US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: President's Proposals for FY 1991 Refugee Admission Levels
Eagleburger
Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Description: Statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Oct 3, 199010/3/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Country: Kuwait, Vietnam, Liberia, USSR (former)
Subject: Refugees
[TEXT]
I am here today to discuss the global refugee situation and to
present the President's proposed refugee admissions levels for
fiscal year (FY) 1991. I would like to begin with a brief discussion
of the trends in refugee affairs over the past year. I will then turn
to some specific areas of concern, including the US response to
Soviet emigration, the comprehensive plan of action for Indochinese
refugees, and the current situations in the Persian Gulf and Liberia.
Finally, I will summarize the proposed admissions levels for
refugees for the coming fiscal year.
Recent Trends in Refugee Affairs
The ideal solution for any refugee situation is that the conditions
which caused the refugees to flee be brought to an end. The
opportunity to reconstruct a life in one's homeland--with one's own
language and culture--is a far more humane solution than to become
an outsider in a foreign land. The enormous changes in world
politics since we consulted on refugee concerns 1 year ago have had
a significant impact on this potential for voluntary repatriation of
refugees.
The warming of relations between the superpowers has meant
that many regional conflicts may be on the road to resolution. The
progress in Afghanistan and Cambodia offers the possibility that
refugees created by those conflicts may have the opportunity to
return in safety and in dignity to their homes in the not too distant
future. Repatriation programs have been planned for each, and have
begun to be implemented for the Afghans.
There have also been major repatriation efforts over the past
year in Central America for Salvadorans and Nicaraguans. By March
of this year, more than 11,000 Salvadorans had returned home from
Honduras, and we are in the midst of the repatriation of thousands
of Nicaraguans to their home country following the democratic
election in February and the establishment of the Chamorro
government. Approximately 12,500 Nicaraguan refugees from both
Honduras and Costa Rica as well as more than 8,000 Nicaraguans
previously associated with the resistance in Honduras have returned
home. While the pace of the returns is affected by the absorptive
capacity of these countries, we are especially gratified that more
than 30,000 Central Americans are now back in their home
countries.
In Africa, some 43,000 Namibians have returned home after
long years in exile to help launch the world's newest independent
state.
Another major political change since last year has been the
spread of democracy and freedom of expression in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union. While this, too, may lead to large
repatriations, especially to East European nations, the rapid change
in governments has also unleashed long repressed ethnic tensions in
those regions. The fear of ethnic strife plus a legacy of official
persecution--particularly in the Soviet Union--has prompted many
Jews, Evangelical Christians, and other religious and ethnic
minorities there to seize the opportunity to emigrate. This has
presented us with some major challenges in our resettlement
program, to which I will refer in a moment.
For the majority of the world's 15 million refugees, however,
repatriation is not a viable option. Mr. Chairman [Senator Joseph
Biden], over the past year you and your colleagues in the Congress
have paid particular attention to the needs of these refugees.
Integration and acceptance by the country of asylum is available
only to a limited number of these refugees, and resettlement to a
third country is available to even fewer.
Many refugees who will not be resettled or repatriated have
been in asylum for an extended period of time. They need food,
water, shelter, the provision of sanitation facilities, and medical
care. They also need international organizations to monitor their
protection. As refugees wait for political and social conditions to
enable them to return home, the international community must be
prepared to provide the resources necessary to sustain them.
A major thrust of congressional attention to refugee affairs
worldwide this year has been the dire financial straits of the
international organizations which assist refugees and conflict
victims. Severe fiscal crises have resulted from a rapid growth in
the number of refugees, with a steady, but not concomitant,
increase in international donor contributions. This situation reached
a critical point in 1989 and mandated severe cutbacks in the
program levels of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). A
consensus has been reached, however, on the UNHCR budget for
1990, and we expect that budget to be fully funded. While the ICRC
has cut its original program projections by one-third, it maintains a
resilient will to respond when needed in a crisis, as demonstrated
by the situation in the Persian Gulf.
Smaller but serious financial difficulties have threatened
programs of the UN Border Relief Operation on the Thai-Cambodian
border (UNBRO) and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). US responses to these latter
two organizations from both the regular migration and refugee
assistance (MRA) appropriation and the emergency refugee and
migration assistance (ERMA) fund have been instrumental in
ameliorating their fiscal crises.
In each of these cases, the United States has vigorously
pressed other donors to carry their share of these needs. New
demands on scarce resources, coupled with budgetary constraints in
all donor nations, will continue to require careful planning and the
setting of priorities by both international organizations and the
governments which support their activities. We shall continue to
build on the close working relationships we have established with
other donors and each of the international organizations that work
with refugees and conflict victims. In FY 1991, the President's
budget request includes a greatly needed increase in regional
refugee assistance of some $46 million as well as a $25 million
replenishment of the ERMA fund, which will help all of these
refugee organizations.
In short, the refugee world is an extremely dynamic one, with
a continuous series of new challenges. We cannot always anticipate
needs or predict how particular programs will develop, but the
United States can--and does--provide strong and constructive
leadership. Leadership comes not only from the total amount of
funds we provide annually, but as well from the numbers of
refugees we resettle. We demonstrate leadership in the policy and
program proposals we make to the refugee community, to refugee-
hosting governments, and to other donor and resettlement nations.
No other nation monitors world situations with the expertise and
steadfastness that we bring to refugee and conflict victim issues.
I would like now to turn to four regional situations which are
currently receiving priority attention.
Soviet Refugee Admissions
Rarely does the State Department have an opportunity to announce a
plan of action to resolve a major problem and return only 12 months
later able to report a resounding success. I am proud to say that
this is the case with regard to Soviet refugees.
For many years, the United States and other nations have
advocated greater freedom of emigration for Soviet citizens. We
have devoted considerable effort and resources to support the
resettlement of persecuted religious and ethnic minorities
allowed to leave that country. The 50,800 Soviet refugees we will
resettle this year in the United States set a new record and
parallels unmatched levels of Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel.
Last year, I described our plans to close the Rome-Vienna
pipeline for Soviet refugee applicants and to transfer all processing
to Moscow. We discussed a nascent Washington processing center,
and a new system in which most of the paperwork for refugee
applications would be handled in this country, with files shuttled
back and forth to our embassy in Moscow. We have now completed
these changes, with the result that we can handle the same number
of refugees at a substantially lower cost to the MRA budget. This
new system has proven so
successful that we are now considering it as a model for other
types of visa processing.
Indochinese Refugees
I characterized the Vietnamese refugee problem last year as long-
standing and extraordinarily complex. It is no less so now than
then. However, we still believe that the comprehensive plan of
action (CPA) that resulted from the 1989 international conference
on Indochinese refugees represents the best mechanism for
addressing humanely the concerns of all involved nations.
Implementation of the CPA is a difficult task, but we have been
steadfast in our commitment to the practice of first asylum and our
opposition to forced repatriation of Vietnamese.
The most serious difficulty we have encountered has been
Malaysia's refusal to offer safe landing to Vietnamese boat people.
The United States has protested--and continues to protest
vigorously--Malaysia's failure to abide by the CPA's provision that
all arriving Vietnamese boat people are to be offered first asylum.
Other items of concern with regard to the CPA include: conditions
in camps in Hong Kong; the relatively slow pace of screening; and
the need for the quick and effective operation of committees in
each first asylum country to provide special attention to
unaccompanied minors.
At the same time, however, there has been progress in several
key areas of the CPA. For example, resettlement of the longstayers
has been a success, and we are ahead of the schedule agreed to at
the conference. The orderly departure program also has been vastly
expanded with good cooperation from Vietnam, in particular in the
implementation of last summer's agreement for the resettlement of
former reeducation center detainees. Refugee screening programs
are underway in each first asylum nation too, representing a major
new activity on behalf of Indochinese asylum seekers. And,
voluntary repatriation programs under the CPA have enabled over
4,000 Vietnamese and nearly 2,000 Lao to return to their homes.
The major unresolved issue concerns the return of non-
refugees to Vietnam. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
Thorvald Stoltenberg, has held extensive negotiations with all
concerned governments on this subject and has proposed an
expansion of the existing UNHCR voluntary repatriation program to
include those "who do not object" to returning home. At the ASEAN
[Association of Southeast Asian Nations] post-ministerial
conference in late July, Secretary Baker announced US support for
the High Commissioner's efforts and raised US concerns with the
foreign ministers of each of the first asylum countries. Moreover,
the Secretary stated the willingness of the United States to join in
a multilateral pledge to undertake "best efforts" to accomplish the
return or resettlement of all Vietnamese asylum seekers by the end
of 1992. At the conclusion of the conference, the ASEAN nations
confirmed their willingness to continue to support the CPA.
Recently, on September 22, the British and Vietnamese
governments, along with the UNHCR, announced an agreement on the
return to Vietnam of Vietnamese in Hong Kong who have been
determined not to be refugees and who do not object. We expect the
UN High Commissioner to provide the necessary safeguards to
ensure that there is no force or coercion employed and that the
existing system for UNHCR monitoring in Vietnam is expanded to
cover all returnees.
Displaced Persons in the Gulf
The August 2 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq has generated a tremendous
number of displaced persons. Exact figures are difficult to
determine because more people flee Iraq and Kuwait every day.
However, the following estimates can be considered accurate to
date:
-- Over 540,000 people have fled to Jordan from Iraq.
-- About 40,000 have crossed the Turkish-Iraqi border.
-- Almost 70,000 have entered Syria from Iraq.
-- Over 20,000 have crossed the Iraq-Iran border.
-- Well over 240,000 people have fled to Saudi Arabia and
other gulf states from Kuwait.
Those fleeing are generally not refugees suffering
persecution, but rather third-country nationals who, until August 2,
were employed in Iraq and Kuwait. In most cases they have escaped
with few personal resources and will return home penniless. The
overwhelming numbers of displaced persons impose a severe
resource burden on countries such as Jordan and Turkey.
Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other countries have
undertaken impressive efforts to care for these displaced persons.
Although conditions in some of the camps were initially harsh,
there have been no deaths due to starvation or epidemic disease. In
Jordan, the worst camps have been closed and the residents have
been moved to new camps with adequate sanitation and shelter. In
Turkey, the only victims of hunger and disease are newly arrived
displaced persons who developed their conditions while still in Iraq.
The international response to this emergency has grown
rapidly and is now effectively meeting the challenge. The Red
Crescent societies in Jordan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have been in
the forefront in helping care for the displaced persons. They are
now backed up by an array of international agencies and personnel.
In Jordan, the UN Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) coordinates
the work of several UN agencies. The ICRC and the League of Red
Cross/Red Crescent Societies are also playing major roles. US and
European non-governmental organizations have become active as
well.
