US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990
Title: Why America Is in the Gulf
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Address before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council,
Los Angeles, California
Date: Oct 29, 199010/29/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations
[TEXT]
(introductory remarks deleted)
These are days of great upheaval. Today, I'd like to speak to you
about one of the most important of those upheavals: the situation
in the Persian Gulf. As members of this World Affairs Council, you
have long understood how distant international events can affect us
at home. But I will say here today that rarely has such an event as
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait been more challenging to our future and
the future of many other nations.
At this moment, many thousands of Americans are standing
guard in the sands of Arabia. Maybe your son or daughter--a Marine
or soldier or sailor or airman who was stationed at Fort Ord, or
Camp Pendleton, or the Alameda Naval Air Station or trained at
Twenty-Nine Palms--is among them. Maybe you know a neighbor
whose job has been affected by the economic dislocation of the
conflict. And certainly we are all paying higher prices at the gas
pump. This conflict was not something we sought. But it won't go
away by itself. It is a vital struggle in which we and the
international community must prevail.
What's at Stake
So let me tell you just what's at stake.
First, Iraq's aggression challenges world peace. We live in one
of those rare transforming moments in history. The Cold War is
over, and an era full of promise has begun. Just this month, we
welcomed a new Germany united in peace and freedom. The peoples
of Central and Eastern Europe have freed themselves through
democratic, peaceful revolutions. After decades of conflict, the
United States and the Soviet Union are writing new rules of
cooperation. And after a long period of stagnation, the United
Nations is becoming a more effective organization. The ideals of the
UN Charter are becoming realities. But it is also an era full of
challenges and dangers. Ethnic and sectarian conflicts are
intensifying. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
advanced means for delivering them are proliferating. Terrorism
and narcotics are scourges without boundaries or limits.
Saddam Hussein's aggression shatters the vision of a better
world in the aftermath of the Cold War. As President Bush and
President Gorbachev stated jointly in Helsinki: "No peaceful
international order is possible if larger states can devour their
smaller neighbors."
The rest of the world is trying to go forward with the 1990s.
But Saddam Hussein is trying to drag us all back into the 1930s.
And we know what that means: The tempting path of appeasing
dictators in the hope that they won't commit further aggression.
The self-defeating path of pretending not to see what was really
happening as small nations were conquered and larger nations
endangered. And then, finally, war at terrible cost .
In the 1930s, the aggressors were appeased. In 1990, the
President has made our position plain: This aggression will not be
appeased.
While the international community tries to build on the
successful ending of the Cold War, Saddam Hussein seems hell-bent
on a revival of hot war. He marries his old-style contempt for
civilized rules with modern destructive methods: chemical and
biological weapons, ballistic missiles, and--if he could--nuclear
weapons.
What can be the long-term meaning of Iraq's extensive
chemical and biological weapons programs? Why is the Iraqi
dictator spending billions of dollars to build weapons of mass
destruction, including a nuclear bomb? And why has he turned
Baghdad into a haven for international terrorists? Surely not
because he expects this aggression--first against Iran, now against
Kuwait--to be his last.
So Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is a clear, indeed historic,
challenge to the rest of the international community. If we reverse
his aggression, we'll help define the world that lies beyond the Cold
War as a place where civilized rules of conduct apply. If we do not,
the bright promise of the post-Cold War era could be eclipsed by
new dangers, new disorders, and a far less peaceful future.
Second, Iraq's aggression is a regional challenge. While might
makes right is bad policy anywhere, it is especially dangerous in
the Middle East. Just as when an event occurs can give it greater
significance, where it happens gives it meaning, too. As we know,
the Middle East is already disturbed by unresolved conflicts,
sectarian and social strife, and vast economic disparities. When
you add weapons of mass destruction and much of the world's
energy supplies, it becomes an explosive mix. Today, the Middle
East is truly at a crossroads. One road leads to peace, the other to
war.
If there is one lesson we have learned, it is that no one is
immune from the effects of conflict in the Middle East. There can
be no hope of resolving other problems in the region unless peaceful
change becomes the wave of the future in the Middle East and the
gulf. But Saddam Hussein's way is not the way of peace. His is a
prescription for war. And I will say this bluntly: If his way of
doing business prevails, there will be no hope for peace in the area.
Third, Iraq's aggression challenges the global economy.
Obviously, we must do more to reduce our energy dependence. But
for better or worse, the health of the global economy will depend
for the foreseeable future on secure access to the energy resources
of the Persian Gulf. Neither we nor the rest of the international
community can afford to let one dictator control that access.
Just consider the consequences. If the entire world were to
be thrust into a deep recession by an Iraqi stranglehold on gulf
energy resources, American industry, farmers, and small businesses
would be hit especially hard. So would the democratic reformers of
Eastern Europe. So would the other emerging democracies--in Latin
America, Africa, and Asia. All would suffer profound setbacks in
their ability to deliver the economic growth needed to sustain
confidence in the democratic process.
All of us would lose from this economic tyranny. And all of us
know how Saddam Hussein would seek to exploit his economic
leverage in pursuit of his larger ambitions.
What the International Community Is Doing
Led by the United States, the international community has
recognized these vital stakes. President Bush has outlined four
goals for our policy:
-- One, the immediate, complete, and unconditional
withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait as mandated in UN
Security Council Resolution 660;
-- Two, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
-- Three, protection of the lives of American citizens held
hostage by Iraq, in both Iraq and Kuwait; and
-- Four, commitment to the security and stability of the
Persian Gulf.
To achieve these goals, we and our international allies have
sought to isolate Iraq: politically, economically, and militarily.
Let me try to put in perspective what we've accomplished to
date. On the diplomatic track, the UN Security Council has now
passed 10 resolutions; the last one was passed earlier today. Each
has steadily increased the pressure on Iraq. Passage of today's
Security Council resolution refocuses international outrage on
Iraq's pillage of Kuwait and strengthens the case for whatever
further actions prove necessary to reverse Iraq's aggression.
Never in its existence has the potential of the UN as a force
for peace and stability been clearer. That's due in no small part to
unprecedented cooperation between the United States and the Soviet
Union--cooperation unthinkable during the Cold War. It's also due to
the support of the Arab
League and the Non-Aligned Movement, and indeed to the virtually
unanimous sentiments of the international community.
Never in recent memory have so many nations acted to
condemn aggression and cruelty.
The result has been Iraq's political and economic isolation.
Economic sanctions are beginning to have an impact on Iraq. Iraq's
oil income has been cut off. Shortages of spare parts will take
their toll on Iraqi industry and, even more important, on the Iraqi
war machine. Sanctions take time to bite, but as they do, they will
impose a very high cost on Iraq's import-dependent economy.
Baghdad recognizes this; that's why it is working desperately
to probe for weakness, splinter the international coalition, and
overcome the sanctions. And that's why we must continue to stand
firm--until Saddam Hussein stops trying to break the sanctions and
starts rejoining civilized society by complying with the Security
Council resolutions.
On the military track, we and some 27 other countries have
sent troops or materiel to the gulf in support of the Security
Council resolutions. Many thousands of Arab and Muslim soldiers in
Saudi Arabia now stand guard together with Americans and
Europeans. And this multinational force on land has been joined by
powerful multinational forces at sea and in the air. In contrast,
only 14 other countries contributed military forces during the
Korean war.
We must be clear about our military mission. Our military
objectives are to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia, protect
American lives, and to ensure the effective implementation of the
Security Council resolutions. Without such forces, Iraq's neighbors
would be subject to attack if they tried to enforce economic
sanctions. Our military forces are also there to provide an
effective and decisive military response should the situation
warrant it.
Saddam Hussein must realize there is a limit to the
international community's patience. He also must realize that
should he use chemical or biological weapons, there will be the
most severe consequences.
The President has made our position clear: We strongly prefer
a peaceful solution consistent with the mandate of the Security
Council resolutions. We are exhausting every diplomatic avenue to
achieve such a solution without further bloodshed. All options,
however, are being considered. And let no one doubt: We will not
rule out a possible use of force if Iraq continues to occupy Kuwait.
Since the invasion, I've spent a lot of time traveling, visiting
our allies and friends and bringing the message that we all share
responsibilities for seeing this matter through. And they have
responded. Our friends in the gulf, Europe, and Asia have committed
an additional $20 billion in resources to support both "front line"
states hardest hit economically by the crisis--namely Egypt,
Turkey, and Jordan--and our own military buildup. We are confident
that additional support will be forthcoming should the conflict
carry over into 1991. All told, 54 nations are contributing
militarily or economically to the effort against Iraq's aggression.
So we're on course. Every day, as the sun sets, Iraq is weaker.
Every day, as the sun rises, the international community remains
firmly committed to implementation of the Security Council
Resolutions. Sooner or later, and we all hope sooner, even the Iraqi
dictator is going to notice that he's in deep trouble and the trouble
is getting deeper.
Sooner or later, one way or another, Iraq will have to comply
with the Security Council resolutions. When it does, the prospects
for peace in the gulf and the Middle East will undoubtedly brighten.
When it does, the prospects for a peaceful international order will
brighten, too. Meanwhile, the United States opposes any attempt to
reward Iraq for its aggression--even if it plays the siren song of a
"partial solution."
And should there be any doubt about the awful consequences of
a partial solution, I would urge a close look at what Saddam Hussein
is doing to the people of Kuwait. And because he controls access to
the true story of Kuwait, this is a story that is not told frequently
enough. It is a story of barbarism in its most crude and evil form,
the rape of Kuwait.
Many of the reports seem unbelievable. There is the report of
a couple, taking two sick children to hospital. On their way, they
were stopped at an Iraqi checkpoint and when they asked for mercy,
to be allowed to continue on their way, the Iraqi soldier summarily
shot their children, "curing them" in his words.
