US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 12, November 19, 1990
Title: Democratic Change in Africa
Cohen
Source: Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Description: Address to the African American Institute, Washington,
DC
Date: Nov 8, 199011/8/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Subsaharan Africa
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
I am pleased that the African-American Institute has offered me
the opportunity to discuss "Democratic Change in Africa."
This is, indeed, a time of positive change in Africa, and not
only in the realm of politics. Africa is changing its economic
orientation and its approach to international relations. All of these
changes are mutually reinforcing and all are supported by the US
government, as well as by Africa's many friends among the
American people.
Democracy and market economics have made huge gains
throughout the world in the past few years, and their triumph has
helped to create a new climate in international relations, a climate
of cooperation and deepening commitment to collective security.
Economically, Africa began to move toward free-market policies
even before the peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe. Positive
political change had a headstart in Eastern Europe and Latin
America, but now Africa, too, has responded to the global rebirth of
hope for freedom.
Some African countries began to abandon the outworn statist
economic model as early as 1985. Now, almost 30 African
countries have embarked on an economic transformation by
implementing structural reforms designed to place them on the path
to sustained economic growth. Throughout the continent, nations
are beginning to foresee the benefits of decentralizing their
economies.
As Secretary Baker noted in his remarks to OAU [Organization
of African Unity] heads of delegation at this year's UNGA [UN
General Assembly], US support for Africa's economic transformation
has been continuous and substantial. For example, several years ago
we placed our development assistance on a grant basis. And we
already have forgiven more than $800 million in old economic
assistance debt owed by African countries implementing economic
reform programs.
But we believe that sustained, self-generated economic
growth can take place only in a political environment that allows
people to have confidence in their government and their future.
Africans, too, have come to realize that development and
democracy go hand-in-hand, and that is one of primary reasons for
the wave of democratic reform that is sweeping the continent
today. As the 1990 OAU summit communique pointed out, Africa's
economic transformation depends on the "participation of our
peoples in the process of government. We accordingly recommit
ourselves to the further democratization of our societies and the
consolidation of democratic institutions in our countries."
Of course, the linkage between democracy and development is
not the only reason that African countries are rejecting
authoritarianism and turning to pluralism.
Africans Have Early Start on Democracy
Democracy had a foothold in Africa even before the recent stunning
events in Eastern Europe. Botswana, The Gambia, Mauritius, and
Senegal are longstanding examples of African pluralism. Their
success and the success of Namibia's multi-party elections, as well
as the collapse of the authoritarian one-party model throughout
Latin America, the Pacific Rim, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union
itself, have inspired other African countries to take another look at
their political systems.
In some countries, wise leaders realized that the
authoritarian model was bankrupt, that it acted to inhibit rather
than promote economic growth, to exacerbate rather than diminish
ethnic tensions. These leaders chose to become architects, rather
than victims, of change.
But in most cases, the impetus for change came from below.
It came from the workers and the unions, the clergy and the
churches, the students and the universities. In short, it came from
the people of Africa.
Like people everywhere, Africans want and need freedom. And
they want what the one-party model has so singularly failed to
provide: government based on the equality of all groups rather than
dominance by or favoritism toward one; leaders interested in
national development rather than the limited perspectives of
patronage politics; economic policies that promote rather than
preclude individual enterprise.
It is, of course, too early to predict whether Africa's
movement toward political pluralism will continue, or even whether
the gains made so far can be sustained. But I believe that there is
cause for optimism because the impetus for change has come from
the people. And now that change has begun, the people are likely to
keep the pressure on.
Pace of Change Is Rapid
The pace of democratic change in Africa over the past year and a
half has been remarkable. And it continues to accelerate.
Independent Namibia was born as a democracy. Gabon already has
held multi-party legislative elections. Nigeria, Africa's most
populous state, continues to move toward the restoration of civilian
democratic rule, with national elections scheduled for 1992. Benin,
Mozambique, and Angola have renounced Marxism-Leninism in favor
of multi-party democracy. Many other African states, including
Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Lesotho, and Zambia are
undertaking or actively considering democratic reforms. The list
goes on, and it gets longer almost by the day.