Perhaps the most critical element in this emergency is the
effort to transport the displaced persons back to their home
countries. Egyptians make up the largest number of these
individuals. Saudi Arabia and the EC [European Community] have now
largely assured steady movement of Egyptians through Jordan and
back home. India is stepping up repatriation of its citizens to more
than 3,000 per day. The International Organization for Migration
(IOM) is coordinating transportation arrangements for the other
displaced persons, mostly those from South Asia whose
governments cannot cover the costs. IOM scheduled the movement
of 50,000 persons through the end of September. As a result of
those efforts, the number of persons in Jordan has dropped to below
50,000.
The international donor community has committed over $200
million to this relief effort, including cash, aircraft, food, and
other supplies. The United States has committed up to $28 million--
$10 million for transportation and up to $18 million in food and
other aid. The efforts of the host governments and generous
international assistance have stabilized the situation for now.
However, the potential for a future crisis remains. Over 2 million
foreign nationals remain in Kuwait and Iraq. If and when they make
it across the borders, most will require the same short-term care
and transportation assistance as those who fled before them.
Liberian Refugees
I would like to draw attention to an area of the world where there
is a grave humanitarian situation that has not received adequate
attention of donor nations. I refer to the Liberian refugee crisis
which began some 8 months ago. Since June, the number of refugees
seeking protection in the neighboring nations of Guinea, Cote
d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone has doubled. There are now more than
500,000 Liberians in asylum--more than one-fifth of the country's
population. Although assistance organizations have launched new
efforts to care for these refugees, the response of the donor
community has been extremely disappointing. The United States has
committed over $5 million in funding, including 30% of the initial
UNHCR appeal, and nearly all the food that has been made available
for these refugees. The rest of the international community has so
far contributed only $4.3 million toward this emergency appeal of
the UNHCR. We continue to urge other donor nations not to ignore
their responsibility toward these refugees. We are concerned in
particular about food deliveries to the refugees in the forest region
of Guinea; logistical problems have hampered efforts to reach this
area. Malnutrition rates there are high, which affect children most
severely. And, in each case, the impact on the citizens of the
neighboring countries of asylum has been substantial. We have asked
the United Nations to develop a coordinated plan to reach all
affected persons over the coming 6-9 months, as the situation
inside of Liberia remains unstable and uncertain.
I have touched on some of the more visible refugee programs
that the United States funds. But there are still millions of victims
of persecution and war whose circumstances we have not had time
to describe. Let me assure you that the United States remains
committed to protecting and promoting their well-being no matter
how long their exile. My hope is that next year we will be able to
report a decrease in the number of refugees worldwide, as many of
those now in asylum are repatriated safely to their home countries.
I would now like to turn to the President's proposal for
refugee admissions in FY 1991.
Refugee Admissions
Historically, part of the American response to refugee situations
worldwide has been to offer resettlement opportunities to a sizable
number of refugees. Those who have been resettled in this country
have a long tradition of bringing special talents to the American
"melting-pot." This tradition is at the core of today's hearing on the
President's proposed refugee admissions level for FY 1991.
The President's proposal for 131,000 worldwide refugee
admissions in FY 1991 includes the following regional levels:
-- Africa: 4,900
-- Near East/South Asia: 6,000
-- East Asia: 52,000
-- Eastern Europe: 5,000
-- Soviet Union: 50,000
-- Latin America/Caribbean: 3,100
TOTAL: 121,000
In addition to the total funded admissions level of 121,000,
we propose to continue the successful private sector initiative
(PSI) program with an authorized ceiling of 10,000, available for
refugees from any region of the world. Thus, the worldwide total of
the President's proposal is 131,000.
A detailed justification of each of the admissions levels has
been provided in the document entitled Proposed Admissions for FY
1991, as submitted for the record.
Ambassador Lafontant-Mankarious has included in her
prepared statement a regional description of the admissions
programs we envision. I would like to review for you how we intend
to fund these admissions levels.
As I have noted, the President's proposal for a worldwide
admissions level of 131,000 refugees includes 10,000 admissions
from any region of the world to be sponsored privately under the
ongoing PSI program. PSI refugees require no federal funding and
are only admitted if the requisite private sector funding is
provided. The question therefore, with the budget process not quite
completed, is how we will fund all the numbers in the remaining
121,000 ceiling.
The President's proposal for 121,000 funded refugee
admissions reflects the fine-tuning of the refugee admissions
program that the consultations process provides; each of the
regional admissions totals has been revised since earlier estimates
were included in our FY 1991 budget presentation. As a result of
this process, the total of 121,000 funded admissions represents a
net increase of 11,000 above the budget request level, most of
which falls within the ceiling for the Soviet Union. In FY 1990, up
to 8,000 Soviet refugees were resettled through private funding by
the Jewish community. We fully appreciate the magnitude of that
effort, and recognize that it cannot easily be repeated in FY 1991.
We have, therefore, raised the funded level of Soviet refugees in FY
1991 to 50,000.
The 121,000 figure is of course a ceiling, not a quota.
Nevertheless, we believe that through cost-saving measures and
new approaches to financing transportation costs, funding
appropriated at the President's original budget request level can
finance the projected 121,000 admissions. Let me be clear: Our
ability to make use of these additional numbers will be dependent
on:
1. The appropriation of funds at the President's requested
level for Fiscal Year 1991,
2. Successful participation of refugees and their sponsors in
financing a portion of transportation to the United States, and
3. Our ability to implement other cost-saving measures.
Subject to these constraints, we are fully committed to covering
the full 121,000 admissions within the authorized ceiling.
In closing, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
provide this update on some of our ongoing refugee policy concerns,
and our plans for refugee admissions in the coming year. Your
committee's continued support of our refugee programs worldwide
is integral to our success.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: US Refugee Admissions Priorities System
Date: Oct 15, 199010/15/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Subject: Refugees
[TEXT]
A worldwide priority system sets guidelines for the orderly
management of refugee admissions into the United States within
the established annual regional ceilings. The issues of whether a
person is a refugee under US law and the priority to which a refugee
should be assigned for resettlement are separate and distinct.
Assignment to a particular priority does not make that individual
either more or less a refugee, but it may reflect an assessment of
the urgency of the need for resettlement. Just as qualifying for
refugee status does not confer a right to resettlement in the United
States, assignment to a particular priority does not entitle a person
to acceptance into the US refugee program.
The US refugee priorities system sets guidelines for the
orderly management of refugee admissions into the United States
within the established annual regional ceilings and is subject to
change during the fiscal year. The processing priorities are:
Priority One
--Compelling concern/interest:
exceptional cases of (a) refugees who are in immediate danger of
loss of life and for whom there appears to be no alternative to
resettlement in the United States, or (b) refugees of compelling
concern to the United States, such as former or present political
prisoners and dissidents.
Priority Two
--Former US government
employees: refugees employed by the US government for at least 1
year prior to the claim for refugee status. This category also
includes persons who were not official US government employees,
but who for at least 1 year were so integrated into US government
offices as to have been in effect and appearance US government
employees.
Priority Three
--Family reunification:
refugees who are spouses, unmarried sons, unmarried daughters, or
parents of persons in the United States. (The status of the anchor
relative in the United States must be one of the following: US
citizen, lawful permanent resident alien, refugee, or asylee.)
Priority Four
--Other ties to the United
States: (a) refugees employed by US foundations, US voluntary
agencies or US business firms for at least 1 year prior to the claim
for refugee status; (b) refugees trained in the United States or
abroad under US government auspices.
Priority Five
--Additional family
reunification: refugees who are (a) married sons or married
daughters of persons in the United States; (b) unmarried siblings of
persons in the United States; (c) married siblings of persons in the
United States; (d) grandparents of persons in the United States; (e)
grandchildren of persons in the United States; (f) more distantly
related individuals who are part of the family group and dependent
on the family for support. (The status of the anchor relative in the
United States must be one of the following: US citizen, lawful
permanent resident alien, temporary resident alien, refugee, or
asylee.)
Priority Six
--Otherwise of national interest:
other refugees whose admission is in the national interest.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: World's Refugee Population Doubles: US Committed to
Assistance
Lafontant-Mankarious
Source: Jewel Lafontant-Mankarious, US Coordinator for
Refugee Affairs
Description: Statement submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Washington, DC
Date: Oct 3, 199010/3/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Country: Kuwait, Vietnam, Liberia, USSR (former)
Subject: Refugees
[TEXT]
The global refugee situation remains very serious despite several
important successes in recent years. In fact, in some respects, the
world refugee situation has worsened. In the last decade, the
refugee population has doubled from approximately 7 million to an
estimated 15 million. Today, conflicts in West Africa and on the
Horn of Africa, sporadic fighting in Afghanistan, and the continuing
plight of the Cambodians, compel the United States to maintain its
leadership role in protecting and assisting the world's refugees.
Today's hearing is a culmination of an ongoing, year-long
process involving members of Congress, representatives of state
and local governments, and voluntary agencies. It is also an
excellent opportunity for the administration to provide the
Congress with an overview of US refugee policy and programs, as
well as the President's refugee admissions proposal for fiscal year
(FY) 1991.
Interagency Coordination
In preparation for these hearings, I, along with other officials of
the administration, have had periodic discussions with members and
staff of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees as well as other
interested congressional committees. In addition, I chair a weekly
meeting with representatives from the Departments of State,
Justice, and Health and Human Services (HHS), the Office of
Management and Budget, and the National Security Council. When
appropriate, a policy coordinating committee on refugees meets to
ensure that policy and program issues requiring interagency
attention, including those that concern refugee admissions, receive
prompt and systematic consideration.
As US Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, I am fully aware of the
importance of cooperation and communication between the
Departments of State and Health and Human Services on refugee
admissions planning and on budgets. The coordinator's office, the
Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs, and the Office
of Refugee Resettlement at HHS all closely monitor domestic
resettlement programs. Consultations are also held with
representatives of state and local governments, public interest
groups, private voluntary organizations, and other organizations
concerned with refugees.
The administration is committed to strengthening and
implementing an effective US refugee admissions and assistance
policy, consistent with domestic and international concerns within
a humanitarian framework. As I'm sure the committee is aware, the
enormous task of balancing these concerns has become increasingly
difficult in recent years because of the growing number of refugees
and constrained budgets. Nevertheless, the United States continues
to admit generous numbers of refugees to our country. At the same
time, the United States contributes to life-saving assistance
programs which impact on millions of the world's refugees who are
not candidates for resettlement but instead are hopeful of being
able to resettle in place or return to their home countries.
Before providing an overview of some of the major refugee
situations and the correlation between these concerns and our
admissions policy, I would like first to review the three main
pillars of US refugee policy of which I am especially proud, as they
are the manifestation of our nation's traditional humanitarian
concern and assistance.
Ensuring that first asylum, protection and relief assistance
are provided to the world's 15 million refugees--wherever they may
be--is one of the most important facets of US refugee policy. As
the world's leading contributor to international refugee assistance
programs, the United States has helped establish and consistently
supports the international network of organizations that assist and
care for refugees around the world. Working with the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Relief and Works
Agency for Palestinians (UNRWA), the UN Border Relief Operation
(UNBRO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), and other
organizations, the United States makes every effort to ensure that
the needs of the world's refugees and displaced persons are
provided for.
