US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Crisis in the Persian Gulf
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Remarks after a meeting with a coalition of ambassadors
on Desert Shield, the White House, Washington, DC
Date: Dec 17, 199012/17/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
What you see here is living proof that the international coalition
arrayed against Saddam's aggression remains deep and wide. We're
talking now about some 28 countries that have committed their
forces of one kind or another to this extraordinarily historic effort.
Every country represented agrees that the 12 Security Council
resolutions that are now on the books make clear what is required--
Iraq's complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal from
Kuwait. These same countries--and there are more than two dozen
represented here today--I think maybe all 28 of us--are
contributing over 200,000 individuals to the military effort against
Iraq. Tens of thousands more are on their way. As has been the
case from August 2 on, it is not simply the United States against
Iraq; it is really Iraq against the world. And, again, none of us
wants war. But none of us is prepared to accept a partial solution.
It is for this reason that we all welcome Security Council
Resolution 678 and its authorization that all necessary means be
used after January 15 to bring about Iraq's full compliance with all
that the United Nations has demanded.
Let me just add that I also used this occasion inside to brief
our coalition partners on our efforts to meet directly with Iraqi
officials. And thus far, Iraq's behavior underscores what I think is
its lack of interest in a peaceful settlement of this crisis.
For our part, we remain open to having these meetings if
mutually acceptable dates can be agreed upon. And if meetings are
held, I want to reiterate publicly what I said inside--namely that
what we want to do is impress upon Iraq the consequences of its
aggression and the need for all Iraqi forces to leave every square
inch of Kuwait. There can and will be no negotiations for
concessions and no rewards for aggression.
So thank you all very much for joining me here today. And I
am glad to have had this opportunity, not only to ask you to convey
my respects to the leaders of state and government represented
here, but to tell them, please, that the United States remains
steadfast and will remain steadfast in its determination to see
every single United Nations resolution on this subject fulfilled
without concession, without yielding one single inch.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Crisis in the Persian Gulf
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Opening statement from news conference, the White
House,. Washington, DC
Date: Dec 18, 199012/18/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
I want to just comment once again on the situation in the Gulf,
because ever since August 2, the world community has been
virtually united in its condemnation and its rejection of Iraqi
aggression.
I've been talking about the [UN] Security Council resolutions,
but the General Assembly of the United Nations, with only one vote
against it--Iraq--joined in condemning what has gone on by Saddam
Hussein. And I think that's a very significant point because those
who were saying, well, it's only the Security Council now have to
recognize that what we've been saying all along is true--that it is
not Saddam Hussein and the Arab world against the United States,
but indeed it is Saddam Hussein against the rest of the world.
And so I mention this because we're coming down toward this
UN-mandated deadline. I still want to see a peaceful solution to
this question. You keep hearing about new initiatives--President
Bendjedid of Algeria--but I gather that that has gone about as far
as those initiatives that others have undertaken. Bendjedid [has]
good credentials on all sides of this dispute, but [was] unable to
talk sense to Iraq's dictator.
So I would just simply say that we will keep trying to find an
answer. It cannot be an answer of concession. It cannot be an
answer where Saddam Hussein is rewarded with one single
concession because that would fly right in the face of the
rejuvenated UN peacekeeping effort, and it simply is unacceptable--
not just to us, but to the rest of our coalition partners. And you
look at what the EC said yesterday--or today I guess it was--
regarding the visit of [Iraqi Foreign Minister] Tariq Aziz when they
said there would be no point in his coming to see them unless the
visits with the United States have taken place -- it shows a real
solidarity because the temptation might have been the other way.
So I think the coalition's holding. We are determined, more
determined than ever. Yesterday, I had a meeting with 27, I believe
it was, other--the ambassadors from other countries; the 28
standing together in the Gulf represented a show of solidarity that I
think was read loud and clear halfway around the world.
So that's where we are. And there is no news to report on the
proposed visit of the Secretary of State to Baghdad or, indeed, of
the Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz coming here.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Crisis in the Persian Gulf
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Remarks on departure to Camp David, the White House,
Washington, DC
Date: Dec 14, 199012/14/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
On November 30, in offering direct meetings between the United
States and Iraq, I offered to go the extra mile for a peaceful
solution to the Gulf question. And I wanted to make clear to Saddam
Hussein the absolute determination of the coalition that he comply
fully with the Security Council resolutions. Iraqi aggression cannot
be rewarded.
And so I have asked the Secretary of State to be available to
go to Baghdad anytime, up to and including January 3, which is over
5 months after the invasion of Kuwait and only 12 days before the
UN deadline for withdrawal [January 15, 1991]. That deadline is
real.
To show flexibility, I have offered any one of 15 dates for
Secretary Baker to go to Baghdad, and the Iraqis have offered only
one date. In offering to go the extra mile for peace, however, I did
not offer to be a party to Saddam Hussein's manipulation.
Saddam Hussein is not too busy to see on short notice Kurt
Waldheim, Willy Brandt, Muhammad Ali, Ted Heath, John Connolly,
Ramsey Clark, and many, many others on very short notice. It
simply is not credible that he cannot, over a 2-week period, make a
couple of hours available for the Secretary of State on an issue of
this importance--unless, of course, he is seeking to circumvent the
UN deadline.
Look, I want a peaceful solution to this crisis. But I will not
be a party to circumventing or diluting the UN deadline which I think
offers the very best chance for a peaceful solution. So I wanted to
get out my feeling about these proposed meetings. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Crisis in the Persian Gulf
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, DC
Date: Dec 14, 199012/14/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
Ambassador Howell [US Ambassador to Kuwait], Mrs. Howell, ladies
and gentlemen, for the last 4 months your courage has inspired all
of us. Cut off from some of the most basic of human necessities,
you have been victorious over an uncivilized and brutal ordeal;
something really no one should ever have had to endure. But now,
your ordeal is over.
On behalf of the President and the American people, let us
simply say welcome home and thanks for a job well done.
What has been done to you and to others by a vicious and
capricious dictator not only violates all norms of international
conduct, it jars our sense of human decency and civility. Some
might naively think it unbelievable if we all did not know that it
was so horribly true.
As diplomats, you had your rights violated by an international
outlaw who callously breaks international law and the most
elementary diplomatic norms. As hostages, you were either held
against your will or were forced by real and immediate threats to
go into hiding. And as human shields, you were treated as less than
human beings by a dictator who considered you nothing more than
cannon fodder.
It is clear from your ordeal that the real war, the brutal war
against the peaceful people of Kuwait, began on August 2. And so
there must be no reward to Saddam Hussein for the war he started.
There must be no thanks or praise for the release of innocent people
who he never should have kidnaped in the first place.
The fact that all of you endured, indeed triumphed, is
testimony, I think, to the character of your convictions, the reliance
of your spirit and the tenacity of your courage. It was a conviction
fanned by freedom--the freedom you unceasingly sought, by the
freedom the Kuwaiti resistance continues to fight for and by the
freedom that the people of Kuwait deserve.
Your courage and the courage of all foreign nationals in the
face of unprovoked aggression has really inspired the world. All
have found strength and solidarity in your example. Yet, while your
ordeal has ended, that of the Kuwaiti people continues. As you were
freed, now, too, we must see Kuwait freed of Iraqi occupation. The
will of the international community, like your will, will not be
broken. The world is determined to see this aggression reversed
and the war against the innocent people of Kuwait ended.
Ambassador Howell, you left the American flag flying high
over our embassy in occupied Kuwait. One day soon, that flag will
fly high in a free Kuwait. Thank you and God bless you all.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Crisis in the Persian Gulf
Howell
Source: Ambassador Howell
Description: Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, DC
Date: Dec 14, 199012/14/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Baker, friends, colleagues and loved ones, it's
great to be home. And I'm delighted to bring home with me the last
plane load of Americans who want to leave Kuwait, and the last
members of the staff of the American Embassy. They are not here
today--that's the prerogative of ambassadors--but they should be,
because they and the American citizens who took refuge in August
in our embassy and were put to work, are the ones that made it
possible for me and my colleagues to stay there. And I hope at some
point there will be an opportunity to recognize their contributions
individually.