The debate within Africa on the correct path of democracy
often emphasizes the issue of tribalism. Opponents of multi-party
structures say that ethnicity in Africa is so strong that multi-party
systems inevitably degenerate into tribal hatred. I believe that the
United States, with its long experience with ethnic politics, can
teach Africans something about this significant phenomenon. It is
my personal feeling that strong ethnic identity should be recognized
in politics rather than suppressed. Single-party structures often
slide into mono-ethnic power monopolies. Pluralistic structures,
by their very nature, require ethnic balance, coalitions, and
compromise. As someone who votes in the state of New York, I feel
I have first-hand knowledge of the role of ethnic politics in
democracy.
I do not need to tell this audience that the United States is
heartened by the democratic trend in Africa, that we are as pleased
by the steps African countries are taking to discard outworn
ideologies for free markets and democratic reforms as we are by
democratic triumphs elsewhere in the world. But some Africans,
and some Americans as well, have expressed concern that events in
Eastern Europe are shifting US attention away from Africa. This is
simply not the case.
As President Bush remarked at the IMF [International Monetary
Fund]-World Bank meeting in Washington this September, the United
States is strongly committed to promoting development and growth
in the newly emerging democracies of Africa," as well as those of
Latin America, Europe, and Asia. And as Secretary Baker told the
OAU delegations in New York, "Africa remains very important to us.
We want to develop further the partnership between Africa and the
US, a partnership based on mutual responsibility and mutual
respect. Above all, we want to encourage the continent-wide
movement toward economic liberty and political freedom."
We want to do this because we believe in democracy ourselves
and because we consider democracy necessary for Africa's
development. But we have also noted that as Africa moves toward
economic liberty and political freedom, African countries are
tending to take a new approach to international relations. African
states are increasingly abandoning foreign policies based on sterile
non-aligned rhetoric and committing themselves to global
cooperation and collective security, as exemplified by their
response to Iraqi aggression.
As Secretary Baker has stated, the United States is "heartened
by Africa's devotion to collective security and the principles of the
UN Charter. The African members of the Security Council took a
leading role in organizing the world's response to Iraqi aggression.
And African countries have, almost without exception, given their
full support to the UN sanctions which will bring the Iraqi
aggressor to heel."
I do not think we can yet be certain that the trend toward
political pluralism, market economics and a more cooperative
approach in international relations will prevail. But Africa's
reformers already have compiled a proud record of achievement, and
we in the US government are doing what we can to support them and
ensure that their achievements endure.
Africa's Responsibility
Of course, the primary responsibility for Africa's political future
rests in the hands of Africans themselves. Nor do we wish to
impose our particular form of government on others. Each nation in
Africa has its own conditions, its own requirements for change, its
own range of options.
But democracy is a system of great adaptability, and it is our
policy to encourage democratization throughout the continent. We
are doing this by making our support for political and economic
pluralism clear at the highest levels of every African government,
most particularly in those capitals where our message might not be
welcome. And our aid program also is bolstering the cause of free
markets and democracy. As USAID [US Agency for International
Development] Administrator Ronald Roskens noted in his September
"statement of mission," USAID's objective is to assist nations
throughout the world to reduce poverty, ignorance, and malnutrition
and to assist developing nations to "realize their full national
potential through the development of open and democratic
societies and the dynamism of free markets and individual
initiative."
To meet these objectives, USAID's programs will be guided by
the principles of "support for free markets and broad-based
economic growth and "support for democracy."
The United States is providing assistance to strengthen these
institutions and values on which democracy rests: accountability
and transparency in government, a free press, an independent
judiciary, the rule of law--institutions and values that are
essential if African countries are to attract the outside investment
necessary for sustained economic growth. We also are providing
newly democratizing African states with expertise and some
financial assistance to help smooth the difficult transition process.
Our own budgetary constraints put limits on what we can do,
but we are exploring the possibility of obtaining new types of
funding to help those countries that are pursuing the mutually
reinforcing goals of political liberalization and market-oriented
economic reform. We also recognize that there is a limit to what
outside assistance can accomplish; the efforts of Africans
themselves will be by far the most important factor in achieving
democracy and making it work.
In this era of limited resources, we intend to pay special
attention to Africa's democracies and to countries that are actively
engaged in the democratization process. As we have told our
African interlocutors on more than one occasion, those countries
that fail to respond--or worse, suppress--popular demands for
democratization will find themselves in an ever more
disadvantageous position in the competition for assistance and
private investment.