And consider the Kuwait City zoo. Iraqi soldiers released the
lions and tigers, and then tried to shoot them for target practice.
Their efforts, however, were not completely successful. A lion
escaped and mauled a young Kuwaiti girl.
He's also making political and economic war on our citizens
still in Iraq and Kuwait. At strategic installations in Iraq, more
than 100 American citizens are being held hostage as human
shields. These Americans are forced to sleep on vermin-ridden
concrete floors. They are kept in the dark during the day and moved
only at night. They have had their meals cut to two a day. And many
are becoming sick as they endure a terrible ordeal. The very idea of
Americans being used as human shields is simply unconscionable.
Life for those who have escaped Saddam's soldiers is no less
odious. Their days are lived with terror. Obtaining food and water--
the most basic of human necessities--carries with it the risk of
death. We all agonize for these people--innocent Americans and
nationals of other countries, trapped by Saddam Hussein's deadly
ambitions. In most cases, we cannot communicate our concern and
sympathy directly to these Americans. But that does not lessen the
pain we feel at their plight nor diminish our desire to banish all
specters of Iraq's aggression.
We understand the concerns of their families, here at home.
The courage they have shown in the face of Saddam Hussein's
manipulations is great. We salute their will and spirit, their unity
in the face of adversity. We shall not forget them either.
This aggression extends beyond our citizens to the small band
of American diplomats, men and women who still fly the American
flag high over Kuwait. They are denied supplies of food, water, or
electricity. But they are not without courage. Since August 2, I've
spoken often to Ambassador Howell, most recently last week. He
and our other diplomats in Kuwait continue to serve our nation in a
superb fashion. They continue to fight back. They are not giving in.
And neither are we.
The Gulf and America's Role in the World
At the beginning of this conflict, the President and I and all of
those concerned with the problem had to ask ourselves the same
questions you must be asking: Why must America take the lead?
Why must our kids be out there in the desert? Now that the Cold
War is over, can't we pass this one up?
This struggle is about the kind of world we want to live in,
the kind of nation we are, and the kind of legacy we want to leave
for our children. The Cold War is over, all right. We fought and
sacrificed and persisted for over 40 years because we would not
accept a world that was safe for the likes of Joseph Stalin. The
American people have not come this long hard way to make the
world safe for the likes of Saddam Hussein.
Let no nation think that it can devour another nation and the
United States will turn a blind eye. Let no dictator believe that we
are deaf to the tolling of the bell, as our principles are attacked.
And let no one believe that because the Cold War is over, the United
States will abdicate its international leadership.
May I remind you that America's involvement in world politics
came about from conviction based on hard and terrible experience.
We're not in the game just to play one inning and then go home. We
cannot be short of breath for the long haul. And whatever the noise
of naysayers, our moral principles and our material interests make
us a leader. That's why we are in the Gulf. That's why we must
prevail.
Will we have the courage, the fortitude to stand up for what
we know in our hearts is right? Is Saddam Hussein's kind of world
the legacy we want to leave for our children? Are the nations of
the world gathered in vain to defend the principles of the UN
Charter? I think you know the answer to these questions. There is
a morality among nations. Aggression cannot be permitted to
succeed. America will do what is right. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990
Title: Crisis in the Gulf: International Response
Date: Nov 5, 199011/5/90
Category: Chronologies
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
August 2, 1990--
UN Security Council adopts Resolution 660 condemning the invasion
of Kuwait.
August 6--
In Resolution 661, the UN Security Council imposes economic
sanctions on the Iraqis.
August 8--
In an address to the nation, President Bush commits US forces to
the defense of Saudi Arabia and outlines four principles for the
resolution of the conflict (unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi
forces, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, ensured
security and stability in the Persian Gulf, and protection of
American citizens abroad).
August 9--
UN Security Council adopts Resolution 662, declaring the annexation
of Kuwait null and void.
August 15--
President Bush tells Pentagon employees "we are not alone" and
says that the vital interests of the US--and the world--are at
stake.
August 18--
UN Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 664, calling for
the immediate release of foreign nationals from Iraq and occupied
Kuwait.
August 20--
In a speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, President Bush
calls the US nationals held by Iraq "hostages" and says that he holds
Iraq responsible for their safety and well-being.
August 25--
Resolution 665, authorizing the use of force to halt maritime
shipping to or from Iraq, passes the Security Council.
August 28--
President Bush briefs congressional leaders on the crisis and
restates American objectives.
September 1--
President Bush announces that he will meet Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev on September 9 in Helsinki to discuss the
situation in the Persian Gulf.
September 4--
Secretary Baker tells the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the
entire world has mobilized to redress Iraq's aggression.
September 13--
Resolution 666 on guidelines for humanitarian aid passes the
Security Council.
In a taped address, President Bush tells the Iraqi people that the
gulf crisis is "Iraq against the world."
September 15--
In Bonn, Secretary Baker says that responsibility-sharing in the
gulf is unprecedented and sends an unmistakable message to Iraq.
September 16--
The UN Security Council, in Resolution 667, again condemns Iraq and
demands that it protect diplomatic and consular personnel.
September 24--
President Bush tells an Arab-American group that the US presence
in the gulf is a matter of principle.
September 24--
In Resolution 669, the UN Security Council authorizes examination
of requests for economic assistance under Article 50.
September 25--
The UN Security Council, in Resolution 670, explicitly states that
the economic embargo against Iraq includes air traffic.
September 25--
Secretary Baker says that the US supports the actions of the UN,
which are aimed at the government of Iraq--not its people.
October 29--
The UN Security Council passes Resolution 674 which calls for the
release of third-country nationals and the provision of food to those
being held against their will. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990
Title: UN Security Council Condemns Actions by Iraq
Pickering
Source: Thomas R. Pickering, US Permanent Representative to
the UN
Description: Statement before the UN Security Council, New York City
Date: Oct 29, 199010/29/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: United Nations, Military Affairs,
Democratization
[TEXT]
The resolutions of the council on Iraq are clear. Since August 2, the
international community has acted together to condemn Iraq's
unprovoked invasion of Kuwait and worked to take appropriate and
measured steps to implement its resolution calling for immediate
and unconditional withdrawal. Concerted action under Article 41
[of the UN Charter] is already having an effect, signaling to Baghdad
international resolve that aggression upon a sovereign member
state of the United Nations must not be rewarded. Should Iraq
continue to try to ignore and deny the international community, we
believe that the council will have to take further measures as
prefigured in this resolution. The United States will actively
support such efforts.
Iraq's continued unacceptable breach of international norms
requires the international community to speak out yet again. It is
speaking out today clearly against Iraq's efforts to destroy the
sovereign state of Kuwait through organized looting, destruction,
and even murder. By its systematic terrorizing of local and foreign
innocent citizens, Baghdad has defied the world community, this
council, and widely accepted standards of international conduct.
The council further demands that Iraq honor its obligations
under the Vienna convention toward diplomatic and consular
personnel and missions and ensure immediate access to supplies to
food, water, and basic services to those missions, to allow these
missions to exercise their functions for the protection of foreign
nationals, to assure the immunities of their premises and
personnel, and to allow the departure of all diplomatic and consular
personnel who wish to leave. The fundamental principles of
international conduct among states are being challenged by
Baghdad's deplorable and illegal conduct, and we reject that
conduct.
This resolution also makes clear that Iraq is liable for full
restitution or compensation for the losses and damages it has
caused by its illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait. We
anticipate the council will address this question more fully in the
days ahead. Baghdad must hear from us clearly: unprovoked
aggression entails crippling costs, and Iraq must not be allowed to
profit from its unacceptable disregard for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of another state.
It is the solemn duty of every state to protect its citizens.
