US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990

Title:

Crisis in the Persian Gulf

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks after a meeting with a coalition of ambassadors on Desert Shield, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Dec 17, 199012/17/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] What you see here is living proof that the international coalition arrayed against Saddam's aggression remains deep and wide. We're talking now about some 28 countries that have committed their forces of one kind or another to this extraordinarily historic effort. Every country represented agrees that the 12 Security Council resolutions that are now on the books make clear what is required-- Iraq's complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. These same countries--and there are more than two dozen represented here today--I think maybe all 28 of us--are contributing over 200,000 individuals to the military effort against Iraq. Tens of thousands more are on their way. As has been the case from August 2 on, it is not simply the United States against Iraq; it is really Iraq against the world. And, again, none of us wants war. But none of us is prepared to accept a partial solution. It is for this reason that we all welcome Security Council Resolution 678 and its authorization that all necessary means be used after January 15 to bring about Iraq's full compliance with all that the United Nations has demanded. Let me just add that I also used this occasion inside to brief our coalition partners on our efforts to meet directly with Iraqi officials. And thus far, Iraq's behavior underscores what I think is its lack of interest in a peaceful settlement of this crisis. For our part, we remain open to having these meetings if mutually acceptable dates can be agreed upon. And if meetings are held, I want to reiterate publicly what I said inside--namely that what we want to do is impress upon Iraq the consequences of its aggression and the need for all Iraqi forces to leave every square inch of Kuwait. There can and will be no negotiations for concessions and no rewards for aggression. So thank you all very much for joining me here today. And I am glad to have had this opportunity, not only to ask you to convey my respects to the leaders of state and government represented here, but to tell them, please, that the United States remains steadfast and will remain steadfast in its determination to see every single United Nations resolution on this subject fulfilled without concession, without yielding one single inch.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

Crisis in the Persian Gulf

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Opening statement from news conference, the White House,. Washington, DC Date: Dec 18, 199012/18/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] I want to just comment once again on the situation in the Gulf, because ever since August 2, the world community has been virtually united in its condemnation and its rejection of Iraqi aggression. I've been talking about the [UN] Security Council resolutions, but the General Assembly of the United Nations, with only one vote against it--Iraq--joined in condemning what has gone on by Saddam Hussein. And I think that's a very significant point because those who were saying, well, it's only the Security Council now have to recognize that what we've been saying all along is true--that it is not Saddam Hussein and the Arab world against the United States, but indeed it is Saddam Hussein against the rest of the world. And so I mention this because we're coming down toward this UN-mandated deadline. I still want to see a peaceful solution to this question. You keep hearing about new initiatives--President Bendjedid of Algeria--but I gather that that has gone about as far as those initiatives that others have undertaken. Bendjedid [has] good credentials on all sides of this dispute, but [was] unable to talk sense to Iraq's dictator. So I would just simply say that we will keep trying to find an answer. It cannot be an answer of concession. It cannot be an answer where Saddam Hussein is rewarded with one single concession because that would fly right in the face of the rejuvenated UN peacekeeping effort, and it simply is unacceptable-- not just to us, but to the rest of our coalition partners. And you look at what the EC said yesterday--or today I guess it was-- regarding the visit of [Iraqi Foreign Minister] Tariq Aziz when they said there would be no point in his coming to see them unless the visits with the United States have taken place -- it shows a real solidarity because the temptation might have been the other way. So I think the coalition's holding. We are determined, more determined than ever. Yesterday, I had a meeting with 27, I believe it was, other--the ambassadors from other countries; the 28 standing together in the Gulf represented a show of solidarity that I think was read loud and clear halfway around the world. So that's where we are. And there is no news to report on the proposed visit of the Secretary of State to Baghdad or, indeed, of the Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz coming here.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

Crisis in the Persian Gulf

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks on departure to Camp David, the White House, Washington, DC Date: Dec 14, 199012/14/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] On November 30, in offering direct meetings between the United States and Iraq, I offered to go the extra mile for a peaceful solution to the Gulf question. And I wanted to make clear to Saddam Hussein the absolute determination of the coalition that he comply fully with the Security Council resolutions. Iraqi aggression cannot be rewarded. And so I have asked the Secretary of State to be available to go to Baghdad anytime, up to and including January 3, which is over 5 months after the invasion of Kuwait and only 12 days before the UN deadline for withdrawal [January 15, 1991]. That deadline is real. To show flexibility, I have offered any one of 15 dates for Secretary Baker to go to Baghdad, and the Iraqis have offered only one date. In offering to go the extra mile for peace, however, I did not offer to be a party to Saddam Hussein's manipulation. Saddam Hussein is not too busy to see on short notice Kurt Waldheim, Willy Brandt, Muhammad Ali, Ted Heath, John Connolly, Ramsey Clark, and many, many others on very short notice. It simply is not credible that he cannot, over a 2-week period, make a couple of hours available for the Secretary of State on an issue of this importance--unless, of course, he is seeking to circumvent the UN deadline. Look, I want a peaceful solution to this crisis. But I will not be a party to circumventing or diluting the UN deadline which I think offers the very best chance for a peaceful solution. So I wanted to get out my feeling about these proposed meetings. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

Crisis in the Persian Gulf

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, DC Date: Dec 14, 199012/14/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Ambassador Howell [US Ambassador to Kuwait], Mrs. Howell, ladies and gentlemen, for the last 4 months your courage has inspired all of us. Cut off from some of the most basic of human necessities, you have been victorious over an uncivilized and brutal ordeal; something really no one should ever have had to endure. But now, your ordeal is over. On behalf of the President and the American people, let us simply say welcome home and thanks for a job well done. What has been done to you and to others by a vicious and capricious dictator not only violates all norms of international conduct, it jars our sense of human decency and civility. Some might naively think it unbelievable if we all did not know that it was so horribly true. As diplomats, you had your rights violated by an international outlaw who callously breaks international law and the most elementary diplomatic norms. As hostages, you were either held against your will or were forced by real and immediate threats to go into hiding. And as human shields, you were treated as less than human beings by a dictator who considered you nothing more than cannon fodder. It is clear from your ordeal that the real war, the brutal war against the peaceful people of Kuwait, began on August 2. And so there must be no reward to Saddam Hussein for the war he started. There must be no thanks or praise for the release of innocent people who he never should have kidnaped in the first place. The fact that all of you endured, indeed triumphed, is testimony, I think, to the character of your convictions, the reliance of your spirit and the tenacity of your courage. It was a conviction fanned by freedom--the freedom you unceasingly sought, by the freedom the Kuwaiti resistance continues to fight for and by the freedom that the people of Kuwait deserve. Your courage and the courage of all foreign nationals in the face of unprovoked aggression has really inspired the world. All have found strength and solidarity in your example. Yet, while your ordeal has ended, that of the Kuwaiti people continues. As you were freed, now, too, we must see Kuwait freed of Iraqi occupation. The will of the international community, like your will, will not be broken. The world is determined to see this aggression reversed and the war against the innocent people of Kuwait ended. Ambassador Howell, you left the American flag flying high over our embassy in occupied Kuwait. One day soon, that flag will fly high in a free Kuwait. Thank you and God bless you all.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

