US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991
Title: Toward a New World Order
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Address before a joint session of Congress, Washington,
DC
Date: Sep 11, 19909/11/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait, USSR (former)
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization,
Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
We gather here tonight, witness to events in the Persian Gulf as
significant as they are tragic. In the early morning hours of August
2, following negotiations and promises by Iraq's dictator Saddam
Hussein not to use force, a powerful Iraqi army invaded its trusting
and much weaker neighbor, Kuwait. Within 3 days, 120,000 Iraqi
troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to
threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that
I decided to check that aggression.
At this moment, our brave servicemen and women stand watch
in that distant desert and on distant seas, side-by-side with the
forces of more than 20 other nations. They are some of the finest
men and women of the United States of America, and they're doing
one terrific job. These valiant Americans were ready at a moment's
notice to leave their spouses and their children, to serve on the
front line halfway around the world. They remind us who keeps
America strong; they do.
In the trying circumstances of the gulf, the morale of our
servicemen and women is excellent. In the face of danger, they are
brave, well-trained, and dedicated.
A soldier, Private First Class Wade Merritt of Knoxville,
Tennessee, now stationed in Saudi Arabia, wrote his parents of his
worries, his love of family, and his hope for peace. But Wade also
wrote, "I am proud of my country and its firm stance against
inhumane aggression. I am proud of my army and its men. I am
proud to serve my country." Let me just say, Wade, America is
proud of you and is grateful to every soldier, sailor, marine, and
airman serving the cause of peace in the Persian Gulf.
I also want to thank the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Powell; the chiefs here tonight; our commander in the
Persian Gulf, General Schwartzkopf; and the men and women of the
Department of Defense. What a magnificent job you all are doing.
Thank you very, very much. I wish I could say that their work is
done. But we all know it is not.
If there ever was a time to put country before self and
patriotism before party, the time is now. Let me thank all
Americans, especially those here in this chamber tonight, for your
support for our forces and for their mission. That support will be
even more important in the days to come.
Tonight, I want to talk to you about what's at stake--what we
must do together to defend civilized values around the world and
maintain our economic strength at home.
The Objectives and Goals
Our objectives in the Persian Gulf are clear; our goals defined and
familiar.
-- Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait completely, immediately,
and without condition.
-- Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored.
-- The security and stability of the Persian Gulf must be
assured.
-- American citizens abroad must be protected.
These goals are not ours alone. They have been endorsed by
the UN Security Council five times in as many weeks. Most
countries share our concern for principle, and many have a stake in
the stability of the Persian Gulf. This is not, as Saddam Hussein
would have it, the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq against the
world.
As you know, I have just returned from a very productive
meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev. I am pleased that we are
working together to build a new relationship. In Helsinki, our joint
statement [see page 92] affirmed to the world our shared resolve to
counter Iraq's threat to peace. Let me quote:
"We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be
tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger
states can devour their smaller neighbors."
Clearly, no longer can a dictator count on East-West
confrontation to stymie concerted UN action against aggression. A
new partnership of nations has begun.
A Historic Period of Cooperation
We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in
the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to
move toward a historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled
times, our fifth objective--a new world order--can emerge; a new
era--freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of
justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the
nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper
and live in harmony.
A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to
peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human
endeavor. Today, that new world is struggling to be born, a world
quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rule
of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations
recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world
where the strong respect the rights of the weak.
This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in
Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the gulf, and around the
world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape
the future for generations to come.
The test we face is great--and so are the stakes. This is the
first assault on the new world that we seek, the first test of our
mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity
of purpose, if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination,
it would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the
world.
America and the world must defend common vital interests.
And we will. America and the world must support the rule of law.
And we will. America and the world must stand up to aggression.
And we will. And one thing more; in the pursuit of these goals,
America will not be intimidated.
Vital issues of principle are at stake. Saddam Hussein is
literally trying to wipe a country off the face of the earth. We do
not exaggerate. Nor do we exaggerate when we say Saddam Hussein
will fail.
Vital economic interests are at risk as well. Iraq itself
controls some 10% of the world's proven oil reserves. Iraq plus
Kuwait controls twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait
would have the economic and military power, as well as the
arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors--neighbors that
control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We
cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so
ruthless. And we won't.
Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute
for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt
American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying
power. We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader
of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth.
The International Response and Obligation
From the outset, acting hand-in-hand with others, we have sought
to fashion the broadest possible international response to Iraq's
aggression. The level of world cooperation and condemnation of
Iraq is unprecedented. Armed forces from countries spanning four
continents are there at the request of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to
deter and, if need be, to defend against attack. Muslims and non-
Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs, soldiers from many nations stand
shoulder-to-shoulder, resolute against Saddam Hussein's ambitions.
We can now point to five UN Security Council resolutions that
condemn Iraq's aggression. They call for Iraq's immediate and
unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate
government, and categorically reject Iraq's cynical and self-serving
attempt to annex Kuwait.
Finally, the United Nations has demanded the release of all
foreign nationals held hostage against their will and in
contravention of international law. It is a mockery of human
decency to call these people "guests." They are hostages, and the
whole world knows it.
[British] Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a dependable ally,
said it all: "We do not bargain over hostages. We will not stoop to
the level of using human beings as bargaining chips--ever." Of
course, our hearts go out to the hostages and to their families. But
our policy cannot change. And it will not change. America and the
world policy cannot change. And it will not change. America and
the world will not be blackmailed by this ruthless policy.
We are now in sight of a United Nations that performs as
envisioned by its founders. We owe much to the outstanding
leadership of Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. The United
Nations is backing up its words with action. The Security Council
has imposed mandatory economic sanctions on Iraq, designed to
force Iraq to relinquish the spoils of its illegal conquest. The
Security Council has also taken the decisive step of authorizing the
use of all means necessary to ensure compliance with these
sanctions.
Together with our friends and allies, ships of the US Navy are
today patrolling Mideast waters. They have already intercepted
more than 700 ships to enforce the sanctions. Three regional
leaders I spoke with just yesterday told me that these sanctions
are working. Iraq is feeling the heat.
We continue to hope that Iraq's leaders will recalculate just
what their aggression has cost them. They are cut off from world
trade, unable to sell their oil. And only a tiny fraction of goods gets
through.
The communique with President Gorbachev made mention of
what happens when the embargo is so effective that children of Iraq
literally need milk or the sick truly need medicine. Then, under
strict international supervision that guarantees the proper
destination, food will be permitted.
At home, the material cost of our leadership can be steep.
That is why Secretary of State Baker and Treasury Secretary Brady
have met with many world leaders to underscore that the burden of
this collective effort must be shared. We are prepared to do our
share and more to help carry that load; we insist that others do
their share as well.
The response of most of our friends and allies has been good.
To help defray costs, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the
United Arab Emirates have pledged to provide our deployed troops
with all the food and fuel they need. Generous assistance will also
be provided to stalwart front-line nations, such as Turkey and
Egypt.
I am also heartened to report that this international response
extends to the neediest victims of this conflict--those refugees.
For our part, we have contributed $28 million for relief efforts.