Swift Response to Middle East Needs
In this regard, the US response to the needs of refugees in Jordan
and Turkey has been swift and substantial. We are working closely
with other governments, the United Nations, and international
humanitarian agencies to coordinate humanitarian assistance
efforts as effectively and quickly as possible.
Another important aspect of US refugee policy is
resettlement. Although the United States supports voluntary
repatriation when conditions permit, we also assist in facilitating
local resettlement in countries of asylum. When neither of these
solutions is available and resettlement in the United States is the
only viable alternative, we admit refugees who are of special
humanitarian concern to the United States. Offering US
resettlement to those who have no other options also strengthens
our ability to obtain commitments from other countries to provide
first asylum--this is especially true in Southeast Asia. The third
pillar of US refugee policy concerns the need to tackle the root
causes of refugee flows. We have actively sought to strengthen
international law and human rights against the expulsion or
mistreatment of a country's own citizens. The United States has
consistently stressed the responsibility and obligations of the
countries of origin to avert new flows of refugees by adhering to
the fundamental principles of human rights.
Ten years ago, the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted to
establish a more uniform and equitable basis for refugee
admissions to the United States. The act set forth the procedure
for formal congressional consultations and specified the type of
information annually required by Congress. This information has
been prepared for you in our report to the Congress on proposed
refugee admissions for FY 1991.
For the worldwide admissions ceiling for FY 1991, President
Bush is proposing a level of 131,000 refugees, within which
121,000 are allocated under regional ceilings and are eligible for
assistance from federally funded programs. In addition, an
unallocated reserve of 10,000 is proposed for additional refugee
admissions needs contingent upon the availability of private sector
funding. The regional allocations for the 121,000 funded
admissions are as follows: 4,900 for Africa; 52,000 for East Asia-
-including Amerasian immigrants; 50,000 for the Soviet Union;
5,000 for Eastern Europe; 6,000 for the Near East and South Asia;
and 3,100 for Latin America and the Caribbean.
FY 1991 Admissions Program Funding
The recommended level of admissions is higher than the 110,000
admissions assumed in the Departments of State and Health and
Human Services FY 1991 budget requests. Let me stress that the
121,000 admissions the President is proposing is a ceiling, not a
quota. The Department of State is implementing a plan for
financing the admission of the additional refugees within the
current budget. The plan includes offering a reduced fare for pre-
payment of the transportation of refugees by relatives and/or
voluntary organizations and identifying cost savings in other areas
of the refugee program. The Departments of State and Health and
Human Services are committed to achieving maximum efficiency in
financing the admission of refugees within the available
appropriations.
At this time, I would like to share with you a brief overview
of some of the major refugee situations that are of concern.
Africa
Africa is currently home to over 4.5 million refugees, a figure
amounting to nearly one-third of the world's total. The three major
countries on the Horn--Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia--are all beset
by fierce civil wars which have generated approximately 2 million
refugees and massive internal displacement with no end in sight. To
make matters worse, another severe drought has hit Ethiopia.
In Mozambique, the ongoing conflict between FRELlMO
[Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Mozambique] and RENAMO
[Mozambique National Resistance] forces have forced approximately
1.3 million Mozambicans to flee their country. Malawi, one of the
smallest and poorest countries on the African continent, has taken
in well over 800,000 Mozambican refugees, a figure amounting to
one-tenth of its entire population. During my travels to Southern
Africa this past spring, I was witness to the enormity of the
current refugee crisis in the region.
In West Africa, the Liberian refugee population has risen in
recent months from 170,000 to 500,000. The conflict, which
started with an incursion by rebels led by a former government
minister in northeast Liberia's Nimba County, has resulted in an
unleashing of violent ethnic hostilities committed by both sides.
The FY 1990 admissions ceiling for Africa was originally set
at 3,000. However, during the course of the year, it became
apparent that additional travel-ready refugees could be moved and,
after reallocating numbers from another region, the Africa ceiling
was raised to 3,500. At the beginning of FY 1991, a pipeline of some
1,500 Immigration and Naturalization Service-approved African
refugees--most of whom will become travel ready during the first
quarter of FY 1991--is expected. Given the continued lack of other
solutions for significant refugee populations in the region, African
refugee numbers should be increased to 4,900.
Near East/South Asia
The Near East/South Asian region has the unhappy distinction of
having the largest concentration of refugees and displaced people in
the world today. With continuing hostilities in the West Bank and
Gaza, the plight of 2 million Palestinians remains without a
solution.
As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980,
more than 3 million Afghan refugees remain in neighboring Pakistan
and an estimated 2 million are in Iran. Voluntary repatriation
programs have met with some success. However, because of the
unstable political situation in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that a
significant number of Afghans will return to their homeland any
time soon. If Afghans were able to return home, the world's refugee
rolls would be reduced by a full one-third.
The original FY 1990 admissions ceiling of 6,500 was revised
to 5,000 during the course of the year when it became apparent that
at least 1,500 numbers were likely to go unused and were needed
elsewhere. The decrease was largely due to a decline in
applications from Iranian religious minorities.
The proposed ceiling for refugees from the Near East and
South Asia for FY 1991 is 6,000. This ceiling would allow us to
continue to process Afghan, Iranian, and Iraqi refugees in priorities
one through four.
Southeast Asia
Over 110,000 Indochinese asylum seekers reside in camps in
Southeast Asia and Hong Kong. Thailand alone is host to some
300,000 displaced persons from Cambodia who await repatriation
to their homeland under a comprehensive political settlement.
Thailand also has a significant camp population of Vietnamese and
Laotians.
In Southeast Asia, maintaining first asylum for Vietnamese
boat people remains one of the most critical issues we face in this
region. The comprehensive plan of action (CPA), adopted by 56
nations in 1989 reaffirms the commitment to providing first
asylum and resettlement opportunities for screened-in refugees.
While the Southeast Asian nations and Hong Kong have recognized
the humanitarian right of boat people to seek asylum, Malaysia has
continued its policy of push-offs--a practice the US deplored and
which we have protested at the highest levels. Since May 1989,
Malaysia has reportedly towed over 8,000 boat people back out to
sea, although fortunately in most cases with provisions for onward
travel to Indonesia.
For FY 1991, in order to provide maximum flexibility in
accomplishing both objectives under the CPA, we are proposing to
combine the first asylum and orderly departure program ceilings
into a single East Asia ceiling of 52,000. Priority would be given to
meeting our commitments under the CPA for first asylum
admissions within the 52,000 ceiling in order to reduce the number
of Vietnamese refugees in the ASEAN [Association of Southeast
Asian Nations] nations and Hong Kong. Nevertheless, we anticipate a
substantial increase in the orderly departure program in FY 1991
with a substantial portion of that increase coming from faster
processing of immigrant petitions.
Eastern Europe
The welcome progression of democratic reforms in Hungary, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia has reduced the number of refugees from this
part of the world. Therefore, the scope of the program will be
narrower in FY 1991, with a proposed admissions ceiling of 5,000.
Only nationals of those countries where democratic reforms have
not yet been put into place--Romania, Bulgaria, Albania--may
routinely apply for the US refugee admissions program as we enter
the new fiscal year. Depending on developments in the region,
however, further changes in the admissions program for this region
may be necessary during the course of the year.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Persecution and discrimination against former political prisoners
and dissidents continues to drive many Cubans to desperate
measures to try to flee the country. In Central America, we are
encouraged by the democratic elections in Nicaragua which have
enabled thousands of people to repatriate to their homeland.
However, we remain concerned by the large number of Guatemalan
refugees who have sought safe haven in Mexico.
For FY 1991, the proposed ceiling for refugees from Latin
America and the Caribbean is 3,100 with an initial allocation of
3,000 for Cuba. As in FY 1990, the admission of Cuban political
prisoners is a high priority in the Latin American admissions
program in FY 1991, the proposed parameters of the Cuban program
will be expanded to include political dissidents, religious activists,
and former US government employees who meet the definition of a
refugee.
Soviet Union
For many years, the United States and other democracies have
advocated greater freedom of emigration for Soviet citizens,
especially Soviet Jews, long a target of persecution within the
Soviet Union. We consider the right to emigrate a fundamental
human right, and the United States has devoted considerable effort
and resources to support resettlement of those allowed to leave.
The unfortunate resurgence of anti-semitism in the Soviet Union
has made emigration a necessary alternative to religious and ethnic
persecution.
The proposed admissions ceiling for refugees from the Soviet
Union in FY 1991 is 50,000. They will be accepted from all six
priorities to include groups determined by Congress to be of special
concern.
Religious minorities--Soviet Jews, Christians, Ukrainian
religious activists, and others--who, in accordance with legislation
enacted late last year, are thought to be in the most urgent need of
refugee resettlement are given priority within these groups, except
for the evangelical Christians, applicants with close family
members who are US citizens, legal permanent residents, refugees,
parolees or asylees are given priority in scheduling interviews in
Moscow.
In FY 1990, we set a ceiling of 40,000 funded and 10,000
unfunded numbers from the Soviet Union. Approximately 8,000 of
the unfunded numbers were utilized, and we are impressed with the
contributions from the private sector that made that possible.
However, based on our consultations, we do not believe the same
number of privately funded numbers is practical in FY 1991. In fact,
we reallocated 2,100 additional numbers to the Soviet program in
FY 1990 to accommodate the needs there which could not be met
from the unfunded numbers. Therefore, for FY 1991, we are
proposing a ceiling of 50,000 funded numbers for the Soviet Union.
We do not propose to request additional funding from Congress to
cover these extra 10,000 Soviet admissions. Rather, as noted
earlier, we will endeavor to incorporate these added numbers in our
FY 1991 budget request by offering a reduced fare for pre-payment
of transportation costs, which we believe will be attractive to
many of the families of the refugees. A positive response to this
offer could substantially reduce the need to finance transportation
loans. Any shortfall in funds for the additional 10,000 would be
reflected in fewer Soviet admissions. We have begun discussing
this program with the relevant voluntary organizations.
Private Sector Initiative (PSI)
A program that we in the coordinator's office are very proud of is
the private sector initiative, or PSI. The PSI is a joint, public-
private program under which all the basic costs of admission and
resettlement are paid for by the private sector. It has made a
substantial contribution to our refugee program in FY 1990. By
September 30, we expect to have admitted approximately 3,000
Cuban refugees, a small number of Vietnamese, and an initial
increment of refugees under a new Ethiopian program. Moreover,
approximately 8,000 Soviet Jews were admitted through a separate,
privately-funded program. The PSI ceiling proposal for FY 1991 is
10,000.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that while we
consistently urge other nations to do their fair share in resettling
and caring for the world's refugee population, the United States will
remain the world's humanitarian leader in refugee affairs.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: Our Vision for the Hemishpere
Aronson
Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs
Description: Remarks before guests at the Organization of American
States (OAS) during "US Week" festivities, Washington, DC
Date: Sep 28, 19909/28/90
Region: Caribbean, Central America, South America
Subject: Trade/Economics, Narcotics
[TEXT]
I want to take this occasion of the 100th anniversary of this proud
organization to reaffirm my own country's strong commitment to
its future. The United States believes in the OAS; we value our
membership in this proud organization. Even when we are
disappointed in its actions--as we have been from time to time--
we never waiver in our commitment to work to strengthen the bonds
of inter-American cooperation and the friendships that we have
built with all of you.
