US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990


America's Stake in the Persian Gulf

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Prepared statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC Date: Sep 4, 19909/4/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] I have come here today to speak to you and--through you to the American people--about the conflict in the Persian Gulf and what it means for the United States. I would like to use my statement today to place this crisis in a larger context. The entire world has mobilized to redress aggression against a small country in a distant place. Already, we are paying higher prices when we pull up to the local gas pump. And thousands of our finest young men and women now stand guard in the heat of the Persian Gulf. The President has made it plain we have a straightforward responsibility to the American people. Openly and clearly, we have a duty to state what is at stake as a result of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. We have a duty to tell our people what our immediate goals are in this conflict. And we have a duty to explain how we plan to achieve those goals in order to further our long-run interests in the gulf and beyond.
The Stakes
Let me start by discussing what's at stake. First, Iraq's unprovoked aggression is a political test of how the post-Cold War world will work. Amidst the revolutions sweeping the globe and the transformation of East-West relations, we stand at a critical juncture in history. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is one of the defining moments of a new era--an era full of promise but also one replete with new challenges. While the rules of the road developed during the Cold War did, in the end, preserve East-West peace in Europe, the task now is to build an enduring peace that is global in scope, not limited just to Europe and not rooted in confrontation and tension. If we are to build a stable and more comprehensive peace, we must respond to the defining moments of this new era, recognizing the emerging dangers lurking before us. We are entering an era in which ethnic and sectarian identities could easily breed new violence and conflict. It is an era in which new hostilities and threats could erupt as misguided leaders are tempted to assert regional dominance before the ground rules of a new order can be accepted. Accordingly, we face a simple choice: Do we want to live in a world where aggression is made less likely because it is met with a powerful response from the international community, a world where civilized rules of conduct apply? Or are we willing to live in a world where aggression can go unchecked, where aggression succeeds because we cannot muster the collective will to challenge it? Sadly, Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait will not be the last act of aggression that international society will face. So long as ruthless aggressors remain, the reality of international life is that such predatory designs will emerge from time to time. But the current crisis is a first opportunity to limit such dangers, to reinforce the standards for civilized behavior found in the UN Charter, and to help shape a more peaceful international order built on the promise of recent trends in Europe and elsewhere. We must seize this opportunity to solidify the ground rules of the new order. Second, from a strategic standpoint, we must show that intimidation and force are not successful ways of doing business in the volatile Middle East--or anywhere else. The combination of unresolved regional conflicts, turbulent social and political changes, weapons of mass destruction, and much of the world's energy supplies makes the Middle East particularly combustible. No one is immune from conflicts in the Middle East. And no one can feel safe when the danger of war escalating in the Middle East is so high. If we want to encourage peaceful change and preserve the security of all our friends in the area, we must remain a reliable partner for peace. We must help demonstrate that Saddam Hussein's violent way is an anachronism, not the wave of the future. Third, and perhaps most obviously, what is at stake economically is the dependence of the world on access to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf. The effects on our economy and our people are already being felt. But this is not about increases in the price of a gallon of gas at your local service station. It is not just a narrow question of the flow of oil from Kuwait and Iraq. It is about a dictator who, acting alone and unchallenged, could strangle the global economic order, determining by fiat whether we all enter a recession or even the darkness of a depression. A sustained oil price spiral--similar to what happened in 1973 and again in 1979--could easily cause higher inflation and interest rates worldwide, sending us all into a sustained recessionary slide. The burden could become particularly great for the new democracies of Eastern Europe, threatening to undo the revolutions of 1989. It would also be painfully felt in the poorer countries of Central America, South Asia, and Africa--threatening those who are now embracing market-oriented reforms and striving to improve living standards for their impoverished millions. Simply put, these are the stakes raised by Iraq's invasion against Kuwait. How have we and the international community responded to them?
Our Objectives
For the United States, the President has identified four immediate goals: One, the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait as mandated in UN Security Council Resolution 660; Two, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; Three, the protection of the lives of American citizens held hostage by Iraq, both in Iraq and in Kuwait; and Four, a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. Our strategy is to lead a global political alliance to isolate Iraq--politically, economically, and militarily. In this way, we aim to make Iraq pay such a high price for its aggression that it will be forced to withdraw from Kuwait and release Americans and others held hostage. This in turn will allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. It will also improve the opportunities for long-term security and stability in the Persian Gulf in a way that builds on the unprecedented international consensus that has already been formed.
