 34 CSCE states endorsed two additional
agreements--the Stockholm Document of 1986 and the Vienna
Document of 1990--which expanded and deepened the CSBMs regime.
The 34 also have, under various principles and agreements,
committed to promoting disarmament. Following are assessments
of the performance of certain CSCE member states.
Bulgaria
The overall improvement in relations between Bulgaria and the
United States and Western Europe was reflected in Bulgaria's
approach to security issues. The Bulgarian People's Army has been
receptive to the idea of increased military contacts but currently is
constrained by severe economic problems from responding favorably
to proposals in this area offered by the United States. Bulgaria has
accepted, in principle, a US naval ship visit (originally scheduled
for the summer of 1990, but, subsequently, canceled due to the
Persian Gulf crisis), a US military band visit, an Air Force Academy
cadet exchange, a visit to the United States by eight mid-level line
officers, and increased medical team visits. The Deputy Surgeon
General of the US- European Command visited Bulgaria in July 1990,
as part of a humanitarian support mission and established contact
with the Bulgarian Minister of Health and Bulgarian People's Army
military medical academy-hospital.
The Bulgarian Government and People's Army have repeatedly
voiced their eagerness to fulfill all requirements of the 1990
Vienna Document, including military inspections, and have provided
detailed information regarding their force structure and equipment,
as required by the Vienna Document. Particularly since the current
coalition government came to power in December 1990, Bulgaria has
expressed deep interest in closer relations with NATO.
In an attempt to establish a dialogue facilitating a decrease in
traditional tensions, better understanding of each other's military
forces, and resolution of other longstanding problems, the Bulgarian
Government and People's Army have initiated significant new
contacts with their Turkish counterparts, to include exchange visits
with chiefs of the general staffs. This dialogue also will
encompass exchanges of instructors from military academies,
sports teams, medical personnel, and possibly naval vessels. Sofia
also has called on its Greek and Turkish neighbors to implement
aspects of the CFE verification regime, even before the treaty
enters into force as a confidence-building measure in the Balkans.
The new Bulgarian Government has expressed its willingness
to cooperate bilaterally with the United States and other states to
combat international terrorism. It worked closely with the United
States and other Western countries in the prevention of terrorism
during the Persian Gulf crisis. Stringent measures were taken to
protect diplomatic missions and residences against potential
threats. Bulgaria's relations with states that support terrorism
have declined markedly under the new political system, though it
maintains relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization,
Iran, and Libya, among other traditional Bulgarian allies.
The Bulgarian Government has initiated investigations into
allegations of Bulgarian involvement in the 1981 assassination
attempt against the Pope and the 1978 London killing of dissident
writer Georgi Markov, and is cooperating with international
authorities in these investigations.
Bulgaria ratified the Montreal Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation on January 5,
1991.
Romania
Romania has moved from its position prior to the revolution in
which it actively helped train and support international terrorists
within its borders, to acting in relative harmony with Western
governments to stop the movement of terrorists. The official
Romanian training of terrorists affiliated with radical Arab groups
appears to have stopped. The government also has entered into
limited, but cooperative information-sharing arrangements with
several neighboring states to combat the movement of terrorists
and associated support, including arms, across its borders. Some
informal counter-terrorist information-sharing arrangements also
have been entered into with Western countries. Because of the
presence of a large number of students from countries that support
international terrorism and the relaxation of border controls, the
movement of terrorists within Romania is often difficult to detect,
control, and interdict. This difficulty is compounded by the
continuing existence of remnants of the support structure
terrorists had established in East European countries.
A possible exception to Romania's new anti-terrorist stance is
the reported continuation of sales of Romanian-made armaments to
states that have traditionally supported terrorism.
In May, Romania concluded a bilateral Open Skies agreement
with Hungary to build mutual confidence, and the Romanian military
has had a useful and growing dialogue with its Hungarian
counterparts.
USSR
The Soviet Union has continued to support means for settling
disputes in the CSCE region. In its relations with the Baltics and
with Soviet republics, the All-Union Government has expressed its
desire to resolve tensions through dialogue. However, the behavior
of its organs has not always reflected this commitment in practice:
in the Baltic states, the Soviet Government instigated or acquiesced
in the use of deadly force in January 1991.
During the last reporting period, the Soviet Union maintained a
constructive approach toward terrorism. Assistance to states
linked to terrorist activities has declined during the past year,
albeit for economic as well as political reasons. The Soviet Union
also increased its level of cooperation with the United States and
other nations, and bilateral counter-terrorism policy discussions
have been increasingly constructive. Soviet representatives have
expressed particular concern over the linkage between international
terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime, and have
sought increased international cooperation to address these
problems. Soviet authorities cooperated closely with the United
States to counter the terrorist threat posed by the Persian Gulf
crisis.
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia continues to try to shed its old image as a terrorist
crossroads, both in its public pronouncements in support of the
battle against international terrorism and in growing cooperation
with foreign police services. The Yugoslav policy of granting entry
to citizens of nearly all countries without visas, combined with
relatively inefficient frontier controls, limits its effectiveness in
stopping terrorists from transiting Yugoslavia, but authorities
seem increasingly inclined to discourage or expel those seeking to
establish support infrastructure there. During the Gulf war,
numerous diplomatic representations established new relationships
with the internal security service to discuss the protection of
embassies from terrorist attacks. The United States worked with
Yugoslav security services closely throughout the crisis. Although
the results were uneven in terms of the actual effectiveness of the
extra security provided, the dialogue between Yugoslav terrorist
specialists and foreign embassies has expanded.
Yugoslavia adheres to the Tokyo Convention on Offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft; the Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; the
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation; the 1987 Protocol to the Montreal
Convention; and the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials.
The Yugoslav military's traditional obsession with secrecy
with regard to military contacts, can be seen in its approach toward
the foreign military attaches in Belgrade. The Yugoslav National
Army (JNA) does not encourage contacts between senior Yugoslav
military leaders and attaches, and provides foreign attaches with
very little information about its activities. It limits access to
military facilities to a small number of carefully stage-managed
visits for attaches each year. Foreign military attaches are
required to inform the JNA 48 hours in advance about travel outside
Belgrade.
Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe (CSBMs)
The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe was originally mandated in 1983 by the
Madrid CSCE Follow-Up Meeting as an integral part of the CSCE
process. The aim of the CSBM talks was to establish concrete
measures to increase military transparency and predictability as a
means of achieving greater security and military stability in
Europe.
The first CSBM talks--from 1984 to 1986, in Stockholm--
produced the Stockholm Document; a set of CSBMs that called for
forecasts, notifications, and observations of major military
exercises; and established on-site inspections to assist in verifying
compliance. In accordance with the terms of the Madrid Mandate
that governed these talks, the Stockholm CSBMs were militarily
significant, politically binding, and verifiable. Further, the CSBMs
were to apply only to land-based military exercises taking place
within the whole of Europe as defined in the mandate. The
provisions of the Stockholm Document follow.
Forecasting. The exchange of annual forecasts of all notifiable
military activities, with large-scale activities (more than 40,000
troops) prohibited unless announced 1 year in advance and activities
over 75,000 prohibited unless forecast 2 years in advance.
Notification. Forty-two-day advance notification of activities
when these involve at least 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, if
organized into a divisional structure or at least two
brigades/regiments. In the case of amphibious and airborne
activities, the notification threshold is 3,000 troops.
Observations. Invitations to observe must be extended when
notifiable military activities meet or exceed 17,000 troops. In the
case of amphibious and airborne activities, the observation
threshold is 5,000 troops.
Inspection. On-site inspections from the air or ground, or
both, to verify compliance with the agreed measures, with no right
of refusal. No country need accept more than three inspections on
its territory per calendar year nor more than one from any one
participating state.
As agreed at the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting, a new set of CSBM
negotiations began in 1989 to expand the measures of the
Stockholm Document. These talks, guided by the Madrid Mandate,
will continue until the Helsinki Follow-Up Conference in March
1992 under the same mandate as the one governing the Stockholm
Document. In July 1990, NATO leaders at the London summit called
for a meaningful package of CSBMs to be ready for endorsement by
the 34 CSCE nations at the Paris summit in November 1990. This
call quickened the pace of negotiations and helped produce a new,
expanded CSBM agreement--the Vienna Document of 1990--which
leaders of the 34 CSCE nations endorsed in Paris. The Vienna
Document builds upon the Stockholm Document and entered into
force January 1, 1991 (its provisions on the military data exchange
enter into force on April 15, and the evaluation visits to verify this
data enter into force on July 1). The Vienna Document adds the
following measures to the Stockholm Document:
-- Military data exchange requires yearly exchange of data on
military forces, equipment, and budgets. Military force and
equipment data will be verified by on-site evaluation visits.
-- Risk reduction permits any state to require an explanation
from any other state of unusual and unscheduled military activities
that cause security concerns and establishes points of contact to
report or receive information on hazardous military incidents to
prevent misunderstandings, and mitigate the effects of such
incidents.
-- Contacts call for increased military contacts among the 34
nations at all levels and for visits to air bases once in a 5-year
period. Sets up a CSBM communication network for the states to
transmit and receive required and relevant information.
-- The annual assessment meeting establishes a yearly
implementation review of the Vienna Document CSBMs.
Implementation
The implementation record for the reporting period
demonstrates a reduction in the level of CSBM-related activity as
compared with earlier years. This is largely due to the fact that
1990 activity forecasts (submitted by NATO, East European states,
neutral and non-aligned states (NNA) and the USSR) included a
limited number of notifiable military activities. Furthermore,
during the year, a number of these activities were subsequently
canceled or reduced below notifiable levels.
East European and Soviet practices were in accord with the
provisions of the Stockholm Document. Most East European states
now have open and constructive approaches to CSBM
implementation. For the most part, the Soviet Union maintains a
narrow interpretation of the Stockholm provisions.
As of March 31, 1991, 45 inspections--under CSBM and
Disarmament in Europe (CDE) terms-- had been conducted. Of these,
44 were carried out under the 1986 Stockholm Document, and one
was carried out under the 1990 Vienna Document. During 1990, 10
CDE inspections were carried out. Inspections have been viewed by
both East and West not only as an element of verification but as an
instrument that can make a contribution to confidence-building.
Eastern states, the GDR, and the Soviet Union forecast six
activities for 1990, three of which were national and three
combined. Three of these forecast activities met the notification
threshold. During the year, one was canceled, and one was reduced
below notification thresholds. As a result, four activities were
notified: USSR/GDR on February 5-11, 1990 in the GDR, with 16,000
troops; USSR on March 16-23, 1991 in the Kiev Military District,
with 17,000 troops; USSR/GDR in the GDR on August 10-17, 1991,
with 15,000 troops; and USSR on September 10-15, 1990, within
the Byelorussia Military District, with 9,800 troops. There also
was one observation program in Kiev in March.
The Soviet Union forecast four notifiable activities for 1991,
two of which will require observation programs. East European
states provided notice that they had no notifiable military
activities planned for 1991.
The NNA states forecast a total of five notifiable military
activities for 1990, one of which met the observation threshold.
Consequently, two of these activities were canceled, and two were
reduced below notification thresholds. As a result, one activity
(not observable) was notified in 1990. Of the NNA states, only
Sweden submitted an activity forecast (including one activity) for
1991.
For 1990, NATO states forecast 10 notifiable activities, eight
of which met the observation threshold. Subsequently, five of these
activities were canceled, and one was reduced below notification
thresholds. As a result, four activities were notified in 1990; two
of these included observation programs. NATO states forecast five
activities for 1991, one of which will require an observation
program.
During the reporting period, East European countries notified
two activities under the Stockholm Document. One of these was a
combined activity in the GDR, and one was a national activity in the
USSR; neither met the threshold for observation. NATO countries
notified four military activities. Two of them included observation
programs. One activity, an amphibious exercise in Norway called
"Adger 91," was notified under the Vienna Document. Among the
NNA states, Finland provided notification of its military activity
"Harjoitus 90." Sweden provided a notification and observation
program, under the Vienna Document, for its activity "Nordanvind
91."
During the reporting period, seven inspections were conducted.
The Soviet Union conducted four inspections: in Italy in May 1990;
in the United Kingdom in September 1990; in the Federal Republic of
Germany in October 1990; and in Norway in March 1991. The Soviet
inspection in Norway was carried out under the provisions of the
Vienna Document.
NATO members conducted three inspections during the
reporting period. The United Kingdom conducted an inspection of an
unnotified activity that took place in the GDR in April 1990, as well
as a previously notified activity in the Soviet Union in September
1990. Norway inspected an unnotified activity in the Soviet Union
in September 1990.
Bulgaria did not forecast activities for 1990 and did not
receive or conduct CDE inspections in 1990.
Czechoslovakia did not forecast activities for 1990, nor did it
receive or conduct any CDE inspections.
Hungary did not forecast activities for 1990, nor did it receive
or conduct any on-site inspections in 1990.
Poland did not forecast activities for 1990, nor did it receive
or conduct any CDE inspections in 1990.
Romania did not forecast activities for 1990, nor did it
receive or conduct any CDE inspections. To date, Romania has not
implemented any agreed CSBMs, other than sending observers to
observable exercises (a practice that only started in 1988).
USSR has carried out its obligations under the CSBMs of the
Stockholm Document, as well as the recently adopted Vienna
Document. During the reporting period, the Soviet Union provided
notification of two activities, one of which took place in the GDR
and the other on the territory of the USSR. The latter was provided
on a voluntary basis as the activity was scaled back below
notification levels.
The notifications were provided in a timely manner and
included, at least the minimum information required under
notification provisions. The exercise calendar for 1991 also was
provided in a timely manner and included all required information on
four ground force exercises scheduled for the last half of the year.
The Soviet Union conducted four inspections and received two
during the reporting period.
Yugoslavia forecast one activity, "Pester '90," but the exercise
was canceled in January 1990. Yugoslavia did not receive or
conduct any CDE inspections in 1990.
Chapter Four--IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET II
(ECONOMICS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT)
Basket II of the Helsinki Final Act calls for the promotion of
cooperation in economics, science and technology, and the
environment. During this reporting period, Basket II activities made
the most significant advances since CSCE's launching in 1973. The
Bonn Document committed member states to market economic
principles and opened the way for true economic cooperation among
CSCE countries. Its signature occurred at a time when such
cooperation became critical to the successful transition to
democracy among the reforming states of Central and Eastern
Europe. The Sofia Document on the Protection of the Environment,
negotiated in 1989 and formally adopted at Vienna in 1990,
provided guidance on the need to protect both the environment and
environmentalists. Following are assessments of the performance
of certain CSCE countries and Albania in Basket II.
Albania
Faced with a declining growth rate in what is already the
poorest country in Europe, the Albanian leadership in 1990 moved in
a very limited way to decentralize the economy by encouraging the
emergence of small-scale private enterprises, providing some
agricultural workers with larger plots of land for private use, and
granting enterprises the power to set their own wage levels and
bonuses for workers who exceed production targets. Hoping to
attract outside assistance to save its failing economy, the
government removed the ban on foreign credits and liberalized the
foreign investment law to provide for repatriation of profits by
foreign investors. While some foreign businesses have expressed an
interest in Albania, most still are wary of investing substantial
amounts until the country has made a stronger commitment to
creating a stable economy backed by a democratic government.
Moreover, the lack of an adequate infrastructure for conducting
business may discourage the development of commercial ties.
Bulgaria
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. An economic reform
program, introduced in early 1991, is designed to move Bulgaria
rapidly in the direction of a market-oriented economy. As a part of
that reform, the government introduced, and the National Assembly
adopted, a budget aimed at a smaller deficit funded by borrowing
rather than by issuing new money. Excess government spending is
being trimmed, and subsidies to enterprises and consumers are
being sharply reduced. As of February 1, 1991, all prices were
liberalized, with the exception of several energy sources (coal,
electricity, heat, gasoline). Prices of 14 basic foodstuffs are under
observation, and the government may intervene to counter sharp
rises in prices. Interest rates were readjusted to a more realistic
rate. A foreign investment law draft is before the National
Assembly, and a revision in the economic statutes allows all firms
to engage in international economic activity, provided they register
with the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Trade unions have operated more vigorously in the last year,
and three trade union groups now exist. The two larger
confederations participate with representatives of government and
employers in considering some economic measures, although they
are now entirely independent of the government and varied in their
political sympathies. A general strike led by the "Podkrepa" trade
union brought down the all-Socialist government of Andrey Lukanov
in late November 1990.
The new agricultural land law, passed February 22, 1991,
recognized the rights of former owners of rural land to receive
equivalent amounts of land again if they wish. Full implementation
will likely take several years, but the law is the first step toward
reprivatizing property.
Commercial exchanges have been facilitated by more liberal
rules for foreign businessmen. For example, US businessmen and
tourists no longer require a visa for stays up to 30 days.
Businesses are allowed to open their own offices, and a number
have done so. Foreign trade statistics published for 1990, for the
first time in many years, included data on import and export of
crude oil and some petroleum products. Balance-of-payments
information has become more accessible, and a new accounting
convention was established to make government data conform more
closely to international standards.
Science and Technology. Bulgaria continued to encourage
expansion of free exchange of scientists and information with the
United States and other developed Western nations during the
reporting period. In mid-1990, Bulgaria hosted the International
Council of Scientific Unions Conference and invited representatives
of the US National Science Foundation to visit Bulgaria.
Bulgarian scientists have made a concerted and consistent
effort to expand contacts at all levels, both privately and through
governmental organizations (chiefly the Ministry of Science and
Higher Education and the National Academy of Sciences), and to
encourage development of joint projects in a variety of fields.
Environment. Environmental issues were of primary concern to
the government throughout 1990-91. It continued to permit a
variety of environmental organizations to operate unhindered and
invited international environmental inspection teams to visit the
country. Numerous representatives of Ecoglasnost and the Green
Party were elected to Parliament and have become prominent
national political leaders. There is an active parliamentary
commission on environmental policy, led by a member of
Ecoglasnost.
The government has actively pursued contacts and cooperation
with international entities regarding environmental protection.
Bulgaria signed the Charter of the Regional Environmental Center
based in Budapest and is pursuing the possibility of establishing
two or three sub-centers of that organization in Bulgaria. In
November 1990, Bulgaria invited international inspections by the UN
Environmental Program of the Ruse-Georghiu region, and by the
International Atomic Energy Agency of the Kozlodui nuclear power
station on the Danube, in an effort to resolve conflicting claims of
environmental negligence between Bulgaria and Romania. The
Bulgarians also are pursuing possible cooperation with other states
on resolving pollution problems in the Black Sea and the Danube, and
have agreed to form a joint commission with Greece to study
pollution in the Mestos River system. Bulgaria participated in the
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change and in the first session
of the International Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change. Bulgaria is a signatory to the
Montreal Protocol.
In early 1991, Bulgaria hosted the visit of a high-ranking
official of the US Environmental Protection Agency to discuss
future cooperation and assistance in environmental issues. The
European Community (EC) has agreed to assist in the establishment
of a national environmental monitoring system.
Czechoslovakia
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. Czechoslovakia is
moving steadily toward a free market economy. To keep the
economy balanced during the difficult transition period, the
government is pursuing a stringent fiscal and monetary policy. To
soften the effects of rising prices and unemployment, the
government has enacted social legislation, including an increase in
the minimum wage, increased pensions, and an unemployment
benefits program. Unions are free and are consulted by the
government on social and economic issues. Major economic reform
legislation which has been passed include:
-- Legalization of private enterprise;
-- Liberalization of foreign investment to allow both joint
ventures and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries in virtually all
sectors of the economy;
-- Liberalization of foreign trade to remove obstacles for
private individuals and organizations to engage in foreign trade;
-- Privatization of small and state-owned enterprises;
-- Restitution of businesses and other personal property
nationalized by communist authorities beginning in 1948;
-- Price liberalization (covers 80% of prices);
-- Foreign exchange liberalization ;
-- Safeguards legislation to prevent illegal transfer of
sensitive technology; and
-- Strengthening protection of intellectual property rights.
The Government of Czechoslovakia welcomes and encourages
foreign investment, cooperation, and trade. Working-level officials
are open and accessible to business representatives. Economic
statistics are published, but at times are difficult to find and are
not all calculated according to Western standards. Economic
legislation and business information is available, often in English,
but due to the rapid changes that the Czechoslovak economy is
undergoing, businessmen often have difficulty obtaining timely and
accurate information. Numerous trade fairs are held annually, and
businesses can freely organize seminars, exhibitions, and other
promotional events as well as advertise in local newspapers.
However, because of the tremendous increase of interest in
Czechoslovakia, the availability of local facilities--hotel space,
conference rooms, and office space--has not kept up with demand.
Finally, bureaucratic reform in Czechoslovakia is incomplete. The
competencies of various federal or republic offices have not yet
been definitively decided. Thus, some businesses have had plans
stymied by red tape and indecision.
Czechoslovakia welcomes foreign investment and trade. Both
joint ventures and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries are permitted;
joint ventures with private CSFR partners or wholly owned foreign
subsidiaries no longer need government permission to be
established. The Foreign Exchange Act permits repatriation of
dividends and profits and allows Czechoslovak businesses (including
joint ventures and foreign subsidiaries) to exchange local currency
for hard currency for ordinary business transactions. However,
capital account transactions are still regulated and some
businesses have complained about delays in obtaining foreign
exchange. A new law on intellectual property rights increases some
protections. With the completion of the Bilateral Investment
Treaty, American investors will have other investment guarantees
in place. The treaty is expected to be signed in mid-1991.
Science and Technology. The United States and Czechoslovakia
initialed a science and technology agreement that was signed in
mid-1991. The agreement provides for joint research by US and
Czechoslovak scientists across a broad range of disciplines
including basic science, energy, health and medicine, the
environment, engineering research, earth and atmospheric sciences,
mining research, and agriculture. Joint research will be funded by
contributions from both governments. Cooperation in a number of
these areas is already taking place between the US National Science
Foundation, the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US
Department of Agriculture, and others with their Czechoslovak
counterparts. A science attache position at the American Embassy
in Prague has been added in recognition of the expanding interest in
both countries of closer collaboration in science and technology.
Environment. The Government of Czechoslovakia has signed
and ratified the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution and its subsequent protocols, as well as the Vienna
Convention on Protecting the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol
to it. Czechoslovakia is interested in cooperating with its
neighbors on specific regional environmental projects and,
generally, in exchanging information and cooperating with the
international community. Specifically, the Governments of
Czechoslovakia and Poland have agreed to work together to address
regional air pollution problems in the northern Bohemian region of
Czechoslovakia, the Upper Silesian region of southern Poland, and
the former German Democratic Republic. Czechoslovakia attended
the first session of the International Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
In early 1991, a joint environmental study was carried out in
cooperation with the federal and republic governments in
Czechoslovakia with the active participation of the US
Environmental Protection Agency, the US Agency for International
Development, and the World Bank, to create a strategic plan and set
priorities for environmental assistance to Czechoslovakia. The
mission was the first such joint assistance effort in Central and
Eastern Europe, and was designed to avoid duplication and maximize
the efficient use of foreign assistance.
Hungary
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. In 1990-91,
Hungary's economy continued the process of transformation from
state to private market regulation. Government leaders committed
themselves to privatization and economic restructuring along
market lines, while struggling with the mechanics of those
processes.
Major external issues were Hungary's $21-billion external
gross debt and the radical re-orientation of its trade from its
former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) partners to
Western countries, in part, as a result of a switch on January 1
from CEMA clearing arrangements to hard-currency accounting.
Internally, the government grappled to control the budget deficit,
rising inflation fueled by subsidy cuts, and the specter of
increasing unemployment as inefficient state industries were shut
down or privatized.
In September 1990, the government announced its new 3-year
economic program for national renewal. The program emphasizes
privatization, import liberalization, deregulation, curbing inflation,
achieving currency convertibility, reforms in public finance,
welfare reform, as well as encouraging increased foreign
investment.
To facilitate privatization efforts, in 1990, the government
created the State Property Agency. This body supervises the
privatization process and can also initiate the privatization of
enterprises unable or unwilling to privatize on their own. Ten
percent to 15% of state assets already have undergone
privatization, with a government goal of reaching 50% by the end of
1992. Additionally, a government announcement in February 1991
described the establishment of a new organization called the
Privatization Holding--which will concentrate on purchasing
unprofitable and inefficient companies from the State Property
Agency--with the aim of restructuring them for resale to investors.
The government considers foreign investment to be one of the
most important means of encouraging economic development,
modernization, and competitiveness. In May 1990, a law on
securities was passed, and on June 21, the first stock exchange in
East-Central Europe officially opened. Parliament has passed
several acts to facilitate foreign investment, of which the
Economics Association Act, the Companies Act, and the Investment
Act are the most noteworthy. All three concentrate on developing
the framework for foreign direct investment in Hungary.
The Investment Act, which came into effect in January 1989
and was amended by Parliament in January 1991, deals with the
establishment and operation of joint ventures with foreign
participation. According to government statistics, as of January
1991, approximately 5,000 joint ventures were in operation, of
which 2,000 were formed in 1990. To further encourage foreign
investment, generous tax reductions are available to joint ventures
that involve a substantial level of capital and foreign participation.
Although the forint is not yet convertible, (the government plans to
make it convertible between 1992 and 1994) foreign investors may
repatriate both profits and capital in hard currency.
The poor state of the transport and telecommunications
infrastructures, as well as the housing and general real estate
situation, are among the most serious barriers to foreign
investment. Recognizing that these weaknesses undermine
Hungary's endeavors to attract foreign investment, the government
is undertaking costly improvements.
In general, the tax structure is designed to promote private
business. The tax on profits in 1990 decreased from 50% to 40%,
while taxes on small businesses are only 30%. State enterprises
pay an additional 25% tax for the use of state assets. In the autumn
of 1990, the Small Business Administration was created to help
foster private business.
Hungary's estimated budget deficit for 1991 is 78 billion
forints, an estimated 4% of gross domestic product. The
government has drastically cut back subsidies in areas such as
housing and agriculture (40% from 1989 levels). It also has
initiated several price increases on food, gas, electricity,
transportation, and household items. As of January 1, 1991, free
market prices apply to 90% of goods.