I would like to take this opportunity to reflect for a few
minutes on the view from Washington of our hemisphere and our
role in it--our hopes, our fears, and, most of all, the enormous
opportunities that lie before us in this unique moment of our
collective history.
Time of Historic Changes
When we read the newspapers, we are struck by the historic
changes that are sweeping this world--the collapse of communism
in Eastern Europe and the revival of democracy; the profound,
continuing changes within the Soviet Union and what we trust and
hope is the beginning of the end of the post-war Cold War; the
emergence of the Economic Community in Europe; the unification of
Germany; and the economic miracle in Asia. Now we have seen in
the response to the aggression in Kuwait an example of what we
hope will be a new world order--a new sense of collective
responsibility and commitment by the world community to defend
the rule of law.
All of these changes are profound; indeed, some are
breathtaking. But I believe the commentators and analysts have
missed an equally profound and historic set of changes here in the
Western Hemisphere.
Our Hemispheric Revolutions
We are in the midst of two profound and related revolutions.
The first is a political revolution in which many of the
individuals and the nations represented here today have played the
leading role. The people of the Americas--from Asuncion to
Santiago, from Managua to Port au Prince--have made a
fundamental decision that has transformed our hemisphere. They
have declared that there is no longer political legitimacy without
democracy and that they will not accept the rule of colonels or
comandantes or any other elites who claim to rule in the name of
the people but will not let the people govern themselves. They have
also soundly rejected the assertion that by denying freedom, you
can deliver social justice, because they have discovered, to their
regret, that those who deny freedom also deny social justice.
I believe there are many inspirations for this democratic
revolution, including the tradition of the rule of law that has
existed for so long in the Caribbean, which is the home to the oldest
continuing parliament in the Americas. I believe that the
commitment of the brave men and women throughout the Americas
who risked, and sometimes sacrificed, their lives for democratic
values has been an example. And, I hope that democracy in the
United States has also been an inspiration to this great revolution.
We have also witnessed an intellectual revolution every bit as
profound. A new generation of democratic leaders has recognized a
fundamental truth--just as political freedom is the key to peace,
economic freedom is the key to opportunity. This revolution about
economic policy is every bit as courageous as the political
revolution waged in defense of democracy, for it too is waged
against powerful, entrenched interests.
These two revolutions are related. For democracy to survive
and prevail, democracy must deliver--not just to the well-to-do but
to those who have never had a chance. The Economist magazine
wrote, at the beginning of my tenure, that "the elected presidents of
this continent rule from capitals ringed by shanty towns swollen
with refugees of an oppressed countryside." That is not a vision
that will sustain democracy for long. The old system of special
privileges and favors, protectionism, and rigged rules is an
economic dinosaur; it cannot long stand in this new global,
competitive economy.
The 1990s will see the most profound and fierce competition
for capital that the world has seen in the postwar era. Only those
countries that can inspire confidence and open up their systems to
new investment will be able to survive in this environment. I am an
optimist about the potential of the Americas, but I must
acknowledge that the recent rise in oil prices brought on by the
crisis in the Persian Gulf and the potential that it will push the
industrial democracies toward recession could not have come at a
worse time for many of your countries. We must find ways to
mitigate the damage lest all our hopes sink before this new crisis.
Today, our central task is to respond to these two revolutions
creatively and effectively; to consolidate democracy, to dig its
roots so deep that no special interest or entrenched minority can
pull them out; to build and defend democratic institutions; to
advance the cause of human rights and the rule of law; and to build
in the Americas the world's first completely democratic
hemisphere.
Enterprise for the Americas
President Bush has enunciated a vision that drives the United
States--his enterprise for the Americas. We must tear down the
barriers to trade and investment from Argentina to Alaska and set
loose the tremendous creative energies of this hemisphere's people
to create, produce, and grow.
There is no short cut to reaching this vision. There are no
easy answers or quick fixes. Hard political choices must be made,
and no one will make them for us. Here in the United States, we are
in the middle of our own budget negotiations, so we know that the
doctrine that we preach to you comes with a price--that democratic
leaders, including those in the United States, must make difficult
decisions that are not always popular.
The vision that we have of a free trade regime throughout this
hemisphere is not a vision of a new trade bloc with a new set of
barriers to the outside world but of a free trade regime to
stimulate worldwide commerce and growth. Each of us must do our
part. Clearly the first challenge is to ensure that this round of
negotiations in the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
is successful. Here I think we are making common cause and will
hopefully be successful in tearing down barriers to products from
this hemisphere, particularly in the area of agriculture.
We also face new challenges to our vision. In some countries,
the forces of violence continue to threaten and attack democratic
institutions. We face the challenge of drugs and new threats to our
common heritage of clean air, rainforests, water, and streams.
The OAS and all of us must rise to meet these challenges.
John Donne wrote that no man is an island unto himself, each is a
part of the main. This is also true among nations. We must do more
to help those nations that need our help, to show solidarity with
those that are embattled. El Salvador's democratic government is
waging a courageous struggle against forces of violence. It is
waging a struggle to achieve peace. It needs the solidarity of this
hemisphere as it goes through this difficult moment.
The people of Haiti need our help. We should not be indifferent
at this moment--we must be engaged.
I believe we have, for too long, neglected the continuing
conflict in Suriname. Perhaps the OAS could play a role, if the
government of Suriname would welcome that.
I am not advocating interventionism but collective
responsibility. A democratic partnership cannot be based on
indifference, because the problems of a few soon become problems
of us all.
Narcotics Threat
There is no better example than the threat of narcotics; I think here
we have made important progress. We are no longer pointing fingers
of blame at each other, north and south, arguing whether consuming
nations or producing nations are responsible for this crisis.
Here in the United States, we recognize that as long as some
American citizens are willing to spend as much for illegal narcotic
substances as this nation spends for imported oil, we will have a
drug problem. We must do more to reduce demand, and we are
committed to doing so. And I will note that, when President Bush
sat down with the presidents of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia at
Cartagena, the first issue he addressed was what we are doing in
the United States to reduce demand, particularly among our young
people.
This problem once appeared to be confined to a few countries
of our hemisphere, but more and more nations are threatened by this
spreading menace. This is not just a question of criminal behavior
but an assault on the rule of law, democratic institutions, and,
ultimately, on civilization itself. We cannot appease these narco-
traffickers; we must defeat them. And we can only do so together.
We must have a strategy that we all formulate and accept to reduce
demand, to interdict drug traffic, and to find alternative economic
opportunities for those who are caught up in drug trafficking, not
because they wish to be but because they are poor and have no
alternatives.
I would remind those who think that there is a short cut to
dealing with this menace or who hope to ignore it, of something
President Kennedy once said: Those who seek to ride the back of the
tiger, usually end up inside.
We have a collective challenge and responsibility to preserve
the heritage of the next generation--our land, our water, our air,
and our rainforests. I hope that the developing nations of the
hemisphere can learn from those of us who sacrificed our
environment in the early stages of our history in the name of
growth and learned to regret it.
Shedding Old Illusions
I am optimistic about the future of the Americas, but I am also
sobered by the dimensions of the threats and dangers. One thing I
know: change is upon us. Those who resist or ignore it will be
swept aside. We must ask ourselves: can we manage change, turning
it to peaceful and hopeful purposes, or is our vision too narrow or
are we too timid to act in time?
To act in time, we must shed the old illusions and myths that
confront our own relations, here in the OAS and throughout the
hemisphere. We must shed the baggage of the past and the
stereotypes of yesterday. We must see each other clearly and speak
frankly and honestly about the many areas where we agree and also
about our genuine differences. That kind of dialogue is the essence
of the OAS, and we are committed to engage in that dialogue with
our friends in the Americas.
We believe it is a two-way street. It is not just what you can
learn from us but what we can learn from you, and what we can do
together. But dialogue must end in action; otherwise it is an
academic and, ultimately, empty exercise.
The world is moving swiftly. We have enormous opportunities
to seize and little time to waste. Secretary Baker said in the first
weeks of this administration:
"Some look at the crises and problems facing the hemisphere
today and despair. I am not one of them. I believe that if we have
the courage and the will to seize the opportunities before us, this is
a time when we can dream great dreams for all the peoples of the
Americas. I believe the day will come when the democratically
elected leaders of the Americas will be seen as the pioneers who
blazed the trail that will lead one day to the world's first
completely democratic hemisphere. I believe that our hemisphere
can become a model for the rest of the planet for a true partnership
between the developed and developing nations, where trade is free
and prosperity is shared and the benefits of technology are
harnessed for all. And I believe the day will soon come when in all
nations of the Americas, the rule of law prevails, human rights are
respected, the strong are just, the weak secure, and all our people
live in peace."(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: The Persian Gulf Crisis and US-European Relations
Seitz
Source: Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs
Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
Date: Oct 9, 199010/9/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, E/C Europe
Subject: Democratization, Military Affairs
[TEXT]
I appreciate this opportunity to testify once again before the
committee. When I last appeared before you in July, I described the
achievements to that point in the administration's European foreign
policy: a breakthrough on German unification, enhancing NATO at
the London summit, further work in Vienna toward a landmark
agreement on conventional forces in Europe, and preparations for a
November summit meeting in Paris of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The culmination of these policy
initiatives promised to make for a momentous autumn.
Progress toward our stated goals has continued at an
encouraging pace. Germany achieved unification on October 3, thanks
in large part to our success in negotiating the Two-Plus-Four treaty
signed on September 12. NATO is pursuing actively the ambitious
agenda it set for itself at the June summit in London. The London
decisions--to review NATO's strategy, initiate SNF [short-range
nuclear forces] negotiations, establish a new relationship with the
Warsaw Pact, and relaunch CSCE--were the key to rapid German
unity on our terms. NATO is an essential structure in the blueprint
for the new European architecture. In New York last week, we
reached agreement in principle on the major outstanding issues in
CFE [conventional armed forces in Europe] and fully expect to sign a
treaty by mid-November. The CSCE summit in Paris will thus be
able to build on a landmark conventional arms control agreement as
it takes important decisions for Europe's future. The just-
concluded ministerial in New York, the first CSCE meeting ever held
in the United States, advanced our objectives for CSCE--widening
political consultation; regularizing review conferences; and
establishing a conflict prevention center, a small, permanent
secretariat, an elections office, and an Assembly of Europe.
The big new element for ourselves and our European partners
since I last testified is the crisis in the Persian Gulf. We have
learned important lessons from the world reaction to Iraq's
aggression, and I would like to mention some of them this morning.