Africa's transition from authoritarianism to democracy will not
be easy. But I believe that democracy will triumph in Africa
because the African people have so clearly demonstrated that they
want freedom. And I am confident that the day will come when
truly representative government will prevail throughout the
continent. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 12, November 19, 1990
Title: The Gulf Crisis
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from news conference in Paris, France
Date: Nov 10, 199011/10/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization,
International Law
[TEXT]
Let me say that I felt before this trip began that we were entering a
new phase in the gulf crisis. Initially, we had focused on deterring
further Iraqi aggression and developing a strong international
consensus determined to reverse Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.
Having put together the coalition, we then had to be able to
sustain it. So we focused on responsibility-sharing to make that
possible and to ease the burden of those hardest hit by the
implementation of sanctions.
So, we have built a consensus, we have increased the pressure
on Saddam Hussein, isolated him, but we have
not yet succeeded in reversing his aggression.
In this phase, we've recognized that we must heighten the
pressure further. Indeed, we have to lay the foundation for the use
of force should that become necessary.
One way to do that is, clearly, to get ready militarily.
Augmenting our forces, sorting out the command and control
arrangements, satisfying the logistics support needs of the
multinational forces so they can be effective, were all issues that I
touched upon or discussed with the political leadership of the
countries which I have visited.
I also discussed and compared views on how we lay the
foundation for a possible use of force politically: meaning that we
continue to consult together about when sanctions have been given a
sufficient period of time to work. And meaning also that we
consider how to proceed under the UN Charter while maintaining
consensus and maintaining support for our actions.
We want to achieve our objective and reverse Iraq's
aggression peacefully and politically if we can possibly do so. That
is our clear preference, that is very much our strong preference.
But we will not let Saddam Hussein's aggression stand, and that
requires putting ourselves in a position to use force if that should
become necessary.
So as we wrap up this trip, I feel we have a very strong
consensus on our collective aims and on the need particularly to
resist partial solutions, on the need to work together and to stay
together in this coalition, and on the need to make all of our options
credible if we are to succeed.
And we are all convinced that we must succeed. Our
principles demand that. A new peaceful international order
demands that. And the jobs and economic well-being of our people
require it. . . .
Q: Mr. Secretary, what about the question of linkage? At the
end of your trip do you feel that you have now completely put to bed
the issue of linking a diplomatic resolution of the gulf crisis to any
other issue in the Middle East? I'm particularly thinking of your
conversations in the Soviet Union and your conversations here. Is
the coalition united in the position that there should be and will be
not linkage?
A: I think the coalition is completely united on the principle
of no partial solutions. They are completely united on the idea that
in no way should Saddam Hussein be rewarded or be seen to be being
rewarded for his aggression. And I think there is almost, if not
complete, unanimity of opinion on the view that there should be no
linkage between the situation in the gulf and other issues affecting
the Middle East or that part of the world. Practically every one of
the--I won't speak for each and every one of the 50-odd nations that
might be seen to be making up a part of the coalition through the
contribution here of economic or political support--but I think,
substantially, there is a degree of unanimity here that there should
be no linkage. We all agree with that. . . .
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 12, November 19, 1990
Title: The CSCE Summit
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Excerpts from news conference in Washington, DC
Date: Nov 14, 199011/14/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, CSCE
[TEXT]
The President will be participating in a summit in Paris scheduled
for November 19-21. He and his counterparts from Europe, the
Soviet Union, and Canada will be meeting to inaugurate a new era in
European relations. In Paris, the President will sign three
documents of far-reaching significance for the future of Europe
that will help to consolidate the security and human rights gains of
the past dramatic year.
First, the President and other NATO leaders, and the leaders of
the Warsaw Pact member states, will sign a treaty on conventional
[armed] forces in Europe (CFE): the first post-war conventional arms
control treaty. The United States, of course, made completion of a
conventional forces agreement a condition of our participation in
this summit in Paris because we view it as the essential foundation
on which greater European cooperation is going to have to rest.
Implementation of the treaty will accelerate the construction
of a more stable and legitimate political and military order in
Europe.
Second, the President will sign a non-aggression declaration
between the members of the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact
which will, in a sense, bury the Cold War hatchet. The declaration
fulfills an important initiative of last summer's NATO summit and
demonstrates the alliance's adaptability to change.