Crisis in the Persian Gulf

Howell Source: Ambassador Howell Description: Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, DC Date: Dec 14, 199012/14/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Baker, friends, colleagues and loved ones, it's great to be home. And I'm delighted to bring home with me the last plane load of Americans who want to leave Kuwait, and the last members of the staff of the American Embassy. They are not here today--that's the prerogative of ambassadors--but they should be, because they and the American citizens who took refuge in August in our embassy and were put to work, are the ones that made it possible for me and my colleagues to stay there. And I hope at some point there will be an opportunity to recognize their contributions individually. Mr. Secretary, however, the President asked us to stay in Kuwait. Our community is imperiled and a war zone begun, as you point out, in a war by Iraq. And make no mistake, the only industry in Kuwait today is war and military occupation. I left them building bunkers around the seacoast and around our embassy. I saw no indication that they plan to leave. We could do nothing else, because our community was in danger and many of them couldn't leave and because the President's policy on this was moral and honorable and right. And I'm pleased that we could stay. I'm pleased that we could operate more than a dozen flights of American citizens and this being the last. As I said, there were many people that made it possible for us to stay, both in the community helping with the support. And it was not an American effort alone, many of our friends from Europe, from North America, the Canadians, who all worked together to make that possible. Yesterday morning I locked the door of the embassy with a garrison flag still flying proudly in the wind. The embassy, which was founded as a consulate in 1951 and as a embassy in 1961, will reopen and it's ready to reopen with a new staff. So, Mr. Secretary, our ordeal, as you point out, is over, but the ordeal of the Kuwaitis and the problem created by the war begun in August, which we all would prefer to be solved peacefully, still persists. Kuwait and the people there must be free. Thank you very much, and again, it's good to be home.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

The Gulf: In Defense of Moral Principle

Quayle Source: Vice President Quayle Description: Remarks at the Foreign Policy Research Institute conference, Washington, DC Date: Dec 18, 199012/18/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] I am delighted to be here this afternoon to address this distinguished group of scholars and policy makers. The topic of your conference could not be more timely. For the more we learn about Saddam Hussein's barbarism in Kuwait, the clearer it becomes that the crisis is not, as Neville Chamberlain once said of Czechoslovakia, "A quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing." Rather, Kuwait's plight and the future security of the Gulf are vital issues that affect us all--strategically, economically, and morally. But before addressing some of the issues your conference poses, I would like to take just a moment to pay tribute to the valor of some of the Kuwaiti people. When Saddam Hussein was trying to round up Americans in Kuwait to serve as his "human shields," the people of Kuwait hid many of our citizens in their homes and provided them with food, medicine, and desperately needed shelter. In doing so, they quite literally put their own lives, and the lives of their loved ones, in terrible danger. I know I speak for President Bush and all Americans in saying that the Kuwaiti people have upheld the true honor and good name of the Arabs. Their courage and humanity will always be remembered. Today, thanks to President Bush's firm policy, the nightmare has ended for Saddam's American hostages. The nightmare has also ended for those Americans who lived in hiding in Kuwait these past 4 months, dreading the knock on the door by Iraqi troops. But for the people of Kuwait, the nightmare is not over. For them, the agony continues, and what an agony it is. Summary executions of scores of people in front of their families; public hangings; families being terrorized by midnight searches; arbitrary arrests of thousands of people, including children; detainees being tortured with electric shocks and prolonged beatings; hospitals being taken over by Iraqi military authorities; medical personnel being detained or killed; and an entire nation being systematically looted of its food, its equipment, and its supplies.
Iraqi Cruelty
The cruelty of the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait is almost unbelievable. Listen to Deborah Hadi, an American woman married to a Kuwaiti: "We took our cousin, who was in labor, to Sabah Maternity Hospital. Upon our arrival, we saw a Kuwaiti woman at the front door--in hysterics, because she was in labor and Iraqi troops would not allow her to enter. When she continued to scream they put a bayonet through her stomach, pinning her to the wall. We left the hospital immediately and delivered my cousin's baby at home." Or listen to Abdulal, a Kuwaiti: "While at the market buying food for a family, I saw two boys, 15 and 16 years old, in handcuffs escorted to a house by Iraqi soldiers. . . . The Iraqi soldiers then asked their mother to call all family members outside the house. . . . In full view of the mother, sister, and brother, as well as 15 men and women in the marketplace, the Iraqi soldiers shot and killed them." As Congressman Tom Lantos, the Democratic co-chairman of the congressional human rights caucus, put it back in October, "In the 8-year history of the . . . caucus, we have never had the degree of ghoulish and nightmarish horror stories coming from totally credible eye-witnesses that we have had this time." It seems to me that those who advocate endless patience with Saddam Hussein, those who say we should give him 12 months, or 18 months before contemplating the use of force, ought to think long and hard about what Congressman Lantos said. And those who call for unlimited patience on moral grounds should ask themselves a few simple questions: Is it moral to prolong the agony of the Kuwaiti people indefinitely? If Kuwaitis refused to stand by as Americans were being hunted down by the Iraqis, is it right for Americans to stand by as Kuwaitis are being tortured and raped and brutalized? And will there even be a Kuwait left to save in a year or a year-and-a-half's time?
US Policy
For our part, the Bush Administration's policy is clear and firm today, as it has been for the past 4 months. We are not going to budge one iota from the goals the President laid out at the start of this crisis, goals reaffirmed in 12 Security Council resolutions: achieving the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, restoring the legitimate government of Kuwait, releasing all the hostages, and maintaining the security and stability of the Gulf region. We must achieve all of these objectives. Some critics of the Administration have questioned these goals. In particular, they have questioned the morality of coming to the defense of what they call a "feudal," "reactionary," and "repressive" regime. Quite frankly, I am always astonished whenever I hear these charges made. First of all, the accusations against Kuwait are false. Secondly, since when has it become acceptable to loot and rape and torture people because they happen to live in a society whose customs differ from our own? And since when have Americans subscribed to a false, class-based morality that classifies some groups as "reactionary," and therefore expendable, and others as "progressive," and therefore beyond reproach? This is precisely the warped and evil morality used by Stalin and his henchmen to justify their infamous campaign of terror during the 1930s. The people of the Soviet Union have turned their backs on the morally demented legacy of Stalinism. And so shall we. The government of Kuwait is not the result of conspiracy and coup d'etat, and its rule is not enforced by terror and repression. The United States and the world, therefore, have no reason to apologize for demanding that the legitimate government of Kuwait be restored. Nor have we any reason to demand or accept anything less than the total and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. These are legitimate demands. These are moral demands. And these demands are not subject to negotiation.
International Support
In support of these demands, close to half a million troops are gathered in the Persian Gulf. Today, over one-third of the troop count is provided by our allies. But, some contributing nations are providing proportionately a greater percentage of their military forces than we are. Twenty-eight nations have committed military support to the allied Persian Gulf effort. This support comes from all quarters of the world, including members of the Warsaw Pact. The majority of Muslim nations opposes the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; 11 have committed military forces to the crisis. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria lead in terms of numbers of troops and equipment. The UK has supported the allied effort in every way possible, including tens of thousands of troops, squadrons of fighter/bombers, and several navy vessels in the Gulf. The French have been supportive, with more tens of thousands of committed troops and equipment. Turkey, which borders the much larger Iraq, from the outset courageously condemned the Iraqi invasion and pledged to send troops into combat in event of an Iraqi attack. The Germans and Japanese have pledged considerable sums of money. The American people--like the international community as a whole--understand and support our objectives. A majority of the public approves of the President's decision to send troops to the Persian Gulf. And an equally large majority believes that the United States should, if need be, take all action necessary, including military force, to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The American people understand that Saddam Hussein's Iraq poses a long-term threat not just to its neighbors but to us. They know that over the past decade, Saddam Hussein has bankrupted his people to bankroll his army. They know that he has launched two wars of aggression, against Iran and against Kuwait, at the cost of some 1 million lives--thus far. They know he is acquiring a sizable stockpile of chemical and biological weapons, and has used chemical weapons against both Iran and his own people. They know he has launched an ambitious campaign to acquire nuclear weapons. And they know that unless he is stopped today, a nuclear-armed Iraq will control the bulk of the world's energy supply tomorrow, thereby holding a gun to all our heads. Because the President is determined to leave no stone unturned in the search for peace, he has offered to send Secretary of State Baker to Baghdad, and has invited Iraq's Foreign Minister [Tariq Aziz] to Washington. Unfortunately, Iraq's attempt to manipulate this process makes it far from certain that these meetings will take place. But one thing is certain. If Secretary Baker does go to Baghdad, his message to Saddam Hussein will be loud and clear: You may leave all of Kuwait peacefully, without conditions, or you will leave Kuwait by force.
The Future
Once Iraqi forces have left Kuwait, however, and once the legitimate Kuwaiti government has been restored, our job will still not be over. We will have to work to see that the President's final objective--maintaining security and stability in the region--is achieved. We cannot allow a situation in which an aggressive dictator has a million-man army, thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, hundreds of jets, and access to billions of petro-dollars. We cannot allow such a dictator credibly to threaten any of his neighbors should they not meet his political and economic demands. Neither we nor our friends in the region are prepared to live with such a situation. Moreover, we cannot allow the development of new and more deadly chemical and biological weapons, and the long-range delivery systems to threaten every nation in the region. And we can't allow the acquisition of an indigenous nuclear weapons production capability--also deliverable at long ranges. Saddam's record makes it clear that he would not hesitate to use these weapons, just as he has not hesitated to use chemical weapons against his own people. And we are not willing to let that happen. That is why we intend to see all the President's objectives attained, and all 12 UN Security Council resolutions carried out-- including UN Security Council Resolution 674, which declares Iraq responsible for all damage resulting from its occupation of Kuwait. Restoring the status quo ante would not be enough. Having tried to erase an entire nation from the face of the earth, Saddam cannot simply walk away without penalty and in a position to repeat his aggression. As for the United States, we will continue to play a positive role in the region. Presidents Truman, Carter, and Reagan all recognized that the US has vital interests in the Middle East. And President Bush is fully determined to defend these interests. As the President said in his September 11 speech to Congress [See Dispatch,VOL. 1, No. 3]: "Our interest, our involvement in the Gulf is not transitory. It pre-dated Saddam Hussein's aggression and it will survive it. Long after our troops come home. . . there will be a lasting role for the United States in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf. Our role then: To deter future aggression . . . to help our friends in their own self-defense. . . and to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile, and above all nuclear technologies." Of course, it won't be easy. Of course, we will all have our work cut out for us. But failure to achieve our objectives is unacceptable. Failure would mean that no future aggressor would be deterred by warnings from the United States or the United Nations. Failure would lead to a new, post-Cold War world more prone to anarchy, and more violent, than the world which preceded it. We will not fail. We will act decisively in defense of our moral principles and strategic interests. And we will work together to ensure the security of all the states in the region. This is both the challenge and the opportunity facing us today. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