This is but a portion of what is needed. I commend, in particular,
Saudi Arabia, Japan, and several European nations which have joined
us in this purely humanitarian effort.
There's an energy-related cost to be borne as well. Oil-
producing nations are already replacing lost Iraqi and Kuwaiti
output. More than half of what was lost has been made up. And
we're getting superb cooperation. If producers, including the United
States, continue steps to expand oil and gas production, we can
stabilize prices and guarantee against hardship. Additionally, we
and several of our allies always have the option to extract oil from
our strategic petroleum reserves if conditions warrant. As I have
pointed out before, conservation efforts are essential to keep our
energy needs as low as possible. We must then take advantage of
our energy sources across the board--coal, natural gas, hydro, and
nuclear. Our failure to do these things has made us more dependent
on foreign oil than ever before. Finally, let no one even contemplate
profiteering from this crisis. We will not have it.
I cannot predict just how long it will take to convince Iraq to
withdraw from Kuwait. Sanctions will take time to have their full
intended effect. We will continue to review all options with our
allies. But let it be clear: We will not let this aggression stand.
Our interest, our involvement in the gulf is not transitory. It
predated Saddam Hussein's aggression and will survive it. Long
after all our troops come home--and we all hope it is soon, very
soon--there will be a lasting role for the United States in assisting
the nations of the Persian Gulf. Our role then--to deter future
aggression. Our role is to help our friends in their own self-
defense, and, something else, to curb the proliferation of chemical,
biological, ballistic missile, and, above all, nuclear technologies.
Let me also make clear that the United States has no quarrel
with the Iraqi people. Our quarrel is with Iraq's dictator and with
his aggression. Iraq will not be permitted to annex Kuwait. That is
not a threat; that is not a boast; that is just the way it is going to
be.
Putting Our Economic House in Order
Our ability to function effectively as a great power abroad depends
on how we conduct ourselves at home. Our economy, our armed
forces, our energy dependence, and our cohesion all determine
whether we can help our friends and stand up to our foes.
For America to lead, America must remain strong and vital.
Our world leadership and domestic strength are mutual and
reinforcing; a woven piece, strongly bound as Old Glory. To
revitalize our leadership, our leadership capacity, we must address
our budget deficit--not after election day or next year, but now.
Higher oil prices slow our growth, and higher defense costs
would only make our fiscal deficit problem worse. That deficit was
already greater than it should have been--a projected $232 billion
for the coming year. It must--it will--be reduced.
To my friends in Congress, together we must act this very
month--before the next fiscal year begins on October 1st--to get
America's economic house in order. The gulf situation helps us
realize we are more economically vulnerable than we ever should
be. Americans must never again enter any crisis--economic or
military--with an excessive dependence on foreign oil and an
excessive burden of federal debt.
Most Americans are sick and tired of endless battles in the
Congress and between the branches over budget matters. It is high
time we pulled together and get the job done right. It's up to us to
straighten this out.
This job has four basic parts.
First, the Congress should, this month, within a budget
agreement, enact growth-oriented tax measures--to help avoid
recession in the short term and to increase savings, investment,
productivity, and competitiveness for the longer term. These
measures include extending incentives for research and
experimentation; expanding the use of IRAs for new homeowners;
establishing tax-deferred family savings accounts; creating
incentives for the creation of enterprise zones and initiatives to
encourage more domestic drilling; and, yes, reducing the tax rate on
capital gains.
Second, the Congress should, this month, enact a prudent
multi-year defense program, one that reflects not only the
improvement in East-West relations but our broader
responsibilities to deal with the continuing risks of outlaw action
and regional conflict. Even with our obligations in the gulf, a sound
defense budget can have some reduction in real terms, and we are
prepared to accept that. But to go beyond such levels, where cutting
defense would threaten our vital margin of safety, is something I
will never accept. The world is still dangerous, and surely, that is
now clear. Stability is not secure. American interests are far
reaching. Interdependence has increased. The consequences of
regional instability can be global. This is no time to risk America's
capacity to protect its vital interests.
Third, the Congress should, this month, enact measures to
increase domestic energy production and energy conservation in
order to reduce dependence on foreign oil. These measures should
include my proposals to increase incentives for domestic oil and
gas exploration, fuel-switching, and to accelerate the development
of the Alaskan energy resources without damage to wildlife. As you
know, when the oil embargo was imposed in the early 1970s, the
United States imported almost 6 million barrels of oil a day. This
year, before the Iraqi invasion, US imports had risen to nearly 8
million barrels per day. We had moved in the wrong direction, and
now we must act to correct that trend.
Fourth, the Congress should, this month, enact a 5-year
program to reduce the projected debt and deficits by $500 billion--
that is, by half a trillion dollars. If, with the Congress, we can
develop a satisfactory program by the end of the month, we can
avoid the axe of sequester--deep, across-the-board cuts that would
threaten our military capacity and risk substantial domestic
disruption.
I want to be able to tell the American people that we have
truly solved the deficit problem. For me to do that, a budget
agreement must meet these tests.
-- It must include the measures I have recommended to
increase economic growth and reduce dependence on foreign oil.
-- It must be fair. All should contribute, but the burden
should not be excessive for any one group or of programs or people.
-- It must address the growth of government's hidden
liabilities.
-- It must reform the budget process, and, further, it must be
real. I urge Congress to provide a comprehensive 5-year deficit
reduction program to me as a complete legislative package, with
measures to assure that it can be fully enforced. America is tired
of phoney deficit reduction, or promise-now, save-later plans. It is
time for a program that is credible and real.
-- Finally, to the extent that the deficit reduction program
includes new revenue measures, it must avoid any measure that
would threaten economic growth or turn us back toward the days of
punishing income tax rates. That is one path we should not head
down again.
I have been pleased with recent progress, although it has not
always seemed so smooth. But now it is time to produce.
I hope we can work out a responsible plan. But with or
without agreement from the budget summit, I ask both Houses of
the Congress to allow a straight up-or-down vote on a complete
$500-billion deficit reduction package not later than September 28.
If the Congress cannot get me a budget, then Americans will have to
face a tough, mandated sequester.
I am hopeful, in fact, I am confident that the Congress will do
what it should. And I can assure you that we in the executive
branch will do our part.
Meeting Responsibilities Abroad
In the final analysis, our ability to meet our responsibilities abroad
depends upon political will and consensus at home. This is never
easy in democracies, for we govern only with the consent of the
governed. Although free people in a free society are bound to have
their differences, Americans traditionally come together in times
of adversity and challenge.
Once again, Americans have stepped forward to share a tearful
good-bye with their families before leaving for a strange and
distant shore. At this very moment, they serve together with
Arabs, Europeans, Asians, and Africans in defense of principle and
the dream of a new world order. That is why they sweat and toil in
the sand and the heat and the sun.
If they can come together under such adversity; if old
adversaries like the Soviet Union and the United States can work in
common cause; then surely we who are so fortunate to be in this
great chamber--Democrats, Republicans, liberals, conservatives--
can come together to fulfill our responsibilities here.