Third, the President and the other leaders of the Helsinki
signatory states will adopt a summit document on the future of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--CSCE. Paris
marks the second summit-level meeting in CSCE history, and it
really is a major milestone for the Helsinki process. The document
will strengthen this process in ways that reinforce the work of
NATO and the work of the European community.
The gathering in Paris will embody in microcosm the new
Europe that is still in the process of evolving its various actors, its
institutions, and it concerns. It will be a trans-Atlantic
constellation of leaders representing the established democracies,
a united Germany, the newly emerging democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe, and, of course, a reforming Soviet Union.
For the first time in 40 years, Europe will be meeting and
discussing and planning without an artificial East-West divide to
block progress. For the first time in the history of the Helsinki
process, all CSCE states will proceed from an agreed basis of
democratic and market principles.
During the last decades of the Cold War, CSCE has been a
major vehicle for facilitating the flow of peoples, ideas, and
information between East and West. In this post-Cold War period,
CSCE represents the common high ground where the nations of
Europe, Canada, and the United States can meet to foster human
rights, military security, economic, and environmental and
scientific cooperation.
Based on proposals put forward by NATO at the London summit
early this summer, the Paris document will institute high-level
political consultations of the CSCE member states, commit the
signatories to review conferences--comprehensive review
conferences--every 2 years, give CSCE its first permanent
secretariat which will be located in Prague and which will
facilitate the high-level political exchanges. It will establish a
conflict prevention center--at least initially based in Vienna--to
promote military predictability, transparency, and confidence, and
to facilitate the conciliation of disputes. And finally, it will create
an office for free elections to facilitate election observation and
the general process of democratic institution-building.
As we strengthen this organization politically and
institutionally in all these ways, we rededicate the Helsinki
process to advancing fundamental freedoms.
In the years when prospects for a whole and free Europe were
very dim, indeed, CSCE served as a beacon of hope for the peoples
beyond the Berlin Wall. In these eventful times, CSCE opens
promising new doors to a future of democracy and cooperation. So
we are certain that the political and institutional strengthening of
this organization at Paris will speed the day when all of Europe's
peoples realize their long-cherished dreams for human rights,
political freedom, prosperity, and peace.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 12, November 19, 1990
Title: State Department Gulf Crisis Information
Date: Nov 19, 199011/19/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: State Department
[TEXT]
Emergencies
: 202-647-0900 (24 hours)
Questions or comments
about the administration's
gulf policy: 202-647-6575 or 6576, Monday-Friday, 8:30 am-5 pm
(Eastern Standard Time)(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 12, November 19, 1990
Title: Feature: Kuwait Task Force Helps Keep Americans in
Touch
Date: Nov 19, 199011/19/90
Category: Features
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: State Department
[TEXT]
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2 trapped about 3,000
Americans in both countries and prompted a deluge of calls and
letters to the Department of State from people requesting
information and expressing concern about their friends and
relatives.
The Department established the Kuwait Task Force, staffed
around the clock, 7 days a week, by employees from the Bureau of
Consular Affairs and other bureaus in the Department. Up to 40
people work on any one of three 8-hour shifts.
Task forces are created to handle many international crises,
such as recent emergencies in Liberia, Romania, and Panama. The
Kuwait Task Force includes representatives of various policy,
military, and other Department elements affected by the crisis.
The Bureau for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA) is
the point of contact between the embassies in Iraq and Kuwait and
the Department. "NEA is the focal point for the US government
policy on the crisis," says David Good, public affairs adviser for the
bureau. "It serves as the liaison with other agencies, such as the
Department of Defense, which are involved in the area." The task
force also contains a special Consular Affairs subgroup that deals
with families and friends of those Americans trying to get out of
Kuwait and Iraq.
Consular Affairs task force members answer calls, gather and
record information they receive about Americans in the two
countries, advise friends and relatives in the United States, and, in
general, try to keep the lines of communication open.
Those lines have been busy. The day of the invasion, the
Department received more than 4,600 telephone calls from
relatives and friends of Americans in Iraq or Kuwait. In the first
few days following Iraq's attack, calls to the Department averaged
as many as 600 an hour. Task force members, in turn, have made
more than 30,000 calls to families and friends.