Challenges Facing the Atlantic Alliance

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from North Atlantic Council intervention, NATO headquarters, Brussels, Belgium Date: Dec 17, 199012/17/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe Country: Iraq, USSR (former) Subject: NATO [TEXT] We meet here today as an alliance of peoples bound by common ties of history and values. Today, I would like to concentrate my remarks on three challenges that face the alliance: -- First, Iraq's brutal occupation of Kuwait and the international community's efforts to redress this aggression; -- Second, the devolution and transformation of power in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; and -- Third, NATO's continuing adaptation, including our internal strategy review and the question of a European security identity. Let me discuss each in turn.
Ending Iraq's Aggression Against Kuwait
We have spoken many times about the Gulf crisis and have strongly agreed from the outset of the crisis that Iraq's aggression must be reversed. We are also agreed that Saddam Hussein must not be seen to gain in any way from his aggression. Any hope for a new world order based on the rule of law, and not the law of the jungle, depends on that. Any hope for peace in the volatile Middle East depends on it--indeed, depends on demonstrating that Saddam Hussein's way of doing business does not work and cannot be the wave of the future in the area. We want a peaceful conclusion to this crisis. And we believe it is still possible. But it is possible only if Saddam Hussein understands that if he does not get out of Kuwait, he will be forced out. President Bush has made it clear that we are prepared to leave no stone unturned in seeking a peaceful solution. That is why he offered to meet [Iraqi Foreign Minister] Tariq Aziz in Washington and to send me to Baghdad to see Saddam Hussein. In making this offer, the President was prepared to ensure that the Iraqis heard directly from us the choices before them and the consequences of their actions. While being prepared to go the extra mile, the President was not willing then nor is he now to be a party to Saddam Hussein's manipulation. He was not prepared then or now to go along with an effort to circumvent or dilute the January 15th deadline imposed in Security Council Resolution 678. We are still willing to meet. We are still willing to have Tariq Aziz come to Washington to meet the President. The President is still willing to send me to Baghdad. And he is still willing to have me go on any one of 15 different dates, including even Christmas or New Year's Day. If after meeting any number of self-anointed envoys from many, many countries on short notice, Saddam Hussein is not willing to see me on any one of 15 dates, he is telling all of us that he's interested not in communication but manipulation. We are willing to communicate but not to play Saddam's games. And no one else should, either. Everyone ought to be sending the same message to Iraq: -- Stop playing games on the meeting in Baghdad; -- Accept the reality of your situation and the will of the international community; -- Understand that you cannot divide the international community; and -- Understand that the international community supports the use of force if you refuse to comply fully with the Security Council resolutions. Communicating this, and making clear that there will be no reward and no linkage to other issues, is essential to convincing Saddam, one, that he cannot drive wedges between us and, two, that time is running out. A peaceful outcome depends on his seeing that he has only two choices. Any meeting with the Iraqis should reinforce the starkness of the choices, lest any miscommunication lead them to miscalculate once again, thereby actually increasing the risk of war. I think we should anticipate that as we draw close to Resolution 678's January 15 deadline and as the choices are presented starkly, Saddam Hussein is likely to try to undercut the collective will of the international community to use force. Just as I believe he chose to release hostages for this purpose, I think he may take a dramatic step on or around January 15. He could withdraw partially. We have all agreed that partial solutions or outcomes that are conditioned or linked to other issues are unacceptable. We need to anticipate Saddam's possible moves, be prepared for a partial withdrawal ploy, and coordinate closely our responses. Before discussing the Soviet Union, I would like to make a critical point about responsibility-sharing in the Gulf, a region that is vital to all of us. When I last spoke with you on this subject, we had not yet augmented our forces in the Gulf to provide a credible offensive capability. That was a very big decision for us--not in abstract but human terms. It meant calling up reserves and dividing tens of thousands of families. It means significant new economic burdens for us. And it means real risks and real sacrifices by the American people. It is in this context that we will be coming to you again to discuss how we might responsibly share these additional costs and risks. Politically, we need to share responsibilities in helping our publics understand this crisis as a test of a new world order and our hopes for a new era of peace. Economically, we need to share equitably the responsibility to absorb the massive costs of this crisis for us, for the coalition facing Iraq, and for nations which have suffered the most for supporting the United Nations. I have spoken to you before about the impact on one of our member states, Turkey. It's essential that the commitments made to Turkey are fulfilled and even enhanced. Militarily, we share responsibility to show Saddam Hussein the choice he really faces and to carry through with the UN's commitments.
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
I would like to turn now to another great challenge facing the West- -our relations with a rapidly changing Soviet Union. Let me make several observations: First, as my Houston [Texas] meeting with [Soviet] Foreign Minister [Eduard] Shevardnadze demonstrates, Moscow continues to act as a solid partner on many important issues. The new thinking has, in fact, become increasingly the new Soviet policy. We have a partnership in the Gulf. On the Middle East, our discussions suggest that the Soviets will support a practical, not simply a rhetorical or symbolic approach to the peace process. On Angola, Afghanistan, and El Salvador, we are moving closer to ending bloodshed and achieving peace. On START [strategic arms reduction talks], we made good progress toward closing out our remaining differences on some highly technical issues. We remain confident that we will have a START treaty ready for signing when President Bush travels to Moscow in February to meet with President Gorbachev. Second, our response to the deteriorating Soviet internal situation has been to provide short-term assistance to help the Soviets get over this critical transition period. As the President announced last Wednesday, our assistance will take the form of medical supplies, guarantees for food credits, including a Jackson- Vanik waiver, and technical economic help. We have also proposed granting the Soviets special associate status in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and World Bank. Our assistance complements that undertaken by many other members of the alliance and the European Community. In providing this assistance, we have sought to make it clear to the Soviets that this must be transitional aid. We continue to press them to ensure that any assistance the West provides is consistent with their long-term objectives of democracy and a market economy. This is especially important given the new, critical stage we now see the Soviets entering domestically. Third, the short-term question the Soviet leadership faces now is not so much whether reform can succeed but whether anarchy and chaos can be prevented. There is the danger that any effort to respond to chaos by strengthening those sectors of Soviet society that are more committed to centralized, command-style solutions--especially the military and KGB--could have unintended consequences. Fourth, and finally, instability and chaos in the Soviet Union are in no one's interest. But we are convinced that the only way