US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 8, October 22, 1990
Title: From Points to Pathways of Mutual Advantage: Next
Steps in Soviet-American Relations
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Address before the American Committee on US-Soviet
Relations, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 19, 199010/19/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Democratization, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
I am honored to address this important audience and to share with
my friend Eduard Shevardnadze [Soviet Foreign Minister] the
distinguished George Kennan Award. It is an honor because
Ambassador Kennan has served his country long and ably as both
diplomat and historian.
Ambassador Kennan, you have been an eyewitness to and a
participant in the historic events of our time: the establishment of
relations with the Bolsheviks, the construction of the Marshall
Plan, and the ebb and flow of the Cold War.
I was particularly struck, however, by an account in your
memoirs about that spring day in Moscow in 1945 when the happy
crowd swarmed around you simply because you were an American
and the war was over. Your Russian words captured the moment:
"Congratulations on the day of victory. All honor to the Soviet
allies."
But that moment, that springtime, was fleeting. It was soon
chilled by the excesses of Stalinism. The grand alliance and its
hopes for a post-war order turned into a long Cold War. Now, we
live in new days of promise. The epoch of the Cold War is over. Any
lingering doubts have been dispelled by the events of the past
month.
The Cold War in Europe ended quietly in New York on October 1:
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I joined with our German,
British, and French colleagues in signing away the rights of the
World War II victors, recognizing a new united Germany and the
trust among former adversaries that made it possible.
The Cold War that was played out across the rest of the globe
ended more dramatically. It was closed by the partnership against
Iraqi aggression that President Bush and President Gorbachev forged
at the Helsinki summit.
But the new epoch is just beginning. An important
determinant of its future will be the change in the Soviet Union
itself--a revolution that is transforming both Soviet foreign policy
and Soviet society. While the people of the United States can take
justifiable pride that their nation was a trustee of freedom
throughout the Cold War, I am also pleased to recognize that
President Gorbachev's revolution of new thinking and perestroika is,
in large part, responsible for the end of the Cold War. And that is
why President Gorbachev is so deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize.
From Containment to Points of Mutual Advantage
Five years ago, the internal contradictions of Stalinist power,
successfully contained, started to lead to what Ambassador Kennan
once termed a mellowing, and what President Gorbachev calls
perestroika, glasnost, and new thinking. Eighteen months ago,
President Bush gave our government a new direction, too. He told us
to move beyond containment. And a year ago this week, I presented
the details of the President's new course. Before the Foreign
Policy Association in New York, I advocated that the United States
pursue a creative search for points of mutual advantage with the
Soviet Union. This, I believed, was the surest way to turn the
promise of perestroika and new thinking into the reality of Soviet
policy beneficial to the West. By standing pat, I contended, we
would gain nothing and lose this chance to transform East-West
relations. So together, we began a revolution in US-Soviet
relations. We helped end the Cold War.
Now, we need to look forward to the time after the Cold War:
we began with a search for points of mutual advantage. Next, we
need to mark pathways of cooperation for addressing the post-Cold
War challenges. This could prove a unique historical opportunity.
I should start by examining how our pursuit of points of
mutual advantage has achieved results on which we can build. Over
the past year, we broadened and deepened our relationship with the
Soviet Union by working on five topics: making Europe whole and
free; resolving regional conflicts; stabilizing and reducing the arms
competition; promoting human rights and democratic institutions;
and assisting economic reform. In each, we've begun a fundamental
change.
First, the changes in Europe
over the past
year may be the most hopeful ones of this century. Germany has
unified, peacefully and freely. The peoples of Warsaw, Budapest,
Prague, Sofia, and even Bucharest are struggling to establish
democracies and ensure economic liberty.
This movement of, by, and for the people could not have
succeeded peacefully without the courageous, far-sighted
cooperation of President Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze,
and the other new thinkers in Moscow. They were the first Soviet
leaders to understand that security ultimately rests on the
legitimacy that can only be granted by the consent of the governed.
But this also came to pass because the United States and
others in the West simultaneously reached out to Moscow. We
developed new mechanisms and adapted longstanding institutions to
handle this sensitive transition. For example, we initiated the
Two-Plus-Four mechanism to reconcile competing interests into a
common European interest. President Bush called for and then led
the first stage of NATO's adaptation that culminated in the London
Summit Declaration. We supported the people power revolutions in
Central and Eastern Europe in a way that assured Moscow that a free
Europe would better serve true Soviet interests than a steel curtain
or a concrete wall. And we worked to strengthen the Helsinki
process, the conscience of the continent, so it can better support
political freedom and economic liberty from North America to the
Soviet Union.
Second, we have made great progress in resolving
regional conflicts
outside Europe. Most notable has been
the solidarity we have shared with Moscow over Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, especially in the Helsinki joint statement [see Dispatch, p.
92]. In it, President Bush and President Gorbachev set the
international community's bottom line: "Nothing short of complete
implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions
is acceptable."
Yet Iraq is only the most obvious example of a regional
conflict resolution policy we've built, step by step, since the spring
of 1989.
Our first real effort was in Central America, where we
combined a US diplomatic approach toward Nicaragua with limits on
Soviet arms shipments to give the people of that wounded nation a
chance to determine their own future. The Soviets joined us in a
commitment to respect both the electoral process and its result.
Peace and democracy were the outcome. Now we are trying to stop
the killing in El Salvador, too, so as to give democracy a chance
there as well.
In Africa, our joint efforts with Moscow led to full Namibian
independence. Now, we are working together to achieve a cease-
fire and multi-party elections in Angola. And we have tried to bring
basic, humanitarian aid to the war-torn Horn of Africa.
In Asia, we began a [UN] Permanent Five process to draw the
Cambodian factions together behind another elections plan. In
Southwest Asia, we have narrowed our differences over Afghanistan
and are working to find a way to help move this conflict from the
battlefield to the ballot box under UN auspices. I'm hopeful we'll
get there soon.
Third, our points of mutual advantage may be most noticeable
in conventional arms control.
The Soviet
conventional force imbalance, which for decades spawned fears of a
continent-wide offensive, will disappear through a CFE
[conventional armed forces in Europe] treaty. Tens of thousands of
pieces of military equipment will be destroyed. A military
revolution this fall will match the political revolutions of last
autumn.
We also continue to make progress on START [strategic arms
reduction talks]--an agreement that will lock in substantial
reductions, including a roughly 50% cut in the most destabilizing
nuclear weapons. And nuclear testing treaties that were hung up
for 15 years have now been ratified. Perhaps even more important
for the post-Cold War world, the Soviet Union and the United States
are making a concerted effort to address the problems of spreading
weapons of mass destruction. We are cooperating in implementing
the chemical weapons initiative the President presented to the
United Nations last year. Soviet and American bilateral destruction
of the bulk of each of our chemical weapons stockpiles will move us
along a realistic path toward our mutual goal: a global ban on these
weapons of horror. The two of us are also working multilaterally on
the control of missile technology.
Fourth, we have supported Soviet political
reform
. We have made real progress on "zeroing" out human
rights cases, although our work is not yet done. We have also
instituted programs to help the Soviets build democratic
institutions and the rule of law.
Finally, we have launched a wide range of economic
contacts
. Our technical economic cooperation already
covers a breadth of activities--from market education to small
business development. We are making efforts to introduce
American businesspeople to the Soviet Union and to introduce the
Soviets to the steps that will create a conducive climate for
private investment. Some of these businesses are also helping to
train Soviet managers. Over time, we hope to expand our efforts to
help republic and even some city leaders. In the international
sphere, we have helped open up possibilities for the Soviets to
participate in and learn from international market institutions.
From Points to Pathways of Mutual Advantage
Our search for points of mutual advantage has been productive. And
the search must continue--in new, more ambitious ways. We now
need to pursue our hopes for the post-Cold War future. We need to
build a new international order--what the President has called a
"new partnership of nations."
Any policy toward the Soviet Union, however, must begin with
a sober appreciation of the twin revolutions in motion: the first--
the Soviet government's relations with the outside world; the
second--the changes within Soviet society.
I will begin with the external revolution--the transformation
of Moscow's foreign and defense policies. New thinking and
reasonable sufficiency have become essential elements of this
leadership's policy. We have never enjoyed greater possibilities for
cooperation between our governments. US-Soviet relations always
will be unique.
But our relations could become more like those we have with
many other governments. Cooperation could become the norm, and
disagreements could be limited to specific disputes. A "normal"
relationship--possibly even a genuine partnership--may be in reach.
In our search for points of mutual advantage, we have tested
whether new thinking could guide Soviet policy, even when it
confronted hard choices. This Soviet leadership has shown it can
make the right hard choices. Now, we need to pose a different
question: Can we build on our points of mutual advantage to create
something more durable, something that strengthens and
accelerates our ability to achieve results to our mutual advantage?
An answer to this question will depend to a great degree on
continued new thinking in Moscow. But for our part, we hope to
build pathways of mutual advantage from the points we've begun.
The notion of pathways assumes that continuous, even lasting
cooperation, not just intermittent or episodic agreements, may be
possible. This idea assumes cooperation can operate in a regular,
almost day-by-day fashion, to manage problems as they evolve. A
pathway assumes that cooperation may prevent future problems as
well as resolve past ones. And the pathways concept assumes that
mechanisms and processes--built on democratic values and
practices--will be the key to maintaining US-Soviet cooperation as
we search for answers to the complex problems of the future.
This concept, in short, proceeds from the premise that
cooperation can become the norm, not the exception; that common
problems can best be solved mutually, not unilaterally; and that
many of our difficulties may stem not from US-Soviet differences
but from the complications inherent in leaving behind the Cold War
and building a new international order. We might look to build
pathways and mechanisms of cooperation in three broad areas:
eliminating the old vestiges of Cold War; addressing the new
threats to the post-Cold War order; and dealing with the
transnational dangers to peoples all over the globe.