Implementing the Strategy
Our strategy has moved on two mutually supporting tracks toward these aims. Let me summarize our efforts. Diplomatically, we have worked from the beginning to foster a coordinated international response to Iraq's aggression. The results have been extraordinary and unprecedented. Five unanimous UN Security Council resolutions have been passed. And Iraq is now isolated. We are gratified by the responsible and productive work we have been able to undertake with the other permanent members-- Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China--as well as the support the Arab League and the Non-Aligned Movement have provided. In particular, the Soviet Union has proven a responsible partner, suggesting new possibilities for active superpower cooperation in resolving regional conflicts. The President will work to further strengthen our ties of partnership when he meets President Gorbachev in Helsinki this Sunday [September 9]. In taking the long view, we should remember what this conflict would have looked like if old-style zero-sum thinking was still driving Soviet policy in the gulf. NATO, the EC [European Community], and the Western European Union have pitched in magnificently. Our NATO ally, Turkey, should also be singled out for its fast, effective, and courageous cooperation. Finally, a broad regional coalition-- including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the gulf states, and Syria-- have done much to foster an international cohesion. In this regard, let me make a larger point: From the early days of this administration, we have made a concerted effort--with our friends in Asia and Europe, with the Soviets, and with organizations like NATO and the EC--to focus on the explosive dangers inherent in regional conflicts. In response to Iraq's invasion, we have drawn upon the new international ties being shaped by this strategy. The Kuwaitis themselves deserve our compassion and respect. They have suffered a brutal invasion, their country pillaged, their lives traumatized. There has been a tragic loss of life, and thousands of Kuwaitis have fled to neighboring states, escaping in many cases with only the clothes on their back. The Kuwaitis, however, are fighting back heroically. They are not collaborating with the Iraqi occupiers. All elements of Kuwaiti society--from religious conservatives to secular liberals--have voiced support for the restoration of the government. An indigenous Kuwaiti resistance has emerged. It carries on the struggle against Iraqi aggression from inside Kuwait. Moreover, the government of Kuwait in exile is providing financial aid to support our military effort and to help alleviate economic disruptions that have occurred in such states as Egypt. In short, Kuwait has been occupied, not conquered. The political coalition, bound by the principle that Saddam Hussein must be denied the fruits of aggression, has created an economic embargo under UN auspices that is solidly in place. Iraq's import-dependent economy is beginning to feel the strain, and international pressures will continue to grow over time as shortages mount. Sanction busters may be tempted by the lure of financial profits, but Security Council Resolution 665--which permits enforcement by appropriate means--should ensure that Iraq's opportunities to export its oil and import key materials will be severely constrained over time. Saddam Hussein's aggression has exacted a broad range of economic costs for countries across both the region and globe. The destruction of the Kuwaiti economy by Iraqi invaders has caused major economic dislocations for our friends in the region, notably Egypt and Turkey. Other countries with fragile economies, especially in Eastern Europe, are bearing heavy costs. The need to offset the burden of our own military efforts must also be addressed. As the President announced last Thursday, we have initiated an action plan to meet these needs. Our friends around the world are responding. Saudi Arabia is meeting a large share of the fuel costs for this effort. And other gulf states are providing fuel and financial resources to the affected states. The President has also asked [Treasury] Secretary Brady and myself to go to key nations in the gulf, Europe, and Asia to help mobilize and coordinate the international effort. We will attempt to ensure that the costs and responsibilities are shared equitably and that our various efforts complement one another. The aim is to address the vital needs of affected parties and to maintain the solidarity of the international coalition. Time can be on the side of the international community. Diplomacy can be made to work. On the military track, over 25 countries are now supplying men and materiel in support of the Security Council resolutions. US military objectives are to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and to ensure the effective implementation of the UN sanctions. Our military forces are also there to protect American lives and to provide an effective and decisive military response should Iraq escalate its aggression to active combat with the multinational force. Once the present danger passes, however, we must not let its lessons go unheeded. We have a responsibility to assure the American people that a decade from now, their sons and daughters will not be put in jeopardy because we failed to work toward long- run solutions to the problems of the gulf. The historic international consensus we have built can become a solid foundation for successfully meeting our immediate objectives and building a safer future. It can foster a future gulf environment that will protect our interests and help us avoid having to make this kind of massive diplomatic and military effort again. In the long run, we seek a stable gulf in which the nations of that region and their peoples can live in peace, free of the fear of coercion. We seek a region in which change can occur and legitimate security concerns can be preserved peacefully. And we seek a region in which energy supplies flow freely. We will need to work together with governments in the gulf and outside it to build a more durable order. We will want to ensure that our friends in the area have the means to deter aggression and defend themselves, making it less necessary to send American men and women to help them. And we will work with the rest of the regional and international community to prevent further Iraqi expansionism as well as Iraqi efforts to acquire and produce weapons of mass destruction. Resolution of today's threat should also become a springboard for a sustained international effort to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in the region and elsewhere. It can become a springboard for revived efforts to resolve the conflicts which lie at the root of such proliferation, including the festering conflict between Israel and its Palestinian and Arab neighbors. It is not enough to demonstrate that aggression and intimidation do not pay; we must show that a pathway to reconciliation and peace does exist and that it can be found with good will and good faith on all sides.