to ensure long-term stability is to continue, indeed accelerate, both political and economic reform. It would be disastrous, for example, for Moscow to crack down on the cooperatives and informal markets that are springing up. That could have a chilling effect on economic and political reform, exacerbating the problems Moscow faces. Reform in Central and Eastern Europe has also reached a critical stage. The easy steps have been taken. Only hard choices remain. We must work together to ensure that the democratic breakthroughs of 1989 do not become the breakdowns of 1991. As we find billions for transitional assistance for the Soviet Union, we cannot ignore those countries that have made the difficult decisions for reform and have become laboratories for the success of this democratic experiment. The alliance must ensure that our liaison missions to the East actually fulfill their purpose of drawing our former adversaries into the democratic community of nations. The members of the alliance, bilaterally and within CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], must continue their efforts to support democracy and market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. The Gulf crisis has hit those governments particularly hard.
Guiding NATO's Continuing Adaptation
The third challenge is to guide NATO's continuing adaptation. Our work over the past 18 months, especially at the London summit, has accomplished a great deal and charted a course for further change. Yet our most fundamental tasks still lie ahead: We need to manage our success; we need to adapt ourselves to handle new threats to our common security that we and our publics are still only beginning to recognize. My comments about Iraq, the Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe should leave no doubt that the world--indeed, the world of Europe and its immediate environs--remains a place of turmoil and danger. Whereas our security focus has been riveted for 40 years on the preponderant Soviet military threat to the East, I would contend that today, and in the future, our collective focus must swing through a wider arc. I believe our task is fivefold: First, we need to continue to offer insurance for our members against dangers posed by the Soviet Union and its still considerable conventional and nuclear capabilities. The nature of this danger has undoubtedly changed, and our immediate task is to deal with Soviet power, present and potential, by finding ways to bring the USSR into a European order that supports democracy and stability. Second, we have a strong common interest in promoting a stable security environment throughout Europe--and especially in Central and Eastern Europe--based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes. Indeed, European security has been threatened many times before by the spillover of political instability and conflict from lands just outside your borders. The challenges--political, economic, and security--of the struggling nations of Central and Eastern Europe are our challenges, too. It's in our interest that those nations not relive the bleak chapters of their history. Third, we need to recognize that our member states face real and potential direct threats to their territory from other directions--in particular, from the south and the southeast. This is evident in Turkey. It should be evident in the Mediterranean. Fourth, Iraq's aggression in the tinderbox of the Middle East certainly poses a danger to Western Europe that could be as important as any direct threat to NATO territory. If we let formalistic logic paralyze our efforts to adapt this alliance to meet these kinds of dangers, we will simply repeat the deadly errors of earlier generations. And this is not likely to be the last challenge we face from that neighboring region. Fifth, this alliance can serve--as provided for in Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty--as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issue that affects our vital interests and for coordinating our efforts at arms procurement and arms control. This should include work against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a danger that may be one of the most significant and difficult security threats we face in the 1990s. I am pleased that the London and Paris summits, through a blend of political and security measures, have already marked much progress for us in reorienting our alliance to meet this five-point agenda. In particular, our evolving ties of peaceful cooperation with the Soviet Union and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are healthy beginnings on which we must build. But I think our strategy review is also revealing that to reorient the alliance to meet this wider arc of security questions, we also need to evaluate how Europe and North America will organize their common security effort in years ahead. Our new realism about a broader security agenda needs to be complemented by a realistic appreciation of the interest in a European security identity. The United States has long supported a strengthened European role within the alliance. So we welcome the prospect of sustaining the transatlantic partnership on security affairs with a more confident and united Europe--a partnership consonant with the North Atlantic Treaty. We know that the common values that bind us offer greater cohesion than any external threat. Indeed, I believe a stronger European identity within the alliance is all the more important given the changing security agenda. We would be especially interested in how a European defense identity might help meet those challenges I noted above upon which NATO traditionally has not acted. In this respect, we have noted with particular interest suggestions that the WEU [Western European Union]--an organization that has twice responded to threats in the Gulf region--might form the basis of such an identity. A European pillar for the alliance building on the experience of the WEU, could help us rise above the old and sterile debate about "out-of-area" roles. Developments on this issue are, of course, of fundamental importance to the WEU and the EC [European Community]. These developments also affect every individual ally seated at this table. The path we take to arrive at a more mature security relationship will have serious and enduring consequences for our mutual relations and common security interests. We have to get it right. I recognize that the history of European integration has often successfully relied on the launching of a visionary idea, pursued thereafter through multiple, incremental, and difficult negotiations. In this case, I believe the European process needs to proceed in a fashion that ensures detailed consideration of its effects on related institutions and allies. A world order creating peace, ensuring stability, and fostering prosperity and liberty cannot rest on a Europe divided from North America. The new world order cannot afford an "insular" Europe or an "isolationist" North America. I am confident that if Europe intends to develop a security identity, we can produce a more clearly defined, visible European pillar that contributes to NATO's ability to handle its new security challenges. To do so, I look forward to continuing close consultations here as NATO's strategy review and parallel EC processes proceed in coming months. It is imperative, as we proceed along these new pathways, that our deliberations are open and that our conclusions are arrived at through close, reinforcing consultations among all of the nations and institutions involved. The consensus of the past must be carried forward to the future. We need to work together to make sure we get the transatlantic relationship as right in the next 40 years, as it has been for the past 40. If we coordinate now--at a time when many embryonic ideas are on the table--we can ensure that a durable and mature transatlantic partnership can emerge. So to conclude, I look forward to this opportunity to discuss in some detail both our immediate challenges and the guidance needed to advance the political track of our strategy review. The significant progress we've already made demonstrates that we are up to the task, if we keep in mind the larger purposes and shared values that have drawn us together.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