One, we need to chart pathways to eliminate the
remnants of the Cold War
and prevent a resurgence of the
conflicts that preceded it. Some of these concerns will be
alleviated by CFE and its follow-on talks; by the adaptation of NATO
and the EC [European Community] to new needs; and by strengthening
CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], politically
and institutionally.
But working in concert with our allies and the new European
democracies, we can do more. We can deepen our dialogue with the
Soviets to exchange regularly our ideas about European challenges
that concern all of us. We should focus our dialogue on ways
democracy, economic liberty, reconciliation, and tolerance could be
fostered across Europe within the CSCE context. We also might
address our common interest in easing the economic transition of
the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, which face
problems of energy supply, disrupted markets, and debt, among
others.
The Cold War could also be left further behind--as I stressed
last fall in a speech in San Francisco--by broadening our dialogue to
explore more fully the "software" side of the arms competition:
strategy and doctrine. This would be a natural addition now to our
attempts to constrain or reduce destabilizing military capabilities-
-the "hardware" side. In US-Soviet arms control negotiations, we
are working to constrain and reduce weapons. We should open up a
complementary mechanism to learn more about the doctrine and
strategy Soviet leaders follow for use of those weapons, in peace
and war.
Therefore, I will propose to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
that we also set up a working group on deterrence, reassurance, and
stability. This would complement discussions the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense are pursuing with their
counterparts.
Our dialogue must also be broadened by talks on defense
conversion. The Secretary of Defense is exploring this topic in his
meetings in Moscow this week. A defense conversion dialogue with
the Soviets can be a pathway to greater openness as well as to
building down the possibilities of future war even further.
Two, the United States and the Soviet Union need
pathways and mechanisms for managing new
threats
to the emerging international order. Iraq's brutal
subjugation of Kuwait leaves no doubt that even though the danger
of US-Soviet confrontation has eased, the world remains a
dangerous place. The world community's condemnation of Iraq also
demonstrates that when the United States and Soviet Union lead,
others are likely to follow.
US, Soviet, and multilateral cooperation needs to anticipate
regional conflicts and to try to resolve them before they lead to
war. Regional conflict prevention must become a goal of US-Soviet
cooperation.
Hand-in-hand with these discussions of regional conflicts, we
plan to move more vigorously to cope with the new security agenda
I detailed in San Francisco last October. The incipient nuclear
programs of Iraq and North Korea are the best argument that our
nonproliferation effort needs a new impetus to cope with a new
danger. We cannot approach proliferation in a business-as-usual
manner. I believe Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agrees.
We both see proliferation as perhaps the greatest security
challenge of the 1990s. We concur that it is unconscionable that
Iraq, with a leader who used chemical weapons against his own
people, should be in a position where it could acquire nuclear
weapons in the future. And we agree that stopping and countering
proliferation must be a central part of our agenda.
Working together, we may be able to inspire a more
comprehensive approach to nuclear, chemical, biological, and
missile proliferation. Just as our bilateral agreement on destroying
our chemical weapons stocks set a critical example--and makes a
global ban more achievable--so now the two of us can help lead the
way on the other weapons of mass destruction.
We must work with others, improving existing mechanisms
and developing new ones to cut off the supply of necessary
technology and reduce the demand for acquiring weapons of mass
destruction. Our experience in Europe in developing confidence-
building measures may also be useful in different regions of the
world, possibly providing mechanisms for gradually reversing
proliferation where it has occurred.
And we will work with the Soviets to explore sanctions, both
bilateral and multilateral, that might be imposed against those
states that violate international non-proliferation norms or use
weapons of mass destruction. Developing together a pathway for
countering the danger of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile
proliferation will be essential to any new, peaceful order. Here,
again, I'll propose a ministerial working group to keep channels open
and promote continual cooperation.
One instrument for fashioning a new international order is the
United Nations. The Iraqi conflict has shown how much the Security
Council can do when the Permanent Five, especially the old
adversaries the United States and the Soviet Union, are united. We
are particularly pleased with the US-Soviet joint statement on the
United Nations that we issued in New York during the General
Assembly [see Dispatch, p. 189]. We hope to build on it in the
months ahead.
Three, we need to build pathways to cope with those
transnational dangers
that threaten all peoples and all
nations. That's why I added the transnational issues of drug
trafficking, terrorism, and environmental degradation to the formal
US-Soviet agenda early in 1989. But we need to achieve greater
results.
We should explore the idea of an international center for
ecological research at Lake Baikal. The center could become a
pathway to more precise knowledge of our global environment for
Soviet, American, and other scientists. Situated on Lake Baikal, the
world's largest body of fresh water, it could stand for our
commitment to end man's despoiling of nature's resources.
In addition, I propose that we advance energy efficiency as a
topic for discussion. This could enhance prospects for economic
growth, limit environmental degradation, and reduce our
vulnerability to supply disruptions. We would invite the private
sector and nongovernmental organizations and develop new US-
Soviet exchanges. Oil extraction would be another potential area
for discussion.
We will also continue to build a pathway with Moscow to
cooperate to counter international terrorism. On civil aviation, we
have already begun discussions on procedures for handling crises
such as hijackings. We are also exploring possibilities for
cooperation in ending state-supported terrorism.
Pathways to a Democratic Dialogue
Let me turn now to the other Soviet revolution--the changes in
Soviet society.
The internal revolution, in contrast to the new thinking in
foreign and defense policy, presents an altogether different
challenge to American policy. And it presents a novel opportunity
for the American people.
Like most revolutions, perestroika has become a mix of
paradoxical elements. On one side, we see remarkable, previously
unthinkable progress. The Supreme Soviet is asserting its
parliamentary powers. In key cities and regions, democrats--with a
small "d"--run the government. The Communist Party has formally
surrendered its political monopoly, and alternative parties are
beginning to form. The ideas of private property and market pricing
are accepted now in mainstream Soviet economic debates. And
Moscow is abandoning the Stalinist principle of empire--where the
center dictated everything--and seems to be moving toward a
confederation through negotiation.
All of this is fundamentally to the good. It represents the
"normalization" of Soviet society: the pluralization of political
power, the decentralization of economic life, and the long-overdue
recognition of the need for a voluntary multinational union.
Unfortunately, this "normalization" is matched and oftentimes
exceeded by a deterioration in Soviet life. Fragmentation equals or
exceeds pluralization in many Soviet political debates. Standards
of living are deteriorating, shortages are spreading, and the harvest
is rotting. Freedom has unleashed age-old ethnic animosities that
often shout down the voices of tolerance.
This other, darker side of the Soviet revolution concerns all of
us. We all must be understanding of the hardship a great people is
now enduring. In this, all must remember that democratic change
must come through peaceful, democratic means--as Andrei
Sakharov, another Nobel Laureate, so often reminded us.
The Cold War image of a single totalitarian monolith is gone,
replaced by a confusing, jumbled mosaic that presents danger as
well as hope.
The danger is that the breakdown of the old Stalinist system
will outstrip the development of a new system--one built on
universal democratic values and the rule of law. The hope is that
devolution of political authority and decentralization of economic
power will prevail over deterioration and decay. As President
Gorbachev has stated plainly, the Soviet future depends ultimately
on the choices the Soviet peoples make. He is right. Their choices
are their own. Building a new system will take all the courage and
hard work and hope the men and women of the Soviet Union can
muster.
But their choices will be less hard if we in the West stand by
their side. Our influence may only be marginal. But help, however
offered and however marginal, can still make a difference. The
American people can make a difference. Here is how they can help.
At the height of the Cold War, dialogue was practically
impossible. The Iron Curtain had few openings. This made it
necessary for most contacts with the Soviet Union to pass from our
diplomats in Washington to Soviet leaders in Moscow. The path of
formal government-to-government contact was often the only one.
But this was, as we always knew, abnormal. Indeed, the
determination of Stalin and his successors to close off the Soviet
people to normal exchanges and dialogue with the outside world
stood as both hallmark and linchpin of Stalinist repression. And it
is perhaps the main reason for the backwardness and poverty in
which much of the Soviet economy is mired today.
Glasnost and democratization have created an opportunity our
people have long sought: the chance to reach out to the Soviet
people directly. The Cold War destroyed much, but it never
destroyed the good will or hope between our peoples--peoples who
fought and died together in World
War II.
Almost from the very outset of this administration, I have
stood on the side of hope--hope for a new Soviet Union built on
democratic values. I intend to continue to stand there. That's why
today I urge the American people--along with state and local
governments--to join us in reaching out to the Soviet Union to help
the Soviet peoples build better lives.
We can build pathways between peoples--pathways built on
mutual respect for universal democratic values and a common
interest in freedom, security, prosperity, and justice. Pathways to
a true democratic dialogue.
These paths should cross at all levels: among persons, groups,
firms, institutions, cities, and states. In joining at the local or
city level, we can help create models or demonstrations of success.
That can give hope.
To lend momentum to this effort, I want to announce today the
President's decision to include the Soviet Union in the Citizens
Democracy Corps.
We know a Europe whole and free must include the Soviet
Union. We know Soviet reform can be accelerated by multiplied
contacts with the American people. Through the Citizens
Democracy Corps, we will try to help the leaders of the new Soviet
Union by increasing their knowledge of democratic processes and
market economics, by increasing their opportunities for interchange
with our citizens and institutions, and above all, by giving them
greater hope.
After the Cold War
Ambassador Kennan, I began by recounting a different time of hope
45 years ago. Now, we are at the end of another war-- the Cold War.
But today Stalin and his perverse ideology are truly gone.
Instead, new Soviet leaders welcome us. They welcome us to
join with the peoples of the Soviet Union in a new revolution--a
revolution of openness, of growing democratic change.
