US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990

Title:

President's Proposals for FY 1991 Refugee Admission Levels

Eagleburger Source: Deputy Secretary Eagleburger Description: Statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC Date: Oct 3, 199010/3/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Country: Kuwait, Vietnam, Liberia, USSR (former) Subject: Refugees [TEXT] I am here today to discuss the global refugee situation and to present the President's proposed refugee admissions levels for fiscal year (FY) 1991. I would like to begin with a brief discussion of the trends in refugee affairs over the past year. I will then turn to some specific areas of concern, including the US response to Soviet emigration, the comprehensive plan of action for Indochinese refugees, and the current situations in the Persian Gulf and Liberia. Finally, I will summarize the proposed admissions levels for refugees for the coming fiscal year.
Recent Trends in Refugee Affairs
The ideal solution for any refugee situation is that the conditions which caused the refugees to flee be brought to an end. The opportunity to reconstruct a life in one's homeland--with one's own language and culture--is a far more humane solution than to become an outsider in a foreign land. The enormous changes in world politics since we consulted on refugee concerns 1 year ago have had a significant impact on this potential for voluntary repatriation of refugees. The warming of relations between the superpowers has meant that many regional conflicts may be on the road to resolution. The progress in Afghanistan and Cambodia offers the possibility that refugees created by those conflicts may have the opportunity to return in safety and in dignity to their homes in the not too distant future. Repatriation programs have been planned for each, and have begun to be implemented for the Afghans. There have also been major repatriation efforts over the past year in Central America for Salvadorans and Nicaraguans. By March of this year, more than 11,000 Salvadorans had returned home from Honduras, and we are in the midst of the repatriation of thousands of Nicaraguans to their home country following the democratic election in February and the establishment of the Chamorro government. Approximately 12,500 Nicaraguan refugees from both Honduras and Costa Rica as well as more than 8,000 Nicaraguans previously associated with the resistance in Honduras have returned home. While the pace of the returns is affected by the absorptive capacity of these countries, we are especially gratified that more than 30,000 Central Americans are now back in their home countries. In Africa, some 43,000 Namibians have returned home after long years in exile to help launch the world's newest independent state. Another major political change since last year has been the spread of democracy and freedom of expression in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While this, too, may lead to large repatriations, especially to East European nations, the rapid change in governments has also unleashed long repressed ethnic tensions in those regions. The fear of ethnic strife plus a legacy of official persecution--particularly in the Soviet Union--has prompted many Jews, Evangelical Christians, and other religious and ethnic minorities there to seize the opportunity to emigrate. This has presented us with some major challenges in our resettlement program, to which I will refer in a moment. For the majority of the world's 15 million refugees, however, repatriation is not a viable option. Mr. Chairman [Senator Joseph Biden], over the past year you and your colleagues in the Congress have paid particular attention to the needs of these refugees. Integration and acceptance by the country of asylum is available only to a limited number of these refugees, and resettlement to a third country is available to even fewer. Many refugees who will not be resettled or repatriated have been in asylum for an extended period of time. They need food, water, shelter, the provision of sanitation facilities, and medical care. They also need international organizations to monitor their protection. As refugees wait for political and social conditions to enable them to return home, the international community must be prepared to provide the resources necessary to sustain them. A major thrust of congressional attention to refugee affairs worldwide this year has been the dire financial straits of the international organizations which assist refugees and conflict victims. Severe fiscal crises have resulted from a rapid growth in the number of refugees, with a steady, but not concomitant, increase in international donor contributions. This situation reached a critical point in 1989 and mandated severe cutbacks in the program levels of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). A consensus has been reached, however, on the UNHCR budget for 1990, and we expect that budget to be fully funded. While the ICRC has cut its original program projections by one-third, it maintains a resilient will to respond when needed in a crisis, as demonstrated by the situation in the Persian Gulf. Smaller but serious financial difficulties have threatened programs of the UN Border Relief Operation on the Thai-Cambodian border (UNBRO) and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). US responses to these latter two organizations from both the regular migration and refugee assistance (MRA) appropriation and the emergency refugee and migration assistance (ERMA) fund have been instrumental in ameliorating their fiscal crises. In each of these cases, the United States has vigorously pressed other donors to carry their share of these needs. New demands on scarce resources, coupled with budgetary constraints in all donor nations, will continue to require careful planning and the setting of priorities by both international organizations and the governments which support their activities. We shall continue to build on the close working relationships we have established with other donors and each of the international organizations that work with refugees and conflict victims. In FY 1991, the President's budget request includes a greatly needed increase in regional refugee assistance of some $46 million as well as a $25 million replenishment of the ERMA fund, which will help all of these refugee organizations. In short, the refugee world is an extremely dynamic one, with a continuous series of new challenges. We cannot always anticipate needs or predict how particular programs will develop, but the United States can--and does--provide strong and constructive leadership. Leadership comes not only from the total amount of funds we provide annually, but as well from the numbers of refugees we resettle. We demonstrate leadership in the policy and program proposals we make to the refugee community, to refugee- hosting governments, and to other donor and resettlement nations. No other nation monitors world situations with the expertise and steadfastness that we bring to refugee and conflict victim issues. I would like now to turn to four regional situations which are currently receiving priority attention.
Soviet Refugee Admissions
Rarely does the State Department have an opportunity to announce a plan of action to resolve a major problem and return only 12 months later able to report a resounding success. I am proud to say that this is the case with regard to Soviet refugees. For many years, the United States and other nations have advocated greater freedom of emigration for Soviet citizens. We have devoted considerable effort and resources to support the resettlement of persecuted religious and ethnic minorities allowed to leave that country. The 50,800 Soviet refugees we will resettle this year in the United States set a new record and parallels unmatched levels of Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel. Last year, I described our plans to close the Rome-Vienna pipeline for Soviet refugee applicants and to transfer all processing to Moscow. We discussed a nascent Washington processing center, and a new system in which most of the paperwork for refugee applications would be handled in this country, with files shuttled back and forth to our embassy in Moscow. We have now completed these changes, with the result that we can handle the same number of refugees at a substantially lower cost to the MRA budget. This new system has proven so successful that we are now considering it as a model for other types of visa processing.
Indochinese Refugees
I characterized the Vietnamese refugee problem last year as long- standing and extraordinarily complex. It is no less so now than then. However, we still believe that the comprehensive plan of action (CPA) that resulted from the 1989 international conference on Indochinese refugees represents the best mechanism for addressing humanely the concerns of all involved nations. Implementation of the CPA is a difficult task, but we have been steadfast in our commitment to the practice of first asylum and our opposition to forced repatriation of Vietnamese. The most serious difficulty we have encountered has been Malaysia's refusal to offer safe landing to Vietnamese boat people. The United States has protested--and continues to protest vigorously--Malaysia's failure to abide by the CPA's provision that all arriving Vietnamese boat people are to be offered first asylum. Other items of concern with regard to the CPA include: conditions in camps in Hong Kong; the relatively slow pace of screening; and the need for the quick and effective operation of committees in each first asylum country to provide special attention to unaccompanied minors. At the same time, however, there has been progress in several key areas of the CPA. For example, resettlement of the longstayers has been a success, and we are ahead of the schedule agreed to at the conference. The orderly departure program also has been vastly expanded with good cooperation from Vietnam, in particular in the implementation of last summer's agreement for the resettlement of former reeducation center detainees. Refugee screening programs are underway in each first asylum nation too, representing a major new activity on behalf of Indochinese asylum seekers. And, voluntary repatriation programs under the CPA have enabled over 4,000 Vietnamese and nearly 2,000 Lao to return to their homes. The major unresolved issue concerns the return of non- refugees to Vietnam. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Thorvald Stoltenberg, has held extensive negotiations with all concerned governments on this subject and has proposed an expansion of the existing UNHCR voluntary repatriation program to include those "who do not object" to returning home. At the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] post-ministerial conference in late July, Secretary Baker announced US support for the High Commissioner's efforts and raised US concerns with the foreign ministers of each of the first asylum countries. Moreover, the Secretary stated the willingness of the United States to join in a multilateral pledge to undertake "best efforts" to accomplish the return or resettlement of all Vietnamese asylum seekers by the end of 1992. At the conclusion of the conference, the ASEAN nations confirmed their willingness to continue to support the CPA. Recently, on September 22, the British and Vietnamese governments, along with the UNHCR, announced an agreement on the return to Vietnam of Vietnamese in Hong Kong who have been determined not to be refugees and who do not object. We expect the UN High Commissioner to provide the necessary safeguards to ensure that there is no force or coercion employed and that the existing system for UNHCR monitoring in Vietnam is expanded to cover all returnees.
Displaced Persons in the Gulf
The August 2 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq has generated a tremendous number of displaced persons. Exact figures are difficult to determine because more people flee Iraq and Kuwait every day. However, the following estimates can be considered accurate to date: -- Over 540,000 people have fled to Jordan from Iraq. -- About 40,000 have crossed the Turkish-Iraqi border. -- Almost 70,000 have entered Syria from Iraq. -- Over 20,000 have crossed the Iraq-Iran border. -- Well over 240,000 people have fled to Saudi Arabia and other gulf states from Kuwait. Those fleeing are generally not refugees suffering persecution, but rather third-country nationals who, until August 2, were employed in Iraq and Kuwait. In most cases they have escaped with few personal resources and will return home penniless. The overwhelming numbers of displaced persons impose a severe resource burden on countries such as Jordan and Turkey. Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other countries have undertaken impressive efforts to care for these displaced persons. Although conditions in some of the camps were initially harsh, there have been no deaths due to starvation or epidemic disease. In Jordan, the worst camps have been closed and the residents have been moved to new camps with adequate sanitation and shelter. In Turkey, the only victims of hunger and disease are newly arrived displaced persons who developed their conditions while still in Iraq. The international response to this emergency has grown rapidly and is now effectively meeting the challenge. The Red Crescent societies in Jordan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have been in the forefront in helping care for the displaced persons. They are now backed up by an array of international agencies and personnel. In Jordan, the UN Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) coordinates the work of several UN agencies. The ICRC and the League of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies are also playing major roles. US and European non-governmental organizations have become active as well. Perhaps the most critical element in this emergency is the effort to transport the displaced persons back to their home countries. Egyptians make up the largest number of these individuals. Saudi Arabia and the EC [European Community] have now largely assured steady movement of Egyptians through Jordan and back home. India is stepping up repatriation of its citizens to more than 3,000 per day. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is coordinating transportation arrangements for the other displaced persons, mostly those from South Asia whose governments cannot cover the costs. IOM scheduled the movement of 50,000 persons through the end of September. As a result of those efforts, the number of persons in Jordan has dropped to below 50,000. The international donor community has committed over $200 million to this relief effort, including cash, aircraft, food, and other supplies. The United States has committed up to $28 million-- $10 million for transportation and up to $18 million in food and other aid. The efforts of the host governments and generous international assistance have stabilized the situation for now. However, the potential for a future crisis remains. Over 2 million foreign nationals remain in Kuwait and Iraq. If and when they make it across the borders, most will require the same short-term care and transportation assistance as those who fled before them.
Liberian Refugees
I would like to draw attention to an area of the world where there is a grave humanitarian situation that has not received adequate attention of donor nations. I refer to the Liberian refugee crisis which began some 8 months ago. Since June, the number of refugees seeking protection in the neighboring nations of Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone has doubled. There are now more than 500,000 Liberians in asylum--more than one-fifth of the country's population. Although assistance organizations have launched new efforts to care for these refugees, the response of the donor community has been extremely disappointing. The United States has committed over $5 million in funding, including 30% of the initial UNHCR appeal, and nearly all the food that has been made available for these refugees. The rest of the international community has so far contributed only $4.3 million toward this emergency appeal of the UNHCR. We continue to urge other donor nations not to ignore their responsibility toward these refugees. We are concerned in particular about food deliveries to the refugees in the forest region of Guinea; logistical problems have hampered efforts to reach this area. Malnutrition rates there are high, which affect children most severely. And, in each case, the impact on the citizens of the neighboring countries of asylum has been substantial. We have asked the United Nations to develop a coordinated plan to reach all affected persons over the coming 6-9 months, as the situation inside of Liberia remains unstable and uncertain. I have touched on some of the more visible refugee programs that the United States funds. But there are still millions of victims of persecution and war whose circumstances we have not had time to describe. Let me assure you that the United States remains committed to protecting and promoting their well-being no matter how long their exile. My hope is that next year we will be able to report a decrease in the number of refugees worldwide, as many of those now in asylum are repatriated safely to their home countries. I would now like to turn to the President's proposal for refugee admissions in FY 1991.
Refugee Admissions
Historically, part of the American response to refugee situations worldwide has been to offer resettlement opportunities to a sizable number of refugees. Those who have been resettled in this country have a long tradition of bringing special talents to the American "melting-pot." This tradition is at the core of today's hearing on the President's proposed refugee admissions level for FY 1991. The President's proposal for 131,000 worldwide refugee admissions in FY 1991 includes the following regional levels: -- Africa: 4,900 -- Near East/South Asia: 6,000 -- East Asia: 52,000 -- Eastern Europe: 5,000 -- Soviet Union: 50,000 -- Latin America/Caribbean: 3,100 TOTAL: 121,000 In addition to the total funded admissions level of 121,000, we propose to continue the successful private sector initiative (PSI) program with an authorized ceiling of 10,000, available for refugees from any region of the world. Thus, the worldwide total of the President's proposal is 131,000. A detailed justification of each of the admissions levels has been provided in the document entitled Proposed Admissions for FY 1991, as submitted for the record. Ambassador Lafontant-Mankarious has included in her prepared statement a regional description of the admissions programs we envision. I would like to review for you how we intend to fund these admissions levels. As I have noted, the President's proposal for a worldwide admissions level of 131,000 refugees includes 10,000 admissions from any region of the world to be sponsored privately under the ongoing PSI program. PSI refugees require no federal funding and are only admitted if the requisite private sector funding is provided. The question therefore, with the budget process not quite completed, is how we will fund all the numbers in the remaining 121,000 ceiling. The President's proposal for 121,000 funded refugee admissions reflects the fine-tuning of the refugee admissions program that the consultations process provides; each of the regional admissions totals has been revised since earlier estimates were included in our FY 1991 budget presentation. As a result of this process, the total of 121,000 funded admissions represents a net increase of 11,000 above the budget request level, most of which falls within the ceiling for the Soviet Union. In FY 1990, up to 8,000 Soviet refugees were resettled through private funding by the Jewish community. We fully appreciate the magnitude of that effort, and recognize that it cannot easily be repeated in FY 1991. We have, therefore, raised the funded level of Soviet refugees in FY 1991 to 50,000. The 121,000 figure is of course a ceiling, not a quota. Nevertheless, we believe that through cost-saving measures and new approaches to financing transportation costs, funding appropriated at the President's original budget request level can finance the projected 121,000 admissions. Let me be clear: Our ability to make use of these additional numbers will be dependent on: 1. The appropriation of funds at the President's requested level for Fiscal Year 1991, 2. Successful participation of refugees and their sponsors in financing a portion of transportation to the United States, and 3. Our ability to implement other cost-saving measures. Subject to these constraints, we are fully committed to covering the full 121,000 admissions within the authorized ceiling. In closing, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to provide this update on some of our ongoing refugee policy concerns, and our plans for refugee admissions in the coming year. Your committee's continued support of our refugee programs worldwide is integral to our success.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990 Title:

US Refugee Admissions Priorities System

Date: Oct 15, 199010/15/90 Category: Fact Sheets Subject: Refugees [TEXT] A worldwide priority system sets guidelines for the orderly management of refugee admissions into the United States within the established annual regional ceilings. The issues of whether a person is a refugee under US law and the priority to which a refugee should be assigned for resettlement are separate and distinct. Assignment to a particular priority does not make that individual either more or less a refugee, but it may reflect an assessment of the urgency of the need for resettlement. Just as qualifying for refugee status does not confer a right to resettlement in the United States, assignment to a particular priority does not entitle a person to acceptance into the US refugee program. The US refugee priorities system sets guidelines for the orderly management of refugee admissions into the United States within the established annual regional ceilings and is subject to change during the fiscal year. The processing priorities are:
Priority One
--Compelling concern/interest: exceptional cases of (a) refugees who are in immediate danger of loss of life and for whom there appears to be no alternative to resettlement in the United States, or (b) refugees of compelling concern to the United States, such as former or present political prisoners and dissidents.
Priority Two
--Former US government employees: refugees employed by the US government for at least 1 year prior to the claim for refugee status. This category also includes persons who were not official US government employees, but who for at least 1 year were so integrated into US government offices as to have been in effect and appearance US government employees.
Priority Three
--Family reunification: refugees who are spouses, unmarried sons, unmarried daughters, or parents of persons in the United States. (The status of the anchor relative in the United States must be one of the following: US citizen, lawful permanent resident alien, refugee, or asylee.)
Priority Four
--Other ties to the United States: (a) refugees employed by US foundations, US voluntary agencies or US business firms for at least 1 year prior to the claim for refugee status; (b) refugees trained in the United States or abroad under US government auspices.
Priority Five
--Additional family reunification: refugees who are (a) married sons or married daughters of persons in the United States; (b) unmarried siblings of persons in the United States; (c) married siblings of persons in the United States; (d) grandparents of persons in the United States; (e) grandchildren of persons in the United States; (f) more distantly related individuals who are part of the family group and dependent on the family for support. (The status of the anchor relative in the United States must be one of the following: US citizen, lawful permanent resident alien, temporary resident alien, refugee, or asylee.)
Priority Six
--Otherwise of national interest: other refugees whose admission is in the national interest.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990 Title:

World's Refugee Population Doubles: US Committed to Assistance

Lafontant-Mankarious Source: Jewel Lafontant-Mankarious, US Coordinator for Refugee Affairs Description: Statement submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC Date: Oct 3, 199010/3/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Country: Kuwait, Vietnam, Liberia, USSR (former) Subject: Refugees [TEXT] The global refugee situation remains very serious despite several important successes in recent years. In fact, in some respects, the world refugee situation has worsened. In the last decade, the refugee population has doubled from approximately 7 million to an estimated 15 million. Today, conflicts in West Africa and on the Horn of Africa, sporadic fighting in Afghanistan, and the continuing plight of the Cambodians, compel the United States to maintain its leadership role in protecting and assisting the world's refugees. Today's hearing is a culmination of an ongoing, year-long process involving members of Congress, representatives of state and local governments, and voluntary agencies. It is also an excellent opportunity for the administration to provide the Congress with an overview of US refugee policy and programs, as well as the President's refugee admissions proposal for fiscal year (FY) 1991.
Interagency Coordination
In preparation for these hearings, I, along with other officials of the administration, have had periodic discussions with members and staff of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees as well as other interested congressional committees. In addition, I chair a weekly meeting with representatives from the Departments of State, Justice, and Health and Human Services (HHS), the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council. When appropriate, a policy coordinating committee on refugees meets to ensure that policy and program issues requiring interagency attention, including those that concern refugee admissions, receive prompt and systematic consideration. As US Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, I am fully aware of the importance of cooperation and communication between the Departments of State and Health and Human Services on refugee admissions planning and on budgets. The coordinator's office, the Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement at HHS all closely monitor domestic resettlement programs. Consultations are also held with representatives of state and local governments, public interest groups, private voluntary organizations, and other organizations concerned with refugees. The administration is committed to strengthening and implementing an effective US refugee admissions and assistance policy, consistent with domestic and international concerns within a humanitarian framework. As I'm sure the committee is aware, the enormous task of balancing these concerns has become increasingly difficult in recent years because of the growing number of refugees and constrained budgets. Nevertheless, the United States continues to admit generous numbers of refugees to our country. At the same time, the United States contributes to life-saving assistance programs which impact on millions of the world's refugees who are not candidates for resettlement but instead are hopeful of being able to resettle in place or return to their home countries. Before providing an overview of some of the major refugee situations and the correlation between these concerns and our admissions policy, I would like first to review the three main pillars of US refugee policy of which I am especially proud, as they are the manifestation of our nation's traditional humanitarian concern and assistance. Ensuring that first asylum, protection and relief assistance are provided to the world's 15 million refugees--wherever they may be--is one of the most important facets of US refugee policy. As the world's leading contributor to international refugee assistance programs, the United States has helped establish and consistently supports the international network of organizations that assist and care for refugees around the world. Working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinians (UNRWA), the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and other organizations, the United States makes every effort to ensure that the needs of the world's refugees and displaced persons are provided for.
Swift Response to Middle East Needs
In this regard, the US response to the needs of refugees in Jordan and Turkey has been swift and substantial. We are working closely with other governments, the United Nations, and international humanitarian agencies to coordinate humanitarian assistance efforts as effectively and quickly as possible. Another important aspect of US refugee policy is resettlement. Although the United States supports voluntary repatriation when conditions permit, we also assist in facilitating local resettlement in countries of asylum. When neither of these solutions is available and resettlement in the United States is the only viable alternative, we admit refugees who are of special humanitarian concern to the United States. Offering US resettlement to those who have no other options also strengthens our ability to obtain commitments from other countries to provide first asylum--this is especially true in Southeast Asia. The third pillar of US refugee policy concerns the need to tackle the root causes of refugee flows. We have actively sought to strengthen international law and human rights against the expulsion or mistreatment of a country's own citizens. The United States has consistently stressed the responsibility and obligations of the countries of origin to avert new flows of refugees by adhering to the fundamental principles of human rights. Ten years ago, the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted to establish a more uniform and equitable basis for refugee admissions to the United States. The act set forth the procedure for formal congressional consultations and specified the type of information annually required by Congress. This information has been prepared for you in our report to the Congress on proposed refugee admissions for FY 1991. For the worldwide admissions ceiling for FY 1991, President Bush is proposing a level of 131,000 refugees, within which 121,000 are allocated under regional ceilings and are eligible for assistance from federally funded programs. In addition, an unallocated reserve of 10,000 is proposed for additional refugee admissions needs contingent upon the availability of private sector funding. The regional allocations for the 121,000 funded admissions are as follows: 4,900 for Africa; 52,000 for East Asia- -including Amerasian immigrants; 50,000 for the Soviet Union; 5,000 for Eastern Europe; 6,000 for the Near East and South Asia; and 3,100 for Latin America and the Caribbean.
FY 1991 Admissions Program Funding
The recommended level of admissions is higher than the 110,000 admissions assumed in the Departments of State and Health and Human Services FY 1991 budget requests. Let me stress that the 121,000 admissions the President is proposing is a ceiling, not a quota. The Department of State is implementing a plan for financing the admission of the additional refugees within the current budget. The plan includes offering a reduced fare for pre- payment of the transportation of refugees by relatives and/or voluntary organizations and identifying cost savings in other areas of the refugee program. The Departments of State and Health and Human Services are committed to achieving maximum efficiency in financing the admission of refugees within the available appropriations. At this time, I would like to share with you a brief overview of some of the major refugee situations that are of concern.
Africa
Africa is currently home to over 4.5 million refugees, a figure amounting to nearly one-third of the world's total. The three major countries on the Horn--Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia--are all beset by fierce civil wars which have generated approximately 2 million refugees and massive internal displacement with no end in sight. To make matters worse, another severe drought has hit Ethiopia. In Mozambique, the ongoing conflict between FRELlMO [Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Mozambique] and RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance] forces have forced approximately 1.3 million Mozambicans to flee their country. Malawi, one of the smallest and poorest countries on the African continent, has taken in well over 800,000 Mozambican refugees, a figure amounting to one-tenth of its entire population. During my travels to Southern Africa this past spring, I was witness to the enormity of the current refugee crisis in the region. In West Africa, the Liberian refugee population has risen in recent months from 170,000 to 500,000. The conflict, which started with an incursion by rebels led by a former government minister in northeast Liberia's Nimba County, has resulted in an unleashing of violent ethnic hostilities committed by both sides. The FY 1990 admissions ceiling for Africa was originally set at 3,000. However, during the course of the year, it became apparent that additional travel-ready refugees could be moved and, after reallocating numbers from another region, the Africa ceiling was raised to 3,500. At the beginning of FY 1991, a pipeline of some 1,500 Immigration and Naturalization Service-approved African refugees--most of whom will become travel ready during the first quarter of FY 1991--is expected. Given the continued lack of other solutions for significant refugee populations in the region, African refugee numbers should be increased to 4,900.
Near East/South Asia
The Near East/South Asian region has the unhappy distinction of having the largest concentration of refugees and displaced people in the world today. With continuing hostilities in the West Bank and Gaza, the plight of 2 million Palestinians remains without a solution. As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, more than 3 million Afghan refugees remain in neighboring Pakistan and an estimated 2 million are in Iran. Voluntary repatriation programs have met with some success. However, because of the unstable political situation in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that a significant number of Afghans will return to their homeland any time soon. If Afghans were able to return home, the world's refugee rolls would be reduced by a full one-third. The original FY 1990 admissions ceiling of 6,500 was revised to 5,000 during the course of the year when it became apparent that at least 1,500 numbers were likely to go unused and were needed elsewhere. The decrease was largely due to a decline in applications from Iranian religious minorities. The proposed ceiling for refugees from the Near East and South Asia for FY 1991 is 6,000. This ceiling would allow us to continue to process Afghan, Iranian, and Iraqi refugees in priorities one through four.
Southeast Asia
Over 110,000 Indochinese asylum seekers reside in camps in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong. Thailand alone is host to some 300,000 displaced persons from Cambodia who await repatriation to their homeland under a comprehensive political settlement. Thailand also has a significant camp population of Vietnamese and Laotians. In Southeast Asia, maintaining first asylum for Vietnamese boat people remains one of the most critical issues we face in this region. The comprehensive plan of action (CPA), adopted by 56 nations in 1989 reaffirms the commitment to providing first asylum and resettlement opportunities for screened-in refugees. While the Southeast Asian nations and Hong Kong have recognized the humanitarian right of boat people to seek asylum, Malaysia has continued its policy of push-offs--a practice the US deplored and which we have protested at the highest levels. Since May 1989, Malaysia has reportedly towed over 8,000 boat people back out to sea, although fortunately in most cases with provisions for onward travel to Indonesia. For FY 1991, in order to provide maximum flexibility in accomplishing both objectives under the CPA, we are proposing to combine the first asylum and orderly departure program ceilings into a single East Asia ceiling of 52,000. Priority would be given to meeting our commitments under the CPA for first asylum admissions within the 52,000 ceiling in order to reduce the number of Vietnamese refugees in the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] nations and Hong Kong. Nevertheless, we anticipate a substantial increase in the orderly departure program in FY 1991 with a substantial portion of that increase coming from faster processing of immigrant petitions.
Eastern Europe
The welcome progression of democratic reforms in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia has reduced the number of refugees from this part of the world. Therefore, the scope of the program will be narrower in FY 1991, with a proposed admissions ceiling of 5,000. Only nationals of those countries where democratic reforms have not yet been put into place--Romania, Bulgaria, Albania--may routinely apply for the US refugee admissions program as we enter the new fiscal year. Depending on developments in the region, however, further changes in the admissions program for this region may be necessary during the course of the year.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Persecution and discrimination against former political prisoners and dissidents continues to drive many Cubans to desperate measures to try to flee the country. In Central America, we are encouraged by the democratic elections in Nicaragua which have enabled thousands of people to repatriate to their homeland. However, we remain concerned by the large number of Guatemalan refugees who have sought safe haven in Mexico. For FY 1991, the proposed ceiling for refugees from Latin America and the Caribbean is 3,100 with an initial allocation of 3,000 for Cuba. As in FY 1990, the admission of Cuban political prisoners is a high priority in the Latin American admissions program in FY 1991, the proposed parameters of the Cuban program will be expanded to include political dissidents, religious activists, and former US government employees who meet the definition of a refugee.
Soviet Union
For many years, the United States and other democracies have advocated greater freedom of emigration for Soviet citizens, especially Soviet Jews, long a target of persecution within the Soviet Union. We consider the right to emigrate a fundamental human right, and the United States has devoted considerable effort and resources to support resettlement of those allowed to leave. The unfortunate resurgence of anti-semitism in the Soviet Union has made emigration a necessary alternative to religious and ethnic persecution. The proposed admissions ceiling for refugees from the Soviet Union in FY 1991 is 50,000. They will be accepted from all six priorities to include groups determined by Congress to be of special concern. Religious minorities--Soviet Jews, Christians, Ukrainian religious activists, and others--who, in accordance with legislation enacted late last year, are thought to be in the most urgent need of refugee resettlement are given priority within these groups, except for the evangelical Christians, applicants with close family members who are US citizens, legal permanent residents, refugees, parolees or asylees are given priority in scheduling interviews in Moscow. In FY 1990, we set a ceiling of 40,000 funded and 10,000 unfunded numbers from the Soviet Union. Approximately 8,000 of the unfunded numbers were utilized, and we are impressed with the contributions from the private sector that made that possible. However, based on our consultations, we do not believe the same number of privately funded numbers is practical in FY 1991. In fact, we reallocated 2,100 additional numbers to the Soviet program in FY 1990 to accommodate the needs there which could not be met from the unfunded numbers. Therefore, for FY 1991, we are proposing a ceiling of 50,000 funded numbers for the Soviet Union. We do not propose to request additional funding from Congress to cover these extra 10,000 Soviet admissions. Rather, as noted earlier, we will endeavor to incorporate these added numbers in our FY 1991 budget request by offering a reduced fare for pre-payment of transportation costs, which we believe will be attractive to many of the families of the refugees. A positive response to this offer could substantially reduce the need to finance transportation loans. Any shortfall in funds for the additional 10,000 would be reflected in fewer Soviet admissions. We have begun discussing this program with the relevant voluntary organizations.
Private Sector Initiative (PSI)
A program that we in the coordinator's office are very proud of is the private sector initiative, or PSI. The PSI is a joint, public- private program under which all the basic costs of admission and resettlement are paid for by the private sector. It has made a substantial contribution to our refugee program in FY 1990. By September 30, we expect to have admitted approximately 3,000 Cuban refugees, a small number of Vietnamese, and an initial increment of refugees under a new Ethiopian program. Moreover, approximately 8,000 Soviet Jews were admitted through a separate, privately-funded program. The PSI ceiling proposal for FY 1991 is 10,000. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that while we consistently urge other nations to do their fair share in resettling and caring for the world's refugee population, the United States will remain the world's humanitarian leader in refugee affairs. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990 Title:

Our Vision for the Hemishpere

Aronson Source: Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Description: Remarks before guests at the Organization of American States (OAS) during "US Week" festivities, Washington, DC Date: Sep 28, 19909/28/90 Region: Caribbean, Central America, South America Subject: Trade/Economics, Narcotics [TEXT] I want to take this occasion of the 100th anniversary of this proud organization to reaffirm my own country's strong commitment to its future. The United States believes in the OAS; we value our membership in this proud organization. Even when we are disappointed in its actions--as we have been from time to time-- we never waiver in our commitment to work to strengthen the bonds of inter-American cooperation and the friendships that we have built with all of you. I would like to take this opportunity to reflect for a few minutes on the view from Washington of our hemisphere and our role in it--our hopes, our fears, and, most of all, the enormous opportunities that lie before us in this unique moment of our collective history.
Time of Historic Changes
When we read the newspapers, we are struck by the historic changes that are sweeping this world--the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the revival of democracy; the profound, continuing changes within the Soviet Union and what we trust and hope is the beginning of the end of the post-war Cold War; the emergence of the Economic Community in Europe; the unification of Germany; and the economic miracle in Asia. Now we have seen in the response to the aggression in Kuwait an example of what we hope will be a new world order--a new sense of collective responsibility and commitment by the world community to defend the rule of law. All of these changes are profound; indeed, some are breathtaking. But I believe the commentators and analysts have missed an equally profound and historic set of changes here in the Western Hemisphere.
Our Hemispheric Revolutions
We are in the midst of two profound and related revolutions. The first is a political revolution in which many of the individuals and the nations represented here today have played the leading role. The people of the Americas--from Asuncion to Santiago, from Managua to Port au Prince--have made a fundamental decision that has transformed our hemisphere. They have declared that there is no longer political legitimacy without democracy and that they will not accept the rule of colonels or comandantes or any other elites who claim to rule in the name of the people but will not let the people govern themselves. They have also soundly rejected the assertion that by denying freedom, you can deliver social justice, because they have discovered, to their regret, that those who deny freedom also deny social justice. I believe there are many inspirations for this democratic revolution, including the tradition of the rule of law that has existed for so long in the Caribbean, which is the home to the oldest continuing parliament in the Americas. I believe that the commitment of the brave men and women throughout the Americas who risked, and sometimes sacrificed, their lives for democratic values has been an example. And, I hope that democracy in the United States has also been an inspiration to this great revolution. We have also witnessed an intellectual revolution every bit as profound. A new generation of democratic leaders has recognized a fundamental truth--just as political freedom is the key to peace, economic freedom is the key to opportunity. This revolution about economic policy is every bit as courageous as the political revolution waged in defense of democracy, for it too is waged against powerful, entrenched interests. These two revolutions are related. For democracy to survive and prevail, democracy must deliver--not just to the well-to-do but to those who have never had a chance. The Economist magazine wrote, at the beginning of my tenure, that "the elected presidents of this continent rule from capitals ringed by shanty towns swollen with refugees of an oppressed countryside." That is not a vision that will sustain democracy for long. The old system of special privileges and favors, protectionism, and rigged rules is an economic dinosaur; it cannot long stand in this new global, competitive economy. The 1990s will see the most profound and fierce competition for capital that the world has seen in the postwar era. Only those countries that can inspire confidence and open up their systems to new investment will be able to survive in this environment. I am an optimist about the potential of the Americas, but I must acknowledge that the recent rise in oil prices brought on by the crisis in the Persian Gulf and the potential that it will push the industrial democracies toward recession could not have come at a worse time for many of your countries. We must find ways to mitigate the damage lest all our hopes sink before this new crisis. Today, our central task is to respond to these two revolutions creatively and effectively; to consolidate democracy, to dig its roots so deep that no special interest or entrenched minority can pull them out; to build and defend democratic institutions; to advance the cause of human rights and the rule of law; and to build in the Americas the world's first completely democratic hemisphere.
Enterprise for the Americas
President Bush has enunciated a vision that drives the United States--his enterprise for the Americas. We must tear down the barriers to trade and investment from Argentina to Alaska and set loose the tremendous creative energies of this hemisphere's people to create, produce, and grow. There is no short cut to reaching this vision. There are no easy answers or quick fixes. Hard political choices must be made, and no one will make them for us. Here in the United States, we are in the middle of our own budget negotiations, so we know that the doctrine that we preach to you comes with a price--that democratic leaders, including those in the United States, must make difficult decisions that are not always popular. The vision that we have of a free trade regime throughout this hemisphere is not a vision of a new trade bloc with a new set of barriers to the outside world but of a free trade regime to stimulate worldwide commerce and growth. Each of us must do our part. Clearly the first challenge is to ensure that this round of negotiations in the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] is successful. Here I think we are making common cause and will hopefully be successful in tearing down barriers to products from this hemisphere, particularly in the area of agriculture. We also face new challenges to our vision. In some countries, the forces of violence continue to threaten and attack democratic institutions. We face the challenge of drugs and new threats to our common heritage of clean air, rainforests, water, and streams. The OAS and all of us must rise to meet these challenges. John Donne wrote that no man is an island unto himself, each is a part of the main. This is also true among nations. We must do more to help those nations that need our help, to show solidarity with those that are embattled. El Salvador's democratic government is waging a courageous struggle against forces of violence. It is waging a struggle to achieve peace. It needs the solidarity of this hemisphere as it goes through this difficult moment. The people of Haiti need our help. We should not be indifferent at this moment--we must be engaged. I believe we have, for too long, neglected the continuing conflict in Suriname. Perhaps the OAS could play a role, if the government of Suriname would welcome that. I am not advocating interventionism but collective responsibility. A democratic partnership cannot be based on indifference, because the problems of a few soon become problems of us all.
Narcotics Threat
There is no better example than the threat of narcotics; I think here we have made important progress. We are no longer pointing fingers of blame at each other, north and south, arguing whether consuming nations or producing nations are responsible for this crisis. Here in the United States, we recognize that as long as some American citizens are willing to spend as much for illegal narcotic substances as this nation spends for imported oil, we will have a drug problem. We must do more to reduce demand, and we are committed to doing so. And I will note that, when President Bush sat down with the presidents of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia at Cartagena, the first issue he addressed was what we are doing in the United States to reduce demand, particularly among our young people. This problem once appeared to be confined to a few countries of our hemisphere, but more and more nations are threatened by this spreading menace. This is not just a question of criminal behavior but an assault on the rule of law, democratic institutions, and, ultimately, on civilization itself. We cannot appease these narco- traffickers; we must defeat them. And we can only do so together. We must have a strategy that we all formulate and accept to reduce demand, to interdict drug traffic, and to find alternative economic opportunities for those who are caught up in drug trafficking, not because they wish to be but because they are poor and have no alternatives. I would remind those who think that there is a short cut to dealing with this menace or who hope to ignore it, of something President Kennedy once said: Those who seek to ride the back of the tiger, usually end up inside. We have a collective challenge and responsibility to preserve the heritage of the next generation--our land, our water, our air, and our rainforests. I hope that the developing nations of the hemisphere can learn from those of us who sacrificed our environment in the early stages of our history in the name of growth and learned to regret it.
Shedding Old Illusions
I am optimistic about the future of the Americas, but I am also sobered by the dimensions of the threats and dangers. One thing I know: change is upon us. Those who resist or ignore it will be swept aside. We must ask ourselves: can we manage change, turning it to peaceful and hopeful purposes, or is our vision too narrow or are we too timid to act in time? To act in time, we must shed the old illusions and myths that confront our own relations, here in the OAS and throughout the hemisphere. We must shed the baggage of the past and the stereotypes of yesterday. We must see each other clearly and speak frankly and honestly about the many areas where we agree and also about our genuine differences. That kind of dialogue is the essence of the OAS, and we are committed to engage in that dialogue with our friends in the Americas. We believe it is a two-way street. It is not just what you can learn from us but what we can learn from you, and what we can do together. But dialogue must end in action; otherwise it is an academic and, ultimately, empty exercise. The world is moving swiftly. We have enormous opportunities to seize and little time to waste. Secretary Baker said in the first weeks of this administration: "Some look at the crises and problems facing the hemisphere today and despair. I am not one of them. I believe that if we have the courage and the will to seize the opportunities before us, this is a time when we can dream great dreams for all the peoples of the Americas. I believe the day will come when the democratically elected leaders of the Americas will be seen as the pioneers who blazed the trail that will lead one day to the world's first completely democratic hemisphere. I believe that our hemisphere can become a model for the rest of the planet for a true partnership between the developed and developing nations, where trade is free and prosperity is shared and the benefits of technology are harnessed for all. And I believe the day will soon come when in all nations of the Americas, the rule of law prevails, human rights are respected, the strong are just, the weak secure, and all our people live in peace."(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990 Title:

The Persian Gulf Crisis and US-European Relations

Seitz Source: Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Description: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC Date: Oct 9, 199010/9/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, E/C Europe Subject: Democratization, Military Affairs [TEXT] I appreciate this opportunity to testify once again before the committee. When I last appeared before you in July, I described the achievements to that point in the administration's European foreign policy: a breakthrough on German unification, enhancing NATO at the London summit, further work in Vienna toward a landmark agreement on conventional forces in Europe, and preparations for a November summit meeting in Paris of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The culmination of these policy initiatives promised to make for a momentous autumn. Progress toward our stated goals has continued at an encouraging pace. Germany achieved unification on October 3, thanks in large part to our success in negotiating the Two-Plus-Four treaty signed on September 12. NATO is pursuing actively the ambitious agenda it set for itself at the June summit in London. The London decisions--to review NATO's strategy, initiate SNF [short-range nuclear forces] negotiations, establish a new relationship with the Warsaw Pact, and relaunch CSCE--were the key to rapid German unity on our terms. NATO is an essential structure in the blueprint for the new European architecture. In New York last week, we reached agreement in principle on the major outstanding issues in CFE [conventional armed forces in Europe] and fully expect to sign a treaty by mid-November. The CSCE summit in Paris will thus be able to build on a landmark conventional arms control agreement as it takes important decisions for Europe's future. The just- concluded ministerial in New York, the first CSCE meeting ever held in the United States, advanced our objectives for CSCE--widening political consultation; regularizing review conferences; and establishing a conflict prevention center, a small, permanent secretariat, an elections office, and an Assembly of Europe. The big new element for ourselves and our European partners since I last testified is the crisis in the Persian Gulf. We have learned important lessons from the world reaction to Iraq's aggression, and I would like to mention some of them this morning. In countering the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the international community faces its first major test of the post-Cold War world. The events of the last 2 months have shown that the old Cold War pattern is broken. Changes in the Soviet Union and the resulting decline of East-West tensions have altered the rules of the game. For the first time, the United States and the Soviet Union approach a crisis as partners in a broad effort to cope with a threat to the world community. The Helsinki summit last month symbolized and further solidified the end of automatic superpower confrontation. One result is that the United Nations can at last function as its founders intended. Freed from veto deadlock, the Security Council can marshal international action in times of crisis. In a joint statement in New York last week, the USSR and we specifically acknowledged the potential for a greater UN role in settling conflicts and assisting elections. The eight Security Council resolutions on the gulf foreshadow the enlarged role the United Nations can play in the future. As a result of the new consensus on the United Nations, American leaders can act in defense of common interests with a good prospect of wide international support and participation. Typically in the past, regional troublemakers could gain resources and maneuvering room by playing on superpower rivalries. Now, with East-West confrontation diminished, regional problems are more likely to be addressed and solved on their merits. Soviet foreign policy expert Georgi Arbatov spelled it out: "The gulf crisis will make quite a few people--those who may also have adventurous desires and who would act in a reckless way- -aware that they won't be able to play the United States and the Soviet Union against each other anymore. Instead, they will probably face cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States." The division of Europe into hostile camps often made Europeans reluctant to play the role their history and economic power indicated. Today, Europeans on both sides of the old dividing line see more clearly that they have a common interest in dealing forthrightly with world crises. East Europeans are learning to weigh their interests independently and act accordingly. They look to us for leadership and help, and we are beginning to engage them as partners. East Europeans have contributed directly to the gulf effort--Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania by offering medical units, Hungary by airlifting supplies to refugees in Jordan. We must not let the gulf crisis distract us from our opportunities and obligations in Eastern Europe.
The Role of NATO
The gulf crisis has given NATO a new and convincing opportunity to demonstrate its value. NATO's prompt and effective consultation on gulf policy is a prime example of what we mean by NATO's political role. We and our allies spoke with one voice on the unacceptability of Iraqi actions. Absent a NATO political consensus, our ability to respond militarily would have been severely limited. NATO's base structure made possible the massive, continuing deployment in which we are engaged. Without fully functioning NATO bases, in this instance and others like it, the North Atlantic democracies would be severely constrained in their ability to protect their vital interests. Among our NATO allies, the British were particularly impressive in the crisis, recognizing immediately the need for firm action and committing substantial forces without hesitation. When the chips are down, the special relationship is more than sentiment. The French are moving toward a military presence of over 10,000 men, with a dozen naval vessels, tanks, and aircraft. The German government has pledged to increase its effort to share the burden. Specifically, Bonn will contribute over $1 billion to support the US effort and an equal amount for the three most heavily affected front-line nations. Italy has been most effective, as EC [European Community] president, in coordinating European efforts. In all, 13 of our NATO allies are participating in the naval blockade. Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, and others have sent ships; Portugal has offered a vessel; Luxembourg is helping pay for the naval forces of the Western European Union (WEU); and the Germans have sent ships to the eastern Mediterranean to replace units now in the gulf. Allies are contributing in other ways as well. Turkey shut off the pipeline, put its troops on alert, and agreed to base additional US aircraft and NATO AWACS [airborne warning and control system]. Several allies have offered sealift at no cost. European bases-- especially in Germany and Spain--are the essential stepping stones for our deployment. The United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy are deploying air units.
EC Support
EC support for economic sanctions was immediate, and cooperation on enforcement has been outstanding. The 12 member states have pledged well over $2 billion in emergency aid to Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and other affected countries, including the reforming East Europeans, who now face massively higher energy bills. The EC has contributed nearly $200 million in humanitarian relief to persons displaced by the invasion of Kuwait. At our initiative, an informal mechanism has been established to coordinate gulf-related assistance, share experience, and avoid duplication of effort. Among the Europeans, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Commission of the {European] Community will participate. The first meeting of the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group was held in Washington on September 26; the second meeting will probably take place next week. Turkey continues to be a key ally, its geopolitical importance and commitment to the West reconfirmed. President Ozal, who visited here last month, has taken courageous decisions at considerable cost to his economy. We must ensure that Turkey receives full recognition and that its needs are met. We will encourage our European partners to reach out to Turkey, as they did by inviting Turkey to the August 21 WEU coordination meeting. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait brought home forcefully to the world community the dangers inherent in the proliferation of modern armaments, especially chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. As Secretary [of State] Baker said at NATO headquarters last month, the existence in Iraq of a well- equipped million-man army only years away from a nuclear capability proves beyond doubt that the Non-Proliferation Treaty needs strengthening. We must develop intrusive, internationally sanctioned procedures to close down the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of dictators with a grievance. European cooperation will be crucial. I have attempted to lay out some of the consequences of the gulf crisis for our relations with Europe. I believe that the accomplishments of recent months in Europe can carry over to help us shape a new, more peaceful international order, one in which we will share responsibility with our friends and former adversaries. We welcome the possibility of a stronger, more responsible contribution by Europe to our common effort. At the same time, nothing has come through more clearly in the gulf crisis than that the world counts on us to take the lead. We can be proud of American leadership. We must work together--Congress and administration--to make certain of its future.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990 Title:

Chronology: Baker-Shevardnadze Meetings

Date: Oct 15, 199010/15/90 Category: Chronologies Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Military Affairs, Arms Control, Democratization [TEXT]
March 7, 1989--Vienna
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held introductory meetings at the conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations. They discussed all aspects of the existing US- Soviet agenda, including arms control, human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral ties. They also agreed to expand the agenda to include transnational issues. Secretary Baker expressed hope for the success of perestroika.
May 10-11, 1989--Moscow
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held their first full ministerial with working groups. They discussed regional problems, human rights, bilateral matters, and transnational questions. They agreed on dates for resuming bilateral arms talks and set a new cycle of meetings between regional experts.
July 29, 1989--Paris
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met on the eve of opening of the Paris Conference on Cambodia. They held a discussion on a wide range of subjects, both bilateral and multilateral, including Cambodia and other regional issues.
September 22-23, 1989--Jackson, Wyoming
At this second full ministerial, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed the entire spectrum of US-Soviet relations. They issued a detailed statement describing the specific agreements or understandings they reached in areas such as arms control, bilateral questions, and transnational issues.
December 2-3, 1989--Malta
In addition to participating in the shipboard summit meeting near Malta, where President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev discussed arms control, trade issues, Soviet emigration, and European issues, the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also met separately to discuss a number of these issues and preparations for the June 1990 summit.
February 7-9, 1990--Moscow
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held ministerial talks as part of preparations for a second US-Soviet summit to be held in the United States in June. A broad range of issues on the US-Soviet agenda was reviewed. Specific agreements were reached on arms control and in other areas.
February 12-13, 1990--Ottawa
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held talks at the "open skies" conference, with focus on development of the Two- Plus-Four mechanism for discussion of external aspects of German unification. They also reached agreement on CFE manpower ceilings.
March 20, 1990--Windhoek, Namibia
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, attending Namibia independence day ceremonies, discussed Lithuania's declaration of independence, Afghanistan, German unification, and arms control.
April 4-6, 1990--Washington, DC
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held a full ministerial meeting to continue their preparations for the summit. They discussed the full range of US-Soviet issues, with special attention to Lithuania and arms control.
May 4, 1990--Bonn, West Germany
On the eve of the Two-Plus-Four ministerial, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met for several hours to discuss German unification and other US-Soviet questions.
May 16-19, 1990--Moscow
In their final preparatory session before the summit, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reviewed all issues on the US-Soviet agenda, with special focus on those agreements being prepared for signature at the summit. In addition, Lithuania and German unification received considerable attention.
May 30-June 3, 1990--Washington, DC
In addition to participating in the wide-ranging summit meetings between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met separately to discuss German unification and START [strategic arms reduction talks] issues.
June 5, 1990--Copenhagen
On the margins of the CSCE's [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Conference on the Human Dimension, the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze continued their dialogue on German unification.
June 22, 1990--Berlin
In addition to participating in the Two-Plus-Four ministerial, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met separately to discuss European and regional issues and the forthcoming NATO summit, as well as German unification.
July 17-18, 1990--Paris
At the third Two-Plus-Four ministerial, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze participated in discussions on German unification, including the East and West German guarantee to accept the post-World War II German-Polish border. The Secretary and Foreign Minister also discussed the Soviet Union's party congress, conventional forces in Europe, Kashmir, Cambodia, and US technical assistance cooperation for Soviet economic reforms.
August 1-2, 1990--Irkutsk, USSR
Meeting in this southern Siberian city, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze focused their attention on matters pertaining to the East Asian region--overall stability, security, the need to eliminate military confrontation, and establishing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the area. Their discussions also covered Afghanistan, German unification, preparations for the CSCE ministerial conference, economic and technological issues, arms control, the Moscow summit, and other regional issues.
August 3, 1990--Moscow
Cutting short his visit to Mongolia, Secretary Baker went to Moscow to confer with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze about Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. At the conclusion of their meeting, they issued a joint statement calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops and the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty and national independence.
September 9, 1990--Helsinki
After visiting several Middle Eastern countries, Secretary Baker joined President Bush for a meeting with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The primary focus was to discuss Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The two leaders issued a joint statement in which they called for the complete implementation of five recent UN Security Council resolutions, the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and the release of all hostages from Iraq and Kuwait. The US and Soviet Union agreed also to consider additional steps allowable under the UN Charter if the economic sanctions and naval interdiction against Iraq fail.
September 11-13, 1990--Moscow
At the final session of the Two-Plus-Four consultations, the World War II Allied Powers (France, USSR, UK, US) and East and West Germany signed a treaty relinquishing all Allied occupation rights over the two Germanys and Berlin, paving the way for the unification of East and West Germany on Oct. 3 and giving a united Germany full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs. In separate bilateral meetings, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed the issues remaining to wrap up the conventional armed forces in Europe treaty and a "security structure" for the Persian Gulf.
September 26-October 5, 1990--New York City
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met five times on the fringes of UN General Assembly and the CSCE ministerial talks. They cleared the major hurdles to a CFE agreement--notably the issue of the number of aircraft allowed on each side--and made what Secretary Baker termed "good progress" toward a START agreement as well. On October 3, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed a joint statement committing the US and USSR to support UN efforts to settle international disputes. The two ministers also joined their counterparts from France and the UK in relinquishing their countries' post-war treaty rights in Germany, clearing the way for formal German unification which occurred on Oct. 3. In addition, they discussed the crisis in the Persian Gulf.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990 Title:

US-Soviet Joint Statement: Responsibility for Peace and Security in the Changing World

Description: Text of statement released by the US and USSR in New York, New York Date: Oct 3, 199010/3/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Country: USSR (former) Subject: Security Assistance and Sales, United Nations [TEXT] The 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly is taking place amidst the most profound changes in international affairs that have occurred since the Second World War. The confrontational nature of relations between East and West is giving way to a cooperative relationship and partnership. The UN is fast becoming a real center for agreed common actions and the Security Council is reestablishing its crucial role in the maintenance of international security, peaceful settlement of disputes, and prevention of conflicts. Yet there remain many challenges to meet and problems to solve on the way to a peaceful and prosperous future. Reaffirming the resolution presented last year by the United States and Soviet Union and unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly, our two countries will attach special importance in the United Nations and its specialized agencies and programs to promoting practical, multifaceted solutions to the issues of international peace and security, political, economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems. To accomplish this we will pursue cooperation with all member-states in attainment of the following: -- Strengthen the UN's efforts to promote international peace and security in all its aspects by working to improve UN peacekeeping, peace-making and crisis prevention functions, by encouraging more active use of the Secretary General's good offices and, at the request of individual countries, electoral assistance; -- Establish a new sense of responsibility at the UN by encouraging the trend away from rhetorical excess toward efforts to deal pragmatically with the major issues of the 1990s, including transnational issues like narcotics, the environment, development, terrorism, and human rights; -- Promote a new way of conducting diplomatic efforts within the UN system to eliminate duplicative programs and activities and ensure that the UN system is utilized in the most efficient manner possible--we call this a "unitary UN"; -- Ensure the availability of sufficient resources to the UN for it to function effectively and efficiently by timely payment of financial obligations to the UN.
Promoting Peace and Security in All its Aspects
Joint efforts have contributed significantly to the easing of tensions in Southern Africa and Central America, and are part of efforts to prepare a peaceful settlement in Cambodia. But serious problems still remain. Our search continues for workable solutions to conflict and instability in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and El Salvador. In the Persian Gulf, we face a most serious threat to the integrity of the emerging international system. The United States and the Soviet Union are working together with other members of the Security Council to fashion a concerted response, unprecedented in UN history, to this crisis. The swift reaction of the international community to Iraq's dangerous and unwarranted aggression serves as a sobering reminder to any future aggressor; the international community will not tolerate the kind of wanton aggression which Iraq has committed. We call upon all United Nations members to continue to support the sanctions invoked by Security Council Resolution 661 and 670 until Iraq abides by the call of the Security Council to withdraw its forces from Kuwait immediately, totally and unconditionally. We call also for the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait. The rapidly changing structure of international relations requires a United Nations that, while remaining faithful to its original purposes, can also respond flexibly and effectively to new challenges as they occur, like drugs, the environment, and the need to ensure the protection of human rights. Tangible examples of the UN movement away from divisive rhetoric and political excess were last December's special session of the General Assembly on Apartheid and the resumed session last month, where the world community underscored its resolute opposition to apartheid while agreeing, by consensus, on a positive approach based on dialogue among all South African parties. We will work for equally positive results at the General Assembly this year. The UN Special Session on International Economic Cooperation in April 1990 also reflected the growing convergence of views worldwide on the need for more effective approaches to national economic development, in the context of a supportive international economic environment. Our two countries will continue working together to promote further convergence in this direction. We will also support efforts to ensure careful and pragmatic preparation for the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development. We want to see the Conference fashion a realistic action plan to set the UN's course in the coming decades. Another area in which the UN is actively promoting peaceful change is in facilitation of free and fair elections. UN assistance in Namibia and Nicaragua was dramatically successful, and there are many other situations where the UN's services are being requested. Our two countries will work with other UN members and the Secretary General to structure a UN electoral assistance process to enable the organization, at the request of countries concerned, to carry out effectively this important new effort.
Promoting a Unitary UN and Assuring Needed Financial Resources
An important area of our bilateral and multilateral cooperation has been the administration and management of the United Nations, particularly its budget. As major contributors to the United Nations, we believe it is essential that all views on the budget are taken into account, and that the agreement of all major contributors is required in order to approve the budget. For there to be consensus, the UN system must improve the setting of priorities and improve coordination among various UN programs. The aim should be to eliminate duplicative programs and activities and ensure that the various components of the United Nations are utilized in the most efficient manner possible. For priority setting and coordination to be effective, members will need clearer and more comprehensive data on what the UN and the specialized agencies are doing with assessed and voluntary contributions. Our two countries provide an important element of UN resources. As such, we recognize our responsibility to pay assessments promptly so that the United Nations has the resources required to perform the tasks as expeditiously as possible, keeping in mind the necessity of strengthening the administrative and budgetary reforms that have taken place in recent years. We intend to work for further enhancing the efficiency of the executive machinery of the Organization.
Establish a New Sense of Responsibility for Peace
The challenges before the international community and the UN are great. So, too, are the opportunities for more and better multilateral cooperation to confront and master the problem of our time. In all spheres of UN activities the renunciation of sterile and rigid positions dictated by ideology rather than by practicality constitutes an essential prerequisite for creating an atmosphere of confidence within the United Nations among all United Nations members. The United Nations can play a leading role on issues of global concern. We will actively support efforts, throughout the UN system, to implement and strengthen the principles and the system of international peace, security and international cooperation laid down in the Charter.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990 Title:

US-Soviet Relations

Date: Oct 15, 199010/15/90 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: History, Arms Control [TEXT]
Background
Since the 1917 Russian Revolution, the US-Soviet relationship has evolved through several phases, including a period of minimal contact, a wartime alliance, an intense cold war, hopes for detente, and disappointment when the competitive aspects of the relationship proved dominant. During most of this period, the Soviet approach to the world--their Marxist-Leninist ideology, vast military buildup, and pattern of aggression abroad and repression at home--made the US-Soviet relationship essentially an adversarial one. Relations with the Soviet Union have improved considerably, however, since 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev launched significant changes in the policies and practices of the Soviet government. Moscow has allowed greater freedoms at home in the context of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) and shown greater restraint and a less threatening military posture abroad. Should these reforms continue, the basic nature of the US-Soviet relationship could be altered profoundly. A key US objective is the institutionalization of Soviet restructuring, whether through new legislation on emigration or arms control agreements that significantly change Soviet force structure.
US Policy
In a fluid situation, the United States must be prudent but not stand back from engaging with the Soviets. Our approach to the Soviet Union is based on realism about the nature of the USSR and the differences of history, geography, ideology, and national experience that set us apart and guarantee that some aspects of our relationship will remain competitive. We must maintain our ability to protect US security and that of our allies and friends with the necessary strength--military, economic, technological, and political--to counter the use or threat of the use of force. At the same time, in a broad and constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union, we are seeking to exploit new opportunities for a more stable and more cooperative relationship. We want to see perestroika succeed in the belief that it will bring about a Soviet Union more interested in satisfying the needs of its people and less interested in aggressive policies abroad.
Five-Part Agenda
The US approach toward the Soviet Union has taken into account what went wrong with the detente of the 1970s; we have gone beyond a relationship based largely on arms control to include all the significant issues causing mistrust and suspicion between our two countries. Our comprehensive, five-part agenda is grounded on the basis of long-term US and Western objectives. It includes: -- Dealing with Western security relations through a coherent strategy of arms control and defense programs. We are engaging in bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations on a range of issues in the nuclear and space talks (which include strategic arms reduction talks and the defense and space talks), the nuclear testing talks, the Conference on Disarmament, the conventional forces in Europe negotiations, and in bilateral consultations on the problems of chemical weapons and missile technology proliferation. We are seeking verifiable arms control agreements that enhance US security, reduce the risk of war, strengthen stability, and lower the levels of arms and armed forces. We also seek to introduce greater predictability and openness in the East-West balance of forces. There are good prospects for significant arms control achievements in 1990. -- Dealing with regional conflicts that contain the seeds of direct confrontation and that, for many years, have been a source of US-Soviet tension. We and the Soviets agree in principle that regional conflicts require political and diplomatic solutions, but we continue to differ on how to translate this common goal into practice. We want to see Moscow turn "new thinking" into reality. -- Addressing human rights, where the Soviet Union's past behavior has been at the heart of many Americans' mistrust. Our dialogue has broadened to discussion of new issues such as the "rule of law." At the same time, we will continue to press on unresolved issues, including cases of long-time refuseniks and divided families. -- Expanding the bilateral relationship between the US and the USSR, including increased cultural and scientific exchange programs, tourism, and commercial ties. Hundreds of exchanges are now taking place at the official level as well as between private citizens. We are moving forward with negotiations for agreements on trade, investments, tax treatment, civil aviation, and maritime transportation in order to promote the expansion of mutually beneficial nonstrategic trade with the Soviet Union. -- Broadening our dialogue into a whole new area of global or transnational issues. Here there is opportunity for cooperation on a range of mutual concerns, including the environment, natural hazards prediction and damage mitigation, control of illegal narcotics, and international terrorism.
High-Level Dialogue
We have an active high-level dialogue. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev held useful discussions in Malta in December 1989, which helped lay the groundwork for the US-Soviet summit in Washington, May 30-June 3. President Bush's conversations with President Gorbachev in Washington were marked by a spirit of candor and openness and a desire to build bridges toward an era of enduring cooperation. They signed an important chemical weapons agreement, nuclear testing protocols, and a commercial agreement, and they renewed their commitment to early conclusion of the negotiations on strategic nuclear forces and conventional forces in Europe. In September, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Helsinki to discuss the Persian Gulf crisis and other urgent matters. This meeting and continuing Baker-Shevardnadze meetings reflect a new ability to work together constructively on a broader range of issues. As Secretary Baker has said, our task is to "find enduring points of mutual advantage that serve the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union." We can begin to envision and even make plans for a new relationship that clearly goes beyond the containment policies of the past. Although we will have to be prepared to deal with the worst as well as the best of Soviet behavior, we have a historic opportunity to make lasting improvements in US-Soviet relations.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990 Title:

US-Australia Joint Communique

Description: Text of communique released after US-Australia ministerial talks, Washington, DC Date: Oct 8, 199010/8/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Pacific Country: Australia Subject: Military Affairs, Trade/Economics [TEXT] The United States Secretary of State Mr. James A. Baker III and Secretary of Defense Mr. Richard B. Cheney, and the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Senator Gareth Evans and the Minister for Defense Senator Robert Ray met on October 8, 1990, in Washington, D.C., to discuss significant global, regional and bilateral issues. Both sides welcomed the continuation of close and regular ministerial-level consultations within the framework of their longstanding alliance. The discussions highlighted their extensive mutual interests and shared strategic perceptions and obligations as allies under the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-United States] Treaty.
Defense and Security
Recognizing that historic and far-reaching changes have taken place in the global strategic situation over the past year, the U.S. and Australian Governments reaffirmed the ongoing importance of their security cooperation under the ANZUS Treaty. They expressed regret that New Zealand's policies continue to prevent resumption of a full trilateral relationship. Recalling the successful completion of the Kangaroo 89 joint military exercise, the United States welcomed Australia's continuing progress toward fulfilling its security goals as set forth in the Australian Government's White Paper on Defence. The United States reaffirmed its understanding that the Australian Government's program of defense self-reliance and modernization, operating within an alliance framework and focusing on strategic responsibilities and regional cooperation, contributes both to the defense of Australia and to Australia's fulfillment of its alliance responsibility. Both sides welcomed the beginning of negotiations on the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station at North West Cape, Australia. The United States and Australian Governments strongly condemned Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and agreed that Iraq must unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait and comply with other provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions, including those relating to the immediate and unconditional departure of foreign nationals from Iraq and Kuwait. Both sides welcomed the prompt and effective action taken by the UN Security Council in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The international cooperation achieved in enforcing UN economic sanctions against Iraq and in assisting those countries adversely affected by the implementation of sanctions has been unprecedented. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the high degree of cooperation between their respective forces participating in the multinational naval force in the Gulf. The United States and Australian Governments expressed their strong preference that the crisis should be resolved peacefully if possible, within the framework of the United Nations Charter and relevant Security Council resolutions. The two sides welcomed the agreement of the Cambodian parties to accept the framework for a comprehensive settlement completed by the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, which drew significantly on Australian concepts for an enhanced United Nations role. They also welcomed the formation at Jakarta of a Supreme National Council based on this framework to embody Cambodian sovereignty and to represent Cambodia externally including at the United Nations. The two sides called on the Supreme National Council to agree urgently on the appointment of a chairman, as called for in the Security Council resolution of September 20, and to work out the practicalities for Cambodian representation at the United Nations. They supported the call by the UN Security Council for the co-chairmen of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia to intensify their consultations on the elaboration of a comprehensive political settlement with a view to reconvening the Conference as soon as possible to adopt a comprehensive settlement document in accord with the Permanent Five framework agreement. Australia expressed its strong support for the decision of the United States to open a dialogue with Vietnam on Cambodia, and expressed confidence that it would contribute to the comprehensive settlement of the Cambodia conflict. Australia and the United States reaffirmed their strong support for Philippine democracy and their opposition to any efforts to change the government by non-constitutional means. The two sides noted that the May national elections in Myanmar [Burma] demonstrated the overwhelming desire of the Burmese people for a return to democratic parliamentary government. They urge the Government of Myanmar to make an early transition to civilian government and to release all political prisoners. The United States and Australia reaffirmed their commitment to all elements of the Comprehensive Plan of Action on Indochinese refugees, and expressed their support for ongoing efforts to ensure its implementation. The Governments of the United States and Australia reaffirmed their shared desire to conclude at the earliest possible date a global convention on chemical weapons. The two sides pursued their dialogue on the issues remaining to be resolved in these negotiations. Reviewing developments in Europe, the two sides welcomed the peaceful unification of Germany. They expressed satisfaction at the reduction of East-West military tension and their hopes for the early conclusion of the CFE [conventional armed forces in Europe] and START [strategic arms reduction talks] agreements. They reiterated their support for efforts to introduce market economies and political pluralism in Eastern Europe and the USSR. While welcoming the positive developments in the overall global security environment, the two sides noted that the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the destabilising transfer of missile technology are sources of grave concern in the post Cold War era. The two sides welcomed the substantial agreements reached at the recent Fourth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, in particular the agreement on fullscope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. They reaffirmed their continuing strong support for the Treaty and the international non- proliferation regime and their determination to work together for a successful review and lengthy extension of the Treaty in 1995.
Regional Security Issues
The two sides discussed the fundamental changes occurring in East- West relations and the implications of those changes for international security in the Asia-Pacific region. They reviewed recent regional and bilateral exchanges in this area. The United States reiterated its intention to maintain a significant military presence in the Pacific region. Australia reaffirmed its view that such a United States military presence, including continuing access to military facilities in the Philippines, represents an important contribution to regional confidence and security. Both sides reaffirmed their continuing commitment to close cooperation with South Pacific states to promote regional economic development, political stability and security. The fundamental importance accorded by Pacific countries and peoples to the management of their marine resources and environmental concerns was acknowledged. Progress over the past year towards the elimination of driftnet fishing in the South Pacific was noted with satisfaction, and both sides endorsed the aspirations of island countries to negotiate an effective management regime to ensure the sustainable exploitation of the southern albacore tuna fishery. The United States and Australia agreed that the Johnston Atoll chemical agent disposal facility would play an important role as the first facility to begin large scale destruction of CW [chemical weapons] stocks. It will establish in practice the principle of destruction of these weapons which will be a central element in achieving a global ban on chemical weapons. Expressing sensitivity to the concerns of Pacific nations about the environmental impact of the facility's operations, the United States reiterated its intention to operate the facility in an environmentally safe manner, and reaffirmed its intention to destroy on the island only those chemical weapons already stored there, the U.S. CW stocks being shipped from the Federal Republic of Germany, and obsolete World War II munitions which may be found in the Pacific area. The two sides welcomed increased contact between North and South Korea and, particularly, the recent meeting between the Prime Ministers of North and South Korea. They also welcomed the recent announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union. In accord with the principle of universality, the United States and Australia support United Nations membership for the Republic of Korea without prejudice to the ultimate objective of reunification of the Korean Peninsula, and without opposition to simultaneous membership for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They noted that the Korean Peninsula must nevertheless remain a focal point for efforts to reduce tensions in Asia, and, in this context, emphasized the urgency and importance of North Korea fulfilling its obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to implement fullscope IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards on all its nuclear facilities.
Economic and Trade Issues
The United States and Australia reaffirmed their support for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, the first ministerial meeting of which was held in Canberra November 6-7, 1989. They welcomed the endorsement by ministers at Singapore July 29-31, 1990, of a seven-point work program, and agreed to work with other APEC countries toward achieving the important benefits the process can bring to the region and the wider international community. The two sides reaffirmed their common commitment to the multilateral trading system and to achieving a successful outcome from the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations. Both sides expressed an urgent need for progress on outstanding important issues, especially agriculture, and agreed that participants must make every effort to achieve a final outcome which adequately takes into account the interests of all GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] member countries. Australia expressed concern at the continuing resort to export subsidies in international agricultural trade. Australia also noted that the 1990 Farm Bill, now under consideration in Congress, contains several provisions which are of serious concern to Australia. The United States took note of Australia's concerns over the impact on Australia of U.S. agricultural trade policies. The U.S. stated its view that the EEP [export enhancement program] remains an important form of leverage in achieving significant reform in agricultural trade in global negotiations. Both sides agree that the best opportunity for achieving substantial reform of world agricultural policies is through the comprehensive, multilateral approach outlined in the draft framework agreement prepared by the chairman of the negotiating group on agriculture, Aart De Zeeuw, and reflected in the U.S. proposal for agricultural reform. The United States expressed its concern about Australian Government procurement offset policies as well as Australian local content requirements for commercials and those proposed for television broadcasting. The two Governments also expressed support for the negotiation of a new legal instrument, within the Antarctic Treaty system, to provide comprehensive protection for the Antarctic environment. Australia recalled its view that no mining should take place in the Antarctic. The United states noted that it is prepared to consider an indefinite ban on mineral activity in Antarctica, but reiterated the need for an international consensus on the mining issue.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990 Title:

Country Profile: Australia

Date: Oct 15, 199010/15/90 Category: Country Data Region: Pacific Country: Australia Subject: History, International Organizations, Trade/Economics [TEXT] Official Name: Commonwealth of Australia
Geography
Area: 7.7 million sq. km. (2.966 million sq. mi.); about the size of the continental United States. Cities: (1987 est.) Capital--Canberra (pop. 286,000). Other cities- -Sydney (3.5 million), Melbourne (3.0 million), Brisbane (1.2 million), Perth (1.1 million). Terrain: Varied, but generally low lying. Climate: Relatively dry, ranging from temperate in the south to semitropical in the north.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Australian(s). Population (1990 est.): 17 million. Annual growth rate: 1.7%. Ethnic groups: European 93%, Asian 5%, aboriginal 1%. Religions: Anglican 26%, Roman Catholic 26%. Languages: English, aboriginal. Education: Years compulsory--to age 15 in all states except Tasmania, where it is 16. Literacy--99%. Health: Infant mortality rate--8.8/1,000. Life expectancy--males 73 yrs., females 79 yrs. Work force (end 1989, 8.3 million): Agriculture--6%. Mining, manufacturing, and utilities--26%. Services--63%. Public administration and defense--5%.
Government
Type: Democratic, federal-state system recognizing British monarch as sovereign. Constitution: July 9, 1900. Independence (federation): January 1, 1901. Branches: Executive--prime minister and cabinet responsible to Parliament. Legislative--bicameral Parliament (76-member Senate, 148-member House of Representatives). Judicial-- independent judiciary. Administrative subdivisions: Six states and two territories. Political parties: Liberal, National, Australian Labor, Australian Democrats. Suffrage: Universal and compulsory over 18. Central government budget (FY 1989-90): $86.95 billion. Defense (FY 1989-90): 3% of GDP or 9.7% of government budget. Flag: On a blue field, UK Union Jack in the top left corner, a large white star directly beneath symbolizing federation, and five smaller white stars on the right half representing the Southern Cross constellation.
Economy
GDP (1989 est.): $283.35 billion. Per capita income: $16,856. Inflation rate: 7.1%. Natural resources: Bauxite, coal, iron ore, copper, tin, silver, uranium, nickel, tungsten, mineral sands, lead, zinc, diamonds, natural gas, oil. Agriculture (1987-88, 4.7% of GDP): Products--livestock, wheat, wool, sugar. Arable land--9%. Industry (1987-88, 43% of GDP): Types--mining, manufacturing, and transportation. Trade (1989): Exports--$37.0 billion: coal, wool, wheat, meat, iron ore and concentrates, alumina, aluminum, petroleum oils, nonmonetary gold. Major markets--Japan, US ($3.9 billion in CY 1989), UK, Korea, PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Germany. Imports--$40.9 billion: transportation equipment, capital goods, industrial supplies, petroleum products. Major suppliers--US ($8.3 billion in CY 1989), Japan, Germany, UK, Taiwan, New Zealand, Italy, Korea. Official exchange rate: The Australian dollar floats freely. The July 1990 rate was approximately US$0.80= Australian $1. Fiscal year: July 1-June 30.
Membership in International Organizations
UN and most of its specialized and related agencies, including the UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO); Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Asian Development Bank (ADB); Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP); Australia-New Zealand-US security treaty (ANZUS); Commonwealth; Colombo Plan; International Energy Agency (IEA); the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Group; and many others.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990 Title:

Who Belongs to What (Membership by country in major international organizations)

Date: Oct 15, 199010/15/90 Category: Fact Sheets Subject: International Organizations, United Nations, CSCE, OAS, EC [TEXT] The October 3, 1990 unification of East and West Germany not only changed the face of Europe, but changed the composition of many international organizations. Groups such as the Warsaw Pact and CSCE "lost" a member (East Germany), while the people of what had been East Germany gained representation in organizations such as NATO. The following revision of "Who Belongs to What" reflects these and other changes.
APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation)
-- Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United States
Arab League--
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Arab Maghreb Union--
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)--
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
CEMA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)--
Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, and Vietnam; Yugoslavia is an associate member
COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls)--
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
COMECON--
See CEMA
COMMON MARKET--
See European Community
COUNCIL OF EUROPE--
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino,Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe)--
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia
EC (European Community)--
Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom
EFTA (European Free Trade Association)--
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)--
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
GROUP OF 5--
France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States
GROUP OF 7--
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States
GROUP OF 15--
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe
GROUP OF 24--
Same members as OECD
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)--
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries)--
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)--
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference)--
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)--
Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela
WARSAW PACT--
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union
WEU (Western European Union)--
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 7, October 15, 1990 Title:

Current Treaty Actions, September 1990

Date: Sep 30, 19909/30/90 Category: Treaties/Agreements Country: Argentina, Australia, Belize, Czechoslovakia (former), Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Mexico, Mongolia, Pakistan, Senegal, Singapore, Thailand, USSR (former), United Kingdom, Venezuela Subject: Immigration, Resource Management, International Law, Terrorism, Environment, Nuclear Nonproliferation [TEXT]
Multilateral
Arbitration
Inter-American convention on international Commercial arbitration. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force June 16, 1976. Ratification deposited: US, Sept. 27, 1990. (1) Entered into force: Oct. 27, 1990.
Conservation
Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249. Accessions deposited: Brunei, May 4, 1990; Guinea-Bissau, May 16, 1990; Cuba, Apr. 20, 1990; United Arab Emirates, Feb. 8, 1990.
Customs
Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1975; for the US May 12, 1985. Accession deposited: Morocco, Aug. 14, 1990.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, formulated at Bretton Woods Conference July 1- 22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. Signatures and Acceptances: Czechoslovakia, Sept. 20, 1990; Bulgaria and Namibia, Sept. 25, 1990.
Germany
Treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany, with agreed minute and related letters. Done at Moscow Sept. 12, 1990. Enters into force on the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification or acceptance. Signatures: France, German Dem. Rep., Germany, Fed. Rep. of, UK, US, USSR, Sept. 12, 1990.
Maritime Matters
Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London Apr. 9, 1965. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1967; for the US May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. Accession deposited: Mauritius, June 18, 1990.
Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. Accession deposited: Mozambique, Sept. 12, 1990.
Oceanographic Research
Agreement concerning the continuation of marine geoscientific research and mineral resource studies in the South Pacific region, with annex. Signed at Washington September 10, 1990. Entered into force September 10, 1990.
Pollution
Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22, 1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. Accessions deposited: Bangladesh, Aug. 2, 1990; Brunei, July 26, 1990; The Gambia, July 25, 1990; Poland, July 13, 1990. Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-10. Accessions deposited: Bangladesh, Aug. 2, 1990; The Gambia, July 25, 1990; Poland, July 13, 1990.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700. Accession deposited: Morocco, Jun. 28, 1990.
Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb 20, 1977. TIAS 8532. Accession deposited: Maldives, Aug. 21, 1990.
Tonnage
International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969. Entered into force July 18, 1982; for the US Feb. 10, 1983. Accession deposited: Morocco, June 28, 1990.
Trade
United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262]. Accession deposited: USSR, Aug. 16, 1990.
Treaties
Vienna convention on the law of treaties between states and international organizations or between international organizations, with annex. Done at Vienna Mar. 21, 1986. (2) Ratification deposited: Argentina, Aug. 17, 1990. Accession deposited: Spain, July 24, 1990.
Trusts
Convention on the law applicable to trusts and on their recognition. Done at The Hague July 1, 1985. (2) Ratifications deposited: Italy, Feb. 21, 1990; UK, Nov. 17, 1989.1,3,4
Bilateral
Argentina
Agreement extending the annexes of the air transport agreement of Oct. 22, 1985, as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires June 22 and July 27, 1990. Entered into force July 27, 1990.
Australia
Protocol amending the treaty on extradition of May 14, 1974 (TIAS 8234). Signed at Seoul Sept. 4, 1990. Enters into force on date on which the parties have exchanged written notification that they have complied with their respective requirements.
Belize
Agreement concerning grants of defense articles and services to Belize from US military stocks. Effected by exchange of notes at Belize and Belmopan Aug. 6 and 23, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 23, 1990.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement concerning trade in certain steel products, with arrangement. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Prague Oct. 27, 1989, and Aug. 10, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 10, 1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989.
Ecuador
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington July 30, 1990. Entered into force Sept. 12, 1990.
Egypt
First amendment to the grant agreement of Sept. 27, 1989, for power sector support. Signed at Cairo Aug. 21, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1990. Fourth amendment to the grant agreement of Sept. 26, 1984, for Cairo Sewerage II. Signed at Cairo Aug. 21, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1990. Sixth amendment to the grant agreement of Sept. 22, 1981 (TIAS 10277), for irrigation management systems. Signed at Cairo Aug. 21, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1990. Grant Agreement for cash transfer. Signed at Cairo Aug. 31, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1990.
German Democratic Republic
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Berlin and Washington Aug. 6 and Sept. 7. 1990. Entered into force Oct. 15, 1990.
Indonesia
Agreement amending the air transport agreement of Jan. 15, 1968 (TIAS 6441), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta April 12 and June 19, 1990. Entered into force June 19, 1990.
Mexico
Minute 283 of the International Boundary and Water Commission: Conceptual plan for the international solution to the border sanitation problem in San Diego, California/Tijuana, Baja California. Signed at El Paso July 2, 1990. Entered into force August 8, 1990. Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 13, 1988, as amended, concerning trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico July 19 and Aug. 3, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 3, 1990.
Mongolia
Agreement concerning the reciprocal issuance of visas to government officials. Effected by exchange of notes at Ulaanbaatar Aug. 2, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 2, 1990.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Tax reimbursement agreement, with annex. Signed at Brussels July 18, 1990. Entered into force: July 18, 1990; applicable with regard to tax reimbursements for institutional income earned after Feb. 29, 1984.
Pakistan
Project grant agreement for Balochistan road project. Signed at Islamabad Aug. 9, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 9, 1990.
Senegal
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Dakar July 13, 1990. Entered into force Sept. 5, 1990.
Singapore
Agreement amending the air transport agreement of March 31, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9002, 9654). Effected by exchange of notes at Singapore May 18 and June 15, 1990. Entered into force June 15, 1990.
Thailand
Agreement on research collaboration related to HIV infection and AIDS [acquired immune deficiency syndrome] in Thailand, with annex. Signed at Bangkok and Atlanta July 24 and Aug. 3 and 8, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1990.
USSR
Implementing agreement concerning cooperation in the space flight of a Soviet Meteor-3 satellite employing a US Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS). Signed at Moscow July 25, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 24, 1990.
United Kingdom
Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 14, 1987, as extended, concerning the British Virgin Islands and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 9, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 9, 1990; effective Aug. 12, 1990.
Venezuela
Agreement extending the agreement of Dec. 26, 1984, as extended (TIAS 10652), establishing a Venezuela-United States Agriculture Commission. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Feb. 15 and July 31, 1990. Entered into force July 31, 1990; effective Dec. 27, 1989. (1) With reservation(s). (2) Not in force. (3) With declaration. (4) Territorial Application: Isle of Man, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Virgin Is., Falkland Is., Gibraltar, St. Helena, St. Helena Dependencies, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Is., UK Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the Is. of Cyprus (Nov. 17, 1989) and Hong Kong (Mar. 30, 1990).(###)