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2>
Title: US-USSR Statement
Region: Eurasia
Country: USSR (former), United States, Iraq
Subject: Military Affairs
Following is the joint statement of the United States and the Soviet
Union issued by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev after their meeting
in Helsinki, Finland, September 9, 1990.
We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be
tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger
states can devour their smaller neighbors.
We reaffirm the joint statement of our Foreign Ministers of
August 3, 1990 and our support for United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665. Today, we once again call
upon the Government of Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from
Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government,
and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait.
Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United
Nations Security Council Resolutions is acceptable.
Nothing short of a return to the pre-August 2 status of Kuwait
can end Iraq's isolation.
We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the
sanctions mandated by the United Nations, and we pledge to work,
individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the
sanctions. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union
recognize that UN Security Council Resolution 661 permits, in
humanitarian circumstances, the importation into Iraq and Kuwait
of food. The Sanctions Committee will make recommendations to
the Security Council on what would constitute humanitarian
circumstances. The United States and the Soviet Union further
agree that any such imports must be strictly monitored by the
appropriate international agencies to ensure that food reaches only
those for whom it is intended, with special priority being given to
meeting the needs of children.
Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will
be united against Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists.
However, we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the
current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional
ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond
any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay.
As soon as the objectives mandated by the UN Security Council
resolutions mentioned above have been achieved, and we have
demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the Presidents direct
their Foreign Ministers to work with countries in the region and
outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to
promote peace and stability. It is essential to work actively to
resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.
Both sides will continue to consult each other and initiate measures
to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2>
Title: News Conference Following North Atlantic Council Session
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Opening statement and excerpts from the Secretary's
news conference, Brussels, Belgiumin which he announced an
upcoming trip to Syria
Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Europe, MidEast/North Africa
Country: Syria
Subject: Military Affairs
Before taking your questions, let me review quickly the key points
of our discussions here today.
First,
as I told our Congress last week and
the North Atlantic Council today, we believe Iraq's unprovoked
invasion and continued occupation of Kuwait is a political test of
how the post-Cold War world will work.
The manner in which we and a coalition of democracies
respond will be a measure of how well the institutions of Western
security, that is NATO and the WEU [Western European Union], can
adapt to today's dangers and tomorrow's threats.
Second,
I reviewed the responsibility-sharing
mission that our Secretary of the Treasury [Nicholas Brady] and I
have been pursuing in the last week. We refer to this mission as
"responsibility sharing" quite deliberately.
The costs of undoing Iraqi aggression undoubtedly will be a
burden to all of us. But the overriding responsibility of building a
more peaceful world justifies such a burden.
My trip to the gulf states and Egypt, I think, was particularly
productive: politically, economically, and militarily. I found a
regional coalition that is cemented in its stand against Iraqi
aggression. In Egypt, President Mubarak made both political and
military commitments to support a regional alliance against
Saddam Hussein. And the gulf states have made an extremely
significant commitment. Having just spoken to our ambassadors in
Saudi Arabia and the UAE [United Arab Emirates] on my way to NATO
today, I am pleased to announce that the commitments of Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates for the remainder of
this year now approximate $12 billion. This commitment includes
economic assistance to countries such as Egypt and Turkey on the
front lines of the economic embargo with Iraq.
Roughly half of this $12 billion will go to offset the costs of
the American military effort in the gulf. A substantial part of their
contribution will be "in-kind" payments: fuel, water, food, and other
essential materiel. This points, I think, to a central fact of the
responsibility-sharing effort, and that is that money alone is not
enough. The billions of dollars that have been pledged are
invaluable. But all the money in the world cannot create the airlift
and sealift capabilities that are required today to move heavy
forces into place and to return refugees home. The industrialized
democracies of Europe and Asia who have extensive airlift and
sealift capabilities can help by making ships and planes available
for this critical need. I heard from my colleagues around the table
this morning that there is a willingness to respond positively in
this area.
Third,
I reviewed President Bush's meeting
with President Gorbachev yesterday.
From the outset of this conflict let me say that the Soviets
have been very reliable partners in the worldwide coalition that has
successfully isolated Saddam Hussein.
In his discussions with President Bush, President Gorbachev
reaffirmed his commitment to seeing the Iraqi aggression reversed.
There were really no major substantive differences between the
two leaders as to how the conflict in the gulf should be managed. In
particular, I would like to stress Soviet support for the bottom line
reflected in yesterday's joint statement [see page 92]: "Nothing
short of the complete implementation of the United Nations
Security Council Resolutions is acceptable." Around the table today
here at NATO, our NATO colleagues also united behind this idea or
principle of no partial solutions.
Finally, I told my colleagues of the need to look to the future.
Once our short-term objectives are met and this particular case of
Iraqi aggression is redressed, we are still going to need to stand
together to prevent potential future Iraqi aggression.
Clearly, peace-loving governments in the Persian Gulf and the
international community will need to consider creative,
multilateral arrangements to ensure against future aggression.
Governments in the region, along with the permanent members
of the UN Security Council, need to consider intrusive
internationally-sanctioned measures and procedures to diminish the
threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Clearly, the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty needs strengthening and perhaps other
measures will be needed as well, if an outlaw like Saddam Hussein
can be only years away from having a nuclear capability.
So the bottom line is simple: Saddam Hussein's aggression
against Kuwait cannot stand, and the world has got to know that he
will be incapable of future aggression, as well.
Visit to Syria
Q: There's an expectation growing now that you're going to
make a visit to Syria. I wondered if you could tell us the purpose,
and I wondered also if you could tell us if the Syrians will receive
either military aid or financial aid, or some combination. The
Egyptians have received a combination; the Saudis are to get new
weapons. You just spoke of proliferation of weapons. One of the
countries that the US used to be concerned about was Syria. Could
you please go into that subject a little bit?
A: Well, to pick one of those questions out of the middle, it's
my understanding that some of the gulf countries have already made
certain commitments to Syria. Secondly, the President has asked
me to go to Damascus, and I will be going there upon leaving
Moscow: I think it's Thursday night for meetings Friday morning
[September 14].
I don't think anything highlights more the isolation of Saddam
Hussein in the Arab world than Syria's opposition to Iraq's invasion
and occupation of Kuwait. It has contributed forces to the
multinational effort--significant forces. I think its presence is
significant. Its position in this matter is certainly significant,
situated as it is on the northern border of Iraq with substantial
forces at its disposal.
The United States has not had good relations with Syria in the
past and we would like to see an improvement in those relations,
but such an improvement is going to depend on some factors other
than the fact that we now find ourselves aligned on the same side
of this issue. We continue to have certain differences with Syria--
and we expect to discuss those differences--as well as to discuss
our mutual interest in continuing to see Saddam Hussein isolated,
and to see a reversal, if you will, of this unprovoked aggression.
Q: What will you be asking of Hafez al-Assad? Are you asking
anything specific from him other than just patting him on the back?
What is the real purpose here?
A: As I've indicated to you we think that Syria's position in
all of this is very important; it is quite significant. They have sent
forces to the region. We would be very interested, frankly, in the
Syrians' assessment of the situation and their view, particularly of
the position of perhaps some other Arab countries. And the
President felt simply that it was an important time for us to have a
face-to-face dialogue with the leaders of Syria.