We should accept their invitation. For if by our example and
assistance, their world is made the better, both our peoples and our
governments will be the better. And if by our work, we rekindle
some of the values of our experience--hard work, individual liberty,
initiative, and tolerance--that will be all for the good, too. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 8, October 22, 1990
Title: US-Soviet Joint Statement on El Salvador
Description: Issued by the governments of the United States and the
Soviet Union in Washington, DC, and in Moscow
Date: Oct 18, 199010/18/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Central America
Country: El Salvador
[TEXT]
Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze directed that officials of the United
States and the Soviet Union responsible for Latin America--
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson
and his Soviet counterparts, Mr. Valery Nikolayenko and Mr. Yuriy
Pavlov--meet in Washington last week. In these meetings, the two
sides expressed their continued support for a peaceful solution in El
Salvador, as the government of El Salvador and the FMLN [Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front] have committed themselves to in
the Geneva and the Caracas agreements. The Soviet and American
participants considered it desirable that the parties in conflict
intensify their negotiations with a view toward reaching political
agreements and a cease-fire as quickly as possible. They also
consider that both sides in the dialogue should refrain from
military actions that would damage the prospects for peace.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 8, October 22, 1990
Title: Isolation Strategy Toward Iraq
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 17, 199010/17/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization,
Military Affairs
[TEXT]
Six weeks ago, it was my privilege to speak to this committee and,
through you, to the American people about Iraq's aggression against
Kuwait. At that time, I outlined the President's goals:
First, the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal
of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait as mandated in UN Security Council
Resolution 660;
Second, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
Third, the protection of the lives of American citizens held
hostage by Iraq, both in Iraq and in Kuwait; and
Fourth, a commitment to the security and stability of the
Persian Gulf.
I also described our strategy for achieving these goals. The
key element of that approach is American leadership of a global
alliance that isolates Iraq--politically, economically, and
militarily.
Today, I would like to discuss with you what we have done to
carry out that strategy since early September, including how
responsibilities are being shared and what results have been
achieved.
Maintaining the Coalition
First, we have been working successfully through the UN Security
Council to isolate Iraq politically and to impose penalties for its
refusal to comply with the UN resolutions. That effort is
continuing today as the council considers its 10th resolution on the
gulf.
Second, we have secured notable cooperation from the Soviet
Union. We have described this conflict as the first real crisis of the
post-Cold War period. The positive approach of the Soviet Union has
validated that label. In their Helsinki joint statement, President
Bush and President Gorbachev declared, "We are united in the belief
that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful
international order is possible if larger states can devour their
smaller neighbors."
Since then, I have met with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on
several occasions, both in Moscow and in New York and have talked
to him on the phone frequently. The Soviets continue to support the
objectives of the Security Council resolutions.
Third, from the beginning, we recognized that maintaining
such an unprecedented international coalition would necessitate
special efforts. The United States could lead--indeed, had to lead--
but we should not carry the responsibility alone. The principle of
shared responsibility had to be observed.
We must jointly face the military threat. But we must also
act collectively to support the many nations observing the economic
embargo or contributing forces for the defense of Saudi Arabia.
Iraq's pillage of Kuwait continues to displace hundreds of thousands
of workers, straining the resources of neighboring states and the
fragile economies of their homelands.
Immediately after testifying before this committee early last
month, I left at the President's request to visit our major allies and
partners in the Arabian Peninsula, the European Community, Italy,
and Germany to put responsibility-sharing into effect. The
Secretary of the Treasury [Nicholas Brady] led a similar mission to
London, Paris, Tokyo, and Seoul. This exercise in sharing
responsibilities produced commitments of $20 billion in resources,
equally divided between support for the front-line states of Egypt,
Turkey, and Jordan and assistance to the multinational military
effort. This includes support for a substantial portion of our
incremental defense costs, now running about $1 billion per month.
I would summarize the results of our on-going efforts as
follows.
-- Fifty-four nations have contributed or offered to
contribute militarily and/or economically to the gulf effort.
-- The three gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the
United Arab Emirates have agreed to contribute more than $12
billion to this effort in 1990. All of the states in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) have contributed troops to the
multinational force in Saudi Arabia and are providing access and
services in support of US forces. Host-nation support for our
deployed forces includes the free use of ports, logistical facilities,
bases, and fuel.
-- The United Kingdom is deploying over 6,000 combat troops,
over 50 aircraft, and 12 warships.
-- France has deployed over 4,000 combat troops, 30 aircraft,
and 12 warships.
-- Japan has pledged $4 billion: $2 billion in support of the
military effort plus $2 billion in economic aid. And we hope to see
that commitment fulfilled promptly and in a form immediately
usable.
-- Germany has pledged $2 billion: $1 billion in support of the
military effort plus $1 billion in economic aid.
-- The European Community has pledged $670 million in
economic aid, along with member state commitments of an
additional $1.3 billion.
-- Italy has deployed four warships and eight aircraft.
-- Korea has pledged $220 million: $95 million in support of
the military effort plus $125 million in economic aid.
To coordinate timely and effective economic assistance to the
front-line states, the President launched the Gulf Crisis Financial
Coordinating Group on September 25. This group unites the major
donors of Europe, Asia, and the gulf under US chairmanship, with
technical support from the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and
World Bank. We see it as an important vehicle for maintaining the
international coalition.
The most important demonstration of America's commitment
to bolstering the economic stability of our front-line aIlies is the
President's proposal to cancel Egypt's FMS [foreign military sales]
debt. No other signal would send the same powerful message to our
friends in the region that we are determined to stand by them, even
on the toughest issues. Last Thursday's [October 11] assassination
of the Speaker of Egypt's Parliament is a tragic reminder of how far
Egypt's enemies are prepared to go to divert President Mubarak from
his responsible and courageous course. Strong congressional
endorsement of Egyptian debt cancellation would provide Egypt
critical economic relief and send a powerful and timely signal that
the United States stands by its friends.
The political and economic isolation of Iraq has been achieved.
The costs and responsibilities for enforcing this isolation are being
fairly distributed. Economic leakage is minimal. The Iraqi economy
will suffer badly, and the Iraqi war machine will be hurt, too.
The Military Track
A discussion of diplomacy and economic sanctions, however, should
not blind us to the other essential track of our policy: the military
build-up in the gulf. I have just detailed for you the contributions
made by our allies, including combat units, aircraft, and warships.
In addition, Arab states such as Egypt and Syria are sending major
units. There are now many thousands of Arab and Muslim soldiers
deployed with the multinational forces in and around Saudi Arabia.
And, of course, very large numbers of American marines, soldiers,
sailors, and airmen are there already. All told, over 25 countries
are now supplying men or materiel in support of the Security
Council resolutions.
Our military objectives are to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi
Arabia and to ensure the effective implementation of the UN
sanctions. Economic sanctions against an aggressor like Saddam
Hussein would never be effective unless the international
community could help ensure the security of those nations, such as
Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who must apply those sanctions. Our
military forces are also there to protect American lives and to
provide an effective and decisive response should Iraq escalate its
aggression to active combat with the multinational force.
Saddam Hussein must know that he lacks not only the political
and economic options of holding Kuwait but also the military option
to succeed with his aggression. The political, economic, and
military aspects of our strategy reinforce each other.
The Need for Time
As the strategy takes effect, we face a difficult task. We must
remain firm, not wavering from the goals we have set or our focus
on the blatant aggression committed by Iraq. We must exercise
patience as the grip of sanctions tightens with increasing severity.
Some may urge action for action's sake. But the only truly
effective action we can take now is to continue to heighten Iraq's
political, economic, and military isolation. Every day--in
Washington, in New York, in the region--we continue our search for
a peaceful solution.
Action that moves toward a partial solution would be self-
defeating appeasement. And should there be any doubt about the
awful consequences of a partial solution, I would urge a close look
at what Saddam Hussein is doing to the people of Kuwait. Because
Saddam Hussein controls access to the true story of Kuwait, this is
a story that is not told frequently enough. So I commend the
Congress' effort to secure eyewitness testimony of the brutalities
now taking place.
It is the rape of Kuwait. Hospitals have been looted without
regard for the sick. Parents have been tortured and executed in
front of their children. Children have been tortured and executed in
front of their parents. Even after his military conquest, Saddam has
continued to make war on the people of Kuwait.
Let me be blunt: Saddam Hussein has invaded and tortured a
peaceful Arab neighbor purely for self-aggrandizement. He is not
raping Kuwait to advance the Palestinian cause.
We cannot allow this violent way to become the wave of the
future in the Middle East. Saddam Hussein must fail if peace is to
succeed. The prospects for a just and lasting peace between Israel
and its Arab neighbors will be shattered if he prevails.
It is time to clear the air once and for all about the
relationship between Saddam's aggression in Kuwait and other
conflicts and problems in the region. I will put it to you simply:
Does anyone seriously think that if this aggression succeeds, that
prospects will be better for peace between Israel and the
Palestinians? Can anyone seriously believe that if Iraq wins this
contest with the international community, it will be easier to
eliminate chemical weapons or biological weapons or nuclear
weapons in the region? Of course not.
Every hope for peace in this conflict-ridden region depends on
stopping Iraq's aggression and ultimately reversing its capacity for
future aggression.
Defeating Aggression
Since we met last, a great coalition of nations has gathered to
isolate Iraq and its dictator. Where before his aggression Saddam
Hussein found allies of consequence, today he finds none. Where
before the invasion, the Iraqi economy had important international
links, today it has none. And where once there were prospects for
successful Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia, today there are
none.
Unity remains essential. I do not believe we could have come
this far if most nations did not agree with President Bush that we
all have a stake in a world where conflicts are settled peacefully.
And that unity, expressed in political, economic, and military
terms, remains the best hope for a peaceful solution to this conflict
as well.