My government takes this responsibility most seriously. We join
the other members of this body in demonstrating solidarity and
resolve to condemn Iraqi violations of the rights of Kuwaitis and
third state nationals present in Kuwait and Iraq. The continued
denial of food, water, and basic services, the refusal to permit the
departure of any and all who seek to depart, the imposition of a
virtual siege and terror--these are unacceptable. By today's action,
the council demands that Iraq cease its deliberate mistreatment of
innocent citizens. I want to leave no doubt on this issue--we join
the council in this demand, and we urge the government of Iraq to
comply. But I want to underscore one point very clearly. Every
nation has a duty to protect its citizens. This is a fundamental
obligation. The United States will do that which is necessary to
meet its obligation to its own citizens.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990
Title: UN Security Council Resolution 674
Date: Oct 29, 199010/29/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: United Nations
[TEXT]
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990),
664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990) and 670 (1990),
Stressing the urgent need for the immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, for the restoration of
Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and of
the authority of its legitimate government,
Condemning the actions by the Iraqi authorities and occupying
forces to take third State nationals hostage and to mistreat and
oppress Kuwaiti and third State nationals, and the other actions
reported to the Council such as the destruction of Kuwaiti
demographic records, forced departure of Kuwaitis, and relocation
of population in Kuwait and the unlawful destruction and seizure of
public and private property in Kuwait including hospital supplies
and equipment, in violation of the decisions of this Council, the
Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the
Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and
international law,
Expressing grave alarm over the situation of nationals of third
States in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of the diplomatic
and consular missions of such States,
Reaffirming that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to
Kuwait and that as a High Contracting Party to the Convention Iraq
is bound to comply fully with all its terms and in particular is
liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches
committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the
commission of grave breaches,
Recalling the efforts of the Secretary-General concerning the
safety and well-being of third State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,
Deeply concerned at the economic cost, and at the loss and
suffering caused to individuals in Kuwait and Iraq as a result of the
invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq,
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
Reaffirming the goal of the international community of
maintaining international peace and security by seeking to resolve
international disputes and conflicts through peaceful means,
Recalling also the important role that the United Nations and
its Secretary-General have played in the peaceful solution of
disputes and conflicts in conformity with the provisions of the
United Nations Charter,
Alarmed by the dangers of the present crisis caused by the
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, directly threatening
international peace and security, and seeking to avoid any further
worsening of the situation,
Calling upon Iraq to comply with the relevant resolutions of
the Security Council, in particular resolutions 660 (1990), 662
(1990) and 664 (1990),
Reaffirming its determination to ensure compliance by Iraq
with the Security Council resolutions by maximum use of political
and diplomatic means,
A
1. Demands that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces
immediately cease and desist from taking third State nationals
hostage, and mistreating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third State
nationals, and from any other actions such as those reported to the
Council and described above, violating the decisions of this Council,
the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the
Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and
international law;
2. Invites States to collate substantiated information in their
possession or submitted to them on the grave breaches by Iraq as
per paragraph 1 above and to make this information available to the
Council;
3. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately fulfill its
obligations to third State nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, including
the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions, under the
Charter, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on
Diplomatic and Consular relations, general principles of
international law and the relevant resolutions of the Council;
4. Reaffirms further its demand that Iraq permit and
facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of those
third State nationals, including diplomatic and consular personnel,
who wish to leave;
5. Demands that Iraq ensure the immediate access to food,
water and basic services necessary to the protection and well-
being of Kuwaiti nationals and of nationals of third States in
Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular
missions in Kuwait;
6. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately protect the
safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and
premises in Kuwait and in Iraq, take no action to hinder these
diplomatic and consular missions in the performance of their
functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of
their person and interests and rescind its orders for the closure of
diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of
the immunity of their personnel;
7. Requests the Secretary-General, in the context of the
continued exercise of his good offices concerning the safety and
well-being of third State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, to seek to
achieve the objectives of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 and in particular the
provision of food, water and basic services to Kuwaiti nationals and
to the diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the
evacuation of third State nationals;
8. Reminds Iraq that under international law it is liable for
any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third
States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;
9. Invites States to collect relevant information regarding
their claims, and those of their nationals and corporations, for
restitution or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to such
arrangements as may be established in accordance with
international law;
10. Requires thatIraq comply with the provisions of the
present resolution and its previous resolutions, failing which the
Council will need to take further measures under the Charter;
11. Decides to remain actively and permanently seized of the
matter until Kuwait has regained its independence and peace has
been restored in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the
Security Council.
B
12. Reposes its trust in the Secretary-General to make
available his good offices and, as he considers appropriate, to
pursue them and undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a
peaceful solution to the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and
occupation of Kuwait on the basis of Security Council resolutions
660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990), and calls on all States,
both those in the region and others, to pursue on this basis their
efforts to this end, in conformity with the Charter, in order to
improve the situation and restore peace, security and stability;
13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security
Council on the results of his good offices and diplomatic efforts.
VOTE: 13 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen)
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990
Title: Iraq's Support for Terrorists
Description: Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism
Date: Nov 5, 199011/5/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Terrorism
[TEXT]
The following was prepared by the Office of the Coordinator for
Counter-Terrorism.
Saddam Hussein has called for a jihad or "holy war" against those
who support the UN condemnation of Iraq. On September 13, in
response to President Bush's statement that he would hold Iraq
responsible for terrorist attacks against the United States, the
Iraqi Foreign Ministry warned that the US military presence in the
Persian Gulf would "draw a natural reaction from the Arab and
Islamic masses." Earlier, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had said
that Baghdad is under no moral obligation to refrain from terrorism
if threatened by the French, British, or US governments.
Iraq has a worldwide network available to support terrorist
operations. In the past, Baghdad has used civilian and military
intelligence officers, diplomatic facilities, Iraqi Airways offices,
and Iraqi cultural centers to support its own operations, as well as
those of non-Iraqi groups, primarily against its regional rivals, Iran
and Syria, and Iraqi dissident targets. Baghdad also offers its
support to Palestinian terrorist groups. Many of these groups say
they are willing to support Iraq by mounting terrorist attacks
against Western, Israeli, and moderate Arab facilities and
personnel.
Several hundred civilians--mostly from the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan--have been dispersed to strategic
locations throughout Iraq, and thousands of other civilians have
been denied permission to leave the country. Some of those who
have left Kuwait and Iraq report that they were forcibly removed
from their homes and separated from their families.
State Sponsored Terrorism
Iraq's record shows that it regards terrorism as a legitimate means
of striking its enemies, both foreign and domestic. During the
1970s, Baghdad gave logistical support to elements within the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as well as to other groups
which advocated armed struggle against Israel and the West.
Baghdad has hosted elements of the PLO's security organization
(Fatah), including Abdullah al-Hamid Labib (Colonel Hawari) who
was linked to a wave of bomb attacks throughout Europe in the
1980s. In 1988, he was convicted in absentia by a French court for
his part in assembling an arms cache in Paris.
Saddam Hussein has for years used acts of terrorism against
political opponents of his regime. Baghdad sponsored three
assassinations of exiled Iraqi dissidents, in the UK, Sudan, and
Norway.
Iraq hosts dissident organizations which use terrorism
against the governments of Syria and Iran, using these ties to
increase pressure on his rivals during periods of increased tension.
In late 1980, six Syrian dissident organizations operating out of
Iraq formed the Syrian National Salvation Front which advocates the
use of armed struggle against the Assad regime. The most
prominent group within the Syrian National Salvation Front is the
militant Muslim Brotherhood, which maintains armed cells inside
Syria and reportedly attacked its diplomats overseas in 1989 and
again in Brussels in early 1990. Iraq openly supports the
Mojahedin-e Khalq, the Iranian dissident group most closely
associated with terrorism, and supplies its national liberation army
with weapons.
Iraq has historical ties to radical Palestinian groups,
including the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), and splinter factions of
George Habbash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP), such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
Special Command (PLFP-SC) and the 15 May Organization led by
master bomb-maker Abu Ibrahim. The 15 May group was responsible
for a number of attacks, including the bombing of a Pan Am flight
over Honolulu in 1982; several Israeli embassies and El Al offices;
and of department stores in London, Paris, and Brussels. In 1979,
the United States designated Iraq a state sponsor of terrorism
under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act.
Iraq's interest in terrorism against Western targets waned
during the 1980-88 war with Iran. In the early 1980s, Baghdad
moved closer to the policies of its moderate Arab neighbors by
reducing its support for non-Palestinian terrorists and placing
restrictions on many Palestinian groups. Consequently, Iraq was
removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1982.
As a further example of its changed policy, Iraq expelled the Abu
Nidal Organization in 1983.
Saddam Hussein resumed pursuit of his wider ambitions in the
Arab world once the fighting with Iran ended. In Lebanon, Baghdad
increased aid to anti-Syrian groups (Lebanese militias and Syrian
dissidents) as well as to Palestinian terrorist groups with
historical ties to Iraq--the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and
Colonel Hawari. In early August 1990, Iraq intensified contacts
with several Palestinian terrorist groups; some have publicly
threatened terrorist attacks against Baghdad's opponents. On
September 1, 1990, in response to Iraq's renewed support for
terrorist groups and its detention of foreign nationals, the US
government returned Iraq to the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Palestinian Terrorist Groups Pledge Support for
Iraq
Iraq has tried to justify its support for Palestinian groups,
including those engaged in terrorism, as being consistent with its
public policy of aiding the struggle for a Palestinian homeland. Iraq
also views its assistance as a means of enhancing its regional
prestige and, most importantly, preventing Syria from gaining
control of the Palestinian movement. Over the years, most
Palestinian factions reciprocated by offering Iraq political support
in its war with Iran; some have helped Iraq oppose Syria.
In recent weeks, leaders of several Palestinian terrorist
groups have paid tribute to Saddam Hussein and threatened
operations against a wide variety of targets in the event of military
action against Baghdad. Iraq's belligerence and promise of support
have attracted those groups long favoring the use of force to solve
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Palestinian groups, including members of the PLO, have
pledged to use "every means available" to remove US and other
forces from Saudi Arabia. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) leader
Abu Abbas has been outspoken in his support for the Iraqis. Within
days of Baghdad's invasion of Kuwait, he called for his men to "open
fire on the American enemy everywhere. Quake the earth under the
feet of the American and NATO invaders and the collaborators." On
October 1, Abu Abbas threatened to down a US airliner if an Iraqi
plane was downed as part of the UN-ordered air blockade. (The Abu
Abbas-led faction of the PLF is the group which carried out the
1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship, Achille Lauro, and the
unsuccessful May 1990 seaborne attack against civilians on Israeli
beaches. Abu Abbas' claim of responsibility for that attack was
broadcast from an Iraqi radio station.)
Some Syrian-based Palestinian groups have expressed their
willingness to support Saddam Hussein in a conflict with the United
States. Their reasons may have more to do with rallying enthusiasm
within their own organizations than with support for Baghdad's
regional ambitions. George Habbash, leader of the PFLP, has said
publicly that he is opening an office in Iraq in support of Saddam
Hussein. He has pledged that his organization will carry out attacks
against the United States and others opposed to Iraq in the event of
a military clash. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the PFLP killed
civilians in attacks on airlines and buses in the Middle East and
Europe.