Final Remarks From the European Community Summit Meeting

Description: Final Remarks issued by the EC, Rome, Italy Date: Dec 16, 199012/16/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Country: Iraq, Lebanon, Israel Subject: EC [TEXT] Following is the text of the final remarks issued by the European Community on December 16, 1990, in Rome, Italy. 1. The European Community and its Member States remain firmly committed to full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions. Complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty and of its legitimate government remain the absolute conditions for a peaceful solution of the crisis. 2. Security Council Resolution 678 sends the clearest possible signal to Iraq that the international community is determined to ensure full restoration of international legality. The responsibility lies on the Iraqi government to ensure peace for its people by complying fully with the demands of the UN Security Council, in particular by a complete withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January. 3. The European Community and its Member States earnestly hope that implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions can be peacefully secured. To this end, they support a dialogue of the sort President Bush has offered. They also favour action by the UN Secretary General and hope that the UN Security Council's Permanent Members will remain actively involved as well. They wish Arab countries to continue to play an important role in the efforts for a peaceful solution. The European Community and its Member States underline the value of a contact between the Presidency and the Foreign Minister of Iraq, aimed at securing, in co-ordination with other members of the international community, full compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions. 4. The European Council expresses relief at Iraq's decision to release all foreign hostages, but underlines its deep concern at Iraq's failure to withdraw, at its oppressive and inhuman occupation of Kuwait and its attempt to destroy the fabric of the country.
Declaration on the Middle East
1. The European Council expresses its dismay at the continuing lack of clear prospects for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the Palestinian problems, and at the renewed acts of terrorism and violence. It expresses its deep concern at the rising incomprehension and tension in the Occupied Territories. It renews its call to the parties concerned to refrain from violence that can only engender new violence. It expresses its concern about the Israeli practices of collective reprisals, such as the destruction of houses or restrictions on freedom of movement, and deplores the recent decision to place moderate Palestinians under Administrative arrest. The European Council calls once again on Israel to comply with Resolutions 672 and 673 of the UN Security Council, to act in conformity with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of the Civilian Population, and to co-operate with the United Nations. It welcomes the recommendations by the UN Secretary-General in this regard and fully supports every effort of the UN Security Council to achieve a better protection of the Palestinian population and to promote peace in the area. It reaffirms the determination of the European Community and its Member States to further assist the Palestinian population in its serious plight. 2. The European Council reiterates its longstanding commitment to a just and lasting solution to these problems, in conformity with the relevant Resolutions of the UN Security Council and with the principles expressed by the European Community in its previous Declarations. To this end, the European Council reaffirms its support for the principle of convening, at an appropriate time, an international peace conference under the auspices of the UN. 3. The serious deterioration in the economic situation in the Occupied Territories is a source of great concern to the Community. In this connection, the European Council reaffirms its commitment to the economic and social development of the Palestinian people and considers that, in the new circumstances, the doubling of Community aid to the Occupied Territories decided on by the Strasbourg European Council appears particularly appropriate and timely. The European Council also considers it vital for all efforts to be made to create the conditions for facilitating and increasing trade between the Occupied Territories and the Community. 4. As expressed in its Declaration of 28 October 1990, the European Council remains convinced that relations of mutual confidence and co-operation must be encouraged among the countries of the region, with a view to establishing a situation of stability, security, economic and social well-being, and respect for civil and political rights, to forestalling the recurrence of crises, and to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The European Community and its Member States remain ready actively to co-operate with the concerned countries to achieve these goals and to contribute to the success of the task entrusted by relevant Resolutions to the UN Secretary General to examine measures to enhance security and stability in the region. In this connection, the European Council reaffirms the importance of meaningful and constructive Euro-Arab Dialogue.
Declaration on Lebanon
The European Council expresses its satisfaction at the implementation of the security plan in greater Beirut following the withdrawal of all militias from the Lebanese capital. It expresses the hope that the recent developments can foster the process of national reconciliation and lead to the full implementation of the Taif Agreements, thus bringing about the restoration of the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of a Lebanon free of all foreign troops and enabling the Lebanese people to express their will through free elections. It appeals to the parties concerned to release all remaining hostages. The European Community and its Member States reaffirm their commitment to help provide Lebanon with the assistance needed to build its future and view favourably the participation of the Community in the pledging conference for the creation of a Lebanon Assistance Fund.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