Q: To underscore what he's done?
A: Syria has been very supportive of the international effort
that has been made to isolate Saddam Hussein. They've been
supportive obviously of the UN resolutions, and they are supportive
of the fact of the US presence in Saudi Arabia. And it's important
that we have a face-to-face discussion of the situation in the gulf
and how we might be able to cooperate to achieve what happen to be
mutual goals.
Syria and Terrorism
Q: Syria is on the State Department list of countries that
support terrorism. Syria has been implicated by the State
Department and the CIA in the Pan Am 103 bombing. It has been
State Department policy to isolate Syria up until this point. I don't
understand how, because they support us on this one issue, you can
just suddenly throw all that out and turn around and pat them on the
back by making a visit--the first visit by a high-level official to
Syria in years.
A: I just said we still have difficulties with Syria. You just
pointed up some of the major difficulties, and we will use the
occasion of this visit to discuss those difficulties with them as
well. And it's very important, it seems to me, in a situation such as
we have in the gulf that we cooperate with a major Arab country
who happens to share the same goals that we do. That does not
mean that the formerly strained relations are cured overnight, and
it doesn't mean that we will not continue to have some differences.
And I am quite sure they will probably continue to have some
differences with the United States. But on these issues, and on this
very, very important issue of what happens to reverse Iraq's
unprovoked aggression, we share the same goals.
Q: Will you be asking, among other things, that Syria expel the
PFLP-GC [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command], the terrorist group said to be responsible for the Pan Am
103 bombing?
A: We will continue to talk to the Syrians about the PFLP-GC,
and we will continue to share with them the difficulties we have
with the presence of that group in Syria, and the difficulties we
have with the presence with the group itself. Let me remind you
that I met with the foreign minister of Syria at the United Nations
about a year ago and had a conversation with him at that time, and
we continue to make our position known to the Syrians through our
ambassador in Damascus. It's not as if we don't have relations with
Syria. We do have relations with Syria. . . .
Comments on Syria Visit
Following is an excerpt from a press conference held by Secretary
Baker and Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, Rome Italy,
September 14, 1990.
I have just come from Syria. And my trip to Syria, I think, should
demonstrate the isolation of Saddam Hussein, because it is a fact
that relations between the United States and Syria have not been
good. There are still problems, as I mentioned in a press conference
in Damascus before coming here. There are still problems in that
relationship, and we make no secret of that.
We have problems, frankly, with Syria's support of terrorism,
and I talked frankly with President Assad about that. Having said
that, we do share with Syria a common goal: to resist the
unprovoked aggression of Iraq into Kuwait and to see that
aggression reversed and to see a reinstitution of the legitimate
government of Kuwait. We cannot dilute, or in any way walk away
from, full enforcement of unanimous resolutions passed by the
Security Council.
Secretary of State Visits to Syria (chart)
Listed as Date; Secretary Name, Purpose of Visit
September 13-14, 1990;Baker;Met with President Assad and
discussed Persian Gulf crisis. Noted continued US concerns with
Syrian support for terrorism.
June 6, 1988; Shultz; Discussed a Middle East peace initiative.
April 5, 1988; Shultz; Discussed a Middle East peace initiative.
March 4, 1988; Shultz; Discussed a Middle East peace initiative.
February 27, 1988; Shultz; Met with President Assad and Foreign
Minister Khaddam regarding a Middle East peace initiative.
July 5-6, 1983; Shultz; Discussed means of withdrawing foreign
forces from Lebanon.
May 6, 1983; Shultz; Discussed the proposed Israeli-Lebanon
agreement with President Assad.
September 24, 1978; Vance; Reviewed the Camp David Accords with
President Assad.
December 13-14, 1977; Vance ; Reviewed the Middle East peace
process.
August 3-5, 1977; Vance; Reviewed the Middle East peace process
with President Assad. Revisited Syria August 11.
February 20-21, 1977; Vance; Met with President Assad; reviewed
the Middle East peace process.
September 3, 1975; Kissinger; Briefed President Assad on the
Middle East peace process.
August 23, 1975; Kissinger; Briefed President Assad on the peace
process.
March 15, 1975; Kissinger; Briefed President Assad on the Egyptian-
Israeli peace process.
March 9, 1975; Kissinger; Reviewed Middle East peace process with
President Assad.
February 13, 1975; Kissinger ; Briefed President Assad on the
Middle East peace process.
November 7, 1974; Kissinger; Discussed the Middle East peace
process with President Assad.
October 14, 1974; Kissinger; Reviewed the peace process with
President Assad.
October 11, 1974; Kissinger; Reviewed the Middle East peace
process with President Assad.
June 15-16, 1974; Kissinger; Accompanied President Nixon.
May 3-29, 1974; Kissinger; Shuttle negotiations leading to an
Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement. Kissinger was in
Damascus May 3-4, 12, 14, 16-17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28,
and 29.
March 1-2, 1974; Kissinger; Presented an Israeli
proposal for military disengagement to President Assad.
February 26, 1974; Kissinger; Met with President Assad.
January 20, 1974; Kissinger; Briefed President Assad on the
Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement.
December 15, 1973; Kissinger; Met with President Assad to discuss
the Middle East peace process.
May 15-16, 1953; Dulles ; Met with President Shishakli.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2>
Title: Country Profile: Syria
Date: Sep 17, 19909/17/90
Category: Country Data
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Syria
Subject: History, Trade/Economics,
International Organizations
[TEXT]
Official Name: Syrian Arab Republic
Geography
Area: 185,170 sq. km. (71,500 sq. mi.), about the size of North
Dakota.
Cities: Capital--Damascus, population about 4 million). Other
cities--Aleppo (about 1.5 million), Homs (about 400,000).
Terrain: Coastal zone separated by a narrow double mountain belt
from a depression to the west, deserts, and a much larger eastern
plateau containing the Euphrates River.
Climate: Predominantly dry; about three-fifths of the country has
less than 25 centimeters of rain annually.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective -- Syrian(s).
Population (1989 est.): 13 million .
Annual growth rate: 3.6%.
Ethnic groups: Arab 90%; Kurds, Armenians, Circassians, Turkmen.
Religions: Sunni Muslims 70%, other Muslim sects 20%, Christians
10%, small Jewish and Yazidi communities.
Languages: Arabic (official), English, French, Kurdish, Armenian.
Education: Years compulsory--primary 6 years. Attendance--94%.
Literacy--78%.
Health: Infant mortality rate-- 42/1,000. Life expectancy--59
yrs.
Work force (3.1 million): Agriculture--32%. Industry and
commerce--29%. Services (including government)--39%.
Government
Type: Republic, under Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party regimes, since
March 1963.
Independence: April 17, 1946.
Constitution: March 12, 1973.
Branches: Executive--president (chief of state) and prime minister
(head of government). Legislative--People's Council. Judicial--
Supreme Court.
Administrative subdivisions: 13 provinces and city of Damascus
(administered as a separate unit).
