US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990

Title:

Why America Is in the Gulf

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, California Date: Oct 29, 199010/29/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations [TEXT] (introductory remarks deleted) These are days of great upheaval. Today, I'd like to speak to you about one of the most important of those upheavals: the situation in the Persian Gulf. As members of this World Affairs Council, you have long understood how distant international events can affect us at home. But I will say here today that rarely has such an event as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait been more challenging to our future and the future of many other nations. At this moment, many thousands of Americans are standing guard in the sands of Arabia. Maybe your son or daughter--a Marine or soldier or sailor or airman who was stationed at Fort Ord, or Camp Pendleton, or the Alameda Naval Air Station or trained at Twenty-Nine Palms--is among them. Maybe you know a neighbor whose job has been affected by the economic dislocation of the conflict. And certainly we are all paying higher prices at the gas pump. This conflict was not something we sought. But it won't go away by itself. It is a vital struggle in which we and the international community must prevail.
What's at Stake
So let me tell you just what's at stake. First, Iraq's aggression challenges world peace. We live in one of those rare transforming moments in history. The Cold War is over, and an era full of promise has begun. Just this month, we welcomed a new Germany united in peace and freedom. The peoples of Central and Eastern Europe have freed themselves through democratic, peaceful revolutions. After decades of conflict, the United States and the Soviet Union are writing new rules of cooperation. And after a long period of stagnation, the United Nations is becoming a more effective organization. The ideals of the UN Charter are becoming realities. But it is also an era full of challenges and dangers. Ethnic and sectarian conflicts are intensifying. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and advanced means for delivering them are proliferating. Terrorism and narcotics are scourges without boundaries or limits. Saddam Hussein's aggression shatters the vision of a better world in the aftermath of the Cold War. As President Bush and President Gorbachev stated jointly in Helsinki: "No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors." The rest of the world is trying to go forward with the 1990s. But Saddam Hussein is trying to drag us all back into the 1930s. And we know what that means: The tempting path of appeasing dictators in the hope that they won't commit further aggression. The self-defeating path of pretending not to see what was really happening as small nations were conquered and larger nations endangered. And then, finally, war at terrible cost . In the 1930s, the aggressors were appeased. In 1990, the President has made our position plain: This aggression will not be appeased. While the international community tries to build on the successful ending of the Cold War, Saddam Hussein seems hell-bent on a revival of hot war. He marries his old-style contempt for civilized rules with modern destructive methods: chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, and--if he could--nuclear weapons. What can be the long-term meaning of Iraq's extensive chemical and biological weapons programs? Why is the Iraqi dictator spending billions of dollars to build weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear bomb? And why has he turned Baghdad into a haven for international terrorists? Surely not because he expects this aggression--first against Iran, now against Kuwait--to be his last. So Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is a clear, indeed historic, challenge to the rest of the international community. If we reverse his aggression, we'll help define the world that lies beyond the Cold War as a place where civilized rules of conduct apply. If we do not, the bright promise of the post-Cold War era could be eclipsed by new dangers, new disorders, and a far less peaceful future. Second, Iraq's aggression is a regional challenge. While might makes right is bad policy anywhere, it is especially dangerous in the Middle East. Just as when an event occurs can give it greater significance, where it happens gives it meaning, too. As we know, the Middle East is already disturbed by unresolved conflicts, sectarian and social strife, and vast economic disparities. When you add weapons of mass destruction and much of the world's energy supplies, it becomes an explosive mix. Today, the Middle East is truly at a crossroads. One road leads to peace, the other to war. If there is one lesson we have learned, it is that no one is immune from the effects of conflict in the Middle East. There can be no hope of resolving other problems in the region unless peaceful change becomes the wave of the future in the Middle East and the gulf. But Saddam Hussein's way is not the way of peace. His is a prescription for war. And I will say this bluntly: If his way of doing business prevails, there will be no hope for peace in the area. Third, Iraq's aggression challenges the global economy. Obviously, we must do more to reduce our energy dependence. But for better or worse, the health of the global economy will depend for the foreseeable future on secure access to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf. Neither we nor the rest of the international community can afford to let one dictator control that access. Just consider the consequences. If the entire world were to be thrust into a deep recession by an Iraqi stranglehold on gulf energy resources, American industry, farmers, and small businesses would be hit especially hard. So would the democratic reformers of Eastern Europe. So would the other emerging democracies--in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. All would suffer profound setbacks in their ability to deliver the economic growth needed to sustain confidence in the democratic process. All of us would lose from this economic tyranny. And all of us know how Saddam Hussein would seek to exploit his economic leverage in pursuit of his larger ambitions.
What the International Community Is Doing
Led by the United States, the international community has recognized these vital stakes. President Bush has outlined four goals for our policy: -- One, the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait as mandated in UN Security Council Resolution 660; -- Two, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; -- Three, protection of the lives of American citizens held hostage by Iraq, in both Iraq and Kuwait; and -- Four, commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. To achieve these goals, we and our international allies have sought to isolate Iraq: politically, economically, and militarily. Let me try to put in perspective what we've accomplished to date. On the diplomatic track, the UN Security Council has now passed 10 resolutions; the last one was passed earlier today. Each has steadily increased the pressure on Iraq. Passage of today's Security Council resolution refocuses international outrage on Iraq's pillage of Kuwait and strengthens the case for whatever further actions prove necessary to reverse Iraq's aggression. Never in its existence has the potential of the UN as a force for peace and stability been clearer. That's due in no small part to unprecedented cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union--cooperation unthinkable during the Cold War. It's also due to the support of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned Movement, and indeed to the virtually unanimous sentiments of the international community. Never in recent memory have so many nations acted to condemn aggression and cruelty. The result has been Iraq's political and economic isolation. Economic sanctions are beginning to have an impact on Iraq. Iraq's oil income has been cut off. Shortages of spare parts will take their toll on Iraqi industry and, even more important, on the Iraqi war machine. Sanctions take time to bite, but as they do, they will impose a very high cost on Iraq's import-dependent economy. Baghdad recognizes this; that's why it is working desperately to probe for weakness, splinter the international coalition, and overcome the sanctions. And that's why we must continue to stand firm--until Saddam Hussein stops trying to break the sanctions and starts rejoining civilized society by complying with the Security Council resolutions. On the military track, we and some 27 other countries have sent troops or materiel to the gulf in support of the Security Council resolutions. Many thousands of Arab and Muslim soldiers in Saudi Arabia now stand guard together with Americans and Europeans. And this multinational force on land has been joined by powerful multinational forces at sea and in the air. In contrast, only 14 other countries contributed military forces during the Korean war. We must be clear about our military mission. Our military objectives are to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia, protect American lives, and to ensure the effective implementation of the Security Council resolutions. Without such forces, Iraq's neighbors would be subject to attack if they tried to enforce economic sanctions. Our military forces are also there to provide an effective and decisive military response should the situation warrant it. Saddam Hussein must realize there is a limit to the international community's patience. He also must realize that should he use chemical or biological weapons, there will be the most severe consequences. The President has made our position clear: We strongly prefer a peaceful solution consistent with the mandate of the Security Council resolutions. We are exhausting every diplomatic avenue to achieve such a solution without further bloodshed. All options, however, are being considered. And let no one doubt: We will not rule out a possible use of force if Iraq continues to occupy Kuwait. Since the invasion, I've spent a lot of time traveling, visiting our allies and friends and bringing the message that we all share responsibilities for seeing this matter through. And they have responded. Our friends in the gulf, Europe, and Asia have committed an additional $20 billion in resources to support both "front line" states hardest hit economically by the crisis--namely Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan--and our own military buildup. We are confident that additional support will be forthcoming should the conflict carry over into 1991. All told, 54 nations are contributing militarily or economically to the effort against Iraq's aggression. So we're on course. Every day, as the sun sets, Iraq is weaker. Every day, as the sun rises, the international community remains firmly committed to implementation of the Security Council Resolutions. Sooner or later, and we all hope sooner, even the Iraqi dictator is going to notice that he's in deep trouble and the trouble is getting deeper. Sooner or later, one way or another, Iraq will have to comply with the Security Council resolutions. When it does, the prospects for peace in the gulf and the Middle East will undoubtedly brighten. When it does, the prospects for a peaceful international order will brighten, too. Meanwhile, the United States opposes any attempt to reward Iraq for its aggression--even if it plays the siren song of a "partial solution." And should there be any doubt about the awful consequences of a partial solution, I would urge a close look at what Saddam Hussein is doing to the people of Kuwait. And because he controls access to the true story of Kuwait, this is a story that is not told frequently enough. It is a story of barbarism in its most crude and evil form, the rape of Kuwait. Many of the reports seem unbelievable. There is the report of a couple, taking two sick children to hospital. On their way, they were stopped at an Iraqi checkpoint and when they asked for mercy, to be allowed to continue on their way, the Iraqi soldier summarily shot their children, "curing them" in his words. And consider the Kuwait City zoo. Iraqi soldiers released the lions and tigers, and then tried to shoot them for target practice. Their efforts, however, were not completely successful. A lion escaped and mauled a young Kuwaiti girl. He's also making political and economic war on our citizens still in Iraq and Kuwait. At strategic installations in Iraq, more than 100 American citizens are being held hostage as human shields. These Americans are forced to sleep on vermin-ridden concrete floors. They are kept in the dark during the day and moved only at night. They have had their meals cut to two a day. And many are becoming sick as they endure a terrible ordeal. The very idea of Americans being used as human shields is simply unconscionable. Life for those who have escaped Saddam's soldiers is no less odious. Their days are lived with terror. Obtaining food and water-- the most basic of human necessities--carries with it the risk of death. We all agonize for these people--innocent Americans and nationals of other countries, trapped by Saddam Hussein's deadly ambitions. In most cases, we cannot communicate our concern and sympathy directly to these Americans. But that does not lessen the pain we feel at their plight nor diminish our desire to banish all specters of Iraq's aggression. We understand the concerns of their families, here at home. The courage they have shown in the face of Saddam Hussein's manipulations is great. We salute their will and spirit, their unity in the face of adversity. We shall not forget them either. This aggression extends beyond our citizens to the small band of American diplomats, men and women who still fly the American flag high over Kuwait. They are denied supplies of food, water, or electricity. But they are not without courage. Since August 2, I've spoken often to Ambassador Howell, most recently last week. He and our other diplomats in Kuwait continue to serve our nation in a superb fashion. They continue to fight back. They are not giving in. And neither are we.
The Gulf and America's Role in the World
At the beginning of this conflict, the President and I and all of those concerned with the problem had to ask ourselves the same questions you must be asking: Why must America take the lead? Why must our kids be out there in the desert? Now that the Cold War is over, can't we pass this one up? This struggle is about the kind of world we want to live in, the kind of nation we are, and the kind of legacy we want to leave for our children. The Cold War is over, all right. We fought and sacrificed and persisted for over 40 years because we would not accept a world that was safe for the likes of Joseph Stalin. The American people have not come this long hard way to make the world safe for the likes of Saddam Hussein. Let no nation think that it can devour another nation and the United States will turn a blind eye. Let no dictator believe that we are deaf to the tolling of the bell, as our principles are attacked. And let no one believe that because the Cold War is over, the United States will abdicate its international leadership. May I remind you that America's involvement in world politics came about from conviction based on hard and terrible experience. We're not in the game just to play one inning and then go home. We cannot be short of breath for the long haul. And whatever the noise of naysayers, our moral principles and our material interests make us a leader. That's why we are in the Gulf. That's why we must prevail. Will we have the courage, the fortitude to stand up for what we know in our hearts is right? Is Saddam Hussein's kind of world the legacy we want to leave for our children? Are the nations of the world gathered in vain to defend the principles of the UN Charter? I think you know the answer to these questions. There is a morality among nations. Aggression cannot be permitted to succeed. America will do what is right. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990 Title:

Crisis in the Gulf: International Response

Date: Nov 5, 199011/5/90 Category: Chronologies Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT]
August 2, 1990--
UN Security Council adopts Resolution 660 condemning the invasion of Kuwait.
August 6--
In Resolution 661, the UN Security Council imposes economic sanctions on the Iraqis.
August 8--
In an address to the nation, President Bush commits US forces to the defense of Saudi Arabia and outlines four principles for the resolution of the conflict (unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, ensured security and stability in the Persian Gulf, and protection of American citizens abroad).
August 9--
UN Security Council adopts Resolution 662, declaring the annexation of Kuwait null and void.
August 15--
President Bush tells Pentagon employees "we are not alone" and says that the vital interests of the US--and the world--are at stake.
August 18--
UN Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 664, calling for the immediate release of foreign nationals from Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
August 20--
In a speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, President Bush calls the US nationals held by Iraq "hostages" and says that he holds Iraq responsible for their safety and well-being.
August 25--
Resolution 665, authorizing the use of force to halt maritime shipping to or from Iraq, passes the Security Council.
August 28--
President Bush briefs congressional leaders on the crisis and restates American objectives.
September 1--
President Bush announces that he will meet Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on September 9 in Helsinki to discuss the situation in the Persian Gulf.
September 4--
Secretary Baker tells the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the entire world has mobilized to redress Iraq's aggression.
September 13--
Resolution 666 on guidelines for humanitarian aid passes the Security Council. In a taped address, President Bush tells the Iraqi people that the gulf crisis is "Iraq against the world."
September 15--
In Bonn, Secretary Baker says that responsibility-sharing in the gulf is unprecedented and sends an unmistakable message to Iraq.
September 16--
The UN Security Council, in Resolution 667, again condemns Iraq and demands that it protect diplomatic and consular personnel.
September 24--
President Bush tells an Arab-American group that the US presence in the gulf is a matter of principle.
September 24--
In Resolution 669, the UN Security Council authorizes examination of requests for economic assistance under Article 50.
September 25--
The UN Security Council, in Resolution 670, explicitly states that the economic embargo against Iraq includes air traffic.
September 25--
Secretary Baker says that the US supports the actions of the UN, which are aimed at the government of Iraq--not its people.
October 29--
The UN Security Council passes Resolution 674 which calls for the release of third-country nationals and the provision of food to those being held against their will. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990 Title:

UN Security Council Condemns Actions by Iraq

Pickering Source: Thomas R. Pickering, US Permanent Representative to the UN Description: Statement before the UN Security Council, New York City Date: Oct 29, 199010/29/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: United Nations, Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] The resolutions of the council on Iraq are clear. Since August 2, the international community has acted together to condemn Iraq's unprovoked invasion of Kuwait and worked to take appropriate and measured steps to implement its resolution calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Concerted action under Article 41 [of the UN Charter] is already having an effect, signaling to Baghdad international resolve that aggression upon a sovereign member state of the United Nations must not be rewarded. Should Iraq continue to try to ignore and deny the international community, we believe that the council will have to take further measures as prefigured in this resolution. The United States will actively support such efforts. Iraq's continued unacceptable breach of international norms requires the international community to speak out yet again. It is speaking out today clearly against Iraq's efforts to destroy the sovereign state of Kuwait through organized looting, destruction, and even murder. By its systematic terrorizing of local and foreign innocent citizens, Baghdad has defied the world community, this council, and widely accepted standards of international conduct. The council further demands that Iraq honor its obligations under the Vienna convention toward diplomatic and consular personnel and missions and ensure immediate access to supplies to food, water, and basic services to those missions, to allow these missions to exercise their functions for the protection of foreign nationals, to assure the immunities of their premises and personnel, and to allow the departure of all diplomatic and consular personnel who wish to leave. The fundamental principles of international conduct among states are being challenged by Baghdad's deplorable and illegal conduct, and we reject that conduct. This resolution also makes clear that Iraq is liable for full restitution or compensation for the losses and damages it has caused by its illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait. We anticipate the council will address this question more fully in the days ahead. Baghdad must hear from us clearly: unprovoked aggression entails crippling costs, and Iraq must not be allowed to profit from its unacceptable disregard for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another state. It is the solemn duty of every state to protect its citizens. My government takes this responsibility most seriously. We join the other members of this body in demonstrating solidarity and resolve to condemn Iraqi violations of the rights of Kuwaitis and third state nationals present in Kuwait and Iraq. The continued denial of food, water, and basic services, the refusal to permit the departure of any and all who seek to depart, the imposition of a virtual siege and terror--these are unacceptable. By today's action, the council demands that Iraq cease its deliberate mistreatment of innocent citizens. I want to leave no doubt on this issue--we join the council in this demand, and we urge the government of Iraq to comply. But I want to underscore one point very clearly. Every nation has a duty to protect its citizens. This is a fundamental obligation. The United States will do that which is necessary to meet its obligation to its own citizens.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990 Title:

UN Security Council Resolution 674

Date: Oct 29, 199010/29/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: United Nations [TEXT] The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990) and 670 (1990), Stressing the urgent need for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, for the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and of the authority of its legitimate government, Condemning the actions by the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to take third State nationals hostage and to mistreat and oppress Kuwaiti and third State nationals, and the other actions reported to the Council such as the destruction of Kuwaiti demographic records, forced departure of Kuwaitis, and relocation of population in Kuwait and the unlawful destruction and seizure of public and private property in Kuwait including hospital supplies and equipment, in violation of the decisions of this Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law, Expressing grave alarm over the situation of nationals of third States in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such States, Reaffirming that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a High Contracting Party to the Convention Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms and in particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches, Recalling the efforts of the Secretary-General concerning the safety and well-being of third State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, Deeply concerned at the economic cost, and at the loss and suffering caused to individuals in Kuwait and Iraq as a result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Reaffirming the goal of the international community of maintaining international peace and security by seeking to resolve international disputes and conflicts through peaceful means, Recalling also the important role that the United Nations and its Secretary-General have played in the peaceful solution of disputes and conflicts in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, Alarmed by the dangers of the present crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, directly threatening international peace and security, and seeking to avoid any further worsening of the situation, Calling upon Iraq to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in particular resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990), Reaffirming its determination to ensure compliance by Iraq with the Security Council resolutions by maximum use of political and diplomatic means,
A
1. Demands that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immediately cease and desist from taking third State nationals hostage, and mistreating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third State nationals, and from any other actions such as those reported to the Council and described above, violating the decisions of this Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law; 2. Invites States to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them on the grave breaches by Iraq as per paragraph 1 above and to make this information available to the Council; 3. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately fulfill its obligations to third State nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions, under the Charter, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular relations, general principles of international law and the relevant resolutions of the Council; 4. Reaffirms further its demand that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of those third State nationals, including diplomatic and consular personnel, who wish to leave; 5. Demands that Iraq ensure the immediate access to food, water and basic services necessary to the protection and well- being of Kuwaiti nationals and of nationals of third States in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait; 6. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq, take no action to hinder these diplomatic and consular missions in the performance of their functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of their person and interests and rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel; 7. Requests the Secretary-General, in the context of the continued exercise of his good offices concerning the safety and well-being of third State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, to seek to achieve the objectives of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 and in particular the provision of food, water and basic services to Kuwaiti nationals and to the diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the evacuation of third State nationals; 8. Reminds Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq; 9. Invites States to collect relevant information regarding their claims, and those of their nationals and corporations, for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to such arrangements as may be established in accordance with international law; 10. Requires thatIraq comply with the provisions of the present resolution and its previous resolutions, failing which the Council will need to take further measures under the Charter; 11. Decides to remain actively and permanently seized of the matter until Kuwait has regained its independence and peace has been restored in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.
B
12. Reposes its trust in the Secretary-General to make available his good offices and, as he considers appropriate, to pursue them and undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait on the basis of Security Council resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990), and calls on all States, both those in the region and others, to pursue on this basis their efforts to this end, in conformity with the Charter, in order to improve the situation and restore peace, security and stability; 13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the results of his good offices and diplomatic efforts. VOTE: 13 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen) (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990 Title:

Iraq's Support for Terrorists

Description: Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Date: Nov 5, 199011/5/90 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Terrorism [TEXT] The following was prepared by the Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism. Saddam Hussein has called for a jihad or "holy war" against those who support the UN condemnation of Iraq. On September 13, in response to President Bush's statement that he would hold Iraq responsible for terrorist attacks against the United States, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry warned that the US military presence in the Persian Gulf would "draw a natural reaction from the Arab and Islamic masses." Earlier, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had said that Baghdad is under no moral obligation to refrain from terrorism if threatened by the French, British, or US governments. Iraq has a worldwide network available to support terrorist operations. In the past, Baghdad has used civilian and military intelligence officers, diplomatic facilities, Iraqi Airways offices, and Iraqi cultural centers to support its own operations, as well as those of non-Iraqi groups, primarily against its regional rivals, Iran and Syria, and Iraqi dissident targets. Baghdad also offers its support to Palestinian terrorist groups. Many of these groups say they are willing to support Iraq by mounting terrorist attacks against Western, Israeli, and moderate Arab facilities and personnel. Several hundred civilians--mostly from the United States, Western Europe, and Japan--have been dispersed to strategic locations throughout Iraq, and thousands of other civilians have been denied permission to leave the country. Some of those who have left Kuwait and Iraq report that they were forcibly removed from their homes and separated from their families.
State Sponsored Terrorism
Iraq's record shows that it regards terrorism as a legitimate means of striking its enemies, both foreign and domestic. During the 1970s, Baghdad gave logistical support to elements within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as well as to other groups which advocated armed struggle against Israel and the West. Baghdad has hosted elements of the PLO's security organization (Fatah), including Abdullah al-Hamid Labib (Colonel Hawari) who was linked to a wave of bomb attacks throughout Europe in the 1980s. In 1988, he was convicted in absentia by a French court for his part in assembling an arms cache in Paris. Saddam Hussein has for years used acts of terrorism against political opponents of his regime. Baghdad sponsored three assassinations of exiled Iraqi dissidents, in the UK, Sudan, and Norway. Iraq hosts dissident organizations which use terrorism against the governments of Syria and Iran, using these ties to increase pressure on his rivals during periods of increased tension. In late 1980, six Syrian dissident organizations operating out of Iraq formed the Syrian National Salvation Front which advocates the use of armed struggle against the Assad regime. The most prominent group within the Syrian National Salvation Front is the militant Muslim Brotherhood, which maintains armed cells inside Syria and reportedly attacked its diplomats overseas in 1989 and again in Brussels in early 1990. Iraq openly supports the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the Iranian dissident group most closely associated with terrorism, and supplies its national liberation army with weapons. Iraq has historical ties to radical Palestinian groups, including the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), and splinter factions of George Habbash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- Special Command (PLFP-SC) and the 15 May Organization led by master bomb-maker Abu Ibrahim. The 15 May group was responsible for a number of attacks, including the bombing of a Pan Am flight over Honolulu in 1982; several Israeli embassies and El Al offices; and of department stores in London, Paris, and Brussels. In 1979, the United States designated Iraq a state sponsor of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act. Iraq's interest in terrorism against Western targets waned during the 1980-88 war with Iran. In the early 1980s, Baghdad moved closer to the policies of its moderate Arab neighbors by reducing its support for non-Palestinian terrorists and placing restrictions on many Palestinian groups. Consequently, Iraq was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1982. As a further example of its changed policy, Iraq expelled the Abu Nidal Organization in 1983. Saddam Hussein resumed pursuit of his wider ambitions in the Arab world once the fighting with Iran ended. In Lebanon, Baghdad increased aid to anti-Syrian groups (Lebanese militias and Syrian dissidents) as well as to Palestinian terrorist groups with historical ties to Iraq--the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and Colonel Hawari. In early August 1990, Iraq intensified contacts with several Palestinian terrorist groups; some have publicly threatened terrorist attacks against Baghdad's opponents. On September 1, 1990, in response to Iraq's renewed support for terrorist groups and its detention of foreign nationals, the US government returned Iraq to the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Palestinian Terrorist Groups Pledge Support for Iraq
Iraq has tried to justify its support for Palestinian groups, including those engaged in terrorism, as being consistent with its public policy of aiding the struggle for a Palestinian homeland. Iraq also views its assistance as a means of enhancing its regional prestige and, most importantly, preventing Syria from gaining control of the Palestinian movement. Over the years, most Palestinian factions reciprocated by offering Iraq political support in its war with Iran; some have helped Iraq oppose Syria. In recent weeks, leaders of several Palestinian terrorist groups have paid tribute to Saddam Hussein and threatened operations against a wide variety of targets in the event of military action against Baghdad. Iraq's belligerence and promise of support have attracted those groups long favoring the use of force to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestinian groups, including members of the PLO, have pledged to use "every means available" to remove US and other forces from Saudi Arabia. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) leader Abu Abbas has been outspoken in his support for the Iraqis. Within days of Baghdad's invasion of Kuwait, he called for his men to "open fire on the American enemy everywhere. Quake the earth under the feet of the American and NATO invaders and the collaborators." On October 1, Abu Abbas threatened to down a US airliner if an Iraqi plane was downed as part of the UN-ordered air blockade. (The Abu Abbas-led faction of the PLF is the group which carried out the 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship, Achille Lauro, and the unsuccessful May 1990 seaborne attack against civilians on Israeli beaches. Abu Abbas' claim of responsibility for that attack was broadcast from an Iraqi radio station.) Some Syrian-based Palestinian groups have expressed their willingness to support Saddam Hussein in a conflict with the United States. Their reasons may have more to do with rallying enthusiasm within their own organizations than with support for Baghdad's regional ambitions. George Habbash, leader of the PFLP, has said publicly that he is opening an office in Iraq in support of Saddam Hussein. He has pledged that his organization will carry out attacks against the United States and others opposed to Iraq in the event of a military clash. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the PFLP killed civilians in attacks on airlines and buses in the Middle East and Europe. Ahmed Jabril's staunchly pro-Syrian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Abu Musa organization recently have pledged support for Saddam. In late September, Saddam Hussein received Shaikh Al-Tamimi, leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) movement, who declared his support for Iraq. The PIJ claimed responsibility for a February 1990 Egyptian bus attack which left 9 killed and 16 wounded.
The ANO Comes Full Circle
The US believes the Abu Nidal organization--one of the most dangerous terrorist groups--is moving elements of its organization back to Baghdad from Libya. Since the ANO was founded in Iraq in 1974, its members have killed or wounded more than 900 people on 3 continents. Over the years, in return for safehaven, logistical support, and financial assistance, the organization conducted operations with the support of three state sponsors--Iraq, Syria, and Libya. In recent months, ANO leaders have killed scores of members in internecine struggles. Sabri al-Banna, the leader of the ANO, was the PLO representative in Baghdad until 1974 when he and others broke from Fatah, denouncing the PLO leadership for its diplomatic efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the 1970s, the ANO carried out attacks from its base of operations in Iraq--mostly against PLO, Syrian, and Jordanian targets. In 1980, Iraqi and ANO interests began to diverge. The ANO launched a series of vicious attacks against synagogues in Europe that became a trademark of the organization. These attacks interfered with Baghdad's attempts to attract European support for its war with Iran. Probably because of pressure from the United States and Europe, Baghdad insisted the ANO move its base of operations out of Iraq. Syria allowed Sabri al-Banna's group--sometimes with the helping hand of Syrian intelligence officers--to expand its operations in Europe and the Middle East. In the mid-1980s, the ANO carried out attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports, continued the bombings and machine gun attacks on synagogues in Europe and Turkey, and conducted over a dozen attacks against Jordanian targets, including diplomats in Ankara and Bucharest and Jordanian airline offices in Europe. Following public revelations of Syrian involvement in terrorist operations in Europe, the costs to Syria of its support for terrorism began to outweigh the benefits. The British prosecution of Nezar Hindawi--the man who attempted to place a bomb on an El Al flight--implicated Syrian Air Force Intelligence officials, the Syrian national airline, and Syrian Embassy personnel. In response the UK broke diplomatic relations with Syria, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany recalled their ambassadors, and the European Community agreed to various political and economic sanctions against Syria. Under pressure from the United States, European, and friendly Arab nations, the Syrians had ANO move its headquarters to Libya in June 1987. However, Syria continued to allow ANO gunmen to operate in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. The ANO, which receives substantial Libyan financial and logistical support (including weapons and travel documents) conducted an attack in July 1988 against the Greek cruise liner, City of Poros, in which 9 civilians were killed and 98 wounded. The ANO also killed 8 and wounded 21 in its attack on the Acropole Hotel and the British Sudan Club in Khartoum, Sudan in May 1988. The ANO now has assets in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, North Africa, and Europe, which could be used to conduct operations against those opposed to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. There are credible reports that ANO operatives are heading for Europe and the Middle East where authorities are taking steps to prevent terrorist attacks.
An International Response to Terrorism
President Bush and Secretary of State Baker have responded directly to Baghdad's aggression and threats to use terrorism against Americans and others. The US government also is working in cooperation with the international community to dissuade Iraq and the groups it supports from holding hostages and attacking civilians. That cooperation also includes requests through diplomatic channels that those who have influence with Baghdad and the Palestinian terrorist groups use that influence to assure that there is no outbreak of international terrorist violence. The threat of terrorist attack is taken seriously. Both the government of Iraq and the groups it supports have carried out operations in the past. They have the resources and infrastructure in place to do so again. The US government has issued travel warnings and threat advisories alerting the American public and others, including foreign governments, to the threat. In response, the international community is working to enhance counter- terrorism cooperation at the operational level--from information- sharing to tightening security to protect against terrorist attack. The United States has made it clear that it holds Iraq responsible for terrorist attacks it carries out, as well as attacks carried out by those who act on its behalf. There can be no moral defense of terrorism. The United States will continue to work with other nations to exert legal, economic, and other pressure on Baghdad to abandon its holding of civilian hostages and to end its support for terrorist groups who threaten civilians with bombings, assassination, and other violence.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990 Title:

Asian Security in the 1990s: Integration in Economics, Diversity in Defense

Solomon Source: Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Description: Address at the University of California at San Diego, California Date: Oct 30, 199010/30/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: East Asia, Southeast Asia Country: South Korea, North Korea, USSR (former) Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, Trade/Economics [TEXT] It is rare in history--short of a major war--that the "tectonic plates" of global politics suddenly shift position, ending one era and opening up new possibilities for a dramatic realignment of international relationships. The last few years have seen such a breakdown in the alignments of the Cold War era, creating new international patterns and new prospects for the world order of the 21st century. The past year's stunning rush of events in Europe--the evaporation of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, and new forms of US-Soviet cooperation--reflects developments driven by trends of global scope: the bankruptcy of communism as an economic and political system, world-wide economic integration sparked by spectacular technological change, and the widespread movement toward market-oriented economics and political pluralism. These world-reshaping developments have led some to surmise that the end of history, the emergence of a new international harmony, is now upon us. Unfortunately, the elation brought on by the ending of the Cold War has been tempered by darker counter-trends: a renascent ethno-nationalism and the re- emergence of regional antagonisms and ambitions long frozen in the time of Cold War confrontation. The current crisis in the Persian Gulf is teaching us that the new cycle of history may be more threatening to international security and economic progress than the relative stability of the Cold War standoff, even if the response of the major powers--indeed the international community--is an unprecedented level of cooperation. We are entering an era of some intriguing contradictions: power among nations is increasingly diffuse, yet nations are more interdependent than ever; ancient feuds and rivalries are again being played out by smaller powers, yet with the destructive potential of state-of-the-art weaponry. We are entering a world in which the information revolution--with its instantaneous flows of communications and capital on a global scale--is eroding the boundaries of the nation-state and compressing international interactions in both time and space. We now face a future in which technological and commercial capabilities more than military strength are the significant determinants of state power and influence. National security is ever more reckoned in terms of economic and environmental concerns. Increasingly, geo-economics is shaping geopolitics.
Asia in Transition: The Emerging Security Environment
These global trends, brought so sharply into focus in Europe this past year, have long been at work in Asia. Indeed, during the 1980s, East Asia led the world in the transformations of the information age: the high-tech, high-paced growth of the newly emerging industrial societies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore; Japan's emergence as an economic superpower; Deng Xiaoping's economic opening up of China; and the transitions to democracy in the Philippines, Korea, and now even Mongolia. These new economic and political realities have yet to be institutionalized in the emerging international order of the coming century. And as this process unfolds in Asia, it will be shaped by the region's unique political rhythm, its own history, cultural diversity, and particular geopolitical architecture. It will also reflect factors of instability and chance in the process of change, even as it opens up new possibilities for policy innovation. The policy-making challenge we face is how best to give form to these transformations in the service of our own interests and those of our allies and friends. And as we assess new possibilities for change, one important consideration is an appreciation of the profound differences between the European experience that weighs so heavily in our thinking and our Asian opportunities. One important difference is that where in Eastern Europe and the USSR change has been driven by economic failure, much of the ferment in Asia is a product of the region's dramatic successes, of its tremendous economic dynamism. Even China is a case in point: It was the reforms launched in 1978 that fostered a decade of 10% annual growth, an economic expansion which created the social and political pressures that exploded in the spring of last year at Tiananmen Square. Asia's geographical expanse, along with its political and cultural diversity, also stands in sharp contrast to the geographical compactness and common cultural and political traditions of Europe. Yet it is in the realm of security and defense that Asia contrasts most fundamentally with Europe. The Asia- Pacific region is a multi-dimensional security environment where the largest armed forces in the world--the United States, the USSR, China, India, Japan, North and South Korea, and Vietnam--are deployed in loose array. The Soviet Union is but one of many factors determining the regional military balance and threats to national security. Today, Asia is evolving toward a multi-polar pattern of power relations: China, Japan--perhaps even India--are emerging as major players in the region, and smaller states such as North Korea are pressing to develop unprecedented military capabilities, from ballistic missiles to weapons of mass destruction. And here lies one of the most fundamental distinctions between Europe and Asia. In the Pacific, it is difficult to discern any single threat commonly perceived across the region. Instead, there are a multiplicity of security concerns that vary from one country to another, from one sub-region to another. Indeed, it is most useful to view East Asia and the Pacific as three sub-regional security zones: Northeast Asia; Southeast Asia; and the South Pacific. Each sub-region has its own set of security issues and players largely independent of one another. The primary sources of tension today in East Asia are the heavily armed standoff on the Korean Peninsula, the Cambodia conflict, and unresolved territorial disputes such as the Soviet occupation of Japan's northern territories and potentially divisive claims over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Resolving such localized disputes and strengthening an open trading and financial system in the face of pressures of nationalism and protectionism are the sine qua non for strengthening security and prosperity in the Pacific.
Asian Collective Security?
In this context, how do we approach the future security of this economically vital region? For the United States, the short answer is by accommodating Asia's geopolitical diversity while fostering cohesion in areas where there is strong common interest--economic development, trade, and investment. This perspective, however, is a matter of some contemporary discussion . In some quarters, we hear calls for a system of collective security in Asia--an advocacy inspired by the European experience of a region-wide conference on security and cooperation. For our part, we remain doubtful about the utility of an all- Pacific security grouping. The sources of tension that remain in the region--indeed, the nature of the security challenges we anticipate in the years ahead--do not easily lend themselves to region-wide solutions. When we look at the key determinants of stability in Asia-- the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, the narrowing Sino- Soviet differences, or the Indochina conflict--in each case it is difficult to see how a Helsinki-type institution would be an appropriate forum for enhancing security or promoting conflict resolution. In Korea, the dialogue between North and South will be the principal forum for reducing tensions and moving toward reunification--although the experience of German reunification suggests that at the right time, Korea's neighbors can play an important role in supporting efforts to reunify the peninsula. In regard to Sino-Soviet relations, border disputes and arms reductions are being worked out on a bilateral basis. And in Cambodia, ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], the United Nations Permanent Five, and the Paris conference have been the primary mechanisms moving us fitfully toward a political settlement. In each instance, the process of conflict resolution has been fashioned to fit the character of the particular problem. In our view, as Secretary Baker made clear at this year's ASEAN post-ministerial discussions, it is preferable to adapt existing, proven mechanisms to meet the challenges of changing circumstances before creating new ones. To the extent that a broader collective framework can help resolve regional security problems, the United Nations is proving to have new capacity to play such a role. This has certainly been the case regarding Cambodia and, even more dramatically, in the gulf crisis. In evaluating the various suggestions for a new security mechanism for East Asia, we should recall the unsuccessful history of collective defense arrangements in the region since 1945. Much of Asia's post-war history has been a struggle between the great powers to shape the architecture of regional security. In early 1950, we faced the prospect of a Sino-Soviet political and security bloc--a challenge that shaped our responses to the Korean war and the French defeat in Indochina. In reaction, the United States attempted to organize Asia in NATO's image through institutions such as CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] and SEATO [South East Asia Treaty Organization]. And in response to the global rivalry of the superpowers, we saw the newly independent countries create the Non-Aligned Movement at Bandung, Indonesia in 1954. As events unfolded in the 1960s and 1970s, the Sino-Soviet alliance degenerated into political feuding and then military confrontation, rendering [Soviet leader] Brezhnev's 1969 call for collective security as unattractive to many regional powers as Western efforts to organize East Asia on an anti-communist basis. In short, Asia has proven remarkably resistant to efforts to fashion all-encompassing security regimes. Instead, the structure of Asian security has been an array of sometimes overlapping alliances and political alignments: the US bilateral security treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand; the sub-regional groupings of ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States security treaty], ASEAN, and the South Pacific Forum; and the Soviet Union's bilateral alliances with North Korea and Vietnam. For the United States, our strategic anchor in Asia has been the US-Japan security relationship, with our forward-deployed presence reinforced through bilateral treaties with our other Asian security partners. And as the Defense Department's East Asia Strategy Initiative pointed out last April, in the decade ahead, "The principal elements of our Asian strategy--forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements--will remain valid and essential to maintaining regional stability, deterring aggression, and preserving US interests."
The Soviet Role in the Pacific