In the past year, foreign trade has been liberalized
substantially. CEMA--and its ruble clearing account trading
system--has been abolished, and Hungary now conducts all of its
foreign trade on a hard currency basis using world prices. Beginning
in January 1991, all Hungarian companies could conduct their own
foreign trade without the assistance of state trading companies.
The number of products subject to import licensing has been greatly
reduced. As of this year, 93% of imported products can be imported
without prior approval, with a government goal set for abolishing
all import licenses by 1992.
In 1990, the EC provided Hungary with several concessions,
such as the lifting of discriminatory barriers, suspension of non-
discriminatory barriers, extension of Generalized System of
Preferences benefits, and the lifting of all self-restraint quotas. It
is expected that during 1991, Hungary's relationship with the EC
will progress further. The EC and Hungary are negotiating an
association agreement which could become effective as early as
January 1, 1992.
Hungary is a contracting party to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In February 1991, the government
announced that Hungary would maintain its GATT obligations and
would reduce the average tariff to around 8%. Following this
announcement, however, the government proceeded to raise the
tariffs on automobiles from 10% to 18% (13% on environmentally
less harmful automobiles).
In the area of intellectual property, Hungary provides process
patent protection but not product patent protection. This has been a
particular problems in the pharmaceutical sector. Hungary is
drafting a new patent law, but enactment could be delayed
depending on other parliamentary business and pressure from the
politically powerful pharmaceutical industry.
A controversial issue which remains unresolved is the
question of ownership of assets and compensation for properties
seized during the communist period. The government is preparing a
bill for parliamentary approval through which it hopes to settle this
aspect of ownership rights. It seeks to remove one of the major
areas of uncertainty that has, hitherto, hampered the sale of real
estate and businesses and the transition to a genuine market
economy.
The field of labor relations remains unsettled. While workers
are free to join labor unions, the independent trade unions allege
that workers feel pressured to join or maintain membership in the
successor unions to the former communist unions. Additionally, the
dispute among unions over how to divide property formerly owned
by the communist unions remains unresolved.
Nevertheless, major labor unrest is rare, in part due to
consultations held at the Interest Coordinating Council (ICC) among
the representatives of the employers, labor, and the government.
Legislation passed in 1990 gives all workers, excluding judicial,
military, and police personnel, the right to strike. Unions are free
to form confederations and affiliate with international labor
organizations. Hungarian unions now maintain extensive
relationships with such bodies as the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions.
The legal minimum wage was raised in 1991 to approximately
$100 per month, and the average work week is 40 hours, with
workers receiving overtime and a minimum of 15 days paid leave
per year, free health care, and pensions. Federal labor courts
enforce occupational safety standards for work places, but specific
safety conditions are not always up to internationally accepted
standards.
Science and Technology. Hungary continues to expand its
scientific and technical contacts, eagerly seeking new sources of
cooperation and funding in Western Europe and the United States. In
late March 1991, the second annual board meeting of the US-Hungary
Science and Technology Agreement convened in Washington to
approve 28 joint research projects in such areas as the
environment, energy, agriculture, basic science, engineering
research, and earth and atmospheric sciences. Joint research is
funded by contributions from each government. At this meeting the
Hungarians emphasized how significant the joint research program
was in promoting the concept of a competitive scientific peer
review and the grants process in Hungary.
The Hungarian science community also is cementing
participation in such cooperative European scientific activities as
EUREKA and the programs supported by the Council of Europe. There
also is keen interest in taking advantage of science and technology
programs that Italy is sponsoring under the aegis of the
"Pentagonale" group of countries (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Italy, and Yugoslavia). The Pentagonale is seen as a bridgehead to
more active participation in future EC programs.
Environment. The Regional Environmental Center for Central
and Eastern [Europe], based in Budapest, began operations in
September 1990, with support from the United States, the EC, and a
number of other countries. Although the center is physically
located in Hungary, it has a regional constituency. Through
activities such as information collection and dissemination,
institution-building, environmental education, and clearinghouse
functions, the center will work in environmental health, energy
efficiency, pollution prevention, and the environmental effects of
agriculture. The center has awarded nearly 50 grants to
environmental organizations in the region and has sponsored several
important conferences that have brought experts together to
discuss important issues and address common environmental
problems.
During the reporting period, the Hungarian Ministry of
Environment was reorganized and began a review of its legislation
and ways to implement an environmental assessment requirement
for new investment. Although Hungary has limited research and
personnel resources to follow a wide range of world environmental
problems, government representatives attended both the Second
World Climate Conference in November 1990 and the first session
of the Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change in February 1991. Hungary also is a
member of the Montreal Protocol.
With the introduction of democracy and the formation of
political parties, environmental organizations have lost some of
their status as mass pressure groups on behalf of political change.
Support for environmental causes, within the various political
parties, is more individualized now. More dedicated
environmentalists are now settling down to work on basic problems.
Industries and local governments also are seeking direct assistance
in tackling long-neglected environmental disasters that can no
longer be overlooked. At the same time, international exchanges
with the United States and Western Europe are expanding and
increasingly are supported by private organizations.
Poland
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. Poland's former
centrally planned economy is undergoing a profound, historically
unprecedented, and difficult transformation to a market economic
system based on private ownership and full integration with the
international trading system. The government's economic
transformation program aims to stabilize and restructure an
economy plagued in 1989 and early 1990 by near hyper-inflation,
severe consumer goods shortages, a highly unstable currency, and
inefficient industrial monopolies. The government managed to rein
in inflation by withdrawing subsidies and limiting wage increases
while balancing the budget and restricting money supply growth;
inflation now hovers around 4%-6% a month. Poland's currency, the
zloty, is internally convertible and remained stable in 1991, while
goods and services are much more widely available.
After an initially slow start, privatization of the Polish
industrial sector has begun, with the first five companies
privatized by public offer and many more due for privatization in
1991. A stock market is getting underway, which will further
support the government's privatization policies. The real standard
of living fell in 1990. Measured production declined as well.
Unemployment, previously disguised, has grown to nearly 1.5
million persons, about 7% of the industrial work force, and is
continuing to rise. The average family now spends about 75% of its
income on food and shelter. Major bright spots in the Polish
economy include an export boom and a rapidly growing (23%-26% in
1990) private non-agricultural sector. Despite the hardships
outlined above, Poland has been free of prolonged and/or massive
worker protests, although strikes have occurred. However, public
grumbling about rising economic hardship has been growing.
The Polish Government welcomes and encourages both direct
and indirect foreign investment and trade. President Walesa has
made the attraction of foreign trade and investment a central pillar
of his presidency. The government is committed to improving the
flow of information available to foreign businesses in Poland.
Senior Polish officials routinely make themselves available to
visiting businessmen and frequently travel abroad on trade and
investment missions.
Poland's decision to unify the exchange rate and to make the
Polish zloty convertible has greatly clarified the business climate
for foreign investors and traders. Poland also has substantially
reduced tariff rates and has worked to liberalize the overall trading
regime, including eliminating most non-tariff barriers.
Science and Technology. US scientific and technical
cooperation takes place with Poland under a Scientific and
Technological Cooperation Agreement signed in 1987. It provides
for cooperation across a number of disciplines, including basic
science, earth, and atmospheric sciences; engineering research;
agriculture; health and medicine; the environment; energy, forestry,
and wildlife; and mining research. Poland established a new State
Committee for Scientific Research in January 1991 to oversee the
organization and funding of all scientific research in the country.
Environment. Poland's air and water environment was greatly
damaged during the decades under communism. In view of the
critical need to address such environmental degradation, the
Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 authorized
the US Environmental Protection Agency to establish an air-
monitoring network and provide equipment for monitoring, analysis,
and treatment of wastewater and drinking water in Krakow. Initial
shipments of equipment for both the air and water projects are
expected in the first half of 1991.
Since 1989 and especially in 1990, the Polish Government has
moved aggressively to sign and ratify international agreements
such as the Montreal Protocol and Vienna Convention on Protecting
the Ozone and the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution. Poland attended the first session of the Inter-
governmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention
on Climate Change. It is working with the United States to assess
emissions of greenhouse gases from Poland. Poland also is working
closely with other countries in the region, including
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries
to address common environmental problems caused by industrial
waste.
Romania
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. Romania's
performance under Basket II has continued to improve over the past
year. Shortly after the May 20, 1990, elections, the Romanian
Government prepared an extensive package of economic reform
legislation to create a legal basis on which to build a market
economy. The highlights of the legislation are the laws on land
reform, privatization of state enterprises, private enterprise
creation and foreign investment. The reform package addresses
liberalization of internal prices, convertibility of the leu, budget
deficit control, and external account balance. Bureaucratic
obstructionism and legal ambiguities, however, have impeded
implementation of significant reforms and private sector
development. Consequently, this has raised questions about the
sincerity of the government's commitment to the establishment of a
true market economy.
Romania is in a state of transition from a highly centralized,
public sector-dominated economy to a market economy, with
expanding private sector activity. In September 1990, Parliament
passed a privatization law which established that all state
enterprises, excluding the railroad; post office;
telecommunications; and enterprises in the defense, nuclear,
extractive, and energy-producing sectors should be reformed as
corporations. These corporations will have autonomous
management and will be privatized via the distribution and sale of
shares to Romanian citizens and foreign investors. How to assure
equality of access to newly privatized enterprises (especially to
prevent unfair access by members of the former nomenklatura)
remains a subject of concern. In November 1990, Parliament passed
the Commercial Societies Law which established the legal basis for
the formation of corporations, partnerships, and sole
proprietorships. Most state enterprises, including foreign trade
companies, have now reconstituted themselves as corporations,
though the government still owns all the shares. A law governing
the implementation of the initial distribution to Romanian citizens
of the first 30% of the shares, as well as subsequent sale of the
remaining shares, currently is under consideration.
In addition to the recognition of private property in the draft
constitution, a land reform law was promulgated in February 1991,
which established private ownership of agricultural land. Romanian
citizens--but not foreigners--are now theoretically able to have
title to, sell, buy, will, and inherit land, but there are still
restrictions on the amount of land that can be owned and how it can
be used.
The monopoly on foreign trade previously held by state-owned
foreign trade organizations has been abolished. Import and export
licenses are now granted automatically to all importers/exporters
unless they want to trade in shortage commodities such as
processed foods or in items controlled for non-proliferation
reasons. The tariff system has been revised to conform to GATT
rules and the use of quotas has been abolished except for instances
in which temporary quotas can be justified to protect infant
industries. Government procurement practices have been changed as
well. Now tenders are published and competitive bids are solicited.
The most important stimulus to private sector development
has been price liberalization. In February 1990, prices for food
products produced on individual plots were decontrolled. On
November 1, 1990, prices of all but essential commodities--basic
food items and residential energy and communications--were
liberalized. Prices were decontrolled for those goods for which
there exist three or more competing suppliers. However, prices for
most goods were raised to cover what the government deemed to be
reasonable production costs plus some profit.
Romania has adopted an IMF stabilization program with
stringent monetary and fiscal policies in order to try to reverse the
post-revolution decline in GNP. In addition to raising domestic
prices in order to stay within budget deficit limits, the government
has removed controls on interest rates, imposed money supply and
credit growth ceilings in order to avoid dangerous levels of
inflation, and devalued the leu for the third time to help stimulate
Romanian exports. It also has launched an inter-bank exchange rate
system in order to facilitate the importation of raw materials and
capital goods, and to squeeze the black market. The plan is to
expand the range of transactions carried out on this market until
the leu can be made fully convertible. Inconvertibility of the leu
has been a major disincentive to the foreign investment needed to
rebuild an economy run down after 10 years of harsh austerity
imposed by the Ceaucescu regime in order to repay all of Romania's
foreign debt.
The Romanian Government is committed to minimizing the
social costs associated with economic restructuring. A new social
security system, funded by a payroll tax, has been created to
finance expanded retirement and disability benefits. Over the past
year, unemployment benefits have been paid to people who lost their
jobs due to enterprise closings and layoffs. A new worker
retraining program is being developed. Both the November 1990 and
the April 1991 price increases were accompanied by salary and
pension increases. In April 1991, student allowances, new mothers,
and families with children, also were increased. However, in order
to avoid an inflationary spiral, these payments are taxable and are
not indexed to the consumer price index. Unfortunately, the
government has used the issue of social responsibility to move
slowly in dismantling its dominant position as the producer and
distributor of both consumption and production goods.
Romanian receptivity to foreign businesses continued to
improve during the reporting period. As a general rule, businessmen
are treated well, as Romania seeks to expand its commercial ties
internationally. Although most foreign visitors, including all those
from Western Europe and the United States, are still required to
obtain entry visas, these may be obtained without difficulty at
Bucharest's international airport. Visas are not, however, issued to
travelers entering the country by train. Businessmen are free to
travel anywhere in Romania and visit factories and places of
business at will. Since September 1990, Chambers of Commerce
have been established in many provincial cities and are slowly
starting to develop programs to attract foreign businessmen.
There are no laws that prohibit the establishment and
operation of foreign businesses in Romania. There are, however,
practical impediments that hinder the efficient operation of such
businesses. Access to Romanian officials and private businessmen
is virtually unlimited, and business discussions are open and
detailed. On the other hand, Romanian commercial laws, as well as
the persons administering them, are constantly changing, and it is
difficult to get concise answers to such questions as how to open a
checking account. Legal interpretations of more technical issues
vary widely. The Chamber of Commerce in Bucharest is technically
the organization to which foreign businessmen should turn to obtain
assistance, but the Chamber has proved to be an inept player in
business development. No general system for locating rental space
yet exists, and rents and means of payment vary, although payments
from foreign businessmen generally are demanded in hard currency
instead of Romanian lei. Visiting American businessmen have been
the subject of direct and indirect bribery solicitations in order to
rent offices.
The Romanian Government has taken steps to improve its
statistical economic reporting. Work is being done to correct the
false data presented during the Ceaucescu years. The National
Commission for Statistics publishes a monthly review of key
economic indicators, and a 1990 statistical yearbook was published
in February 1991. Bilateral trade statistics are available upon
request from the Ministry of Trade and Tourism.
As the government works to put into place a market economy,
Romanian businesses are beginning to recognize the benefits of
advertising and promotion, both of which were ignored under the
Ceaucescu regime. Romanian television now carries commercial
advertisements for foreign and domestic businesses as well as spot
promotions for government and privately sponsored events. The
amount of print and billboard advertising continues to increase. The
Bucharest Chamber of Commerce continues to organize the
Bucharest International Fair, which, held annually in October, is the
nation's premier trade show event. A spring fair, devoted to
consumer goods, will be reinstated in 1991 after an 11-year hiatus.
Approximately 12 smaller, specialized trade exhibits also are
planned for 1991. Publicom, the advertising arm of the Chamber, is
responsible for promoting all these events and is approaching the
task in a more sophisticated, Western-style.
The Romanian Government is eager to receive management
training assistance. The most frequently expressed desire is for
mid-level management training, but government representatives
also show a keen interest in technical business skills, finance and
banking, trade administration, and similar subjects. Romanian
invitees to government or privately sponsored programs and events
in the United States now appear to have no problems receiving
permission to attend, and American sponsors of programs in
Romania are openly encouraged.
In March 1990, Romania revised its 1972 foreign investment
law to make it more attractive. The changes, however, were not
sufficient to attract the desired level of foreign business. As a
result, in October a new organization to promote foreign
investment, the Romanian Agency for the Promotion of Foreign
Investment and Coordination of Economic Assistance (ARPIS), was
created and charged with drafting a new foreign investment law.
The new version will increase the amount of annual local currency
profit that may be repatriated in hard currency from a flat 8% of
capital investment to between 8% and 15%, depending upon industry
sector. Agriculture, food processing, and tourism are priority
sectors receiving the highest benefits. The law also provides tax
benefits to investors.
The government states that 700 new joint ventures have been
established since the revolution, 132 of them with US participation.
The vast majority of these, however, are small operations with
limited capital participation. No major American companies have
concluded equity joint ventures in Romania since the revolution,
although many Fortune 500 companies have expressed interest in
investing in Romania. Most potential American investors are
reluctant to commit resources to operations in Romania due to the
uncertainty of the Romanian political and economic situation and
the inconvertibility of the leu.
The situation in regard to small- and medium-sized
enterprises is somewhat brighter. Since the passage in February
1990 of a law authorizing the creation of small companies (those
employing 20 persons or less), some 50,000 such enterprises have
been registered, but most are service oriented, have limited
financial means, and have yet to make any substantial in-roads into
the state-dominated production or distribution systems. Business
operating conditions in Romania are still far from ideal.
Business amenities such as hotels, restaurants, vehicle
rentals, foreign- language newspapers, typing and copying services,
and telecommunications facilities have improved little since the
revolution, and foreigners are still generally charged dollars for
these services. As of November 1990, air travel within Romania by
foreigners has to be paid for in hard currency as well. Availability
of office space, equipment and furnishings also is limited, making
the setting up and supplying of an office difficult.
Science and Technology. An agreement between the US
National Science Foundation and Romania's National Committee for
Science and Technology (NCST) expired. Since then, the NCST has
been abolished. The Ministry of Education and Science has
expressed interest in negotiating a new agreement. Romanian
scientists have been active in re-establishing international
contacts. Currently, scientific exchanges are made by a variety of
non- and quasi-governmental organizations. Exchanges and contacts
are free from interference by the Romanian government.
In early 1991, agreement was reached to convert the US-
provided Triga research reactor from highly enriched uranium to
low enriched uranium fuel use. The agreement calls for the US
Department of Energy to convert the fuel and to provide technical
assistance for reloading the reactor.
Environment. Environmental groups have formed several
ecological political parties and are represented in the Parliament.
The new Ministry of Environment is an active participant in regional
and global environmental meetings. Romania is active in both the
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change and the International
Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate
Change.
The Ecological University of Bucharest, the first of its kind in
Eastern Europe, opened in September 1990. A private academic
institution, it will grant degrees in medicine, engineering, natural
sciences, and law, and will carry out scientific research in relevant
environmental fields.
USSR
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. Until recently, the
Soviet Union had no free, democratically organized trade unions.
The official trade union movement, which officially embraced
nearly all Soviet workers, acted largely as a "transmission belt" for
management, rather than representing workers' interests. The
unions were effectively controlled by the Communist Party and
included as members both management and workers. As a result,
workers' wage, health, and safety interests were poorly served.
In response to this situation, Soviet coal mines in 1989 staged
several long-running strikes and organized a loose network of
strike committees to represent their interests. These strike
committees have since coalesced into the first major free,
independent, and democratic trade union in Soviet history--the
Independent Miners' Union (Russian initials: NPG), founded in October
1990 at the Second Independent Congress of Soviet Miners in the
Ukrainian coal mining center of Donetsk. The Soviet authorities
have, to date, permitted this new union to organize, develop, and
establish contacts with trade unions abroad.
In addition, the coal miners of the Western Siberian Kuzbass
region have joined with workers in other industries there and in
several other regions of the Russian republic to form the
Confederation of Labor (COL), an independent labor movement
espousing economic reform and democratic political change. The
NPG and COL are closely linked and cooperate with each other. In
addition, several other smaller independent labor movements exist.
Forced labor is not a major element of the Soviet economy,
although Siberian convicts are reported to work in the logging
industry and perform other tasks. Employment discrimination on
the basis of race and language is not presently a serious problem,
although exacerbated ethnic tensions in some republics may
influence hiring practices. Job discrimination on the basis of
gender is a more serious problem, and there are very few women on
the higher rungs of the economic and political ladders.
Until recently, religious believers reported significant
discrimination in the work place. While anti-religious prejudice
continues to exist, the strong revival of religious activity has
apparently lessened harassment of believers. While not an official
requirement for holding a leading position in trade or industry,
Communist Party membership remains a de facto requirement for
advancement in many cases, and the upper ranks of key branches of
the Soviet economy are still dominated by party members.
Currently, Soviet fiscal and monetary policies do not
encourage workable, sustainable economic growth, due to the
inability and refusal of the Soviet Government to take meaningful
steps away from centralized planned economy. Repeated attempts
by the government to devise a balanced economic reform program
have failed, with the economy entering a severe recession in 1990,
according to official Soviet economic statistics. Important sectors
such as coal and petroleum showed decline in output, while much of
the best harvest in years went uncollected due to poor organization
and lack of resources. Due to a severe housing shortage, labor
mobility in the Soviet Union is very low, making it difficult to
allocate labor resources from old, outmoded industries and
industrial centers to areas and industries of potential growth. As
in the past, the Soviet industrial economy remains dominated by the
military-industrial complex. Efforts at conversion of defense
industrial capacity to civilian production have been fitful,
uncoordinated, and largely ineffective so far.
Although the Soviet leadership is publicly committed to
adopting policies designed to stimulate trade and foreign
investment, in fact, only limited progress has been achieved in this
area. Moreover, Soviet economic legislation regulating foreign
investment, which appears to be evolving in the right direction,
still contains ambiguities. Regulation of capital flow is complex
and contradictory. Laws in both areas are subject to constant
change on both the national and republic level. The quick succession
of impractical and poorly conceived economic reform plans also has
damaged the investment climate.
The Soviet currency, the ruble, is inconvertible externally and
increasingly inconvertible internally. As a result, internal barter
trade has been growing rapidly, while the increasing internal
inconvertibility of the currency has pushed individual regions,
cities, and even enterprises into economic autarky and isolation.
This has further strengthened the tendency toward economic
contraction. In the absence of an externally convertible currency,
the Soviet Government has been hard-pressed to define effective
and meaningful policies on the repatriation of profits. Essentially,
companies establishing manufacturing operations in the USSR can
achieve a hard-currency profit only by exporting a portion of their
output to Western markets. Given this state of affairs, significant
foreign investment is unlikely outside the energy sector, where
hard currency profits can easily be generated by oil and gas exports.
Despite several years of attempted economic reform, most
prices in the Soviet economy are set by the central government,
rather than by the market place. Prices on mostly unregulated
farmers markets are high and effectively beyond the reach of most
Soviet consumers. Heavy monopolization of industry, trade, and
services and excess liquidity make price decontrol difficult in the
case of many industries and sectors.
Although social equity is a prime official concern of the Soviet
government's economic policy, its inability, so far, even to stabilize
the economy has led to declining living standards for most Soviet
citizens. Consequently, this has helped to generate great
frustration, rising social tensions, and a growing number of strikes
and disturbances.
Despite the passage of landmark legislation on property and
land in 1990, private ownership of most productive assets, land,
and housing remains insignificant. Most land is considered state
property under the jurisdiction of local councils of people's
deputies. Recent reform legislation allows small-scale, long-term
leasing of farm land and of plots for cottage construction. The
concept of intellectual property rights is undeveloped in the Soviet
economy.
While the top Soviet leadership has repeatedly stated its
intention to open the country to foreign investment, progress in this
area has been slow. The inconvertibility of the ruble is one major
obstacle, since it hinders arrangements for the orderly repatriation
of profits earned by foreign investors. Yet another key obstacle to
greater foreign investment is the continued absence of legally
recognized land ownership rights in the Soviet economy.
Both the central and republic governments continue to assert
that most key industrial assets and natural resources should be
state property, and that their exploitation should be regulated by
state bureaucracies rather than the market place. The center and
the republics are struggling for control of key resources and this
"war of laws" has had a chilling effect on the development of
foreign investment in the USSR. For example, the division of hard-
currency profits derived from the exploitation of mineral resources
between the central and republic governments has been a subject of
intense controversy. In such a confused environment, it has been
difficult for a foreign investor to know which signature makes a
contract valid.
The absence of land ownership rights also means that foreign
investment by private firms in the USSR acquires the character of
an enclave within the Soviet economy, rather than fitting
organically into the economic scene, as is the case in free market
countries. Moreover, Soviet commercial legislation on foreign
investment, in general, and joint ventures, in particular, has often
been criticized for vagueness, impracticality, and a lack of internal
consistency.
Soviet commercial legislation has been in a state of constant
flux in recent years due to numerous legislative revisions in the
all-union and republic legislatures. In addition, the attempted
assertion of greater economic sovereignty by union and autonomous
republics in the USSR has meant that republic and local regulations
and laws regarding business activity can differ from all-union
legislation.
Some steps have been taken improve the access of foreign
businessmen to Soviet businessmen. Some US businessmen not
resident in Moscow have been given Soviet multiple-entry visas.
However, it is still necessary for most US businessmen applying for
a business visa to receive support from a sponsoring Soviet
organization. This naturally hampers most US businessmen wishing
to enter the Soviet market for the first time and who have no
established Soviet contacts.
The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations maintains that it
has already implemented a promise made in connection with the
new US-Soviet trade agreement to afford US businessmen an
accelerated process in applying for accreditation for a
representative office in the USSR, which should lead to a decision
on accreditation within 60 days of application. During the past
year, a number of US firms have received accreditation and,
currently, there are 43 US firms with accredited offices in Moscow.
A number of additional US firms have applications for accreditation
pending.
Current statistics published by the Soviets are readily
accessible but are inadequate for use in making commercial
decisions and business judgment, primarily because they lack
enough detail. Other types of commercial information, such as lists
of Soviet enterprises and identification of their activities, are still
their infancy. For example, more than 20,000 firms have been
authorized to enter into foreign trade, but the list of such firms
published by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations mentions
only several thousand.
Access to business contacts and commercial officials
continues to be without official hindrance. Due to poor
communications and Soviet business practices, however, attempts
to reach and set up appointments are frequently frustrating.
Poor international telecommunications links make it
especially difficult to arrange meetings on short notice from the
United States. The hotel infrastructure in Moscow and other Soviet
cities is still inadequate, and it is frequently difficult to obtain
hotel reservations. Any major improvement in this situation and in
the present unavailability of suitable office and residential space
for Western businessmen will depend on further Western
investment in the Soviet infrastructure and, thus, will take time.
The Soviet transport system is a complex mixture of
economically available air transport--tickets are very cheap, if a
reservation can be had; an inadequate road system; and an aging rail
network which is the principal cargo carrier for the country. The
dimensions of the problem are so large that speedy progress is
unlikely.
