US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991


Toward a New World Order

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address before a joint session of Congress, Washington, DC Date: Sep 11, 19909/11/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait, USSR (former) Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization, Trade/Economics [TEXT] We gather here tonight, witness to events in the Persian Gulf as significant as they are tragic. In the early morning hours of August 2, following negotiations and promises by Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein not to use force, a powerful Iraqi army invaded its trusting and much weaker neighbor, Kuwait. Within 3 days, 120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to check that aggression. At this moment, our brave servicemen and women stand watch in that distant desert and on distant seas, side-by-side with the forces of more than 20 other nations. They are some of the finest men and women of the United States of America, and they're doing one terrific job. These valiant Americans were ready at a moment's notice to leave their spouses and their children, to serve on the front line halfway around the world. They remind us who keeps America strong; they do. In the trying circumstances of the gulf, the morale of our servicemen and women is excellent. In the face of danger, they are brave, well-trained, and dedicated. A soldier, Private First Class Wade Merritt of Knoxville, Tennessee, now stationed in Saudi Arabia, wrote his parents of his worries, his love of family, and his hope for peace. But Wade also wrote, "I am proud of my country and its firm stance against inhumane aggression. I am proud of my army and its men. I am proud to serve my country." Let me just say, Wade, America is proud of you and is grateful to every soldier, sailor, marine, and airman serving the cause of peace in the Persian Gulf. I also want to thank the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell; the chiefs here tonight; our commander in the Persian Gulf, General Schwartzkopf; and the men and women of the Department of Defense. What a magnificent job you all are doing. Thank you very, very much. I wish I could say that their work is done. But we all know it is not. If there ever was a time to put country before self and patriotism before party, the time is now. Let me thank all Americans, especially those here in this chamber tonight, for your support for our forces and for their mission. That support will be even more important in the days to come. Tonight, I want to talk to you about what's at stake--what we must do together to defend civilized values around the world and maintain our economic strength at home.
The Objectives and Goals
Our objectives in the Persian Gulf are clear; our goals defined and familiar. -- Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait completely, immediately, and without condition. -- Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored. -- The security and stability of the Persian Gulf must be assured. -- American citizens abroad must be protected. These goals are not ours alone. They have been endorsed by the UN Security Council five times in as many weeks. Most countries share our concern for principle, and many have a stake in the stability of the Persian Gulf. This is not, as Saddam Hussein would have it, the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq against the world. As you know, I have just returned from a very productive meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev. I am pleased that we are working together to build a new relationship. In Helsinki, our joint statement [see page 92] affirmed to the world our shared resolve to counter Iraq's threat to peace. Let me quote: "We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors." Clearly, no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted UN action against aggression. A new partnership of nations has begun.
A Historic Period of Cooperation
We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward a historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective--a new world order--can emerge; a new era--freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today, that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come. The test we face is great--and so are the stakes. This is the first assault on the new world that we seek, the first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose, if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination, it would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world. America and the world must defend common vital interests. And we will. America and the world must support the rule of law. And we will. America and the world must stand up to aggression. And we will. And one thing more; in the pursuit of these goals, America will not be intimidated. Vital issues of principle are at stake. Saddam Hussein is literally trying to wipe a country off the face of the earth. We do not exaggerate. Nor do we exaggerate when we say Saddam Hussein will fail. Vital economic interests are at risk as well. Iraq itself controls some 10% of the world's proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors--neighbors that control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And we won't. Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth.
The International Response and Obligation
From the outset, acting hand-in-hand with others, we have sought to fashion the broadest possible international response to Iraq's aggression. The level of world cooperation and condemnation of Iraq is unprecedented. Armed forces from countries spanning four continents are there at the request of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to deter and, if need be, to defend against attack. Muslims and non- Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs, soldiers from many nations stand shoulder-to-shoulder, resolute against Saddam Hussein's ambitions. We can now point to five UN Security Council resolutions that condemn Iraq's aggression. They call for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and categorically reject Iraq's cynical and self-serving attempt to annex Kuwait. Finally, the United Nations has demanded the release of all foreign nationals held hostage against their will and in contravention of international law. It is a mockery of human decency to call these people "guests." They are hostages, and the whole world knows it. [British] Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a dependable ally, said it all: "We do not bargain over hostages. We will not stoop to the level of using human beings as bargaining chips--ever." Of course, our hearts go out to the hostages and to their families. But our policy cannot change. And it will not change. America and the world policy cannot change. And it will not change. America and the world will not be blackmailed by this ruthless policy. We are now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders. We owe much to the outstanding leadership of Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. The United Nations is backing up its words with action. The Security Council has imposed mandatory economic sanctions on Iraq, designed to force Iraq to relinquish the spoils of its illegal conquest. The Security Council has also taken the decisive step of authorizing the use of all means necessary to ensure compliance with these sanctions. Together with our friends and allies, ships of the US Navy are today patrolling Mideast waters. They have already intercepted more than 700 ships to enforce the sanctions. Three regional leaders I spoke with just yesterday told me that these sanctions are working. Iraq is feeling the heat. We continue to hope that Iraq's leaders will recalculate just what their aggression has cost them. They are cut off from world trade, unable to sell their oil. And only a tiny fraction of goods gets through. The communique with President Gorbachev made mention of what happens when the embargo is so effective that children of Iraq literally need milk or the sick truly need medicine. Then, under strict international supervision that guarantees the proper destination, food will be permitted. At home, the material cost of our leadership can be steep. That is why Secretary of State Baker and Treasury Secretary Brady have met with many world leaders to underscore that the burden of this collective effort must be shared. We are prepared to do our share and more to help carry that load; we insist that others do their share as well. The response of most of our friends and allies has been good. To help defray costs, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates have pledged to provide our deployed troops with all the food and fuel they need. Generous assistance will also be provided to stalwart front-line nations, such as Turkey and Egypt. I am also heartened to report that this international response extends to the neediest victims of this