Ahmed Jabril's staunchly pro-Syrian Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Abu
Musa organization recently have pledged support for Saddam. In late
September, Saddam Hussein received Shaikh Al-Tamimi, leader of
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) movement, who declared his
support for Iraq. The PIJ claimed responsibility for a February
1990 Egyptian bus attack which left 9 killed and 16 wounded.
The ANO Comes Full Circle
The US believes the Abu Nidal organization--one of the most
dangerous terrorist groups--is moving elements of its organization
back to Baghdad from Libya. Since the ANO was founded in Iraq in
1974, its members have killed or wounded more than 900 people on
3 continents. Over the years, in return for safehaven, logistical
support, and financial assistance, the organization conducted
operations with the support of three state sponsors--Iraq, Syria,
and Libya. In recent months, ANO leaders have killed scores of
members in internecine struggles.
Sabri al-Banna, the leader of the ANO, was the PLO
representative in Baghdad until 1974 when he and others broke from
Fatah, denouncing the PLO leadership for its diplomatic efforts to
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the 1970s, the ANO
carried out attacks from its base of operations in Iraq--mostly
against PLO, Syrian, and Jordanian targets. In 1980, Iraqi and ANO
interests began to diverge. The ANO launched a series of vicious
attacks against synagogues in Europe that became a trademark of
the organization. These attacks interfered with Baghdad's attempts
to attract European support for its war with Iran. Probably because
of pressure from the United States and Europe, Baghdad insisted the
ANO move its base of operations out of Iraq.
Syria allowed Sabri al-Banna's group--sometimes with the
helping hand of Syrian intelligence officers--to expand its
operations in Europe and the Middle East. In the mid-1980s, the ANO
carried out attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports, continued the
bombings and machine gun attacks on synagogues in Europe and
Turkey, and conducted over a dozen attacks against Jordanian
targets, including diplomats in Ankara and Bucharest and Jordanian
airline offices in Europe.
Following public revelations of Syrian involvement in
terrorist operations in Europe, the costs to Syria of its support for
terrorism began to outweigh the benefits. The British prosecution
of Nezar Hindawi--the man who attempted to place a bomb on an El
Al flight--implicated Syrian Air Force Intelligence officials, the
Syrian national airline, and Syrian Embassy personnel. In response
the UK broke diplomatic relations with Syria, the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany recalled their ambassadors, and the
European Community agreed to various political and economic
sanctions against Syria. Under pressure from the United States,
European, and friendly Arab nations, the Syrians had ANO move its
headquarters to Libya in June 1987. However, Syria continued to
allow ANO gunmen to operate in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley
in Lebanon.
The ANO, which receives substantial Libyan financial and
logistical support (including weapons and travel documents)
conducted an attack in July 1988 against the Greek cruise liner,
City of Poros, in which 9 civilians were killed and 98 wounded. The
ANO also killed 8 and wounded 21 in its attack on the Acropole
Hotel and the British Sudan Club in Khartoum, Sudan in May 1988.
The ANO now has assets in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, North Africa,
and Europe, which could be used to conduct operations against those
opposed to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. There are credible reports
that ANO operatives are heading for Europe and the Middle East
where authorities are taking steps to prevent terrorist attacks.
An International Response to Terrorism
President Bush and Secretary of State Baker have responded
directly to Baghdad's aggression and threats to use terrorism
against Americans and others. The US government also is working
in cooperation with the international community to dissuade Iraq
and the groups it supports from holding hostages and attacking
civilians. That cooperation also includes requests through
diplomatic channels that those who have influence with Baghdad and
the Palestinian terrorist groups use that influence to assure that
there is no outbreak of international terrorist violence.
The threat of terrorist attack is taken seriously. Both the
government of Iraq and the groups it supports have carried out
operations in the past. They have the resources and infrastructure
in place to do so again. The US government has issued travel
warnings and threat advisories alerting the American public and
others, including foreign governments, to the threat. In response,
the international community is working to enhance counter-
terrorism cooperation at the operational level--from information-
sharing to tightening security to protect against terrorist attack.
The United States has made it clear that it holds Iraq
responsible for terrorist attacks it carries out, as well as attacks
carried out by those who act on its behalf. There can be no moral
defense of terrorism. The United States will continue to work with
other nations to exert legal, economic, and other pressure on
Baghdad to abandon its holding of civilian hostages and to end its
support for terrorist groups who threaten civilians with bombings,
assassination, and other violence.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990
Title: Asian Security in the 1990s: Integration in Economics,
Diversity in Defense
Solomon
Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Description: Address at the University of California at San Diego,
California
Date: Oct 30, 199010/30/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia
Country: South Korea, North Korea, USSR (former)
Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
It is rare in history--short of a major war--that the "tectonic
plates" of global politics suddenly shift position, ending one era and
opening up new possibilities for a dramatic realignment of
international relationships. The last few years have seen such a
breakdown in the alignments of the Cold War era, creating new
international patterns and new prospects for the world order of the
21st century.
The past year's stunning rush of events in Europe--the
evaporation of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the collapse
of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, and new forms of
US-Soviet cooperation--reflects developments driven by trends of
global scope: the bankruptcy of communism as an economic and
political system, world-wide economic integration sparked by
spectacular technological change, and the widespread movement
toward market-oriented economics and political pluralism.
These world-reshaping developments have led some to
surmise that the end of history, the emergence of a new
international harmony, is now upon us. Unfortunately, the elation
brought on by the ending of the Cold War has been tempered by
darker counter-trends: a renascent ethno-nationalism and the re-
emergence of regional antagonisms and ambitions long frozen in the
time of Cold War confrontation. The current crisis in the Persian
Gulf is teaching us that the new cycle of history may be more
threatening to international security and economic progress than
the relative stability of the Cold War standoff, even if the response
of the major powers--indeed the international community--is an
unprecedented level of cooperation.
We are entering an era of some intriguing contradictions:
power among nations is increasingly diffuse, yet nations are more
interdependent than ever; ancient feuds and rivalries are again
being played out by smaller powers, yet with the destructive
potential of state-of-the-art weaponry. We are entering a world in
which the information revolution--with its instantaneous flows of
communications and capital on a global scale--is eroding the
boundaries of the nation-state and compressing international
interactions in both time and space.
We now face a future in which technological and commercial
capabilities more than military strength are the significant
determinants of state power and influence. National security is
ever more reckoned in terms of economic and environmental
concerns. Increasingly, geo-economics is shaping geopolitics.
Asia in Transition: The Emerging Security
Environment
These global trends, brought so sharply into focus in Europe this
past year, have long been at work in Asia. Indeed, during the 1980s,
East Asia led the world in the transformations of the information
age: the high-tech, high-paced growth of the newly emerging
industrial societies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore; Japan's emergence as an economic superpower; Deng
Xiaoping's economic opening up of China; and the transitions to
democracy in the Philippines, Korea, and now even Mongolia.
These new economic and political realities have yet to be
institutionalized in the emerging international order of the coming
century. And as this process unfolds in Asia, it will be shaped by
the region's unique political rhythm, its own history, cultural
diversity, and particular geopolitical architecture. It will also
reflect factors of instability and chance in the process of change,
even as it opens up new possibilities for policy innovation.
The policy-making challenge we face is how best to give form
to these transformations in the service of our own interests and
those of our allies and friends. And as we assess new possibilities
for change, one important consideration is an appreciation of the
profound differences between the European experience that weighs
so heavily in our thinking and our Asian opportunities.
One important difference is that where in Eastern Europe and
the USSR change has been driven by economic failure, much of the
ferment in Asia is a product of the region's dramatic successes, of
its tremendous economic dynamism. Even China is a case in point:
It was the reforms launched in 1978 that fostered a decade of 10%
annual growth, an economic expansion which created the social and
political pressures that exploded in the spring of last year at
Tiananmen Square.
Asia's geographical expanse, along with its political and
cultural diversity, also stands in sharp contrast to the
geographical compactness and common cultural and political
traditions of Europe. Yet it is in the realm of security and defense
that Asia contrasts most fundamentally with Europe. The Asia-
Pacific region is a multi-dimensional security environment where
the largest armed forces in the world--the United States, the USSR,
China, India, Japan, North and South Korea, and Vietnam--are
deployed in loose array. The Soviet Union is but one of many factors
determining the regional military balance and threats to national
security.
Today, Asia is evolving toward a multi-polar pattern of power
relations: China, Japan--perhaps even India--are emerging as major
players in the region, and smaller states such as North Korea are
pressing to develop unprecedented military capabilities, from
ballistic missiles to weapons of mass destruction.
And here lies one of the most fundamental distinctions
between Europe and Asia. In the Pacific, it is difficult to discern
any single threat commonly perceived across the region. Instead,
there are a multiplicity of security concerns that vary from one
country to another, from one sub-region to another.
Indeed, it is most useful to view East Asia and the Pacific as
three sub-regional security zones: Northeast Asia; Southeast Asia;
and the South Pacific. Each sub-region has its own set of security
issues and players largely independent of one another.
The primary sources of tension today in East Asia are the
heavily armed standoff on the Korean Peninsula, the Cambodia
conflict, and unresolved territorial disputes such as the Soviet
occupation of Japan's northern territories and potentially divisive
claims over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Resolving
such localized disputes and strengthening an open trading and
financial system in the face of pressures of nationalism and
protectionism are the sine qua non for strengthening security and
prosperity in the Pacific.
Asian Collective Security?
In this context, how do we approach the future security of this
economically vital region? For the United States, the short answer
is by accommodating Asia's geopolitical diversity while fostering
cohesion in areas where there is strong common interest--economic
development, trade, and investment. This perspective, however, is a
matter of some contemporary discussion .
In some quarters, we hear calls for a system of collective
security in Asia--an advocacy inspired by the European experience
of a region-wide conference on security and cooperation.