Trade promotion and other marketing activities, including
advertising, consulting, and other business services, as well as the
organizing of seminars, fairs, and exhibitions, are now possible,
although very expensive. A number of Western trade fair
authorities and other firms specializing in trade fairs and exhibits
have been able to organize trade fairs and exhibits in the USSR.
Numerous seminars also are now being organized to take place in
the Soviet Union.
Science and Technology. The Soviet Government continues to
make available increasing amounts and types of scientific and
technical data, and the trend appears to be to allow such decisions
to be made at a lower bureaucratic level. Generally, cooperation is
willing and open; however, in the effort to find hard currency to
supplement diminishing budgets, Soviet science organizations of all
kinds are trying to market their data and may require pre-payment.
No incidents were reported during the period under review of
deliberate, official denial to Soviet scientists of the freedom to
establish and maintain direct contacts with professional colleagues
in other countries. Indeed, access to computer "bit-net" and "E-
mail" - type networks, for example, may be becoming easier, even
for non-official groups.
However, continued official requirements for exit approval,
and logistical and technical--computer, telephonic, and postal--
communications difficulties, ensure that Soviet scientists cannot
establish and maintain direct contacts with their colleagues in the
same sense as their Western counterparts. To the extent that exit
permission is speeded by bribes and the judicious use of influence,
corruption is also a hindrance. However, obstacles to free
scientific interchange appear to be primarily technical and
logistical, rather than political.
Environment. The USSR is a party to the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Vienna Convention For the
Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Soviets participate in
the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change and are active in
the International Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change.
The responsible Soviet organizations have stepped up their
participation in numerous multi-lateral fora and continue to give
international environmental issues a high profile. The Soviet
Government has recently raised the State Committee for
Environmental Protection to the level of a ministry, the Ministry for
Utilization of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.
However, more significant than this elevation in status will be the
type of environmental legislation passed by the Supreme Soviet. In
the past, organizations have been beset by funding problems and
lack of legislation defining jurisdiction or enforcement
mechanisms; should this situation continue, the elevation of the
environmental organization will not make a difference.
Similarly, while the USSR is party to about 50 international
environmental agreements, the country's lead environmental agency
has direct responsibility for only a small number of them. A well-
functioning mechanism for effective environmental policy-making
and enforcement is lacking. At present, the USSR is unprepared to
implement pollution reduction targets and accelerated reductions in
the production or consumption of various pollutants, including
chloroflouro-carbons (CFCs) and will not be able to meet
international environmental commitments while experiencing
political and economic changes and crises.
Soviet authorities generally tolerate and encourage
independent environmental activism. A semi-formal "public"
council, sponsored by the governmental body responsible for
environmental protection--and chaired by a prominent
environmental activist who is the incumbent deputy chairman of the
Supreme Soviet Ecology Committee--serves as a clearinghouse for
citizen and community concerns about the environment. A number
of other, less "official" organizations exist and function without
apparent governmental hindrance; during recent official bilateral
environmental discussions, both US and Soviet environmental NGO's
freely participated. Moscow was the site in late March of an
international non-governmental environmental conference.
Environmental data, which began to be published in 1988, continues
to become more and more available to the public.
A large proportion of members of the Soviet and republic
parliaments campaign on environmental issues, but the strength of
these sentiments has not yet been truly tested against economic
and political concerns. In the case of the Aral Sea, for example, the
various republic officials concerned appear unable to formulate a
cohesive environmental strategy in the face of economic concerns
(agricultural irrigation demands) and inter-ethnic rivalry.
Environmental concerns appear to carry the most weight when they
are allied with other forces, such as nationalism, in the various
republics.
Yugoslavia
Economic, Trade, and Commercial Issues. Yugoslavia has long
been an active participant in world markets, although the internal
political problems of the reporting period adversely affected the
Yugoslav economy and business activity. Since the Yugoslav-Soviet
split in 1948, Yugoslavia has followed a fundamentally different
course than the other socialist countries in the region. This is most
evident in the breadth of the country's international economic
relations. Yugoslavs have traveled, worked, and studied in the West
for more than 30 years, providing them with a generation of
exposure to Western business practices, education, culture, and
products. Such exposure has influenced Yugoslavia's decentralized
economic system, within which enterprises make independent
business decisions on all matters, including those dealing with
foreign investors and exporters. In the agricultural sector, private
farmers own 85% of the country's agricultural land, and there has
always existed an active, if small, private sector economy. No
other East European socialist republic in the region could claim
these market credentials.
The Yugoslav Government's 2- year-old economic reform
program has focused on eliminating hyper-inflation, introducing a
convertible dinar, rehabilitating the banking system, and privatizing
enterprises. To reach these goals, the government of Prime
Minister Ante Markovic devoted its efforts in 1989 to laying the
legislative groundwork for the transformation of a socialist
economy to one based on market principles. In 1989, the Federal
Assembly enacted legislation that opened the way for greater
foreign investment in the country, liberalized trade, established a
program of ownership restructuring, and loosened restrictions on
private sector businessmen. The fruits of these efforts were
realized in 1990 as foreign businessmen concluded more than 2,000
new investments with Yugoslav firms and Yugoslavs established
some 50,000 new private companies. In fact, the first half of 1990
saw the Yugoslav Government reach significant economic
achievements, including the virtual elimination of inflation, strong
growth in foreign exchange reserves, and the establishment of an
internally convertible dinar that increased public confidence in the
economy.
A June 1990 loosening of monetary controls and wage
restraints, however, released a new surge in wage bills and
inflation. A double blow from Gulf war sanctions (damaging to
Yugoslav firms working in Iraq and Kuwait, and to Yugoslav oil
supplies) and a drought that severely reduced agricultural output
took even more air out of the federal government's reform program.
By December 1990, foreign exchange reserves were falling by $1
billion each month, forcing the National Bank of Yugoslavia to pull
out of the foreign exchange market. Controls put on withdrawals
from Yugoslavia's foreign currency accounts have led to a sharp
decline in remittances from workers employed abroad, while
political instability has destroyed the country's normally lucrative
tourist industry. Privatization was slowed by conflicting
republican policies which, in practice, overrode federal law. The
pillars of the reform program--convertibility, privatization, and
control of inflation--were seriously damaged. Further national
reform awaits a political consensus among the country's six
republics, though some progress is being made on reform issues at
the republican level.
Although the federal government's reform program is stalled,
the government remains committed to a prudent economic strategy
that includes cutting public expenditures and maintaining control
over the monetary system, efforts that are vital to economic
reform and securing Western assistance. Furthermore, the
government has stressed freer pricing of goods and a more open
trade policy that has greatly expanded access to Yugoslavia's
markets. All types of property now have equal legal status in
Yugoslavia, and increased protection of intellectual property has
been the result of amendments to existing legislation made in early
1990.
Science and Technology. US science and technology
cooperation with Yugoslavia is carried out under a bilateral
scientific and technological cooperation agreement signed in 1988.
The United States and Yugoslavia have had a joint research program
in effect continuously since 1972. Each government contributes in
generally equal amounts to fund joint research activities. The joint
program provides for cooperation across a number of disciplines,
including basic science, earth and atmospheric sciences engineering
research, agriculture, health and medicine, the environment, energy,
and mining research. The scientific and technical cooperation
program is structured particularly to respond to the interests of
each of Yugoslavia's republics, and joint work proceeded during the
reporting period without significant interruption despite political
and ethnic tensions.
Environment. In January 1991, the United States participated
in a Group of 24 (G-24) environmental fact-finding mission to
Yugoslavia organized by the European Community to identify
programs and projects in the environment sector that could be
considered for possible funding by the G-24 and/or the PHARE (EC)
program. Projects in three main categories (policy/institution-
building, feasibility studies for large investment projects, and pilot
projects with near-term mitigation impact) were submitted to the
mission by the Yugoslav authorities. The numerous senior Yugoslav
participants from various republics representing government,
academia, and the private sector reflected a strong interest in
environmental issues.
Yugoslavia is a signatory to the Montreal Protocol. It attended
the first session of the International Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change and participated in the
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change.
Chapter Five--IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS-RELATED
PRINCIPLES AND OF BASKET III
(HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER FIELDS OF COOPERATION)
Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields is covered under
Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act. In this Basket, CSCE states
have committed themselves to respect human rights and to further
human contacts, information flow, and cooperation and exchanges in
the fields of culture and education. The Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension
marked a significant step forward in Basket III, elaborating
freedoms such as free and fair elections and rule of law as part of
basic human rights. Copenhagen reflected the changing climate in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as the continuing
improvement in East-West relations. Following are assessments of
the performance of certain CSCE countries and Albania regarding
Basket III commitments.
ALBANIA
Human Rights
Freedom of Religion or Belief. In May 1990 the legislature,
declaring that religion was separate from the state and that the
question of religious belief would be a matter of conscience for
every individual, amended the 1967 ban on all religious practices.
The law permits Albanians to practice their religion individually
but left a ban on collective worship. The government also
decriminalized "religious propaganda," thereby allowing some
religious services to be held without official interference. While in
1990, Albanian officials told a US delegation that nobody in Albania
wanted to open places of worship, an increasing number of mosques
and churches have been re-opened and reportedly are being used
with or without official approval.
Freedom of Expression. During 1990, all news media continued
to be government-controlled, and the government prohibited
criticism of the state and party leadership or their policies.
However, there were indications that media criticism of some
aspects of Albanian society, such as the pervasive problem of
corruption, did increase. In December 1990, the government
announced that newly registered political parties would be able to
publish their own newspapers; both the Democratic Party of Albania
and Republican Party began publishing papers in early 1991.
Nonetheless, these papers only received limited allocations of
newsprint and encountered problems with circulation. Journalists
and opposition figures also contended with threats, intimidation,
and physical violence attributable to the government. During the
spring 1991 election campaign, the opposition parties were allowed
only limited access to the government-controlled media.
Art and literature remained subject to state control and
censorship, and the authorities continued to manipulate scholarly
inquiry and publications for political purposes.
Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly. On July 31,
1990, a legislative decree established the freedom to assemble but
with strict limits on meetings and sanctions against violators. A
few independent associations and organizations began to organize in
December. On December 9, 1990, Tirana University students
demonstrated against electricity shortages and demanded political
liberalization. The government responded by agreeing to the
formation of independent political organizations. In mid-December,
the Democratic Party of Albania, comprised mostly of intellectuals,
students, and urban workers, was founded and legally registered.
Other parties and organizations have since been allowed to form.
Participation in these groups, however, has not been without
retribution or free of threats and intimidation.
The government reacted more harshly against other
demonstrators in other areas of the country. Reports indicated that
in Kavalje, Elbasan, and other cities, the army was used to stop
demonstrations. Some demonstrations reportedly included attacks
on public buildings, the looting of stores, and the burning of police
cars and other vehicles; others were peaceful. There were no
reported casualties connected with these events, but official
sources stated that 157 demonstrators were arrested. Many were
convicted, and some received prison sentences of up to 20 years.
Leaders of the new opposition accused the police of torturing those
arrested. During visits of the UN Secretary General and
representatives of the CSCE, Albanian authorities denied violating
human rights and refused to cooperate with any investigation of
allegations to the contrary.
There was no evidence of political killings by the authorities
during the reporting period. However, in demonstrations protesting
general living conditions in Tirana in late June and again on July 2,
1990, security forces used force, including gunfire, to disperse
crowds. The exact number of injuries and deaths is unknown, but
some foreign diplomats and Albanian citizens estimated between 30
and 50. Thousands of demonstrators took refuge in European
embassies.
During demonstrations related to the felling of late communist
leader Enver Hoxha's statue on February 20, 1991, as many as 12
Albanians reportedly were killed and some 200 arrested. Official
Albanian sources said 54 were arrested. A February 22 meeting in
Tirana at the military academy led to the killing of four
demonstrators and one police officer.
During the March 31 election campaign, most opposition
parties were allowed to hold political rallies without interference
from the authorities, although Democratic Party leaders reported
that some of their election rallies were disrupted. Additionally,
some opposition speakers and activists reportedly were stoned or
beaten.
Freedom of Movement. On May 8, 1990, the legislature granted
Albanian citizens the right to acquire passports for foreign travel.
Passports are issued for specific countries of destination, and exit
visas are required. While many Albanians were able to travel during
the reporting period, reports continued that passports were denied
to some applicants. The May 8 law also stipulated that defection by
an Albanian "should be considered not as a betrayal of the homeland
but as an illegal border trespassing." Such illegal border crossings
are punished "with reeducation through work or loss of freedom for
up to 5 years," according to Article 127 of the revised penal code.
The number of refugees crossing the borders increased
dramatically during 1990-91, although at the end of the reporting
period there was a marked decrease in the use of deadly force by
border guards. Although border guards began to exercise somewhat
more restraint, they continued to use deadly force to stop Albanian
citizens from fleeing the country by land and sea and, reportedly,
killed a number of them during 1990 and 1991. Some Albanian
citizens attempting to flee without passports were shot by border
guards. In one incident, two ethnic Greek Albanians were reportedly
killed while trying to cross into Greece. Some 4,700 Albanians who
took refuge in European embassies during and after the July 1990
demonstrations were allowed to leave Albania for Central and
Western Europe.
In early 1991, some 25,000 Albanians left the country by land
or sea, although many later returned. After this mass exodus, the
nation's main port, Durres, was placed under military control and
access to some of Albania's other ports restricted. The exact
number of injuries and deaths during this period is unknown.
Albanian authorities, however, claimed that returnees were not
punished and that many returned to work the next day. Reports from
returnees indicate that returning civilians, at least, were not
subject to punishment.
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest or Punishment. Former
political prisoners often report that they were tortured, beaten, or
otherwise ill-treated during investigative proceedings to force
them to confess. In the first months of 1991 the government
released hundreds of political prisoners, the last of which were set
free just prior to the March 31 elections. At that time, the
authorities stated that 27 persons charged with anti-state crimes
remained in prison. The independent Albanian Human Rights Forum,
however, has requested a full list of those imprisoned but has not
been given any details. Independent Albanian sources believe that
about 100 political prisoners remain. To date, there has been no
compensation, no formal process of rehabilitation, and no official
acknowledgment of the wrongfulness of detention for released
political prisoners.
Although a US delegation was refused permission to visit a
prison camp in Spac during a trip to Albania in 1990, an
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights mission visited
Albania from March 7-12, 1991, toured several prison and labor
camps, and conducted numerous interviews with current and former
political prisoners. In addition to the reported mistreatment of
prisoners and poor prison conditions, random interviews by the
Helsinki group mission with some 183 prisoners revealed that they
uniformly had been denied basic due process rights. While the
legislature in May 1990 voted to amend the penal code to provide
for the right to legal defense, none of the interviewed prisoners had
received the benefit of independent counsel, and very few had
received any legal assistance at all.
In 1990, the Ministry of Justice, which had been abolished in
1967, was re-established. Its powers and authority are still being
defined as the new constitution is being developed. The ruling PLA
also has announced its intention to depoliticize the army, security
forces, and courts. None of the interviewed prisoners had received
the benefit of a trial before an impartial tribunal because there was
no independent judiciary. Many also complained of having been
coerced to confess to their alleged crimes.
Fundamental Freedoms
Free and Fair Elections. In a sign of political change, the
legislature on November 15, 1990, approved a new electoral law
that called for multi-candidate elections and provided that any
party or social organization, legally registered association, or
individual could propose a candidate to the elections. In December,
the government announced that independent political parties could
be established and present candidates for the legislative elections.
The Democratic Party became the first independent party to
register with the Ministry of Justice. Bowing to demands from the
opposition, the Albanian government subsequently postponed
elections initially scheduled for February until March 31 to allow
opposition parties to organize and campaign.
The March 31 vote reportedly included candidates from some
11 different parties or social organizations, including the Omonia--
a cultural organization representing the Greek minority's interests.
Some 250 foreign election observers were in Albania to observe the
voting process. Albania's first multi-party elections since 1945
gave the 4-month-old opposition Democratic party 75 seats in the
250-seat legislature but also ensured a controlling two-thirds
majority to the PLA. An official observation team from the United
States and other reputable international observers agreed that the
electoral process fell short in several key areas of CSCE standards
for free and fair elections. There was a disparity of resources
which favored the PLA and credible reports of intimidation against
opposition party candidates and activists during the campaign and
on election day. However, the elections were an important first
step toward the creation of a democratic Albania.
Earlier in 1990, the government approved a law to limit the
terms of office of high-ranking officials (up to deputy minister) to
5 years. Those affected include government officials and top plant
management in industry, agriculture, and construction. If the
masses approve of their performance, they may be re-elected to an
additional, non-consecutive 5-year term.
Minority Rights. The current constitution grants national
minorities "guaranteed protection and development of their culture
and popular traditions, the use of their mother tongue and its
teaching in the schools, and development in all fields of social life."
However, there are some restrictions on the extent to which
minorities may exercise their rights, particularly in the education.
Greeks may be educated in their mother tongue through the primary
level. Thereafter, Greek is taught as a foreign language. A Greek-
language newspaper, Laiko Vima, is published in the southern town
of Girokaster. Large numbers of ethnic Greeks fled Albania for
Greece in 1990 and 1991, and members of other smaller minority
groups resettled in Yugoslavia. Practically the entire Jewish
community of Albania has been resettled in Israel.
Human Contacts. Contact with the outside world is still, to a
large extent, carefully monitored, although many Albanians now
welcome casual contact with foreign tourists. It has become
significantly easier for Albanian citizens to receive letters and
packages from relatives abroad. In 1990, direct telephone
communications with the United States were opened.
In another sign of increasing openness, Albania resumed
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and with the
United States on March 15, 1991. Discussions aimed at establishing
diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom were initiated. A
small official US delegation arrived in Tirana on March 20, 1991, to
observe the elections, meet with various government and
independent organizations, and lay the foundation for a permanent
diplomatic presence in Albania.
BULGARIA
Human Rights
Improvements in the human rights situation in Bulgaria, begun
after the November 10, 1989 ouster of long-time dictator Todor
Zhivkov, came into full force during the reporting period. For the
first time, a broad range of human rights monitoring groups was
allowed to operate freely in Bulgaria, including the Independent
Society for the Defense of Human Rights, the Club for the Repressed
Since 1945, Amnesty International, and a local chapter of Helsinki
Watch.
Freedom of Religion or Belief. Bulgarians have enjoyed a new-
found freedom of religion since the beginning of 1990. There are no
longer controls placed upon attendance at church services or other
religious ceremonies. A number of Protestant churches have
registered and begun importing Bibles for distribution in Bulgaria.
The country's mosques are no longer prevented or discouraged from
opening. A school for Imams has been established, as has an Islamic
cultural center, although there is still a shortage of Korans in
Bulgarian. Easter and Christmas services were broadcast
nationwide, and the Chief Mufti was allowed to broadcast his
address in Arabic at the time of Ramadan. Christmas and Easter
were official holidays for the first time in 1990.
The Chief Mufti and the Patriarch of the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church are still appointed by the state, as are other church leaders,
and there have been many outspoken critics of these holdovers from
the old regime. Religious education for children is once again
allowed but is not widespread. Although serious consideration has
been given to the full return of all religious properties confiscated
during communist rule, this has not yet been done.
Freedom of Expression. A wide range of newspapers, covering
the political spectrum, emerged during the last year, generally
restricted only by a shortage of newsprint and operating free of
censorship. However, there have been charges that the Bulgarian
Socialist Party (BSP) has used its influence to control distribution
of newsprint to opposition papers, particularly during the electoral
campaign. The newspaper of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms
(MRF) finally received permission to publish in Turkish as well as
Bulgarian and obtained newsprint for its first issue in February. At
the end of the reporting period, it had published four issues, and
there were no reports of problems with distribution in either
language.
Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly. Freedoms of
expression and assembly were well tested and, generally, fully
exercised in the campaign leading up to the June elections and in
the period since. Opposition parties hold political rallies without
interference from the authorities, and the trade unions have often
held their own rallies, although they are prohibited from engaging in
purely political activities. There are no controls placed upon the
right of association, though there have been complaints of informal
pressure from pro-BSP bosses on workers not to join the Podkrepa
trade union in some rural areas.
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest or Punishment. A close
examination of the roles of the Interior and Justice Ministries has
led to major reforms in those areas as well. The National Assembly
began a major overhaul of the penal code early in 1990 in order to
bring it into line with accepted international norms. The
government has disbanded the notorious Sixth Department of the
Ministry of the Interior (the former secret police), ending the
control it once maintained over everyday correspondence and
communications of Bulgarian citizens. Soon after his appointment
in August, President Zhelev amnestied most political prisoners, and
the remaining were released on December 17. The Government of
Bulgaria claims that there currently are no known political
prisoners in Bulgaria. However, ethnic Turkish leaders still
maintain that many ethnic Turks who resisted the Zhivkov forced
assimilation campaign are still imprisoned because they were
falsely sentenced on criminal charges. Bulgarian human rights
activists note in particular five remaining cases (three involving
ethnic Turks sentenced on terrorist charges) of prisoners whose
criminal convictions may have rested on political motivations.
Summary exile, house arrest, internal exile, and
incommunicado detention no longer exist as lawful forms of
punishment. However, ousted communist leader Todor Zhivkov and
two of his associates were held under house arrest, in lieu of
imprisonment, pending their trials on charges of fraud and
embezzlement, which began in February 1991. Podkrepa trade union
leader Dr. Konstatin Trenchev was briefly placed under "city arrest"
in the fall of 1990 after a demonstration in front of BSP
headquarters in Sofia got out of control and the building was set on
fire. Trenchev was soon released and allowed to travel abroad after
the personal intervention of President Zhelev. Although security
forces did not act in time to prevent the fire and extensive damage
to the structure, a thorough investigation was conducted, and the
Sofia prosecutor's office planned to prepare indictments against a
number of people, including officials who allegedly failed to
respond to official orders to restrain the demonstrators. One of the
most significant political reforms enacted by the Grand National
Assembly has been depoliticization of all government organs. The
new law prohibits all non-elected government officials and
members of the officers' corps from holding membership in any
political party. Few public servants opted to retain their party
membership rather than remain in their current positions.
Fundamental Freedoms
Free and Fair Elections. Bulgaria's transition to democracy
was marked most significantly by its first free parliamentary
elections in 45 years in June 1990. The elections, which resulted in
a Grand National Assembly whose task has been to initiate reforms
and write a new constitution, were judged to be, generally, free by
international observers and members of the internal opposition.
However, there was some concern over intimidation in the
countryside by members of the Socialist Party and local leaders
who still retained positions held under the Zhivkov regime. There
also was a serious disparity of resources which favored the
Socialist Party.
A wide range of parties participated in the elections, in which
candidates competed for parliamentary seats on both a majority and
a proportional basis. A majority of seats was won by the BSP, with
the opposition coalition Union of Democratic Forces coming in
second. The largely Turkish and Muslim Movement for Rights and
Freedoms also was allowed to participate and later to form a
parliamentary group despite a constitutional ban on parties formed
along ethnic or religious lines. Its fate will ultimately depend upon
provisions in the new constitution. An agreement among the major
political forces under re-negotiation, called for local elections in
March followed by parliamentary elections in June 1991. However,
many observers feel that local elections might not take place until
June 1991, with parliamentary elections held in the fall.
Minority Rights. The issue of minority rights, particularly in
regard to the ethnic Turks, has been in the forefront of public
debate during the last year. The process of restoring rights to
Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish, Gypsy, and Pomak minorities began with
the December 1989, decision ending the assimilation campaign
which had sought to "Bulgarize" these groups. In March 1990, the
National Assembly passed a law allowing members of these
minorities to restore their names, which had been forcibly changed
to Slavic names during the assimilation campaign. However, this
law was much criticized for the sometimes lengthy court processes
it entailed, and the assembly adopted a new name law in October
1990 which provided for name restoration through a simplified
administrative procedure, and removed the requirement for Slavic
"-ov" and "-ev" endings on family names.
In ending the assimilation campaign, the Bulgarian Government
also restored the rights of non-Bulgarian ethnic groups to practice
their own traditions and religious ceremonies including burials,
weddings, and circumcisions. Speaking Turkish in public is no
longer prohibited, and no official violations have been reported,
although ethnic Turks from some areas report that they have still
met with some discrimination from private individuals.
The issue of allowing Turkish to be taught in Bulgarian public
schools has been hotly contested by Bulgarian nationalist groups.
The constitution guarantees the right of all citizens to study their
mother tongue. When the Minister of Education announced in
February that Turkish language classes would be introduced March
1, 1991, on a limited experimental basis, several nationalist groups
initiated hunger strikes and blockades in protest in some areas with
a high concentration of ethnic Turks. At the same time, the MRF
undertook a series of strikes, demanding full and immediate
implementation of Turkish classes for any student wishing to study
the language. On March 8, the National Assembly voted to continue
the experimental classes for the remainder of the year and to begin
full implementation of classes with the beginning of the next
school year in September 1991. However, in response to rising
opposition, the assembly subsequently decided to postpone Turkish
language classes until the new school year.
The current constitution bans the registration of political
parties or movements formed along ethnic lines. This prohibition
has most notably and controversially affected the MRF and the pro-
Macedonian "Ilindin" organization. The former has been allowed to
exist as a fully functioning political party, but its status is
expected to come under review before the next elections, pursuant
to the relevant provisions in the new constitution. Nationalist
groups as well as many mainstream politicians have argued that it
is a purely ethnic- and religious- based movement and, therefore,
unconstitutional. Ilindin has been denied registration on the
grounds that it is a separatist organization, and an appeal of that
decision was rejected by the Supreme Court.
Human Contacts. During 1990, regulations regarding issuance
of passports to Bulgarians were significantly relaxed. Passports
for international travel are now available to virtually anyone who
properly completes application forms and pays appropriate fees,
which generally are reasonable and cover processing costs. In
January 1991, Bulgaria eliminated the exit visa requirement for
citizens wishing to travel outside the country. There have been
some complaints from applicants in rural areas who have
experienced significant delays in passport issuance after being told
by local officials that there is a shortage of paper for passports.
Access to diplomatic missions by Bulgarian nationals for visa or
other purposes is not restricted.