Consular Affairs task force members are working with the
Department's new, computer-based Crisis Information System
(CRIS), which maintains a record of Americans in Kuwait and Iraq
and can quickly refer to a specific individual or family when
answering a call. "The Crisis Management Information System is
part of a Department effort to respond to any crisis anywhere with
the greatest speed, compassion, and professionalism possible, no
matter what the situation," says Elizabeth M. Tamposi, Assistant
Secretary for Consular Affairs.
The system allows users access to information that is timely,
accurate, and easily retrievable, she explains. "CRIS records the
name and vital data of the American citizen, indicates names of
family, corporate, or congressional contacts in the United States,
creates a chronology of caller inquiries, and generates information
to create 'welfare and whereabouts' cables for transmission to the
embassy in Kuwait or Iraq."
The latter refers to cables from the Department to an
embassy requesting that it report any information that it has on an
individual.
Task force members keep in touch with people who have made
an inquiry even if they have no new information to offer, Assistant
Secretary Tamposi notes. "We do this for two reasons: to reassure
people that we are concerned about their cases, and to find out if
the people calling have had any contact with their overseas relative
or friend and, if so, whether they have gathered any information."
The best calls, she adds, "are the ones we make to friends or family
in the United States when we have good news--that a friend or a
family member is on an evacuation flight."
The task force also is organized so that each of the hundreds
of families affected by the crisis in the Persian Gulf will have a
single point of contact in the Department. These "case officers" are
the family's primary link with the Department and keep in touch
with the family by calling at least once every 48 hours or, in the
case of victims with medical conditions or known to actually be in
Iraqi custody, once every 24 hours.
In addition, the Department has continued twice-a-week mail
delivery to the embassy in Baghdad, sending more than 400 letters
from family members to American hostages and receiving almost
300 in return. The embassy must rely on the Iraqi Foreign Ministry
to distribute letters to the hostages.
President Bush has said that the safety of Americans in the
two countries is the US government's highest priority. The
embassies in Iraq and Kuwait are devoting almost all their
resources to that end, says John Hotchner, a Consular Affairs
official who represents the bureau on the NEA task force. As other
Western missions in Iraq and Kuwait are closed, the burden grows
even greater on the US embassies, he adds.
Communication sometimes is difficult because of restraints
the Iraqis have imposed on the movement of embassy personnel,
Hotchner notes. Nonetheless, embassy officers in Baghdad and
Kuwait before the embassy was surrounded by soldiers risked their
lives to visit hotels where American citizens have been detained, in
many cases defying Iraqi soldiers, he adds.
"Even though the embassy personnel in Kuwait have been
confined to their compound, they continue to provide assistance for
Americans in the area, including arrangements for evacuation
flights," he says. "They have made every effort to ensure that our
citizens were well cared for and their needs met as far as
possible."
The Iraqis also have monitored calls between Americans
hiding in Kuwait and the embassy in an attempt to find Americans.
"As a result, our telephone conversations with the Americans in
Kuwait are short," Hotchner notes. "Our citizens usually have time
only to advise us they are well and, in some cases, that they moved
their location. But, of course, they cannot say where they have
moved for fear of discovery."
Hotchner and all other Consular Affairs officers are trained to
respond when a crisis erupts. The bureau has developed a
comprehensive Crisis Management Training Course, which is part of
the course work for every officer who comes to the bureau.
Consular Affairs also has worked with the Foreign Service Institute
to ensure that officers in all bureaus are exposed to crisis
management training and that they learn how to help people
affected by tragedies. In the case of the Kuwait Task Force, the
bureau employs specially trained officers to handle contact with
families known to be in Iraqi custody or to persons with medical
conditions.
Alberta Espie, a Consular Affairs staff member who
volunteered for the task force, says she is glad to lend a helping
hand. "I enjoy talking to people, and I really feel like I'm helping
them," she says. "Some people use the call to vent their frustration
over the situation in the Persian Gulf, but virtually everyone is
grateful for whatever information we can provide. I think it's been
a rewarding experience."