Mr. Secretary, however, the President asked us to stay in
Kuwait. Our community is imperiled and a war zone begun, as you
point out, in a war by Iraq. And make no mistake, the only industry
in Kuwait today is war and military occupation. I left them building
bunkers around the seacoast and around our embassy. I saw no
indication that they plan to leave.
We could do nothing else, because our community was in
danger and many of them couldn't leave and because the President's
policy on this was moral and honorable and right. And I'm pleased
that we could stay. I'm pleased that we could operate more than a
dozen flights of American citizens and this being the last.
As I said, there were many people that made it possible for us
to stay, both in the community helping with the support. And it was
not an American effort alone, many of our friends from Europe, from
North America, the Canadians, who all worked together to make that
possible.
Yesterday morning I locked the door of the embassy with a
garrison flag still flying proudly in the wind. The embassy, which
was founded as a consulate in 1951 and as a embassy in 1961, will
reopen and it's ready to reopen with a new staff.
So, Mr. Secretary, our ordeal, as you point out, is over, but the
ordeal of the Kuwaitis and the problem created by the war begun in
August, which we all would prefer to be solved peacefully, still
persists. Kuwait and the people there must be free. Thank you very
much, and again, it's good to be home.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: The Gulf: In Defense of Moral Principle
Quayle
Source: Vice President Quayle
Description: Remarks at the Foreign Policy Research Institute
conference, Washington, DC
Date: Dec 18, 199012/18/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
I am delighted to be here this afternoon to address this
distinguished group of scholars and policy makers.
The topic of your conference could not be more timely. For the
more we learn about Saddam Hussein's barbarism in Kuwait, the
clearer it becomes that the crisis is not, as Neville Chamberlain
once said of Czechoslovakia, "A quarrel in a far-away country
between people of whom we know nothing."
Rather, Kuwait's plight and the future security of the Gulf are
vital issues that affect us all--strategically, economically, and
morally. But before addressing some of the issues your conference
poses, I would like to take just a moment to pay tribute to the valor
of some of the Kuwaiti people.
When Saddam Hussein was trying to round up Americans in
Kuwait to serve as his "human shields," the people of Kuwait hid
many of our citizens in their homes and provided them with food,
medicine, and desperately needed shelter. In doing so, they quite
literally put their own lives, and the lives of their loved ones, in
terrible danger. I know I speak for President Bush and all
Americans in saying that the Kuwaiti people have upheld the true
honor and good name of the Arabs. Their courage and humanity will
always be remembered.
Today, thanks to President Bush's firm policy, the nightmare
has ended for Saddam's American hostages. The nightmare has also
ended for those Americans who lived in hiding in Kuwait these past
4 months, dreading the knock on the door by Iraqi troops.
But for the people of Kuwait, the nightmare is not over. For
them, the agony continues, and what an agony it is. Summary
executions of scores of people in front of their families; public
hangings; families being terrorized by midnight searches; arbitrary
arrests of thousands of people, including children; detainees being
tortured with electric shocks and prolonged beatings; hospitals
being taken over by Iraqi military authorities; medical personnel
being detained or killed; and an entire nation being systematically
looted of its food, its equipment, and its supplies.
Iraqi Cruelty
The cruelty of the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait is almost
unbelievable. Listen to Deborah Hadi, an American woman married
to a Kuwaiti:
"We took our cousin, who was in labor, to Sabah Maternity
Hospital. Upon our arrival, we saw a Kuwaiti woman at the front
door--in hysterics, because she was in labor and Iraqi troops would
not allow her to enter. When she continued to scream they put a
bayonet through her stomach, pinning her to the wall. We left the
hospital immediately and delivered my cousin's baby at home."
Or listen to Abdulal, a Kuwaiti:
"While at the market buying food for a family, I saw two boys,
15 and 16 years old, in handcuffs escorted to a house by Iraqi
soldiers. . . . The Iraqi soldiers then asked their mother to call all
family members outside the house. . . . In full view of the mother,
sister, and brother, as well as 15 men and women in the
marketplace, the Iraqi soldiers shot and killed them."
As Congressman Tom Lantos, the Democratic co-chairman of
the congressional human rights caucus, put it back in October,
"In the 8-year history of the . . . caucus, we have never had the
degree of ghoulish and nightmarish horror stories coming from
totally credible eye-witnesses that we have had this time."
It seems to me that those who advocate endless patience with
Saddam Hussein, those who say we should give him 12 months, or 18
months before contemplating the use of force, ought to think long
and hard about what Congressman Lantos said.
And those who call for unlimited patience on moral grounds
should ask themselves a few simple questions: Is it moral to
prolong the agony of the Kuwaiti people indefinitely? If Kuwaitis
refused to stand by as Americans were being hunted down by the
Iraqis, is it right for Americans to stand by as Kuwaitis are being
tortured and raped and brutalized? And will there even be a Kuwait
left to save in a year or a year-and-a-half's time?
US Policy
For our part, the Bush Administration's policy is clear and firm
today, as it has been for the past 4 months. We are not going to
budge one iota from the goals the President laid out at the start of
this crisis, goals reaffirmed in 12 Security Council resolutions:
achieving the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi
forces from Kuwait, restoring the legitimate government of Kuwait,
releasing all the hostages, and maintaining the security and
stability of the Gulf region. We must achieve all of these
objectives.
Some critics of the Administration have questioned these
goals. In particular, they have questioned the morality of coming to
the defense of what they call a "feudal," "reactionary," and
"repressive" regime.
Quite frankly, I am always astonished whenever I hear these
charges made. First of all, the accusations against Kuwait are
false. Secondly, since when has it become acceptable to loot and
rape and torture people because they happen to live in a society
whose customs differ from our own? And since when have
Americans subscribed to a false, class-based morality that
classifies some groups as "reactionary," and therefore expendable,
and others as "progressive," and therefore beyond reproach?
This is precisely the warped and evil morality used by Stalin
and his henchmen to justify their infamous campaign of terror
during the 1930s. The people of the Soviet Union have turned their
backs on the morally demented legacy of Stalinism. And so shall
we.
The government of Kuwait is not the result of conspiracy and
coup d'etat, and its rule is not enforced by terror and repression.
The United States and the world, therefore, have no reason to
apologize for demanding that the legitimate government of Kuwait
be restored. Nor have we any reason to demand or accept anything
less than the total and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces
from Kuwait. These are legitimate demands. These are moral
demands. And these demands are not subject to negotiation.
International Support
In support of these demands, close to half a million troops are
gathered in the Persian Gulf. Today, over one-third of the troop
count is provided by our allies. But, some contributing nations are
providing proportionately a greater percentage of their military
forces than we are. Twenty-eight nations have committed military
support to the allied Persian Gulf effort. This support comes from
all quarters of the world, including members of the Warsaw Pact.
The majority of Muslim nations opposes the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait; 11 have committed military forces to the crisis. Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Syria lead in terms of numbers of troops and
equipment.
The UK has supported the allied effort in every way possible,
including tens of thousands of troops, squadrons of
fighter/bombers, and several navy vessels in the Gulf. The French
have been supportive, with more tens of thousands of committed
troops and equipment. Turkey, which borders the much larger Iraq,
from the outset courageously condemned the Iraqi invasion and
pledged to send troops into combat in event of an Iraqi attack. The
Germans and Japanese have pledged considerable sums of money.
The American people--like the international community as a
whole--understand and support our objectives. A majority of the
public approves of the President's decision to send troops to the
Persian Gulf. And an equally large majority believes that the United
States should, if need be, take all action necessary, including
military force, to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
The American people understand that Saddam Hussein's Iraq
poses a long-term threat not just to its neighbors but to us. They
know that over the past decade, Saddam Hussein has bankrupted his
people to bankroll his army. They know that he has launched two
wars of aggression, against Iran and against Kuwait, at the cost of
some 1 million lives--thus far. They know he is acquiring a sizable
stockpile of chemical and biological weapons, and has used
chemical weapons against both Iran and his own people. They know
he has launched an ambitious campaign to acquire nuclear weapons.