In countering the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the international
community faces its first major test of the post-Cold War world.
The events of the last 2 months have shown that the old Cold War
pattern is broken. Changes in the Soviet Union and the resulting
decline of East-West tensions have altered the rules of the game.
For the first time, the United States and the Soviet Union approach
a crisis as partners in a broad effort to cope with a threat to the
world community. The Helsinki summit last month symbolized and
further solidified the end of automatic superpower confrontation.
One result is that the United Nations can at last function as
its founders intended. Freed from veto deadlock, the Security
Council can marshal international action in times of crisis. In a
joint statement in New York last week, the USSR and we
specifically acknowledged the potential for a greater UN role in
settling conflicts and assisting elections. The eight Security
Council resolutions on the gulf foreshadow the enlarged role the
United Nations can play in the future. As a result of the new
consensus on the United Nations, American leaders can act in
defense of common interests with a good prospect of wide
international support and participation.
Typically in the past, regional troublemakers could gain
resources and maneuvering room by playing on superpower rivalries.
Now, with East-West confrontation diminished, regional problems
are more likely to be addressed and solved on their merits. Soviet
foreign policy expert Georgi Arbatov spelled it out:
"The gulf crisis will make quite a few people--those who may
also have adventurous desires and who would act in a reckless way-
-aware that they won't be able to play the United States and the
Soviet Union against each other anymore. Instead, they will probably
face cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States."
The division of Europe into hostile camps often made
Europeans reluctant to play the role their history and economic
power indicated. Today, Europeans on both sides of the old dividing
line see more clearly that they have a common interest in dealing
forthrightly with world crises. East Europeans are learning to
weigh their interests independently and act accordingly. They look
to us for leadership and help, and we are beginning to engage them
as partners. East Europeans have contributed directly to the gulf
effort--Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania by offering medical
units, Hungary by airlifting supplies to refugees in Jordan. We must
not let the gulf crisis distract us from our opportunities and
obligations in Eastern Europe.
The Role of NATO
The gulf crisis has given NATO a new and convincing
opportunity to demonstrate its value. NATO's prompt and effective
consultation on gulf policy is a prime example of what we mean by
NATO's political role. We and our allies spoke with one voice on the
unacceptability of Iraqi actions. Absent a NATO political
consensus, our ability to respond militarily would have been
severely limited. NATO's base structure made possible the massive,
continuing deployment in which we are engaged. Without fully
functioning NATO bases, in this instance and others like it, the
North Atlantic democracies would be severely constrained in their
ability to protect their vital interests.
Among our NATO allies, the British were particularly
impressive in the crisis, recognizing immediately the need for firm
action and committing substantial forces without hesitation. When
the chips are down, the special relationship is more than sentiment.
The French are moving toward a military presence of over 10,000
men, with a dozen naval vessels, tanks, and aircraft. The German
government has pledged to increase its effort to share the burden.
Specifically, Bonn will contribute over $1 billion to support the US
effort and an equal amount for the three most heavily affected
front-line nations. Italy has been most effective, as EC [European
Community] president, in coordinating European efforts.
In all, 13 of our NATO allies are participating in the naval
blockade. Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, and
others have sent ships; Portugal has offered a vessel; Luxembourg is
helping pay for the naval forces of the Western European Union
(WEU); and the Germans have sent ships to the eastern
Mediterranean to replace units now in the gulf.
Allies are contributing in other ways as well. Turkey shut off
the pipeline, put its troops on alert, and agreed to base additional
US aircraft and NATO AWACS [airborne warning and control system].
Several allies have offered sealift at no cost. European bases--
especially in Germany and Spain--are the essential stepping stones
for our deployment. The United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy
are deploying air units.
EC Support
EC support for economic sanctions was immediate, and
cooperation on enforcement has been outstanding. The 12 member
states have pledged well over $2 billion in emergency aid to Turkey,
Jordan, Egypt, and other affected countries, including the reforming
East Europeans, who now face massively higher energy bills. The EC
has contributed nearly $200 million in humanitarian relief to
persons displaced by the invasion of Kuwait.
At our initiative, an informal mechanism has been established
to coordinate gulf-related assistance, share experience, and avoid
duplication of effort. Among the Europeans, Germany, France, Italy,
the United Kingdom, and the Commission of the {European]
Community will participate. The first meeting of the Gulf Crisis
Financial Coordination Group was held in Washington on September
26; the second meeting will probably take place next week.
Turkey continues to be a key ally, its geopolitical importance
and commitment to the West reconfirmed. President Ozal, who
visited here last month, has taken courageous decisions at
considerable cost to his economy. We must ensure that Turkey
receives full recognition and that its needs are met. We will
encourage our European partners to reach out to Turkey, as they did
by inviting Turkey to the August 21 WEU coordination meeting.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait brought home forcefully to the
world community the dangers inherent in the proliferation of
modern armaments, especially chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles. As Secretary [of State] Baker said
at NATO headquarters last month, the existence in Iraq of a well-
equipped million-man army only years away from a nuclear
capability proves beyond doubt that the Non-Proliferation Treaty
needs strengthening. We must develop intrusive, internationally
sanctioned procedures to close down the threat posed by weapons of
mass destruction in the hands of dictators with a grievance.
European cooperation will be crucial.
I have attempted to lay out some of the consequences of the
gulf crisis for our relations with Europe. I believe that the
accomplishments of recent months in Europe can carry over to help
us shape a new, more peaceful international order, one in which we
will share responsibility with our friends and former adversaries.
We welcome the possibility of a stronger, more responsible
contribution by Europe to our common effort. At the same time,
nothing has come through more clearly in the gulf crisis than that
the world counts on us to take the lead. We can be proud of
American leadership. We must work together--Congress and
administration--to make certain of its future.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: Chronology: Baker-Shevardnadze Meetings
Date: Oct 15, 199010/15/90
Category: Chronologies
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Military Affairs, Arms Control,
Democratization
[TEXT]
March 7, 1989--Vienna
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held
introductory meetings at the conventional armed forces in Europe
(CFE) negotiations. They discussed all aspects of the existing US-
Soviet agenda, including arms control, human rights, regional
conflicts, and bilateral ties. They also agreed to expand the agenda
to include transnational issues. Secretary Baker expressed hope for
the success of perestroika.
May 10-11, 1989--Moscow
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held their first
full ministerial with working groups. They discussed regional
problems, human rights, bilateral matters, and transnational
questions. They agreed on dates for resuming bilateral arms talks
and set a new cycle of meetings between regional experts.
July 29, 1989--Paris
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met on the eve
of opening of the Paris Conference on Cambodia. They held a
discussion on a wide range of subjects, both bilateral and
multilateral, including Cambodia and other regional issues.
September 22-23, 1989--Jackson, Wyoming
At this second full ministerial, Secretary Baker and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze discussed the entire spectrum of US-Soviet
relations. They issued a detailed statement describing the specific
agreements or understandings they reached in areas such as arms
control, bilateral questions, and transnational issues.
December 2-3, 1989--Malta
In addition to participating in the shipboard summit meeting near
Malta, where President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev discussed
arms control, trade issues, Soviet emigration, and European issues,
the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also met
separately to discuss a number of these issues and preparations for
the June 1990 summit.
February 7-9, 1990--Moscow
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held ministerial
talks as part of preparations for a second US-Soviet summit to be
held in the United States in June. A broad range of issues on the
US-Soviet agenda was reviewed. Specific agreements were reached
on arms control and in other areas.
February 12-13, 1990--Ottawa
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held talks at the
"open skies" conference, with focus on development of the Two-
Plus-Four mechanism for discussion of external aspects of German
unification. They also reached agreement on CFE manpower ceilings.
March 20, 1990--Windhoek, Namibia
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, attending
Namibia independence day ceremonies, discussed Lithuania's
declaration of independence, Afghanistan, German unification, and
arms control.
April 4-6, 1990--Washington, DC
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held a full
ministerial meeting to continue their preparations for the summit.
They discussed the full range of US-Soviet issues, with special
attention to Lithuania and arms control.
May 4, 1990--Bonn, West Germany
On the eve of the Two-Plus-Four ministerial, Secretary Baker and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met for several hours to discuss
German unification and other US-Soviet questions.
May 16-19, 1990--Moscow
In their final preparatory session before the summit, Secretary
Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reviewed all issues on the
US-Soviet agenda, with special focus on those agreements being
prepared for signature at the summit. In addition, Lithuania and
German unification received considerable attention.
May 30-June 3, 1990--Washington, DC
In addition to participating in the wide-ranging summit meetings
between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, the Secretary and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze met separately to discuss German
unification and START [strategic arms reduction talks] issues.
June 5, 1990--Copenhagen
On the margins of the CSCE's [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Conference on the Human Dimension, the
Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze continued their
dialogue on German unification.
June 22, 1990--Berlin
In addition to participating in the Two-Plus-Four ministerial,
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met separately
to discuss European and regional issues and the forthcoming NATO
summit, as well as German unification.
July 17-18, 1990--Paris
At the third Two-Plus-Four ministerial, Secretary Baker and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze participated in discussions on
German unification, including the East and West German guarantee
to accept the post-World War II German-Polish border. The
Secretary and Foreign Minister also discussed the Soviet Union's
party congress, conventional forces in Europe, Kashmir, Cambodia,
and US technical assistance cooperation for Soviet economic
reforms.
August 1-2, 1990--Irkutsk, USSR
Meeting in this southern Siberian city, Secretary Baker and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze focused their attention on matters
pertaining to the East Asian region--overall stability, security, the
need to eliminate military confrontation, and establishing bilateral
and multilateral cooperation in the area. Their discussions also
covered Afghanistan, German unification, preparations for the CSCE
ministerial conference, economic and technological issues, arms
control, the Moscow summit, and other regional issues.
August 3, 1990--Moscow
Cutting short his visit to Mongolia, Secretary Baker went to Moscow
to confer with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze about Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait. At the conclusion of their meeting, they issued a joint
statement calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops
and the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty and national
independence.
September 9, 1990--Helsinki
After visiting several Middle Eastern countries, Secretary Baker
joined President Bush for a meeting with President Gorbachev and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The primary focus was to discuss
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The two leaders issued a joint statement
in which they called for the complete implementation of five
recent UN Security Council resolutions, the unconditional
withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's
legitimate government, and the release of all hostages from Iraq
and Kuwait. The US and Soviet Union agreed also to consider
additional steps allowable under the UN Charter if the economic
sanctions and naval interdiction against Iraq fail.
September 11-13, 1990--Moscow
At the final session of the Two-Plus-Four consultations, the World
War II Allied Powers (France, USSR, UK, US) and East and West
Germany signed a treaty relinquishing all Allied occupation rights
over the two Germanys and Berlin, paving the way for the
unification of East and West Germany on Oct. 3 and giving a united
Germany full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs. In
separate bilateral meetings, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze discussed the issues remaining to wrap up the
conventional armed forces in Europe treaty and a "security
structure" for the Persian Gulf.