Chronology: Baker-Shevardnadze Meetings

Description: HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS Date: Dec 24, 199012/24/90 Category: Chronologies Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Arms Control, Trade/Economics, Human Rights [TEXT] The following was prepared by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs.
March 7, 1989--Vienna
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held introductory meetings at the conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations. They discussed all aspects of the existing US- Soviet agenda, including arms control, human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral ties. They also agreed to expand the agenda to include transnational issues. Secretary Baker expressed hope for the success of perestroika.
May 10-11, 1989--Moscow
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held their first full ministerial with working groups. They discussed regional problems, human rights, bilateral matters, and transnational questions. They agreed on dates for resuming bilateral arms talks and set a new cycle of meetings between regional experts.
July 29, 1989--Paris
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met on the eve of opening of the Paris Conference on Cambodia. They held a discussion on a wide range of subjects, both bilateral and multilateral, including Cambodia and other regional issues.
September 22-23, 1989--Jackson, Wyoming
At this second full ministerial, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed the entire spectrum of US-Soviet relations. They issued a detailed statement describing the specific agreements or understandings they reached in areas such as arms control, bilateral questions, and transnational issues.
December 2-3, 1989--Malta
In addition to participating in the shipboard summit meeting near Malta, where President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev discussed arms control, trade issues, Soviet emigration, and European issues, the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also met separately to discuss a number of these issues and preparations for the June 1990 summit.
February 7-9, 1990--Moscow
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held ministerial talks as part of preparations for a second US-Soviet summit to be held in the United States in June. A broad range of issues on the US-Soviet agenda was reviewed. Specific agreements were reached on arms control and in other areas.
February 12-13, 1990--Ottawa
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held talks at the "open skies" conference, with focus on development of the Two- Plus-Four mechanism for discussion of external aspects of German unification. They also reached agreement on CFE manpower ceilings.
March 20, 1990--Windhoek, Namibia
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, attending Namibia independence day ceremonies, discussed Lithuania's declaration of independence, Afghanistan, German unification, and arms control.
April 4-6, 1990--Washington, DC
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held a full ministerial meeting to continue their preparations for the summit. They discussed the full range of US-Soviet issues, with special attention to Lithuania and arms control.
May 4, 1990--Bonn, West Germany
On the eve of the Two-Plus-Four ministerial, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met for several hours to discuss German unification and other US-Soviet questions.
May 16-19, 1990--Moscow
In their final preparatory session before the summit, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reviewed all issues on the US-Soviet agenda, with special focus on those agreements being prepared for signature at the summit. In addition, Lithuania and German unification received considerable attention.
May 30-June 3, 1990--Washington, DC
In addition to participating in the wide-ranging summit meetings between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met separately to discuss German unification and START [strategic arms reduction] issues.
June 5, 1990--Copenhagen
On the margins of the CSCE's [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Conference on the Human Dimension, the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze continued their dialogue on German unification.
June 22, 1990--Berlin
In addition to participating in the Two-Plus-Four ministerial, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met separately to discuss European and regional issues and the forthcoming NATO summit, as well as German unification.
July 17-18, 1990--Paris
At the third Two-Plus-Four ministerial, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze participated in discussions on German unification, including the East and West German guarantee to accept the post-World War II German-Polish border. The Secretary and Foreign Minister also discussed the Soviet Union's party congress, conventional forces in Europe, Kashmir, Cambodia, and US technical assistance cooperation for Soviet economic reforms.
August 1-2, 1990--Irkutsk, USSR
Meeting in this southern Siberian city, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze focused their attention on matters pertaining to the East Asian region--overall stability, security, the need to eliminate military confrontation, and establishing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the area. Their discussions also covered Afghanistan, German unification, preparations for the CSCE ministerial conference, economic and technological issues, arms control, the Moscow summit, and other regional issues.
August 3, 1990--Moscow
Cutting short his visit to Mongolia, Secretary Baker went to Moscow to confer with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze about Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. At the conclusion of their meeting, they issued a joint statement calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops and the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty and national independence.
September 9, 1990--Helsinki
After visiting several Middle Eastern countries, Secretary Baker joined President Bush for a meeting with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The primary focus was to discuss Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The two leaders issued a joint statement in which they called for the complete implementation of five recent UN Security Council resolutions, the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and the release of all hostages from Iraq and Kuwait. The US and Soviet Union agreed also to consider additional steps allowable under the UN Charter if the economic sanctions and naval interdiction against Iraq fail.
September 11-13, 1990--Moscow
At the final session of the Two-Plus-Four consultations, the World War II Allied Powers (France, USSR, UK, US) and East and West Germany signed a treaty relinquishing all Allied occupation rights over the two Germanys and Berlin, paving the way for the unification of East and West Germany on October 3 and giving a united Germany full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs. In separate bilateral meetings, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed the issues remaining to wrap up the conventional armed forces in Europe treaty and a "security structure" for the Persian Gulf.
September 26-October 5, 1990--New York City
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met five times on the fringes of UNGA and the CSCE ministerial talks. They cleared the major hurdles to a CFE agreement--notably the issue of the number of aircraft allowed on each side--and made what Secretary Baker termed "good progress" toward a START agreement as well. On October 3, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed a joint statement committing the US and USSR to support UN efforts to settle international disputes. The two ministers also joined their counterparts from France and the UK in relinquishing their countries' post-war treaty rights in Germany, clearing the way for formal German unification which occurred on October 3. In addition, they discussed the crisis in the Persian Gulf.
November 8, 1990--Moscow
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed arms control issues and the Persian Gulf crisis. On START, they made progress on the issue of non-circumvention, and they settled a number of technical questions remaining on zonal issues for CFE.
November 18-21, 1990--Paris
In a series of meetings held around the CSCE summit, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze focused their discussions on a possible UN Security Council resolution concerning the use of military force against Iraq.
November 28, 1990--New York City
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed the upcoming UN Security Council vote on a resolution on the use of military force against Iraq.
November 29, 1990--New York City
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze attend a dinner meeting of the five UN Security Council permanent representatives (China, France, UK, US, USSR).
December 9-12, 1990--Houston and Washington, DC
Secretary Baker's and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's agenda for discussions included emergency economic assistance to the Soviet Union, technical issues related to a START treaty, disposition of Soviet military hardware called for in the CFE Treaty, upcoming US meetings with Iraqi officials, and regional issues (Middle East, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Central America, and Cuba).(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

Resignation of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Washington, DC Date: Dec 20, 199012/20/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Democratization [TEXT] Minister Shevardnadze's resignation and warning, I think, has to be taken seriously. In my experience, Minister Shevardnadze has always worked as a professional who served his country's interests. He was in the forefront of the new thinking in foreign policy and democratization at home, and I think that he has earned the respect of leaders all around the world. We are pleased that President Gorbachev has said that there will be no change in Soviet foreign policy. Since the US-Soviet partnership serves the interests of peace internationally and the process of reform domestically, we, of course, expect that to be the case, and we will be watching events closely in the weeks ahead. As the President has often stated, our new relationship with the Soviet Union depends on its continuing commitment to democratization and to reform. On a personal note, let me say that I have known Eduard Shevardnadze to be a man of his word; a man of courage, conviction, and principle. I'm convinced that he is committed to peaceful reform, political and economic, in the Soviet Union, and I'm also convinced that the dramatic moves toward democratization and freedom in Central and Eastern Europe and the new thinking in Soviet foreign policy would never have happened without his and President Gorbachev's courageous leadership. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

UN Security Council Resolution 681 on Israel

Date: Dec 20, 199012/20/90 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: United Nations, Military Affairs [TEXT]
Resolution 681 (December 20, 1990)
The Security Council, Reaffirming the obligations of member states under the United Nations Charter, Reaffirming further the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war set forth in Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), Having received the report of the Secretary-General submitted in accordance with Security Council Resolution 672 (1990) on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation and in particular taking note of paragraphs 20-26 therein (S/21919), Taking note of the interest of the Secretary-General to visit and send his envoy to pursue his initiative with the Israeli authorities, as indicated in paragraph 22 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/21919), and of their recent invitation extended to him, Gravely concerned at the dangerous deterioration of the situation in all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and at the violence and rising tension in Israel, Taking into consideration the statement made by the President of the Security Council on December 1990 concerning the method and approach for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Recalling its resolutions 607 (1988), 608 (1988), 636 (1989) and 641 (1989) and alarmed by the decision of the Government of Israel to deport four Palestinians from the occupied territories in contravention of its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention, 1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report contained in document S/21919; 2. Expresses its grave concern over the rejection by Israel of Security Council resolutions 672 (1990) and 673 (1990); 3. Deplores the decision by the Government of Israel, the occupying power, to resume deportations of Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories; 4. Urges the Government of Israel to accept de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the said Convention; 5. Calls on the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying power, for its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention in accordance with Article 1; 6. Requests the Secretary-General in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross to develop further the idea from the report of the Secretary-General (S/21919) of convening a meeting of the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and to discuss possible measures that might be taken by them under the Convention and for this purpose to invite these parties to submit their views on how the idea could contribute to the goals of the Convention as well as on other relevant matters and to report to the Council; 7. Requests the Secretary-General to monitor and observe the situation regarding Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation, making new efforts in this regard on an urgent basis, and to utilize and designate or draw upon the United Nations and other personnel and resources present there in the area and elsewhere needed to accomplish this task and to keep the Security Council regularly informed; 8. Requests further the Secretary-General to submit a first progress report to the Security Council by the first week of March 1991, and every four months thereafter and decides to remain seized of the matter as necessary. [VOTE: Unanimous]. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