And they know that unless he is stopped today, a nuclear-armed Iraq
will control the bulk of the world's energy supply tomorrow,
thereby holding a gun to all our heads.
Because the President is determined to leave no stone
unturned in the search for peace, he has offered to send Secretary
of State Baker to Baghdad, and has invited Iraq's Foreign Minister
[Tariq Aziz] to Washington.
Unfortunately, Iraq's attempt to manipulate this process
makes it far from certain that these meetings will take place. But
one thing is certain. If Secretary Baker does go to Baghdad, his
message to Saddam Hussein will be loud and clear: You may leave
all of Kuwait peacefully, without conditions, or you will leave
Kuwait by force.
The Future
Once Iraqi forces have left Kuwait, however, and once the
legitimate Kuwaiti government has been restored, our job will still
not be over. We will have to work to see that the President's final
objective--maintaining security and stability in the region--is
achieved. We cannot allow a situation in which an aggressive
dictator has a million-man army, thousands of tanks and artillery
pieces, hundreds of jets, and access to billions of petro-dollars.
We cannot allow such a dictator credibly to threaten any of
his neighbors should they not meet his political and economic
demands. Neither we nor our friends in the region are prepared to
live with such a situation. Moreover, we cannot allow the
development of new and more deadly chemical and biological
weapons, and the long-range delivery systems to threaten every
nation in the region. And we can't allow the acquisition of an
indigenous nuclear weapons production capability--also deliverable
at long ranges.
Saddam's record makes it clear that he would not hesitate to
use these weapons, just as he has not hesitated to use chemical
weapons against his own people. And we are not willing to let that
happen.
That is why we intend to see all the President's objectives
attained, and all 12 UN Security Council resolutions carried out--
including UN Security Council Resolution 674, which declares Iraq
responsible for all damage resulting from its occupation of Kuwait.
Restoring the status quo ante would not be enough. Having
tried to erase an entire nation from the face of the earth, Saddam
cannot simply walk away without penalty and in a position to repeat
his aggression.
As for the United States, we will continue to play a positive
role in the region. Presidents Truman, Carter, and Reagan all
recognized that the US has vital interests in the Middle East. And
President Bush is fully determined to defend these interests.
As the President said in his September 11 speech to Congress
[See Dispatch,VOL. 1, No. 3]:
"Our interest, our involvement in the Gulf is not transitory. It
pre-dated Saddam Hussein's aggression and it will survive it. Long
after our troops come home. . . there will be a lasting role for the
United States in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf. Our role
then: To deter future aggression . . . to help our friends in their own
self-defense. . . and to curb the proliferation of chemical,
biological, ballistic missile, and above all nuclear technologies."
Of course, it won't be easy. Of course, we will all have our
work cut out for us. But failure to achieve our objectives is
unacceptable. Failure would mean that no future aggressor would be
deterred by warnings from the United States or the United Nations.
Failure would lead to a new, post-Cold War world more prone to
anarchy, and more violent, than the world which preceded it.
We will not fail. We will act decisively in defense of our
moral principles and strategic interests. And we will work
together to ensure the security of all the states in the region. This
is both the challenge and the opportunity facing us today.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Challenges Facing the Atlantic Alliance
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from North Atlantic Council intervention, NATO
headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
Date: Dec 17, 199012/17/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Country: Iraq, USSR (former)
Subject: NATO
[TEXT]
We meet here today as an alliance of peoples bound by common ties
of history and values. Today, I would like to concentrate my
remarks on three challenges that face the alliance:
-- First, Iraq's brutal occupation of Kuwait and the
international community's efforts to redress this aggression;
-- Second, the devolution and transformation of power in
Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; and
-- Third, NATO's continuing adaptation, including our internal
strategy review and the question of a European security identity.
Let me discuss each in turn.
Ending Iraq's Aggression Against Kuwait
We have spoken many times about the Gulf crisis and have strongly
agreed from the outset of the crisis that Iraq's aggression must be
reversed. We are also agreed that Saddam Hussein must not be seen
to gain in any way from his aggression.
Any hope for a new world order based on the rule of law, and
not the law of the jungle, depends on that. Any hope for peace in the
volatile Middle East depends on it--indeed, depends on
demonstrating that Saddam Hussein's way of doing business does
not work and cannot be the wave of the future in the area.
We want a peaceful conclusion to this crisis. And we believe
it is still possible. But it is possible only if Saddam Hussein
understands that if he does not get out of Kuwait, he will be forced
out.
President Bush has made it clear that we are prepared to
leave no stone unturned in seeking a peaceful solution. That is why
he offered to meet [Iraqi Foreign Minister] Tariq Aziz in Washington
and to send me to Baghdad to see Saddam Hussein. In making this
offer, the President was prepared to ensure that the Iraqis heard
directly from us the choices before them and the consequences of
their actions.
While being prepared to go the extra mile, the President was
not willing then nor is he now to be a party to Saddam Hussein's
manipulation. He was not prepared then or now to go along with an
effort to circumvent or dilute the January 15th deadline imposed in
Security Council Resolution 678.
We are still willing to meet. We are still willing to have
Tariq Aziz come to Washington to meet the President. The
President is still willing to send me to Baghdad. And he is still
willing to have me go on any one of 15 different dates, including
even Christmas or New Year's Day.
If after meeting any number of self-anointed envoys from
many, many countries on short notice, Saddam Hussein is not
willing to see me on any one of 15 dates, he is telling all of us that
he's interested not in communication but manipulation.
We are willing to communicate but not to play Saddam's
games. And no one else should, either. Everyone ought to be sending
the same message to Iraq:
-- Stop playing games on the meeting in Baghdad;
-- Accept the reality of your situation and the will of the
international community;
-- Understand that you cannot divide the international
community; and
-- Understand that the international community supports the
use of force if you refuse to comply fully with the Security Council
resolutions.
Communicating this, and making clear that there will be no
reward and no linkage to other issues, is essential to convincing
Saddam, one, that he cannot drive wedges between us and, two, that
time is running out.
A peaceful outcome depends on his seeing that he has only two
choices. Any meeting with the Iraqis should reinforce the starkness
of the choices, lest any miscommunication lead them to
miscalculate once again, thereby actually increasing the risk of
war.
I think we should anticipate that as we draw close to
Resolution 678's January 15 deadline and as the choices are
presented starkly, Saddam Hussein is likely to try to undercut the
collective will of the international community to use force. Just as
I believe he chose to release hostages for this purpose, I think he
may take a dramatic step on or around January 15. He could
withdraw partially.
We have all agreed that partial solutions or outcomes that are
conditioned or linked to other issues are unacceptable. We need to
anticipate Saddam's possible moves, be prepared for a partial
withdrawal ploy, and coordinate closely our responses.
Before discussing the Soviet Union, I would like to make a
critical point about responsibility-sharing in the Gulf, a region that
is vital to all of us. When I last spoke with you on this subject, we
had not yet augmented our forces in the Gulf to provide a credible
offensive capability. That was a very big decision for us--not in
abstract but human terms. It meant calling up reserves and dividing
tens of thousands of families. It means significant new economic
burdens for us. And it means real risks and real sacrifices by the
American people. It is in this context that we will be coming to you
again to discuss how we might responsibly share these additional
costs and risks.
Politically, we need to share responsibilities in helping our
publics understand this crisis as a test of a new world order and
our hopes for a new era of peace.
Economically, we need to share equitably the responsibility to
absorb the massive costs of this crisis for us, for the coalition
facing Iraq, and for nations which have suffered the most for
supporting the United Nations. I have spoken to you before about the
impact on one of our member states, Turkey. It's essential that the
commitments made to Turkey are fulfilled and even enhanced.
Militarily, we share responsibility to show Saddam Hussein
the choice he really faces and to carry through with the UN's
commitments.
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
I would like to turn now to another great challenge facing the West-
-our relations with a rapidly changing Soviet Union.