September 26-October 5, 1990--New York City
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met five times
on the fringes of UN General Assembly and the CSCE ministerial
talks. They cleared the major hurdles to a CFE agreement--notably
the issue of the number of aircraft allowed on each side--and made
what Secretary Baker termed "good progress" toward a START
agreement as well. On October 3, Secretary Baker and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze signed a joint statement committing the US
and USSR to support UN efforts to settle international disputes.
The two ministers also joined their counterparts from France and
the UK in relinquishing their countries' post-war treaty rights in
Germany, clearing the way for formal German unification which
occurred on Oct. 3. In addition, they discussed the crisis in the
Persian Gulf.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: US-Soviet Joint Statement: Responsibility for Peace and
Security in the Changing World
Description: Text of statement released by the US and USSR in New
York, New York
Date: Oct 3, 199010/3/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, United Nations
[TEXT]
The 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly is taking
place amidst the most profound changes in international affairs
that have occurred since the Second World War. The confrontational
nature of relations between East and West is giving way to a
cooperative relationship and partnership. The UN is fast becoming a
real center for agreed common actions and the Security Council is
reestablishing its crucial role in the maintenance of international
security, peaceful settlement of disputes, and prevention of
conflicts. Yet there remain many challenges to meet and problems
to solve on the way to a peaceful and prosperous future.
Reaffirming the resolution presented last year by the United
States and Soviet Union and unanimously adopted by the UN General
Assembly, our two countries will attach special importance in the
United Nations and its specialized agencies and programs to
promoting practical, multifaceted solutions to the issues of
international peace and security, political, economic, social,
cultural and humanitarian problems.
To accomplish this we will pursue cooperation with all
member-states in attainment of the following:
-- Strengthen the UN's efforts to promote international peace
and security in all its aspects by working to improve UN
peacekeeping, peace-making and crisis prevention functions, by
encouraging more active use of the Secretary General's good offices
and, at the request of individual countries, electoral assistance;
-- Establish a new sense of responsibility at the UN by
encouraging the trend away from rhetorical excess toward efforts
to deal pragmatically with the major issues of the 1990s, including
transnational issues like narcotics, the environment, development,
terrorism, and human rights;
-- Promote a new way of conducting diplomatic efforts
within the UN system to eliminate duplicative programs and
activities and ensure that the UN system is utilized in the most
efficient manner possible--we call this a "unitary UN";
-- Ensure the availability of sufficient resources to the UN
for it to function effectively and efficiently by timely payment of
financial obligations to the UN.
Promoting Peace and Security in All its Aspects
Joint efforts have contributed significantly to the easing of
tensions in Southern Africa and Central America, and are part of
efforts to prepare a peaceful settlement in Cambodia. But serious
problems still remain. Our search continues for workable solutions
to conflict and instability in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East,
Afghanistan, and El Salvador.
In the Persian Gulf, we face a most serious threat to the
integrity of the emerging international system. The United States
and the Soviet Union are working together with other members of
the Security Council to fashion a concerted response, unprecedented
in UN history, to this crisis. The swift reaction of the international
community to Iraq's dangerous and unwarranted aggression serves
as a sobering reminder to any future aggressor; the international
community will not tolerate the kind of wanton aggression which
Iraq has committed. We call upon all United Nations members to
continue to support the sanctions invoked by Security Council
Resolution 661 and 670 until Iraq abides by the call of the Security
Council to withdraw its forces from Kuwait immediately, totally
and unconditionally. We call also for the restoration of the
legitimate government of Kuwait.
The rapidly changing structure of international relations
requires a United Nations that, while remaining faithful to its
original purposes, can also respond flexibly and effectively to new
challenges as they occur, like drugs, the environment, and the need
to ensure the protection of human rights.
Tangible examples of the UN movement away from divisive
rhetoric and political excess were last December's special session
of the General Assembly on Apartheid and the resumed session last
month, where the world community underscored its resolute
opposition to apartheid while agreeing, by consensus, on a positive
approach based on dialogue among all South African parties. We
will work for equally positive results at the General Assembly this
year.
The UN Special Session on International Economic Cooperation
in April 1990 also reflected the growing convergence of views
worldwide on the need for more effective approaches to national
economic development, in the context of a supportive international
economic environment. Our two countries will continue working
together to promote further convergence in this direction. We will
also support efforts to ensure careful and pragmatic preparation for
the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development. We want to
see the Conference fashion a realistic action plan to set the UN's
course in the coming decades.
Another area in which the UN is actively promoting peaceful
change is in facilitation of free and fair elections. UN assistance in
Namibia and Nicaragua was dramatically successful, and there are
many other situations where the UN's services are being requested.
Our two countries will work with other UN members and the
Secretary General to structure a UN electoral assistance process to
enable the organization, at the request of countries concerned, to
carry out effectively this important new effort.
Promoting a Unitary UN and Assuring Needed Financial
Resources
An important area of our bilateral and multilateral cooperation has
been the administration and management of the United Nations,
particularly its budget. As major contributors to the United
Nations, we believe it is essential that all views on the budget are
taken into account, and that the agreement of all major contributors
is required in order to approve the budget.
For there to be consensus, the UN system must improve the
setting of priorities and improve coordination among various UN
programs. The aim should be to eliminate duplicative programs and
activities and ensure that the various components of the United
Nations are utilized in the most efficient manner possible. For
priority setting and coordination to be effective, members will need
clearer and more comprehensive data on what the UN and the
specialized agencies are doing with assessed and voluntary
contributions.
Our two countries provide an important element of UN
resources. As such, we recognize our responsibility to pay
assessments promptly so that the United Nations has the resources
required to perform the tasks as expeditiously as possible, keeping
in mind the necessity of strengthening the administrative and
budgetary reforms that have taken place in recent years.
We intend to work for further enhancing the efficiency of the
executive machinery of the Organization.
Establish a New Sense of Responsibility for Peace
The challenges before the international community and the UN are
great. So, too, are the opportunities for more and better
multilateral cooperation to confront and master the problem of our
time.
In all spheres of UN activities the renunciation of sterile and
rigid positions dictated by ideology rather than by practicality
constitutes an essential prerequisite for creating an atmosphere of
confidence within the United Nations among all United Nations
members.
The United Nations can play a leading role on issues of global
concern. We will actively support efforts, throughout the UN
system, to implement and strengthen the principles and the system
of international peace, security and international cooperation laid
down in the Charter.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: US-Soviet Relations
Date: Oct 15, 199010/15/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former)
Subject: History, Arms Control
[TEXT]
Background
Since the 1917 Russian Revolution, the US-Soviet relationship has
evolved through several phases, including a period of minimal
contact, a wartime alliance, an intense cold war, hopes for detente,
and disappointment when the competitive aspects of the
relationship proved dominant. During most of this period, the
Soviet approach to the world--their Marxist-Leninist ideology, vast
military buildup, and pattern of aggression abroad and repression at
home--made the US-Soviet relationship essentially an adversarial
one.
Relations with the Soviet Union have improved considerably,
however, since 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev launched significant
changes in the policies and practices of the Soviet government.
Moscow has allowed greater freedoms at home in the context of
perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) and shown
greater restraint and a less threatening military posture abroad.
Should these reforms continue, the basic nature of the US-Soviet
relationship could be altered profoundly. A key US objective is the
institutionalization of Soviet restructuring, whether through new
legislation on emigration or arms control agreements that
significantly change Soviet force structure.
US Policy
In a fluid situation, the United States must be prudent but not stand
back from engaging with the Soviets. Our approach to the Soviet
Union is based on realism about the nature of the USSR and the
differences of history, geography, ideology, and national experience
that set us apart and guarantee that some aspects of our
relationship will remain competitive. We must maintain our ability
to protect US security and that of our allies and friends with the
necessary strength--military, economic, technological, and
political--to counter the use or threat of the use of force. At the
same time, in a broad and constructive dialogue with the Soviet
Union, we are seeking to exploit new opportunities for a more
stable and more cooperative relationship. We want to see
perestroika succeed in the belief that it will bring about a Soviet
Union more interested in satisfying the needs of its people and less
interested in aggressive policies abroad.
Five-Part Agenda
The US approach toward the Soviet Union has taken into account
what went wrong with the detente of the 1970s; we have gone
beyond a relationship based largely on arms control to include all
the significant issues causing mistrust and suspicion between our
two countries. Our comprehensive, five-part agenda is grounded on
the basis of long-term US and Western objectives. It includes:
-- Dealing with Western security relations through a coherent
strategy of arms control and defense programs. We are engaging in
bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations on a range of
issues in the nuclear and space talks (which include strategic arms
reduction talks and the defense and space talks), the nuclear testing
talks, the Conference on Disarmament, the conventional forces in
Europe negotiations, and in bilateral consultations on the problems
of chemical weapons and missile technology proliferation. We are
seeking verifiable arms control agreements that enhance US
security, reduce the risk of war, strengthen stability, and lower the
levels of arms and armed forces. We also seek to introduce greater
predictability and openness in the East-West balance of forces.
There are good prospects for significant arms control achievements
in 1990.
-- Dealing with regional conflicts that contain the seeds of
direct confrontation and that, for many years, have been a source of
US-Soviet tension. We and the Soviets agree in principle that
regional conflicts require political and diplomatic solutions, but we
continue to differ on how to translate this common goal into
practice. We want to see Moscow turn "new thinking" into reality.
-- Addressing human rights, where the Soviet Union's past
behavior has been at the heart of many Americans' mistrust. Our
dialogue has broadened to discussion of new issues such as the "rule
of law." At the same time, we will continue to press on unresolved
issues, including cases of long-time refuseniks and divided
families.
-- Expanding the bilateral relationship between the US and the
USSR, including increased cultural and scientific exchange
programs, tourism, and commercial ties. Hundreds of exchanges are
now taking place at the official level as well as between private
citizens. We are moving forward with negotiations for agreements
on trade, investments, tax treatment, civil aviation, and maritime
transportation in order to promote the expansion of mutually
beneficial nonstrategic trade with the Soviet Union.
-- Broadening our dialogue into a whole new area of global or
transnational issues. Here there is opportunity for cooperation on a
range of mutual concerns, including the environment, natural
hazards prediction and damage mitigation, control of illegal
narcotics, and international terrorism.
High-Level Dialogue
We have an active high-level dialogue. Presidents Bush and
Gorbachev held useful discussions in Malta in December 1989, which
helped lay the groundwork for the US-Soviet summit in Washington,
May 30-June 3. President Bush's conversations with President
Gorbachev in Washington were marked by a spirit of candor and
openness and a desire to build bridges toward an era of enduring
cooperation. They signed an important chemical weapons
agreement, nuclear testing protocols, and a commercial agreement,
and they renewed their commitment to early conclusion of the
negotiations on strategic nuclear forces and conventional forces in
Europe. In September, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in
Helsinki to discuss the Persian Gulf crisis and other urgent matters.