-- Jim Pinkelman, Dispatch Staff(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 12, November 19, 1990
Title: US-EC Relations
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Statements at the departure of Prime Minister Giulio
Andreotti, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 13, 199011/13/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Italy
Subject: EC, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Statements by President Bush and Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti,
President of the European Community (EC) Council and Prime
Minister of Italy, upon the latter's departure, Washington, DC,
November 13, 1990
I was delighted to have the opportunity for these extended
discussions with my friend, Giulio Andreotti. This is my first
official meeting with the leader of the European Community (EC) in
his capacity as President of [the] EC Council. And as such, it
fulfills an agreement that I made with Prime Minister [Charles J.]
Haughey during the Irish EC presidency.
I look forward to regular working sessions with future EC
presidency representatives and consider this the beginning of a
valuable new tradition. I, of course, also wanted to extend a warm
welcome to the EC Commission President, an old friend, Jacques
Delors, and of course, the Foreign Minister of Italy, Foreign Minister
De Michelis, who have made valuable contributions in these
discussions that we had there in the Cabinet Room.
We discussed at length our goals for the Uruguay Round and
our strong conviction that we must succeed in substantial trade
liberalization and strengthening the multilateral world trading
system. And I, for my part, and Prime Minister Andreotti and
President Delors on behalf of the Community and its member states,
have pledged to make every effort to ensure that the Round
concludes successfully in the coming weeks. Indeed, there will be
follow-on meetings tomorrow with President Delors.
We also continued our discussions on the crisis in the gulf.
We've worked closely with our EC colleagues on all aspects of the
gulf situation since the invasion of Kuwait. And we've cooperated
to pass and maintain effective UN Security Council sanctions. Our
continuing consultations are providing vital assistance to the
front-line states. And I want to salute Prime Minister Andreotti
for his strong leadership and for the Community's firm resolve in
the international effort in the gulf.
Through our consultations today and in the future, we are
strengthening the transatlantic partnership--a partnership which
will continue to unite the United States and Europe in advancing our
shared values of political and economic freedom.
Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for coming, sir, and have a safe
trip home.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 12, November 19, 1990
Title: US-EC Relations
Giulion
Source: Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, President of the
European Community (EC) and Prime Minister of Italy
Description: Statements at the departure of Prime Minister Giulio
Andreotti, Washington, DC
Date: Nov 13, 199011/13/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe
Country: Italy
Subject: EC, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
I thank you, Mr. President, for the welcome you gave to me and to
President Delors and [Foreign] Minister De Michelis.
The close relationship between the United States of America
and the European Community constitutes a point and has constituted
a point of great strength for the maintenance of stability and peace
in the world.
What occurred in Kuwait is rightly deemed to be untolerable.
If it [Iraq] were allowed to occupy and to annex a country without
any opposition, then this would mean the end of the juridical order
system which exists in the world. The effort being carried out by
the United Nations with the contribution of all of us is aimed at
obtaining three results:
First, the liberation of Kuwait and the return of the legality in
the country;
Second, the freeing of the hostages; and
Third, the establishment of a system of security in all the
countries in the Middle East capable of assuring a reciprocal peace
in that area and a reciprocal respect amongst their peoples.
As President Bush has said in his speech in front of the United
Nations on the first of October, there can be no simultaneity to
solve all the problems in the area, but there exists a connection
among them and a strong commitment to bring back peace and
security in the Middle East. All our efforts must be aimed at
achieving these goals in a peaceful way.
Lastly, I want to say that we have worked out the wording of
the declaration of the relationship between the EC and the United
States of America. I know that there has been only one word, in
brackets, and I hope this will be very soon solved, so that in Paris
next week we can have the issuance of this declaration.
And lastly, as President Bush has said, during the meeting we
have devoted a great part of it to discuss at length the problems
connected with the Uruguay Round, and with great clarity and also
with the will to reach a positive conclusion. We believe truly that
should this agreement not be achieved, then it would bring about
serious damages, in particular, to the less developed countries.
I will have the pleasure of meeting next week in Paris [with]
President Bush, and I would just [like] to emphasize how important
it is this formula of cooperation for security in Europe. Also,
before 1975 [signature of the Helsinki Final Act], relations between
Europe and the American continent were very good. But as of 1975,
the United States of America and Canada are Europe. It is not a
fantasy to say that it was in that very moment that the new history
for the United States, for Canada, and for Europe and for the whole
world had started. We must have this policy or cooperation and
security guide always our steps in the future in our decisions.