Let me make several observations:
First, as my Houston [Texas] meeting with [Soviet] Foreign
Minister [Eduard] Shevardnadze demonstrates, Moscow continues to
act as a solid partner on many important issues. The new thinking
has, in fact, become increasingly the new Soviet policy. We have a
partnership in the Gulf. On the Middle East, our discussions suggest
that the Soviets will support a practical, not simply a rhetorical or
symbolic approach to the peace process. On Angola, Afghanistan,
and El Salvador, we are moving closer to ending bloodshed and
achieving peace.
On START [strategic arms reduction talks], we made good
progress toward closing out our remaining differences on some
highly technical issues. We remain confident that we will have a
START treaty ready for signing when President Bush travels to
Moscow in February to meet with President Gorbachev.
Second, our response to the deteriorating Soviet internal
situation has been to provide short-term assistance to help the
Soviets get over this critical transition period. As the President
announced last Wednesday, our assistance will take the form of
medical supplies, guarantees for food credits, including a Jackson-
Vanik waiver, and technical economic help. We have also proposed
granting the Soviets special associate status in the IMF
[International Monetary Fund] and World Bank. Our assistance
complements that undertaken by many other members of the
alliance and the European Community.
In providing this assistance, we have sought to make it clear
to the Soviets that this must be transitional aid. We continue to
press them to ensure that any assistance the West provides is
consistent with their long-term objectives of democracy and a
market economy. This is especially important given the new,
critical stage we now see the Soviets entering domestically.
Third, the short-term question the Soviet leadership faces
now is not so much whether reform can succeed but whether
anarchy and chaos can be prevented. There is the danger that any
effort to respond to chaos by strengthening those sectors of Soviet
society that are more committed to centralized, command-style
solutions--especially the military and KGB--could have unintended
consequences.
Fourth, and finally, instability and chaos in the Soviet Union
are in no one's interest. But we are convinced that the only way to
ensure long-term stability is to continue, indeed accelerate, both
political and economic reform. It would be disastrous, for example,
for Moscow to crack down on the cooperatives and informal markets
that are springing up. That could have a chilling effect on economic
and political reform, exacerbating the problems Moscow faces.
Reform in Central and Eastern Europe has also reached a
critical stage. The easy steps have been taken. Only hard choices
remain. We must work together to ensure that the democratic
breakthroughs of 1989 do not become the breakdowns of 1991. As
we find billions for transitional assistance for the Soviet Union, we
cannot ignore those countries that have made the difficult decisions
for reform and have become laboratories for the success of this
democratic experiment.
The alliance must ensure that our liaison missions to the East
actually fulfill their purpose of drawing our former adversaries
into the democratic community of nations. The members of the
alliance, bilaterally and within CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe], must continue their efforts to support
democracy and market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. The
Gulf crisis has hit those governments particularly hard.
Guiding NATO's Continuing Adaptation
The third challenge is to guide NATO's continuing adaptation. Our
work over the past 18 months, especially at the London summit, has
accomplished a great deal and charted a course for further change.
Yet our most fundamental tasks still lie ahead: We need to
manage our success; we need to adapt ourselves to handle new
threats to our common security that we and our publics are still
only beginning to recognize.
My comments about Iraq, the Soviet Union, and Central and
Eastern Europe should leave no doubt that the world--indeed, the
world of Europe and its immediate environs--remains a place of
turmoil and danger.
Whereas our security focus has been riveted for 40 years on
the preponderant Soviet military threat to the East, I would contend
that today, and in the future, our collective focus must swing
through a wider arc.
I believe our task is fivefold:
First, we need to continue to offer insurance for our members
against dangers posed by the Soviet Union and its still considerable
conventional and nuclear capabilities. The nature of this danger has
undoubtedly changed, and our immediate task is to deal with Soviet
power, present and potential, by finding ways to bring the USSR into
a European order that supports democracy and stability.
Second, we have a strong common interest in promoting a
stable security environment throughout Europe--and especially in
Central and Eastern Europe--based on the growth of democratic
institutions and commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes.
Indeed, European security has been threatened many times before by
the spillover of political instability and conflict from lands just
outside your borders. The challenges--political, economic, and
security--of the struggling nations of Central and Eastern Europe
are our challenges, too. It's in our interest that those nations not
relive the bleak chapters of their history.
Third, we need to recognize that our member states face real
and potential direct threats to their territory from other
directions--in particular, from the south and the southeast. This is
evident in Turkey. It should be evident in the Mediterranean.
Fourth, Iraq's aggression in the tinderbox of the Middle East
certainly poses a danger to Western Europe that could be as
important as any direct threat to NATO territory. If we let
formalistic logic paralyze our efforts to adapt this alliance to meet
these kinds of dangers, we will simply repeat the deadly errors of
earlier generations. And this is not likely to be the last challenge
we face from that neighboring region.
Fifth, this alliance can serve--as provided for in Article IV of
the North Atlantic Treaty--as a transatlantic forum for allied
consultations on any issue that affects our vital interests and for
coordinating our efforts at arms procurement and arms control.
This should include work against the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, a danger that may be one of the most significant
and difficult security threats we face in the 1990s.
I am pleased that the London and Paris summits, through a
blend of political and security measures, have already marked much
progress for us in reorienting our alliance to meet this five-point
agenda. In particular, our evolving ties of peaceful cooperation
with the Soviet Union and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe
are healthy beginnings on which we must build.
But I think our strategy review is also revealing that to
reorient the alliance to meet this wider arc of security questions,
we also need to evaluate how Europe and North America will
organize their common security effort in years ahead. Our new
realism about a broader security agenda needs to be complemented
by a realistic appreciation of the interest in a European security
identity.
The United States has long supported a strengthened European
role within the alliance. So we welcome the prospect of sustaining
the transatlantic partnership on security affairs with a more
confident and united Europe--a partnership consonant with the
North Atlantic Treaty. We know that the common values that bind
us offer greater cohesion than any external threat.
Indeed, I believe a stronger European identity within the
alliance is all the more important given the changing security
agenda. We would be especially interested in how a European
defense identity might help meet those challenges I noted above
upon which NATO traditionally has not acted. In this respect, we
have noted with particular interest suggestions that the WEU
[Western European Union]--an organization that has twice responded
to threats in the Gulf region--might form the basis of such an
identity. A European pillar for the alliance building on the
experience of the WEU, could help us rise above the old and sterile
debate about "out-of-area" roles.
Developments on this issue are, of course, of fundamental
importance to the WEU and the EC [European Community]. These
developments also affect every individual ally seated at this table.
The path we take to arrive at a more mature security
relationship will have serious and enduring consequences for our
mutual relations and common security interests. We have to get it
right.
I recognize that the history of European integration has often
successfully relied on the launching of a visionary idea, pursued
thereafter through multiple, incremental, and difficult negotiations.
In this case, I believe the European process needs to proceed in a
fashion that ensures detailed consideration of its effects on related
institutions and allies.
A world order creating peace, ensuring stability, and fostering
prosperity and liberty cannot rest on a Europe divided from North
America. The new world order cannot afford an "insular" Europe or
an "isolationist" North America.
I am confident that if Europe intends to develop a security
identity, we can produce a more clearly defined, visible European
pillar that contributes to NATO's ability to handle its new security
challenges. To do so, I look forward to continuing close
consultations here as NATO's strategy review and parallel EC
processes proceed in coming months. It is imperative, as we
proceed along these new pathways, that our deliberations are open
and that our conclusions are arrived at through close, reinforcing
consultations among all of the nations and institutions involved.
The consensus of the past must be carried forward to the future.
We need to work together to make sure we get the
transatlantic relationship as right in the next 40 years, as it has
been for the past 40. If we coordinate now--at a time when many
embryonic ideas are on the table--we can ensure that a durable and
mature transatlantic partnership can emerge.