Political parties: Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba'ath) Party, Syrian
Arab Socialist Union, Unionist Socialist, Arab Union Socialist Party,
Communist Party of Syria.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.
Central government budget (1989): $5.1 billion. Current
expenditures--$3.2 billion. Development projects--$1.9 billion.
Defense (1989): 46% of current government expenditures.
Flag: Comprises a red band (top), a white band (center) with two
green stars, and a black band (bottom).
Economy
GDP (1988): $15.83 billion, current prices converted at the official
rate.
Annual growth rate: 1988, 11% in real terms; 1987, -9.5% in real
terms.
Per capita GDP: $1,318 in nominal terms converted at the official
rate.
Natural resources: Crude oil and natural gas, phosphates, asphalt,
rock salt, marble, gypsum.
Agriculture (27% of GDP): Products--cotton, wheat, barley, sugar
beets, fruits, vegetables. Arable land--48%.
Industry: Mining and manufacturing--26%; building and
construction--8%; transportation and communication--7%.
Trade (1988): Exports--$1.4 billion: petroleum, textiles,
phosphates, fruits and vegetables, cotton. Major markets--EC,
Eastern Europe, USSR. Imports--$2.2 billion: machinery and metal
products, wheat and flour. Major suppliers--EC, Eastern Europe,
Japan.
Exchange rates: (Syrian pound): Official 11.2 S.P.=US$1.
Promotional 20 S.P.=$1. Airline 18 S.P.=US$1. Offshore 44
S.P.=US$1 as of January 1990.
Fiscal year: calendar year.
International Affiliations
UN and most of its specialized agencies, Arab League, Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Non-Aligned Movement,
Group of 77, International Olive Oil Council, Interparliamentary
Union, International Whaling Commission, World Tourist
Organization, INTELSAT, Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), World Federation of Trade Unions.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2>
Title: Country Profile: Jordan
Date: Sep 17, 19909/17/90
Category: Country Data
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Jordan
Subject: History, Trade/Economics,
International Organizations
[TEXT]
Official Name: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Geography (1)
Area: 91,000 sq. km. (35,000 sq. mi.).
Cities: Capital--Amman (pop. 648,000). Other cities--Irbid
(112,000), Az-Zarqa (215,000).
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Jordanian(s).
Population (1989 est.): 3.2 million.
Religions: Sunni Muslim 95%, Christian 5%.
Languages: Arabic (official), English.
Education: Literacy--71%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--50/1,000. Life expectancy--64 yrs.
Ethnic groups: Mostly Arab, but small communities of Circassians,
Armenians, and Kurds.
Work force: Agriculture--80%. Manufacturing and mining--20%.
Government
Type: Constitutional monarchy.
Independence: May 25, 1946.
Constitution: January 8, 1952.
Branches: Executive--king (chief of state), prime minister (head of
government), Council of Ministers (cabinet). Legislative--bicameral
National Assembly (appointed Senate, elected Chamber of Deputies).
Judicial--civil, religious, special courts.
Political party: Only the government-sponsored Arab National Union
is officially recognized.
Suffrage: Universal.
Administrative subdivisions: Eight governorates--Irbid, al-Mafraq,
al-Zarqa, Amman, al-Balqa, al-Karak, al-Tafilah, and Ma'an.
Defense: About 12% of GNP.
Flag: Three horizontal bands of black, white, and green joined at the
staff by a red triangle with a white star in the middle.
Economy
GDP (1989): $4 billion.
Annual growth rate (1989): 0%.
Per capita GDP (1989 est.): $1,000.
Natural resources: Phosphate, potash.
Agriculture: Products--fruits, vegetables, wheat, olive oil. Land--
11% arable.
Industry (20% of GDP): Type--phosphate mining, manufacturing,
cement, and petroleum production.
Trade (1989): Exports--$1 billion: fertilizer, phosphates,
pharmaceuticals, fruits, vegetables. Major markets--formerly Iraq,
India, Saudi Arabia, Romania, China. Imports--$2.7 billion:
machinery, transportation equipment, cereals, petroleum products.
Major suppliers--US, UK, FRG, Iraq, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Syria.
Fiscal year: Calendar year.
US economic aid received: $1.6 billion (1946-87)--loans, grants,
PL 480 (Food for Peace) programs.
International Affiliations
UN and several of its specialized and related agencies, including the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), World Health Organization (WHO), World Bank,
International Monetary Fund (IMF); Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), INTELSAT, Nonaligned Movement, Arab League.
(1) From 1949 to 1967, Jordan administered that part of former
mandate Palestine west of the Jordan River known as the West
Bank. Since the 1967 war, when Israel took control of this
territory, the United States has considered the West Bank to be
territory occupied by Israel. The United States believes that the
final status of the West Bank can be determined only through
negotiations among the parties concerned on the basis of Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The US view is that self-
government for the Palestinians of the West Bank in association
with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just, and lasting
peace.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2>
Title: The Second Decade: Panama and the Canal Treaties
Date: Sep 17, 19909/17/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: Central America
Country: Panama
Subject: International Law, Development/Relief Aid
Background
In 1989, the United States and Panama celebrated the 75th
anniversary of the opening of the Panama Cana, and the end of the
first decade of operation under the 1977 Panama Canal treaties.
The Senate ratified the treaties in 1978, and Congress enacted
implementing legislation in the Panama Canal Act of 1979; the two
treaties entered into force on October 1, 1979. The Panama Canal
treaty governs the operation and defense of the canal until its
transfer to Panama on December 31, 1999. Military units of the US
Southern Command will remain in Panama until that date to assure
the canal's defense. Under the treaty, the US has primary
responsibility for operating and managing the canal through a US
government agency, the Panama Canal Commission (PCC).
The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation
of the Panama Canal guarantees the canal's availability to ships of
all nations on a non-discriminatory basis in peace and war. Under
this treaty, both the US and Panama have a unilateral right to
defend the canal against any threats, and US warships have the right
to transit the canal expeditiously and without conditions.
Treaty Implementation
The Panama Canal treaties were controversial in both Panama and
the United States. However, during the early 1980s,
implementation of the treaties helped reduce bilateral tensions. US
civilian and military personnel work closely with Panamanian
officials to manage the canal.
The Panama Canal Commission, supervised by a board of
directors composed of five Americans and four Panamanians,
operates the canal. This includes setting tolls and ensuring long-
term effective operation through continuing maintenance and
modernization. The PCC has fulfilled an important US treaty
responsibility by increasing Panamanian participation in the canal
workforce from 69% in 1979 to 86% at the end of 1989. The last
formal step the US must complete before transferring the canal to
Panama in 1999 is the appointment of a Panamanian as PCC
administrator, but a challenging period of preparation for full
transition lies ahead. On April 30, 1990, President Bush nominated
Dr. Gilberto Guardia Fabrega, Panama's designee, to serve as canal
administrator.
Modernization Options
The United States and Panama, with Japan, are also studying
alternatives to, or modifications of, the existing canal system. The
purpose is to provide for the canal's continuing commercial
viability. Some options under consideration are a sea-level canal,
widening the canal to permit two-way traffic, adding a third lane of
locks to accommodate larger ships, and modernizing port facilities.