It is gratifying that the vast majority of Americans have
rallied behind the President in support of both
our goals and our strategy in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, most of the
world has done so, as well. Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to
ruin the region. He cannot be allowed to spoil this time of hope in
the world for a more secure and prosperous future. There is a
morality among nations. That morality must prevail.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 8, October 22, 1990
Title: Iraqi Atrocities in Kuwait
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Excerpt from remarks at the Hyatt Regency Hotel,
Dallas, Texas
Date: Oct 15, 199010/15/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Human Rights
[TEXT]
. . . We all know the grave economic consequences of Iraq's
occupation of Kuwait. But as serious as these consequences may be,
what is ultimately at stake is far more than a matter of economics
or oil.
What is at stake is whether the nations of the world can take
a common stand against aggression or whether Iraqi aggression will
go unanswered. Whether we will live in a world governed by the
rule of law or by the law of the jungle.
Every day now, new word filters out about the ghastly
atrocities perpetrated by Saddam's forces. Eyewitness accounts of
the cruel and senseless suffering endured by the people of Kuwait;
of a systematic assault on the soul of a nation. Summary
executions, routine torture. Under the forces of Iraqi occupation,
we are told that mere possession of the Kuwaiti flag or a
photograph of the Kuwait's Amir are crimes punishable by death.
And last month at the White House, I met with the Amir of
Kuwait. And I heard horrible tales: newborn babies thrown out of
incubators and the incubators then shipped off to Baghdad. Dialysis
patients ripped from their machines and those machines then, too,
sent off to Baghdad. The story of two young kids passing out
leaflets: Iraqi troops rounded up their parents and made them
watch while those two kids were shot to death--executed before
their eyes.
Hitler revisited. But remember, when Hitler's war ended,
there were the Nuremburg trials.
America will not stand aside. The world will not allow the
strong to swallow up the weak. . . .(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 8, October 22, 1990
Title: US Statement on the Situation in the Occupied Territories
Pickering
Source: Thomas R. Pickering, US Permanent Representative to
the United Nations
Description: Statement before the UN Security Council, and
Resolution 672, New York, New York
Date: Oct 12, 199010/12/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Israel
Subject: United Nations, Democratization
[TEXT]
My government supports this resolution on the tragic event which
occurred in Jerusalem on October 8. My government extends its
condolences to the families and friends of those many innocent
persons and worshippers who were victims of violence on that sad
day.
This is an incident which never should have happened. The
Security Council tonight grieves for those lost and injured,
condemns the acts of violence--both provocative and reactive--and
reaffirms the obligations and responsibilities conferred upon the
occupying power by the fourth Geneva Convention. Moreover, we
recall and reaffirm--properly and urgently I might add--that a just
and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict must be based on
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
My government is dedicated to doing whatever it can to bring
the parties closer to a negotiated peace. We want to be clear for
the record that this resolution, however, should not be
misinterpreted: the council's action does not empower it to address
any subject beyond the matters directly contained in this
resolution. Most obviously and certainly, this resolution makes
clear it does not address in any way the status of the Middle East
peace process, nor does it change in any way the role of the United
Nations in that regard. We expect the Secretary General's mission
to examine the circumstances of the October 8 incident and report
back. We look forward to reviewing that report.
On behalf of the United States and in accordance with this
resolution, I would like to call on all sides to exercise restraint in
words and actions so that calm can be restored and the holy places
of all faiths respected.
Resolution 672, October 12, 1990
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 476 (1980) and 478 (1980),
Reaffirming that a just and lasting solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict must be based on its resolutions 242 (1967) and
338 (1973) through an active negotiating process which takes into
account the right to security for all States in the region, including
Israel, as well as the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian
people.
Taking into consideration the statement of the Secretary-
General relative to the purpose of the mission he is sending to the
region and conveyed to the Council by the President on 12 October
1990.
1. Expresses alarm at the violence which took place on 8
October at the Al Haram Al Shareef and other Holy Places of
Jerusalem resulting in over twenty Palestinian deaths and to the
injury of more than one hundred and fifty people, including
Palestinian civilians and innocent worshippers;
2. Condemns especially the acts of violence committed by the
Israeli security forces resulting in injuries and loss of human life;
3. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide
scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the
Fourth Geneva Convention, which is applicable to all the territories
occupied by Israel since 1967;
4. Requests, in connection with the decision of the Secretary-
General to send a mission to the region, which the Council
welcomes, that he submit a report to it before the end of October
1990 containing his findings and conclusions and that he use as
appropriate all of the resources of the United Nations in the region
in carrying out the mission.
VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 8, October 22, 1990
Title: Rewards for Terrorism Information Program
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Opening statement at a news conference, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 16, 199010/16/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Subject: Terrorism
[TEXT]
Let me welcome all of you this morning to the Department of State,
and let me start by saying it's a pleasure to be here to boost our
Rewards for Terrorism Information Program. This array of
distinguished guests form the private sector and from the executive
and legislative branches of government testifies to our strong
nationwide commitment to counter-terrorism.
At the outset of this administration, we made a solemn pledge
to integrate counter-terrorism into our global foreign policy
efforts, and I want to reaffirm that pledge today. We will do all
that we can to ensure that everyone, everywhere, understands that
terrorists are criminals--international criminals. Their targets
are mankind's most fundamental values: a respect for human life,
for legitimate processes of government, and for peaceful
international relations. In short, terrorism is a crime really against
civilization itself.
The United States will accept no rationalization for
terrorism. We will not make deals with terrorists. We and the rest
of the civilized world must give no outlet nor quarter to terrorists.
Acts of terror are meant to brutalize and to bully and to demoralize
and to destroy.
Pan Am 103 and the assassination last week of the speaker of
the Egyptian parliament, all are meant to seize us with horror, to
bring daily life to a standstill, and to hold entire nations hostage.
Even as we recoil in horror at the carnage, there are ways that
governments and citizens can work together to ensure that the
warped psychology of the terrorist does not dominate our lives or
distort our policies.
Every government and every citizen has a stake in bringing
terrorists to justice. Every government and every citizen can take a
stand. Programs such as the Rewards for Terrorism Information
play a key role. Role-playing comes naturally to Charlie Sheen,
Charles Bronson, and Charleton Heston, all of whom have
volunteered their time and talent to make public service
announcements for radio and television about the Rewards for
Terrorism Information Program. As concerned citizens, they are
doing their part, and that matters very much.
The announcements will be aired at home, and they will be
announced as well abroad. They will help spread the message that
the US government can now pay rewards of up to $4 million for
information that prevents or resolves an act of terrorism or brings
terrorists to justice.
Our program also involves a unique public-private partnership.
The government can pay up to $2 million for each reward. The Air
Transport Association and the Air Line Pilots' Association,
represented today by Mr. Robert Aaronson and Capt. Henry Duffy,
each pledge up to $1 million in matching funds for terrorism against
US civil aviation.
I also want to, particularly this morning, acknowledge the
vital work done by Bruce Smith. Bruce is a Pan Am pilot whose wife
was murdered in the Pan Am 103 bombing. Bruce has successfully
lobbied the Congress to raise the fund ceiling for our rewards
program. As you can see, we have posters advertising the program.
Mr. George Hughes, President of the George King Company,
printed 7,000 of these posters for free. The posters will be
distributed to airports, to airline offices, to US embassies, and to
other government facilities worldwide.
The rewards program itself, which has INTERPOL's unqualified
endorsement, has been working very effectively. So we've scored
some important victories.
Recently, the largest rewards to date were paid to people who
provided information that facilitated the successful prosecution of
an international terrorist.
In the past year, we have paid $500,000 in rewards, and more
are under consideration. We can also relocate people who provide
helpful information, and this has been done as well.
Moreover, the US government continues to expand its
intelligence exchanges with other governments, its police-to-police
liaison work, and its training of foreign law enforcement personnel
in anti-terrorism techniques.
Our gathering today and the launching of our public campaign
marks another step forward in our ongoing counter-terrorism
effort. Advertising the Rewards for Terrorism Information Program
can help save lives. It can help put terrorists behind bars, increase
public awareness, and show the world where we stand. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 8, October 22, 1990
Title: The Rewards for Terrorism Information Program
Date: Oct 16, 199010/16/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Subject: Terrorism
[TEXT]
Overview
The Rewards for Terrorism Information Program was signed into
law in September 1984 (The 1984 Act to Combat International
Terrorism, Public Law 98-533). Administered jointly by the US
Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Office of
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the program initially offered
rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction of those
persons responsible for specific terrorist attacks.
The following rewards were announced publicly:
-- $250,000 for the December 4, 1984, hijacking of Kuwaiti
Airlines Flight 221;
-- $250,000 for the June 13, 1985, hijacking of TWA Flight
847;
-- $100,000 for the June 19, 1985, assassination of four US
Marines and two US civilians in El Salvador;
-- $100,000 for the August 7-8, 1985, attacks at Rhein-Main
Air Force Base that killed three US citizens;
-- $250,000 for the November 24, 1985, bombing of the US
Military Post Exchange at Rhein-Main Air Force Base;
-- $250,000 for the April 2, 1986, terrorist bombing of TWA
Flight 840; and
-- $500,000 for the June 28, 1988, murder of US Defense
Attache William Nordeen in Athens.
In December 1988, the US Department of State announced that
the rewards program had been expanded to include payment for
information that would lead to the "prevention, frustration, or
favorable resolution of terrorist acts against US persons or
properties overseas." Specific rewards for particular terrorist
incidents would no longer be announced.
Rewards of more than $500,000 have been paid under this
program. Details regarding these rewards are classified to protect
confidentiality of informants.
After the tragic bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, legislation
was introduced in the US Congress by Senators Ted Stevens and
Frank Murkowski (both Republicans from Alaska), and
Representatives Dante Fascell (Democrat from Florida) and William
Broomfield (Republican from Michigan) to raise the rewards
payment ceiling from as much as $500,000 to a maximum of $2
million. This higher ceiling was seen as a vital tool to obtain
information on major terrorist operations. President Bush signed
this legislation on December 13, 1989.