For our part, we remain doubtful about the utility of an all-
Pacific security grouping. The sources of tension that remain in the
region--indeed, the nature of the security challenges we anticipate
in the years ahead--do not easily lend themselves to region-wide
solutions.
When we look at the key determinants of stability in Asia--
the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, the narrowing Sino-
Soviet differences, or the Indochina conflict--in each case it is
difficult to see how a Helsinki-type institution would be an
appropriate forum for enhancing security or promoting conflict
resolution.
In Korea, the dialogue between North and South will be the
principal forum for reducing tensions and moving toward
reunification--although the experience of German reunification
suggests that at the right time, Korea's neighbors can play an
important role in supporting efforts to reunify the peninsula. In
regard to Sino-Soviet relations, border disputes and arms
reductions are being worked out on a bilateral basis. And in
Cambodia, ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], the
United Nations Permanent Five, and the Paris conference have been
the primary mechanisms moving us fitfully toward a political
settlement. In each instance, the process of conflict resolution has
been fashioned to fit the character of the particular problem.
In our view, as Secretary Baker made clear at this year's
ASEAN post-ministerial discussions, it is preferable to adapt
existing, proven mechanisms to meet the challenges of changing
circumstances before creating new ones. To the extent that a
broader collective framework can help resolve regional security
problems, the United Nations is proving to have new capacity to play
such a role. This has certainly been the case regarding Cambodia
and, even more dramatically, in the gulf crisis.
In evaluating the various suggestions for a new security
mechanism for East Asia, we should recall the unsuccessful history
of collective defense arrangements in the region since 1945. Much
of Asia's post-war history has been a struggle between the great
powers to shape the architecture of regional security. In early
1950, we faced the prospect of a Sino-Soviet political and security
bloc--a challenge that shaped our responses to the Korean war and
the French defeat in Indochina.
In reaction, the United States attempted to organize Asia in
NATO's image through institutions such as CENTO [Central Treaty
Organization] and SEATO [South East Asia Treaty Organization]. And
in response to the global rivalry of the superpowers, we saw the
newly independent countries create the Non-Aligned Movement at
Bandung, Indonesia in 1954.
As events unfolded in the 1960s and 1970s, the Sino-Soviet
alliance degenerated into political feuding and then military
confrontation, rendering [Soviet leader] Brezhnev's 1969 call for
collective security as unattractive to many regional powers as
Western efforts to organize East Asia on an anti-communist basis.
In short, Asia has proven remarkably resistant to efforts to fashion
all-encompassing security regimes.
Instead, the structure of Asian security has been an array of
sometimes overlapping alliances and political alignments: the US
bilateral security treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines,
and Thailand; the sub-regional groupings of ANZUS [Australia, New
Zealand, United States security treaty], ASEAN, and the South
Pacific Forum; and the Soviet Union's bilateral alliances with North
Korea and Vietnam.
For the United States, our strategic anchor in Asia has been
the US-Japan security relationship, with our forward-deployed
presence reinforced through bilateral treaties with our other Asian
security partners. And as the Defense Department's East Asia
Strategy Initiative pointed out last April, in the decade ahead, "The
principal elements of our Asian strategy--forward deployed forces,
overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements--will remain
valid and essential to maintaining regional stability, deterring
aggression, and preserving US
interests."
The Soviet Role in the Pacific
Let me say a few words about the Soviet role in the Pacific. There
is no question that the Soviet Union, like the United States, is a
power with interests in Asia as well as in Europe. With more than
two-thirds of Soviet territory in Asia, it could not be otherwise.
Nor is there any doubt that Moscow has been playing an increasingly
constructive role in the region, to the extent that Mr. Gorbachev's
"new thinking" has been matched by new actions.
Moscow's cooperative response to the crisis in the Persian
Gulf is a dramatic illustration of the potential for new forms of
collaboration among the major powers as we shape a post-Cold War
order. We have also been encouraged by growing Soviet cooperation
on such regional conflicts as Korea and Cambodia and on critical
security issues such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
chemical and nuclear weapons.
There is perhaps no more dramatic recent example of the
changing Soviet role in the region than the meeting in San Francisco
last June between Presidents Gorbachev and Roh Tae Woo and the
more recent opening of Soviet diplomatic relations with the
Republic of South Korea. These developments have fundamentally
altered the equation on the Korean Peninsula and opened up new
possibilities for dialogue and tension reduction between North and
South Korea.
There have also been significant Soviet military cutbacks in
East Asia--along the Sino-Soviet frontier, from Mongolia, from
Vietnam, and reductions in Soviet naval operations in the Pacific.
We have also seen reductions in the total number of Soviet ships
and planes deployed in the region--although as a result of
continuing force modernization efforts, Soviet air and naval assets
deployed in the Pacific are no less capable than in the recent past.
But threat assessments are based on more than just
calculations of military capability; they are grounded on judgments
about intentions. And in our view, the Soviets have demonstrated a
substantially changed intent toward East Asia, to the point where
prospects for non-adversarial relations with Moscow are beginning
to acquire some reality. As the Soviet Union initiates market-
oriented economic reforms, for example, the basis will be
established for constructive Soviet involvement in international
economic organizations.
Asian Arms Control?
In this rapidly evolving context, we have been weighing the calls
from Soviet and allied leaders for new security measures in Asia.
What is our position? We are, without question, in favor of
reducing conflicts, tensions, and armaments in Asia--as we are
doing in Europe. Indeed, as part of our super-active
agenda of negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control and
confidence-building measures, we are quite prepared to explore new
possibilities.
But in evaluating the virtues of any arms control initiative,
we must keep in mind several fundamental objectives: Any measure
must be equitable and verifiable; it must reduce the risks of war
and lower tensions; and it must strengthen confidence,
transparency, and predictability. When measured against these
basic criteria, a number of the initiatives recently suggested fail
the test.
In regard to the reduction of strategic weapons--and, if we
chose to pursue it, naval arms control--these processes are global
in character, and they are best dealt with on a global, not a
regional, basis.
We must make certain that measures which appear attractive
at the global level do not, on close inspection, have an adverse
impact on regional security or vice versa.
Put in concrete terms, there are global as well as regional
implications of US and Soviet military deployments in the Pacific.
As we saw in the case of the INF [intermediate-range nuclear
forces] treaty negotiations of the late 1980s, deployments of
Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia, which were of great concern to
Japan and China, were eliminated along with those in Europe when
the United States insisted on a global solution. Similarly, current
US-Soviet and European arms control talks--CFE [conventional
armed forces in Europe], START [strategic arms reduction talks],
CSBM [confidence- and security-building measures]--and their
successors will serve Asian security interests by bringing about
substantial reductions in strategic and conventional forces, thus
enhancing strategic stability--and this without any specifically
Asian-oriented agreements.
I should also note that in recent years we have seen the
emergence of a uniquely Asia-Pacific phenomenon--an informal
arms control process, sometimes unilateral, sometimes reciprocal
in character. In the early 1980s, the Chinese reduced their military
forces by 1 million, and, not long thereafter, the Soviets thinned out
their troops along the Sino-Soviet border and reduced their forces
stationed at Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay. In the last year, the
Vietnamese have demobilized thousands of their troops withdrawn
from Cambodia. In addition, Japan's three non-nuclear principles
and its defensive posture is another example of unilateral restraint.
Only Korea thus far seems immune to this trend.
The United States has taken similar unilateral steps. As part
of our East Asia strategy initiative we have begun a 10%-12%
reduction of our forces in the Pacific. This process, for all of us, is
a reflection of changing security circumstances, force
modernization programs, and resource constraints. But however
informal the process, the result is that both US and Soviet defense
spending--and the growth of Japanese defense spending--are all
decreasing, again, without any explicit, Asian-oriented agreements.
What about more formal, structured arms control processes in
Asia? Though often overlooked, we have a number of mechanisms
already in place. We have had an incidents at sea agreement with
Moscow since 1971. We have standard maritime notification
procedures, a ship visit program which recently brought the US
fleet to Vladivostok and the Soviets right here to San Diego, and
other US-Soviet military exchanges in the Pacific. We also have a
trilateral agreement with the Soviets and Japan to assure air
traffic safety in the North Pacific.
We have begun talks in Vienna with the Soviet Union on
military doctrine which, while worldwide in scope, could focus on
the Pacific in a global context. And since last January, we have had
in place a dangerous military activities agreement with the Soviets.
While we might explore ways to better adapt such confidence-
building measures to current circumstances in the region, in our
view, these mechanisms provide a well-established basis for
dealing with many of the security concerns in the Asia-Pacific
theater.
One problem we have with contemporary proposals for naval
arms control is that they seem to be based on the assumption that
the US military presence in the Pacific is a source of tension.
Neither we nor the vast majority of countries in the region,
however, believe this to be the case. Indeed, there is a broad
consensus in East Asia that a continuing US security presence is an
essential ingredient of regional stability.
Thus, measures that would constrain the US naval presence--
which secures our logistical lifelines to our allies--or which would
precipitously reduce our force presence are unlikely to build
confidence. On the contrary, given the increasingly multi-polar
balance of power in Asia, a diminution in the US security
commitment to the region would likely create uncertainty and
"empty spaces" that other major powers would be tempted or
compelled to fill.
The fact is that no power other than the United States is now
able or welcome to play the role of regional balancer. As Defense
Secretary Cheney pointed out in Tokyo earlier this year, the United
States for four decades has served as the "balancing wheel" in the
security structure of East Asia and the Pacific. And a real or
perceived US reluctance to play the role of regional balancer, honest
broker, and arbiter would be inherently destabilizing.
This does not mean we are wedded to the status quo. As the
security environment changes, our force structure and defense
activities will be altered to fit the challenges of the 1990s. Put in
other terms, we seek to find ways of adapting existing institutions
to new circumstances.