Let me say a few words about the Soviet role in the Pacific. There is no question that the Soviet Union, like the United States, is a power with interests in Asia as well as in Europe. With more than two-thirds of Soviet territory in Asia, it could not be otherwise. Nor is there any doubt that Moscow has been playing an increasingly constructive role in the region, to the extent that Mr. Gorbachev's "new thinking" has been matched by new actions. Moscow's cooperative response to the crisis in the Persian Gulf is a dramatic illustration of the potential for new forms of collaboration among the major powers as we shape a post-Cold War order. We have also been encouraged by growing Soviet cooperation on such regional conflicts as Korea and Cambodia and on critical security issues such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons. There is perhaps no more dramatic recent example of the changing Soviet role in the region than the meeting in San Francisco last June between Presidents Gorbachev and Roh Tae Woo and the more recent opening of Soviet diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Korea. These developments have fundamentally altered the equation on the Korean Peninsula and opened up new possibilities for dialogue and tension reduction between North and South Korea. There have also been significant Soviet military cutbacks in East Asia--along the Sino-Soviet frontier, from Mongolia, from Vietnam, and reductions in Soviet naval operations in the Pacific. We have also seen reductions in the total number of Soviet ships and planes deployed in the region--although as a result of continuing force modernization efforts, Soviet air and naval assets deployed in the Pacific are no less capable than in the recent past. But threat assessments are based on more than just calculations of military capability; they are grounded on judgments about intentions. And in our view, the Soviets have demonstrated a substantially changed intent toward East Asia, to the point where prospects for non-adversarial relations with Moscow are beginning to acquire some reality. As the Soviet Union initiates market- oriented economic reforms, for example, the basis will be established for constructive Soviet involvement in international economic organizations.
Asian Arms Control?
In this rapidly evolving context, we have been weighing the calls from Soviet and allied leaders for new security measures in Asia. What is our position? We are, without question, in favor of reducing conflicts, tensions, and armaments in Asia--as we are doing in Europe. Indeed, as part of our super-active agenda of negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control and confidence-building measures, we are quite prepared to explore new possibilities. But in evaluating the virtues of any arms control initiative, we must keep in mind several fundamental objectives: Any measure must be equitable and verifiable; it must reduce the risks of war and lower tensions; and it must strengthen confidence, transparency, and predictability. When measured against these basic criteria, a number of the initiatives recently suggested fail the test. In regard to the reduction of strategic weapons--and, if we chose to pursue it, naval arms control--these processes are global in character, and they are best dealt with on a global, not a regional, basis. We must make certain that measures which appear attractive at the global level do not, on close inspection, have an adverse impact on regional security or vice versa. Put in concrete terms, there are global as well as regional implications of US and Soviet military deployments in the Pacific. As we saw in the case of the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] treaty negotiations of the late 1980s, deployments of Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia, which were of great concern to Japan and China, were eliminated along with those in Europe when the United States insisted on a global solution. Similarly, current US-Soviet and European arms control talks--CFE [conventional armed forces in Europe], START [strategic arms reduction talks], CSBM [confidence- and security-building measures]--and their successors will serve Asian security interests by bringing about substantial reductions in strategic and conventional forces, thus enhancing strategic stability--and this without any specifically Asian-oriented agreements. I should also note that in recent years we have seen the emergence of a uniquely Asia-Pacific phenomenon--an informal arms control process, sometimes unilateral, sometimes reciprocal in character. In the early 1980s, the Chinese reduced their military forces by 1 million, and, not long thereafter, the Soviets thinned out their troops along the Sino-Soviet border and reduced their forces stationed at Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay. In the last year, the Vietnamese have demobilized thousands of their troops withdrawn from Cambodia. In addition, Japan's three non-nuclear principles and its defensive posture is another example of unilateral restraint. Only Korea thus far seems immune to this trend. The United States has taken similar unilateral steps. As part of our East Asia strategy initiative we have begun a 10%-12% reduction of our forces in the Pacific. This process, for all of us, is a reflection of changing security circumstances, force modernization programs, and resource constraints. But however informal the process, the result is that both US and Soviet defense spending--and the growth of Japanese defense spending--are all decreasing, again, without any explicit, Asian-oriented agreements. What about more formal, structured arms control processes in Asia? Though often overlooked, we have a number of mechanisms already in place. We have had an incidents at sea agreement with Moscow since 1971. We have standard maritime notification procedures, a ship visit program which recently brought the US fleet to Vladivostok and the Soviets right here to San Diego, and other US-Soviet military exchanges in the Pacific. We also have a trilateral agreement with the Soviets and Japan to assure air traffic safety in the North Pacific. We have begun talks in Vienna with the Soviet Union on military doctrine which, while worldwide in scope, could focus on the Pacific in a global context. And since last January, we have had in place a dangerous military activities agreement with the Soviets. While we might explore ways to better adapt such confidence- building measures to current circumstances in the region, in our view, these mechanisms provide a well-established basis for dealing with many of the security concerns in the Asia-Pacific theater. One problem we have with contemporary proposals for naval arms control is that they seem to be based on the assumption that the US military presence in the Pacific is a source of tension. Neither we nor the vast majority of countries in the region, however, believe this to be the case. Indeed, there is a broad consensus in East Asia that a continuing US security presence is an essential ingredient of regional stability. Thus, measures that would constrain the US naval presence-- which secures our logistical lifelines to our allies--or which would precipitously reduce our force presence are unlikely to build confidence. On the contrary, given the increasingly multi-polar balance of power in Asia, a diminution in the US security commitment to the region would likely create uncertainty and "empty spaces" that other major powers would be tempted or compelled to fill. The fact is that no power other than the United States is now able or welcome to play the role of regional balancer. As Defense Secretary Cheney pointed out in Tokyo earlier this year, the United States for four decades has served as the "balancing wheel" in the security structure of East Asia and the Pacific. And a real or perceived US reluctance to play the role of regional balancer, honest broker, and arbiter would be inherently destabilizing. This does not mean we are wedded to the status quo. As the security environment changes, our force structure and defense activities will be altered to fit the challenges of the 1990s. Put in other terms, we seek to find ways of adapting existing institutions to new circumstances. Yet the diverse nature of security concerns in Asia must be dealt with on their own terms. Although there is a tendency in some quarters to superimpose the European model onto the strategic and geopolitical landscape (and seascape) of East Asia and the Pacific, with the important exception of the Korean Peninsula, the region is simply not analogous to the European theater. We must tailor our solutions to Asian security problems to the character of the context. We should not create solutions in search of problems. A fundamental consideration is the profound asymmetry in both the force structures and missions of the US and Soviet military presence in the region. While the Soviet Union is a great Eurasian land power, the United States is a maritime power. The sea lanes are to US security what roads and railways are to the Soviets. Equally important, the Soviet factor is but one aspect of the mission of US forces in the Pacific. Today's crisis in Southwest Asia underscores the multidimensional US security role in East Asia, which sustains our ability to deploy forces into the Indian Ocean and to the Middle East--a matter of considerable interest to the many states in East Asia dependent on gulf energy supplies. The gulf crisis thus highlights the non-Soviet oriented mission of US naval forces, the need for operational flexibility across many theaters, and the stabilizing role of US defense capabilities. This serves the interests not only of the United States but of the international community--including the Soviet Union. Were the Soviet presence to disappear from Asia, these other missions and the historic balancing role of the United States would remain of fundamental importance to the security of the region.
Focus on Korea
The one place in East Asia where European-style confidence- building measures--and, in time, arms reduction initiatives--seem relevant is the Korean Peninsula. In Korea, as in Europe, large and heavily armed ground forces confront each other across a clearly demarcated land border. As the newly activated North-South dialogue proceeds, there is great potential for the Koreans to apply the arms control experience gained in Europe to reducing tensions and building the confidence necessary for significant arms reductions. And as we have seen this year in Germany, such a dialogue can pave the way for rapid reunification. While the process of building confidence must be created by the Koreans themselves, the major powers--the United States, the USSR, China, and Japan--have important interests that intersect on the peninsula. As the North-South dialogue begins to make real progress, we believe there are good prospects for increasing cooperation among the major powers in support of the dialogue, the easing of tensions on the peninsula, and, ultimately, the guaranteeing of outcomes. One security issue of common concern to the major powers is North Korea's reluctance to sign and implement a full-scope nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This is a commitment Pyongyang was obliged to undertake within 18 months after acceding in 1985 to the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea's lack of cooperation in this matter sustains tensions in Northeast Asia and limits Pyongyang's welcome in the international community. We view nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula as the number one threat to stability in East Asia. Were the North Koreans to fulfill their obligations under the NPT they would remove a major obstacle to the improvement of US- DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] relations. And they would not find wanting our response or that of the Republic of Korea. We view improved US relations with the North as part of the process of reducing tensions and creating an atmosphere conducive to reunification. As demonstrated by our support for German reunification, the United States will support peaceful reunification of the two Korean states on terms acceptable to all Koreans--North and South. The recent Korean prime ministerial talks hopefully will prove to be an important milestone on the road to national reconciliation.