Program Initiatives
The State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism established a
program to broadly publicize these rewards. Publicity initiatives
include:
-- Establishment of a special post office box for use by those
people with terrorism information who are reluctant to contact US
diplomatic missions. The post office box address is:
PO Box 96781
Washington, DC 20090-6781
USA
-- Printing a new Department of State rewards program
poster in eight different languages listing the post office box
address and the increased reward ceiling of $2 million. Languages
include English, Arabic, Spanish, Greek, French, German, Italian, and
Portuguese. These posters have been sent to all US diplomatic
posts for public display and provided to INTERPOL for further
distribution;
-- Accepting offers by the Air Transport Association (ATA)
and the Air Line Pilots' Association (ALPA) to match the Department
of State's reward payment amounts, up to $1 million each. These
matching rewards provide for a total of up to $4 million for
information on terrorist acts against US civil aviation. A special
reward poster on this issue has been prepared for display at
airports and other public locations around the world. In addition,
INTERPOL is being provided copies for further distribution.
-- Producing radio and television Public Service
Announcements (PSAs) that advertise the Rewards for Terrorism
Information Program. These PSAs were produced in several
languages for worldwide distribution (English, Arabic, Spanish,
French, German, and Greek) and feature actors Charlie Sheen,
Charlton Heston, and Charles Bronson. Their message is to
encourage people with terrorism information to contact the
appropriate authorities in their own country, the US government, or
to write to "Heroes" at the address mentioned above. PSAs are
being sent to US diplomatic missions overseas for distribution to
the media with the cooperation of the host foreign government.
The PSAs were written and produced by Jack Guerin of
Hollywood Promos and directed by Wayne Williams. Copies of the
PSAs and the posters are available by calling the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security at (202) 663-0549.
Confidentiality
A key element of the program is that the US government will
ensure complete confidentiality for persons who provide
information on terrorist attacks. If deemed appropriate, the US
government will even relocate people in the United States.
The Department of State would like to thank Capt. Bruce Smith
of Pan Am Airlines for his untiring efforts in promoting the
rewards program, and George Hughes of the George W. King Company
for printing more than 7,000 copies of the special US
government/airline industry poster at no cost to the government.
The US Department of State hopes that this program will
reach people who have information that will save innocent lives.
For further information on the Rewards for Terrorism
Information Program, call (202) 429-2207.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 8, October 22, 1990
Title: Diplomatic Immunity
Date: Oct 22, 199010/22/90
Category: Policy Briefs (Gist)
Subject: Democratization
[TEXT]
Background
Diplomatic immunity is a principle of international law by which
certain foreign government officials are not subject to the
jurisdiction of local courts and other authorities. The concept of
immunity began with ancient tribes. In order to exchange
information, messengers were allowed to travel from tribe to tribe
without fear of harm. They were protected even when they brought
bad news. Today, immunity protects the channels of diplomatic
communication by exempting diplomats from local jurisdiction so
that they can perform their duties with freedom, independence, and
security. Diplomatic immunity is not meant to benefit individuals
personally; it is meant to ensure that foreign officials can do their
jobs. Under the concept of reciprocity, diplomats assigned to any
country in the world benefit equally from diplomatic immunity.
Legal Framework
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 codified most
modern diplomatic and consular practices, including diplomatic
immunity. More than 140 nations, including the United States, are
parties to these treaties. The conventions provide immunity to
persons according to their rank in a diplomatic mission or consular
post and according to the need for immunity in performing their
duties. For example, diplomatic agents and members of their
immediate families are immune from all criminal prosecution and
most civil law suits. Administrative and technical staff members
of embassies have a lower level of immunity. Consular officers
serving in consulates throughout the country have an even lower
level of immunity. Members of an embassy's service staff and
consular employees are immune only for acts performed as part of
their official duties.
The United States considers the Vienna conventions to be
particularly important because of the large number of American
diplomatic and consular personnel stationed in countries where
judicial systems are very different and less protective of individual
rights than our own or where unfriendly governments might use
their police authorities to harass American diplomats and their
families. Failure by US authorities to uphold the Vienna
conventions would complicate US diplomatic relations and could
lead to harsher treatment in foreign courts of US personnel abroad.
Abuses of Diplomatic Immunity
Under the Vienna conventions, all persons entitled to immunity have
the obligation and duty to respect the laws and regulations of the
host country. Immunity is not a license to commit a crime, and
violations of the law are not condoned. In the United States, any
time a person with immunity is alleged to have committed a crime,
the Department of State advises his or her government of the
incident and, where prosecution would be the normal procedure,
requests a waiver of the alleged offender's immunity so that the
case may be heard in the appropriate US court. If immunity is not
waived, the Department of State may, in serious cases, order the
withdrawal of the offender from the United States. In the case of
an offense committed by a member of a diplomat's family, the
diplomat and his or her entire family may be expelled. Diplomatic
visas of serious offenders are canceled, and their names are entered
into a worldwide lookout system to keep them from returning to the
United States.
The Department of State's Office of Protocol works with the
injured parties and the foreign government to secure restitution in
those cases where criminal incidents have resulted in injuries to
individuals. The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 and related
regulations require that before a person with immunity can obtain
license plates for a vehicle, he or she must have liability insurance.
Anyone injured in an automobile accident by a person with immunity
may bring direct action against the vehicle's insurer in US District
Court. In addition, diplomats do not have a right to endanger public
safety by driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
by disregarding the rules of the road. Police stop them and, if they
are intoxicated, prevent them from driving. Police issue citations
for driving offenses and the Department of State revokes drivers'
permits for any persons found to be unsafe drivers or who
continually abuse driving regulations. Furthermore, some countries
follow the practice of investigating, and, if appropriate, taking
legal action against their own diplomats who are accused of
breaking a host country's laws.
In those cases where immunity prevents civil suits, the
Department of State works to settle the matter and mediates
disputes in an effort to find a mutually satisfactory solution. The
vast majority of persons entitled to some form of diplomatic
immunity are law-abiding people. Only a few ever run afoul of the
law. Unfortunately, those few who do exhibit egregious behavior
draw the attention of the public and the media and damage the
reputation of the entire group.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 8, October 22, 1990
Title: Cuba: An Anachronism in Today's World
Kozak
Source: Michael G. Kozak, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs
Description: Address before the Cuban-American National Foundation,
Washington, DC
Date: Oct 11, 199010/11/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Caribbean
Country: Cuba
[TEXT]
Thank you for the opportunity to come here today to discuss US
policy toward Cuba. Over the years, the Cuban-American National
Foundation has shown firm support for many of our policies on Cuba
and been a source of great assistance in humanitarian efforts to
help Cuban immigrants. It is a pleasure to be with you.
In August 1989, I spoke to the Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee about
US policy toward Cuba. Looking over that statement in preparation
for speaking with you today, I had to marvel at how much the
communist world has changed since then--and at how much Cuba
has remained the same. While Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
have embarked on the path toward democratic freedom and market
economy, President Fidel Castro has frozen Cuba in a time warp
choked with 30 years of stale rhetoric and outmoded centralized
control that, as each day passes, bring greater hardship to the Cuban
people.
Cuba's Time Warp and US Policy
Developments in the socialist world have provided Castro with an
opening for change. Yet, while other socialist nations move
unequivocally toward democracy, the government of Cuba defies the
times, forbidding any review of the country's single-party system.
On the contrary, Castro has implemented the first phase of "the
special period in peacetime." Instead of moving Cuba forward with
the rest of the world, Castro has announced that Cuba is moving
backward, toward a pre-industrial economy where beasts of burden
and bicycles will replace 20th-century machines and modes of
transportation--all in the name of preserving the purity of the
revolution.
In the name of that revolution, the government of Cuba has,
for three decades, systematically deprived its people of basic
political rights and economic freedoms, supported armed
insurgencies abroad, and been the Soviet Union's major client state
in the Western Hemisphere. These are the issues that separate Cuba
from the United States. Where the American system fosters
individual achievement, the Cuban structure stifles personal
development, flattening the individual into a cog in the machinery
of an increasingly discredited ideology. In the past year, Castro has
not only closed Cuba off from the climate of international reform.
He has, at the same time, increased repression at home and
continued to support the efforts of Marxist guerrillas to overthrow
the freely elected government of El Salvador in defiance of the
regionally accepted peace process.
Recently, I have heard rumors that US policy toward Cuba is
under review: that we are hardening our line toward Cuba by
targeting it in international forums or that we are softening our
policy through moves to normalize relations.
Neither is the case. US policy objectives toward Cuba have
been constant for the nearly 30 years that Cuba has pursued policies
inimical to American values and to US interests. The objectives of
our policy are internal democratic reform, an end to human rights
abuses, and an end to support for insurgency abroad. The tools of
this policy are well known to you all:
-- The absence of normal diplomatic relations;
-- Diplomatic isolation in international organizations and
from normal bilateral ties with other countries;
-- The comprehensive economic embargo, which aims to deny
Cuba the means to carry out policies inimical to the United States;
and
-- The broadcast of unbiased news and information to the
Cuban people.
US policy toward Cuba is the result of an unacceptable pattern
of behavior by the Cuban government at home and abroad. The United
States cannot have friendly relations with a government that
abuses its own people, that resists reforms to improve the life of
its citizens and supports insurgencies abroad. US policy toward
Cuba has been and will remain constant until Cuba takes steps to
remove the impediments to improved relations. These impediments
are major and worthy of review.
Cuban Support for Subversion Abroad
Cuba's continued support of the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front] insurgency in El Salvador not only attempts to
subvert a democratically elected government but also clashes with
the policies of Cuba's regional neighbors, the authors of the peace
process now in train. Why does Cuba continue to support the FMLN?