Yet the diverse nature of security concerns in Asia must be
dealt with on their own terms. Although there is a tendency in
some quarters to superimpose the European model onto the
strategic and geopolitical landscape (and seascape) of East Asia and
the Pacific, with the important exception of the Korean Peninsula,
the region is simply not analogous to the European theater. We must
tailor our solutions to Asian security problems to the character of
the context. We should not create solutions in search of problems.
A fundamental consideration is the profound asymmetry in
both the force structures and missions of the US and Soviet
military presence in the region. While the Soviet Union is a great
Eurasian land power, the United States is a maritime power. The
sea lanes are to US security what roads and railways are to the
Soviets. Equally important, the Soviet factor is but one aspect of
the mission of US forces in the Pacific.
Today's crisis in Southwest Asia underscores the
multidimensional US security role in East Asia, which sustains our
ability to deploy forces into the Indian Ocean and to the Middle
East--a matter of considerable interest to the many states in East
Asia dependent on gulf energy supplies. The gulf crisis thus
highlights the non-Soviet oriented mission of US naval forces, the
need for operational flexibility across many theaters, and the
stabilizing role of US defense capabilities. This serves the
interests not only of the United States but of the international
community--including the Soviet Union.
Were the Soviet presence to disappear from Asia, these other
missions and the historic balancing role of the United States would
remain of fundamental importance to the security of the region.
Focus on Korea
The one place in East Asia where European-style confidence-
building measures--and, in time, arms reduction initiatives--seem
relevant is the Korean Peninsula. In Korea, as in Europe, large and
heavily armed ground forces confront each other across a clearly
demarcated land border. As the newly activated North-South
dialogue proceeds, there is great potential for the Koreans to apply
the arms control experience gained in Europe to reducing tensions
and building the confidence necessary for significant arms
reductions. And as we have seen this year in Germany, such a
dialogue can pave the way for rapid reunification.
While the process of building confidence must be created by
the Koreans themselves, the major powers--the United States, the
USSR, China, and Japan--have important interests that intersect on
the peninsula. As the North-South dialogue begins to make real
progress, we believe there are good prospects for increasing
cooperation among the major powers in support of the dialogue, the
easing of tensions on the peninsula, and, ultimately, the
guaranteeing of outcomes.
One security issue of common concern to the major powers is
North Korea's reluctance to sign and implement a full-scope nuclear
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). This is a commitment Pyongyang was obliged to undertake
within 18 months after acceding in 1985 to the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea's lack of cooperation in this
matter sustains tensions in Northeast Asia and limits Pyongyang's
welcome in the international community. We view nuclear
proliferation on the Korean Peninsula as the number one threat to
stability in East Asia.
Were the North Koreans to fulfill their obligations under the
NPT they would remove a major obstacle to the improvement of US-
DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] relations. And they
would not find wanting our response or that of the Republic of
Korea.
We view improved US relations with the North as part of the
process of reducing tensions and creating an atmosphere conducive
to reunification. As demonstrated by our support for German
reunification, the United States will support peaceful reunification
of the two Korean states on terms acceptable to all Koreans--North
and South. The recent Korean prime ministerial talks hopefully will
prove to be an important milestone on the road to national
reconciliation.
The Emerging Architecture of East Asia and the
Pacific
At the outset of these remarks, I suggested that national security
is increasingly reckoned in economic terms, that the international
standing of a state is now less a matter of military might than of
scientific and commercial capabilities, of environmental health, of
political and social vitality. This suggests some important
considerations as we seek to shape the structure of an international
system in flux.
Our experience of the past half century is that East Asia is
most naturally organized for defense in diversified bilateral or sub-
regional groupings. At the same time, the forces of economic
growth are steadily leading to regional integration and to the
internal transformations that are producing higher educational
levels, greater openness to the world of the information revolution,
and pressures for political reform. It is these perspectives that are
shaping our agenda for East Asia and the Pacific in the 1990s.
Let me comment briefly on our vision of regional security
relationships. For the United States, the core of Asian security has
been--and will continue to be--the US-Japan security relationship.
The security treaty is the anchor of our engagement in the region.
It forms the basis of the
US-Japan partnership, a partnership which has now grown to global
proportions. The world's two largest economies--in terms of trade,
aid, investment, and technology--are the engine of global growth
and East Asia's economic dynamism.
What do I mean by "global partnership"? Increasingly, the full
range of transnational issues is on the US-Japan political agenda:
conflict resolution in Cambodia; cooperation on the gulf crisis; and
management of refugee flows, illicit narcotics trafficking, and
environmental problems. With the combined resources of almost
40% of the world's GNP, Japanese-American cooperation is
essential to meeting these challenges.
Yet we know that the US-Japan relationship requires careful
and farsighted cultivation. We face the daunting challenges of
correcting our bilateral economic imbalance, fostering a two-way
flow of defense-related technologies, and overcoming an undertow
of resentments and charges of unfairness that occasionally surface
with an edge of corrosive racism. Successful management of the
tensions in the US-Japan relationship is essential to sustaining a
secure and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.
China is another major factor in the Asian security equation.
The normalization of US-PRC [People's Republic of China] relations
over the past two decades has made a major contribution to
regional stability. Yet last year's violence at Tiananmen Square
raised serious human rights concerns which eroded support in the
United States for our relations with China. This political fact
presents us a second major challenge to maintaining the structure
of our bilateral relationships in Asia.
The recent normalization of both US and PRC relations with
the Soviet Union has fundamentally altered the "strategic
counterweight" argument for our relations with China. Yet the need
for strategic engagement with Beijing endures as China's
international role evolves to encompass a broad range of global and
regional issues: from missile and nuclear non-proliferation to
cooperation on the gulf crisis to resolution of the regional conflicts
in Cambodia and on the Korean Peninsula. And for the long term, a
modernizing China at peace with itself and its neighbors is
essential to stability and prosperity in Asia.
ASEAN is an increasingly central factor for stability and
economic growth in Southeast Asia. We have worked closely with
ASEAN over the years, as symbolized by the annual ministerial-
level consultations, and our political coordination will be
increasingly important in meeting new challenges soon to come.
Integrating Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into the region will be a
top priority item as our efforts to achieve a comprehensive
political settlement in Cambodia reach fruition.
Beyond our engagement with ASEAN as a multilateral
organization, two of its members--Thailand and the Philippines--
are bilateral treaty allies. Our firm commitment to Thai security
has shaped our policy toward the instability in Indochina, as
Thailand is a front-line state confronting the Cambodia conflict.
Our defense relationship with the Philippines has also been a
key element in regional stability. It is our fundamental objective,
as we pursue a new accord to replace the expiring 1947 military
bases agreement, that whatever else results, we will build a new,
more balanced relationship with the Philippines reflecting the
broad range of our shared interests. But let there be no doubt of our
commitment to sustain a security presence in Southeast Asia
regardless of the future status of US forces at Clark Air Base and
Subic Bay Naval Station.
In this regard, let me note the constructive proposal made by
Philippine Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus at this summer's ASEAN
post-ministerial dialogue. Secretary Manglapus called for a full-
fledged ASEAN debate on regional security issues. As we enter the
post-Cold War world, the ASEAN countries could only benefit from a
thorough reassessment of their security interests. Inasmuch as
non-alignment was a response to the confrontations of the Cold War
years, the concept could usefully be reassessed in view of the
emerging realities of an era of multiple power centers.
I must not overlook our other major treaty ally in this part of
the world, Australia--our southern anchor in the Pacific. Canberra
is increasingly active in both global and regional affairs, in the
effort to rid the world of chemical weapons and to achieve a
political settlement in Cambodia. Australia also plays an important
role in the South Pacific as an honest broker and a catalyst for
regional development.
I should note here that we hope that future New Zealand
defense policies will permit it to return to full participation in the
ANZUS alliance.
I also feel compelled to mention the current situation in
Burma. The results of the May 1990 elections revealed that the
Burmese people are as much a part of the worldwide trend toward
political reform and democracy as are the people of Korea, the
Philippines, Mongolia, or Eastern Europe. To their credit, the
military authorities provided the people of Burma last spring a
voice to express their political will. Yet in subsequent months, the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has refused to
accept the unambiguous rejection of military rule and the deep
desire of the Burmese people for civilian, democratic government.
We and much of the world community are deeply troubled by
the failure of the Burmese authorities to honor the outcome of the
spring elections. The increasingly violent repression of dissent in
Burma, including now the attempt to repress the religious
community, is a harbinger of even more difficult times ahead.
Fulfilling the electoral mandate is the only way the SLORC can avoid
a future of domestic instability and international self-isolation.
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Our defense relationships have helped to secure East Asia's
economic dynamism, turning the region into one of the engines of
world growth and forging a $300-billion annual two-way trade
between the United States and the nations of the Pacific Rim. Yet it
is economics, not security, that holds the promise of bringing a new
cohesion to the region.
To this end, the United States joined together with 11 other
nations of the Pacific Basin in Canberra last year to strengthen
economic cooperation based on free-market principles. Secretary
Baker has twice met with his ministerial colleagues to initiate the
Asia Pacific economic cooperation (APEC) process. APEC is now
exploring ways to enhance the economic structure of regional
integration in its working group on telecommunications, and we
anticipate similar efforts on regional transport. It is seeking ways
to remove impediments to investment flows. And it is helping to
develop a shared sense of the future through analysis of the
regional economic outlook, by developing a common economic data
base, and by projecting future energy needs.
At last July's APEC meeting in Singapore, Secretary Baker
proposed an education initiative in support of a commitment to
human resource development. By expanding private- sector
internships and training programs and by developing linkages
between US and regional educational institutions in the areas of
science, engineering, business, and management, the United States
intends to enhance the human talent that will sustain economic
growth.