Thank you, President Bush, also for having me--for this
welcome and having bid me a good return, because now I will not
suffer today of jet lag since I'm leaving tonight.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 12, November 19, 1990
Title: GATT and the Uruguay Round
Date: Nov 19, 199011/19/90
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Subject: International Organizations, Trade/Economics,
International Law
[TEXT]
Background
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) entered into
force in 1948 as one in a series of post-war agreements to improve
world political and economic stability. It sets rules for
international trade and provides a forum for multilateral tariff and
other trade negotiations. The United States is among the founding
members and a chief author of the GATT. It now has 99 members,
known as contracting parties, which account for almost 90% of
world trade. (1)
Since the inception of the GATT, international trade has
increased in volume at least tenfold. This growth has occurred
partly as a result of a consensus among GATT members that the
world's economic welfare depends on freer trade, without the risk
of escalating tariff wars. Seven rounds of multilateral
negotiations under the GATT have succeeded in reducing average
tariffs in the industrial countries from more than 40% in the early
1950s to less than 5% today.
The 1974-79 Tokyo Round established additional international
agreements (codes) on the use of subsidies and countervailing
duties, anti-dumping actions, technical barriers to trade
(standards), import licensing, government procurement, customs
valuation, and trade in bovine meat, dairy products, and civil
aircraft.
The Uruguay Round
The current Uruguay Round is in its final and critical year. It began
in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1986 and is scheduled to conclude in
Brussels, Belgium, in December 1990. Like previous rounds, the
Uruguay Round includes a challenging set of negotiations on tariffs
and non-tariff measures restricting trade. Efforts to improve
market access include specialized negotiations to reduce barriers
to trade in tropical products, natural resource-based products, and
textiles. The United States also expects the final package to
include agreements in services, trade-related investment measures,
and protection of trade-related intellectual property.
The agenda reflects the rising complexity of today's trade
issues. Members hope to strengthen and renew the GATT with the
successful conclusion of the most ambitious, comprehensive
negotiations so far. The stakes are high. Failure of the Uruguay
Round could result in an increase in unilateral protectionist
measures by many countries. Increasing protectionism would slow
the world's economic growth and retard the development of
emerging democracies in Central America and Central and Eastern
Europe.
US Policy
The US objective for the final conference in December 1990 is a
meaningful agreement that will add new discipline to international
trade and maintain the relevance and purpose of the GATT in the
world economy.
The United States has made it clear that, at a minimum, it
wants comprehensive reforms of agricultural trade; expanded
market access for goods, including sharply reduced tariffs; greater
discipline over trade-distorting subsidies; meaningful disciplines
in the "new areas" (intellectual property, services, and investment);
and more complete integration of developing countries into the
global trading system.
A top US priority is agreement on new market-oriented rules
to reduce, and ultimately eliminate, government measures that
distort world agricultural trade. In the agricultural sector, the
United States has received substantial support in calling for
progressive elimination of export subsidies; substantially reduced
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and trade-distorting domestic
supports; and resolution of health and safety issues. At the
beginning of the Uruguay Round and at the mid-term review in 1989,
countries committed themselves to making progressive and
substantial cuts in agricultural support. Many countries that export
agricultural products agree with us that a successful conclusion to
the round must include fundamental agricultural reform.
The US draft text on services would allow providers
throughout the world to set up shop in foreign markets and compete
like local firms. In the area of investment, the United States has
proposed a "two-tiered" scheme that would prohibit some
investment measures and establish rules governing the use of
others. US goals on intellectual property include higher standards
of protection, effective enforcement of those standards, and an
effective dispute settlement mechanism.
The United States hopes to gain agreement on improved rules
for tighter discipline on trade-distorting subsidies and on trade
restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons, swift and effective
dispute settlement procedures, and greater commitment by
developing countries to GATT rules. The United States has pressed
its goal of achieving one set of trading rules for all GATT members
to ensure that developing countries reap the full benefits of the
international trading system. Developing countries account for more
than $500 billion in trade and no longer are on the fringes of the
system.
(1) GATT members (November 1990): Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium,
Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burma,
Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,
Colombia, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba , Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, The
Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Hong Kong, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lesotho, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 12, November 19, 1990
Title: Chronology: Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations, 1986-90
Date: Nov 19, 199011/19/90
Category: Chronologies
Subject: International Law, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
The following was prepared by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of
Public Affairs.