The visa requirement was abolished in 1990 for US citizens
wishing to visit Bulgaria for periods of less than 30 days. This
applies to travel to Bulgaria for business and tourism. In addition,
there is no limit to the number of times a US citizen may enter and
leave Bulgaria, and in late March 1991, mandatory currency
exchange requirements also were abolished.
Information. The availability of and access to Western
publications on the local market has substantially improved.
However, due to prevailing economic conditions, the cost is
prohibitive to local citizens. Numerous institutions throughout the
country have been forced to cancel subscriptions to scholarly
journals. The availability of Western books is limited primarily by
economic factors and the availability of printing materials. The US
Information Agency has developed a significant translation and
publishing program for key American titles on economics, politics,
history, and philosophy. Book donations from American foundations
are welcome and equitably distributed.
Cultural Exchanges. Cultural relations have so improved that
the bilateral agreement between the United States and Bulgaria was
considered redundant and allowed to lapse. Academic and cultural
exchanges continued to grow in the private sector. The demand for
foreign cultural products--performers, books, exhibits--continued
to increase and was encouraged by the Bulgarian government.
Western cultural centers opened in Sofia, including a small British
center. A small German center is expected in 1991. During the
reporting period, USIA sent a photography exhibit and a country
music group to Bulgaria.
Educational Exchanges. Educational exchanges are growing.
There has been continuing expansion of the range of exchange
activities and access to exchanges. Most exchange opportunities
are now awarded through competitive selection. English language
training is in great demand. For the first time, the Peace Corps will
send approximately 20 English- language teachers to Bulgaria in
1991.
The numbers of US government-sponsored educational
exchanges are small, but the programs are significant. Three to
four Fulbright scholars and three to five graduate students were in
Bulgaria on year-long programs. Shorter term (mainly summer)
opportunities were available for five more students. Other US
government-sponsored programing included a lecturer-specialist in
English-language teaching. Other growing exchange areas include
non-US programs such as the International Research and Exchanges
Board (10 places for Americans in Bulgaria) and the conclusion of
agreements between individual US universities and consortia and
Bulgarian institutions.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Human Rights
Czechoslovak citizens now enjoy full political and human
rights. Most steps to ensure these rights were undertaken by the
democratic government of the Czechoslovakia in the months
immediately following the November 1989 revolution. Nonetheless,
the democratic reform process continued throughout 1990 and into
the first quarter of 1991. During the period covered by this report,
Czechoslovakia continued to make the protection of political and
human rights of paramount importance in the development of both
domestic and foreign policies.
The most important development during the first quarter of
1991 was the passage on January 9, 1991, by the Federal Assembly
(Parliament) of a comprehensive bill on human rights and freedoms.
This Charter of Basic Rights and Freedoms provides constitutional
guarantees for a full range of political and human rights. The
charter is not a mere recitation of rights, but accurately reflects
the rights and freedoms generally enjoyed by persons residing in
Czechoslovakia. Many of these rights had previously been expressed
in other forms of domestic legislation. Examples of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the charter include:
-- Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion;
-- Freedom of expression;
-- Right of petition, peaceful assembly, and free association;
-- Procedural and substantive due process in criminal
proceedings, including the right to remain silent;
-- Right to privacy;
-- Freedom of movement and residence;
-- Right to participate in the administration of public affairs
directly or through free election of representatives; and
-- Access to impartial judicial tribunals.
The charter also provides that basic rights and freedoms may
not be denied because of a person's sex, race, color of skin,
language, faith, political or other belief, or national or social
origin. In addition, a provision of the charter states that no one
may be disadvantaged by being a member of a national or ethnic
minority. Citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities are
also guaranteed a right to education in their own language, use of
their language in official communications, and participation in the
settlement of problems concerning national and ethnic minorities.
Fundamental Freedoms
Highlights in the political and human rights area during the
reporting period included the holding of free and fair elections for
parliamentary and municipal council seats and the enactment of a
constitutional charter of basic human rights and freedoms. Other
significant developments included the enactment of legislation
guaranteeing the rights of petition, assembly, and association, and
the passage of legal provisions strengthening the right of
procedural and substantive due process for criminal defendants.
Recent labor legislation also guarantees the right to collective
bargaining.
The Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms provides that the
rights and freedoms it enumerates are to be protected by a
constitutional court. At the time of the charter's enactment, no
constitutional court existed. The Federal Assembly, however, on
February 27, 1991, passed legislation creating a constitutional
court with jurisdiction over cases involving human rights. The
court is expected to be formally constituted and begin hearing cases
sometime before the end of 1991.
Perhaps the most sensitive human rights issue confronted by
the Czechoslovak public during the first quarter of 1991 centered
around a Federal Assembly investigation into the alleged
collaboration of a number of Federal Assembly deputies and high
federal government officials with the former secret police. A
special parliamentary commission in late March 1991 publicly
announced the names of 10 Federal Assembly deputies it had
determined had secret police connections. Another four or five
deputies reportedly resigned when confronted with evidence of
their secret police collaboration. Although the screening process
began first with Federal Assembly deputies, it will be extended to
high federal government officials who will be quietly asked to
resign if secret police connections are discovered.
The names of 10 deputies whose names were released publicly
March 22 as secret police collaborators have, generally, denied the
allegations, have argued that the materials and process used to
establish their collaboration was unreliable, claim that they remain
competent to serve as Federal Assembly deputies, and have
advocated the creation of independent tribunals before which their
cases can be adjudicated. Thus far, the Federal Assembly has not
addressed these points, but neither has it taken any actions to
remove the 10 deputies from their assembly seats, although the
federal prosecutor's office has been asked to begin criminal
proceedings against them for betraying the public trust. On April
10, the names of three additional deputies who had quietly resigned
in late March and early April were published, seemingly
contravening the Federal Assembly's stated policy of not publicizing
the names of those accused who voluntarily give up their public
office.
As a result of this, a law being drafted lists jobs and
functions for which a background check will be required--
apparently all public positions will now be subject to vetting.
Minority Rights. Czechoslovakia has two major nationalities--
Czechs and Slovaks--and two sizable minorities--Hungarians and
Gypsies. There is a small separatist movement in Slovakia, which
enjoys the support of as much as 10% of the Slovak population, but
the Slovak republic represents the democratic aspirations of the
Slovak people (as does the Czech republic those of the Czechs)
through representative bodies and local institutions.
For the Hungarians, the state allows for primary and secondary
education in Hungarian and allows ethnic Hungarians to pursue
higher education in Hungary. Ethnic Hungarians complain that
Hungarian language at the primary and secondary school level is
inadequate. In October 1990, there was some friction between
Slovaks and Hungarians, as Slovak was designated the official
language of the Slovak republic.
Gypsies appear to suffer disproportionately from high rates of
poverty, disease, and crime. Their problems seem to result more
from popular prejudices than from any government policies,
although Gypsies are not officially recognized as a minority and
thus are not accorded the rights enjoyed by other minorities.
Human Contacts. Human contacts are not limited in
Czechoslovakia, either in law or in practice.
Information. Freedom of speech and press is provided for by
law and respected, in practice. During 1990, a multi-faceted
independent press emerged, with hundreds of newspapers and
magazines beginning publication. Some previously politicized
newspapers, such as Mlada Fronta of the Communist Youth
Movement, were converted into independent publications. In 1991,
the main foe of these publications is not government policy but
economic pressures from the reform process.
All domestic television broadcasting is government-owned and
divided between the Slovak and Czech governmental competencies.
Western-sourced broadcasting began in 1990 on the OK-3 (third
channel), including feeds from Cable News Network. Domestic
channels reflect a wide range of opinion, including opinion opposing
government policies.
The government also supports radio broadcasting facilities.
Radio Free Europe now broadcasts using medium- wave facilities
within Czechoslovakia.
The federal government has come under increasing domestic
and foreign criticism for its imposition of a 22% turnover tax on
print media. In early May the Brussels-based International
Federation of Journalist condemned the government's policy, noting
that the tax combined with the increased price of news print and
using process in the printing industry could lead to a situation
where almost 80% of Czech and Slovak journalists would lose their
jobs because the majority of newspapers and periodicals would
collapse as a result of introducing the tax measure. The government
subsequently backed down, reducing the tax to 11% on May 6, but the
controversy continues with journalists warning of the threat to a
free and objective press.
The extensive control of the governing political parties over
the media has led to demands by opposition parties for more space
for free, independent, and non-party information and expression of
views.
Cultural and Educational Exchanges. Czechoslovakia's
transformation has been led by major cultural figures, most notably
by its playwright-President, Vaclav Havel. Although Czechoslovakia
has always been culturally rich, cultural activities, including
bilateral ones, have a heightened importance in relations with the
new authorities. Cultural and educational exchanges generally are
state-run, though quasi-private organizations (often tied to emigre
communities overseas) participate in many programs. There are
virtually no limits on cultural exchanges, except fiscal ones.
Because Czechoslovakia's currency, the koruna, is not convertible,
private cultural exchanges are limited. The United States continues
to conduct its exchanges of performers, artists, and exhibits under
the terms of a bilateral educational and cultural exchange
agreement signed in 1986 and renewed in 1988. Four cultural
programs were conducted in 1990-91, including country music,
jazz, dance performances, and a photography exhibit. In addition, a
visit by an American arts funding expert was sponsored. USIA is
rapidly expanding its programs throughout Czechoslovakia and will
establish a Fulbright Commission in 1991. These efforts will bear
even greater numbers when cultural centers are established in
Bratislava (1991) and Prague (1992), thus, institutionalizing
exchange mechanisms.
HUNGARY
Human Rights
Hungarians enjoy all the basic freedoms, including freedom of
association, of religion, to change their government, to travel
abroad, and access to information. Hungarian citizens exercised
their right to peacefully change their government through elections
in 1990.
Freedom of Religion or Belief. The government, in February,
restored full diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and a Papal
Nuncio has since been accredited to Hungary. Although many
elements in the government are influenced by pre-1956 Christian
traditions, there is no officially preferred religion, and religious
affiliation carries no benefits or penalties. Since late 1989, more
than 60 religious orders and numerous seminaries and schools were
established or reopened.
Hungary's Jewish community, the largest in Eastern Europe,
was the object both of rising expressions of anti-Semitism and of
government efforts to protect the community in 1990. There were
scattered reports of anti-Semitic provocations, but the government
consistently condemned all anti-Semitic activities and responded
with action when required. In July,
the government demonstrated its support for the Jewish community
when President Goncz, Prime Minister Antall, and a score of top
leaders attended the dedication of the new holocaust memorial.
Freedom of Movement. Movement of Hungarian citizens within
the country and abroad is unrestricted. All residents carry identity
cards and must register with the local town or district council
when they change residences. Current law establishes the right of
Hungarians to emigrate and of emigres to return freely. Since mid-
1989, several exiled dissidents have returned to Hungary, regained
their revoked citizenships, and were elected to Parliament or
appointed to prominent government positions.
Fundamental Freedoms
Parliamentary elections in March and April, which saw the
overwhelming defeat of the communists, resulted in a peaceful
transition to a coalition government formed by the Hungarian
Democratic Forum, the Independent Smallholder's Party, and the
Christian Democratic People's Party, which together hold 230 of the
386 seats. In opposition were the Alliance of Free Democrats, the
Federation of Young Democrats, and the Hungarian Socialist
(formerly Communist) Party.
In late summer, Parliament passed a local government bill
designed to transfer many powers to local authorities, and local
elections were held in September and October. Elections were
characterized by the participation of multiple parties fielding
freely chosen slates of candidates, secret balloting, and universal
suffrage. There was no evidence of fraud or coercion in the election
process.
Following the inauguration of the democratically elected
government, two former instruments of internal control, the State
Security Services and the police, were reorganized. State Security
Services was removed from the control of the Ministry of Interior
and now reports to a separate minister without portfolio. The
Minister of Interior remains ultimately responsible to Parliament
for the police but does not exercise day-to-day control. In 1990,
many political prisoners convicted and imprisoned by the former
regime were rehabilitated or received amended sentences. Hungary
reportedly released its last four political prisoners in September
1990.
Minority Rights. In cooperation with the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, the government continued to receive
and provide for a flow of refugees into Hungary approaching 40,000
since borders opened in 1989. Despite government concern about its
ability to handle these numbers, given its limited financial
resources, refugees fearing political persecution have not been
turned away.
Preferential allocations of scarce housing and employment to
refugees and immigrants remain troublesome issues. Most refugees
seeking to stay in Hungary in 1990 continued to be Romanian
citizens; of these, ethnic Hungarians generally had little trouble
finding work and acceptance. Public tolerance of ethnic Romanians
and Gypsies was lower; as economic conditions deteriorated and
public resentment over what was perceived as these groups'
preferential access to housing and jobs became an increasingly
sensitive social issue.
There are no formal restrictions, in law or practice, on the
participation of women in government or politics. A few members
of Parliament are minorities but none ran for office in the 1990
national legislature. In an attempt to promote minority
representation, the government devised a system of minority lists
for elections to local governments and authorized, in September
1990, a fund of approximately $24,000 to support minority
candidates in local elections. At least four well-known human
rights monitoring groups operate freely in Hungary: the Hungarian
Helsinki Committee, the Hungarian Chapter of Amnesty
International, the Wallenberg Association for Minority Rights, and
the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation. A 25-member
Parliamentary Committee for Human, Minority, and Religious Rights
oversees the field of human rights.
In 1990, Hungary was not the object of allegations or
investigations of human rights abuses by any international or non-
governmental body. It worked actively in the United Nations and the
CSCE to promote human and minority rights. Hungary's particular
preoccupation is the welfare of its ethnic minorities in neighboring
countries; a separate government office was established during
1990 to promote the rights of Hungarians living beyond its borders.
Hungary's largest minority group is the Gypsies, who account
for roughly 5% of its population of 10.5 million. Conditions of life
within the Gypsy community are significantly worse than among the
general populace. Gypsies reportedly account for more than half of
Hungary's unemployed, and the crime rates in the Gypsy
communities are nearly double that in other areas.
The government sponsors programs both to preserve Gypsy
language and cultural heritage and to assist social and economic
assimilation. Beginning in mid-1990, the media increased public
discussion of Gypsy issues and reflected official sensitivity to
heavy-handed treatment of Gypsies under the communist regime.
Widespread popular prejudice continues, however, along with de
facto discrimination in housing and jobs. In June 1990, the various
Gypsy rights organizations were assembled under the umbrella of a
new national oversight body, the Nationality Council of Gypsy
Organizations.
Information. In practice, Hungarians enjoy full access to print
and broadcast media at a level similar to the less affluent
democracies of Western Europe. The only existing impediments to
the free flow of information are economic. However, the
democratically elected Hungarian government still has to decide
whether to draft a press law and, if so, what its provisions should
be. The same holds true for broadcasting.
There is no government censorship of the press, despite
occasional tension between the government and some elements of
the media typical of other Western countries. The flow of
information from abroad is not restricted. Economic factors, as
well as the uncertainty surrounding media legislation, are imposing
pressures and limitations on both media outlets and information
consumers.
In addition to domestic publications, leading international
magazines and newspapers are available at hotels and major kiosks.
Business and home subscriptions also are available. While the state
post office's monopoly on the distribution of subscriptions is
eroding, it remains the principal distributor, and service is often
deficient.
Administratively, major Hungarian radio and television
stations continued as state properties, but the Prime Minister and
the President, as part of the reform process, have appointed new
management. The new directors appeared to enjoy a high degree of
autonomy, and views of the opposition are regularly reported. One
standard feature of the media is fair and objective reporting on the
United States, including interviews with prominent Americans.
With the exception of the privately owned Bridge Radio
station, all radio and TV stations in Hungary are state-owned. This
may change after the passage of a new law on broadcasting. The
law, which is expected to be passed sometime in 1991, will finalize
the redistribution and availability of frequencies. The results are
expected to produce a third TV station and several new radio
stations.
A growing number of affluent Hungarians have purchased
satellite dishes and have access to the entire international
spectrum of satellite television. However, for most Hungarians,
dishes remain prohibitively expensive. A much cheaper way for
Hungarians to gain access to satellite programing is via cable
television. Currently, as many as 600,000 TV households (out of a
total of 2.5 million) have cable, and the number is growing daily.
Newspapers and magazines no longer fall under state control.
All of Hungary's major dailies are owned by private corporations
and are run as businesses, with significant foreign investment.
There is no hard evidence that foreign investors are trying to shape
editorial content of the newspapers they partially own.
Nevertheless, like TV and radio, newspapers and magazines
generally are strapped financially, putting certain limitations on
reporting.
Access to foreign films in Hungary is unhindered. New
distribution companies and video rental stores are increasing and
offer an extensive selection of American, French, and German, as
well as Hungarian films. As resources for dubbing films expand,
foreign films can be expected to be released on the market at a
faster pace.
Human Contacts. Hungarian passports are valid for 5 years for
travel to any country. In January 1990, the Hungarian Government
abolished the requirement to obtain permission from the local
police for travel abroad. Foreign travel generally is limited only by
the difficulty in obtaining convertible currency.
As of November 1, 1990, the Hungarian Government abolished
the visa requirement for all US citizens with planned stays in
Hungary of 3 months or less. Hungary has made similar
announcements regarding citizens of several European countries.
The United States has reciprocated by abolishing fees for non-
immigrant visas to the United States for Hungarians.
A Hungarian law passed in 1989 establishes the fundamental
right of all Hungarian citizens to emigrate. The law limits
emigration by those facing criminal charges, minors, and those
liable for compulsory military service.
Cultural Exchanges. The Hungarian Ministry of Culture and
Education is eager to facilitate all exchange programs proposed by
the United States, as well as the establishment of direct contacts
among institutions from both countries. Lack of easy access to hard
currency on the part of Hungarians continues to appear to be the
only obstacle to increasing the exchanges. Most US-Hungarian
educational and cultural exchanges are governed by a bilateral
agreement and a protocol of 2 years specifying the exchanges in
various categories.
Educational Exchanges. The number of educational exchanges
between the United States and Hungary is experiencing a dramatic
boost both under the terms of the existing US-Hungarian bilateral
agreement and through direct private sector contacts. Private
foundations are busily establishing new and lengthier exchange
programs with Hungarian secondary schools and universities, while
the "traditional" governmental exchanges are registering increases
given the growing US interest in supporting the consolidation of the
democratization process in the region.
The Fulbright program for Hungary has greatly expanded with
the introduction of a variety of new fields ranging from local
government to banking and sciences. For the 1991-92 academic
year, the Fulbright program will have approximately 100 scholars,
lecturers, teachers, and graduate students traveling to both
countries, a considerable increase from the 70 that participated in
the 1990-91 program. Included in this number is the secondary
school teacher exchange, which started in 1987 with one English
teacher and which will have 12 participants by 1992.
In December 1990, both governments signed an agreement
establishing a Fulbright Commission, scheduled to begin operations
by late summer 1991. As a complement to the Fulbright program,
USIA also established the Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall
fellowships and chairs which, for the 1992 academic year, will be
further expanded to include special categories of scholars in the
fields of business administration, banking, finance, law,
government, and political science.
The Hubert Humphrey Fellowship also was enlarged in its scope
and now offers special scholarships, sponsored by the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, in fields focused on the study of drug-
related issues. The Eisenhower Fellowship Program registered a
slight setback during this past year, mainly due to problems arising
from the restructuring of the Government of Hungary's office in
charge of its administration. This obstacle has been overcome, and
a new committee will be established to proceed with the recruiting
and nomination procedures. University affiliation programs also are
increasing with active programs of faculty and student exchanges.
POLAND
Human Rights
Polish citizens now enjoy the full range of human rights that
exist in Western Europe. Poland made dramatic progress on major
human rights issues in 1990 and early 1991. Officially sanctioned,
politically motivated police violence has ceased; former high-
ranking members of the security apparatus were arrested for
corruption and murder (including the murder in 1984 of the pro-
Solidarity priest Father Jerzy Popieluszko); investigations into
other political killings that took place under the former regime
have been re-opened and are being vigorously pursued; all
censorship has ended; newspapers are being privatized; the criminal
code has been completely reworked to establish the independence of
the judiciary and to protect the rights of prisoners and detainees.
In the past, the communist government abused many laws for
political purposes; government practice now firmly respects the
law and the rights of individuals.
Numerous changes in the criminal code in 1990 eliminated
most of the provisions used in the past for political reasons.
Poland's military-security apparatus has undergone profound
reform. The Minister of Defense, a former member of the
Communist Party (PZPR) Politburo, was replaced in July by Rear
Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczk, a professional officer without high
rank in the former Communist Party, who had good relations with
Solidarity and the Catholic Church during the 1980s. The Principal
Deputy Minister of Defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, is a long-time
Solidarity activist. The new Chief of Staff, General Dyw. Zdzislaw
Stelmaszuk, appears to have been selected, in part, because he had
no ties with the Soviets. The leadership of the army also is being
replaced. According to new guidelines, all generals over age 62 are
to be retired; the army will thus be reformed without a political
"witch hunt."
The Minister of the Interior, a former Politburo member, was
replaced in July 1990 by long-term opposition activist and
Solidarity adviser, Krzysztof Kozlowski. Minister Kozlowski
appointed Solidarity advisers as his two vice ministers and as his
Director of Intelligence. Following Lech Walesa's election, the new
government replaced Kozlowski with another long-time Solidarity
activist, Henryk Majewski. The Interior Ministry, which oversees
Poland's police and security apparatus, has undergone considerable
change under its current top leaders, who are veterans of the
Solidarity movement. The secret police (Polish acronym SB) has
been dismantled, ministry operations were decentralized, and the
police are being restructured to fight crime rather than political
opponents. A process of "verification" of former SB employees
occurred in 1990, with special commissions under the supervision
of the Interior Ministry's new leadership reviewing the files and
removing personnel found to have systematically violated the law
during the period of Communist rule. As a result of these changes,
the Interior Ministry was in the process of transformation
throughout 1990 and early 1991 from a tool of political control and
domestic repression to a protector of Polish national security.
Fundamental Freedoms
Elections in May 1990 established genuine self-government at
the local level, giving citizens the opportunity to replace regional
and city governments appointed under the communists. A new
constitution, being drafted by a parliamentary commission, will
codify legal and institutional changes and symbolize Poland's
peaceful transition from a one-party state to a democracy. The
Polish Parliament has agreed that fully democratic parliamentary
elections will occur in the fall of 1991. Parliamentary committees
are debating the law that will govern these elections. A broad
range of political parties and groups will compete for places in the
new Parliament and Senate. Many new political groups are already
in existence and are competing openly and democratically. Partisan
politics typical of democratic states are a feature of Polish daily
life.
Poland's political transition to a fully functioning democracy
is not yet complete, however. Its democratic structures are new
and are still being tested. Political parties are active but still
tiny; many Poles have expressed concern about the ability of parties
to perform their functions, especially in times of economic stress.
Some argue that the new political appointees heading the electronic
media, including television, exhibit a preference for news
supporting the president. Prison conditions are still sub-standard,
and work conditions in many plants are hazardous. Despite the
range of newspapers, some political groups complain about a lack of
objectivity and contend they lack adequate access to the media.
Minimum wage requirements are not always enforced. Nonetheless,
the establishment of a system in which the rights of the individual
are protected against the power of the state is now well
established in Poland.
Minority Rights. Poland is a nearly homogeneous country with
a smattering of ethnic Germans, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and
Lithuanians. Polish Jewish leaders have expressed concern over
manifestations of latent anti-Semitism in Polish society, and anti-
Semitism became a political issue during the presidential campaign
in December 1990. Both the government and President Walesa have
taken public stands against any such discrimination.
Human Contacts. Human contacts are unhampered by law and
flourish in practice. Visa requirements for US citizens were
eliminated during the reporting period to expand human and business
relations.
Information. The print media are diverse, with daily
newspapers representing a broad spectrum of political and editorial
opinion. The electronic media has undergone less radical
transformation. One private television and three private radio
stations are operating, but the state-owned television and radio
stations are under leaderships committed to objectivity in news
broadcasting.
Cultural Exchanges. Poland is eager to increase its cultural
contacts with the United States and other countries, and the only
impediment is lack of funds. Generally, the foreign partner must
pay for any new programs or expansion of old ones. Despite this,
the US cultural exchange program with Poland is the largest for any
country in Eastern Europe. During 1990, the US Government
sponsored nine programs which included music, theater, and dance
performances; arts and crafts exhibitions, and expert lectures on
literature, music and the theater.
Educational Exchanges. A similar potentially unlimited--but
fiscally constrained--situation exists with respect to educational
exchanges. The demand for educational exchange programs is
enormous, and the US response ranges from a large US Government-
sponsored program to many non-governmental exchanges. At least
30 Polish students and young professionals were given full
academic-year scholarships to study law and business in the United
States under US Government auspices. Some 35 Americans--
lecturers, and post-doctoral and other students--received support
varying from a full academic year to a single term. Other programs
such as the Fulbright Secondary School Teacher Exchange and the
Samantha Smith fund also were heavily used.
ROMANIA
Human Rights
Progress in promoting the effective exercise of human rights
has been tangible but with troubling and persistent lapses. A
number of domestic human rights monitoring organizations have
been established, including the Romanian Helsinki Watch
Committee, the League for the Defense of Human Rights, the
Independent Romanian Society for Human Rights, and the
Association of Former Political Prisoners. These groups are all
based in Bucharest, but they claim to have branches in many of the
country's larger cities. During the reporting period they published
and disseminated several thousand copies of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights. The Romanian Helsinki Watch
Committee published a 250-page report on the June events in
Bucharest which was publicly sold without hindrance. Privately
organized international conferences on human rights were held in
Timisoara in October and in Bucharest in December. All of these
groups have unfettered access to international human rights
monitoring organizations, but are plagued by a lack of financial
resources and experience that limits their impact.
A government-sponsored bill, creating an official human rights
institute, was passed on January 28, 1991. The Romanian Institute
for Human Rights is designed to serve as a clearinghouse for
information and research on human rights observance in Romania
and abroad. It will be funded by Parliament but has not yet begun
operating. Critics outside the government fear that the new
institute will be dominated by the NSF-controlled Parliament,
which has the authority to name all of its members. The Ministry of
Defense and the Interior Ministry, which has authority over
Romania's police, have begun training courses for officers on human
rights-related issues. A human rights course and a human rights
professorship at the University of Bucharest also were established.