Another central goal of APEC has been to build support for the
Uruguay Round of trade talks in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). Maintaining a global system of open trade and
investment, one resilient enough to stave off protectionist
pressures, is a vital component of any viable post-Cold War order.
Open trade is essential to sustaining growth among the nations of
the Pacific Basin.
It is our belief that, over time, APEC will evolve into a new
multilateral mechanism reinforcing the sense of collective purpose
among the market-oriented economies of East Asia and the Pacific.
And as we have seen so dramatically in the political revolutions of
the 1980s, economic openness is difficult to sustain without
corresponding political openness and vice versa. Thus, we hope that
APEC will encourage reform in those countries moving in the
direction of market-oriented policies. At present, APEC is
considering the inclusion of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan--a goal
the United States strongly endorses.
APEC was formed just a year ago, amidst some early doubts
and concerns in the region about its rationale or viability. Today,
its working groups are off to an energetic start, demonstrating in
practical terms why the economies of the Pacific Basin share a
common future. APEC can build shared benefits through economic
expansion. And by emphasizing economic progress rather than
defense issues as the basis for regional integration, we can provide
a more broadly acceptable framework for assuring security in the
Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the 1990s promises to be one of those rare "open"
periods in history; the United States and its allies and trading
partners have the opportunity to shape institutions and patterns of
cooperation in pursuit of shared values, shared growth, and shared
security. Our agenda for shaping the future stresses common
economic benefits, global arms control, and the resolution of
regional conflicts.
By focusing efforts to enhance security on the true sources of
tension--on military conflicts and territorial disputes--we are
likely to maximize cooperation while getting at the roots of key
problems. Success in Northeast Asia can mean a stable and
eventually reunified Korean Peninsula. And it can encourage
normalized Soviet-Japanese relations. In Southeast Asia, resolving
the Cambodian conflict can pave the way to integrating Indochina
into the region and sharing the fruits of economic growth with
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. As President Bush stressed at the
recent summit of Pacific island leaders, cooperation on economic
and environmental issues can help foster the development vital to
stability and nation-building in the South Pacific. And if we are
successful in the Uruguay Round and the work of APEC, we will have
established an economic framework which can bridge the diverse
cultures of East Asia and harness its dynamism in new cooperative
ventures, thus carrying the region toward greater integration and
greater influence in the global community. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990
Title: Summit With Pacific Island Leaders
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Concluding remarks at the East-West Center, Honolulu,
Hawaii
Date: Oct 27, 199010/27/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Pacific
Country: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati,
Marshall Islands,
Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru,
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Tuvalu, Western Samoa
Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
(President Bush met with leaders from Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati,
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa)
It's been a great pleasure to greet you here in the Pacific, here in
the United States. We've just completed an unprecedented dialogue
on a wide range of mutual interests and concerns. In particular, we
emphasize that America shares the islands' vision of the region's
future--seeing the Pacific not as a great ocean of small islands and
tiny populations but rather as an aquatic continent--the world's
largest--covering a full third of the earth's surface.
Like a string of pearls spread out across the sea, each nation
is unique, each is precious, and each has something to contribute to
the value of the whole.
The Pacific islands have a special place in the minds and
hearts of the American people. And, on my own visits, starting
almost 50 years ago, I witnessed the natural charm of the island
peoples and the natural beauty of the islands. Their reputation is
well-deserved.
With island jurisdictions of our own, we are also proud of
America's special place in the extended family of Pacific nations.
We enjoy close relations, linked by many bonds of friendship and
family. Today, we share this great aquatic continent as partners in
peace, bound together in an oceanic community pledged to protect
both new democracies and worthy old traditions.
During World War II, many Americans journeyed to the Pacific
islands to help protect our shared heritage of freedom and peace.
Today, we have returned, this time, to help protect our shared
heritage of beauty and nature. That is why, just last month, I
signed the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources
and Environment of the South Pacific Region and promptly sent it to
the Senate for ratification.
Similarly, we have directed our ambassador in New Zealand to
sign the Wellington convention, a major new step in dealing with
the challenge of driftnet fishing. We also described our plan to host
the first round of discussions for a framework convention on global
climate change beginning in Washington next February 4th. This
effort is being bolstered by the world's largest environmental
research program--our administration's initiative to commit about
$1 billion a year to explore the causes and effects of climate
change.
We also shared a valuable discussion on one program of
particular concern to the island nations and of particular concern
and importance to our global arms control efforts--the destruction
of all chemical weapons on Johnston Island. We emphasized our
common interest in ridding the world of these terrible weapons and
asked for their understanding and support in this significant step
toward peace and disarmament.
We assured the leaders that we plan to dispose of only the
chemical munitions from the Pacific theater currently stored at
Johnston Atoll, any obsolete materials found in the Pacific Islands,
and those relatively small quantities shipped from Germany. We
confirmed that these munitions will be destroyed safely on a
prioritized schedule and that, once the destruction is completed, we
have no plans to use Johnston Atoll for any other chemical
munitions purpose or as a hazardous waste disposal site.
We also assured the leaders that the safeguards we're
employing ensure that there will be no associated environmental
damage. And we expressed the hope that they would accept our
offer for a technical team, sponsored by the South Pacific Forum, to
visit Johnston Atoll to independently monitor the operation.
Today, the United States has rededicated itself to lasting
security in the region--a security which comes not so much from
force of arms, but through nurturing of free people, free markets,
free economies.
In order to strengthen these economies, we were pleased to
announce several initiatives.
First, we proposed establishing a joint commercial
commission with the island nations to meet each year at senior
government levels to identify and address commercial opportunities
and trade concerns.
Second, we announced that the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) would establish two new funds--an Asian
Pacific growth fund and an environmental investment fund to
respectively assist private sector and natural resource
development. In addition, OPIC will lead a 1991 mission of
American investors to Pacific Island countries.
Third, we announced our plan to begin negotiations to extend
the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Treaty.
And fourth, the addition of USAID [US Agency for International
Development] private-sector assistance programs to enhance
agricultural and marine resource development.
Fifth, three new programs--educational exchanges sponsored
by the East-West Center and USIA [US Information Agency].
And further, I would also like to announce an extension of our
APEC [Asia Pacific economic cooperation] Partnership of Education
Initiative to include the Pacific island countries. This last
initiative will enhance educational links all across the Pacific,
through both the public and private sector.
I am very pleased that you all came. Like the early Pacific
navigators who braved the seas alone so that others could follow,
you have come to Hawaii today to help chart a new course for the
children of the Pacific--the children of tomorrow. Together, we are
moving forward. And together, we're racing toward a new era in the
century of the Pacific. Together, we and the island nations can
ensure it is, indeed, a new era of peace and growth.
Thank you--all of you--for this visit. You've shown us
friendship. You've shown leadership in promoting democracy and
economic progress. I simply want to wish each and every one of you
the very best. The frankness of the exchange, the chance to
exchange ideas, has been extraordinarily beneficial to me, and I
expect those American officials with me feel exactly the same way.
We look forward to working with you as together we face the
enormous challenges of the future. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990
Title: The United States and Oceania
Date: Nov 5, 199011/5/90
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: Pacific
Country: Aleutian Islands, American Samoa,
Antipodes Islands, Auckland Islands, Australia,
Baker Island, Christmas Island, Clipperton Island,
Cocos Islands, Cook Islands, Diego Garcia, Fiji,
French Polynesia, Gaum, Howland Island, Japan,
Johnston Atoll, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
Midway Island, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand,
Norfolk Island, Pacific Islands, Palmyra Atoll,
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands,
South Sandwich Islands, Spratly Islands, Tokelau,
Tromelin Island, Western Samoa, Tonga,
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wake Island,
Wallis and Futuna Islands
Subject: Democratization, History
[TEXT]
Background
Sparsely scattered over one-sixth of the earth's surface are some
10,000 islands, sometimes called "Oceania," in the central and
south Pacific Ocean. Included among them are nine independent
countries, four freely associated states, and a number of
dependencies belonging primarily to the United States and France.
Other islands, inhabited and uninhabited, are sometimes
defined as belonging to the region. Within and among these
subgroups is great social and cultural diversity. More than 700
languages are spoken in Papua New Guinea alone.
Current Status
Nine island countries became independent between 1962 and 1980.
The Cook Islands and Niue became self-governing states freely
associated with New Zealand in 1965 and 1972. The Federated
States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands,
former parts of the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
became sovereign states in free association with United States
when the Compact of Free Association was implemented in 1986.
The Northern Mariannas voted to join the United States as a
common-wealth. Only the Republic of Palau continues in Trust
Territory status. Guam and American Samoa are the two US
territories in the Pacific..
Despite differences in size, resources, and historical
experience, important similarities exist between the United States
and the island countries. The islanders share America's respect for
democracy and human rights and have modeled many of their
institutions on those of Australia, New Zealand, and the United
States.
Economic development has proved more difficult than political
advancement. Oceania has experienced little real economic growth
over the last 5 years. Economies are dependent on a few activities,
mostly agriculture and fisheries, and are tied to the vagaries of
world commodities markets and to general economic undulations.
Enormous problems with transportation and communications
constrain growth. Larger islands such as Papua New Guinea are
broken up by rugged terrain. Populations in smaller countries are
dispersed in low-lying atolls scattered across thousands of miles
of water.
Island governments are facing these challenges by practicing
fiscal restraint and by pursuing market-oriented trade, investment,
and monetary policies designed to make them more competitive and
export oriented. Before the most recent oil shock, these policies
had encouraged cautious optimism about Oceania's economic
prospects.