conflict--those refugees. For our part, we have contributed $28 million for relief efforts. This is but a portion of what is needed. I commend, in particular, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and several European nations which have joined us in this purely humanitarian effort. There's an energy-related cost to be borne as well. Oil- producing nations are already replacing lost Iraqi and Kuwaiti output. More than half of what was lost has been made up. And we're getting superb cooperation. If producers, including the United States, continue steps to expand oil and gas production, we can stabilize prices and guarantee against hardship. Additionally, we and several of our allies always have the option to extract oil from our strategic petroleum reserves if conditions warrant. As I have pointed out before, conservation efforts are essential to keep our energy needs as low as possible. We must then take advantage of our energy sources across the board--coal, natural gas, hydro, and nuclear. Our failure to do these things has made us more dependent on foreign oil than ever before. Finally, let no one even contemplate profiteering from this crisis. We will not have it. I cannot predict just how long it will take to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Sanctions will take time to have their full intended effect. We will continue to review all options with our allies. But let it be clear: We will not let this aggression stand. Our interest, our involvement in the gulf is not transitory. It predated Saddam Hussein's aggression and will survive it. Long after all our troops come home--and we all hope it is soon, very soon--there will be a lasting role for the United States in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf. Our role then--to deter future aggression. Our role is to help our friends in their own self- defense, and, something else, to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile, and, above all, nuclear technologies. Let me also make clear that the United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our quarrel is with Iraq's dictator and with his aggression. Iraq will not be permitted to annex Kuwait. That is not a threat; that is not a boast; that is just the way it is going to be.
Putting Our Economic House in Order
Our ability to function effectively as a great power abroad depends on how we conduct ourselves at home. Our economy, our armed forces, our energy dependence, and our cohesion all determine whether we can help our friends and stand up to our foes. For America to lead, America must remain strong and vital. Our world leadership and domestic strength are mutual and reinforcing; a woven piece, strongly bound as Old Glory. To revitalize our leadership, our leadership capacity, we must address our budget deficit--not after election day or next year, but now. Higher oil prices slow our growth, and higher defense costs would only make our fiscal deficit problem worse. That deficit was already greater than it should have been--a projected $232 billion for the coming year. It must--it will--be reduced. To my friends in Congress, together we must act this very month--before the next fiscal year begins on October 1st--to get America's economic house in order. The gulf situation helps us realize we are more economically vulnerable than we ever should be. Americans must never again enter any crisis--economic or military--with an excessive dependence on foreign oil and an excessive burden of federal debt. Most Americans are sick and tired of endless battles in the Congress and between the branches over budget matters. It is high time we pulled together and get the job done right. It's up to us to straighten this out. This job has four basic parts. First, the Congress should, this month, within a budget agreement, enact growth-oriented tax measures--to help avoid recession in the short term and to increase savings, investment, productivity, and competitiveness for the longer term. These measures include extending incentives for research and experimentation; expanding the use of IRAs for new homeowners; establishing tax-deferred family savings accounts; creating incentives for the creation of enterprise zones and initiatives to encourage more domestic drilling; and, yes, reducing the tax rate on capital gains. Second, the Congress should, this month, enact a prudent multi-year defense program, one that reflects not only the improvement in East-West relations but our broader responsibilities to deal with the continuing risks of outlaw action and regional conflict. Even with our obligations in the gulf, a sound defense budget can have some reduction in real terms, and we are prepared to accept that. But to go beyond such levels, where cutting defense would threaten our vital margin of safety, is something I will never accept. The world is still dangerous, and surely, that is now clear. Stability is not secure. American interests are far reaching. Interdependence has increased. The consequences of regional instability can be global. This is no time to risk America's capacity to protect its vital interests. Third, the Congress should, this month, enact measures to increase domestic energy production and energy conservation in order to reduce dependence on foreign oil. These measures should include my proposals to increase incentives for domestic oil and gas exploration, fuel-switching, and to accelerate the development of the Alaskan energy resources without damage to wildlife. As you know, when the oil embargo was imposed in the early 1970s, the United States imported almost 6 million barrels of oil a day. This year, before the Iraqi invasion, US imports had risen to nearly 8 million barrels per day. We had moved in the wrong direction, and now we must act to correct that trend. Fourth, the Congress should, this month, enact a 5-year program to reduce the projected debt and deficits by $500 billion-- that is, by half a trillion dollars. If, with the Congress, we can develop a satisfactory program by the end of the month, we can avoid the axe of sequester--deep, across-the-board cuts that would threaten our military capacity and risk substantial domestic disruption. I want to be able to tell the American people that we have truly solved the deficit problem. For me to do that, a budget agreement must meet these tests. -- It must include the measures I have recommended to increase economic growth and reduce dependence on foreign oil. -- It must be fair. All should contribute, but the burden should not be excessive for any one group or of programs or people. -- It must address the growth of government's hidden liabilities. -- It must reform the budget process, and, further, it must be real. I urge Congress to provide a comprehensive 5-year deficit reduction program to me as a complete legislative package, with measures to assure that it can be fully enforced. America is tired of phoney deficit reduction, or promise-now, save-later plans. It is time for a program that is credible and real. -- Finally, to the extent that the deficit reduction program includes new revenue measures, it must avoid any measure that would threaten economic growth or turn us back toward the days of punishing income tax rates. That is one path we should not head down again. I have been pleased with recent progress, although it has not always seemed so smooth. But now it is time to produce. I hope we can work out a responsible plan. But with or without agreement from the budget summit, I ask both Houses of the Congress to allow a straight up-or-down vote on a complete $500-billion deficit reduction package not later than September 28. If the Congress cannot get me a budget, then Americans will have to face a tough, mandated sequester. I am hopeful, in fact, I am confident that the Congress will do what it should. And I can assure you that we in the executive branch will do our part.
Meeting Responsibilities Abroad
In the final analysis, our ability to meet our responsibilities abroad depends upon political will and consensus at home. This is never easy in democracies, for we govern only with the consent of the governed. Although free people in a free society are bound to have their differences, Americans traditionally come together in times of adversity and challenge. Once again, Americans have stepped forward to share a tearful good-bye with their families before leaving for a strange and distant shore. At this very moment, they serve together with Arabs, Europeans, Asians, and Africans in defense of principle and the dream of a new world order. That is why they sweat and toil in the sand and the heat and the sun. If they can come together under such adversity; if old adversaries like the Soviet Union and the United States can work in common cause; then surely we who are so fortunate to be in this great chamber--Democrats, Republicans, liberals, conservatives-- can come together to fulfill our responsibilities here.
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2> Title:

US-USSR Statement

Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former), United States, Iraq Subject: Military Affairs Following is the joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union issued by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev after their meeting in Helsinki, Finland, September 9, 1990. We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors. We reaffirm the joint statement of our Foreign Ministers of August 3, 1990 and our support for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665. Today, we once again call upon the Government of Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait. Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions is acceptable. Nothing short of a return to the pre-August 2 status of Kuwait can end Iraq's isolation. We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanctions mandated by the United Nations, and we pledge to work, individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the sanctions. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union recognize that UN Security Council Resolution 661 permits, in humanitarian circumstances, the importation into Iraq and Kuwait of food. The Sanctions Committee will make recommendations to the Security Council on what would constitute humanitarian circumstances. The United States and the Soviet Union further agree that any such imports must be strictly monitored by the appropriate international agencies to ensure that food reaches only those for whom it is intended, with special priority being given to meeting the needs of children. Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will be united against Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists. However, we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay. As soon as the objectives mandated by the UN Security Council resolutions mentioned above have been achieved, and we have demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the Presidents direct their Foreign Ministers to work with countries in the region and outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to promote peace and stability. It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each other and initiate measures to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2> Title:

News Conference Following North Atlantic Council Session

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Opening statement and excerpts from the Secretary's news conference, Brussels, Belgiumin which he announced an upcoming trip to Syria Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, MidEast/North Africa Country: Syria Subject: Military Affairs Before taking your questions, let me review quickly the key points of our discussions here today.
as I told our Congress last week and the North Atlantic Council today, we believe Iraq's unprovoked invasion and continued occupation of Kuwait is a political test of how the post-Cold War world will work. The manner in which we and a coalition of democracies respond will be a measure of how well the institutions of Western security, that is NATO and the WEU [Western European Union], can adapt to today's dangers and tomorrow's threats.
I reviewed the responsibility-sharing mission that our Secretary of the Treasury [Nicholas Brady] and I have been pursuing in the last week. We refer to this mission as "responsibility sharing" quite deliberately. The costs of undoing Iraqi aggression undoubtedly will be a burden to all of us. But the overriding responsibility of building a more peaceful world justifies such a burden. My trip to the gulf states and Egypt, I think, was particularly productive: politically, economically, and militarily. I found a regional coalition that is cemented in its stand against Iraqi aggression. In Egypt, President Mubarak made both political and military commitments to support a regional alliance against Saddam Hussein. And the gulf states have made an extremely significant commitment. Having just spoken to our ambassadors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE [United Arab Emirates] on my way to NATO today, I am pleased to announce that the commitments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates for the remainder of this year now approximate $12 billion. This commitment includes economic assistance to countries such as Egypt and Turkey on the front lines of the economic embargo with Iraq. Roughly half of this $12 billion will go to offset the costs of the American military effort in the gulf. A substantial part of their contribution will be "in-kind" payments: fuel, water, food, and other essential materiel. This points, I think, to a central fact of the responsibility-sharing effort, and that is that money alone is not enough. The billions of dollars that have been pledged are invaluable. But all the money in the world cannot create the airlift and sealift capabilities that are required today to move heavy forces into place and to return refugees home. The industrialized democracies of Europe and Asia who have extensive airlift and sealift capabilities can help by making ships and planes available for this critical need. I heard from my colleagues around the table this morning that there is a willingness to respond positively in this area.
I reviewed President Bush's meeting with President Gorbachev yesterday. From the outset of this conflict let me say that the Soviets have been very reliable partners in the worldwide coalition that has successfully isolated Saddam Hussein. In his discussions with President Bush, President Gorbachev reaffirmed his commitment to seeing the Iraqi aggression reversed. There were really no major substantive differences between the two leaders as to how the conflict in the gulf should be managed. In particular, I would like to stress Soviet support for the bottom line reflected in yesterday's joint statement [see page 92]: "Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions is acceptable." Around the table today here at NATO, our NATO colleagues also united behind this idea or principle of no partial solutions. Finally, I told my colleagues of the need to look to the future. Once our short-term objectives are met and this particular case of Iraqi aggression is redressed, we are still going to need to stand together to prevent potential future Iraqi aggression. Clearly, peace-loving governments in the Persian Gulf and the international community will need to consider creative, multilateral arrangements to ensure against future aggression. Governments in the region, along with the permanent members of the UN Security Council, need to consider intrusive internationally-sanctioned measures and procedures to diminish the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Clearly, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty needs strengthening and perhaps other measures will be needed as well, if an outlaw like Saddam Hussein can be only years away from having a nuclear capability. So the bottom line is simple: Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait cannot stand, and the world has got to know that he will be incapable of future aggression, as well.
Visit to Syria
Q: There's an expectation growing now that you're going to make a visit to Syria. I wondered if you could tell us the purpose, and I wondered also if you could tell us if the Syrians will receive either military aid or financial aid, or some combination. The Egyptians have received a combination; the Saudis are to get new weapons. You just spoke of proliferation of weapons. One of the countries that the US used to be concerned about was Syria. Could you please go into that subject a little bit? A: Well, to pick one of those questions out of the middle, it's my understanding that some of the gulf countries have already made certain commitments to Syria. Secondly, the President has asked me to go to Damascus, and I will be going there upon leaving Moscow: I think it's Thursday night for meetings Friday morning [September 14]. I don't think anything highlights more the isolation of Saddam Hussein in the Arab world than Syria's opposition to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. It has contributed forces to the multinational effort--significant forces. I think its presence is significant. Its position in this matter is certainly significant, situated as it is on the northern border of Iraq with substantial forces at its disposal. The United States has not had good relations with Syria in the past and we would like to see an improvement in those relations, but such an improvement is going to depend on some factors other than the fact that we now find ourselves aligned on the same side of this issue. We continue to have certain differences with Syria-- and we expect to discuss those differences--as well as to discuss our mutual interest in continuing to see Saddam Hussein isolated, and to see a reversal, if you will, of this unprovoked aggression. Q: What will you be asking of Hafez al-Assad? Are you asking anything specific from him other than just patting him on the back? What is the real purpose here? A: As I've indicated to you we think that Syria's position in all of this is very important; it is quite significant. They have sent forces to the region. We would be very interested, frankly, in the Syrians' assessment of the situation and their view, particularly of the position of perhaps some other Arab countries. And the President felt simply that it was an important time for us to have a face-to-face dialogue with the leaders of Syria. Q: To underscore what he's done? A: Syria has been very supportive of the international effort that has been made to isolate Saddam Hussein. They've been supportive obviously of the UN resolutions, and they are supportive of the fact of the US presence in Saudi Arabia. And it's important that we have a face-to-face discussion of the situation in the gulf and how we might be able to cooperate to achieve what happen to be mutual goals.
Syria and Terrorism
Q: Syria is on the State Department list of countries that support terrorism. Syria has been implicated by the State Department and the CIA in the Pan Am 103 bombing. It has been State Department policy to isolate Syria up until this point. I don't understand how, because they support us on this one issue, you can just suddenly throw all that out and turn around and pat them on the back by making a visit--the first visit by a high-level official to Syria in years. A: I just said we still have difficulties with Syria. You just pointed up some of the major difficulties, and we will use the occasion of this visit to discuss those difficulties with them as well. And it's very important, it seems to me, in a situation such as we have in the gulf that we cooperate with a major Arab country who happens to share the same goals that we do. That does not mean that the formerly strained relations are cured overnight, and it doesn't mean that we will not continue to have some differences. And I am quite sure they will probably continue to have some differences with the United States. But on these issues, and on this very, very important issue of what happens to reverse Iraq's unprovoked aggression, we share the same goals. Q: Will you be asking, among other things, that Syria expel the PFLP-GC [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command], the terrorist group said to be responsible for the Pan Am 103 bombing? A: We will continue to talk to the Syrians about the PFLP-GC, and we will continue to share with them the difficulties we have with the presence of that group in Syria, and the difficulties we have with the presence with the group itself. Let me remind you that I met with the foreign minister of Syria at the United Nations about a year ago and had a conversation with him at that time, and we continue to make our position known to the Syrians through our ambassador in Damascus. It's not as if we don't have relations with Syria. We do have relations with Syria. . . .
Comments on Syria Visit
Following is an excerpt from a press conference held by Secretary Baker and Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, Rome Italy, September 14, 1990. I have just come from Syria. And my trip to Syria, I think, should demonstrate the isolation of Saddam Hussein, because it is a fact that relations between the United States and Syria have not been good. There are still problems, as I mentioned in a press conference in Damascus before coming here. There are still problems in that relationship, and we make no secret of that. We have problems, frankly, with Syria's support of terrorism, and I talked frankly with President Assad about that. Having said that, we do share with Syria a common goal: to resist the unprovoked aggression of Iraq into Kuwait and to see that aggression reversed and to see a reinstitution of the legitimate government of Kuwait. We cannot dilute, or in any way walk away from, full enforcement of unanimous resolutions passed by the Security Council.
Secretary of State Visits to Syria (chart)
Listed as Date; Secretary Name, Purpose of Visit September 13-14, 1990;Baker;Met with President Assad and discussed Persian Gulf crisis. Noted continued US concerns with Syrian support for terrorism. June 6, 1988; Shultz; Discussed a Middle East peace initiative. April 5, 1988; Shultz; Discussed a Middle East peace initiative. March 4, 1988; Shultz; Discussed a Middle East peace initiative. February 27, 1988; Shultz; Met with President Assad and Foreign Minister Khaddam regarding a Middle East peace initiative. July 5-6, 1983; Shultz; Discussed means of withdrawing foreign forces from Lebanon. May 6, 1983; Shultz; Discussed the proposed Israeli-Lebanon agreement with President Assad. September 24, 1978; Vance; Reviewed the Camp David Accords with President Assad. December 13-14, 1977; Vance ; Reviewed the Middle East peace process. August 3-5, 1977; Vance; Reviewed the Middle East peace process with President Assad. Revisited Syria August 11. February 20-21, 1977; Vance; Met with President Assad; reviewed the Middle East peace process. September 3, 1975; Kissinger; Briefed President Assad on the Middle East peace process. August 23, 1975; Kissinger; Briefed President Assad on the peace process. March 15, 1975; Kissinger; Briefed President Assad on the Egyptian- Israeli peace process. March 9, 1975; Kissinger; Reviewed Middle East peace process with President Assad. February 13, 1975; Kissinger ; Briefed President Assad on the Middle East peace process. November 7, 1974; Kissinger; Discussed the Middle East peace process with President Assad. October 14, 1974; Kissinger; Reviewed the peace process with President Assad. October 11, 1974; Kissinger; Reviewed the Middle East peace process with President Assad. June 15-16, 1974; Kissinger; Accompanied President Nixon. May 3-29, 1974; Kissinger; Shuttle negotiations leading to an Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement. Kissinger was in Damascus May 3-4, 12, 14, 16-17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29. March 1-2, 1974; Kissinger; Presented an Israeli proposal for military disengagement to President Assad. February 26, 1974; Kissinger; Met with President Assad. January 20, 1974; Kissinger; Briefed President Assad on the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement. December 15, 1973; Kissinger; Met with President Assad to discuss the Middle East peace process. May 15-16, 1953; Dulles ; Met with President Shishakli. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2> Title:

Country Profile: Syria

Date: Sep 17, 19909/17/90 Category: Country Data Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Syria Subject: History, Trade/Economics, International Organizations [TEXT] Official Name: Syrian Arab Republic
Area: 185,170 sq. km. (71,500 sq. mi.), about the size of North Dakota. Cities: Capital--Damascus, population about 4 million). Other cities--Aleppo (about 1.5 million), Homs (about 400,000). Terrain: Coastal zone separated by a narrow double mountain belt from a depression to the west, deserts, and a much larger eastern plateau containing the Euphrates River. Climate: Predominantly dry; about three-fifths of the country has less than 25 centimeters of rain annually.
Nationality: Noun and adjective -- Syrian(s). Population (1989 est.): 13 million . Annual growth rate: 3.6%. Ethnic groups: Arab 90%; Kurds, Armenians, Circassians, Turkmen. Religions: Sunni Muslims 70%, other Muslim sects 20%, Christians 10%, small Jewish and Yazidi communities. Languages: Arabic (official), English, French, Kurdish, Armenian. Education: Years compulsory--primary 6 years. Attendance--94%. Literacy--78%. Health: Infant mortality rate-- 42/1,000. Life expectancy--59 yrs. Work force (3.1 million): Agriculture--32%. Industry and commerce--29%. Services (including government)--39%.
Type: Republic, under Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party regimes, since March 1963. Independence: April 17, 1946. Constitution: March 12, 1973. Branches: Executive--president (chief of state) and prime minister (head of government). Legislative--People's Council. Judicial-- Supreme Court. Administrative subdivisions: 13 provinces and city of Damascus (administered as a separate unit). Political parties: Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba'ath) Party, Syrian Arab Socialist Union, Unionist Socialist, Arab Union Socialist Party, Communist Party of Syria. Suffrage: Universal at 18. Central government budget (1989): $5.1 billion. Current expenditures--$3.2 billion. Development projects--$1.9 billion. Defense (1989): 46% of current government expenditures. Flag: Comprises a red band (top), a white band (center) with two green stars, and a black band (bottom).
GDP (1988): $15.83 billion, current prices converted at the official rate. Annual growth rate: 1988, 11% in real terms; 1987, -9.5% in real terms. Per capita GDP: $1,318 in nominal terms converted at the official rate. Natural resources: Crude oil and natural gas, phosphates, asphalt, rock salt, marble, gypsum. Agriculture (27% of GDP): Products--cotton, wheat, barley, sugar beets, fruits, vegetables. Arable land--48%. Industry: Mining and manufacturing--26%; building and construction--8%; transportation and communication--7%. Trade (1988): Exports--$1.4 billion: petroleum, textiles, phosphates, fruits and vegetables, cotton. Major markets--EC, Eastern Europe, USSR. Imports--$2.2 billion: machinery and metal products, wheat and flour. Major suppliers--EC, Eastern Europe, Japan. Exchange rates: (Syrian pound): Official 11.2 S.P.=US$1. Promotional 20 S.P.=$1. Airline 18 S.P.=US$1. Offshore 44 S.P.=US$1 as of January 1990. Fiscal year: calendar year.
International Affiliations
UN and most of its specialized agencies, Arab League, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Non-Aligned Movement, Group of 77, International Olive Oil Council, Interparliamentary Union, International Whaling Commission, World Tourist Organization, INTELSAT, Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), World Federation of Trade Unions. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2> Title:

Country Profile: Jordan

Date: Sep 17, 19909/17/90 Category: Country Data Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Jordan Subject: History, Trade/Economics, International Organizations [TEXT] Official Name: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Geography (1)
Area: 91,000 sq. km. (35,000 sq. mi.). Cities: Capital--Amman (pop. 648,000). Other cities--Irbid (112,000), Az-Zarqa (215,000).
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Jordanian(s). Population (1989 est.): 3.2 million. Religions: Sunni Muslim 95%, Christian 5%. Languages: Arabic (official), English. Education: Literacy--71%. Health: Infant mortality rate--50/1,000. Life expectancy--64 yrs. Ethnic groups: Mostly Arab, but small communities of Circassians, Armenians, and Kurds. Work force: Agriculture--80%. Manufacturing and mining--20%.
Type: Constitutional monarchy. Independence: May 25, 1946. Constitution: January 8, 1952. Branches: Executive--king (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), Council of Ministers (cabinet). Legislative--bicameral National Assembly (appointed Senate, elected Chamber of Deputies). Judicial--civil, religious, special courts. Political party: Only the government-sponsored Arab National Union is officially recognized. Suffrage: Universal. Administrative subdivisions: Eight governorates--Irbid, al-Mafraq, al-Zarqa, Amman, al-Balqa, al-Karak, al-Tafilah, and Ma'an. Defense: About 12% of GNP. Flag: Three horizontal bands of black, white, and green joined at the staff by a red triangle with a white star in the middle.
GDP (1989): $4 billion. Annual growth rate (1989): 0%. Per capita GDP (1989 est.): $1,000. Natural resources: Phosphate, potash. Agriculture: Products--fruits, vegetables, wheat, olive oil. Land-- 11% arable. Industry (20% of GDP): Type--phosphate mining, manufacturing, cement, and petroleum production. Trade (1989): Exports--$1 billion: fertilizer, phosphates, pharmaceuticals, fruits, vegetables. Major markets--formerly Iraq, India, Saudi Arabia, Romania, China. Imports--$2.7 billion: machinery, transportation equipment, cereals, petroleum products. Major suppliers--US, UK, FRG, Iraq, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Syria. Fiscal year: Calendar year. US economic aid received: $1.6 billion (1946-87)--loans, grants, PL 480 (Food for Peace) programs.
International Affiliations
UN and several of its specialized and related agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Health Organization (WHO), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF); Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), INTELSAT, Nonaligned Movement, Arab League. (1) From 1949 to 1967, Jordan administered that part of former mandate Palestine west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank. Since the 1967 war, when Israel took control of this territory, the United States has considered the West Bank to be territory occupied by Israel. The United States believes that the final status of the West Bank can be determined only through negotiations among the parties concerned on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The US view is that self- government for the Palestinians of the West Bank in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just, and lasting peace. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2> Title:

The Second Decade: Panama and the Canal Treaties

Date: Sep 17, 19909/17/90 Category: Fact Sheets Region: Central America Country: Panama Subject: International Law, Development/Relief Aid
In 1989, the United States and Panama celebrated the 75th anniversary of the opening of the Panama Cana, and the end of the first decade of operation under the 1977 Panama Canal treaties. The Senate ratified the treaties in 1978, and Congress enacted implementing legislation in the Panama Canal Act of 1979; the two treaties entered into force on October 1, 1979. The Panama Canal treaty governs the operation and defense of the canal until its transfer to Panama on December 31, 1999. Military units of the US Southern Command will remain in Panama until that date to assure the canal's defense. Under the treaty, the US has primary responsibility for operating and managing the canal through a US government agency, the Panama Canal Commission (PCC). The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal guarantees the canal's availability to ships of all nations on a non-discriminatory basis in peace and war. Under this treaty, both the US and Panama have a unilateral right to defend the canal against any threats, and US warships have the right to transit the canal expeditiously and without conditions.
Treaty Implementation
The Panama Canal treaties were controversial in both Panama and the United States. However, during the early 1980s, implementation of the treaties helped reduce bilateral tensions. US civilian and military personnel work closely with Panamanian officials to manage the canal. The Panama Canal Commission, supervised by a board of directors composed of five Americans and four Panamanians, operates the canal. This includes setting tolls and ensuring long- term effective operation through continuing maintenance and modernization. The PCC has fulfilled an important US treaty responsibility by increasing Panamanian participation in the canal workforce from 69% in 1979 to 86% at the end of 1989. The last formal step the US must complete before transferring the canal to Panama in 1999 is the appointment of a Panamanian as PCC administrator, but a challenging period of preparation for full transition lies ahead. On April 30, 1990, President Bush nominated Dr. Gilberto Guardia Fabrega, Panama's designee, to serve as canal administrator.
Modernization Options
The United States and Panama, with Japan, are also studying alternatives to, or modifications of, the existing canal system. The purpose is to provide for the canal's continuing commercial viability. Some options under consideration are a sea-level canal, widening the canal to permit two-way traffic, adding a third lane of locks to accommodate larger ships, and modernizing port facilities.
Bilateral Relations
Beginning in mid-1987, a major internal political crisis in Panama seriously disrupted bilateral relations. At the root of the crisis was the refusal of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) commander, Manuel Noriega, to relinquish power to civilian authorities. In February 1988, Noriega seized complete control of the government after US courts had indicted him on drug-trafficking charges and after Panama's constitutional president, Eric Arturo Delvalle, had attempted to remove him as PDF commander. The United States refused to recognize the Noriega regime, suspended all assistance to Panama, and ended all diplomatic contacts with the regime. US economic sanctions imposed in April 1988 prevented US government agencies, businesses, or citizens from making most payments to the regime. Those payments due to Panama under the Panama Canal Treaty were paid to the legitimate government of President Delvalle and deposited in escrow accounts. In May 1989, the Noriega regime annulled a national election after the electorate voted by more than 3 to 1 for the democratic opposition. Noriega survived efforts by PDF elements to oust him from office in March 1988 and October 1989 and ruled increasingly through repression. The political crisis adversely affected the exercise of some US treaty rights and bilateral cooperation on treaty implementation. In early 1989, the Noriega regime embarked on a systematic campaign to harass US and Panamanian employees of US government agencies in Panama. By interfering with US freedom of movement rights under the treaty, Noriega sought to force the United States to change its non-recognition policy and lift economic sanctions. The absence of a legitimate government prevented Panama from nominating a Panamanian citizen for appointment by the United States as PCC administrator by January 1, 1990. Throughout the crisis, the Noriega regime attempted to manipulate treaty issues for its political benefit and unsuccessfully sought to persuade Panamanians that the US would not transfer the canal to Panama. For 2 years, the United States tried by various means short of military force, including recourse to multilateral diplomacy, to assist the democratic opposition in Panama in resolving the crisis. This included a concerted multilateral diplomacy effort led by the Organization of American States. After the second coup attempt in October 1989, violence and lawlessness intensified. In mid- December, the regime declared that a state of war existed between Panama and the US. This downward spiral culminated in the killing of an unarmed off-duty US military officer and a life-threatening assault on another US officer and his wife by members of the PDF. Facing a rapidly deteriorating security situation, President Bush ordered US troops into Panama on December 20, 1989, to protect US citizens, to meet US treaty responsibilities to defend the canal, to assist in restoring democracy, and to bring Noriega to justice. The Panamanian people overwhelmingly welcomed Operation Just Cause as a liberation. The democratic opposition-- certified by Panama's electoral tribunal as winners of the May 1989 election--formed a new government led by President Guillermo Endara. By February 15, 1990, the number of US troops in Panama was below the level prior to Operation Just Cause.
Economic Assistance
Before concluding the troop withdrawal, the United States began to provide assistance to promote Panama's economic and political recovery. In early February 1990, the Congress approved an initial $42 million for job creation, public services, housing for displaced people, and loans to small businesses hurt by looting. The US also dismantled its economic sanctions against Panama and restored Panama's eligibility for US economic program--including Generalized System of Preferences, Caribbean Basin Initiative, Export-Import Bank, US sugar quota, and Overseas Private Investment Corporation insurance. In May, Congress approved an assistance package providing an additional $420 million to help finance private sector revitalization, rehabilitate Panama's infrastructure, help clear Panama's arrears to international lending institutions, and restructure and develop the public sector. With a freely elected Panamanian government in office, both countries are optimistic that the terms of the treaties will be fully carried out and that the second decade of operation will mark a new era in US-Panamanian relations. In the spirit of this new relationship, President Endara met with President Bush at the White House in April 1990. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2> Title:

Diplomatic Efforts to Achieve a Cambodian Settlement

Kimmitt Source: Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Description: Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs Date: Sep 12, 19909/12/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Southeast Asia Country: Cambodia Subject: United Nations, Democratization [TEXT] I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss our very active diplomatic efforts to achieve a Cambodian settlement based on the framework agreement that representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council completed in New York on August 28. The past 2 months have seen a dramatic upswing in the prospects for a peaceful settlement to the Cambodian conflict. As a result of a combination of diplomatic efforts by a number of countries--including, I'm pleased to say, some well-timed initiatives by the United States--a major step has been taken toward a comprehensive political settlement. Reflecting the new spirit of the post-Cold War era, the permanent five [permanent members of the UN Security Council] have produced a settlement framework that has been welcomed around the world and that was accepted by the four Cambodian parties on September 10 at a pivotal meeting in Jakarta [Indonesia]. Contributing to this result were the policy revisions announced by Secretary Baker on July 18 in Paris, which led to our opening of talks with the Vietnamese, as well as our decision to begin a dialogue with the Hun Sen regime. The flexibility and constructive approach of the Soviets and the Chinese have also contributed to this successful first step. We join the Congress in unalterable opposition to the Khmer Rouge shooting its way back into power. As Secretary Baker has repeatedly stressed, we want to move the conflict off the battlefield, where the Khmer Rouge thrive, to the negotiating table. We seek a neutral political process under UN auspices, culminating in the free and fair election of a legitimate government which we hope will end the death and suffering in Cambodia.
Our Objectives
Our objectives in Cambodia remain unchanged: -- Creating a neutral political process culminating in free and fair elections under UN auspices; -- Verifying the withdrawal of all foreign forces; and -- Above all, building into the settlement process procedures that would guard against the Khmer Rouge again imposing their violent rule on the Cambodian people. Through permanent five and regional efforts over the past 9 months, we have helped to build a broad consensus on the outlines of a comprehensive solution, with the United Nations playing a central role. The permanent five framework includes military and peacekeeping procedures, transitional administrative arrangements, guidelines for the election process, international guarantees, and human rights' protections. We are committed to the permanent five formula as the most promising basis for a just and durable settlement. We believe this framework agreement formula, if actively supported by all parties involved, is also the best way to build into a settlement credible guarantees against a Khmer Rouge return to violent domination of Cambodia.
US Policy Revisions
For our part, Secretary Baker announced in recent weeks certain steps designed to widen the range of US diplomatic activity in support of the permanent five process as part of a series of revisions to our Cambodian policy. Our overall goals have not changed--but circumstances have evolved. We substantially realized our strategic objective when the bulk of Vietnam's combat units withdrew last year. Now we want to encourage formal acceptance by all parties of the permanent five framework agreement--and we want to maintain strong support for our policy at home. We have initiated dialogue with Hanoi to include the subject of Cambodia, meeting with Vietnamese representatives in New York twice last month. More recently, Secretary Baker directed that we initiate direct discussion with Phnom Penh representatives in Vientiane, Laos, the only capital in Southeast Asia where both the US and the Phnom Penh regime have embassies. We also met with Hun Sen in Jakarta--on an exceptional basis--in order to encourage his personal participation in efforts to form a Supreme National Council [SNC]. We have used these contacts to make clear to Hanoi and Phnom Penh the need for cooperation on their parts to achieve a political settlement. We are also able to answer directly their concerns about the permanent five process--adding our views to those being offered by the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom. Secretary Baker also announced in mid-July that we can no longer support the resistance coalition's holding [of] Cambodia's UN seat, so long as that coalition includes the Khmer Rouge. We, along with the vast majority of UN members, supported the coalition's UN credentials in the past because we did not--and do not--see the Vietnamese-installed Hun Sen regime as a superior claimant to the seat. Yet I should stress that we do not now--and never have-- recognized, supported, or otherwise dealt with the resistance coalition as a whole, precisely because it includes the Khmer Rouge. For the future, we want the seat to be occupied by a freely elected government, and pending that development, the seat should be held by Cambodians committed to free and fair elections appointed by the Supreme National Council. Along with these steps, we are also easing licensing restrictions on humanitarian programs for Vietnam and Cambodia to indicate our openness to new relationships once the Cambodian conflict is resolved. And we are working to implement a new program, mandated by the Congress, that is designed to aid Cambodian children; both those within the country and those in camps along the Thai-Cambodian border.
Cambodian Factions Meet in Jakarta
We believe this combination of actions on our part--direct talks with Hanoi and Phnom Penh, non-support for the resistance coalition in the UNGA [UN General Assembly] seat, a more forthcoming posture on humanitarian assistance--should be effective in eliciting flexibility and cooperation from the various parties involved in the Cambodian conflict. We are encouraged to see that the four Cambodian factions, meeting in Jakarta last weekend, announced their acceptance of the permanent five framework agreement as the basis for a Cambodian settlement and announced the formation of an SNC. We hope the SNC will have its first meeting in the near future, and that it will work with the Paris conference participants and the UN to implement the permanent five framework agreement.
Next Steps
Until last weekend's Jakarta meeting, only the three resistance factions had endorsed the permanent five formula. Our recent decision to talk directly to Phnom Penh representatives, rather than relying on intermediaries, was a logical step toward encouraging Phnom Penh also to accept and actively support the permanent five framework agreement, and to use our influence to bring about the early formation of a Supreme National Council based on this framework. We believe the Phnom Penh regime realizes that its position is slowly deteriorating, although the military situation during the ongoing rainy season is currently stalemated. The Khmer Rouge lack the heavy weapons to take and hold population centers, but the Phnom Penh army lacks the ability to contain the resistance forces. We believe the Phnom Penh regime must soon realize that the permanent five framework agreement offers the best possibility of reestablishing peace for the Cambodian people. The early formation by the Cambodian parties of a Supreme National Council based on the permanent five formula was a crucial next step following the conclusion of the framework agreement by the five. This was the primary goal of the Jakarta meeting, co- chaired by the organizers of the Paris conference--Indonesia and France. We expect that formation of an SNC will resolve the question of Cambodia's UN representation. Acceptance by the Cambodians of the overall framework agreement will allow them to work with the UN, and the Paris Conference on Cambodia, to design the details of a comprehensive settlement process based on an enhanced UN role; this will lead to free and fair elections, organized and conducted by the UN.
Non-communist Aid Still Needed
As we make diplomatic progress, I would point out that it is vital that the United States sustain our current non-lethal aid program for the non-communist organizations of Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) until an overall settlement is actually achieved. We are moving to a political process where non-communist strengths will come into play; where the non-communist parties can provide the Cambodian people an alternative to the communists in a free and fair election campaign. In this context, cutting off aid to the non-communists would undercut their position-- and our credibility--just as the diplomatic process appears to moving toward a conclusion. I know that there is concern that some of our non-lethal aid may have ended up in Khmer Rouge hands or has indirectly assisted that murderous group. Nothing would be more abhorrent to me, to the Secretary, or to the President, and we have constantly reviewed our compliance with Section 906 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985. We do not believe any of our assistance has been diverted to the Khmer Rouge, or that it has enhanced the combat capacity of the Khmer Rouge in any other way, as prohibited by that section. We have raised this issue repeatedly with the non-communist military leaders. Prince Ranariddh, who commands the Sihanoukist forces, and his counterpart in the KPNLF, General Sak Sutsakhan, wrote to [this subcommittee] in July, confirming that no US aid has gone to the Khmer Rouge and outlining clear directives to their field commanders to ensure against any such diversion or military cooperation in the future. I assure you that we will immediately cease our materiel support for any non-communist resistance organization if reliable intelligence demonstrates that the legal prohibition applies.
Cambodia--the Alternatives
The alternatives for Cambodia are clear: either a negotiated settlement, or continuing warfare. The diplomatic approach is difficult and has presented us with controversial choices. Yet in recent weeks a great deal of progress has been made through the permanent five process. The battlefield is an unacceptable alternative, not least because it gives the Khmer Rouge its best chance for a violent return to power. While our ability to influence events in Cambodia is limited, we have helped advance the prospects for peace--through the permanent five process--in that unhappy country. If we are to remain active and effective in the search for a political settlement, we--the Congress and the executive branch--must continue to work closely. I believe that the objectives we seek justify, indeed compel, our continuing involvement in that search, and I hope the Congress will maintain its bipartisan support for our participation in this process. We all look forward to a Cambodian settlement which will bring peace and reconciliation to Southeast Asia, enhance the region's stability and prosperity, allow the eventual integration of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos into this economically dynamic region, and permit the normalization of relations between the United States and both Cambodia and Vietnam. We hope these goals can be realized in the near future; delays or failure at this point would only compound Cambodia's tragic history and again put off the prospect of broader reconciliation in--and with--Indochina. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2> Title:

Country Profile: Cambodia

Date: Sep 17, 19909/17/90 Category: Country Data Region: Southeast Asia Country: Cambodia Subject: History, Trade/Economics, International Organizations [TEXT] Official Name: Cambodia
Area: 181,040 sq. km. (69,900 sq. mi.); about the size of Missouri. Cities: Capital-Phnom Penh (pop. 400,000 est.). Other cities- Battambang, Siem Reap, Kompong Cham, Kompong Som, Kompong Thom. Terrain: Central plain drained by the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) and Mekong and Bassac Rivers. Heavy forests away from the rivers and the lake, mountains in the southwest (Cardamom Mountains) and north (Dangrek Mountains) along the border with Thailand. Climate: Tropical monsoon with rainy season June-Oct. and dry season Nov.-May.
Nationality: Noun and adjective: Cambodian(s), Khmer. Population: (1989) 6.8 million. Avg. annual growth rate: 2.2%. Births: 39 births/1000 population (1989). Deaths: 17 deaths/1000 population . Infant mortality: 131 deaths/1000 live births. Life expectancy: 47 years male/50 years female . Ethnic groups: Cambodian 90%; Chinese and Vietnamese 5% each; small numbers of hill tribes, Chams, and Burmese. Religions: Theravada Buddhism 95%; Islam; animism; atheism. Languages: Khmer (official) spoken by more than 95% of the population, including minorities; some French still spoken. Literacy: about 50%.
Government is disputed between the resistance groups of the National Government of Cambodia (NGC)--which formerly called itself the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)-- and the Vietnamese-installed authorities in Phnom Penh: the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) -- which now calls itself the State of Cambodia. No single authority controls the entire country. Administrative subdivisions: 19 provinces and municipalities. Independence: November 9, 1953. Constitution: PRK: April 30, 1989. Elections: None. Political parties and leaders: NGC: umbrella organization for the three resistance groups, including National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk; Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son Sann; and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer Rouge) ostensibly led by Khieu Samphan (all since July 1982); PRK: Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), the Communist party installed by Vietnam in 1979, led by Heng Samrin, KPRP General Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State since 1981, and Hun Sen, Chairman of the Council of Ministers since 1985. Diplomatic Relations: NGC: Brunei, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Yugoslavia; PRK: Vietnam, Laos, Soviet Union, most East European countries, India, Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua, Seychelles, and the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic. Flag: NGC-two horizontal blue bands, divided by a wider red band on which is centered a white stylized representation of Angkor Wat; PRK-a red field with five stylized yellow towers.
GDP: $570 million (1984). Per capita GDP: $90 (1984). Natural resources: Timber, gemstones, some iron ore, manganese and phosphate, hydroelectric potential from the Mekong River. Agriculture: About 4,848,000 hectares (12 million acres) are unforested land; all are arable with irrigation but less than two million hectares are cultivated. Products: Rice, rubber, corn, meat, vegetables, dairy products, sugar, flour. Industry: Types--rice milling, fishing, wood and wood products, textiles, cement, some rubber production (largely abandoned since 1975). Trade: Exports: $3 million (1986)--natural rubber, rice, pepper, wood; Major partners: Vietnam, USSR, Eastern Europe, Japan, India; Imports: $17 million (1986)--international food aid, fuels, consumer goods; Major Partners: Vietnam, USSR, Eastern Europe, Japan, India. Exchange rate: Approximately 400 riels = $1 (1990). Economic Aid: Unknown amount from USSR and Eastern Europe to areas under PRK control. Some humanitarian aid from the UN and private groups. UN relief efforts coordinated by the Secretary General's Special Representative for Kampu-chean Humanitarian Assistance provide more than $58 million per year in assistance (cash and in-kind contributions) for displaced Cambodians along the Thai-Cambodian border. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 3, September 17, 1991/h2> Title:

Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Status

Date: Sep 17, 19909/17/90 Category: Fact Sheets Subject: Trade/Economics, International Law [TEXT]
Most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment refers to a policy of non- discrimination in trade. Despite the name, it is, in fact, the norm for current international trade policy, rather than a preference. Countries provide customs and tariff treatment equally to all trading partners granted MFN status. The emergence of MFN treatment is attributable to the growth of world commerce in the 15th and 16th centuries, where nations seeking maximum advantage for their exports granted concessions in return. Trading nations sought to ensure that they were treated as well as the "most favored" partner.
MFN non-discriminatory treatment is one of the most important principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the main international institution and agreement concerned with international trade. The United States and 22 other countries signed the GATT agreement in 1948. Nearly 100 countries representing almost 90% of total world trade are GATT members and adhere to MFN principles. The GATT recognizes that MFN treatment is not necessarily appropriate in all circumstances and allows some exceptions. The most significant exceptions concern customs unions and free trade areas (e.g., the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement) and certain preferences for less developed countries (LDCs). Under the GATT, non-reciprocal tariff preferences granted to LDCs under a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program need not be extended to countries which otherwise would be entitled to MFN treatment.
US Policy
The United States grants MFN treatment to most of its trading partners. Countries generally are entitled to receive MFN treatment from the United States because of their GATT membership. In a few cases, MFN treatment is required by a bilateral commercial agreement or a treaty. Exports from countries granted MFN treatment are subject to duty at the lowest available non-preferential rates, i.e., those listed under "Column I" of the US tariff schedule. Imports from countries not granted MFN treatment are assessed duties under "Column II" of the US tariff schedule (rates set under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930). LDCs eligible for the US GSP program receive duty-free treatment for about 4,100 products included in that program. Broader duty-free treatment is provided to the 23 beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Separate tariff schedules, either duty free or moving toward duty free, apply to Israel and Canada, with which the United States has negotiated free trade agreements.
Countries Not Granted MFN Treatment
MFN treatment was withdrawn from most communist countries under the Trade Expansion Act of 1951, which denied MFN treatment to any country under the control of the "world communist movement." The Trade Act of 1974 set new conditions for granting MFN treatment to non-market economy (communist) countries. First, a non-market economy country must satisfy or receive a presidential waiver of the freedom of emigration and certain other criteria contained in Title IV of the 1974 act. The president may grant a one-year waiver of the application of the freedom of emigration provisions of the act (the Jackson-Vanik amendment), if he determines that extension of the waiver would substantially promote freedom of emigration. The President also may find a country in compliance with the amendment (thus making a waiver unnecessary) by virtue of its liberal emigration law and practices. The President can withdraw MFN status at any time if he determines that a country no longer satisfies the Title IV provisions. Second, once these conditions have been met or waived, Title IV also requires conclusion of a bilateral commercial agreement before MFN status is granted. Among the specific issues that must be addressed in such agreements are reciprocal granting of MFN treatment, safeguards, trade promotion, and adequate protection of intellectual property rights. These agreements have a renewable term of 3 years. As of June 1990, Poland, Yugoslavia , Hungary, and China had MFN status. Poland and Yugoslavia always have been exempt from the provisions of Title IV. Hungary received annual waivers of the Jackson-Vanik amendment from 1978 to 1989, when it was found to be in compliance with the emigration provisions. In February 1990, the President issued the first annual waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to Czechoslovakia. Negotiations on a bilateral commercial agreement began in March. The United States has signed a bilateral commercial trade agreement which could grant MFN treatment to the Soviet Union if Title IV conditions on emigration are met. Bulgaria, East Germany, and Mongolia also have expressed interest in MFN treatment. Romania has requested that MFN treatment be restored, which was lost in 1988 when the previous government renounced MFN treatment tied to the continued observance of the Jackson-Vanik conditions. (###)