The Emerging Architecture of East Asia and the Pacific
At the outset of these remarks, I suggested that national security is increasingly reckoned in economic terms, that the international standing of a state is now less a matter of military might than of scientific and commercial capabilities, of environmental health, of political and social vitality. This suggests some important considerations as we seek to shape the structure of an international system in flux. Our experience of the past half century is that East Asia is most naturally organized for defense in diversified bilateral or sub- regional groupings. At the same time, the forces of economic growth are steadily leading to regional integration and to the internal transformations that are producing higher educational levels, greater openness to the world of the information revolution, and pressures for political reform. It is these perspectives that are shaping our agenda for East Asia and the Pacific in the 1990s. Let me comment briefly on our vision of regional security relationships. For the United States, the core of Asian security has been--and will continue to be--the US-Japan security relationship. The security treaty is the anchor of our engagement in the region. It forms the basis of the US-Japan partnership, a partnership which has now grown to global proportions. The world's two largest economies--in terms of trade, aid, investment, and technology--are the engine of global growth and East Asia's economic dynamism. What do I mean by "global partnership"? Increasingly, the full range of transnational issues is on the US-Japan political agenda: conflict resolution in Cambodia; cooperation on the gulf crisis; and management of refugee flows, illicit narcotics trafficking, and environmental problems. With the combined resources of almost 40% of the world's GNP, Japanese-American cooperation is essential to meeting these challenges. Yet we know that the US-Japan relationship requires careful and farsighted cultivation. We face the daunting challenges of correcting our bilateral economic imbalance, fostering a two-way flow of defense-related technologies, and overcoming an undertow of resentments and charges of unfairness that occasionally surface with an edge of corrosive racism. Successful management of the tensions in the US-Japan relationship is essential to sustaining a secure and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. China is another major factor in the Asian security equation. The normalization of US-PRC [People's Republic of China] relations over the past two decades has made a major contribution to regional stability. Yet last year's violence at Tiananmen Square raised serious human rights concerns which eroded support in the United States for our relations with China. This political fact presents us a second major challenge to maintaining the structure of our bilateral relationships in Asia. The recent normalization of both US and PRC relations with the Soviet Union has fundamentally altered the "strategic counterweight" argument for our relations with China. Yet the need for strategic engagement with Beijing endures as China's international role evolves to encompass a broad range of global and regional issues: from missile and nuclear non-proliferation to cooperation on the gulf crisis to resolution of the regional conflicts in Cambodia and on the Korean Peninsula. And for the long term, a modernizing China at peace with itself and its neighbors is essential to stability and prosperity in Asia. ASEAN is an increasingly central factor for stability and economic growth in Southeast Asia. We have worked closely with ASEAN over the years, as symbolized by the annual ministerial- level consultations, and our political coordination will be increasingly important in meeting new challenges soon to come. Integrating Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into the region will be a top priority item as our efforts to achieve a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia reach fruition. Beyond our engagement with ASEAN as a multilateral organization, two of its members--Thailand and the Philippines-- are bilateral treaty allies. Our firm commitment to Thai security has shaped our policy toward the instability in Indochina, as Thailand is a front-line state confronting the Cambodia conflict. Our defense relationship with the Philippines has also been a key element in regional stability. It is our fundamental objective, as we pursue a new accord to replace the expiring 1947 military bases agreement, that whatever else results, we will build a new, more balanced relationship with the Philippines reflecting the broad range of our shared interests. But let there be no doubt of our commitment to sustain a security presence in Southeast Asia regardless of the future status of US forces at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station. In this regard, let me note the constructive proposal made by Philippine Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus at this summer's ASEAN post-ministerial dialogue. Secretary Manglapus called for a full- fledged ASEAN debate on regional security issues. As we enter the post-Cold War world, the ASEAN countries could only benefit from a thorough reassessment of their security interests. Inasmuch as non-alignment was a response to the confrontations of the Cold War years, the concept could usefully be reassessed in view of the emerging realities of an era of multiple power centers. I must not overlook our other major treaty ally in this part of the world, Australia--our southern anchor in the Pacific. Canberra is increasingly active in both global and regional affairs, in the effort to rid the world of chemical weapons and to achieve a political settlement in Cambodia. Australia also plays an important role in the South Pacific as an honest broker and a catalyst for regional development. I should note here that we hope that future New Zealand defense policies will permit it to return to full participation in the ANZUS alliance. I also feel compelled to mention the current situation in Burma. The results of the May 1990 elections revealed that the Burmese people are as much a part of the worldwide trend toward political reform and democracy as are the people of Korea, the Philippines, Mongolia, or Eastern Europe. To their credit, the military authorities provided the people of Burma last spring a voice to express their political will. Yet in subsequent months, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has refused to accept the unambiguous rejection of military rule and the deep desire of the Burmese people for civilian, democratic government. We and much of the world community are deeply troubled by the failure of the Burmese authorities to honor the outcome of the spring elections. The increasingly violent repression of dissent in Burma, including now the attempt to repress the religious community, is a harbinger of even more difficult times ahead. Fulfilling the electoral mandate is the only way the SLORC can avoid a future of domestic instability and international self-isolation.
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Our defense relationships have helped to secure East Asia's economic dynamism, turning the region into one of the engines of world growth and forging a $300-billion annual two-way trade between the United States and the nations of the Pacific Rim. Yet it is economics, not security, that holds the promise of bringing a new cohesion to the region. To this end, the United States joined together with 11 other nations of the Pacific Basin in Canberra last year to strengthen economic cooperation based on free-market principles. Secretary Baker has twice met with his ministerial colleagues to initiate the Asia Pacific economic cooperation (APEC) process. APEC is now exploring ways to enhance the economic structure of regional integration in its working group on telecommunications, and we anticipate similar efforts on regional transport. It is seeking ways to remove impediments to investment flows. And it is helping to develop a shared sense of the future through analysis of the regional economic outlook, by developing a common economic data base, and by projecting future energy needs. At last July's APEC meeting in Singapore, Secretary Baker proposed an education initiative in support of a commitment to human resource development. By expanding private- sector internships and training programs and by developing linkages between US and regional educational institutions in the areas of science, engineering, business, and management, the United States intends to enhance the human talent that will sustain economic growth. Another central goal of APEC has been to build support for the Uruguay Round of trade talks in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Maintaining a global system of open trade and investment, one resilient enough to stave off protectionist pressures, is a vital component of any viable post-Cold War order. Open trade is essential to sustaining growth among the nations of the Pacific Basin. It is our belief that, over time, APEC will evolve into a new multilateral mechanism reinforcing the sense of collective purpose among the market-oriented economies of East Asia and the Pacific. And as we have seen so dramatically in the political revolutions of the 1980s, economic openness is difficult to sustain without corresponding political openness and vice versa. Thus, we hope that APEC will encourage reform in those countries moving in the direction of market-oriented policies. At present, APEC is considering the inclusion of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan--a goal the United States strongly endorses. APEC was formed just a year ago, amidst some early doubts and concerns in the region about its rationale or viability. Today, its working groups are off to an energetic start, demonstrating in practical terms why the economies of the Pacific Basin share a common future. APEC can build shared benefits through economic expansion. And by emphasizing economic progress rather than defense issues as the basis for regional integration, we can provide a more broadly acceptable framework for assuring security in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the 1990s promises to be one of those rare "open" periods in history; the United States and its allies and trading partners have the opportunity to shape institutions and patterns of cooperation in pursuit of shared values, shared growth, and shared security. Our agenda for shaping the future stresses common economic benefits, global arms control, and the resolution of regional conflicts. By focusing efforts to enhance security on the true sources of tension--on military conflicts and territorial disputes--we are likely to maximize cooperation while getting at the roots of key problems. Success in Northeast Asia can mean a stable and eventually reunified Korean Peninsula. And it can encourage normalized Soviet-Japanese relations. In Southeast Asia, resolving the Cambodian conflict can pave the way to integrating Indochina into the region and sharing the fruits of economic growth with Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. As President Bush stressed at the recent summit of Pacific island leaders, cooperation on economic and environmental issues can help foster the development vital to stability and nation-building in the South Pacific. And if we are successful in the Uruguay Round and the work of APEC, we will have established an economic framework which can bridge the diverse cultures of East Asia and harness its dynamism in new cooperative ventures, thus carrying the region toward greater integration and greater influence in the global community. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990 Title:

Summit With Pacific Island Leaders

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Concluding remarks at the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii Date: Oct 27, 199010/27/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Pacific Country: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Western Samoa Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] (President Bush met with leaders from Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa) It's been a great pleasure to greet you here in the Pacific, here in the United States. We've just completed an unprecedented dialogue on a wide range of mutual interests and concerns. In particular, we emphasize that America shares the islands' vision of the region's future--seeing the Pacific not as a great ocean of small islands and tiny populations but rather as an aquatic continent--the world's largest--covering a full third of the earth's surface. Like a string of pearls spread out across the sea, each nation is unique, each is precious, and each has something to contribute to the value of the whole. The Pacific islands have a special place in the minds and hearts of the American people. And, on my own visits, starting almost 50 years ago, I witnessed the natural charm of the island peoples and the natural beauty of the islands. Their reputation is well-deserved. With island jurisdictions of our own, we are also proud of America's special place in the extended family of Pacific nations. We enjoy close relations, linked by many bonds of friendship and family. Today, we share this great aquatic continent as partners in peace, bound together in an oceanic community pledged to protect both new democracies and worthy old traditions. During World War II, many Americans journeyed to the Pacific islands to help protect our shared heritage of freedom and peace. Today, we have returned, this time, to help protect our shared heritage of beauty and nature. That is why, just last month, I signed the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region and promptly sent it to the Senate for ratification. Similarly, we have directed our ambassador in New Zealand to sign the Wellington convention, a major new step in dealing with the challenge of driftnet fishing. We also described our plan to host the first round of discussions for a framework convention on global climate change beginning in Washington next February 4th. This effort is being bolstered by the world's largest environmental research program--our administration's initiative to commit about $1 billion a year to explore the causes and effects of climate change. We also shared a valuable discussion on one program of particular concern to the island nations and of particular concern and importance to our global arms control efforts--the destruction of all chemical weapons on Johnston Island. We emphasized our common interest in ridding the world of these terrible weapons and asked for their understanding and support in this significant step toward peace and disarmament. We assured the leaders that we plan to dispose of only the chemical munitions from the Pacific theater currently stored at Johnston Atoll, any obsolete materials found in the Pacific Islands, and those relatively small quantities shipped from Germany. We confirmed that these munitions will be destroyed safely on a prioritized schedule and that, once the destruction is completed, we have no plans to use Johnston Atoll for any other chemical munitions purpose or as a hazardous waste disposal site. We also assured the leaders that the safeguards we're employing ensure that there will be no associated environmental damage. And we expressed the hope that they would accept our offer for a technical team, sponsored by the South Pacific Forum, to visit Johnston Atoll to independently monitor the operation. Today, the United States has rededicated itself to lasting security in the region--a security which comes not so much from force of arms, but through nurturing of free people, free markets, free economies. In order to strengthen these economies, we were pleased to announce several initiatives. First, we proposed establishing a joint commercial commission with the island nations to meet each year at senior government levels to identify and address commercial opportunities and trade concerns. Second, we announced that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) would establish two new funds--an Asian Pacific growth fund and an environmental investment fund to respectively assist private sector and natural resource development. In addition, OPIC will lead a 1991 mission of American investors to Pacific Island countries. Third, we announced our plan to begin negotiations to extend the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Treaty. And fourth, the addition of USAID [US Agency for International Development] private-sector assistance programs to enhance agricultural and marine resource development. Fifth, three new programs--educational exchanges sponsored by the East-West Center and USIA [US Information Agency]. And further, I would also like to announce an extension of our APEC [Asia Pacific economic cooperation] Partnership of Education Initiative to include the Pacific island countries. This last initiative will enhance educational links all across the Pacific, through both the public and private sector. I am very pleased that you all came. Like the early Pacific navigators who braved the seas alone so that others could follow, you have come to Hawaii today to help chart a new course for the children of the Pacific--the children of tomorrow. Together, we are moving forward. And together, we're racing toward a new era in the century of the Pacific. Together, we and the island nations can ensure it is, indeed, a new era of peace and growth. Thank you--all of you--for this visit. You've shown us friendship. You've shown leadership in promoting democracy and economic progress. I simply want to wish each and every one of you the very best. The frankness of the exchange, the chance to exchange ideas, has been extraordinarily beneficial to me, and I expect those American officials with me feel exactly the same way. We look forward to working with you as together we face the enormous challenges of the future. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990 Title:

The United States and Oceania

Date: Nov 5, 199011/5/90 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: Pacific Country: Aleutian Islands, American Samoa, Antipodes Islands, Auckland Islands, Australia, Baker Island, Christmas Island, Clipperton Island, Cocos Islands, Cook Islands, Diego Garcia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Gaum, Howland Island, Japan, Johnston Atoll, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Midway Island, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, Pacific Islands, Palmyra Atoll, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, South Sandwich Islands, Spratly Islands, Tokelau, Tromelin Island, Western Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wake Island, Wallis and Futuna Islands Subject: Democratization, History [TEXT]
Background
Sparsely scattered over one-sixth of the earth's surface are some 10,000 islands, sometimes called "Oceania," in the central and south Pacific Ocean. Included among them are nine independent countries, four freely associated states, and a number of dependencies belonging primarily to the United States and France. Other islands, inhabited and uninhabited, are sometimes defined as belonging to the region. Within and among these subgroups is great social and cultural diversity. More than 700 languages are spoken in Papua New Guinea alone.
Current Status
Nine island countries became independent between 1962 and 1980. The Cook Islands and Niue became self-governing states freely associated with New Zealand in 1965 and 1972. The Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, former parts of the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, became sovereign states in free association with United States when the Compact of Free Association was implemented in 1986. The Northern Mariannas voted to join the United States as a common-wealth. Only the Republic of Palau continues in Trust Territory status. Guam and American Samoa are the two US territories in the Pacific.. Despite differences in size, resources, and historical experience, important similarities exist between the United States and the island countries. The islanders share America's respect for democracy and human rights and have modeled many of their institutions on those of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Economic development has proved more difficult than political advancement. Oceania has experienced little real economic growth over the last 5 years. Economies are dependent on a few activities, mostly agriculture and fisheries, and are tied to the vagaries of world commodities markets and to general economic undulations. Enormous problems with transportation and communications constrain growth. Larger islands such as Papua New Guinea are broken up by rugged terrain. Populations in smaller countries are dispersed in low-lying atolls scattered across thousands of miles of water. Island governments are facing these challenges by practicing fiscal restraint and by pursuing market-oriented trade, investment, and monetary policies designed to make them more competitive and export oriented. Before the most recent oil shock, these policies had encouraged cautious optimism about Oceania's economic prospects.
US Policy
The United States has a long history of contact with the islanders, dating back to the vigorous pursuit of dollars and souls by 19th- century traders, whalers, and missionaries. During World War II, the United States suffered about 300,000 casualties in the region, almost 30% of US worldwide losses. The state of Hawaii, the territories of Guam and American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariannas, and its close relationship with the states formerly part of the Trust Territory also give the United States a stake in the region's future. Strategically, the United States wants to ensure freedom of navigation for its ships and alternate sealanes to the Indian Ocean. It has worked to maintain good relations with the region and to deal with the concerns of its leaders. In 1983, the United States ratified separate treaties of friendship with Tokelau, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Cook Islands, renouncing outdated claims to uninhabited islands. The United States has signed a fisheries agreement with 15 South Pacific countries that provides cash transfers and small grants in return for access for US tuna boats to the region's stocks. The US Agency for International Development provides direct aid, and the United States contributes to international lending agencies such as the Asian Development Bank. The US Senate is expected to ratify the South Pacific Regional Environmental Protection Convention, a regional framework for protecting the environment of the South Pacific against pollution from various sources, including vessels, seabed activities, land- based sources, hazardous wastes, and nuclear testing. Also, the United States has offered to host the first round of world talks on a framework convention on climate change in February 1991, a key concern of the region.
The Regions of Oceania (box)
Ethnically and culturally, the islands of Oceania fall into three subregions:
Micronesia
: Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Palau, Guam, Nauru, and Kiribati;
Melanesia
: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, and part of Fiji; and
Polynesia
: part of Fiji, French Polynesia, Tuvalu, Tonga, Western Samoa, Cook Islands, American Samoa and Hawaii, Niue, Tokelau, and Wallis and Futuna.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990 Title:

High-Seas Driftnet Fishing and the Protection of Living Marine Resources

Date: Nov 5, 199011/5/90 Category: Policy Briefs (Gist) Region: Pacific, East Asia Country: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan Subject: Resource Management, Environment, International Law [TEXT]
Background
The management and conservation of living marine resources and averting threats to marine life have become more important international fisheries issues in recent years. The US continues to have a deep concern for the conservation and protection of living marine resources. Through negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements and by promoting UN and other projects calling for greater multilateral cooperation, the State Department aims to conserve and protect marine resources and prevent unacceptable impacts on high-seas living marine resources.
High-Seas Driftnet Fishing
Large squid and tuna driftnet fleets from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan operating throughout the Pacific potentially pose a major conservation and environmental problem. Such fishing indiscriminately ensnares both target species, such as squid and tuna, as well as others, including various marine mammal species, seabirds, salmonids, and other living marine resources.
South Pacific
The issue of driftnet fishing has been of continuing importance in the South Pacific, mainly because of concern over the possible depletion of South Pacific albacore tuna stocks. The United States has supported efforts by the Pacific island nations concerning driftnets, e.g., in cosponsoring a resolution in the 44th UNGA calling for a moratorium in the South Pacific. The US has decided to sign the Wellington convention prohibiting the use of driftnets in the South Pacific. It also has begun the process of negotiating with South Pacific nations a conservation and management agreement for albacore tuna. The Japanese are also participating in these negotiations, which are being conducted separately from the driftnet ban.
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Treaty
The 5-year regional fisheries treaty between the US and the South Pacific countries which entered into force in 1988 marked a new step forward in US relations with the region. The treaty authorizes the issuance of up to 50 licences to US tuna boats by the Forum Fisheries Agency. It also provides $10 million annually through the US Agency for International Development to the treaty parties. Island governments strongly support the treaty. Congress has called for a 10-year extension, and negotiations are likely to begin next year.
North Pacific
In 1989 and 1990, under the US Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act of 1987, bilateral agreements were signed with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan establishing scientific monitoring and enforcement programs for driftnet fisheries in the North Pacific. These joint programs monitor the numbers of mammals, seabirds, and other living marine resources taken by the driftnet fleets. Bilateral enforcement programs aim to ensure that these fleets do not operate in high seas areas where they may take US-origin salmonids. These agreements should provide the information needed to understand and document how such fleets affect the marine environment and provide a sound basis for developing policy regarding them. They are important steps toward addressing the potential environmental and fishery conservation problems presented by driftnet fishing.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 10, November 5, 1990 Title:

Country Profiles: Pacific Islands

Date: Nov 5, 199011/5/90 Category: Country Data Region: Pacific Country: Cook Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Niue, Tuvalu Subject: History [TEXT]
Cook Islands
Area: 240 sq. km. Capital: Avarua Population: 18,100 Ethnic groups: Polynesian (81%), Polynesian/European 8%, Polynesian/other 8%, European 2.4% Religion: Christian (Cook Islands Christian Church) Work force: 5,800 (agriculture 29%, government 27%, services 25%, industry 15%) Government: self-governing in free association with New Zealand Constitution: 1965 Branches: Executive--Queen's representative, prime minister. Legislative-- 24-member parliament; 15-member House of Arikis (chiefs) Political parties: Cook Islands Party, Democratic Tumu Party, Democratic Party, Cook Islands Labor Party, Cook Islands People's Party. Suffrage: universal adult GDP: $21.3 million Per capita income: $1,200 Inflation rate: 9.9% Exports: $3.2 million: copra, fresh and canned fruit, clothing Imports: $26.4 million: foodstuffs, textiles, fuels, timber Major trading partners: New Zealand (49%), Japan, Australia, US
Kiribati
Area: 717 sq. km. Capital: Tarawa Population: 69,000 Annual growth rate: 1.5% Ethnic groups: Micronesian Religions: Roman Catholic (48%) Work force: 7,900 Government: republic Constitution: 1979 Branches: Executive--president. Legislative--unicameral 40- member National Assembly Political parties: Gilbertese National Party, Christian Democratic Party Suffrage: universal over 18 GDP: $24.7 million Per capita income: $370 Inflation rate: 5% Exports: $2.3 million: fish, copra Imports: $17.5 million: foodstuffs, fuel, transportation equipment Major trading partners: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, UK, US
Republic of the Marshall Islands
Area: 181 sq. km. Capital: Majuro Population: 42,000 Ethnic groups: almost entirely Micronesian Religions: predominantly Protestant Work force: 4,800 Government: constitutional in free association with the US; Compact of Free Association entered into force 1986 Constitution: 1979 Branches: parliamentary with legislative authority vested in 33- member Nitijela (parliament) and a Council of Chiefs. Judicial-- supreme court Political parties: no formal parties Suffrage: universal over 18 GDP: $31.9 million Per capita income: $1,000 Exports: $2.5 million: copra, copra oil, agricultural products, handicrafts Imports: $29.2 million: foodstuffs, beverages, building materials Major trading partners: NA
Federated States of Micronesia
Area: 702 sq. km. Capital: Kolonia Population: 102,100 Ethnic groups: Micronesian and Polynesian groups Religions: predominantly Christian, divided between Roman Catholic and Protestant Work force: NA Government: constitutional in free association with the US; Compact of Free Association entered into force in 1986 Constitution: 1979 Branches: Executive--president and vice president elected from ranks of popularly elected senators. Legislative--unicameral National Congress. Judicial--Supreme Court Political parties: no formal parties Suffrage: universal over 18 GDP: $144 million Per capita income: $1,300 Inflation rate: NA Exports: $5.4 million Imports: $67.7 million Major trading partners: NA
Niue
Area: 260 sq. km. Capital: Alofi Population: 2,112 Ethnic groups: Polynesian, with some Europeans, Samoans, and Tongans Religions: Niuean Church (Protestant church closely related to the London Missionary Society), Mormon Work force: 1,000 Government: self-governing territory in free association with New Zealand Constitution: 1974 Branches: Executive--four-member cabinet (premier and three ministers). Legislative--20-member unicameral Legislative Assembly Suffrage: universal adult GNP: $3 million Per capita income: $1,080 Inflation rate: 9.6% Exports: $87,800: canned coconut cream, copra, honey, passion fruit products, pawpaw, root crops, limes, footballs, stamps, handicrafts Imports: $1.9 million: food, live animals, manufactured goods, machinery, fuels, lubricants, chemicals Major trading partners: New Zealand, Fiji, Japan, Cook Islands, Western Samoa, Australia, US
Tuvalu
Area: 26 sq. km. Capital: Funafuti Population: 8,600 Ethnic groups: Polynesian Religions: Christian, predominantly Protestant Work force: NA Government: independent state, special member of the Commonwealth Constitution: 1978 Branches: Executive prime minister, cabinet. Legislative-- unicameral 12-member House of Parliament. Judicial--High Court. Political parties: none Suffrage: universal adult GNP: $4 million Per capita income: $450 Inflation rate: 3.90% Exports: $1: copra Imports: $2.8 million: food, animals, mineral fuels, machinery, manufactured goods Major trading partners: Fiji, Australia, New Zealand NOTE: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, sells State Department Background Notes on Fiji, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Western Samoa, the other participants in the October 27 Pacific island summit. (For sales information, call 202-783-3238.)(###)