A number of foreign human rights organizations established
offices in or visited Romania during the reporting period. These
include the International Committee of the Red Cross, Helsinki
Watch, Amnesty International, the International Human Rights Law
Group, and the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). The
UNCHR's special rapporteur for Romania visited the country twice
during 1990 and in March 1991 published a detailed report in which
he praised the government for general progress in the field but
outlined a number of areas that continue to concern his
organization. He concluded that the June events "constituted the
most serious violation of human rights in Romania in 1990." He also
pointed to attacks on the Gypsy community as a significant minority
problem with which the Romanian Government had failed to deal.
Romania co-sponsored the UN resolution to extend the special
rapporteur's mandate for 1 year. During the reporting period,
independent international human rights organizations, such as those
named above, continued to find significant human rights abuses,
including free speech and assembly, freedom of the press,
treatment and rights of minorities, criminal procedure, and official
violence against Romanian citizens.
A new Romanian constitution is being written. The draft
theses were prepared by a joint committee of the Senate and House
of Deputies and were debated in Parliament in the spring of 1991.
In a number of instances the theses, if enacted, would restrict
important human rights and freedoms. When the debate is finished,
the final draft will be ratified by the Parliament as a constituent
assembly. Ratification is expected by late 1991. The intent of the
draft constitution is to include provisions to protect various
freedoms, political pluralism, the promotion of free enterprise and
private property, equality before the law, and the presumption of
innocence, as well as prohibiting discrimination based on "race,
ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion and political
allegiance, and wealth or social origin." Nationwide elections will
be held once the constitution is accepted. Local elections,
repeatedly delayed, are possible at the end of 1991. If honestly run,
local elections could be an important means of removing many of
the local hold-overs from Ceaucescu's regime who currently are
resisting the reform process.
Freedom of Religion or Belief. Currently, there are no bars to
the free exercise of religious belief and expression in Romania.
Religious materials are imported into the country without
restriction; religious education is now offered on a limited basis in
public schools; and religious training institutes operate unhindered.
A draft law stating in its first article that "the freedom of
thought, conscience, faith, and religion are basic human rights," to
be respected by the state, is being prepared by the government and
representatives of all of the recognized religious denominations in
Romania for submission to Parliament. This draft law, if approved
in its present form, would formally ensure religious freedoms,
although it would grant a large role to the state in the organization
and administration of religious denominations. Critics of the draft
proposal are uneasy with such provisions. They also are concerned
about restrictions based on state security and "public morals." The
problem of the Uniate Church (also known as the Greek Catholic
Church) remains unresolved. This denomination was suppressed in
1948, with all the properties in its more than 1,800 parishes
passing to the Orthodox Church and all its cathedrals, deaneries,
monasteries, and other properties being seized by the state. (All
the cathedrals and other churches in the latter category were
subsequently transferred to the orthodox patriarchate). The decree
abolishing the Uniate Church was revoked immediately after the
revolution in December 1989, and the government decreed in April
1990, that it would restore all the properties it still retains.
Except for the residence of the Metropolitan and part of the former
theological institute in Blaj, however, no state property had been
returned by the end of the reporting period.
Freedom of Expression. Freedom of expression has increased
substantially in Romania since December 1989. Many Romanian
citizens feel able to receive and impart information without
interference from public authorities. But, as in many other fields
of human rights observance in Romania, significant exceptions
remain to this freedom. A large segment of the population believes
that its correspondence and telephone communications are
interfered with. The draft law on the Romanian Intelligence Service
would inter alia authorize the Service, under conditions permitted
by law, to have and use technical equipment to gather or check
information affecting national security, a concept which is
undefined.
An even larger segment of the population believes that
Romanian television, which is the largest mass media outlet in the
country, slants its news coverage to favor the government.
Examples include discriminatory coverage of certain events such as
the Proclamation of Timisoara (March 11, 1990) and the events of
June 13-15 in Bucharest. The government refuses to allow national
independent broadcasting, although limited independent regional
broadcasting is allowed. Romanians are not prohibited from
watching or listening to foreign television and radio broadcasting.
The opposition press continues to report that the government
restricts the amount of newsprint available for newspapers,
inhibits the distribution of opposition publications in the
countryside, and interferes administratively with independent
publications. Price increases for newsprint also have been
interpreted as government efforts to restrict the opposition press.
The government has a monopoly on printing works and controls the
use of printing presses. Distribution is centrally controlled. In
addition, a number of independent publications and journalists have
been physically attacked during the reporting period. For example,
several Romanian and foreign journalists were beaten by police in
Bucharest on three separate occasions in January 1991, and offices
of independent publications have been ransacked.
A recent government proposal on sanctions against the
violations of freedom of the press would have restricted free
expression by making defamations of any public authority liable to
criminal prosecution. This draft law, delivered by the government
to Parliament in February 1991, met a hail of domestic and
international criticism and was withdrawn in March. Another law,
passed by Parliament in February 1991, sanctions with possible
loss of citizenship Romanians who "commit seriously grave acts
which harm the interests or undermine the prestige of the Romanian
state" while traveling or living abroad. The vague wording of this
law seemed designed to intimidate Romanian citizens, as it could be
interpreted to allow the withdrawal of citizenship if a Romanian
were critical of the government while abroad.
Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly. The
government recognizes the rights of citizens freely to associate
and to form political parties, non-governmental organizations,
trade unions, and human rights monitoring organizations. Except for
the crackdown on demonstrators in mid-June, the right to peaceful
assembly was respected, although in several instances,
demonstrations that had gone on for some time were dispersed by
police using force.
A decree of December 31, 1989, permits the formation of all
types of political parties except those that are fascist or that
"spread conceptions contrary to the state order and law of
Romania." Despite these rather ambiguous exceptions, there appear
to be no political organizations that were denied the right to form a
party. The decree stipulates that all political parties and social
organizations must provide a list of at least 251 members in order
to be granted juridical status. It further provides that any political
party denied registration rights may appeal to the Supreme Court.
As of March 21, 1991, there were 121 legally recognized political
parties in Romania.
According to the decrees of January 3 and January 24, 1990,
mayors and local police authorities must be notified at least 48
hours in advance of any assemblies. Assemblies may not interfere
with other economic or social activities; are limited to holidays or
non-working hours; and may not be held near various types of
institutions such as hospitals, airports, or military installations.
In some instances, the mayor of Bucharest denied organizations the
right to hold assemblies, although he is not empowered by law to do
so. Nonetheless, a number of demonstrations were held without
authorization in Bucharest and other cities. The government did not
prosecute organizers and participants in these demonstrations,
although the law provides for short jail terms or fines for failure
to register.
On June 13, the government forcibly broke up a 7-week-old
demonstration in Bucharest's University Square. To protest what
they felt was the continued presence of communist officials and
structures in the government, demonstrators had gathered daily at
an encampment of opponents of the government blocking one of the
city's major thoroughfares. Following police action on June 13
against the demonstrators, violence erupted, with demonstrators
attacking police stations and television headquarters. Six persons
were killed and over 100 injured. President-elect Ion Iliescu
appealed on radio and television for citizens to defend the
government. In response to the appeal, thousands of coal miners and
others rampaged through the streets of Bucharest on June 14-15. In
some cases, the miners were provided with lists and addresses of
opposition members and directed to various buildings or individuals.
They attacked many people in the streets who appeared to be
government opponents. Altogether, some 500 persons were injured,
about 1,000 were initially taken into custody by miners or police,
and 191 were arrested. Among those arrested were Marian
Munteanu, President of the Students' League, and Leon Nica,
President of the Free Democratic Party. Both had made anti-
government speeches at University Square. After almost 2 months
of detention without charges, they were released pending trial. Six
persons (miners and others) were arrested later for their part in
the June 14-15 incident. Vigilante groups, guided by persons
believed to be current or former intelligence officers, ransacked
the offices of the independent Romania Libera and two opposition
newspapers during the June 13-15 disturbances and threatened
their editors. Within a few days, the newspapers were able to
resume publication, but no one was charged with any offense other
than theft.
The "mid-June events" were the subject of a parliamentary
investigation and report. Unable to reach consensus, in January
1991, the Parliament produced two separate reports on the events.
The majority report absolved President Iliescu and the government
of any wrongdoing, but the minority report, written by opposition
party representatives, fixed most of the responsibility for the
violent affair on the president. The minority representatives also
complained that the Romanian Government bodies responsible for
providing information had been uncooperative during the
investigation.
The former Securitate's role in the June beatings is but one
example of a fundamental issue of distrust and uncertainty about
the role of the Securitate. The organization was officially
disbanded shortly after the revolution and its files taken over by
the Ministry of Defense. A successor organization, the Romanian
Intelligence Service (SRI) was created on March 26, 1990, and
composed largely of former Securitate personnel. Despite official
claims that the SRI engages only in legal surveillance and counter-
espionage activities and is under parliamentary control, a broad
sector of Romanian society and many observers continue to believe
that it retained or rehired individuals that participated in
repressive activities under the communist regime and that former
Securitate agents continue to harass and threaten opponents of the
government. These allegations are difficult to prove, but official
reluctance to confront openly the issue, and a campaign of
threatening letters and telephone calls to opposition figures, as
well as isolated beatings, does little to allay a general sense of
unease and fear.
Romanian workers are free to organize trade unions, to
affiliate these unions into federations or confederations, and to
affiliate internationally. There are now hundreds of trade union
locals in Romania, as well as at least five national confederations.
One of the labor confederations, Fratia, is preparing to apply for
membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU), and a number of its members have already been accepted as
members of international trade secretariats. During the reporting
period, some independent unions were alleged to be under
surveillance, had their documents or correspondence interfered
with, or received threatening calls. The Romanian Government
currently is the subject of a violation of freedom of association
complaint filed with the International Labor Organization (ILO) by
the International Union of Food and Allied Workers' Associations on
behalf of one of its affiliates, the Free Independent Trade Union of
the Inter-Continental Hotel in Bucharest. The union alleges that the
management of the government-owned hotel has been engaging in
union-busting techniques by pressuring or transferring its members
and by creating an alternative, management-sponsored union. In
response to the complaint, the Romanian Ministry of Labor
interceded to mediate the return to her former position of one of
the union's leaders who had been transferred to another hotel. The
Romanian Government will make a formal response to the ILO's
Freedom of Association Committee, which was expected to take up
the complaint at its May meeting.
Freedom of Movement. The right of Romanian citizens to travel
abroad or to emigrate is no longer restricted. In 1990 the
government issued 3.6 million tourist passports, more than four
times the number issued in 1989. During the same period, it issued
129,714 emigrant passports. While there are occasional delays and
roadblocks for what appear to be arbitrary reasons, Romanian
citizens who wish to obtain a passport and depart the country,
generally, are able to do so within a reasonable period of time.
Romania continues to distinguish between travelers and
emigrants. Passports for the latter are issued only after evidence
is presented that all debts are paid, paperwork regarding
terminated employment and release of housing is submitted, and
customs clearance obtained for any items that will accompany the
traveler. The government abolished, however, the requirement that
Romanians repay the state for costs of their state subsidized higher
education before emigrating.
All who lost Romanian citizenship may apply to regain it. In
principle, all former Romanian citizens seeking to return are
entitled to do so. Romanian citizens who emigrate must obtain the
approval of the government before resuming residence in Romania.
This approval was not withheld during the reporting period.
In April 1990 Romania's ex-King Michael, who was forced by
the communists to abdicate in 1947 and who now resides in
Switzerland, was denied permission to enter the country. On
December 25, he entered Romania on a Danish diplomatic passport
but was expelled about 12 hours later, ostensibly for lack of a
proper visa.
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest or Punishment. In marked
contrast to the Ceaucescu era, Romanians now feel free from
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. An important exception was
the June events, during which many of the more than 1,000 persons
who were taken into custody were apprehended by vigilante miners
and other non-official forces. There were credible reports that
some of those detained in June were beaten and denied medical
treatment while in custody. There also were reports that female
arrestees were forced partially to disrobe in front of male jailers
and other prisoners, and there was one report of rape by the pro-
government vigilantes.
Prison conditions remain poor by Western standards. The
overcrowding, poor diet and medical care, and insufficient staff are
largely consequences of Romania's depressed economy and the low
priority accorded these institutions in the allocation of government
resources. Attitudes of wardens toward prisoners continue in many
cases to evince hostility and brutality.
During the reporting period, the government took some steps to
eradicate torture and other degrading punishments. International
and domestic human rights organizations were granted the right to
visit detainees and question them about abuses. In September, the
Parliament ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In October, a
law was passed transferring the administration of prisons from the
Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Justice; this transfer was
effected on January 15, 1991. In January 1991, Romania ratified
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty.
At the beginning of the reporting period, Romanian law
provided for either a judge or a prosecutor to issue an arrest
warrant. Warrants could be issued at any time up to 24 hours after
a person was detained. Once arrested, a person could be held
without trial for up to 1 month before a hearing, but the prosecutor
could obtain an extension for an additional 3 months. Thereafter, a
court could order further extensions in 30-day increments. There
was no legal limit on the time a person could be held before trial,
nor was there any provision for bail. The government either
implemented or proposed a number of changes to the criminal code,
which include the right to inform family or friends of one's arrest
within 24 hours; the right to legal counsel after arrest; limitation
on the detention period prior to a hearing; the right to protest an
arrest to a court within 24 hours and to receive the court's ruling
within an additional 24 hours; the right to bail, except for
recidivists and in the case of capital crimes; and the right to be
informed of these rights by the arresting authorities. Anticipating
formal adoption of these reforms, the Prosecutor General's office
began to implement some of them, e.g., granting prisoners access to
attorneys before the minimal investigation is complete.
Fundamental Freedoms
On May 20, 1990, more than 80 political parties and
organizations contested the first multi-party pluralistic elections
since 1946. NSF candidates--many of whom were former members
of the Romanian Communist Party, which disappeared as an
organization in 1989--won about two-thirds of the seats in
Parliament. Seventeen other parties elected representatives and
senators. The NSF's presidential candidate, Ion Iliescu, won 86% of
the vote. New national elections are to be called by the President
not later than one year after the ratification of the new
constitution.
The opposition and the US Government sharply criticized the
NSF for unfair election campaign practices, including using
government resources, interfering with opposition rallies and
meetings, impeding the distribution of opposition newspapers and
literature, threatening and harassing opposition candidates, and
unfairly dominating television. Election day activity was monitored
by several hundred international observers, who concluded that the
voting was essentially free and fair, although this was not true of
the campaign.
Minority Rights. The Hungarian minority in Romania totals
about 2 million. They are concentrated in Transylvania, in central
and northwestern Romania, but more than 200,000 ethnic
Hungarians also live in Bucharest. The bases for many of the
Hungarian claims of government discrimination were removed in
1990, including restrictions on language use and on the ability to
organize politically and travel freely. Hungarians formed a political
grouping, the Democratic Union of Magyars of Romania (UDMR),
which won 41 seats in the May elections, making it the largest
party in Parliament after the ruling NSF. However, the legal basis
of the party may be in jeopardy: the draft theses of the new
constitution being debated include language that would prohibit
political parties "founded exclusively on ethnic, religious or
language criteria" which, if enacted, could jeopardize the legal
basis of the UDMR.
Disputes between Hungarians and Romanians continue to
simmer and have occasionally flared up into acts of violence. There
were instances of intimidation of Hungarian students and teachers,
for example, in Bucharest's High School 33, and numerous
allegations of the forced eviction of Romanians from their homes
and places of work in Transylvania. There also were allegations of
murders of Romanians by Hungarians in the counties of Covasna and
Harghita and evidence of an anonymous hate campaign of threatening
letters and phone calls directed against Hungarians. In November, a
special joint parliamentary committee was established to
investigate the alleged murders and forced evictions of Romanians.
A report is expected in the summer of 1991.
The problems between the Romanian and Hungarian
communities are in part, exacerbated by the activities of Vatra
Romaneasca (Romanian Hearth), a chauvinistic, anti-Hungarian
organization. There also has been an increase in chauvinistic
newspapers like Romania Mare, edited by two of Ceaucescu's
propagandists. The government has, thus far, been slow to condemn
forcefully what, by all appearances, is a rising level of exclusionary
nationalism. Local elements of Vatra Romaneasca are widely
believed to have been the leading instigators of the Tirgu Mures
violence in March, in which five persons were killed and more than
300 were injured from both ethnic communities. But legal charges
stemming from the violence targeted predominantly ethnic
Hungarians and Gypsies. After the Tirgu Mures violence, ethnic
Hungarian leaders alleged that the government conspired with
ultra-nationalist Romanian organizations, such as Vatra
Romaneasca, against the interests of the Hungarian minority.
Societal prejudices fueled by historical ethnic animosities persist.
There appear to have been recent criminal prosecutions that
predominately targeted Hungarians. All but one of those prosecuted
for participating in the Tirgu Mures violence are Hungarians or
Gypsies who speak Hungarian as their native language. In addition,
in October three Hungarian youths were sentenced to 2-1/2 years in
prison for attempting to deface a monument to a Romanian national
hero in Tirgu Mures.
Besides Hungarians, there are more than 10 other ethnic
minorities in Romania. Education is available in some of the
minority languages. Hungarians have pushed for the restoration of
the Hungarian Bolyai University, in Cluj, but the government has
resisted. Education in the Hungarian language is available through
the secondary level and in some areas of study at the university
level.
Many minorities have established political organizations, and
the government has set aside seats in the Chamber of Deputies for
those minorities (nine) that did not gain seats on the basis of either
individual candidacies or party lists.
Gypsies, whose estimated population ranges from 220,000 to
perhaps as many as 2 million, continue to suffer discrimination.
Public opinion about Gypsies is nearly universally negative. They
are cited in newspapers as generic "suspects" in the rising
incidence of crime and black marketeering. During the June events,
Gypsy neighborhoods in Bucharest were singled out by vigilantes;
many Gypsy homes were ransacked and looted, and several persons
were beaten.
Latent anti-Semitism rose to the surface in 1990 as evidenced
by the publication of the "Protocols of Zion" and by the appearance
of anti-Semitic articles in the newspaper, Romania Mare, and other
extreme nationalist journals. No incidents of anti-Semitic violence
were reported, and several prominent government figures, including
the prime minister and the president, have spoken out against anti-
Semitism. In January, the Parliament organized a 50th anniversary
commemoration of the victims of the pogrom in Bucharest.
Human Contacts. Departure formalities for family
reunification purposes are not expedited, but are generally are
accomplished within the required 90 days. Bi-national marriages
are handled expeditiously. Applications for travel abroad are
handled without discrimination. Applications for emergency
medical or other reasons are treated rapidly, though not always
within a 3-day period.
Sixteen months after the 1989 Romanian revolution and 11
months after Romania's first free elections, the media situation
remains volatile and politically contentious. Parliament has yet to
pass legislation governing newspapers, radio, and television. A
press law that set heavy fines and penalties for journalists who
criticized the president or government institutions was submitted
to the Parliament by the Prime Minister and then withdrawn when it
was attacked as oppressive by independent journalists. A draft law
to regulate broadcasting--and to authorize some form of
independent radio and television--has been introduced, but its
passage is uncertain.
Meanwhile, about 1,300 newspapers and magazines are now
published--about 10 times the pre-revolution number--and they are
ostensibly free of censorship. However, independent publications
confront enormous handicaps, particularly, in logistic matters--
supplies of newsprint, time on government presses, distribution
systems--which are still largely under government control and
which indirectly limit their freedom.
Though a few independent broadcasters have managed to get on
the air, their status is precarious, their impact limited, and their
future uncertain. Romanian state radio and television networks,
technically independent, still dominate the airwaves and are widely
regarded as instruments of the government. Television remains a
battleground, with internal struggles between unions and
management and external pressures from government and opposition
forces.
Opposition voices have severely limited opportunities to be
heard on state radio and television. Domestic news reporting is
often slanted and erratic. An RTV initiative in October 1990 gave
opposition political parties 90 minutes of television time a week
and the government the same amount, in the same time slot, on
alternating nights. But in February 1991, RTV halted the practice,
citing a need to reduce overall air time due to budget difficulties.
Time for broadcasting in Hungarian and German, also was reduced
dramatically. Only a few independent regional television stations
function in Romania. Among them is Oradea TV, based in the
northwestern city of the same name, which operates on a makeshift
basis using time on RTV transmitters when RTV is off the air, i.e.,
after midnight. It was ordered closed in early April 1991,
ostensibly for technical reasons, after airing a program linking two
local members of Parliament to the old Securitate; it won
reinstatement at the end of the month.
A few low-wattage FM radio stations received approval to
broadcast shortly after the revolution and remain on the air in
Bucharest. They broadcast mostly music and are barred from
broadcasting partisan political material. Two of these stations
have affiliations with foreign broadcasters (French and Belgian),
and one is considering an arrangement with Voice of America (VOA)
Europe. No new independent, private radio stations of any
importance have gone on the air in recent months, though more than
100 applications are pending; among them are student groups in
three provincial cities that received US-donated studio equipment
in 1990 but still lack transmitters as well as broadcast licenses.
In publishing, government officials and printing plant
managers remain mostly hostile to independent publishers. Yet, a
surprising number of independent dailies and weeklies continue to
survive, if not thrive. A few independent publishing houses have
started, offering alternatives to the overworked, antiquated
government presses. In Brasov, a newspaper consortium appears on
the verge of setting up its own press. The largest national
independent daily, Romania Libera, has expanded to eight pages daily
and uses computers to help improve its print quality.
The government news agency, Rompres, still has a de facto
monopoly on distribution of foreign news, though the AZR and SOTI
hope to try to start their own wire service for independent
publications sometime in 1991. The demand for foreign
newspapers, magazines, and books is great, growing, and mostly
unmet. Foreign publications are still not generally available,
although there are no official restrictions on them. The general
lack of hard currency, both on the part of organizations and
individuals, is the principal barrier. The extreme shortage of
technical and professional journals inhibits economic, social, and
political progress.
The flow of donated books from abroad continues, and the
Romanian government remains receptive and grateful for this
support. The domestic publishing industry is hard-pressed to meet
the need for school books and supplies. It will probably be years
before the Romanian government is able to print or import enough
books to meet the mushrooming demand.
There also is a strong demand for American and other foreign
films, especially on television. Again, the lack of hard currency has
made it difficult for would-be Romanian distributors to obtain
recent movies and television series. Romanian radio's programing
is still almost entirely locally produced, but it, too, is seeking
program input from the VOA and other sources. VOA, Radio Free
Europe, and other foreign radio stations are heard in Romania
without hindrance, and are still popular. About one-third of the
population say they listen to foreign radio stations, while 95% say
they listen to Romanian radio.
Romania's attitude toward the foreign press is ambivalent.
Officially, the government is open and hospitable to foreign
journalists. Visas are readily obtainable, and there is an
established procedure for press credentials. Reporters,
photographers, and TV crews appear to have reasonable access to
government officials and institutions. There is a foreign press
club, with a clubhouse, and the government and Foreign Ministry
spokesmen hold frequent briefings for Romanian and foreign
journalists. In practice, however, reporting from Romania is still a
difficult and sometimes dangerous job. External communications
are terrible, and internal communications are not much better.
Office space is scarce and expensive. Only Associated Press,
Reuters, and Agence France Presse have established permanent
bureaus in Romania. Reporters and photographers have been beaten,
some seriously, while covering demonstrations. For example, in
mid-January 1991, several Romanian and foreign photographers
were roughed up by police while covering protests in University
Square. The government, subsequently, apologized and
acknowledged its responsibility to protect journalists and allow
them to do their work. But there was no adequate guarantee against
a repetition, and the intimidating effect of the incident was clear.
Cultural Exchanges. There is widespread interest in Romania
in widening and deepening contacts with Western countries,
including the United States. That the desired expansion of
intellectual interchange is slow is due not to official policy but
mostly to economic and other practical considerations. These
include the lack of convertible currency for royalties, foreign
publications, films, videotapes, and media equipment.
Direct cultural contacts between Americans and Romanians are
growing, as they are between Romanians and other Europeans.
American conductors and soloists have performed in Bucharest and
Romanian musicians in American cities. American exhibits
circulate freely in Romanian cities. American and French films are
popular, both in cinemas and on television, but costs again limit
availability mostly to older features. In November, the Ministry of
Culture took the Romanian sculpture exhibit of Brancusi's works to
the United States for the first time, where it attracted many
Americans.
The American cultural center in Bucharest is more popular
than ever, attracting an average of more than 1,000 library patrons
a day. Access is now apparently unimpeded, in contrast to the pre-
revolution days when it was politically dangerous to frequent the
American facility. A January 1991, book exhibit through which
Romanians could buy with local currency books for studying English,
attracted eager, overflow crowds, a testament to the pent-up
demand. Other cultural events at the center are similarly well
attended. Presentation by the United States of large numbers of
books donated by private citizens--more than 150,000 by early
1991--was warmly received and favorably noted by government
officials and in the media.
Educational Exchanges. The US-Romanian Fulbright Exchange
Program is flourishing. The framework bilateral agreement is broad
enough to encompass branching out into new areas, including law,
journalism, and economics, which were previously off limits to
Americans in Romania. In addition, new programs such as the
Marshall, Hamilton, and Eisenhower Fellowships have been added. In
1990-91, 15 American Fulbright grantees are working in five
Romanian cities, and 26 Romanians (10 lecturers and 16
researchers) are in the United States. Other academic exchanges,
both government and private, are beginning to develop and are
allowed to proceed freely. Romanians are eager for increased
contact with American universities and scholars. Funding will,
again, be something of a brake, but Romanians have so far been
ready to pay a reasonable share of the costs of these exchanges.
USSR
Human Rights
The reporting period saw some of the improvements in Soviet
human rights practices of the last few years slow down and, in
some cases, reverse. Nonetheless, the human rights situation in the
Soviet Union has not returned to the pre-Gorbachev years: recent
gains remain, both on the books and in the streets. The current
human rights picture is characterized by incongruity, with some
earlier problems appearing alongside the newly permitted exercise
of political freedoms and individual rights that were all but
unthinkable in the past.