This meeting and continuing Baker-Shevardnadze meetings reflect a
new ability to work together constructively on a broader range of
issues.
As Secretary Baker has said, our task is to "find enduring
points of mutual advantage that serve the interests of both the
United States and the Soviet Union." We can begin to envision and
even make plans for a new relationship that clearly goes beyond the
containment policies of the past. Although we will have to be
prepared to deal with the worst as well as the best of Soviet
behavior, we have a historic opportunity to make lasting
improvements in US-Soviet relations.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: US-Australia Joint Communique
Description: Text of communique released after US-Australia
ministerial talks, Washington, DC
Date: Oct 8, 199010/8/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Pacific
Country: Australia
Subject: Military Affairs, Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
The United States Secretary of State Mr. James A. Baker III and
Secretary of Defense Mr. Richard B. Cheney, and the Australian
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Senator Gareth Evans and the
Minister for Defense Senator Robert Ray met on October 8, 1990, in
Washington, D.C., to discuss significant global, regional and
bilateral issues.
Both sides welcomed the continuation of close and regular
ministerial-level consultations within the framework of their
longstanding alliance. The discussions highlighted their extensive
mutual interests and shared strategic perceptions and obligations
as allies under the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-United States]
Treaty.
Defense and Security
Recognizing that historic and far-reaching changes have taken place
in the global strategic situation over the past year, the U.S. and
Australian Governments reaffirmed the ongoing importance of their
security cooperation under the ANZUS Treaty. They expressed
regret that New Zealand's
policies continue to prevent resumption of a full trilateral
relationship.
Recalling the successful completion of the Kangaroo 89 joint
military exercise, the United States welcomed Australia's
continuing progress toward fulfilling its security goals as set forth
in the Australian Government's White Paper on Defence. The United
States reaffirmed its understanding that the Australian
Government's program of defense self-reliance and modernization,
operating within an alliance framework and focusing on strategic
responsibilities and regional cooperation, contributes both to the
defense of Australia and to Australia's fulfillment of its alliance
responsibility.
Both sides welcomed the beginning of negotiations on the
Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station at North West Cape,
Australia.
The United States and Australian Governments strongly
condemned Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and agreed that
Iraq must unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait and comply with
other provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions, including
those relating to the immediate and unconditional departure of
foreign nationals from Iraq and Kuwait.
Both sides welcomed the prompt and effective action taken by
the UN Security Council in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The
international cooperation achieved in enforcing UN economic
sanctions against Iraq and in assisting those countries adversely
affected by the implementation of sanctions has been
unprecedented. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the high
degree of cooperation between their respective forces participating
in the multinational naval force in the Gulf. The United States and
Australian Governments expressed their strong preference that the
crisis should be resolved peacefully if possible, within the
framework of the United Nations Charter and relevant Security
Council resolutions.
The two sides welcomed the agreement of the Cambodian
parties to accept the framework for a comprehensive settlement
completed by the five Permanent Members of the Security Council,
which drew significantly on Australian concepts for an enhanced
United Nations role. They also welcomed the formation at Jakarta
of a Supreme National Council based on this framework to embody
Cambodian sovereignty and to represent Cambodia externally
including at the United Nations. The two sides called on the
Supreme National Council to agree urgently on the appointment of a
chairman, as called for in the Security Council resolution of
September 20, and to work out the practicalities for Cambodian
representation at the United Nations. They supported the call by the
UN Security Council for the co-chairmen of the Paris International
Conference on Cambodia to intensify their consultations on the
elaboration of a comprehensive political settlement with a view to
reconvening the Conference as soon as possible to adopt a
comprehensive settlement document in accord with the Permanent
Five framework agreement.
Australia expressed its strong support for the decision of the
United States to open a dialogue with Vietnam on Cambodia, and
expressed confidence that it would contribute to the comprehensive
settlement of the Cambodia conflict.
Australia and the United States reaffirmed their strong
support for Philippine democracy and their opposition to any efforts
to change the government by non-constitutional means.
The two sides noted that the May national elections in
Myanmar [Burma] demonstrated the overwhelming desire of the
Burmese people for a return to democratic parliamentary
government. They urge the Government of Myanmar to make an early
transition to civilian government and to release all political
prisoners.
The United States and Australia reaffirmed their commitment
to all elements of the Comprehensive Plan of Action on Indochinese
refugees, and expressed their support for ongoing efforts to ensure
its implementation.
The Governments of the United States and Australia
reaffirmed their shared desire to conclude at the earliest possible
date a global convention on chemical weapons. The two sides
pursued their dialogue on the issues remaining to be resolved in
these negotiations.
Reviewing developments in Europe, the two sides welcomed
the peaceful unification of Germany. They expressed satisfaction at
the reduction of East-West military tension and their hopes for the
early conclusion of the CFE [conventional armed forces in Europe]
and START [strategic arms reduction talks] agreements. They
reiterated their support for efforts to introduce market economies
and political pluralism in Eastern Europe and the USSR.
While welcoming the positive developments in the overall
global security environment, the two sides noted that the
proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the
destabilising transfer of missile technology are sources of grave
concern in the post Cold War era.
The two sides welcomed the substantial agreements reached
at the recent Fourth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, in particular the agreement on fullscope
safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. They reaffirmed their
continuing strong support for the Treaty and the international non-
proliferation regime and their determination to work together for a
successful review and lengthy extension of the Treaty in 1995.
Regional Security Issues
The two sides discussed the fundamental changes occurring in East-
West relations and the implications of those changes for
international security in the Asia-Pacific region. They reviewed
recent regional and bilateral exchanges in this area.
The United States reiterated its intention to maintain a
significant military presence in the Pacific region. Australia
reaffirmed its view that such a United States military presence,
including continuing access to military facilities in the Philippines,
represents an important contribution to regional confidence and
security.
Both sides reaffirmed their continuing commitment to close
cooperation with South Pacific states to promote regional economic
development, political stability and security. The fundamental
importance accorded by Pacific countries and peoples to the
management of their marine resources and environmental concerns
was acknowledged. Progress over the past year towards the
elimination of driftnet fishing in the South Pacific was noted with
satisfaction, and both sides endorsed the aspirations of island
countries to negotiate an effective management regime to ensure
the sustainable exploitation of the southern albacore tuna fishery.
The United States and Australia agreed that the Johnston
Atoll chemical agent disposal facility would play an important role
as the first facility to begin large scale destruction of CW
[chemical weapons] stocks. It will establish in practice the
principle of destruction of these weapons which will be a central
element in achieving a global ban on chemical weapons. Expressing
sensitivity to the concerns of Pacific nations about the
environmental impact of the facility's operations, the United States
reiterated its intention to operate the facility in an
environmentally safe manner, and reaffirmed its intention to
destroy on the island only those chemical weapons already stored
there, the U.S. CW stocks being shipped from the Federal Republic of
Germany, and obsolete World War II munitions which may be found
in the Pacific area.
The two sides welcomed increased contact between North and
South Korea and, particularly, the recent meeting between the
Prime Ministers of North and South Korea. They also welcomed the
recent announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union. In accord with
the principle of universality, the United States and Australia
support United Nations membership for the Republic of Korea
without prejudice to the ultimate objective of reunification of the
Korean Peninsula, and without opposition to simultaneous
membership for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They
noted that the Korean Peninsula must nevertheless remain a focal
point for efforts to reduce tensions in Asia, and, in this context,
emphasized the urgency and importance of North Korea fulfilling its
obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to implement
fullscope IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards on
all its nuclear facilities.
Economic and Trade Issues
The United States and Australia reaffirmed their support for the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, the first
ministerial meeting of which was held in Canberra November 6-7,
1989. They welcomed the endorsement by ministers at Singapore
July 29-31, 1990, of a seven-point work program, and agreed to
work with other APEC countries toward achieving the important
benefits the process can bring to the region and the wider
international community.
The two sides reaffirmed their common commitment to the
multilateral trading system and to achieving a successful outcome
from the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations. Both
sides expressed an urgent need for progress on outstanding
important issues, especially agriculture, and agreed that
participants must make every effort to achieve a final outcome
which adequately takes into account the interests of all GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] member countries.
Australia expressed concern at the continuing resort to export
subsidies in international agricultural trade. Australia also noted
that the 1990 Farm Bill, now under consideration in Congress,
contains several provisions which are of serious concern to
Australia. The United States took note of Australia's concerns over
the impact on Australia of U.S. agricultural trade policies. The U.S.
stated its view that the EEP [export enhancement program] remains
an important form of leverage in achieving significant reform in
agricultural trade in global negotiations. Both sides agree that the
best opportunity for achieving substantial reform of world
agricultural policies is through the comprehensive, multilateral
approach outlined in the draft framework agreement prepared by the
chairman of the negotiating group on agriculture, Aart De Zeeuw,
and reflected in the U.S. proposal for agricultural reform. The
United States expressed its concern about Australian Government
procurement offset policies as well as Australian local content
requirements for commercials and those proposed for television
broadcasting.
The two Governments also expressed support for the
negotiation of a new legal instrument, within the Antarctic Treaty
system, to provide comprehensive protection for the Antarctic
environment. Australia recalled its view that no mining should take
place in the Antarctic. The United states noted that it is prepared to
consider an indefinite ban on mineral activity in Antarctica, but
reiterated the need for an international consensus on the mining
issue.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: Country Profile: Australia
Date: Oct 15, 199010/15/90
Category: Country Data
Region: Pacific
Country: Australia
Subject: History, International Organizations,
Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Official Name: Commonwealth of Australia
Geography
Area: 7.7 million sq. km. (2.966 million sq. mi.); about the size of
the continental United States.
Cities: (1987 est.) Capital--Canberra (pop. 286,000). Other cities-
-Sydney (3.5 million), Melbourne (3.0 million), Brisbane (1.2
million), Perth (1.1 million).
Terrain: Varied, but generally low lying.
Climate: Relatively dry, ranging from temperate in the south to
semitropical in the north.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Australian(s).
Population (1990 est.): 17 million.
Annual growth rate: 1.7%.
Ethnic groups: European 93%, Asian 5%, aboriginal 1%.
Religions: Anglican 26%, Roman Catholic 26%.
Languages: English, aboriginal.
Education: Years compulsory--to age 15 in all states except
Tasmania, where it is 16. Literacy--99%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--8.8/1,000. Life expectancy--males
73 yrs., females 79 yrs.
Work force (end 1989, 8.3 million): Agriculture--6%. Mining,
manufacturing, and utilities--26%. Services--63%. Public
administration and defense--5%.
Government
Type: Democratic, federal-state system recognizing British
monarch as sovereign.
Constitution: July 9, 1900.
Independence (federation): January 1, 1901.
Branches: Executive--prime minister and cabinet responsible to
Parliament. Legislative--bicameral Parliament (76-member
Senate, 148-member House of Representatives). Judicial--
independent judiciary.
Administrative subdivisions: Six states and two territories.