Why does Cuba jeopardize the best chance we have had in a decade
for peace in Central America? Why won't the Cubans use their
influence to support progress in the negotiations? The only answer
seems to be that Cuba is not willing to apply in Central America the
lesson of the Namibian accords in Southern Africa, where Cuba's
ongoing troop withdrawal from Angola is making a contribution to
regional peace and stability. Instead, in this, our shared
hemisphere, Cuba has persisted in disrupting the hopes of thousands
for peace and democracy in Central America.
Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in
Cuba
Cuba continues to be one of the worst violators of human rights in
our hemisphere. Since the revolution in 1959, Cubans have been
denied the most basic democratic rights and guarantees for fair
political and judicial processes. They are subjected to surveillance
by block committees, denied legal due process, and prevented from
travel abroad. Many have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment.
In recent months, the Cuban government has intensified its
crackdown on dissent after a resolution passed by the UN Human
Rights Commission on Cuba offered it an incentive to correct its
abusive practices. Instead, in response to that resolution--which
four East European nations supported--Castro replied: "Do not even
dream that we are going to comply." Castro later articulated his
concept of human rights: "Revolutionaries have complete freedom
of expression, while counterrevolutionaries have no freedom of
expression at all. That is the rule."
Indeed, last July, a Cuban court meted out the stiffest
sentences against human rights activists in nearly a decade. Seven
members of the small Democratic Unity Movement were condemned
to up to 7 years in prison for rebellion after they talked to foreign
reporters. Just last week, eight activists were sentenced to up to 6
years in prison for "subversive propaganda" or "illegal associations."
The leaders of four of Cuba's five principal human rights groups
remain in detention; some without being charged. The longest-
serving political prisoner in the world, Mario Chanes de Armas, is
still detained after more than 29 years.
Castro's denial of basic human and political freedom to Cuban
citizens remains a major obstacle to the improvement of relations.
We share the goal of all who seek the establishment of democracy
in Cuba through a pluralistic process.
Cuba's Military Ties With the Soviet Union
Over the years, Soviet security assistance has given Cuba one of the
largest and best equipped military establishments in the Western
Hemisphere. In the past, Soviet military assistance to Cuba has
hovered around $1.5 billion annually. It has enabled Cuba to project
its power and influence in this hemisphere and elsewhere in a
manner inimical to US interests and those of other peaceful nations.
In turn, the Soviet Union has traditionally received important
strategic benefits from its military ties to Cuba. Soviet aircraft
and naval vessels use Cuban facilities. The Soviets' largest single
intelligence gathering installation outside the USSR is located in
Cuba.
Although the overall Soviet-Cuban relationship is evolving,
Soviet military support to Cuba remains a source of serious concern
for the United States. We would like to see Soviet military
assistance to Cuba eliminated.
Changes in the Soviet Union may bring this about, but, so far,
this has not occurred. Yet as Moscow moves forward with its own
reforms, the ideological gap between Cuba and its longtime ally
will grow. Castro has reacted harshly to the prospect of losing
Soviet support, trying to minimize its importance. In his last July
Rebellion Day speech, he rejected the lessons of the reforms in the
Soviet Union. "If the USSR crumbled," he said, "if the USSR
disappeared, we would continue building socialism in our country.
Socialism is not . . . a temporary game. It is not and cannot be a
transitory decision."
Moscow has stated publicly its intention to put its trade
relations with Cuba on a hard currency basis. The present Soviet
economic relationship with Cuba allows Castro to prolong his
corrupt system and to inflict greater suffering on the Cuban people.
The United States would like to see Soviet aid and subsidized trade
arrangements with Cuba evolve into an economic relationship more
in consonance with general trade practices around the world--based
on world market prices in hard currency. The Soviets have said that
this is their intention. We hope that is so.
Conclusion
There is no sign that the Cuban government would consider the
changes that could improve life inside Cuba and lead to better
relations with the United States. On the contrary, Castro has taken
the path of defiance, forcing the Cuban people to endure more
hardship, deprivation, and repression. In Castro's words, "we shall
not resign for any reason or circumstances whatsoever . . . from the
path that we have chosen." His new, preferred motto is "socialism
or death."
The economic landscape in Cuba today paints a grim picture of
what the consequences may be. Last week, Castro launched the
austerity program known as the "special period in peacetime," with
strict rationing of food, fuel, and consumer goods. Castro told the
people they will have to make their own clothes. He plans to
relocate more than 30,000 workers and students to rural areas,
where they will till the farms with their hands. Shortages in basic
commodities, deteriorating public services, long lines, and empty
shelves define the daily disintegration of the lives of the Cuban
people as they try to survive under a regime whose legitimacy
erodes day by day.
Castro has claimed that the US embargo is responsible for the
economic destruction we now are watching in Cuba. That is simply
not the case. Castro has ruled Cuba for 30 years. He and his
policies are responsible for what has happened--no one else. He
should cease evoking the specter of US plots and an imagined
military threat "from the north" to justify his repressive regime.
The government of Cuba must answer for the consequences of its
policies on the Cuban people.
The United States looks forward to the day when a democratic
Cuba will flourish. Our policies seek to promote change in Cuba that
will allow all Cubans to participate freely in the decisions that
govern their lives. We know you share this goal.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 8, October 22, 1990
Title: Country Profile: Cuba
Date: Oct 22, 199010/22/90
Category: Country Data
Region: Caribbean
Country: Cuba
Subject: History, Trade/Economics,
International Organizations
[TEXT]
Official Name: Republic of Cuba
People
Nationality: Noun--Cuban(s); adjective--Cuban.
Population: 10.5 million (Sept. 1989); 70% urban, 30% rural.
Avg. annual growth rate: 0.93%.
Density: 95/sq. km. (238/sq. mi.).
Ethnic groups: Spanish-African mixture.
Language: Spanish.
Education: Years compulsory--6.
Attendance: 92% (ages 6-16).
Literacy: 98.5%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--11.8/1,000. Life expectancy --75
years. No statistics available by sex.
Work force: 3.3 million; 30% government and services, 29% industry,
13% agriculture, 11% commerce, 10% construction, 7%
transportation and communications (1987).
Geography
Area: 110,860 sq. km. (44,200 sq. mi.); about the size of
Pennsylvania. Capital--Havana (pop. 2 million). Other cities--
Santiago de Cuba, Camaguey, Santa Clara, Holguin, Matanzas,
Cienfuegos, Pinar del Rio.
Terrain: Flat or gently rolling plains, hills, mountains up to 2,000
meters (6,000 ft.) in the southeast.
Climate: Tropical; moderated by trade winds; dry season
(November- April); rainy season (May-October).
Government
Type: Communist state; current government assumed power January
1, 1959.
Independence: May 20, 1902.
Constitution: February 24, 1976.
Branches: Executive--President, Council of Ministers. Legislative-
-National Assembly of People's Government. Judicial--People's
Supreme Court.
Political party: Cuban Communist Party (PCC).
Suffrage: All citizens age 16 and older, except those who have
applied for permanent emigration. National Assembly elections
were held in 1986 and municipal elections for local assemblies in
1989.
Administrative subdivisions: 14 provinces and one special
municipality (Havana).
Flag: White star centered on red triangle at staff side, three blue
and two white horizontal bands.
Economy
Gross social product (GSP) (This economic measure is not
convertible to GNP/GDP) (1990 est.): $27 billion.
Real annual growth rate: 0% (1988).
Per capita income: $2,644.
Natural resources: Nickel, cobalt, iron ore, copper, manganese, salt,
timber.
Agriculture: Products--sugar, citrus and tropical fruits, tobacco,
coffee, rice, beans, meat, and vegetables.
Industry: Types--sugar, food processing, oil refining, cement,
electric power, light consumer and industrial products.
Trade: Exports--$5.4 billion (f.o.b. 1987): sugar and its byproducts,
petroleum, nickel, seafood, citrus, tobacco, rum. Major markets--
USSR, 72%; other communist countries, 15% . Imports--$7.6 billion
(c.i.f. 1987): capital goods, industrial raw materials, food,
petroleum, consumer goods. Major suppliers--USSR, 72%, other
communist countries, 14%.
Official exchange rate: 1 Cuban peso=US$1.33.
Membership in International Organizations
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Group of 77 (G-77), Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU),
Latin American Economic System (SELA), United Nations and some
of its specialized and related agencies, including UN Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), Universal Postal Union (UPU),
and the World Health Organization (WHO).(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 8, October 22, 1990
Title: Focus on Central and Eastern Europe
Juster
Source: Kenneth I. Juster, Senior Adviser to the Deputy
Secretary of State
Description: Remarks from conference sponsored by the RAND
Corporation on Supporting East European Democracy and Free
Markets, Santa Monica, California
Date: Sep 21, 19909/21/90
Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies
Region: E/C Europe
Country: Czechoslovakia (former), Hungary,
Yugoslavia (former), Romania
Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid
[TEXT]
Following is an abridged version of remarks by Kenneth I.
Juster, Senior Adviser to the Deputy Secretary of State, before a
conference sponsored by the RAND Corporation on Supporting East
European Democracy and Free Markets, Santa Monica, California,
September 21, 1990. The President has designated Deputy
Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger as the coordinator of US
assistance to Eastern Europe.
During the past year, we have witnessed the most dramatic changes
on the European continent since the end of World War II. The turn
away from communism and the emergence of democracies in Eastern
Europe represent nothing less than a vindication of US foreign
policy during the post-war era. But we also must appreciate the
fact that the communists drove the countries of Eastern Europe and
their economies to the brink of ruin. They have left behind in these
countries an obsolescent industrial base, massive debt, and
environmental decay. Perhaps the most damaging legacy, however,
is psychological--populations grown accustomed to risk-avoidance,
an atrophying of entrepreneurial skills, and a dependence on
government largess (including price subsidies, guaranteed jobs, and
rent control). Thus, the new governments of Central and Eastern
Europe have their work cut out for them. And so does the West--
because it is in our interest that they succeed.