September 20, 1986--
Trade ministers from
74 of 92 nations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, agreed to an agenda for
a new round of world trade talks to be completed by December 1990.
Officially called the Uruguay Round, the talks would become the
eighth set of trade negotiations since the signing of the GATT
treaty in 1947. The agenda featured proposals to extend GATT
coverage to services, investments, and intellectual property and to
eliminate trade-distorting government policies in agriculture.
June 10, 1987--
The leaders of the seven
major industrialized nations and the European Community (EC),
meeting at the Venice economic summit, endorsed the recently
inaugurated Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Led by France,
Germany, and the EC, however, the summit participants refused to
support President Reagan's proposal to commit themselves to a date
for the elimination of all agricultural subsidies.
July 6, 1987--
At the GATT negotiations
underway in Geneva, the US delegation formally proposed that all
nations eliminate all agricultural subsidies by the year 2000. EC
spokesman Nico Wegter declared the proposal unrealistic.
June 21, 1988--
The heads of government of
the major industrialized countries at the Toronto economic summit
agreed to adopt a "framework approach" in efforts to reduce "all
direct and indirect subsidies affecting agricultural trade."
July 13, 1988--
The Cairns Group of 14 food
exporting nations propose a four-part plan to phase out all
agricultural subsidies by the year 2000. The group consisted of
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and
Uruguay.
December 9, 1988--
The mid-term review of
GATT negotiations broke down when EC representatives resisted the
Reagan administration's demand that the contracting parties
commit themselves to negotiate the complete elimination of
subsidies. The EC promised only to work to reduce them. The
meeting was adjourned after a group of Latin American nations, led
by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay threatened to
block implementation of agreements reached in other areas unless
the agricultural deadlock was resolved in favor of significant
subsidy reductions.
April 7, 1989--
The United States and the
European Community agreed to work toward "substantial
progressive reductions" in long-term agricultural supports. There
was no mention of the word "elimination" in the agreement, which
paved the way for a resumption of the trade negotiations.
November 30, 1989--
At the GATT
negotiations in Geneva, US delegates introduced a proposal calling
for an end to trade subsidies and price supports on agricultural
goods. EC representatives opposed the proposal, defending many of
the subsidies under attack as legitimate tools of socioeconomic
policy.
July 10, 1990--
At the Houston economic
summit, the leaders of the seven major industrialized countries and
the EC committed themselves to complete the Uruguay Round
negotiations before the December 1990 deadline. President Bush,
acting as host, fashioned a compromise based on the 1989 US-EC
agreement whereby the participants pledged to make "substantial,
progressive reductions in support and protection of agriculture,
covering internal regimes, market access, and export subsidies."
October 15, 1990--
At the Geneva
negotiations, the US GATT delegation introduced a proposal to cut
agricultural export subsidies by 90% and overall farm supports and
market barriers by 75% over a 10-year period.
November 6, 1990--
The European Community,
after weeks of international debate, agreed to accept a 30%
reduction in both agricultural price supports and market access
barriers on farm imports over a 10-year period. Chancellor Kohl,
defending local farming interests in anticipation of the December 2
German elections, complained that the EC proposal was too severe
to European farmers. The Bush administration and the Cairns Group
criticized the EC position for not going far enough.
Fundamentals of GATT
Most-favored-Nation Status. GATT members must extend to
all other members the most favorable treatment granted to any
trading partner. This non-discriminatory treatment ensures that
any tariff reduction or other trade concession is automatically
extended to all GATT parties, multiplying its liberalizing effects.
The GATT allows some exceptions, primarily for customs unions
such as the European Community and the US-Canada Free Trade
Agreement.
National Treatment
. GATT members must
give imported goods treatment equal to that accorded domestic
goods in the domestic markets. Any restrictions applied to
imported products also must apply to like domestic products.
Protection Through Tariffs
. The GATT
generally prohibits quantitative restrictions or quotas. Contracting
parties must, to the extent possible, provide any protection
necessary to their industries solely by means of tariffs, which are
transparent and subject to negotiation in the GATT.
Dispute Settlement
. Parties may challenge
trade actions of other parties that may be consistent with the
GATT. GATT members decide whether to accept by consensus the
resulting findings of a panel of trade experts.
(###)