Bilateral Relations
Beginning in mid-1987, a major internal political crisis in Panama
seriously disrupted bilateral relations. At the root of the crisis
was the refusal of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) commander,
Manuel Noriega, to relinquish power to civilian authorities. In
February 1988, Noriega seized complete control of the government
after US courts had indicted him on drug-trafficking charges and
after Panama's constitutional president, Eric Arturo Delvalle, had
attempted to remove him as PDF commander.
The United States refused to recognize the Noriega regime,
suspended all assistance to Panama, and ended all diplomatic
contacts with the regime. US economic sanctions imposed in April
1988 prevented US government agencies, businesses, or citizens
from making most payments to the regime. Those payments due to
Panama under the Panama Canal Treaty were paid to the legitimate
government of President Delvalle and deposited in escrow accounts.
In May 1989, the Noriega regime annulled a national election after
the electorate voted by more than 3 to 1 for the democratic
opposition. Noriega survived efforts by PDF elements to oust him
from office in March 1988 and October 1989 and ruled increasingly
through repression.
The political crisis adversely affected the exercise of some
US treaty rights and bilateral cooperation on treaty implementation.
In early 1989, the Noriega regime embarked on a systematic
campaign to harass US and Panamanian employees of US government
agencies in Panama. By interfering with US freedom of movement
rights under the treaty, Noriega sought to force the United States to
change its non-recognition policy and lift economic sanctions. The
absence of a legitimate government prevented Panama from
nominating a Panamanian citizen for appointment by the United
States as PCC administrator by January 1, 1990. Throughout the
crisis, the Noriega regime attempted to manipulate treaty issues
for its political benefit and unsuccessfully sought to persuade
Panamanians that the US would not transfer the canal to Panama.
For 2 years, the United States tried by various means short of
military force, including recourse to multilateral diplomacy, to
assist the democratic opposition in Panama in resolving the crisis.
This included a concerted multilateral diplomacy effort led by the
Organization of American States. After the second coup attempt in
October 1989, violence and lawlessness intensified. In mid-
December, the regime declared that a state of war existed between
Panama and the US. This downward spiral culminated in the killing
of an unarmed off-duty US military officer and a life-threatening
assault on another US officer and his wife by members of the PDF.
Facing a rapidly deteriorating security situation, President
Bush ordered US troops into Panama on December 20, 1989, to
protect US citizens, to meet US treaty responsibilities to defend
the canal, to assist in restoring democracy, and to bring Noriega to
justice. The Panamanian people overwhelmingly welcomed
Operation Just Cause as a liberation. The democratic opposition--
certified by Panama's electoral tribunal as winners of the May 1989
election--formed a new government led by President Guillermo
Endara. By February 15, 1990, the number of US troops in Panama
was below the level prior to Operation Just Cause.
Economic Assistance
Before concluding the troop withdrawal, the United States began to
provide assistance to promote Panama's economic and political
recovery. In early February 1990, the Congress approved an initial
$42 million for job creation, public services, housing for displaced
people, and loans to small businesses hurt by looting. The US also
dismantled its economic sanctions against Panama and restored
Panama's eligibility for US economic program--including
Generalized System of Preferences, Caribbean Basin Initiative,
Export-Import Bank, US sugar quota, and Overseas Private
Investment Corporation insurance. In May, Congress approved an
assistance package providing an additional $420 million to help
finance private sector revitalization, rehabilitate Panama's
infrastructure, help clear Panama's arrears to international lending
institutions, and restructure and develop the public sector.
With a freely elected Panamanian government in office, both
countries are optimistic that the terms of the treaties will be fully
carried out and that the second decade of operation will mark a new
era in US-Panamanian relations. In the spirit of this new
relationship, President Endara met with President Bush at the White
House in April 1990.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2>
Title: Diplomatic Efforts to Achieve a Cambodian Settlement
Kimmitt
Source: Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs
Description: Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
on Asian and Pacific Affairs
Date: Sep 12, 19909/12/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Cambodia
Subject: United Nations, Democratization
[TEXT]
I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss our very active
diplomatic efforts to achieve a Cambodian settlement based on the
framework agreement that representatives of the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council completed in New York on
August 28.
The past 2 months have seen a dramatic upswing in the
prospects for a peaceful settlement to the Cambodian conflict. As a
result of a combination of diplomatic efforts by a number of
countries--including, I'm pleased to say, some well-timed
initiatives by the United States--a major step has been taken
toward a comprehensive political settlement. Reflecting the new
spirit of the post-Cold War era, the permanent five [permanent
members of the UN Security Council] have produced a settlement
framework that has been welcomed around the world and that was
accepted by the four Cambodian parties on September 10 at a
pivotal meeting in Jakarta [Indonesia]. Contributing to this result
were the policy revisions announced by Secretary Baker on July 18
in Paris, which led to our opening of talks with the Vietnamese, as
well as our decision to begin a dialogue with the Hun Sen regime.
The flexibility and constructive approach of the Soviets and the
Chinese have also contributed to this successful first step.
We join the Congress in unalterable opposition to the Khmer
Rouge shooting its way back into power. As Secretary Baker has
repeatedly stressed, we want to move the conflict off the
battlefield, where the Khmer Rouge thrive, to the negotiating table.
We seek a neutral political process under UN auspices, culminating
in the free and fair election of a legitimate government which we
hope will end the death and suffering in Cambodia.
Our Objectives
Our objectives in Cambodia remain unchanged:
-- Creating a neutral political process culminating in free
and fair elections under UN auspices;
-- Verifying the withdrawal of all foreign forces; and
-- Above all, building into the settlement process procedures
that would guard against the Khmer Rouge again imposing their
violent rule on the Cambodian people.
Through permanent five and regional efforts over the past 9
months, we have helped to build a broad consensus on the outlines
of a comprehensive solution, with the United Nations playing a
central role. The permanent five framework includes military and
peacekeeping procedures, transitional administrative arrangements,
guidelines for the election process, international guarantees, and
human rights' protections. We are committed to the permanent five
formula as the most promising basis for a just and durable
settlement. We believe this framework agreement formula, if
actively supported by all parties involved, is also the best way to
build into a settlement credible guarantees against a Khmer Rouge
return to violent domination of Cambodia.
US Policy Revisions
For our part, Secretary Baker announced in recent weeks certain
steps designed to widen the range of US diplomatic activity in
support of the permanent five process as part of a series of
revisions to our Cambodian policy. Our overall goals have not
changed--but circumstances have evolved. We substantially
realized our strategic objective when the bulk of Vietnam's combat
units withdrew last year. Now we want to encourage formal
acceptance by all parties of the permanent five framework
agreement--and we want to maintain strong support for our policy
at home.
We have initiated dialogue with Hanoi to include the subject
of Cambodia, meeting with Vietnamese representatives in New York
twice last month. More recently, Secretary Baker directed that we
initiate direct discussion with Phnom Penh representatives in
Vientiane, Laos, the only capital in Southeast Asia where both the
US and the Phnom Penh regime have embassies. We also met with
Hun Sen in Jakarta--on an exceptional basis--in order to encourage
his personal participation in efforts to form a Supreme National
Council [SNC]. We have used these contacts to make clear to Hanoi
and Phnom Penh the need for cooperation on their parts to achieve a
political settlement. We are also able to answer directly their
concerns about the permanent five process--adding our views to
those being offered by the Soviet Union, China, France, and the
United Kingdom.