The right of the individual to know and act upon his/her rights
has improved through glasnost but remains, on the whole, weakly
exercised. CSCE materials are made available but not always
readily. For example, 100,000 copies of the Vienna Concluding
Document have been published in the USSR, and in 1990, the Charter
of Paris, signed by CSCE heads of state in November, was published
in the government newspaper Izvestiya, which has a large,
nationwide circulation. Generally, however, copies of the various
CSCE documents are difficult to obtain, especially in one's native
language. The document of the June 1990 Copenhagen CSCE Meeting
of the Conference on the Human Dimension reportedly has been
published, but with a print-run of only 1,000.
There are shortcomings in the availability of effective
executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative remedies for
addressing human rights violations. Though significant strides have
been taken in recent years, much work remains to be done before a
state based on the rule of law is fully established. Executive bodies
theoretically charged with providing remedies against human rights
violations, i.e., the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the USSR
and republic Procuracies, with some exceptions, have not been
sufficiently reformed. Likewise, the Committee on State Security
(KGB) and the military are also remain predominantly in the hands
of "old thinkers." In theory, one exception to this rule is the
Committee on Questions of Citizenship of the Office of the USSR
Presidency (formerly of the USSR Supreme Soviet) which reviews
cases of individual citizens who have been denied the right to leave
the country by the state. This committee, however, is not widely
known and Soviet officials have not revealed its membership.
Access to it is, in practice, restricted, but Soviet officials have
indicated that it is open to approaches by Soviet citizens.
Though legislative remedies for addressing some human rights
issues increased in this reporting period, in practice, they remained
of limited effectiveness. The Russian Republic Supreme Soviet
created a human rights committee which considers individual cases.
The USSR Supreme Soviet's CSCE Commission continued to function,
most notably producing a study of conditions in Soviet prisons and
labor camps. The power of the legislative branch to provide
effective remedies to individual victims of human rights abuse
remained limited by the executive branch's dominance. The
judiciary still is not effectively independent, though some judicial
reform took place in the reporting period. With few exceptions,
individuals could not turn to the courts to seek redress against
human rights violations. Similarly, administrative remedies
generally are unavailable.
On the positive side, the Soviet government generally
respected the right of citizens to contribute individually or in
association with others to promote and protect human rights.
Soviet human rights groups continued to function freely for the
most part. For the first time, an international human rights group
legally set up shop in the Soviet Union when in the fall of 1990 the
US-based Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry, in conjunction with a
Soviet human rights organization, established a legally registered
organization in Moscow. Other Soviet human rights groups
functioned openly and freely, participating in major international
human rights conferences in Moscow in June 1990, and in Leningrad
in September 1990. At those conferences, Soviet and foreign human
rights activists were most outspoken regarding the shortcomings in
Soviet human rights practices. The right of individuals and human
rights groups to communicate with international bodies information
concerning allegations of human rights abuse is unrestricted.
The legal system has not developed to the extent that legal
counsel is available to the average Soviet citizen with a human
rights complaint. Though the legal right of an individual to seek and
receive such help exists, the actual ability of an individual to find
effective help is limited.
Several months of backtracking on political reform and
reversion to threats of physical force as a means of addressing
political problems culminated in violence in the Baltic states in
January 1991. The most egregious instances of this regression took
place in Lithuania and Latvia, where the use of troops backed by
armor--ostensibly to enforce USSR laws--resulted in at least 14
dead and many more injured in Lithuania, and at least five dead and
numerous injured in Latvia. Azerbaijan was under a declared state
of emergency enforced by Soviet troops for most of 1990; over 100
civilians were killed in January 1990 following the introduction of
troops. Conflict between Armenians and Azeris flared again in May
1991. Armenians accused Soviet authorities of aiding Azeri efforts
to force Armenians out of disputed areas of Azerbaijan.
Freedom of Religion or Belief. Soviet authorities continued to
display a more tolerant attitude toward religion. The visibility of
religion in public life has greatly expanded: religious services
continue to be televised, particularly during the Christmas and
Easter holiday seasons. Articles in the press expressing believers'
attitudes on public issues, propagating the faith, and bemoaning the
loss of Christian moral values in Soviet society continue to appear
in the official press. The USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a law
guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religion in 1990. The law
gives religious organizations (those that register with the
government) access to the media, grants them the right to establish
their own schools, own property, and engage in social work, and
facilitates the registration of new religious groups. The RSFSR
version of the same law, also adopted in 1990, was even more
beneficial to believers. Most other republics, however, have not
adopted laws guaranteeing these freedoms and still enforce pre-
1990 restrictions on religious belief. Remaining restrictions on
religious freedom include:
-- Numbers of clergymen and places of worship (often on a
local level);
-- The right of local authorities to refuse to register
congregations and to deny them adequate premises (a particularly
severe problem in Ukraine with regards to the Autocephalous
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (AUOC) and Pentacostalists); and
-- Extensive KGB influence over official religious activities.
Although the customs administration officially lifted
numerical limits on the importation of Bibles and other religious
literature over 2 years ago, implementation of the new rules
continues to be erratic. Availability of religious literature, some
of it now being printed in the USSR itself, has greatly increased in
the past year, particularly with regard to children's literature.
Individuals continue to be able to receive legally religious
literature through the mail and many have received small packages
of such literature.
The authorities continued to allow a number of unofficial
religious groups to hold seminars and conferences with minimal
interference, sometimes in public halls rented for that purpose.
Exceptions to this included groups of Pentacostalists and AUOC
believers in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Catholic congregations are free to register in
Ukraine. There are reports that in some areas of western Ukraine
where non-communist political leaders who are sympathetic to the
Ukrainian Catholics have come to power, all churches have been
given to the Ukrainian Catholics, with Orthodox believers in the
area left with no place to worship. Orthodox believers have staged
hunger strikes and protests, reportedly to no avail.
During 1990, the AUOC, which was totally stamped out by
Stalin in the early 1930s, reconstituted itself under the leadership
of Patriarch Mstislav, who resides in the United States. His
November 1990 "enthronement" in Kiev was seen as a watershed by
many AUOC believers. However, Ukrainian authorities have
reportedly refused him permission to return to Kiev permanently.
The AUOC has had great difficulty in registering congregations,
although the enactment on March 22, 1991, of a law on freedom of
religion by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet may improve the situation.
The AUOC has not been formally granted legal status as a religious
organization and AUOC parishes are still required to register with
Ukrainian authorities as social organizations.
Anti-Semitism notwithstanding, Soviet Jews continued to
experience widespread freedom in the practice and teaching of their
religion in this reporting period. Additional yeshivas opened in
Moscow. The teaching of Hebrew spread in Jewish communities
throughout the Soviet Union. Hebrew schools for children were
established, and Synagogues were returned to the Jewish
community. Soviet Jews established and maintained close contact
and cooperation with foreign Jewish religious groups, which
themselves were able to establish offices in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet authorities continued to allow Soviet Muslims more
freedom to practice and learn about Islam. An Islamic revival is
now taking place in Azerbaijan and central Asia. For example, the
latest session of the Azeri Supreme Soviet was opened with a
religious invocation by a mullah. This revival, however, sometimes
had an anti-regime tone which, when combined with nationalism,
prompted Muslims in central Asia to take to the streets. More
mosques were given back to believers and Korans in Russian became
readily available, even in Moscow. More Muslims were able to visit
Mecca than in the past.
Official harassment of Hare Krishna remained low during the
reporting period, and their visibility increased. For example, they
participated in the February 24 Moscow demonstration in support of
RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Boris Yeltsin. US authorities know
of no Hare Krishna in prison or labor camp at this time. Buddhism
also has been experiencing a revival in parts of the eastern USSR,
where houses of worship, monasteries, and Buddhist schools have
been opened. The Baha'i also are beginning to revive their sect, and
a Mormon congregation has been formed in Moscow.
Young men who object to military duty because of their faith
continued to be sentenced to prison terms. Alternatives to military
service for conscientious objectors are being discussed for
inclusion in a draft military bill.
Freedom of Expression. A new law making it a crime to "insult
the honor and dignity of the Soviet President" was passed in 1990.
A number of people were convicted of this offense. In one case, the
individual was sentenced to 1 year in prison. Uzbekistan adopted a
law making insulting the Uzbek president a crime punishable by 6
years in prison or 2 years of "correctional labor." Another
individual received a 3-year prison term for defacing a Lenin
monument. Valeriya Novodvorskaya, leader of the Democratic Union
Party, received a 2-year sentence of "correctional labor" for
insulting the Soviet flag by publicly burning it.
Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly. A new law on
public organizations, which provides formal legal recognition of a
multi-party system in the Soviet Union, took effect on January 1,
1991. The law notes that the right to form associations is an
inalienable right of all mankind and all citizens and guarantees
every Soviet citizen the right to form public organizations. The law
defines public organizations to include political parties and mass
movements, including national fronts, trade unions, veterans
organizations, and youth groups, among others. It requires that
public organizations register their statutes with the USSR Ministry
of Justice and states the grounds on which the Ministry may refuse
to register an organization.
The law requires that political parties must demonstrate that
they have at least 5,000 members and must provide the Justice
Ministry with the name, address, telephone number, and date of
birth of at least that many members. The right of organizations to
appeal a refusal by the Ministry of Justice to register the
organization also is defined. In addition, public organizations are
granted the right to disseminate information about their goals and
objectives and to found newspapers and mass media enterprises.
The USSR Minister of Justice has said that the leadership of those
organizations which refused to register would be subject to legal
sanctions, including criminal prosecution. As of mid-March, 22
public organizations and no all-union political parties had been
registered.
NGOs and human rights monitoring groups continued to be
permitted to exercise the right of association. Many of these
groups are openly critical of the Soviet Government. Groups
established, for example, to defend the rights of those repressed in
the past, improve the situation of the handicapped and invalids,
monitor the conditions in Soviet prisons and labor camps, gather
information on and report cases of political prisoners, and keep
track of individuals who are denied permission to exit the country
legally, pursued their goals actively and openly. Harassment of such
groups by the authorities was not unheard of but generally was
sporadic or connected with the breaking of laws such as the law
prohibiting the selling of newspapers without a license.
Unfortunately, the new registration law of organizations could
prove too costly or administratively burdensome for small
organizations.
The number of demonstrations, both authorized and
unauthorized, grew exponentially throughout the reporting period.
The July 1988 Supreme Soviet decree on "procedure for the
organization and conduct of meetings, rallies, street marches and
demonstrations in the USSR" has been declared unconstitutional by
the constitutional committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The
committee determined that the law contradicted the
constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of assembly by
granting local Soviet officials too much leeway in approving or
denying permission to demonstrate.
Freedom of Movement. Record numbers of Soviet citizens
traveled abroad during the reporting period, but the long-awaited
passage of the new Soviet emigration law intended to bring the
country into compliance with its CSCE commitments did not occur.
Travel abroad was still restricted by the requirement that
Soviet citizens have official permission to depart the USSR.
Persons seeking permission to emigrate are required to give up
their places of residence, employment, and eligibility for social
benefits. They also must submit an invitation from a close relative
abroad. (Soviet authorities, however, still refuse to accept
invitations from four defectors currently living in the United States
who have invited close relatives to either visit or emigrate).
During the reporting period, many US-bound emigrants who were
granted refugee status and offered sponsorship, ran afoul of this
requirement. The USSR showed some flexibility in this regard,
however, for a small number of Armenians from Azerbaijan and
Evangelical Christians.
Until October 1990, persons who had exit permission for a
temporary visit generally were allowed to depart unhindered for
permanent residence abroad. In October, however, Soviet border
authorities began to require that all such persons possess a foreign
entry visa corresponding to their exit permission.
Although many well-known refusenik cases were resolved
during the reporting period, the United States still maintains
lengthy lists of persons who have been waiting 10 years or more for
permission to emigrate. The current US government list of
refuseniks contains at least 150 names. This includes former
Soviet Army officer Vasily Barats who has been attempting to
emigrate since 1977. Physicist Moisey Iskin left his defense
industry job in 1979; his latest refusal was upheld by the
"Committee on Citizenship" in April 1990. Denials of exit
permission still occur because of access to state secrets and other,
often seemingly arbitrary, reasons. In addition, freedom of
movement is hampered by an often unresponsive bureaucracy that
may take many months to process an application for exit
permission. In addition, the bureaucratic requirements imposed by
local offices of the exit permit and passport issuing agency are
inconsistent from region to region.
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest or Punishment. The Soviet
Government has stated that all political prisoners were released
under a broad amnesty in late 1988. But it applies the term
primarily to those convicted under Article 70 of the Soviet criminal
code (anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation) or Article 190-1
(slandering the Soviet system) and excludes, for example, persons
convicted under Article 64 (treason).
No prisoners were known to be serving sentences solely under
the so-called political and religious articles of the Soviet criminal
code (Articles 70, 142, 227, and the now abolished 190-1) during
the reporting period. Since 1989 the US and Soviet Governments
have been engaged in a mechanism to review criminal cases with
possible political motivations. Of the 75 persons whose cases were
initially raised by the United States, many have been confirmed as
released from prison, some when their terms expired, and others
ahead of schedule. There are three confirmed cases of persons
remaining in prison for offenses that, in the US view, would not now
subject them to prosecution. Using various definitions of
"political" arrests, including conscientious objectors, military
deserters, and aircraft hijackers, reliable Soviet and Western
human rights groups carry on their lists more than 100 names of
political prisoners in the USSR.
Persons may still be detained arbitrarily and without arrest
warrants. The Soviet criminal code states that detainees must be
charged or released within 4 hours. Once charged, however, the
criminal code permits holding an accused in pre-trial detention for
up to 18 months, with no requirement for judicial approval or
preliminary judicial hearing on the charges and continued detention.
In several cases, persons were detained for lengthy periods without
being brought to trial. In criminal cases, detainees may be released
and restricted to their place of residence pending trial.
Ukrainian People's Deputy Stepan Khmara was detained in a
Kiev prison without trial from November 17, 1990 to April 5, 1991.
At the time of his release, it was not clear whether charges had
been dropped or whether he had simply been released pending trial.
He was re-arrested on April 12, after having spoken out on the
"political" nature of his arrest. Khmara, allegedly involved in the
beating of a militia colonel during a November 7 Revolution Day
counter-demonstration, was charged with abusing the authority of
his office under Article 166 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code. By a
vote of its majority (coinciding with the number of Communist
Party deputies), the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on November 14
deprived Khmara of his parliamentary immunity to allow for his
arrest. Leaders of the Ukrainian national movement "RUKH" and the
democratic opposition asserted that the prosecution had
inconclusive evidence of Khmara's complicity in the November 7
incident and pressed to have Khmara released prior to his trial.
They argued that the arrest was politically motivated. As of late
March 1991, no date had been set for a trial and no indictment read
against Khmara. His wife (only once), his priest, and his lawyer
have been allowed to visit Khmara in jail. A Western human rights
lawyer, working as a consultant on the case, was not allowed to see
him.
The Procuracy's dual role as investigative as well as
prosecuting arm of the legal system allows few protections for
defendants' rights. Legal reform advocates in the USSR have
recommended the separation of the investigative function from the
Procuracy, so far, to no avail. They cite reports of persons who
were seriously mistreated by militia and Procuracy investigators
seeking to obtain confessions. In addition, human rights activists
say it is standard for the police to pay criminals to beat dissidents
in prison.
Persons participating in anti-government demonstrations or
distributing anti-government printed materials were sometimes
detained briefly and fined. Demonstrators were charged with
"organizing an unsanctioned meeting" and usually detained from a
few hours to 15 days. In Sverdlovsk on December 3, 1990,
Democratic Union leader Valeriya Novodvorskaya and other
organizers were detained and fined for attempting to hold an
unsanctioned rally and for insulting the honor and dignity of the
Soviet President. Novodvorskaya was later declared not guilty of
the same charge but found guilty of insulting the dignity of the
USSR flag by burning it. Distributors of unofficial literature were
charged with "trading in an unauthorized area" and usually fined up
to 100 rubles, more than one-third of the average monthly wage.
There were no reports of persons being punished by being sent
into internal exile during the reporting period. Human rights
sources claim, however, that there are still people in internal exile.
The laws providing for internal exile are still on the books.
There were no reports of torture during the reporting period.
However, many prisoners suffered from mental and physical abuse
and mistreatment during interrogation, trial, and confinement,
according to a wide variety of reliable sources. Prisoners are
frequently placed in punishment cells for violations of camp rules,
sometimes for periods of several months. Conditions in punishment
cells are excessively punitive, and no administrative process exists
to ensure that prisoners are not arbitrarily and inappropriately sent
to such cells.
Under Article 188 of the Soviet Criminal Code, prisoners may
receive an additional 3- to 5-year sentence for "malicious
disobedience" in labor camps. Whereas in the past Article 188 was
used to extend the sentence of prisoners who had nearly completed
their sentences, no such reports were heard during the reporting
period.
Law enforcement personnel frequently use excessive force in
dispersing demonstrations and have beaten political activists. For
example, Democratic Union and "Memorial" activists were
reportedly beaten by Interior Ministry troops at a May Day
demonstration in Chernovtsy. In early December, Democratic Union
activists were beaten at a rally in Sverdlovsk. In most cases, the
victims were from groups openly declaring opposition to the
Communist Party or charging corruption in law enforcement organs.
There were no reports of law enforcement personnel being punished
for use of excessive force or of victims being able to seek redress.
No instances of new long-term hospitalizations of sane
persons were reported during the reporting period. Nonetheless,
many high-level psychiatric officials associated with past abuses
remain in influential positions. The Supreme Soviet published a
new draft law on psychiatry that includes provisions for
disciplining doctors who confine healthy people to psychiatric
institutions and for appealing cases of involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization to the courts. Current law, however, still provides
the basis for compulsory psychiatric hospitalization without
adequate legal protection of persons arrested under questionable
circumstances and then diagnosed as mentally ill. In December,
local officials in Nikolayev reportedly threatened Jewish refusenik
Dmitriy Berman with a psychiatric examination as part of a re-
investigation of charges that were previously dropped for lack of
evidence. There were numerous reports of the use of psychiatric
examinations and the threat of compulsory commitment as ways of
intimidating persons whose actions have irritated local officials.
For example, in July 1990 in Astrakhan, a member of the Christian
Democratic Union, Aleksandr Zykov, was sent to a psychiatric
hospital for declaring a hunger strike and protest on the town
square in front of the local Communist Party and government
headquarters against local authorities' harassment. And, according
to Moscow News No. 46, Kurbanberdy Karabalakov was put into a
psychiatric hospital for trying to set up a branch of "Democratic
Platform" in Turkestan.
Fundamental Freedoms
Free and Fair Elections. During the reporting period, the first
open, contested republic and local elections resulted in the election
of non-communist governments in several cities, regions, and
republics. Impartial observers generally have conceded that
elections such as those carried out in Georgia were conducted
fairly. Nevertheless, in some areas of the country, particularly in
some central Asian republics, the continued domination of the
electoral process by the Communist Party and its candidates calls
into question the fairness of elections.
In the USSR's largest republic, Russia, a pro-reform
government was established following republic and local level
elections in March 1990. The elections were the first freely
contested elections at that level in Soviet history. Universal adult
suffrage was observed, voting procedures were free, and results
were reported publicly and honestly. The formulation and
implementation of nomination procedures, however, allowed local
Communist Party leaders to stand for office with greater ease than
candidates seeking to oppose them. Nonetheless, many high-level
Communist Party officials were defeated, and large numbers of pro-
democracy candidates were elected. Liberals espousing
democratization of the USSR won a majority of seats in the Moscow
and Leningrad city soviets (local governing councils) and in a few
other areas. Also, one of the year's most noted events was the
election by Russian republic legislators of democratic opposition
leader Boris Yeltsin as Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.
Accountability of the Executive to the Elected Legislature or
Electorate. The USSR constitution provides that "the USSR Supreme
Soviet is the permanently operating legislative and monitoring
organ of state power in the USSR." Judging by the floor debate in
the Supreme Soviet, the legislators take their oversight function
seriously. However, the Supreme Soviet is hampered in its
oversight function by a number of institutional handicaps. Among
the most serious of these are a shortage of professional staff and
the lack of independent sources of information.
Other steps taken by the Supreme Soviet and the President
tend to blur the distinction between the elected legislature and the
executive branch. On September 24, 1990, the Supreme Soviet
passed a law granting the President the right, for the period to
March 1992, to promulgate laws of a normative character by means
of presidential decrees on matters concerning the economy and law-
and-order issues. Although the Supreme Soviet retains the right to
declare such laws unnecessary or to propose alternative legislation,
in practice, it has yet to do so. The USSR Constitutional Oversight
Committee, however, decided that it will be necessary to examine
the question of limiting the legislative powers granted to the
President under the September 24 law.
Similarly, the law on the KGB, which was passed in first
reading by the Supreme Soviet on March 5, grants the KGB the power
to issue and enforce normative acts concerning security-related
matters that are binding on government agencies and public
organizations alike.
Among the decrees President Gorbachev has issued under the
authority granted him by the Supreme Soviet is one establishing a
presidential committee to coordinate the work of law enforcement
agencies. At the end of the reporting period, the committee had not
been established.
Separation Between the State and Political Parties. One of
President Gorbachev's early and often stated goals in his campaign
of perestroika was the removal of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) from the day-to-day running of the Soviet
Government and economy. Constitutional changes approved by the
Third Congress of People's Deputies in March 1990 stripped the
CPSU of its constitutionally guaranteed role as the "leading and
guiding force of Soviet society." Furthermore, the law on public
organizations passed by the Supreme Soviet on October 9, 1990,
prohibits the interference by political parties in the activities of
government organs.
The fact remains, however, that members of the CPSU continue
to dominate the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme
Soviet, the government (including the procuracy and the law
enforcement and security organs), the courts, and the military. The
party's hold over government organs remains strong in many parts
of the country. Kaliningrad Oblast, where the same person heads
both the oblast party committee and the oblast soviet, is typical in
this respect.
Respect for the Law in the Activity of the Government.
President Gorbachev has made the transition to a "law-based"
society in the Soviet Union one of the pillars of his program of
perestroika. Recent legal reforms aimed at accomplishing this goal
have been unevenly implemented in the country as a whole, however,
due to the breakdown of executive authority and the so-called "war
of laws" being waged between the center and republic and local
governments and legislatures, and the dominance of the CPSU.
Moreover, the oversight activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet is
still in its formative stages and suffers from a number of
institutional handicaps. The Soviet judiciary is neither independent
enough nor powerful enough to ensure respect for the law in the
activity of the government.
Military Forces Subservient to Civil Authority. Although the
Soviet armed forces have a long history of loyalty and subservience
to civil, or at least CPSU, authority, recent events have raised
questions about this traditional relationship. The military as an
institution has been unhappy with a number of recent reforms,
particularly those that have had a negative impact on the quality of
military life. President Gorbachev faced a decidedly hostile
audience when he met with military people's deputies in mid-
November 1990.
It was the bloody clashes in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991,
however, that most seriously called into question the central
government's control over the military and security forces.
President Gorbachev has maintained that military units in Vilnius
acted without Moscow's approval when they stormed that city's TV
tower. The local military commander claimed that he acted at the
behest of the "Committee for National Salvation," commonly held to
be a front organization for the Moscow-oriented Communist Party
of Lithuania.
Recent events in the Baltics, particularly in Lithuania, suggest
that the CPSU as an institution continues to exert an inordinate--
and in some respects illegal--influence over the Soviet armed
forces. The USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee has ruled
that a number of military regulations requiring the armed forces to
carry out the policies of the CPSU no longer conform to Article 6 of
the USSR constitution, which has been revised to remove the
constitutionally guaranteed guiding role of the CPSU in Soviet life.
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Guaranteed by Law.
The USSR Supreme Soviet has been working to make its human
rights legislation conform with its international treaty obligations.
In 1990, the legislature passed laws guaranteeing freedom of the
press, freedom of conscience and religious organizations, and a law
on public organizations. The latter provides the legal basis for a
multi-party system in the Soviet Union. A law on trade unions,
passed in December, provides for the existence of trade unions as
independent organizations which are equal before the law with
official trade unions.
Publication and Full Accessibility to Legislation. Laws passed
by the USSR Supreme Soviet and republic-level Supreme Soviets are
published in the press. Many of the laws passed by the USSR
Supreme Soviet enter into force from the moment of their
publication. The USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee has
determined, however, that some 70% of legislation and other
government regulations affecting the rights, freedoms, and
obligations of Soviet citizens have never been published, because
the government treats them as classified information.
The Constitutional Oversight Committee instructed the
government to declassify and publish all of these laws and
regulations, declaring that any which were not published within the
3-month period set by the Committee would no longer be valid. The
3-month period expired March 1, with the government failing to
declassify and publish a single law or regulation. The
Constitutional Oversight Committee has no independent mechanism
to enforce its decisions; it is up to the USSR Supreme Soviet to see
that the committee's decisions are enforced. Some deputies have
complained, however, of the weakness of the Supreme Soviet's
oversight function.
Equal Protection Before the Law. Those rights guaranteed by
the Soviet constitution apply equally to all citizens. Nevertheless,
the great influence which the CPSU continues to exert over law
enforcement organs and the judiciary, together with the extensive
system of privileges which still exists for party members, serves
to undermine the concept of equal protection before the law.
Effective Redress Against Administrative Decisions. Recent
legislation passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet, such as the law on
public organizations, contains specific provisions guaranteeing
judicial review of administrative decisions. Legal experts have
acknowledged, however, that the general population remains largely
ignorant of its legal rights and that law enforcement agencies are
slow to dispense such information. Coupled with the scarcity of
legal assistance available to the general public, this has resulted in
a situation in which effective legal redress against administrative
decisions is simply not available for most people.
Impartial Judges. Communist Party officials still largely
control the nomination of judges, although this role gradually is
being assumed by soviets. Unofficial party influences on the
judiciary, such as the dispensation of privileges, also exist.
Consequently, the establishment of a truly independent judiciary
has progressed slowly.