The Situation in the Occupied Territories

Pickering Source: Thomas R. Pickering, US Permanent Representative to the UN Description: Statement before the UN Security Council, New York City Date: Dec 20, 199012/20/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Israel Subject: United Nations [TEXT] Mr. President [Al-Ashtal, Permanent Representative for Yemen], the United States has supported this text [Resolution 681]. However, I want to make it perfectly clear that there are a number of elements in the text which cause us concern. There are also elements that are not in the text which ought to have been. The council ought to be willing to say to the Palestinians that any use of violence to achieve their ends is plain wrong. We lament the continued violence, particularly in Israel, where innocent people have been the victims of numerous stabbings. The Security Council began this debate several months ago with the intention of achieving a resolution concerning the protection of Palestinians in the occupied territories, and that is what we have achieved today. This has only been accomplished after long, excruciating, intensive consultations among members of this council. It has taken us far too long to reach this point. Far too much of our energy was spent to the detriment of the other pressing issues facing this council, including having to deal with proposals that would have done nothing to improve the situation in the occupied territories. Nonetheless, I express my appreciation to those of my colleagues who engaged in these intensive consultations in good faith to achieve a text we all could support, especially Ambassadors Tornudd [Permanent Representative for Finland] and Razali [Deputy Permanent Representative for Finland].
US Views on the Resolution
Let there be no mistake, however, our vote for this resolution is designed to demonstrate--as we have done all along--our deep concern about the situation in the occupied territories. Our vote today in no way indicates a change in US policy on any issue related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
First
, we have made clear that the United States has not changed its position on an international conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Secretary Baker has said, and I quote: "We have not in any way or to any extent or to any degree shifted our policy regarding the question of an international conference." First of all we have taken the position for a long time that an international conference, properly structured, at an appropriate time, might be useful.... We are not now recommending that an international conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict be held, nor are we supporting a resolution in the Security Council that would seek to convene such a conference. Precisely because of our consistent position that we will not link the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli dispute, this is certainly not an appropriate time for an international conference." Indeed, in consultations on the resolution before us today, we have turned aside efforts that would have linked this resolution to the crisis in the Gulf. Saddam Hussein has tried to link the idea of an international conference to his invasion of Kuwait, and the Council has deprived him of any satisfaction in this regard. Saddam Hussein did not invade Kuwait to benefit Palestinians; he did so for his own self-aggrandizement. Nor should Saddam be rewarded for this aggression by being made to appear as a savior of the Palestinian people. Nothing could be further from the truth. If anything, Saddam's actions have set back the pursuit of peace and taken Palestinians farther than ever from their goal. Linkage of the solution to the gulf crisis with the Arab-Israeli conflict would not only be wrong; it undercuts the efforts of the international community to reverse Iraq's aggression as evidenced by the 12 resolutions this body had passed against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Second
, the United States has consistently maintained that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to all of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The United States has supported the position here at the United Nations, and we urge the government of Israel--in fulfillment of its obligation as a high contracting party, and in accordance with its responsibilities under Article 1 of the convention--to ensure respect for the convention and to accept its de jure application and its provisions. As stated in the past, the United States regards the phrase "Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967," which appears in this resolution, as being merely demographically and geographically descriptive and not indicative of sovereignty.
Finally
, Mr. President, the US position on deportations has not changed. Indeed, during the course of the council's consideration of this issue, the government of Israel announced its intention to resume deportations. The United States deplores this decision. We believe that such deportations are a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention as it pertains to the treatment of inhabitants of occupied territories. We condemn the increasing attacks on Israelis and the deaths which have resulted, just as we condemn attacks on Palestinians. Violence is not the way forward; neither, however, are deportations an effective or acceptable answer to violence. We strongly urge the government of Israel to immediately and permanently cease deportations, and to comply fully with the Fourth Geneva Convention in all of the territories it has occupied since June 5, 1967. The tragic events that have prompted this latest round of Security Council resolutions on the dangerous deterioration of the situation in the occupied territories occurred against a background of increasing violence. We call on all sides to exercise maximum restraint so as to avoid further violence and bloodshed. I also want to take this opportunity to clarify for the record US views on several elements of this resolution. The resolution requests the Secretary General to invite the high contracting parties to the Geneva conventions to submit their views on the idea of convening a meeting of the high contracting parties and looks forward to receiving those views. As a high contracting party, my government has serious questions whether such a meeting realistically can help to improve the conditions of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. A premature decision to convene such a conference invites uncertainty and confusion that, in the end, could undermine rather than contribute to the safety and protection of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation and, more generally, could have adverse impacts on the future implementation of the conventions.
US Support for Secretary General's Efforts
The United States strongly supports the ongoing efforts of the Secretary General [Perez de Cuellar] to monitor and report on the situation in the occupied territories. Nonetheless, my government wants to explain its view regarding the scope of the council's request that the Secretary General utilize available personnel of various UN organizations in the region and elsewhere for this purpose. UN personnel in the area are mostly employees of UNTSO [United Nations Truce Supervision Organization] and UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency (for Palestine Refugees in the Near East)], organizations with separate and well-defined mandates. No activity should be undertaken that would alter those mandates, which remain in force, and we would oppose any attempt to alter them. We are pleased to note that the government of Israel has invited the Secretary General to send his envoy again to Israel and the occupied territories. We strongly hope this visit will take place soon and that his efforts can lead to a genuine amelioration of the situation for Palestinians in the territories and an end to the bloodshed between Israelis and Palestinians. For our part, the US reaffirms it commitment and determination to support an active negotiating process leading to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security Council, and which should take into account the right to security of all states in the region, including Israel, and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. This process of negotiations between the parties concerned is the only way that will advance the cause of peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and all of our efforts should be actively focused on renewing this process. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

Security Council Presidential Statement, December 20, 1990

Date: Dec 20, 199012/20/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: United Nations, Military Affairs [TEXT] The members of the Security Council reaffirm their determination to support an active negotiating process in which all relevant parties would participate leading to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict through negotiations which should be based on resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security Council and which should take into account the right to security of all states in the region, including Israel, and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. In this context they agree that an international conference, at an appropriate time, properly structured, should facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement and lasting peace in the Arab- Israeli conflict. However, the members of the Council are of the view that there is not unanimity as to when would be the appropriate time for such a conference. In the view of the members of the Council, the Arab-Israeli conflict is important and unique and must be addressed independently on its own merits. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