Secretary Baker also announced in mid-July that we can no
longer support the resistance coalition's holding [of] Cambodia's UN
seat, so long as that coalition includes the Khmer Rouge. We, along
with the vast majority of UN members, supported the coalition's UN
credentials in the past because we did not--and do not--see the
Vietnamese-installed Hun Sen regime as a superior claimant to the
seat. Yet I should stress that we do not now--and never have--
recognized, supported, or otherwise dealt with the resistance
coalition as a whole, precisely because it includes the Khmer Rouge.
For the future, we want the seat to be occupied by a freely elected
government, and pending that development, the seat should be held
by Cambodians committed to free and fair elections appointed by
the Supreme National Council.
Along with these steps, we are also easing licensing
restrictions on humanitarian programs for Vietnam and Cambodia
to indicate our openness to new relationships once the Cambodian
conflict is resolved. And we are working to implement a new
program, mandated by the Congress, that is designed to aid
Cambodian children; both those within the country and those in
camps along the Thai-Cambodian border.
Cambodian Factions Meet in Jakarta
We believe this combination of actions on our part--direct talks
with Hanoi and Phnom Penh, non-support for the resistance
coalition in the UNGA [UN General Assembly] seat, a more
forthcoming posture on humanitarian assistance--should be
effective in eliciting flexibility and cooperation from the various
parties involved in the Cambodian conflict. We are encouraged to
see that the four Cambodian factions, meeting in Jakarta last
weekend, announced their acceptance of the permanent five
framework agreement as the basis for a Cambodian settlement and
announced the formation of an SNC. We hope the SNC will have its
first meeting in the near future, and that it will work with the
Paris conference participants and the UN to implement the
permanent five framework agreement.
Next Steps
Until last weekend's Jakarta meeting, only the three resistance
factions had endorsed the permanent five formula. Our recent
decision to talk directly to Phnom Penh representatives, rather than
relying on intermediaries, was a logical step toward encouraging
Phnom Penh also to accept and actively support the permanent five
framework agreement, and to use our influence to bring about the
early formation of a Supreme National Council based on this
framework.
We believe the Phnom Penh regime realizes that its position
is slowly deteriorating, although the military situation during the
ongoing rainy season is currently stalemated. The Khmer Rouge lack
the heavy weapons to take and hold population centers, but the
Phnom Penh army lacks the ability to contain the resistance forces.
We believe the Phnom Penh regime must soon realize that the
permanent five framework agreement offers the best possibility of
reestablishing peace for the Cambodian people.
The early formation by the Cambodian parties of a Supreme
National Council based on the permanent five formula was a crucial
next step following the conclusion of the framework agreement by
the five. This was the primary goal of the Jakarta meeting, co-
chaired by the organizers of the Paris conference--Indonesia and
France. We expect that formation of an SNC will resolve the
question of Cambodia's UN representation. Acceptance by the
Cambodians of the overall framework agreement will allow them to
work with the UN, and the Paris Conference on Cambodia, to design
the details of a comprehensive settlement process based on an
enhanced UN role; this will lead to free and fair elections, organized
and conducted by the UN.
Non-communist Aid Still Needed
As we make diplomatic progress, I would point out that it is vital
that the United States sustain our current non-lethal aid program
for the non-communist organizations of Prince Sihanouk and the
Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) until an overall
settlement is actually achieved. We are moving to a political
process where non-communist strengths will come into play; where
the non-communist parties can provide the Cambodian people an
alternative to the communists in a free and fair election campaign.
In this context, cutting off aid to the non-communists would
undercut their position-- and our credibility--just as the
diplomatic process appears to moving toward a conclusion.
I know that there is concern that some of our non-lethal aid
may have ended up in Khmer Rouge hands or has indirectly assisted
that murderous group. Nothing would be more abhorrent to me, to
the Secretary, or to the President, and we have constantly reviewed
our compliance with Section 906 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985. We do not believe any of our
assistance has been diverted to the Khmer Rouge, or that it has
enhanced the combat capacity of the Khmer Rouge in any other way,
as prohibited by that section.
We have raised this issue repeatedly with the non-communist
military leaders. Prince Ranariddh, who commands the Sihanoukist
forces, and his counterpart in the KPNLF, General Sak Sutsakhan,
wrote to [this subcommittee] in July, confirming that no US aid has
gone to the Khmer Rouge and outlining clear directives to their field
commanders to ensure against any such diversion or military
cooperation in the future.
I assure you that we will immediately cease our materiel
support for any non-communist resistance organization if reliable
intelligence demonstrates that the legal prohibition applies.
Cambodia--the Alternatives
The alternatives for Cambodia are clear: either a negotiated
settlement, or continuing warfare. The diplomatic approach is
difficult and has presented us with controversial choices. Yet in
recent weeks a great deal of progress has been made through the
permanent five process. The battlefield is an unacceptable
alternative, not least because it gives the Khmer Rouge its best
chance for a violent return to power. While our ability to influence
events in Cambodia is limited, we have helped advance the
prospects for peace--through the permanent five process--in that
unhappy country. If we are to remain active and effective in the
search for a political settlement, we--the Congress and the
executive branch--must continue to work closely. I believe that the
objectives we seek justify, indeed compel, our continuing
involvement in that search, and I hope the Congress will maintain
its bipartisan support for our participation in this process.
We all look forward to a Cambodian settlement which will
bring peace and reconciliation to Southeast Asia, enhance the
region's stability and prosperity, allow the eventual integration of
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos into this economically dynamic region,
and permit the normalization of relations between the United
States and both Cambodia and Vietnam. We hope these goals can be
realized in the near future; delays or failure at this point would
only compound Cambodia's tragic history and again put off the
prospect of broader reconciliation in--and with--Indochina.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2>
Title: Country Profile: Cambodia
Date: Sep 17, 19909/17/90
Category: Country Data
Region: Southeast Asia
Country: Cambodia
Subject: History, Trade/Economics,
International Organizations
[TEXT]
Official Name: Cambodia
Geography
Area: 181,040 sq. km. (69,900 sq. mi.); about the size of Missouri.
Cities: Capital-Phnom Penh (pop. 400,000 est.). Other cities-
Battambang, Siem Reap, Kompong Cham, Kompong Som, Kompong
Thom.
Terrain: Central plain drained by the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) and
Mekong and Bassac Rivers. Heavy forests away from the rivers and
the lake, mountains in the southwest (Cardamom Mountains) and
north (Dangrek Mountains) along the border with Thailand.
Climate: Tropical monsoon with rainy season June-Oct. and dry
season Nov.-May.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective: Cambodian(s), Khmer.
Population: (1989) 6.8 million.
Avg. annual growth rate: 2.2%.
Births: 39 births/1000 population (1989).
Deaths: 17 deaths/1000 population .