So to conclude, I look forward to this opportunity to discuss
in some detail both our immediate challenges and the guidance
needed to advance the political track of our strategy review. The
significant progress we've already made demonstrates that we are
up to the task, if we keep in mind the larger purposes and shared
values that have drawn us together.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Final Remarks From the European Community Summit Meeting
Description: Final Remarks issued by the EC, Rome, Italy
Date: Dec 16, 199012/16/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Iraq, Lebanon, Israel
Subject: EC
[TEXT]
Following is the text of the final remarks issued by the European
Community on December 16, 1990, in Rome, Italy.
1. The European Community and its Member States remain firmly
committed to full implementation of the UN Security Council
Resolutions. Complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the
restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty and of its legitimate government
remain the absolute conditions for a peaceful solution of the crisis.
2. Security Council Resolution 678 sends the clearest
possible signal to Iraq that the international community is
determined to ensure full restoration of international legality. The
responsibility lies on the Iraqi government to ensure peace for its
people by complying fully with the demands of the UN Security
Council, in particular by a complete withdrawal from Kuwait by 15
January.
3. The European Community and its Member States earnestly
hope that implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions
can be peacefully secured. To this end, they support a dialogue of
the sort President Bush has offered. They also favour action by the
UN Secretary General and hope that the UN Security Council's
Permanent Members will remain actively involved as well. They
wish Arab countries to continue to play an important role in the
efforts for a peaceful solution. The European Community and its
Member States underline the value of a contact between the
Presidency and the Foreign Minister of Iraq, aimed at securing, in
co-ordination with other members of the international community,
full compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions.
4. The European Council expresses relief at Iraq's decision to
release all foreign hostages, but underlines its deep concern at
Iraq's failure to withdraw, at its oppressive and inhuman occupation
of Kuwait and its attempt to destroy the fabric of the country.
Declaration on the Middle East
1. The European Council expresses its dismay at the continuing lack
of clear prospects for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to
the Palestinian problems, and at the renewed acts of terrorism and
violence. It expresses its deep concern at the rising
incomprehension and tension in the Occupied Territories. It renews
its call to the parties concerned to refrain from violence that can
only engender new violence. It expresses its concern about the
Israeli practices of collective reprisals, such as the destruction of
houses or restrictions on freedom of movement, and deplores the
recent decision to place moderate Palestinians under
Administrative arrest.
The European Council calls once again on Israel to comply with
Resolutions 672 and 673 of the UN Security Council, to act in
conformity with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention
on the Protection of the Civilian Population, and to co-operate with
the United Nations. It welcomes the recommendations by the UN
Secretary-General in this regard and fully supports every effort of
the UN Security Council to achieve a better protection of the
Palestinian population and to promote peace in the area. It
reaffirms the determination of the European Community and its
Member States to further assist the Palestinian population in its
serious plight.
2. The European Council reiterates its longstanding
commitment to a just and lasting solution to these problems, in
conformity with the relevant Resolutions of the UN Security Council
and with the principles expressed by the European Community in its
previous Declarations. To this end, the European Council reaffirms
its support for the principle of convening, at an appropriate time, an
international peace conference under the auspices of the UN.
3. The serious deterioration in the economic situation in the
Occupied Territories is a source of great concern to the Community.
In this connection, the European Council reaffirms its commitment
to the economic and social development of the Palestinian people
and considers that, in the new circumstances, the doubling of
Community aid to the Occupied Territories decided on by the
Strasbourg European Council appears particularly appropriate and
timely.
The European Council also considers it vital for all efforts to
be made to create the conditions for facilitating and increasing
trade between the Occupied Territories and the Community.
4. As expressed in its Declaration of 28 October 1990, the
European Council remains convinced that relations of mutual
confidence and co-operation must be encouraged among the
countries of the region, with a view to establishing a situation of
stability, security, economic and social well-being, and respect for
civil and political rights, to forestalling the recurrence of crises,
and to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The
European Community and its Member States remain ready actively to
co-operate with the concerned countries to achieve these goals and
to contribute to the success of the task entrusted by relevant
Resolutions to the UN Secretary General to examine measures to
enhance security and stability in the region. In this connection, the
European Council reaffirms the importance of meaningful and
constructive Euro-Arab Dialogue.
Declaration on Lebanon
The European Council expresses its satisfaction at the
implementation of the security plan in greater Beirut following the
withdrawal of all militias from the Lebanese capital. It expresses
the hope that the recent developments can foster the process of
national reconciliation and lead to the full implementation of the
Taif Agreements, thus bringing about the restoration of the
sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of a
Lebanon free of all foreign troops and enabling the Lebanese people
to express their will through free elections.
It appeals to the parties concerned to release all remaining
hostages.
The European Community and its Member States reaffirm their
commitment to help provide Lebanon with the assistance needed to
build its future and view favourably the participation of the
Community in the pledging conference for the creation of a Lebanon
Assistance Fund.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Chronology: Baker-Shevardnadze Meetings
Description: HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Date: Dec 24, 199012/24/90
Category: Chronologies
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Arms Control, Trade/Economics, Human Rights
[TEXT]
The following was prepared by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of
Public Affairs.
March 7, 1989--Vienna
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held
introductory meetings at the conventional armed forces in Europe
(CFE) negotiations. They discussed all aspects of the existing US-
Soviet agenda, including arms control, human rights, regional
conflicts, and bilateral ties. They also agreed to expand the agenda
to include transnational issues. Secretary Baker expressed hope for
the success of perestroika.
May 10-11, 1989--Moscow
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held their first
full ministerial with working groups. They discussed regional
problems, human rights, bilateral matters, and transnational
questions. They agreed on dates for resuming bilateral arms talks
and set a new cycle of meetings between regional experts.
July 29, 1989--Paris
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met on the eve
of opening of the Paris Conference on Cambodia. They held a
discussion on a wide range of subjects, both bilateral and
multilateral, including Cambodia and other regional issues.
September 22-23, 1989--Jackson, Wyoming
At this second full ministerial, Secretary Baker and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze discussed the entire spectrum of US-Soviet
relations. They issued a detailed statement describing the specific
agreements or understandings they reached in areas such as arms
control, bilateral questions, and transnational issues.
December 2-3, 1989--Malta
In addition to participating in the shipboard summit meeting near
Malta, where President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev discussed
arms control, trade issues, Soviet emigration, and European issues,
the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also met
separately to discuss a number of these issues and preparations for
the June 1990 summit.
February 7-9, 1990--Moscow
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held ministerial
talks as part of preparations for a second US-Soviet summit to be
held in the United States in June. A broad range of issues on the
US-Soviet agenda was reviewed. Specific agreements were reached
on arms control and in other areas.
February 12-13, 1990--Ottawa
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held talks at the
"open skies" conference, with focus on development of the Two-
Plus-Four mechanism for discussion of external aspects of German
unification. They also reached agreement on CFE manpower ceilings.
March 20, 1990--Windhoek, Namibia
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, attending
Namibia independence day ceremonies, discussed Lithuania's
declaration of independence, Afghanistan, German unification, and
arms control.
April 4-6, 1990--Washington, DC
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held a full
ministerial meeting to continue their preparations for the summit.
They discussed the full range of US-Soviet issues, with special
attention to Lithuania and arms control.
May 4, 1990--Bonn, West Germany
On the eve of the Two-Plus-Four ministerial, Secretary Baker and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met for several hours to discuss
German unification and other US-Soviet questions.
May 16-19, 1990--Moscow
In their final preparatory session before the summit, Secretary
Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reviewed all issues on the
US-Soviet agenda, with special focus on those agreements being
prepared for signature at the summit. In addition, Lithuania and
German unification received considerable attention.
May 30-June 3, 1990--Washington, DC
In addition to participating in the wide-ranging summit meetings
between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, the Secretary and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze met separately to discuss German
unification and START [strategic arms reduction] issues.
June 5, 1990--Copenhagen
On the margins of the CSCE's [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Conference on the Human Dimension, the
Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze continued their
dialogue on German unification.
June 22, 1990--Berlin
In addition to participating in the Two-Plus-Four ministerial,
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met separately
to discuss European and regional issues and the forthcoming NATO
summit, as well as German unification.