Feature: State Department Helps US Space Program Meet Future Challenges

Date: Dec 24, 199012/24/90 Category: Features Subject: Science/Technology [TEXT] When Secretary Baker hosted Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the December 9-12, 1990 ministerial talks in Houston, Texas, he escorted the Soviet official on a tour of NASA's Johnson Space Center. In a telephone hook-up with the orbiting US space shuttle Columbia, Mr. Shevardnadze told the astronauts that their mission would benefit the human race. Mr. Shevardnadze's comment echoed President Bush's view that space exploration is "vitally important to our nation's future and the quality of life on Earth." In addition, the visit to Johnson Space Center by the Secretary and Mr. Shevardnadze underscored the important role that diplomats will play in charting the priorities of space exploration in the 21st century. The Department of State plays a key, but largely unheralded, role in America's space program through its membership on the National Space Council. That inter-agency group, chaired by Vice President Quayle, develops and coordinates US space policy and monitors its implementation. The council's national policy goals call for expanding human presence and activities beyond the Earth's orbit into the solar system; obtaining scientific, technological, and economic benefits for the American people; enhancing US security; encouraging private sector participation in space; improving the quality of life on Earth; and promoting international cooperation in space. The global aspects are of special concern to the Department's representative on the council, Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary for International Security Affairs. Ambassador Bartholomew, supported by the Office of Advanced Technology in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, ensures that US space policy reflects America's foreign policy goals and international interests. "The space program plays a positive role in enhancing American influence and prestige, especially with our Pacific and European allies," says Under Secretary Bartholomew. "It also serves to demonstrate America's continuing commitment to technological, economic, and political leadership." The space program is an excellent vehicle for cooperation with longstanding allies, such as Western Europe and Japan, and for the development of new ties to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. "Cooperation in space activities offers great potential for reinforcing cohesion among the Western allies," he notes. "Such cooperation can help the United States acquire resources and technology from abroad to achieve our goals more rapidly." Space cooperation with the Soviet Union, provided it is properly coordinated with US allies, also can play a positive foreign policy role by contributing to better East-West relations, Mr. Bartholomew adds. Space Station Freedom, which is planned for construction in the 1990s, is a US priority. Several US space station partners-- Western Europe, Japan, and Canada--have major shares of their space budgets tied to the project, which makes it crucial from a foreign policy standpoint that the United States provide sustained funding for its part of the program. "If the space station succeeds as a cooperative venture, we can look forward to broader and deeper cooperation with other countries on the ambitious space missions that surely will take place beyond the year 2000," says Mr. Bartholomew. Among the missions in the next century will be those carried out as part of the Space Exploration Initiative, which President Bush has described as "a challenging vision of America's future in space." The initiative calls for Americans to establish a permanent presence on the moon, where they can learn about living and working on an alien surface under harsh conditions. The initiative then envisions robotic and human missions to Mars to study the planet and search for signs of life, past and present. In 1991, the United States will begin an exploratory dialogue with other governments on the prospects for international cooperation on these ambitious missions of the future. The Department of State will lead the talks from the US side. The initiative will produce scientific advancements that benefit all countries. The moon is an ideal location for astronomical observations, planetary geology, and life sciences research. On Mars, scientists will be able to learn more about planetary evolution, climate change, and the origin of life. Another program that attracts the Department's attention is Mission to Planet Earth, under which satellites will be launched to observe long-term environmental changes on the planet. The goal is to formulate policies to ameliorate any negative effects of changes in the Earth's environment. "International cooperation on the Mission to Planet Earth is critical to augment research conducted by the United States," says Bartholomew. "The Department is working to define the scope and the nature of participation by other countries in this project." Space exploration already meets many modern needs around the world, Bartholomew points out, such as new communication, navigation, and other services that knit together people and countries more effectively than ever before. Space is used to preserve US security through satellite reconnaissance and treaty verification. And space efforts have helped people everywhere by fueling the world's economic engines, advancing human health through biomedical research, improving communications around the globe, and using satellites to observe and predict weather and to assess environmental changes. "America's future is linked to our efforts in space," says Under Secretary Bartholomew. "The Department plays a key role in helping achieve international cooperation, economic benefits, and the other goals of US national space policy." --Jim Pinkelman, Dispatch Staff (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990 Title:

Space Exploration Initiative

Date: Dec 24, 199012/24/90 Category: Fact Sheets Subject: Science/Technology [TEXT] On July 20, 1989, the 20th anniversary of the Apollo moon landing, President Bush announced his long-range goals for human exploration of the moon and Mars. He asked the National Space Council to develop a strategy for achieving those goals. The result is the Space Exploration Initiative, a challenging vision of America's future that will enable the American people to journey toward a permanent human presence beyond Earth. To achieve that goal, the initiative envisions a three-step process: -- Construction of Space Station Freedom in Earth orbit; -- Establishment of a permanent base on the moon; and -- A landing on Mars.
Space Station Freedom
Space Station Freedom, which is to be constructed in the 1990s, will be a permanently occupied orbiting base that will help maintain US space leadership in the 21st century. In September 1988, the United States, Japan, Canada, and nine members of the European Space Agency signed an agreement pledging to work together to build and operate the space station. The station's goals are to: -- Contribute to US pre-eminence in critical aspects of manned spaceflight; -- Provide support for scientific and technological research; -- Provide early benefits, particularly in materials and life sciences; -- Promote private-sector activity and participation in space; -- Contribute to the long-term goal of expanding human presence beyond Earth's orbit into the solar system. (###)
US Department of State

Dispatch, Vol 1, No 18, December 31, 1990

Title:

US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement

Date: Dec 31, 199012/31/90 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: North America Country: Mexico Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade [TEXT] The governments of the United States and Mexico are preparing to negotiate a historic free trade and investment agreement. Such an agreement would be a catalyst for economic growth and development in both countries. The two neighbors would obtain significant benefits from increased trade, investment, and jobs.
US Goals
The US government seeks a broad agreement to eliminate restrictions on the flow of goods, services, and investment between the United States and Mexico. US objectives include: -- Reduction of tariffs to zero over a period of years (the period is 10 years in the US-Canada FTA); -- Elimination (as far as possible) of nontariff barriers on goods and services; -- Ensuring an open investment climate; and -- Full protection of intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights, and trademarks).
Expanded Trade
Mexico is our third largest trade partner with bilateral commerce of $52 billion in 1989. An FTA would lead to expanded trade with Mexico and the creation of additional jobs for US workers. It would give US exporters unrestricted access to a Mexican market of 81 million people, which may reach 100 million by the year 2000. Mexico purchases more than two-thirds of its imports from the United States. Traditional US competitive advantages--geographic, cultural, and historic links--in this important market would be further enhanced by an FTA. As the Mexican economy grows, a substantial part of the increased income--as much as 15%--is spent on US goods and services. Strong Mexican growth is expected because of President Salinas' economic reforms. Mexico's middle class is increasing as a percentage of the total population; this means more consumers for American products. The United States benefits from expanded trade. For each additional $1 billion in real net exports, about 25,000 new US jobs are created. About two-thirds of US economic growth in 1988 can be attributed to trade. Increased exports have helped the US economy expand out of recessions in the past. The United States and Mexico are consulting with Canada to determine how it might participate in the US-Mexico trade negotiations. A North American free trade area encompassing all three countries would constitute the world's largest market, with annual production of more than $6 trillion and with almost 370 million consumers.
Investment
The United States is the source for 65% ($25 billion) of foreign direct investment in Mexico. Therefore, the US government has a strong interest in encouraging favorable conditions for new and expanded investments in Mexico. US firms investing there tend to use US suppliers and designing and managerial talent. Overall US and Mexican competitiveness in international markets would be enhanced by the opportunities offered by an FTA. In May 1989, President Salinas expanded foreign ownership (in many cases up to as much as 100%) in sectors accounting for nearly two-thirds of Mexico's economic output. He also streamlined the approval process for foreign investments. An FTA would further enhance the investment climate facing US firms in Mexico. The further partnerships and alliances in industrial agriculture and service sectors that an open trade and investment climate will foster can take advantage of the complementary strengths of our two economies. The result will be that we will both be more competitive against third country competition in our own markets and abroad--and that translates into more jobs and investment in the US and Mexico alike.
US Foreign Policy Benefits
Mexico is a close neighbor and friend, and an FTA would strengthen our good relationship. Mexico also is important as the cornerstone of a comprehensive Western Hemisphere policy. A US-Mexico FTA, added to the existing US-Canada FTA, would give further substance to President Bush's long-range vision of a hemisphere-wide free trade area. Mexico's example of market-oriented economic reform is a significant role model for other developing countries.
Steps Toward an FTA
--June 1990. Presidents Bush and Salinas announce their mutual goal of a comprehensive FTA. --August 1990. President Salinas formally requests negotiations. --September 1990. President Bush notifies the US Congress of US intent to enter into negotiations with Mexico. --Spring 1991. Following notification, the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees have 60 legislative days (i.e., until spring 1991) during which they can disallow the use of "fast-track" procedures. (Under these procedures, Congress can only approve without amendments or reject the bill implementing an FTA.) --Spring or Summer 1991. Formal negotiations begin after the expiration of the 60-day requirement and are expected to conclude in 1992.(###)