A successful transition to democracy and free markets in
Eastern Europe would serve US national interests in important
ways: It would mean that the turn away from communism has
become irreversible, and it would help ensure that the region will
attain some stability and not once again become a power vacuum or
an unstable theater of tension and rivalries. We, therefore, have
every incentive to assist the Central and East European nations in
their time of need--and we are doing just that.
General Framework for US Assistance
US assistance policy in Central and Eastern Europe is based on the
concept of a "new democratic differentiation." This term was
chosen to contrast with our long-standing policy of expanding
contact with communist governments in Eastern Europe to the
extent that their foreign policies differed from that of the Soviet
Union. We now have adopted a new policy standard--that is, the
United States will tailor its assistance to the specific needs of
each East European country as it moves positively toward four
objectives:
First, progress toward political pluralism, based on free and
fair elections and an end to the monopoly of the communist party;
Second, progress toward economic reform, based on the
emergence of a market-oriented economy with a substantial private
sector;
Third, enhanced respect for internationally recognized human
rights, including the right to emigrate, and to speak and travel
freely; and
Fourth, a willingness on the part of each of these countries to
build a friendly relationship with the United States.
In practice, the "new democratic differentiation"
distinguishes three levels of assistance to Central and East
European countries.
First, at the most basic level, some countries need short-term
humanitarian aid to cope with severe shortages of necessities--
such as food and medicine. The United States has made
humanitarian assistance available to all countries of the region.
For example, we have provided medical supplies to the Romanians,
and food relief totaling approximately $200 million to both Poland
and Romania in their time of urgent need. Also during this fiscal
year, the Department of Defense, through its humanitarian
assistance program, has provided surplus equipment to Hungary,
Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria.
Second, over the medium term, there are a number of steps
that the United States is taking to create an institutional
framework to support political reform and the move toward market
economies. Again, most of this assistance is open to all countries
of the region but in proportion to their commitment to reform.
There are four general categories of assistance here, and different
priorities within each for each country.
Developing Democratic Institutions
One of our priorities is to assist in developing democratic
institutions and the rule of law. Our initiatives in this area are
concentrated in four areas.
Rule of Law and Human Rights. The United States will assist
democratic governments of Central and Eastern Europe to establish
laws and legal systems based on the rule of the majority and
protection of the rights of individuals and minorities.
Political Process. The United States will help new
legislatures, political parties, and civic organizations develop into
effective, stable democratic institutions.
Social Process and Cultural Pluralism. Through, among other
things, support for educational curriculum reform, training of
teachers, and support for trade unions and other non-governmental
organizations, the United States will assist in strengthening the
principles and practices of democratic pluralism within the
societies of Central and Eastern Europe.
Support for Independent Media. The United States will assist
in establishing independent radio and television stations, publishing
independent newspapers, and training journalists. Indeed, we have
already launched an Independent Media Fund designed to advance
these programs on a regional basis.
Technical Training and Assistance
A second medium-term priority is technical training and assistance
in support of economic reform. Our priorities here include:
-- Assistance in designing comprehensive economic reform
policies, both in the macroeconomic and microeconomic areas. We
have had extensive consultations with several of the East European
governments on monetary policy, budget policy, and exchange rate
convertibility, as well as on price reform, privatization, and
competition policy;
-- Assistance in restructuring state-owned enterprises and
preparing them for privatization;
-- Assistance aimed at developing an institutional
infrastructure conducive to a market-based economy, with
emphasis on banking and financial services, a securities exchange,
new tax codes, and generally accepted accounting practices;
-- Assistance to develop legal frameworks for private,
market-based economies;
-- Training of managers, accountants, and others in the basic
workings of a market economy; and
-- English-language training, which will facilitate the
exchange of scientific and technical information.
Based on the suggestions that the United States has received
from the various East European governments, we are focusing this
assistance most heavily in the areas of agriculture, banking, energy,
health care, housing, small business, and public administration.
Environmental Assistance
The environment is a separate medium-term assistance priority.
The primary goal of US environmental assistance programs in
Eastern Europe is to strengthen the region's capacity for mitigation
of critical environmental problems and remediation and prevention
of pollution through the setting of new environmental standards and
regulations, perhaps on a regional basis, that are compatible with
economic growth. We also seek to maximize the rapid introduction
of cost-effective energy conservation technologies in Central and
Eastern Europe to bring about environmental improvements while
lowering the cost and capital requirements for fossil fuel
consumption.
Normalizing Trade and Investment Relations
Finally, though not strictly within the assistance framework, the
US government seeks to normalize bilateral trade and investment
relations with countries that meet the requirements of US law. Our
efforts in this area include:
Signing Bilateral Investment Treaties. We have concluded a
comprehensive business and economic agreement with Poland. We
are in the final stages of concluding a bilateral investment treaty
with Czechoslovakia. We are in the midst of negotiations with
Yugoslavia on a bilateral investment treaty. We are in the process
of opening negotiations for such agreements with Hungary and
Bulgaria.
Signing Trade Agreements and Granting Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) Status. We have granted MFN status to Poland, Hungary, and
Yugoslavia. We have signed a trade agreement with Czechoslovakia
which will grant MFN status once approved by the Congress. We are
beginning the process of negotiating the trade agreement necessary
for such status with Bulgaria.
This category of assistance also includes the programs of the
Export-Import Bank (now operating in Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia,
and Czechoslovakia), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(operating in Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, and opening in
Czechoslovakia in the near future), and the trade and development
program (operating in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia), which
provides US government money to foreign governments for
feasibility studies by US firms.
All of these agreements and activities are designed to
stimulate the economies of Eastern Europe and, as such, to improve
the quality of life.
Economic Support
The final level of assistance is bilateral and multilateral economic
support and other measures designed to permit the integration of
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the world economic
community. This is the largest category of funding and is available,
generally with a good deal of conditionality, for those countries
which have decided to take the "leap" to a market-based economy by
implementing major economic reform programs. Poland is clearly
in this category, followed by Yugoslavia, with Hungary and
Czechoslovakia not far behind them. US economic support here is in
several forms.
On the multilateral front, the United States is the major
contributor (almost 20%) to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
stabilization programs and World Bank structural adjustment
programs in these countries. Again, these two institutions are
most active in Poland but have programs in Hungary and Yugoslavia
as well. Czechoslovakia has just become a member of the IMF and
the World Bank, and Bulgaria is currently in the process of seeking
membership to these institutions. The United States is also one of
the founding members of, and will be the largest contributor (10%)
to, the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD). At least 60% of the EBRD's loans are to be devoted to
private sector projects--to set up new enterprises or fund the
privatization of state-owned enterprises. No more than 40% of the
EBRD's loans will be for infrastructure improvements for state-
owned enterprises that also should help nurture free enterprise--
such as improved telephone systems and railways.
The United States has also taken the lead in establishing the
new Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Center for Cooperation with European Economies in Transition and
has proposed, in addition, that the OECD offer a new affiliate status
at this time for Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia
has long been an associate member of the OECD.
In terms of bilateral economic support, the United States led
the way, with a $200-million grant, in establishing a $1-billion
stabilization fund to support the convertibility of the Polish
currency. In addition, one of our most significant initiatives has
been the establishment of the Polish-American and Hungarian-
American Enterprise Funds.
The enterprise funds are a bold experiment in a new way of
delivering economic assistance. Rather than have the US
government provide a one-time grant to Poland or Hungary, we have
developed, instead, the enterprise funds as a means for tapping into
private-sector expertise to manage US government grants. The
President, in consultation with the Congress, has asked a group of
prominent private citizens from the United States, and from Poland
and Hungary for each of the two funds, respectively, to form a
corporation to use US government money to make loans, grants,
equity investments, and other forms of financial transactions
designed to promote private-sector development in Poland and
Hungary. The hope is that these enterprise funds will be able to
manage the US government grants in the way that an investment
banker might do--unencumbered by the bureaucratic constraints
normally associated with government activities--and that they will
be able to multiply many times over the financial impact of the
initial grants.
Guiding Principles
The United States has developed some general principles that guide
its activities:
-- Use assistance to advance the process of economic reform,
not substitute for it;
-- Emphasize projects that can start up fast and have an
immediate impact to meet urgent needs;
-- Concentrate assistance in each country in a limited
number of areas, where the United States has a comparative
advantage over other Western donors and where the United States
can have an impact;
-- Concentrate on practical, nuts-and-bolts programs rather
than abstract theory or study;
-- Encourage demonstration projects in key sectors of the
economy, especially projects designed to improve the environment
and the quality of life;
-- Establish, where practical, generic programs which can
then be tailored to the needs of each country;
-- Put experts in the field for periods of up to 1 year; stay
away from short visits or 1-day programs;
-- Emphasize training in the recipient countries rather than
in the United States, for reasons of both cost effectiveness and
avoidance of a brain drain of valuable but limited talent;
-- Emphasize educating the educators and training the
trainers;
-- Work with existing institutions, if possible (generally
avoid creating new institutions because the overall costs and the
time lag are too great);
-- Establish sustainable relationships between US
institutions and organizations in Central and Eastern Europe, so as
to strengthen the American presence (and influence) in the region;
-- Support programs which respond to the needs of the
Central and East Europeans rather than those which are designed to
suit the desires of US organizations;
-- Develop a streamlined funding mechanism to gain
maximum flexibility while maintaining accountability; and
-- Before starting a new project, take into account the
activities of other Western countries and of the international
financial institutions. Coordinate efforts where possible.
US Assistance Programs
Four countries qualify now for special attention because of their
readiness to implement democratic reforms and their decision to
make the transition to a market-based economy--Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Of these four, we believe that
Poland deserves top priority for several reasons:
-- Its economic problems are the most severe.