July 17-18, 1990--Paris
At the third Two-Plus-Four ministerial, Secretary Baker and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze participated in discussions on
German unification, including the East and West German guarantee
to accept the post-World War II German-Polish border. The
Secretary and Foreign Minister also discussed the Soviet Union's
party congress, conventional forces in Europe, Kashmir, Cambodia,
and US technical assistance cooperation for Soviet economic
reforms.
August 1-2, 1990--Irkutsk, USSR
Meeting in this southern Siberian city, Secretary Baker and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze focused their attention on matters
pertaining to the East Asian region--overall stability, security, the
need to eliminate military confrontation, and establishing bilateral
and multilateral cooperation in the area. Their discussions also
covered Afghanistan, German unification, preparations for the CSCE
ministerial conference, economic and technological issues, arms
control, the Moscow summit, and other regional issues.
August 3, 1990--Moscow
Cutting short his visit to Mongolia, Secretary Baker went to Moscow
to confer with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze about Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait. At the conclusion of their meeting, they issued a joint
statement calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops
and the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty and national
independence.
September 9, 1990--Helsinki
After visiting several Middle Eastern countries, Secretary Baker
joined President Bush for a meeting with President Gorbachev and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The primary focus was to discuss
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The two leaders issued a joint statement
in which they called for the complete implementation of five
recent UN Security Council resolutions, the unconditional
withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's
legitimate government, and the release of all hostages from Iraq
and Kuwait. The US and Soviet Union agreed also to consider
additional steps allowable under the UN Charter if the economic
sanctions and naval interdiction against Iraq fail.
September 11-13, 1990--Moscow
At the final session of the Two-Plus-Four consultations, the World
War II Allied Powers (France, USSR, UK, US) and East and West
Germany signed a treaty relinquishing all Allied occupation rights
over the two Germanys and Berlin, paving the way for the
unification of East and West Germany on October 3 and giving a
united Germany full sovereignty over its internal and external
affairs. In separate bilateral meetings, Secretary Baker and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed the issues remaining to
wrap up the conventional armed forces in Europe treaty and a
"security structure" for the Persian Gulf.
September 26-October 5, 1990--New York City
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met five times
on the fringes of UNGA and the CSCE ministerial talks. They cleared
the major hurdles to a CFE agreement--notably the issue of the
number of aircraft allowed on each side--and made what Secretary
Baker termed "good progress" toward a START agreement as well.
On October 3, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
signed a joint statement committing the US and USSR to support UN
efforts to settle international disputes. The two ministers also
joined their counterparts from France and the UK in relinquishing
their countries' post-war treaty rights in Germany, clearing the
way for formal German unification which occurred on October 3. In
addition, they discussed the crisis in the Persian Gulf.
November 8, 1990--Moscow
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed arms
control issues and the Persian Gulf crisis. On START, they made
progress on the issue of non-circumvention, and they settled a
number of technical questions remaining on zonal issues for CFE.
November 18-21, 1990--Paris
In a series of meetings held around the CSCE summit, Secretary
Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze focused their discussions
on a possible UN Security Council resolution concerning the use of
military force against Iraq.
November 28, 1990--New York City
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed the
upcoming UN Security Council vote on a resolution on the use of
military force against Iraq.
November 29, 1990--New York City
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze attend a dinner
meeting of the five UN Security Council permanent representatives
(China, France, UK, US, USSR).
December 9-12, 1990--Houston and Washington, DC
Secretary Baker's and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's agenda for
discussions included emergency economic assistance to the Soviet
Union, technical issues related to a START treaty, disposition of
Soviet military hardware called for in the CFE Treaty, upcoming US
meetings with Iraqi officials, and regional issues (Middle East,
Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Central America, and Cuba).(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Resignation of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Dec 20, 199012/20/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
Minister Shevardnadze's resignation and warning, I think, has to be
taken seriously. In my experience, Minister Shevardnadze has
always worked as a professional who served his country's interests.
He was in the forefront of the new thinking in foreign policy and
democratization at home, and I think that he has earned the respect
of leaders all around the world.
We are pleased that President Gorbachev has said that there
will be no change in Soviet foreign policy. Since the US-Soviet
partnership serves the interests of peace internationally and the
process of reform domestically, we, of course, expect that to be the
case, and we will be watching events closely in the weeks ahead.
As the President has often stated, our new relationship with
the Soviet Union depends on its continuing commitment to
democratization and to reform. On a personal note, let me say that I
have known Eduard Shevardnadze to be a man of his word; a man of
courage, conviction, and principle. I'm convinced that he is
committed to peaceful reform, political and economic, in the Soviet
Union, and I'm also convinced that the dramatic moves toward
democratization and freedom in Central and Eastern Europe and the
new thinking in Soviet foreign policy would never have happened
without his and President Gorbachev's courageous leadership.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: UN Security Council Resolution 681 on Israel
Date: Dec 20, 199012/20/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: United Nations, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
Resolution 681 (December 20, 1990)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming the obligations of member states under the
United Nations Charter,
Reaffirming further the principle of the inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory by war set forth in Security Council
Resolution 242 (1967),
Having received the report of the Secretary-General submitted
in accordance with Security Council Resolution 672 (1990) on ways
and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian
civilians under Israeli occupation and in particular taking note of
paragraphs 20-26 therein (S/21919),
Taking note of the interest of the Secretary-General to visit
and send his envoy to pursue his initiative with the Israeli
authorities, as indicated in paragraph 22 of the report of the
Secretary-General (S/21919), and of their recent invitation
extended to him,
Gravely concerned at the dangerous deterioration of the
situation in all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since
1967, including Jerusalem, and at the violence and rising tension in
Israel,
Taking into consideration the statement made by the
President of the Security Council on December 1990 concerning the
method and approach for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in
the Arab-Israeli conflict,
Recalling its resolutions 607 (1988), 608 (1988), 636 (1989)
and 641 (1989) and alarmed by the decision of the Government of
Israel to deport four Palestinians from the occupied territories in
contravention of its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention,
1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his
report contained in document S/21919;
2. Expresses its grave concern over the rejection by Israel of
Security Council resolutions 672 (1990) and 673 (1990);
3. Deplores the decision by the Government of Israel, the
occupying power, to resume deportations of Palestinian civilians in
the occupied territories;
4. Urges the Government of Israel to accept de jure
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, to all the
territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and to abide scrupulously
by the provisions of the said Convention;
5. Calls on the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949 to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying
power, for its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention in
accordance with Article 1;
6. Requests the Secretary-General in cooperation with the
International Committee of the Red Cross to develop further the
idea from the report of the Secretary-General (S/21919) of
convening a meeting of the high contracting parties to the Fourth
Geneva Convention and to discuss possible measures that might be
taken by them under the Convention and for this purpose to invite
these parties to submit their views on how the idea could
contribute to the goals of the Convention as well as on other
relevant matters and to report to the Council;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to monitor and observe the
situation regarding Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation,
making new efforts in this regard on an urgent basis, and to utilize
and designate or draw upon the United Nations and other personnel
and resources present there in the area and elsewhere needed to
accomplish this task and to keep the Security Council regularly
informed;
8. Requests further the Secretary-General to submit a first
progress report to the Security Council by the first week of March
1991, and every four months thereafter and decides to remain
seized of the matter as
necessary. [VOTE: Unanimous].
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: The Situation in the Occupied Territories
Pickering
Source: Thomas R. Pickering, US Permanent Representative to
the UN
Description: Statement before the UN Security Council, New York City
Date: Dec 20, 199012/20/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel
Subject: United Nations
[TEXT]
Mr. President [Al-Ashtal, Permanent Representative for Yemen], the
United States has supported this text [Resolution 681]. However, I
want to make it perfectly clear that there are a number of elements
in the text which cause us concern. There are also elements that
are not in the text which ought to have been. The council ought to
be willing to say to the Palestinians that any use of violence to
achieve their ends is plain wrong. We lament the continued
violence, particularly in Israel, where innocent people have been the
victims of numerous stabbings.