Some steps were taken to promote the independence of the
judiciary. For example, the Ministry of Justice formally took
control of judges' promotions away from the CPSU apparatus, but
new mechanisms for installing key judicial leaders are not yet in
place. A law on liability for contempt of court is aimed at
deterring party officials from telephoning judges with instructions
on how to proceed in a case but has proven ineffective. It carries
sentences of up to 3 years for persons exerting improper pressure
on judges.
Independence of Legal Practitioners. The Communist Party's
control of society still extends to many areas of the legal and
judicial system. This works against the objectivity and
independence of the judicial process.
Clear Definition of Criminal Prosecution. Several decrees
issued by President Gorbachev, under the authority granted him by
the Supreme Soviet, concern criminal activities. Although these
decrees carry the force of law, they often lack clear and precise
definitions of the criminal activity against which they are directed.
In fact, the Deputy Chairman of the KGB complained at a press
conference that the lack of legal norms defining economic crime and
economic sabotage posed a serious obstacle to law enforcement
agencies attempting to enforce presidential decrees.
Right to Appear Before a Judge if Charged with an Offense.
The Criminal Code permits holding an accused in pre-trial detention
for up to 18 months, with no requirement for judicial approval or
preliminary judicial hearing on the charges and the continued
detention.
Right to a Fair and Public Hearing Before an Impartial and
Independent Legal Tribunal. Generally, except in cases asserted to
involve national security issues, trials are public. Defendants have
the right to attend the proceedings, confront witnesses, and present
evidence. The court appoints an attorney for defendants who do not
have one. Defense lawyers, like judges, are subject to a number of
state and party controls. For example, in prosecutions involving the
KGB, only those defense lawyers on a list kept by the local
government may be selected.
Defendants have a right to appeal, as does the prosecution.
Recent reports indicate a significant growth in the number of cases
appealed by defendants and in the percentage of cases overturned by
higher courts. In many cases that were not overturned on appeal,
sentences were reduced.
Right to Defend Oneself or to Obtain Legal Assistance. A new
law, signed by President Gorbachev in April 1990, allows defense
counsel to participate in a case from the moment a charge is
brought or a detention order is implemented. In the past, the
defense counsel had no access to the defendant until the trial began.
Access to the defendant during his detention or the Procuracy's pre-
trial investigation was prohibited. Soviet legal experts have noted,
however, that the new law is only slowly being implemented.
Another factor affecting the right to obtain legal assistance is
the relative scarcity of defense lawyers in the Soviet Union.
According to Soviet legal experts, most law faculty graduates find
it more lucrative and prestigious to go to work for various organs
of the Procuracy or for legal research institutes than to work as
practicing attorneys.
Presumption of Innocence Until Proven Guilty. Judges
generally accept the conclusions of the preliminary investigations
conducted by the Procuracy, and many presume that the accused is
guilty even before the trial begins. One 1989 study showed that
only 1% of all criminal cases resulted in acquittal. Recent
experience shows, however, that weak cases are increasingly
dropped during the investigative stage. The Procurator General of
Ukraine recently reported that 15% of cases were dropped during
the investigative stage, a 50% increase over past practice. A
Moscow court official said that, in recent years, several thousand
cases were sent back to the Procuracy for re-investigation, and 50%
of those were eventually dropped. In cases that are not dropped,
however, the defendant may continue indefinitely to face the
possibility of renewed prosecution.
Respecting the Right of Citizens to Seek Political or Public
Office, Without Discrimination. The law on public organizations
allows all political parties the right to field candidates in
elections and provides that no citizen shall have his right or
freedom to participate in political activities limited.
Respecting the Right of Individuals and Groups to Establish
Political Parties or Other Political Organizations. The law on
public organizations legalizes a multi-party system, expressly
allows the formation of political parties and mass social
movements, and guarantees these organizations the right to
propagate their views. The law declares all political parties equal
before the law, prohibiting only those organizations advocating
violent changes in the constitutional order or territorial integrity
of the Soviet Union.
Although the law declares all political parties equal, several
provisions reinforce the predominant position of the CPSU. This is
particularly true of articles that bar parties from receiving
financial or other support from abroad. New political parties in the
RSFSR and other republics continued to proliferate during the
reporting period. The difficulties of registering a new political
party; however, are such that no new all-union parties registered,
however some local parties did register in the republics.
Ensuring Unimpeded Access to the Media for All Political
Groupings. On April 12, 1990, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a
law on the press and mass media that abolished preliminary
censorship and established a new basis for government-media
relations. Nevertheless, the government continues to own and
control most broadcast and printing facilities and properties.
However, press freedom and access to the media faced a number of
challenges, including in areas where nationalist groups came to
power or where they constituted a vocal opposition. One of the
alleged reasons behind the attack on the TV tower in Vilnius was
the claim by the "Committee for National Salvation" that Lithuanian
television was broadcasting "anti-Soviet propaganda."
Many of the newly established parties founded their own
newspapers, although the Communist Party's control of some 90% of
the country's publishing facilities and of official distribution
networks effectively limited many publications' access to the
public. The RSFSR government received limited access to state
broadcasting facilities, which somewhat increased opposition
groups' access to the electronic media. In February 1991, however,
central authorities reduced the RSFSR's access following a dispute
over the content of its broadcasts.
Ensuring That Elected Candidates are Duly Installed in Office
and Permitted to Remain in Office Until Their Term Expires. The US
Embassy is unaware of any instance in which lawfully elected
candidates have been prevented from taking over the office to which
they have been elected or removed from office before the expiration
of the term of office, although the Khmara case verges on this. The
December 1990 USSR Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) approved,
in principle, a law governing the recall of People's deputies and
instructed the USSR Supreme Soviet to submit a final draft of the
legislation for consideration at the next CPD, probably in December
1991.
Minority Rights. Public expressions of anti-Semitism
continued to concern Jews throughout the Soviet Union during the
reporting period. The painting of swastikas on Moscow cemetery
graves, the distribution of anti-Semitic leaflets in Novosibirsk and
other cities, pogrom rumors in Kiev, and the desecration of the
Moscow Choral Synagogue contributed to this concern. Jews in
Moscow, Leningrad, and other Russian cities have reported insults
and anonymous threatening letters. In July, the Communist Party
newspaper Pravda ran an unprecedented article acknowledging anti-
Semitism as one of society's most serious ills. Subsequently,
Pamyat leader Konstantin Smirnov-Ostashvili was convicted on
charges of "inciting racial hatred" (attacking the central house of
writers in Moscow, shouting anti-Semitic slogans, and threatening
Jewish writers and their supporters), and received a 2-year
sentence. (He committed suicide in prison in April 1991.) Other
participants in the crime were investigated but not brought to trial.
Jews view activities of organizations like Pamyat as particularly
dangerous and believe that official criticism of anti-Semitic acts
is insufficient and ineffective. Concern also exists among Jews
about anti-Semitic arguments holding them responsible for the
Soviet Union's economic and social woes. At the same time,
opportunities increased for Jews to take advantage of cultural and
religious freedom, including the study of Hebrew and Yiddish and
publication of Jewish periodicals. Additional yeshivas were
established in Moscow. Several mass-circulation pro-reform
periodicals have published strong denunciations of anti-Semitism.
Outside large cities and the Russian republic, popular front
movements that regard the Jews as allies against the central
authorities supported increased opportunities for Jewish religious
and cultural activity. Three major conferences of nationwide
Soviet Jewish organizations took place during the reporting period.
Equality between men and women has always been proclaimed
as a basic principle by Marxism-Leninism, and it remains officially
recognized under Soviet law today. Despite this legal equality,
women suffer from discrimination in the Soviet work place.
Although most Soviet women work outside the home, relatively few
women hold prominent or influential positions in the state
administration, educational system, or economic apparatus. Those
professions in which women predominate, such as medicine, tend to
be treated as low-status occupations. Moreover, effective denial of
many fundamental economic and social rights to Soviet citizens of
both genders has long deprived the official legal equality of men and
women of real content.
Human Contacts--Family Meetings and Family Reunification.
Figures on emigration from the Soviet Union reflect expanding
human contacts across a broad spectrum. For example, nearly
200,000 Soviet Jews emigrated to Israel in 1990, and
approximately 150,000 ethnic Germans departed for Germany. From
April 1, 1990, through February 28, 1991, more than 25,000 persons
arrived in the United States as refugees from the USSR, many with
relatives in the United States. In addition, during this period, the
US Embassy in Moscow issued travel documents to 4,289 individuals
eligible to enter the United States under the parole authority of the
Attorney General. Moreover, from April 1, 1990, through February
28, 1991, the US Embassy issued 687 immigrant visas to Soviet
citizens, most of whom had first-degree relatives who are US
citizens or resident aliens.
Bi-national Marriage. Exit visas for Soviet citizens who want
to marry American citizens generally have not been difficult to
obtain. The US Embassy is not aware of any cases in which
recipients of non-immigrant fiance(e) visas and immigrant visas,
based on marriage to US citizens and resident aliens, were denied
permission to depart for the United States during the reporting
period. Cases of blocked marriages on the US representation list
have been resolved or are no longer active.
Travel and Tourism. Judging by non-immigrant visa statistics
at the US Embassy in Moscow and Consulate General in Leningrad,
the Soviet Government continued, during the reporting period, to
take a more liberal approach to issuing temporary exit permission
to its citizens. From April 1, 1990, through February 28, 1991, the
US Embassy and the Consulate General issued 99,334 non-immigrant
visas. Persons traveling for private reasons and tourism made up
about one-half of this total. The other half consisted of business
and government travelers and persons participating in scientific,
educational, cultural, or other types of exchanges. The demand for
visitor visas to the United States continued to increase as the
desire to travel, pent up for many years under restrictive Soviet
regulations, was released. Indeed, Soviet officials have expressed
fear that once the new emigration law is passed, the demand for
passports will exceed the ability of the government to issue them.
Religious Contacts. The Soviet authorities regularly grant
Soviet entry visas to religious representatives of various faiths. Of
particular note was the October-November 1990 visit of AUOC
Patriarch Mstislav, who resides in the United States. His visa was
initially refused but eventually granted, though he is still being
refused permission to reside in Ukraine. It is more difficult for
individual representatives of various faiths inside the USSR to
receive exit visas to visit churches in the West. Particular
problems exist with securing airline tickets due to much greater
demand than supply.
Information. Despite glasnost, the Soviet leadership continues
to see the media, and particularly the broadcast media, as
instruments of control to be used by the central organs for
implementing policy and molding a compliant public.
While more new and often outspoken publications have
appeared over the past year, especially in Moscow, the broadcast
media have begun to be reined in, most notably since December when
President Gorbachev brought staunch conservative Leonid P.
Kravchenko back from "TASS" to take over the state radio and
television committee. How much the central government plans to
regain control of radio and television programing from more
liberal-reformist elements remains to be seen.
For the print media, the government and party continue to
control much of the actual publication and distribution process,
although these monopolies have been weakened in regions where the
central Soviet authorities must contend with broad-based
nationalist movements. The old form of censorship based on
ideological criteria no longer exists for most print media--
apparently, censors are no longer officially assigned to Soviet
publications, although stamping each completed issue with a seal of
official approval is still a tradition for party- and government-
sponsored publications.
However, as Soviet society grows increasingly polarized,
efforts to promote the interests of the state or party via indirect
means remain a key element of the system. Although party
discipline and loyalty are less compelling now than in the past, the
still-important network of official contacts can make or break an
individual publication by controlling its access to essential
supplies, office space, and various employee benefits.
While party conservatives have encouraged efforts to remove
reform-oriented editors and deputy editors of several publications
recently, including Izvestiya, Komsomol'skaya Pravda, and
Vechernaya Moskva, individual journalists working for more liberal
publications, such as Argumenty i Fakty, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, and
Interfax (news agency) continue to test the limits of glasnost with
diversified and, at times, controversial coverage of domestic
events. In Georgia, publications attracting the ire of the republic
government were closed by republic officials. For example, the
newspaper Molodezh Gruzii was forced to close in early 1991. The
paper's employees received threats of physical violence and
continue to experience discriminatory treatment. In Moldova, the
Russian-language newspaper Molodezh Moldavii was forced to close
in late 1990. Its Russian and Jewish employees were physically
attacked and continue to experience discriminatory treatment. Its
headquarters were fire-bombed.
Efforts to institutionalize freedom of the press reached a
zenith on August 1, 1990, with passage by the USSR Supreme Soviet
of a new "law on the press," which abolished institutionalized
censorship and authorized individual Soviet enterprises and citizens
to set up independent publications within the Soviet Union. Since
that time, the former unofficial samizdat press has evolved into a
rich variety of new publications, ranging from extreme right-wing
diatribes to missionary tracts, from glossy business magazines to
pornography.
No formal restrictions exist on the ability of Soviet citizens
to receive foreign publications by subscription, except when
unevenly enforced Soviet laws against pornography and "incendiary"
political tracts are invoked. However, the non-availability of hard
currency to the vast majority of Soviet citizens and the general
unreliability of the Soviet mail system continue to have the
practical effect of limiting access to those enjoying special status.
When a presidential decree on the broadcast industry was
issued in July 1990 calling for the decentralization and
demonopolization of broadcasting, hundreds of independent radio
and television broadcasters and cable TV operators began
operations at the local and regional levels. At the same time, many
neophyte television operators, especially those with larger
ambitions--such as the new All-Russia Radio and Television
Company--still found independence illusory as the crucial technical
facilities remained in the hands of the center.
In January 1991, statements by President Gorbachev and other
officials that the new press law might need to be re-written or
abrogated provoked concern, but the law remains on the books. De
facto restrictions on the new openness, however, linger, such as the
politically motivated firing in March of three news commentators
from the independent daytime and late night TV news program TSN
and the earlier cancellation of the popular Vzglyad talk show.
Toward the end of the reporting period, the central government
has increasingly begun to rein in independent-minded broadcasters,
both within the central TV and radio apparatus and in the smaller
companies around the country. The transformation of the State
Radio and Television Committee (Gosteleradio) into the All-Union
State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, with a stated
purpose of de-monopolization and financial independence, meant
little in day-to-day operations, but the new structure enabled the
newly appointed conservative head of the company, Leonid P.
Kravchenko, to re-assert central ideological control over
programing. Earlier plans to reorganize Gosteleradio into four
independent channels were scrapped, leaving ambitious plans for
new initiatives in disarray.
The changes since the end of 1990 indicate a return to the "old
ways" in broadcasting. Old-guard censors are back at work; and, at
the local level, new and would-be broadcasters are being denied
licenses on "political grounds" by local authorities (political
grounds were cited in the suspension of Vzglyad). Selective
reporting and overt propagandizing was evident in news coverage of
the January violence in the Baltics and the March national unity
referendum.
The call for decentralization has, in a limited way, been
respected in Leonid Kravchenko's recent announcement that all
television studios in the republics are now local property. This
move provides additional autonomy for the locals but also adds
significantly to their financial responsibilities. Since they are not
yet in a position to fill air time with their own programing, they
will continue to carry central television's programs but have to pay
for them. Although the new All-Russian Television and Radio
Company has started operation, its allotted frequencies and air
times are still in dispute.
Radio, in general, has escaped the closer scrutiny television
receives. Independent radio stations like Moscow's Ekho Moskvy,
funded by the Moscow soviet, Moscow University, and liberal weekly
Ogonek, among others, broadcast relatively freely with frequent
transmission of anti-establishment opinions.
In addition to CNN, which is re-broadcast without change over
UHF, foreign television from the United States, France, Germany,
Italy, Great Britain, and Japan is increasingly seen in the Soviet
Union. Central television broadcasts many acquired programs, from
Adam Smith's Money World to MTV. Super Channel and other
American and foreign program distributors successfully placed a
wide range of their programing with the center and with local
stations in the Baltics, Kiev, Kazakhstan, and Siberia.
One American company signed a contract with the Moscow
soviet to bring up to eight cable channels to the Moscow area and
plans to expand to Kiev as well. Not only has there been no jamming
of foreign radio broadcasts since 1988, central radio and TV
broadcasts now frequently quote VOA and British Broadcasting
Company in their own broadcasts.
Reports of threats and physical violence involving Soviet
journalists increased but were more often the result of clashes
between rival political or ethnic factions than government-
sanctioned repression of freedom of expression.
Foreign films are seen more and more on Soviet screens. A
new French movie center brings the latest in French cinema to
Moscow, while "Rambo," "Gone With The Wind," "Tootsie," and other
well known American productions enjoyed success in Moscow
theaters this past year. Any limits on the availability of foreign
films in the Soviet Union are more related to a lack of hard currency
and/or copyright access than to ideological censorship.
The number of journalists based in Moscow on behalf of US and
other Western news organizations continues to grow. Although
housing and other infrastructure problems are still daunting, the
life of a foreign correspondent in Moscow is much easier than
before with access to sources, even in the military and the KGB,
generally good to excellent. Only on the subject of travel
restrictions are significant complaints still heard. Among the new
American bureaus this past year were the San Francisco Chronicle,
Christian Science Monitor, Fortune, Saba Photo, The Village Voice,
Advertising Age, and Reader's Digest. The total number of American
reporters is now well over 100.
Also during the past year, a Foreign Correspondents'
Association (FCA) was established in Moscow to represent the
collective interests of the foreign news media in dealings with
various government officials concerning housing, travel,
accreditation, access to news pools, and briefings. In addition to
the efforts of the FCA, US journalists were invited, on several
occasions, to air their grievances (largely relating to travel) with
Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovskiy and other MFA officials. Some
progress was made.
Cultural Exchanges. USIA's traveling exhibition, "Design USA,"
completed its tour of the USSR with showings in Kishinev, Alma-
Ata, Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok. Total attendance in
these five cities exceeded 1 million, and collateral programs
brought together Soviet and American specialists for seminars on
architecture and designing for the handicapped.
Under the USIA book translation program, agreement was
reached or is pending with Soviet publishing houses for the
translation and sales distribution of 31 American books, including
classics of American history, biography, political science,
literature, business, and economics.
Exchanges in the performing and fine arts continue to increase
and expand. However, the rapidly deteriorating economic situation
in the country, as well as the political restructuring of the
government (both national and republic), have greatly reduced
subsidies to Soviet cultural institutions that had previously enabled
them to host their foreign colleagues with little difficulty. As
cultural institutions are quickly having to become financially self-
sufficient, their interest in performing abroad or showing their
work abroad--and thereby earning much needed hard currency--
increased dramatically. At the same time, the need to become
financially self-sufficient severely limited the ability of Soviet
cultural institutions to invite their foreign counterparts to the
USSR. Therefore, for purely financial reasons, cultural exchange
has become increasingly one-sided and will probably continue so
until the Soviet economy improves.
Despite the financial difficulties, many American cultural
groups are eager to perform in the USSR, and with major corporate
support, continue to tour the country. Museums in the United States
and USSR have increased exchanges of fine arts exhibitions and have
organized joint exhibitions shown in both countries. In addition,
warming relations between the two countries have enabled
numerous individual artists, theater and film directors, musicians,
and dancers to arrange their own private exchanges and to work and
have their work shown in each other's country.
The Soviet Government continues to allow individuals and
organizations to conduct discussions with Americans dealing with
cultural presentations, but ruble inconvertibility, increasing
requirements to pay for hotel and travel for foreigners with hard
currency only, and bureaucratic difficulties have conspired to
create considerable handicaps to arranging US cultural
presentations in the USSR.
Educational Exchanges. Dramatic growth in bilateral
educational exchange programs at all levels continued during this
reporting period, including exchanges of elementary school children,
along with high school, college, graduate, and professional
exchanges. Efforts to establish a bilateral exchange office in
Moscow faltered when the Soviet side rejected the US proposal to
open a Fulbright representation office in Moscow. The Soviet side
insisted on a reciprocal Fulbright office in the United States, which
would have been unprecedented. Continuing discussions have led the
US side to consider a locally hired person to serve the needs of
Fulbright lecturers.
Presidents Bush and Gorbachev agreed at their December 1989
Malta meeting to expand undergraduate exchanges by 1,000 students
per side. An agreement on the new exchange, which will begin in
the 1991-92 academic year, was signed in March 1991.
The Soviet Government actively encourages its own scholars to
seek contacts with American and other Western counterparts. The
principal obstacles continue to be bureaucratic and financial,
especially the difficulties of financing travel to the West.
Aeroflot's policy on hard currency payment for domestic travel of
foreigners seriously hampered programs arranged on a ruble basis.
While the State Committee for Education is able to get around this
problem for programs it arranges, other institutions often cannot.
American exchangees may have to put up the hard currency
themselves or travel long hours by train to get to outlying cities.
Archival and research materials are available at many levels
to US scholars, in contrast to the situation a few years ago. There
is a problem, however, with access to older magazines and
newspapers, which are frequently withheld because they are in an
advanced state of deterioration.
Baltic and Republic Overview
Baltics. The Baltic States Supreme Councils and governments,
newly elected in spring 1990, took dramatic steps toward effective
independence from the USSR. On May 4, 1990, the Latvian Supreme
Council passed a declaration affirming its goal of restoring Latvian
independence. Not as encompassing as the Lithuanian Supreme
Council's March 11, 1990, declaration of independence, the Latvian
declaration envisaged a transition period to restored independence.
The Estonian Supreme Council passed legislation to restore the
symbols of the independent State of Estonia, while also embarking
on a transition period to full independence.
During the latter months of 1990, the popular front-dominated
Baltic parliaments discussed and passed legislation affirming the
supremacy of republican laws over those of the USSR and announced
their intent to abide by international and CSCE standards in human
rights. During this same period, preliminary negotiations were
undertaken between Baltic and Soviet delegations with a view
toward resolving issues relating to Baltic independence.
However, by the end of the year these talks were effectively
suspended. Tension increased in all three Baltic states, and
November and December witnessed a series of explosions in Riga
and Latvia. The January 1991 announcement that additional Soviet
military units would enter the Baltics to assist in enforcing the
military draft also raised tension. On January 2, the main
publishing house in Riga was occupied by armed units of the Soviet
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), precipitating a crisis during
which a pro-Moscow Latvian self-proclaimed National Salvation
Association called for the resignation of the Latvian government
and the imposition of direct rule from Moscow.
On January 11-14, armed Soviet security and army units,
acting reportedly at the request of a pro-Moscow Lithuanian
"Committee for National Salvation," took over several buildings in
Vilnius, including the central press building, the radio and TV
administration building, and the TV tower. During the latter
operation, accomplished with tanks and armed personnel carriers,
over a dozen people were killed and scores injured. On January 20,
special forces of the Soviet MVD attacked the Latvian Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD) building in Riga, resulting in the deaths of
two Latvian MVD guards. In firing near the building, two civilians
were also killed and a third died weeks later from his wounds.
Following these incidents and amidst calls from the pro-
Moscow National Salvation Committees for the resignation of the
Baltic parliaments and governments and the imposition of direct
rule from Moscow, barricades were erected in all three Baltic
capitals to protect the Supreme Council buildings from expected
attack from Soviet security and military forces. To show the
strength of popular support for Baltic independence in the
aftermath of these incidents, the Baltic governments organized
special non-binding votes on February 9 (Lithuania) and March 3
(Latvia and Estonia), which witnessed high voter turnout and
overwhelming support for the restoration of independent,
democratic states. The Russian-dominated fronts supported the
Salvation Committee calls for the resignation of the Baltic
governments and expressed concern that the popular front-
dominated legislatures in the Baltic republics would not guarantee
their language and cultural rights. In protest over the violence in
the Baltics, the United States and more than 20 other CSCE member
states, including the EC-12, invoked the CSCE's Human Dimension
Mechanism. Following the January incidents, Soviet President
Gorbachev issued decrees naming delegations of Soviet officials
who would be empowered to discuss a range of political, economic,
and social issues with Baltic representatives.
Ukraine. Ukrainian informal groups were permitted more
activity than in the past, as the Ukrainian Communist Party and
government under new Party Chief Kravchuk tried to co-opt some of
the former's popular support as the regime's own diminished. The
officially registered Ukrainian Popular Movement (RUKH) supported
candidates for elections to the republic Supreme Soviet and local
soviets, winning more than one-fourth of the republic Parliament's
seats and completely taking over the local soviets in such western
Ukrainian cities as Lvov and Ivano-Frankovsk.
In western cities, calls for independence of Ukraine were
frequently heard, although more conservative activist leaders in
RUKH claimed the majority of Ukraine's large and diverse population
wanted only economic independence and more political sovereignty,
i.e., more control over Ukraine. In July 1990, the Ukrainian Supreme
Soviet passed overwhelmingly a "Declaration of Ukraine's
Sovereignty."
However, there were later signs that revealed that Ukrainian
authorities might crack down on such activism. In late March,
proceedings were begun against several activists who had organized
and participated in unsanctioned rallies in support of Lithuanian
independence. Top RUKH leaders were mentioned by name, a
warning that they, too, could be prosecuted.
Ukrainian activist leaders said the issues of most concern in
Ukraine had moved from cultural and linguistic to economic and
ecological issues, especially contamination from the Chernobyl
nuclear accident. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet put forth an appeal
to the international community for the billions of dollars of aid
needed to clean up Chernobyl contamination, treat victims, and
evacuate and relocate affected populations.
Byelorussia. The hard-line Byelorussian Communist Party and
government leadership remained in place, although the republic
Supreme Soviet also appealed for international help to deal with
consequences of Chernobyl. Byelorussian activists continued to find
themselves more constricted than counterparts in some other
republics. No doubt encouraged by Moscow, Byelorussian party
authorities condemned Lithuania's independence movement and
claimed territory along the Byelorussian-Lithuanian border. The
democratic opposition made gains in March and April with a largely
successful general strike and mass demonstrations in major cities.
Moldova. Activism by Moldova's major ethnic groups continued
to increase. Moldavian People's Front activists disrupted and forced
an early end to the November 7 Revolution Day parade in Kishinev,
after local militia had beaten some peaceful protesters earlier that
morning. Within a week, hard-line republic Communist Party boss
Grossu was replaced by Luchinskiy, former Second Secretary of
Tadzhikistan and reportedly a relatively popular ethnic Moldavian.