Infant mortality: 131 deaths/1000 live births.
Life expectancy: 47 years male/50 years female .
Ethnic groups: Cambodian 90%; Chinese and Vietnamese 5% each;
small numbers of hill tribes, Chams, and Burmese.
Religions: Theravada Buddhism 95%; Islam; animism; atheism.
Languages: Khmer (official) spoken by more than 95% of the
population, including minorities; some French still spoken.
Literacy: about 50%.
Government
Government is disputed between the resistance groups of the
National Government of Cambodia (NGC)--which formerly called
itself the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)--
and the Vietnamese-installed authorities in Phnom Penh: the
People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) -- which now calls itself the
State of Cambodia. No single authority controls the entire country.
Administrative subdivisions: 19 provinces and municipalities.
Independence: November 9, 1953.
Constitution: PRK: April 30, 1989.
Elections: None.
Political parties and leaders: NGC: umbrella organization for the
three resistance groups, including National United Front for an
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
(FUNCINPEC) led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk; Khmer People's
National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son Sann; and the Party of
Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer Rouge) ostensibly led by Khieu
Samphan (all since July 1982); PRK: Kampuchean People's
Revolutionary Party (KPRP), the Communist party installed by
Vietnam in 1979, led by Heng Samrin, KPRP General Secretary and
Chairman of the Council of State since 1981, and Hun Sen, Chairman
of the Council of Ministers since 1985.
Diplomatic Relations: NGC: Brunei, China, Egypt, Indonesia,
Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Yugoslavia;
PRK: Vietnam, Laos, Soviet Union, most East European countries,
India, Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua, Seychelles, and the Saharan
Democratic Arab Republic.
Flag: NGC-two horizontal blue bands, divided by a wider red band on
which is centered a white stylized representation of Angkor Wat;
PRK-a red field with five stylized yellow towers.
Economy
GDP: $570 million (1984).
Per capita GDP: $90 (1984).
Natural resources: Timber, gemstones, some iron ore, manganese
and phosphate, hydroelectric potential from the Mekong River.
Agriculture: About 4,848,000 hectares (12 million acres) are
unforested land; all are arable with irrigation but less than two
million hectares are cultivated.
Products: Rice, rubber, corn, meat, vegetables, dairy products,
sugar, flour.
Industry: Types--rice milling, fishing, wood and wood products,
textiles, cement, some rubber production (largely abandoned since
1975).
Trade: Exports: $3 million (1986)--natural rubber, rice, pepper,
wood; Major partners: Vietnam, USSR, Eastern Europe, Japan, India;
Imports: $17 million (1986)--international food aid, fuels,
consumer goods; Major Partners: Vietnam, USSR, Eastern Europe,
Japan, India. Exchange rate: Approximately 400 riels = $1 (1990).
Economic Aid: Unknown amount from USSR and Eastern Europe to
areas under PRK control. Some humanitarian aid from the UN and
private groups. UN relief efforts coordinated by the Secretary
General's Special Representative for Kampu-chean Humanitarian
Assistance provide more than $58 million per year in assistance
(cash and in-kind contributions) for displaced Cambodians along the
Thai-Cambodian border.
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US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2>
Title: Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Status
Date: Sep 17, 19909/17/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Subject: Trade/Economics, International Law
[TEXT]
Background
Most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment refers to a policy of non-
discrimination in trade. Despite the name, it is, in fact, the norm
for current international trade policy, rather than a preference.
Countries provide customs and tariff treatment equally to all
trading partners granted MFN status.
The emergence of MFN treatment is attributable to the growth
of world commerce in the 15th and 16th centuries, where nations
seeking maximum advantage for their exports granted concessions
in return. Trading nations sought to ensure that they were treated
as well as the "most favored" partner.
GATT
MFN non-discriminatory treatment is one of the most important
principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the main international institution and agreement concerned with
international trade. The United States and 22 other countries
signed the GATT agreement in 1948. Nearly 100 countries
representing almost 90% of total world trade are GATT members
and adhere to MFN principles.
The GATT recognizes that MFN treatment is not necessarily
appropriate in all circumstances and allows some exceptions. The
most significant exceptions concern customs unions and free trade
areas (e.g., the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement) and certain
preferences for less developed countries (LDCs). Under the GATT,
non-reciprocal tariff preferences granted to LDCs under a
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program need not be
extended to countries which otherwise would be entitled to MFN
treatment.
US Policy
The United States grants MFN treatment to most of its trading
partners. Countries generally are entitled to receive MFN treatment
from the United States because of their GATT membership. In a few
cases, MFN treatment is required by a bilateral commercial
agreement or a treaty.
Exports from countries granted MFN treatment are subject to
duty at the lowest available non-preferential rates, i.e., those
listed under "Column I" of the US tariff schedule.
Imports from countries not granted MFN treatment are
assessed duties under "Column II" of the US tariff schedule (rates
set under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930). LDCs eligible for
the US GSP program receive duty-free treatment for about 4,100
products included in that program. Broader duty-free treatment is
provided to the 23 beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
Separate tariff schedules, either duty free or moving toward duty
free, apply to Israel and Canada, with which the United States has
negotiated free trade agreements.
Countries Not Granted MFN Treatment
MFN treatment was withdrawn from most communist countries
under the Trade Expansion Act of 1951, which denied MFN treatment
to any country under the control of the "world communist
movement." The Trade Act of 1974 set new conditions for granting
MFN treatment to non-market economy (communist) countries.
First, a non-market economy country must satisfy or receive a
presidential waiver of the freedom of emigration and certain other
criteria contained in Title IV of the 1974 act. The president may
grant a one-year waiver of the application of the freedom of
emigration provisions of the act (the Jackson-Vanik amendment), if
he determines that extension of the waiver would substantially
promote freedom of emigration. The President also may find a
country in compliance with the amendment (thus making a waiver
unnecessary) by virtue of its liberal emigration law and practices.
The President can withdraw MFN status at any time if he
determines that a country no longer satisfies the Title IV
provisions.
Second, once these conditions have been met or waived, Title
IV also requires conclusion of a bilateral commercial agreement
before MFN status is granted. Among the specific issues that must
be addressed in such agreements are reciprocal granting of MFN
treatment, safeguards, trade promotion, and adequate protection of
intellectual property rights. These agreements have a renewable
term of 3 years.
As of June 1990, Poland, Yugoslavia , Hungary, and China had
MFN status. Poland and Yugoslavia always have been exempt from
the provisions of Title IV. Hungary received annual waivers of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment from 1978 to 1989, when it was found to
be in compliance with the emigration provisions.
In February 1990, the President issued the first annual
waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to
Czechoslovakia. Negotiations on a bilateral commercial agreement
began in March. The United States has signed a bilateral
commercial trade agreement which could grant MFN treatment to
the Soviet Union if Title IV conditions on emigration are met.
Bulgaria, East Germany, and Mongolia also have expressed interest
in MFN treatment. Romania has requested that MFN treatment be
restored, which was lost in 1988 when the previous government
renounced MFN treatment tied to the continued observance of the
Jackson-Vanik conditions.
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