Political parties: Liberal, National, Australian Labor, Australian
Democrats.
Suffrage: Universal and compulsory over 18.
Central government budget (FY 1989-90): $86.95 billion.
Defense (FY 1989-90): 3% of GDP or 9.7% of government budget.
Flag: On a blue field, UK Union Jack in the top left corner, a large
white star directly beneath symbolizing federation, and five
smaller white stars on the right half representing the Southern
Cross constellation.
Economy
GDP (1989 est.): $283.35 billion.
Per capita income: $16,856.
Inflation rate: 7.1%.
Natural resources: Bauxite, coal, iron ore, copper, tin, silver,
uranium, nickel, tungsten, mineral sands, lead, zinc, diamonds,
natural gas, oil.
Agriculture (1987-88, 4.7% of GDP): Products--livestock, wheat,
wool, sugar. Arable land--9%.
Industry (1987-88, 43% of GDP): Types--mining, manufacturing,
and transportation.
Trade (1989): Exports--$37.0 billion: coal, wool, wheat, meat, iron
ore and concentrates, alumina, aluminum, petroleum oils,
nonmonetary gold. Major markets--Japan, US ($3.9 billion in CY
1989), UK, Korea, PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Germany. Imports--$40.9
billion: transportation equipment, capital goods, industrial
supplies, petroleum products. Major suppliers--US ($8.3 billion in
CY 1989), Japan, Germany, UK, Taiwan, New Zealand, Italy, Korea.
Official exchange rate: The Australian dollar floats freely. The
July 1990 rate was approximately US$0.80= Australian $1.
Fiscal year: July 1-June 30.
Membership in International Organizations
UN and most of its specialized and related agencies, including the
UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO); Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD); Asian Development Bank
(ADB); Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific
(ESCAP); Australia-New Zealand-US security treaty (ANZUS);
Commonwealth; Colombo Plan; International Energy Agency (IEA);
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Group; and many others.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: Who Belongs to What (Membership by country in major
international organizations)
Date: Oct 15, 199010/15/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Subject: International Organizations, United Nations,
CSCE, OAS, EC
[TEXT]
The October 3, 1990 unification of East and West Germany not only
changed the face of Europe, but changed the composition of many
international organizations. Groups such as the Warsaw Pact and
CSCE "lost" a member (East Germany), while the people of what had
been East Germany gained representation in organizations such as
NATO. The following revision of "Who Belongs to What" reflects
these and other changes.
APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation)
--
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United States
Arab League--
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Arab Maghreb Union--
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)--
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand
CEMA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)--
Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland,
Romania, Soviet Union, and Vietnam; Yugoslavia is an associate
member
COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls)--
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
COMECON--
See CEMA
COMMON MARKET--
See European Community
COUNCIL OF EUROPE--
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino,Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe)--
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Soviet
Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States, Yugoslavia
EC (European Community)--
Belgium, France,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom
EFTA (European Free Trade Association)--
Austria,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)--
Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
GROUP OF 5--
France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States
GROUP OF 7--
Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, United Kingdom, United States
GROUP OF 15--
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal,
Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe
GROUP OF 24--
Same members as OECD
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)--
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries)--
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, United Arab Emirates
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development)--
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference)--
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania,
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)--
Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela
WARSAW PACT--
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union
WEU (Western European Union)--
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, United Kingdom.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990
Title: Current Treaty Actions, September 1990
Date: Sep 30, 19909/30/90
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Country: Argentina, Australia, Belize,
Czechoslovakia (former), Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia,
Mexico, Mongolia, Pakistan, Senegal, Singapore,
Thailand, USSR (former), United Kingdom,
Venezuela
Subject: Immigration, Resource Management,
International Law, Terrorism, Environment,
Nuclear Nonproliferation
[TEXT]
Multilateral
Arbitration
Inter-American convention on international Commercial arbitration.
Done at Panama City Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force June 16,
1976.
Ratification deposited: US, Sept. 27, 1990. (1) Entered into force:
Oct. 27, 1990.
Conservation
Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild
fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973.
Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249. Accessions deposited:
Brunei, May 4, 1990; Guinea-Bissau, May 16, 1990; Cuba, Apr. 20,
1990; United Arab Emirates, Feb. 8, 1990.
Customs
Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol.
Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1975; for
the US May 12, 1985. Accession deposited: Morocco, Aug. 14, 1990.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
formulated at Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered
into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, formulated at Bretton Woods Conference July 1-
22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. Signatures
and Acceptances: Czechoslovakia, Sept. 20, 1990; Bulgaria and
Namibia, Sept. 25, 1990.
Germany
Treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany, with
agreed minute and related letters. Done at Moscow Sept. 12, 1990.
Enters into force on the date of deposit of the last instrument of
ratification or acceptance. Signatures: France, German Dem. Rep.,
Germany, Fed. Rep. of, UK, US, USSR, Sept. 12, 1990.
Maritime Matters
Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with
annex. Done at London Apr. 9, 1965. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1967;
for the US May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. Accession deposited:
Mauritius, June 18, 1990.
Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force
Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. Accession deposited: Mozambique, Sept.
12, 1990.
Oceanographic Research
Agreement concerning the continuation of marine geoscientific
research and mineral resource studies in the South Pacific region,
with annex. Signed at Washington September 10, 1990. Entered
into force September 10, 1990.
Pollution
Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, with annexes.
Done at Vienna Mar. 22, 1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988.
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. Accessions deposited: Bangladesh, Aug.
2, 1990; Brunei, July 26, 1990; The Gambia, July 25, 1990; Poland,
July 13, 1990.
Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, with
annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-10. Accessions deposited:
Bangladesh, Aug. 2, 1990; The Gambia, July 25, 1990; Poland, July
13, 1990.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with
annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25,
1980. TIAS 9700. Accession deposited: Morocco, Jun. 28, 1990.
Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents.
Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb 20, 1977.
TIAS 8532. Accession deposited: Maldives, Aug. 21, 1990.
Tonnage
International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, with
annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969. Entered into force July 18,
1982; for the US Feb. 10, 1983. Accession deposited: Morocco, June
28, 1990.
Trade
United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of
goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262]. Accession deposited: USSR, Aug. 16,
1990.
Treaties
Vienna convention on the law of treaties between states and
international organizations or between international organizations,
with annex. Done at Vienna Mar. 21, 1986. (2) Ratification
deposited: Argentina, Aug. 17, 1990. Accession deposited: Spain,
July 24, 1990.
Trusts
Convention on the law applicable to trusts and on their recognition.
Done at The Hague July 1, 1985. (2) Ratifications deposited: Italy,
Feb. 21, 1990; UK, Nov. 17, 1989.1,3,4
Bilateral
Argentina
Agreement extending the annexes of the air transport agreement of
Oct. 22, 1985, as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of
notes at Buenos Aires June 22 and July 27, 1990. Entered into force
July 27, 1990.
Australia
Protocol amending the treaty on extradition of May 14, 1974 (TIAS
8234). Signed at Seoul Sept. 4, 1990. Enters into force on date on
which the parties have exchanged written notification that they
have complied with their respective requirements.
Belize
Agreement concerning grants of defense articles and services to
Belize from US military stocks. Effected by exchange of notes at
Belize and Belmopan Aug. 6 and 23, 1990. Entered into force Aug.
23, 1990.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement concerning trade in certain steel products, with
arrangement. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and
Prague Oct. 27, 1989, and Aug. 10, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 10,
1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989.
Ecuador
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or
refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by
the US government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at
Washington July 30, 1990. Entered into force Sept. 12, 1990.
Egypt
First amendment to the grant agreement of Sept. 27, 1989, for
power sector support. Signed at Cairo Aug. 21, 1990. Entered into
force Aug. 21, 1990.
Fourth amendment to the grant agreement of Sept. 26, 1984, for
Cairo Sewerage II. Signed at Cairo Aug. 21, 1990. Entered into
force Aug. 21, 1990.
Sixth amendment to the grant agreement of Sept. 22, 1981 (TIAS
10277), for irrigation management systems. Signed at Cairo Aug.
21, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1990.
Grant Agreement for cash transfer. Signed at Cairo Aug. 31, 1990.
Entered into force Aug. 31, 1990.
German Democratic Republic
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.
Signed at Berlin and Washington Aug. 6 and Sept. 7. 1990. Entered
into force Oct. 15, 1990.
Indonesia
Agreement amending the air transport agreement of Jan. 15, 1968
(TIAS 6441), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta
April 12 and June 19, 1990. Entered into force June 19, 1990.
Mexico
Minute 283 of the International Boundary and Water Commission:
Conceptual plan for the international solution to the border
sanitation problem in San Diego, California/Tijuana, Baja
California. Signed at El Paso July 2, 1990. Entered into force
August 8, 1990.
Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 13, 1988, as amended,
concerning trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and
textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico July 19
and Aug. 3, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 3, 1990.
Mongolia
Agreement concerning the reciprocal issuance of visas to
government officials. Effected by exchange of notes at Ulaanbaatar
Aug. 2, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 2, 1990.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Tax reimbursement agreement, with annex. Signed at Brussels July
18, 1990. Entered into force: July 18, 1990; applicable with regard
to tax reimbursements for institutional income earned after Feb.
29, 1984.
Pakistan
Project grant agreement for Balochistan road project. Signed at
Islamabad Aug. 9, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 9, 1990.
Senegal
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain
debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US government and
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Dakar July 13, 1990. Entered
into force Sept. 5, 1990.
Singapore
Agreement amending the air transport agreement of March 31, 1978,
as amended (TIAS 9002, 9654). Effected by exchange of notes at
Singapore May 18 and June 15, 1990. Entered into force June 15,
1990.
Thailand
Agreement on research collaboration related to HIV infection and
AIDS [acquired immune deficiency syndrome] in Thailand, with
annex. Signed at Bangkok and Atlanta July 24 and Aug. 3 and 8,
1990. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1990.
USSR
Implementing agreement concerning cooperation in the space flight
of a Soviet Meteor-3 satellite employing a US Total Ozone Mapping
Spectrometer (TOMS). Signed at Moscow July 25, 1990. Entered
into force Aug. 24, 1990.
United Kingdom
Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 14, 1987, as extended,
concerning the British Virgin Islands and narcotics activities.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 9, 1990. Entered
into force Aug. 9, 1990; effective Aug. 12, 1990.
Venezuela
Agreement extending the agreement of Dec. 26, 1984, as extended
(TIAS 10652), establishing a Venezuela-United States Agriculture
Commission. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Feb. 15
and July 31, 1990. Entered into force July 31, 1990; effective Dec.
27, 1989.
(1) With reservation(s).
(2) Not in force.
(3) With declaration.
(4) Territorial Application: Isle of Man, Bermuda, British Antarctic
Territory, British Virgin Is., Falkland Is., Gibraltar, St. Helena, St.
Helena Dependencies, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Is., UK
Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the Is. of Cyprus
(Nov. 17, 1989) and Hong Kong (Mar. 30, 1990).(###)