The Security Council began this debate several months ago
with the intention of achieving a resolution concerning the
protection of Palestinians in the occupied territories, and that is
what we have achieved today. This has only been accomplished
after long, excruciating, intensive consultations among members of
this council. It has taken us far too long to reach this point. Far
too much of our energy was spent to the detriment of the other
pressing issues facing this council, including having to deal with
proposals that would have done nothing to improve the situation in
the occupied territories.
Nonetheless, I express my appreciation to those of my
colleagues who engaged in these intensive consultations in good
faith to achieve a text we all could support, especially
Ambassadors Tornudd [Permanent Representative for Finland] and
Razali [Deputy Permanent Representative for Finland].
US Views on the Resolution
Let there be no mistake, however, our vote for this resolution is
designed to demonstrate--as we have done all along--our deep
concern about the situation in the occupied territories. Our vote
today in no way indicates a change in US policy on any issue related
to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
First
, we have made clear that the United
States has not changed its position on an international conference
on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Secretary Baker has said, and I quote:
"We have not in any way or to any extent or to any degree
shifted our policy regarding the question of an international
conference."
First of all we have taken the position for a long time that an
international conference, properly structured, at an appropriate
time, might be useful....
We are not now recommending that an international
conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict be held, nor are we
supporting a resolution in the Security Council that would seek to
convene such a conference.
Precisely because of our consistent position that we will not
link the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli dispute, this is certainly
not an appropriate time for an international conference."
Indeed, in consultations on the resolution before us today, we
have turned aside efforts that would have linked this resolution to
the crisis in the Gulf. Saddam Hussein has tried to link the idea of
an international conference to his invasion of Kuwait, and the
Council has deprived him of any satisfaction in this regard. Saddam
Hussein did not invade Kuwait to benefit Palestinians; he did so for
his own self-aggrandizement. Nor should Saddam be rewarded for
this aggression by being made to appear as a savior of the
Palestinian people. Nothing could be further from the truth. If
anything, Saddam's actions have set back the pursuit of peace and
taken Palestinians farther than ever from their goal. Linkage of the
solution to the gulf crisis with the Arab-Israeli conflict would not
only be wrong; it undercuts the efforts of the international
community to reverse Iraq's aggression as evidenced by the 12
resolutions this body had passed against the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait.
Second
, the United States has consistently
maintained that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to all of the
territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The United States has
supported the position here at the United Nations, and we urge the
government of Israel--in fulfillment of its obligation as a high
contracting party, and in accordance with its responsibilities under
Article 1 of the convention--to ensure respect for the convention
and to accept its de jure application and its provisions. As stated
in the past, the United States regards the phrase "Palestinian
territories occupied by Israel since 1967," which appears in this
resolution, as being merely demographically and geographically
descriptive and not indicative of sovereignty.
Finally
, Mr. President, the US position on
deportations has not changed. Indeed, during the course of the
council's consideration of this issue, the government of Israel
announced its intention to resume deportations. The United States
deplores this decision. We believe that such deportations are a
violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention as it pertains to the
treatment of inhabitants of occupied territories. We condemn the
increasing attacks on Israelis and the deaths which have resulted,
just as we condemn attacks on Palestinians. Violence is not the
way forward; neither, however, are deportations an effective or
acceptable answer to violence. We strongly urge the government of
Israel to immediately and permanently cease deportations, and to
comply fully with the Fourth Geneva Convention in all of the
territories it has occupied since June 5, 1967.
The tragic events that have prompted this latest round of
Security Council resolutions on the dangerous deterioration of the
situation in the occupied territories occurred against a background
of increasing violence. We call on all sides to exercise maximum
restraint so as to avoid further violence and bloodshed.
I also want to take this opportunity to clarify for the record
US views on several elements of this resolution. The resolution
requests the Secretary General to invite the high contracting
parties to the Geneva conventions to submit their views on the idea
of convening a meeting of the high contracting parties and looks
forward to receiving those views. As a high contracting party, my
government has serious questions whether such a meeting
realistically can help to improve the conditions of the Palestinians
in the occupied territories. A premature decision to convene such a
conference invites uncertainty and confusion that, in the end, could
undermine rather than contribute to the safety and protection of the
Palestinians under Israeli occupation and, more generally, could
have adverse impacts on the future implementation of the
conventions.
US Support for Secretary General's Efforts
The United States strongly supports the ongoing efforts of the
Secretary General [Perez de Cuellar] to monitor and report on the
situation in the occupied territories. Nonetheless, my government
wants to explain its view regarding the scope of the council's
request that the Secretary General utilize available personnel of
various UN organizations in the region and elsewhere for this
purpose. UN personnel in the area are mostly employees of UNTSO
[United Nations Truce Supervision Organization] and UNRWA [United
Nations Relief and Works Agency (for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East)], organizations with separate and well-defined mandates. No
activity should be undertaken that would alter those mandates,
which remain in force, and we would oppose any attempt to alter
them.
We are pleased to note that the government of Israel has
invited the Secretary General to send his envoy again to Israel and
the occupied territories. We strongly hope this visit will take place
soon and that his efforts can lead to a genuine amelioration of the
situation for Palestinians in the territories and an end to the
bloodshed between Israelis and Palestinians.
For our part, the US reaffirms it commitment and
determination to support an active negotiating process leading to a
comprehensive, just and lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict
based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)
of the Security Council, and which should take into account the
right to security of all states in the region, including Israel, and the
legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. This process
of negotiations between the parties concerned is the only way that
will advance the cause of peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and all
of our efforts should be actively focused on renewing this process.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Security Council Presidential Statement, December 20, 1990
Date: Dec 20, 199012/20/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: United Nations, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
The members of the Security Council reaffirm their determination
to support an active negotiating process in which all relevant
parties would participate leading to a comprehensive, just and
lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict through negotiations
which should be based on resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of
the Security Council and which should take into account the right to
security of all states in the region, including Israel, and the
legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people.
In this context they agree that an international conference, at
an appropriate time, properly structured, should facilitate efforts
to achieve a negotiated settlement and lasting peace in the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
However, the members of the Council are of the view that
there is not unanimity as to when would be the appropriate time for
such a conference.
In the view of the members of the Council, the Arab-Israeli
conflict is important and unique and must be addressed
independently on its own merits.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Feature: State Department Helps US Space Program Meet
Future Challenges
Date: Dec 24, 199012/24/90
Category: Features
Subject: Science/Technology
[TEXT]
When Secretary Baker hosted Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze at the December 9-12, 1990 ministerial talks in
Houston, Texas, he escorted the Soviet official on a tour of NASA's
Johnson Space Center. In a telephone hook-up with the orbiting US
space shuttle Columbia, Mr. Shevardnadze told the astronauts that
their mission would benefit the human race.
Mr. Shevardnadze's comment echoed President Bush's view
that space exploration is "vitally important to our nation's future
and the quality of life on Earth." In addition, the visit to Johnson
Space Center by the Secretary and Mr. Shevardnadze underscored the
important role that diplomats will play in charting the priorities of
space exploration in the 21st century.
The Department of State plays a key, but largely unheralded,
role in America's space program through its membership on the
National Space Council. That inter-agency group, chaired by Vice
President Quayle, develops and coordinates US space policy and
monitors its implementation.
The council's national policy goals call for expanding human
presence and activities beyond the Earth's orbit into the solar
system; obtaining scientific, technological, and economic benefits
for the American people; enhancing US security; encouraging private
sector participation in space; improving the quality of life on Earth;
and promoting international cooperation in space.
The global aspects are of special concern to the Department's
representative on the council, Reginald Bartholomew, Under
Secretary for International Security Affairs. Ambassador
Bartholomew, supported by the Office of Advanced Technology in the
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, ensures that US space policy reflects America's foreign
policy goals and international interests.
"The space program plays a positive role in enhancing
American influence and prestige, especially with our Pacific and
European allies," says Under Secretary Bartholomew. "It also serves
to demonstrate America's continuing commitment to technological,
economic, and political leadership."