US Policy
The United States has a long history of contact with the islanders,
dating back to the vigorous pursuit of dollars and souls by 19th-
century traders, whalers, and missionaries. During World War II,
the United States suffered about 300,000 casualties in the region,
almost 30% of US worldwide losses. The state of Hawaii, the
territories of Guam and American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariannas, and its close relationship with the states
formerly part of the Trust Territory also give the United States a
stake in the region's future.
Strategically, the United States wants to ensure freedom of
navigation for its ships and alternate sealanes to the Indian Ocean.
It has worked to maintain good relations with the region and to deal
with the concerns of its leaders. In 1983, the United States
ratified separate treaties of friendship with Tokelau, Tuvalu,
Kiribati, and the Cook Islands, renouncing outdated claims to
uninhabited islands.
The United States has signed a fisheries agreement with 15
South Pacific countries that provides cash transfers and small
grants in return for access for US tuna boats to the region's stocks.
The US Agency for International Development provides direct aid,
and the United States contributes to international lending agencies
such as the Asian Development Bank.
The US Senate is expected to ratify the South Pacific Regional
Environmental Protection Convention, a regional framework for
protecting the environment of the South Pacific against pollution
from various sources, including vessels, seabed activities, land-
based sources, hazardous wastes, and nuclear testing. Also, the
United States has offered to host the first round of world talks on a
framework convention on climate change in February 1991, a key
concern of the region.
The Regions of Oceania (box)
Ethnically and culturally, the islands of Oceania fall into three
subregions:
Micronesia
: Federated States of Micronesia,
Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Palau, Guam, Nauru,
and Kiribati;
Melanesia
: Papua New Guinea, Solomon
Islands, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, and part of Fiji; and
Polynesia
: part of Fiji, French Polynesia,
Tuvalu, Tonga, Western Samoa, Cook Islands, American Samoa and
Hawaii, Niue, Tokelau, and Wallis and Futuna.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990
Title: High-Seas Driftnet Fishing and the Protection of
Living Marine Resources
Date: Nov 5, 199011/5/90
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Region: Pacific, East Asia
Country: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan
Subject: Resource Management, Environment,
International Law
[TEXT]
Background
The management and conservation of living marine resources and
averting threats to marine life have become more important
international fisheries issues in recent years. The US continues to
have a deep concern for the conservation and protection of living
marine resources. Through negotiation of bilateral and multilateral
agreements and by promoting UN and other projects calling for
greater multilateral cooperation, the State Department aims to
conserve and protect marine resources and prevent unacceptable
impacts on high-seas living marine resources.
High-Seas Driftnet Fishing
Large squid and tuna driftnet fleets from Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan operating throughout the Pacific potentially pose a major
conservation and environmental problem. Such fishing
indiscriminately ensnares both target species, such as squid and
tuna, as well as others, including various marine mammal species,
seabirds, salmonids, and other living marine resources.
South Pacific
The issue of driftnet fishing has been of continuing importance in
the South Pacific, mainly because of concern over the possible
depletion of South Pacific albacore tuna stocks.
The United States has supported efforts by the Pacific island
nations concerning driftnets, e.g., in cosponsoring a resolution in
the 44th UNGA calling for a moratorium in the South Pacific. The
US has decided to sign the Wellington convention prohibiting the use
of driftnets in the South Pacific. It also has begun the process of
negotiating with South Pacific nations a conservation and
management agreement for albacore tuna. The Japanese are also
participating in these negotiations, which are being conducted
separately from the driftnet ban.
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Treaty
The 5-year regional fisheries treaty between the US and the South
Pacific countries which entered into force in 1988 marked a new
step forward in US relations with the region. The treaty authorizes
the issuance of up to 50 licences to US tuna boats by the Forum
Fisheries Agency. It also provides $10 million annually through the
US Agency for International Development to the treaty parties.
Island governments strongly support the treaty. Congress has
called for a 10-year extension, and negotiations are likely to begin
next year.
North Pacific
In 1989 and 1990, under the US Driftnet Impact Monitoring,
Assessment and Control Act of 1987, bilateral agreements were
signed with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan establishing scientific
monitoring and enforcement programs for driftnet fisheries in the
North Pacific. These joint programs monitor the numbers of
mammals, seabirds, and other living marine resources taken by the
driftnet fleets. Bilateral enforcement programs aim to ensure that
these fleets do not operate in high seas areas where they may take
US-origin salmonids.
These agreements should provide the information needed to
understand and document how such fleets affect the marine
environment and provide a sound basis for developing policy
regarding them. They are important steps toward addressing the
potential environmental and fishery conservation problems
presented by driftnet fishing.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990
Title: Country Profiles: Pacific Islands
Date: Nov 5, 199011/5/90
Category: Country Data
Region: Pacific
Country: Cook Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Niue, Tuvalu
Subject: History
[TEXT]
Cook Islands
Area: 240 sq. km.
Capital: Avarua
Population: 18,100
Ethnic groups: Polynesian (81%), Polynesian/European 8%,
Polynesian/other 8%, European 2.4%
Religion: Christian (Cook Islands Christian Church)
Work force: 5,800 (agriculture 29%, government 27%, services
25%, industry 15%)
Government: self-governing in free association with New Zealand
Constitution: 1965
Branches: Executive--Queen's representative, prime minister.
Legislative-- 24-member parliament; 15-member House of Arikis
(chiefs)
Political parties: Cook Islands Party, Democratic Tumu Party,
Democratic Party, Cook Islands Labor Party, Cook Islands People's
Party.
Suffrage: universal adult
GDP: $21.3 million
Per capita income: $1,200
Inflation rate: 9.9%
Exports: $3.2 million: copra, fresh and canned fruit, clothing
Imports: $26.4 million: foodstuffs, textiles, fuels, timber
Major trading partners: New Zealand (49%), Japan, Australia, US
Kiribati
Area: 717 sq. km.
Capital: Tarawa
Population: 69,000
Annual growth rate: 1.5%
Ethnic groups: Micronesian
Religions: Roman Catholic (48%)
Work force: 7,900
Government: republic
Constitution: 1979
Branches: Executive--president. Legislative--unicameral 40-
member National Assembly
Political parties: Gilbertese National Party, Christian Democratic
Party
Suffrage: universal over 18
GDP: $24.7 million
Per capita income: $370
Inflation rate: 5%
Exports: $2.3 million: fish, copra
Imports: $17.5 million: foodstuffs, fuel, transportation equipment
Major trading partners: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, UK, US
Republic of the Marshall Islands
Area: 181 sq. km.
Capital: Majuro
Population: 42,000
Ethnic groups: almost entirely Micronesian
Religions: predominantly Protestant
Work force: 4,800
Government: constitutional in free association with the US;
Compact of Free Association entered into force 1986
Constitution: 1979
Branches: parliamentary with legislative authority vested in 33-
member Nitijela (parliament) and a Council of Chiefs. Judicial--
supreme court
Political parties: no formal parties
Suffrage: universal over 18
GDP: $31.9 million
Per capita income: $1,000
Exports: $2.5 million: copra, copra oil, agricultural products,
handicrafts
Imports: $29.2 million: foodstuffs, beverages, building materials
Major trading partners: NA
Federated States of Micronesia
Area: 702 sq. km.
Capital: Kolonia
Population: 102,100
Ethnic groups: Micronesian and Polynesian groups
Religions: predominantly Christian, divided between Roman Catholic
and Protestant
Work force: NA
Government: constitutional in free association with the US;
Compact of Free Association entered into force in 1986
Constitution: 1979
Branches: Executive--president and vice president elected from
ranks of popularly elected senators. Legislative--unicameral
National Congress. Judicial--Supreme Court
Political parties: no formal parties
Suffrage: universal over 18
GDP: $144 million
Per capita income: $1,300
Inflation rate: NA
Exports: $5.4 million
Imports: $67.7 million
Major trading partners: NA
Niue
Area: 260 sq. km.
Capital: Alofi
Population: 2,112
Ethnic groups: Polynesian, with some Europeans, Samoans, and
Tongans
Religions: Niuean Church (Protestant church closely related to the
London Missionary Society), Mormon
Work force: 1,000
Government: self-governing territory in free association with New
Zealand
Constitution: 1974
Branches: Executive--four-member cabinet (premier and three
ministers). Legislative--20-member unicameral Legislative
Assembly
Suffrage: universal adult
GNP: $3 million
Per capita income: $1,080
Inflation rate: 9.6%
Exports: $87,800: canned coconut cream, copra, honey, passion fruit
products, pawpaw, root crops, limes, footballs, stamps, handicrafts
Imports: $1.9 million: food, live animals, manufactured goods,
machinery, fuels, lubricants, chemicals
Major trading partners: New Zealand, Fiji, Japan, Cook Islands,
Western Samoa, Australia, US
Tuvalu
Area: 26 sq. km.
Capital: Funafuti
Population: 8,600
Ethnic groups: Polynesian
Religions: Christian, predominantly Protestant
Work force: NA
Government: independent state, special member of the
Commonwealth
Constitution: 1978
Branches: Executive prime minister, cabinet. Legislative--
unicameral 12-member House of Parliament. Judicial--High Court.
Political parties: none
Suffrage: universal adult
GNP: $4 million
Per capita income: $450
Inflation rate: 3.90%
Exports: $1: copra
Imports: $2.8 million: food, animals, mineral fuels, machinery,
manufactured goods
Major trading partners: Fiji, Australia, New Zealand
NOTE: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing
Office, sells State Department Background Notes on Fiji, Nauru,
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Western Samoa, the
other participants in the October 27 Pacific island summit. (For
sales information, call 202-783-3238.)(###)