Non-Moldavian ethnic minorities, including Russians, Jews, and
Gaga'uz, alleged that the Moldavian government was discriminating
against them. The Turlian Gaga'uz declared independence and set up
their own self-proclaimed republic in August 1990, while the
primarily ethnic Russian-populated Dnestr region did the same in
September.
Ethnic Moldavians wholeheartedly supported their co-
nationals' December 1989 revolution across the border in Romania;
Moldavian deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet called on Moscow
also to show support. Contacts with Romania continued to increase,
with growing border violations and demands to dismantle the
border. Most Moldavians, however, still considered reunification
with Romania possible only after Romania has democratized and the
economy improved.
The Caucasus. Violence escalated in the Caucasus between
Azerbaijanis and Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh. The number of
deaths, injuries, hostage-takings, bomb explosions, and thefts of
weapons continued to grow, with no resolution in sight. Armenians
claim that Azerbaijan's refusal to allow Nagorno-Karabakh to
secede from Azerbaijan is a violation of the self-determination of
the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijanis claim
Nagorno-Karabakh is legally and historically a part of Azerbaijan.
In September 1990, a state of emergency was declared by the local
government in Armenia after a series of incidents between rival
armed bands, including the shooting of a local member of the
Armenian Supreme Soviet. The republic government brought this
crisis to a peaceful conclusion, but conflict between Armenians and
Azerbaijanis flared again in May.
Although Georgian ethnic rights increased, violence among
opposing Georgian political groups rose. Bomb explosions, street
snipers, and numerous shooting incidents were reported. Georgians
were freer to demonstrate for their rights and a more nationalistic
Georgian Supreme Soviet granted and reinforced a number of
cultural and ethnic rights. Tensions, however, continued between
Georgians and Abkhazians and Ossetians over rights.
Central Asia. The Central Asian republics continue to be the
most traditionalist politically, but they are experiencing, in
differing degrees, the same forces of democratization and social
change experienced elsewhere in the USSR. They now present a
more variegated pattern of human rights observance than before.
Nevertheless, because of their more passive and conservative
populations, remoteness and weak media coverage, very few formal
human rights violations come to the surface. The enjoyment of
human rights has expanded greatly in recent years, most notably the
area of religious observance and, to a lesser degree, open political
expression. The Communist Party continues to rule throughout the
region and use its control of the governmental machinery to
overpower any opposition. Nevertheless, fledgling opposition
movements exist in all the republics either as legislative factions
or popular movements. Kyrgyestan, under its reform leadership, has
made a strong commitment to open political activity and reduction
of party dominance. Turkmenistan allows little free political
expression. Tajikistan has allowed some opposition parties but has
repressed political expression by a Muslim party. In between,
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are led by popular leaders and have large
independent political movements but also restrict political
expression in a number of ways.
YUGOSLAVIA
Human Rights
In keeping with the greater democratization evidenced by
multi-party republican elections in 1990, there was improvement in
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in much of
Yugoslavia during this period. In particular, progress was made in
the areas of political and religious freedoms and the right of
association. However, CSCE compliance has been uneven, notably in
Serbia and its province of Kosovo--which has been marked by
massive violations of human rights--and Croatia.
Increasingly, human rights became a topic of attention in the
media and among the Yugoslav public. The Helsinki Final Act and the
Vienna Concluding Document have been published in Yugoslavia in
Serbo-Croatian, and no restrictions have been made on the
circulation of CSCE documents in Yugoslavia.
In August 1990, 17 CSCE participating States, including the
United States, invoked the first step of the human dimension
mechanism of CSCE to express concern over the situation in Kosovo.
The Yugoslav response recognized its commitment to comply with
the CSCE process but, nevertheless, insisted that the Kosovo
problem was largely due to ethnic Albanian separatist activity, and
that democratic reforms were underway
in Kosovo.
Human rights organizations exist and are active in Yugoslavia.
Although there was a noticeable reduction in overt police
harassment of leaders of such organizations, government
sensitivity to criticism of its human rights record remains. For
example, in Serbia, the government-controlled media often accused
human rights advocates of being anti-Serb; Croatian human rights
advocates also were accused of disloyalty by Croatian republican
authorities. In Kosovo, ethnic Albanian human rights activists are
routinely harassed by police and often summoned for lengthy
questioning at any time. Federal government officials have
expressed willingness to sign the European Human Rights
Convention and the 1966 UN Protocol on Civil and Political Rights,
but these measures are being impeded by authorities in the six
republics who consider that their sovereignty may be weakened by
the federal government's commitment to these agreements.
Contacts of Yugoslav human rights activists with international
bodies and parent organizations were permitted. For example,
Helsinki committees in Belgrade and Pristina (Kosovo) maintained
regular contact with the International Helsinki Federation (IHF) in
Vienna and with non-governmental organizations in other countries.
However, in September 1990, a four-person IHF delegation was
detained briefly by Serbian police and expelled. A Norwegian IHF
official was briefly detained by the police in Kosovo on October 19.
Nevertheless, the entire text of IHF's 40-page critical study on
Kosovo was published in the national daily Borba.
With the notable exception of Kosovo, there has been a decline
in the number of charges for so-called "political crimes" in
Yugoslavia. People arrested on political charges have the right to
legal counsel, but in many cases, those tried on misdemeanor
charges do not have the opportunity to obtain counsel. In Kosovo,
human rights activists estimate that as many as 5,000 persons
were arrested on political charges in 1990.
Police force also was a problem during the reporting period.
The Serbian campaign to reassert control over the predominantly
ethnic Albanian province of Kosovo led to large Albanian
demonstrations which the Serbian police repressed with lethal
gunfire. Serb authorities contended that such measures were
necessary because the "separatist" nature of these demonstrations
threatened Serbia's and Yugoslavia's integrity. In August 1990, a
peaceful crowd of about 10,000 ethnic Albanians gathered in the
Kosovo capital, Pristina, to welcome a delegation of visiting US
Senators, was dispersed by police using tear gas and clubs.
Freedom of Religion or Belief. For many years, religious
activity in Yugoslavia was significantly freer than in other
countries in Eastern Europe. Believers in most major faiths are not
persecuted. Past restrictions on religious freedom stemmed from
the monopoly position of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
which, in practice, meant that believers were denied professional
advancement and that governmental authority was used to restrict
the ability of religious communities to carry out practical daily
activities. Those restrictions took the form of limitations on the
permits needed to build new churches and restrictions on religious
publishing, education, and dissemination of materials. However,
with the general opening of Yugoslavia in most areas, virtually all
former restrictions on religious activity have either been formally
eliminated or tacitly abandoned. In view of the close connection in
Yugoslavia between religion and nationality, many new Yugoslav
republican governments have been eager to establish close public
ties with religious establishments linked to the dominant national
group in a republic. However, the minority religions in a given
republic (for example, the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia), have
complained of republican government discrimination in such areas
as granting building permits and lack of police protection against
vandalism.
Religious institutions are allowed to propagate their beliefs
and offer religious education in any language of choice. In 1990,
commercial outlets began selling religious publications; previously,
such publications were only available through subscription or at
houses of worship. Soldiers are now allowed to possess religious
materials , although they are forbidden to attend religious services
while on duty.
Freedom of Expression. Although the trend in most of
Yugoslavia is toward greater freedom of expression, most media
organs remain heavily influenced by the leadership of the republics
in which they are located. This control is more a function of
nationalism than communism, except in Serbia where it is both.
Even in Slovenia, considered the most democratic of Yugoslavia's
republics, the President of the Republican Assembly in March 1991
publicly threatened to revoke the credentials of a journalist whose
coverage of assembly activities had offended the ruling Demos
coalition. In Serbia proper and its provinces of Kosovo and
Vojvodina, restrictions on freedom of expression are especially
severe. In October 1990, Serbian authorities in Vojvodina replaced
about 20 journalists with persons more acceptable to the ruling
Socialist Party of Serbia, and in December, three more Vojvodinan
journalists were fired for "insubordination." In Belgrade, at least
63 journalists from the "Politika" publishing house were demoted
and suffered pay cuts for refusing to write as they were ordered.
During the Serbian elections in December, the opposition continued
to be denied non-discriminatory media access despite commitments
contained in the CSCE Copenhagen Document. Almost all Albanian-
language media in Kosovo have been suppressed by the Serbian
republican authorities since September 1990.
Many previously banned works, such as Milovan Djilas' The New
Class and The Unperfect Society, were published in 1990. Several
new independent publications and broadcast media organs were
launched. After demonstrations in Belgrade on March 9, aimed in
part at protesting control of the media, Serbian authorities began
gradually to allow a wider range of opinion to appear in the
republican media.
Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly. Freedom of
association expanded significantly in 1990, with the registration of
more than 200 political parties and associations, and independent
trade unions for pilots and journalists. The dissolution of the
Socialist Alliance of Working People, the communist front
organization, formerly responsible for registering all legal
organizations, also contributed to greater freedom of association.
Under the new system, groups or parties that operate in more than
one republic must register with the Federal Secretariat for Justice;
those that only operate within one republic must register with that
republic's Justice Ministry. The federal law against "hostile
association" was limited in 1990 to be applicable only to those
groups using or advocating violence. Although the trend in 1990 has
been to grant registration to non-governmental political and other
organizations, a few were denied registration. For example, in
October, Macedonian authorities refused to register an Albanian
cultural organization in Tetovo; in Serbia, republic officials refused
registration to the Serbian Chetnik movement on the grounds that
its name "offends public morality."
In the more developed northern republics of Slovenia and
Croatia, new unions have had no difficulty registering or operating
without government harassment under the new republican
governments that were elected in 1990. However, the Independent
Trade Unions of Kosovo, comprised of ethnic Albanians, was
harassed and its president detained for 45 days in the wake of the
September 3, 1990, general strike in Kosovo. As many as 50,000
ethnic Albanians who participated in the strike have since been
fired from their jobs.
Freedom of assembly varies widely; public authorities must
grant permission for assemblies, but this is routinely denied to
opposition groups. In Kosovo, practically any gathering of ethnic
Albanians is likely to be broken up on the pretext that it is
"separatist" or "hostile" to the Serbian government. Many
demonstrations in Kosovo, and some in Belgrade, ended in mass
arrests, sometimes accompanied by violence. However, some
meetings in Belgrade, which were officially "banned," were allowed
to take place without hindrance.
In March 1991, Serbian police broke up a peaceful
demonstration in Belgrade, where 40,000 to 50,000 Serbian
opposition demonstrators demanded the resignation of the head of
Belgrade television. Police used tear gas and water cannons to
disperse the crowd; one teenager and one policeman were killed in
the ensuing violence.
Freedom of Movement. Yugoslavia has long had a liberal policy
allowing its citizens to leave and return to Yugoslavia. Passports
are routinely available to most people, and exit permits are only
required to visit a few countries, such as Albania. Ethnic Albanian
writer and opposition leader Ibrahim Rugova was denied an exit
permit to attend a literary conference in Tirana in October 1990.
However, changes in the passport law were announced in October,
reducing police discretion to deny or confiscate passports
arbitrarily. Some Kosovo Albanian dissidents, including Dr. Zekeria
Cana, Azem Vlasi, and Adem Demaqi, were denied passports by
Kosovo authorities. Cana was later issued a passport by the
republic government of Croatia.
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest or Punishment. Yugoslav
criminal law and legal procedures include many provisions
inconsistent with internationally accepted human rights norms. The
law allows investigatory detention for up to 3 months, with a
possible 3- month extension, which is often implemented. Access
to prisoners in pre-trial detention by family is sometimes
restricted, ostensibly to prevent interference with investigations.
Arbitrary arrests were most frequent in Kosovo, where thousands of
participants in demonstrations were routinely and summarily
sentenced to 30 to 60 days in jail, often on misdemeanor charges of
"disturbing public order." These convictions can only be appealed
after sentencing; in practice, the sentence is served before the
accused can appeal and often before the accused can even summon
an attorney. Prisoners in many parts of Yugoslavia are beaten and
otherwise mistreated during arrest and detention. This practice is
most widespread in Kosovo, where Serbian police engage in
widespread and brutal abuse of persons arrested for suspicion of
participating in unsanctioned activity. Prisoners are often made to
"run the gauntlet" through lines of baton-wielding police.
Demonstrators arrested after March 9 demonstrations in Belgrade
reported widespread instances of police brutality. Serbian leaders
arrested by Croatian police reported that they had been beaten.
Fundamental Freedoms
During the reporting period, the Markovic government
established respect for the rule of law as one of the fundamental
objectives for the country's transition to a more democratic
system. As in most areas, there are wide differences among
Yugoslavia's republics, with the rule of law being most developed in
Slovenia and least developed in Serbia, especially in Kosovo, where
it is virtually non-existent. Rule of law also is inhibited by the
political and financial corruption that is endemic in the Yugoslav
judicial system.
Federal and republican laws may be adopted and enforced in
secrecy from the public. According to press accounts, a wide range
of political, economic, and security-related laws have been adopted
in this fashion since 1980. In 1990, Serbia used this procedure to
adopt punitive measures against economic activities by other
Yugoslav republics and to issue to itself large sums of money.
Judges are no longer required to be members of the League of
Communists and, in 1990, several republics adopted reforms that
aimed at creating an independent judiciary. However, the ruling
parties in each republic still have strong influence over the
judiciary. In Kosovo in 1990, any semblance of an independent
judiciary disappeared after the Serbian takeover, when most ethnic
Albanian judges and officials were replaced by ethnic Serbs.
Despite reforms limiting the scope of laws depicting "political
crimes," the potential for political abuse remains in several federal
laws, including Federal Criminal Code Article 114 ("spreading
racial, ethnic, or religious hatred") and Article 116 ("endangering
territorial integrity"). Prosecutions under these articles have
declined, but a new republican law in Croatia bans political parties
that threaten Croatia's territorial integrity, and a new Serbian law
makes insulting federal or republic officials punishable by up to 3
years imprisonment. Several hundred political prisoners throughout
Yugoslavia were granted amnesty in 1990, and Slovenia, Croatia,
and Macedonia appeared virtually free of political prisoners.
The Yugoslav military operates under the legal authority of the
collective Federal Presidency, the nominal commander in chief. In
practice, however, the military increasingly acted on its own
authority. After the president of the Federal Presidency failed to
get a political decision to allow the army to intervene in ethnic
disputes in Croatia in March, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA)
issued a statement asserting that it would defend the country's
external borders and prevent civil war but would not involve itself
in political discussions of Yugoslavia's future.
However, the JNA tried to manipulate political opinion with an
expose of an alleged conspiracy on the part of Croatian authorities
to arm Croatian police illegally. In January, the JNA released a
film, shot surreptitiously, of the Croatian Ministers of Defense and
Interior discussing a deal to acquire arms from foreign sources to
retaliate against minority Serb actions in Serb-inhabited areas of
Croatia.
In 1990, free multi-party elections were held on the republic
level in all of Yugoslavia's six republics. Elections were not
scheduled on the federal level. Polling in the republican elections
generally was conducted according to accepted procedures. Election
laws were published in advance and widely publicized. However,
access to the media was not equal for all parties in Serbia or in
Montenegro, and official coverage of campaign activities generally
was distorted in favor of the ruling party. Opposition parties in
Serbia complained that the Serbian government controlled the
timing of the December 1990 elections, leaving insufficient time
for the opposition to make its stands known to the public.
Minority Rights. In multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, with its varied
population and a history of ethnic conflict, few topics are as
sensitive or as complicated as minority rights. In an effort to
reduce the ethnic conflicts that wracked Yugoslavia before World
War II, Tito's communist partisans generally granted significant
rights to members of national minorities in the fields of language,
education, and culture, while at the same time attempting to ensure
political unity through the monopoly of the League of Communists.
Members of every significant ethnic group in Yugoslavia have long
had the right to, at least, some education, newspapers, and cultural
activities in their own language and the right to have ethnic
associations as long as these avoided proscribed political
activities. At the same time, the Kosovo government maintained a
vigilant policy against expressions of nationalist sentiment, which
were viewed as fundamentally anti-Yugoslav. Most political
prisoners in Yugoslavia over the years were, in fact imprisoned for
their nationalist views.
In recent years, with the rise of nationalist groups and
passions in much of Yugoslavia, the country's previously good record
has begun to erode. For many years, Albanians actively participated
in the political life of Yugoslavia at every level, from provincial
politics in Kosovo to the Federal Presidency. Unfortunately, as the
ethnic conflict between majority Albanians and minority Serbs in
Kosovo grew, Serbia reversed, in Kosovo, Yugoslavia's positive
accomplishments in the protection of national minorities. Since
1989, a Serbian republican policy of controlling all aspects of life
in the province of Kosovo, which has a population of more than 90%
ethnic Albanians, has led to a de facto policy of discrimination
against Albanians. Following the Kosovo provincial government's
declaration of separation from Serbia July 2, Albanians were denied
their rights to participate in public affairs after the Serbian
republic government suspended the provincial assembly, the
executive council, and judicial and security organs. The decision to
suspend the provincial assembly has been appealed. As of March
1991, no decision had been reached by the federal constitutional
court. Serbia later used this move as the basis for "recalling"
Kosovo's representative on the Federal Presidency. Many district-
level government bodies in Kosovo also were suspended or purged.
Many Albanian-language schools were closed in Kosovo,
because Albanian teachers (who are Muslim) refused to implement
the Serbian republican curriculum, which mandates the teaching of
Serbian and Christian Orthodox cultural themes (such as the life of
the patron saint of Serbia, St. Sava). The Serbian Republican
Government also reserved student slots, in disproportion to its
population, at the University of Pristina for ethnic Serbs and
Montenegrins, many from outside Kosovo. Many of these slots were
not filled in the fall of 1990, while ethnic Albanians were denied
the opportunity to study. Albanians in Macedonia, who have
significantly improved that representation in the new multi-party
assembly, assert that their access to education in the Albanian
language above the primary school level has been cut back.
The new Croatian republican constitution gave ethnic Serbs the
right to use the Cyrillic alphabet in the ethnic Serb areas of the
republic, e.g., Cyrillic textbooks in schools. Cyrillic newspapers are
widely available in Croatia. However, ethnic Serbs complained that
they were discriminated against, citing firings of ethnic Serbs from
official positions as evidence. Croatian officials countered that the
firings represented not ethnic discrimination but a purge of old
communist officials from the republic bureaucracies, a
disproportionate number of whom happened to be Serbs.
Hungarians in Vojvodina have the right to use their own
language, be educated in Hungarian, and form Hungarian cultural
organizations. However, controversy arose during the reporting
period when Serbian republican officials attempted to put Hungarian
media under the control of the Serbian Government, including by
appointing Serbian-speaking editors for Hungarian-language
journals.
Gypsies have complained that rights extended to other
minorities in Yugoslavia have not been equally extended to them.
Education is not available to Gypsies in their own language, for
example. Also, Gypsies claimed that they have been discriminated
against in employment and social services. A Gypsy cultural
organization exists in Yugoslavia, and the President of the World
Romany Federation is a Yugoslav Gypsy.
Human Contacts. Compared to other East European countries,
Yugoslavia has long had a liberal policy regarding travel, for any
reason, including family meetings, family reunification, and
emigration. Hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs live and work in
Western Europe and have no difficulty entering and leaving
Yugoslavia at will. Yugoslavia is visited annually by millions of
foreign tourists (almost eight million in 1990), who contribute 10%
of Yugoslavia's hard currency earnings. Likewise, millions of
Yugoslav tourists go abroad each year, chiefly to neighboring
countries such as Austria and Italy, but also to the United States,
Canada, and Australia, where many Yugoslav immigrants live.
In some parts of Yugoslavia, notably Serbia and its provinces
of Kosovo and Vojvodina, authorities still attempt to monitor
opposition or dissident activity by eavesdropping on telephone
conversations and opening private mail. This was made public
during the elections in the republic of Montenegro in December
1990, when the opposition accused police of eavesdropping from a
special booth in the postal-telephone-telegraph building
headquarters.
There are few hindrances for religious believers in Yugoslavia
who wish to associate with their co-religionists elsewhere.
Pentecostalists, Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses and the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) exist and proselytize
in Yugoslavia, but they sometimes experience difficulties in
obtaining permits from the authorities. Hundreds of thousands of
Roman Catholic pilgrims from many countries have visited the
shrine in Medjugorje.
Information. The Yugoslav federal press law and the press
laws in each of the six republics, theoretically, guarantee the
public's right to know. They reflect the realities of the pre-
election federal and republic governments, however, and therefore
provide for a significant governmental role in managing and editing
the news. Revised, liberalized press laws have been under
discussion in at least four of the six republics during the past year.
The fact that the republic governments still exercise de facto
control over the major publishing houses, radio, and TV stations
means that most media in Yugoslavia play an advocacy role for the
party in power. The debates about liberalized press laws indicate
that resistance is still strong to a fully independent press. Many
opposition parties have shown greater concern for having their own
publications advocating their point of view, than for depoliticizing
the media.
Generally, Yugoslav institutions and individuals are allowed to
possess, reproduce, and distribute information. One glaring
exception to this is in Kosovo, where the Albanian-language daily
paper, Rilindja, was closed for printing articles promoting the
ethnic Albanian point of view. Both television and radio in Kosovo
also are in the hands of management loyal to the ruling Socialist
Party of Serbia.
Yugoslavia has no tariffs on imported books, newspapers, or
magazines. Foreign publications are not taxed in Yugoslavia, but
they are expensive because of the high printing costs throughout
most of Europe. Yugoslav citizens are free to subscribe to foreign
publications. Such subscriptions are limited by the difficulty in
obtaining hard currency.
Radio reception is unrestricted. The six republic governments
retain control of frequencies, however, and use this authority to
favor the government-controlled radio networks. As a result,
opposition groups and dissenting views do not get a fair share of air
time. Despite this limitation, some stations have gone commercial
and have followed an independent editorial line in their news
coverage. So far, they represent a small minority found mainly in
urban centers.
Generally, international news coverage is good in Yugoslavia,
particularly in the larger cities, and there is widespread interest in
foreign news. Many stations carry CNN or SKY news, sometimes in
English and sometimes with voice-over. But, as previously noted,
the majority of radio, television, and print media is heavily
influenced by the respective republican governments. In cases
where reports from other countries concern domestic Yugoslav
events or interests, local coverage is not always complete or
objective.
The US Embassy in Belgrade is not aware of any foreign
journalist being expelled during the past year because of critical
reporting. During the same period, however, many Yugoslav
journalists were demoted, fired, or effectively silenced for the
content of their reporting or their party affiliation. Foreign
journalists have no restrictions on contacts and communications
with Yugoslav sources. Foreign journalists routinely bring their
own press, equipment, and reference material into Yugoslavia
without any problems. The foreign press center in Belgrade, run by
the Yugoslav press agency, Tanjug, provides helpful assistance for
both Yugoslav and foreign journalists. Republic governments also
have provided support to journalists covering elections during the
past year. Official press conferences generally are open to
accredited foreign and local journalists. The Federal government
has relatively open relations with journalists, although some
offices, such as the Federal Secretariat for Defense, are still not
accustomed to open encounters with the press. While the
accessibility of local officials varies greatly among the republics,
the newly elected republic legislatures have quickly adapted to open
debate with, and to an intensive relationship with, the press.
Cultural Exchanges. Yugoslavia actively promotes cultural and
educational cooperation through formal government-to-government
cultural and bilateral agreements, and informal people-to-people
exchanges. It also is a signatory to several multiateral educational
and cultural agreements (such as UNESCO agreements). The
publishing industry and pop culture throughout the country reflect
an open and learned appreciation of international educational and
cultural activities.
The United States has not signed a formal cultural agreement
with Yugoslavia but sponsors, annually, a broad array of cultural
presentations throughout the country, developed in collaboration
with official and unofficial Yugoslav participation.
The earliest cultural agreement of record was signed in June
1955 between Yugoslavia and Norway. Since then, Yugoslavia has
maintained 10- year cultural agreements with more than 60
countries. It has bilateral agreements, which allow for various
levels of educational cooperation, with over 30 countries.
Friendship societies abound. During the last 2 years, these bilateral
associations have developed both at the national and republican
level, keeping Yugoslavia a viable participant in the international
political, cultural, and educational arena. As Yugoslavia is still
nominally a socialist country, most of the organizations involved in
educational and cultural exchanges are governmental, but private
groups are increasingly coming into existence and taking part.
Publishing houses, large and small, translate, publish, and
distribute a wide array of foreign literature, scientific and
education texts, and entertainment materials of all kinds and for all
ages.
The television stations and cinemas schedule weekly foreign
films. Theaters regularly present foreign productions or Yugoslav
adaptations of foreign productions.
Yugoslavia hosts six foreign libraries-cultural centers in
Belgrade, with affiliates in several of its other major cities. Its
vast public library system is fast becoming automated, so it can
readily acquire information from Western and other international
capitals.
As the country moves to a more market-oriented society,
cultural institutions as well as publishing houses have had to
accept the difficulties of becoming more competitive, financially
self-reliant entities. They face decreasing governmental subsidies
and higher taxes with some reluctance but have sought ways to
improve their marketing and public policy strategies in order to
remain viable. Customs charges are not exorbitant, are restricted
to handling and facilitation costs, and do not discourage imports of
any foreign materials. Books are expensive, but this does not
discourage sales or imports and translations of foreign matter.
Educational Exchanges. Yugoslav education is open to all and
free through the university level, although some universities, faced
with reduced subsidies from the government, are considering
charging fees. At lower levels of education, the systems vary in
quality depending on the republic's financial means. Although
education in one's native language is guaranteed under the 1974
constitution, this does not mean that the same quality of education
is available to all ethnic groups. In Kosovo, for example, Albanian-
language schools reportedly receive far fewer funds, on a per-
student basis, than do Serbian-language schools in the same
republic.
US-Yugoslav education exchanges are managed by the bilateral
Fulbright Commission which, in its 26 years, has sponsored more
than 2,500 American and Yugoslav scholars in study programs in the
United States and Yugoslavia. In addition, Yugoslavia participates
in an active program of scientific exchanges through the Yugoslav-
American Joint Science and Technology Fund, which supports 200-
250 researchers from various scientific disciplines between
Yugoslavia and the United States each year. (###)