The space program is an excellent vehicle for cooperation
with longstanding allies, such as Western Europe and Japan, and for
the development of new ties to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
"Cooperation in space activities offers great potential for
reinforcing cohesion among the Western allies," he notes. "Such
cooperation can help the United States acquire resources and
technology from abroad to achieve our goals more rapidly." Space
cooperation with the Soviet Union, provided it is properly
coordinated with US allies, also can play a positive foreign policy
role by contributing to better East-West relations, Mr. Bartholomew
adds.
Space Station Freedom, which is planned for construction in
the 1990s, is a US priority. Several US space station partners--
Western Europe, Japan, and Canada--have major shares of their
space budgets tied to the project, which makes it crucial from a
foreign policy standpoint that the United States provide sustained
funding for its part of the program.
"If the space station succeeds as a cooperative venture, we
can look forward to broader and deeper cooperation with other
countries on the ambitious space missions that surely will take
place beyond the year 2000," says Mr. Bartholomew.
Among the missions in the next century will be those carried
out as part of the Space Exploration Initiative, which President
Bush has described as "a challenging vision of America's future in
space." The initiative calls for Americans to establish a permanent
presence on the moon, where they can learn about living and working
on an alien surface under harsh conditions. The initiative then
envisions robotic and human missions to Mars to study the planet
and search for signs of life, past and present.
In 1991, the United States will begin an exploratory dialogue
with other governments on the prospects for international
cooperation on these ambitious missions of the future. The
Department of State will lead the talks from the US side.
The initiative will produce scientific advancements that
benefit all countries. The moon is an ideal location for
astronomical observations, planetary geology, and life sciences
research. On Mars, scientists will be able to learn more about
planetary evolution, climate change, and the origin of life.
Another program that attracts the Department's attention is
Mission to Planet Earth, under which satellites will be launched to
observe long-term environmental changes on the planet. The goal is
to formulate policies to ameliorate any negative effects of changes
in the Earth's environment.
"International cooperation on the Mission to Planet Earth is
critical to augment research conducted by the United States," says
Bartholomew. "The Department is working to define the scope and
the nature of participation by other countries in this project."
Space exploration already meets many modern needs around
the world, Bartholomew points out, such as new communication,
navigation, and other services that knit together people and
countries more effectively than ever before. Space is used to
preserve US security through satellite reconnaissance and treaty
verification. And space efforts have helped people everywhere by
fueling the world's economic engines, advancing human health
through biomedical research, improving communications around the
globe, and using satellites to observe and predict weather and to
assess environmental changes.
"America's future is linked to our efforts in space," says
Under Secretary Bartholomew. "The Department plays a key role in
helping achieve international cooperation, economic benefits, and
the other goals of US national space policy."
--Jim Pinkelman, Dispatch Staff
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 17, December 24, 1990
Title: Space Exploration Initiative
Date: Dec 24, 199012/24/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Subject: Science/Technology
[TEXT]
On July 20, 1989, the 20th anniversary of the Apollo moon landing,
President Bush announced his long-range goals for human
exploration of the moon and Mars. He asked the National Space
Council to develop a strategy for achieving those goals.
The result is the Space Exploration Initiative, a challenging
vision of America's future that will enable the American people to
journey toward a permanent human presence beyond Earth.
To achieve that goal, the initiative envisions a three-step
process:
-- Construction of Space Station Freedom in Earth orbit;
-- Establishment of a permanent base on the moon; and
-- A landing on Mars.
Space Station Freedom
Space Station Freedom, which is to be constructed in the 1990s,
will be a permanently occupied orbiting base that will help
maintain US space leadership in the 21st century. In September
1988, the United States, Japan, Canada, and nine members of the
European Space Agency signed an agreement pledging to work
together to build and operate the space station.
The station's goals are to:
-- Contribute to US pre-eminence in critical aspects of
manned spaceflight;
-- Provide support for scientific and technological research;
-- Provide early benefits, particularly in materials and life
sciences;
-- Promote private-sector activity and participation in
space;
-- Contribute to the long-term goal of expanding human
presence beyond Earth's orbit into the solar system.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 18, December 31, 1990
Title: US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement
Date: Dec 31, 199012/31/90
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: North America
Country: Mexico
Subject: Trade/Economics, North America Free Trade
[TEXT]
The governments of the United States and Mexico are preparing to
negotiate a historic free trade and investment agreement. Such an
agreement would be a catalyst for economic growth and
development in both countries. The two neighbors would obtain
significant benefits from increased trade, investment, and jobs.
US Goals
The US government seeks a broad agreement to eliminate
restrictions on the flow of goods, services, and investment between
the United States and Mexico. US objectives include:
-- Reduction of tariffs to zero over a period of years (the
period is 10 years in the US-Canada FTA);
-- Elimination (as far as possible) of nontariff barriers on
goods and services;
-- Ensuring an open investment climate; and
-- Full protection of intellectual property rights (patents,
copyrights, and trademarks).
Expanded Trade
Mexico is our third largest trade partner with bilateral commerce
of $52 billion in 1989. An FTA would lead to expanded trade with
Mexico and the creation of additional jobs for US workers. It would
give US exporters unrestricted access to a Mexican market of 81
million people, which may reach 100 million by the year 2000.
Mexico purchases more than two-thirds of its imports from the
United States. Traditional US competitive advantages--geographic,
cultural, and historic links--in this important market would be
further enhanced by an FTA.
As the Mexican economy grows, a substantial part of the
increased income--as much as 15%--is spent on US goods and
services. Strong Mexican growth is expected because of President
Salinas' economic reforms. Mexico's middle class is increasing as a
percentage of the total population; this means more consumers for
American products.
The United States benefits from expanded trade. For each
additional $1 billion in real net exports, about 25,000 new US jobs
are created. About two-thirds of US economic growth in 1988 can
be attributed to trade. Increased exports have helped the US
economy expand out of recessions in the past.
The United States and Mexico are consulting with Canada to
determine how it might participate in the US-Mexico trade
negotiations. A North American free trade area encompassing all
three countries would constitute the world's largest market, with
annual production of more than $6 trillion and with almost 370
million consumers.
Investment
The United States is the source for 65% ($25 billion) of foreign
direct investment in Mexico. Therefore, the US government has a
strong interest in encouraging favorable conditions for new and
expanded investments in Mexico. US firms investing there tend to
use US suppliers and designing and managerial talent. Overall US
and Mexican competitiveness in international markets would be
enhanced by the opportunities offered by an FTA.
In May 1989, President Salinas expanded foreign ownership
(in many cases up to as much as 100%) in sectors accounting for
nearly two-thirds of Mexico's economic output. He also streamlined
the approval process for foreign investments. An FTA would further
enhance the investment climate facing US firms in Mexico.
The further partnerships and alliances in industrial
agriculture and service sectors that an open trade and investment
climate will foster can take advantage of the complementary
strengths of our two economies. The result will be that we will
both be more competitive against third country competition in our
own markets and abroad--and that translates into more jobs and
investment in the US and Mexico alike.
US Foreign Policy Benefits
Mexico is a close neighbor and friend, and an FTA would strengthen
our good relationship. Mexico also is important as the cornerstone
of a comprehensive Western Hemisphere policy. A US-Mexico FTA,
added to the existing US-Canada FTA, would give further substance
to President Bush's long-range vision of a hemisphere-wide free
trade area. Mexico's example of market-oriented economic reform
is a significant role model for other developing countries.
Steps Toward an FTA
--June 1990. Presidents Bush and Salinas announce their mutual
goal of a comprehensive FTA.
--August 1990. President Salinas formally requests negotiations.
--September 1990. President Bush notifies the US Congress of US
intent to enter into negotiations with Mexico.
--Spring 1991. Following notification, the House Ways and Means
and Senate Finance Committees have 60 legislative days (i.e., until
spring 1991) during which they can disallow the use of "fast-track"
procedures. (Under these procedures, Congress can only approve
without amendments or reject the bill implementing an FTA.)
--Spring or Summer 1991. Formal negotiations begin after the
expiration of the 60-day requirement and are expected to conclude
in 1992.(###)