-- Its economic reforms are the most far-reaching.
-- Its economy is the largest in the region.
Poland is viewed by most observers as the "test case" in
Eastern Europe. Success or failure of the Polish effort, therefore,
is extremely important politically.
Yugoslavia, under Prime Minister Markovic, has also embarked
on an ambitious program of economic reform, and two of the
republics--Slovenia and Croatia--have recently held free elections.
The United States has provided substantial technical assistance to
Yugoslavia, but we are concerned about the rising internal tensions
in the country and the detrimental effect these tensions could have
on further political and economic reforms.
Hungary and Czechoslovakia have both elected new democratic
governments this year and, while each country is moving toward a
market-oriented economy, each is still in the process of defining a
comprehensive economic reform program.
With respect to Bulgaria, the US government has expressed its
concern about the fairness of the elections in June, but we are
cautiously optimistic about the new government just formed there.
Assuming continued democratization, the United States is prepared
to offer assistance.
Finally, on Romania, the United States continues to have some
reservations about the commitment there to democratic reforms
and basic human rights. We have informed the Iliescu regime of the
sorts of democratic reforms we would like to see, and we are
prepared to assist the Romanians in building democratic
institutions.
As to specific programs in the region, the focus during the
past year has been primarily on Poland and Hungary because those
are the countries for which the Congress appropriated money. The
initial legislation in this area--the Support for East European
Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989--was written prior to the
revolutions in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and East Germany.
The SEED Act, therefore, was designed to promote reforms in the
two most liberalized countries in the region at the time--Poland
and Hungary. Moreover, because at the time of the drafting of the
SEED Act we were not yet dealing with popularly elected
governments in those two countries, the act designated virtually all
of the funds appropriated to be used for specific programs.
Humanitarian assistance--
-- Food assistance for Poland (over $130 million);
-- Medical supplies for Poland ($2 million).
Democratic initiatives for Poland and Hungary--
($4
million).
Developing human resources for Poland and Hungary--
-- Technical training ($3 million);
-- Labor market transition ($1.5 million);
-- Peace Corps ($2 million);
-- Educational/cultural exchanges ($3 million);
-- Scholarship programs ($2 million);
-- Science and technology exchanges ($1.5 million).
Environmental initiatives--
-- Clean fossil fuels in Poland ($10 million);
-- Krakow environmental activities ($2.3 million);
-- Regional Environmental Center ($1 million).
Trade and investment--
-- OPIC authority to operate in Poland and Hungary with $40
million of OPIC's investment guarantee authority earmarked for
Poland;
-- Export-Import Bank authority to guarantee, insure,
finance, extend credit, and participate in extension of credit in
Poland and Hungary;
-- Trade credit insurance program--$200 million in
secondary guarantees of short-term Export-Import Bank trade
credits for exports for the private sector in Poland;
-- Trade and development program--$2 million for financing
planning services of the US private sector for important
development projects.
Stabilization fund for Poland--
($200 million
grant).
Enterprise funds--
-- Poland ($35 million)
-- Hungary ($5 million)
While the SEED Act provided authority for the expenditure of
funds only in Poland and Hungary, there has been to date some
limited authority for expenditures in the other East European
countries. First, when the Congress passed the Panama act to
provide emergency assistance to the new government in that
country, it added authority for the expenditure of $10 million for
democratic initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe. These funds
have been used for pre-election assistance, development of an
independent media fund, and the launching of rule-of-law programs,
among other things.
Second, various US government agencies--such as the
Commerce Department, the Agency for International Development
(AID), the US Information Agency (USIA), and the Peace Corps--have
utilized existing budgetary authority or presidential waivers for
additional programs in Central and Eastern Europe.
The administration also introduced new legislation on March
7, entitled the "Eastern European Democracy and Free Market Act of
1990," to respond to the dramatic events in that region. The
President's initiative, in effect, seeks to enact the general
framework for assistance described above. It makes all the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Yugoslavia,
eligible for assistance at a level corresponding to their positive
movement toward US objectives for the region. It requests $300
million for FY 1991 for the funding of assistance programs. And it
contains no earmarks, so as to provide the administration with the
necessary flexibility to coordinate assistance based on
developments in the region, the cooperative international effort,
and requests from the recipient countries.
The International Effort
US strategy is to avoid pumping money willy-nilly into the region.
Despite the calls for some kind of new "Marshall Plan" for Eastern
Europe, the needs of the region today are substantially different
from those of Western Europe in 1947.
After World War II, we had to rebuild a region which was
physically devastated but which, nevertheless, possessed the
entrepreneurial know-how, economic infrastructure, and democratic
institutions necessary for a quick recovery. In Central and Eastern
Europe today, those skills and institutions are, to one degree or
another, lacking. That is why, in addition to the financial
assistance we are providing to back meaningful stabilization and
structural adjustment programs, we are concentrating on
transferring a wide range of technical assistance so that these
countries will become equipped to absorb Western investment and
aid. Simply throwing money at the region, even lots of it, without
relating it to progress toward structural reforms may--as happened
in the 1970s--only postpone the advent of change and squander our
assistance efforts.
There are a few additional points that should be made in
response to those who are saying we are not doing enough. First, in
large part because of US efforts, we now have powerful and
prosperous European allies who can share with us the burden and
responsibility of helping to rebuild the other half of their continent.
Indeed, President Bush was instrumental in establishing the Group
of 24 Western governments (G-24) that has already coordinated
approximately $14 billion in grants, credits, guarantees, and
technical assistance for Poland and Hungary.
The G-24 is designed to harness the concerted efforts of the
West to support political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe.
The European Commission serves as the secretariat to the G-24. Its
functions include:
-- Coordinating the bilateral assistance programs of the
donor countries;
-- Serving as an information clearinghouse to exchange
information and avoid duplication of effort;
-- Conducting needs assessments and setting indicative
priorities for the East European countries; and
-- Helping implement initiatives and joint projects, such as
the Polish stabilization fund and the regional environmental project
in Budapest.
The G-24 has agreed on criteria for eligibility for its
coordinated assistance that are similar to those adopted by the
United States. These criteria are progress toward the rule of law,
respect for human rights, the introduction of multiparty systems,
the holding of free and fair elections, and the development of
market-oriented economies. The G-24 has also established working
groups on food aid, investment, training, and the environment. The
group on food aid was especially successful in coordinating
emergency agricultural assistance to Poland.
Finally, it needs to be said that when one looks at the actual
budgetary outlays for assistance to Eastern Europe--as opposed to
credits, insurance, and guarantees which make up the assistance
programs of many of our partners--the United States is right at the
top of the list of donor countries. The East Europeans know this,
and they appreciate it.
Administration of US Assistance
Over 30 US government agencies have become involved in providing
assistance of one form or another to the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. Some of these agencies are normally engaged in
foreign affairs and are, therefore, familiar with operating in the
international environment. However, in many cases, domestic
agencies are seeking to become involved in the assistance process.
These agencies have an important role to play, but coordinating
among them has been a difficult task, especially when all agencies
are competing for scarce resources. I suspect our West European
counterparts have had similar experiences.
It is even more difficult to coordinate private-sector
activities, which include for-profit ventures, proposals for
technical assistance that require government funding, and volunteer
efforts. With regard to for-profit ventures, we can--and do--
provide guidance and encouragement because such ventures are
critical to successful reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. But it
is not government's role to subsidize or favor one business venture
over another.
As to private-sector groups seeking government funding, this
is, in many instances, the most difficult category with which we
deal. Both we and the governments of Central and Eastern Europe
have been overrun by a vast array of private-sector proposals to
provide technical assistance and the like, proposals which vary
significantly in quality. We have to find ways to sort out the good
from the bad.
Finally, voluntary assistance represents a great untapped
potential. We are now seeking to organize voluntary activities in
the United States through the President's recently announced
Citizens Democracy Corps. We plan to develop a clearinghouse that
will provide an inventory of the technical skills and services that
the US private sector can provide. We will then be able to match
these skills and services with needs of the Central and Eastern
European countries.
One other important point to note is the need for coordination
in-country by the recipients of our assistance. As new governments
are formed in the region, they must develop their own sets of
priorities, so that they can provide greater specificity of direction
for the donor countries. In doing so, we also encourage the new
governments of Central and Eastern Europe to increase the degree of
dialogue and cooperation among them and even consider approaching
some of their problems--such as energy efficiency--on a regional
basis.
The Role of the Private Sector
I am convinced that we must accord a high priority to the role of
the American private sector in the transformation and recovery of
the Central and East European economies. Western public-sector
money alone is not going to be the answer to the needs of the East
Europeans today. In the long run, it is through American and
Western private-sector investment that the region will obtain the
amounts of capital needed to create jobs and self-sustaining
economic growth.
Clearly, the involvement of the private sector is not simply a
matter of government exhortation or a sense of charity or adventure
by US businessmen. It goes without saying that American
companies will have to be satisfied that the mix of risk and return
is competitive with opportunities elsewhere. The US government is
doing everything it can to make Central and Eastern Europe a level
playing field and an attractive place for American investment.
Conclusion
The task ahead for the East Europeans will not be an easy one. The
current crisis in the Persian Gulf highlights some of their energy
problems; the expected Soviet conversion to hard currency trade
based on market prices this January will bring further problems.
Moreover, we are now seeing new regimes learning that it was
easier to unite in opposition to the communists than it is to develop
the political skills necessary to govern under democratic
conditions.
We must be patient and realistic. We must acknowledge that
reform is going to be a lengthy and painful process. In the final
analysis, success depends on the democratically elected
governments of the region. But Western assistance can make a
difference. And if we do it right, we will have created a model for
the transition in Central and Eastern Europe which can be applied to
transitions we face elsewhere today, such as in the Soviet Union,
and to transitions we will surely face tomorrow.(###)