Implications for America's Role in the World
Let me conclude by placing Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in historical perspective. For over four decades, the central fact of international relations was the conflict between East and West. The Cold War reverberated across the globe, affecting everyone everywhere. Much of America's foreign policy was either driven by, or derivative of, our efforts to contain Stalinist aggression. Now, the central dispute of the post-war period--the East- West conflict over the future of Europe--has been transformed. Last year's people-power revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe swept away the dictatorships of the past. In their place, the people are finding freedom. Europe is becoming whole and free, and Germany will be united in peace and freedom. An enlightened Soviet leadership has encouraged peaceful, democratic change as the only legitimate road to progress. This administration has actively engaged the new thinkers and reformers in the Soviet Union. Together, we are finding common interests that will unite East and West. Partnership is replacing conflict. As I have said many times before, America's role in this sea change in world politics is straightforward: We must leave behind not only the Cold War but also the conflicts that preceded it. And this is why--as the President has said from the outset-- Iraq's aggression cannot stand. The line in the sands of Arabia is also a line in time. By crossing into Kuwait, Saddam Hussein took a dangerous step back in history. Maybe he thought the world would consider Kuwait expendable, that we would think of it as just a small, faraway country of which we knew and cared little. Possibly he remembered the 1930s when the League of Nations failed to respond effectively to Mussolini's aggression against Abyssinia, what is today Ethiopia. Clearly, Saddam Hussein thought his crime would pay. But the world has decided otherwise. He must not be allowed to hold on to what he stole. The President has made our position clear: The world must stand united to defend the principles enshrined in the UN Charter. In this effort, America must lead and our people must understand that. We remain the one nation that has the necessary political, military, and economic instruments at our disposal to catalyze a successful collective response by the international community. Geographically, we stand apart from much of the world, separated by the Atlantic and the Pacific. But politically, economically, and strategically, there are no oceans; and in a world without oceans, a policy of isolationism is no option at all. Only American engagement can shape the peaceful world our people so deeply desire. We believe this coordinated and comprehensive international isolation of Iraq is the only peaceful path to meeting the objectives set by the President. Our efforts will, however, take time and that is what we ask most of the American people: Stand firm, be patient, and remain united so that together we can show that aggression does not pay. (###)
State Department Gulf Crisis Information
Emergencies: 202-647-0900 (24 hours) Questions or comments about the Administration's Gulf policy: 202-647-6575 or 6576 Monday-Friday, 8:30 am-5 p.m (Eastern time)(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990 Title:

A Collective Effort To Reverse Iraqi Aggression

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Opening statement from news conference, Washington, DC Date: Aug 30, 19908/30/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] "I will not change the policy of the United States, and I don't think other leaders whose foreign nationals are in the same predicament will change their policies, to pay homage or to give credibility to [Iraq's] brutal move of staking out citizens and a brutal move of holding people against their will." (1) The United States is engaged in a collective effort involving the overwhelming majority of the member states of the United Nations to reverse the consequences of Iraqi aggression. Our goals, enshrined in five Security Council resolutions, are clear: the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; the stability of Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf; and the protection of American citizens. What is at stake here is truly significant--the dependability of America's commitments to its friends and allies; the shape of the post-postwar world; opposition to aggression; the potential domination of the energy resources that are crucial to the entire world. This effort has been truly international from the very outset. Many other countries are contributing. At last count, 22 countries have either responded to a request from Saudi Arabia to help deter further aggression or are contributing maritime forces pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 665. Others are providing other forms of financial and material support to these defense efforts or to countries whose economies are affected adversely by sanctions or by higher oil prices. Still others are paying a heavy economic price at home for complying with the UN sanctions.
Sharing the Burden
It is important that the considerable burden of the effort be shared by those being defended and those who benefit from the free flow of oil. Indeed, anyone with a stake in international order has an interest in ensuring that all of us succeed. The United States has large interests in the balance and has undertaken commitments commensurate with them. We're more than willing to bear our fair share of the burden. This includes, above all, the thousands of men and women in our armed forces who are now in the gulf. But we also expect others to bear their fair share. A number of countries already have announced their willingness to help those adversely affected economically by this endeavor. It's essential, though, that this be a concerted and coordinated one and that all affected countries participate. It is important to get the priorities right and make sure that those most deserving of assistance receive it and that those most able to contribute do so. For that reason, I directed an interagency effort to develop a strategy to accomplish this objective. The group's report was presented at yesterday's National Security Council meeting here, and this morning I approved an action plan. Our approach calls for substantial economic assistance to those states--in particular, I'd single out Turkey and Egypt, which are bearing a great part of the burden of sanctions and higher oil prices. The plan also targets additional countries, including Jordan, the countries of Eastern Europe, and others for special assistance. The United States will also seek burden-sharing for part of our own effort. At the same time, we will be asking other governments-- including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Federal Republic of Germany, Saudi Arabia, the [United Arab] Emirates, free Kuwait, and others--to join us in making available financial and, where appropriate, energy resources to countries that have been most affected by the current situation.
Delgations to the Gulf
To facilitate this undertaking, I've asked Secretary of State Jim Baker and Secretary of the Treasury Nick Brady to lead high- level delegations to the Persian Gulf, Europe, and Asia. And I'll be getting directly in touch with the leaders of these countries, before Secretaries Baker and Brady arrive, to set forth--spell out--our general objectives. Let me close by repeating what I said the other day in meeting with the congressional leaders. The basic pieces of our policy are in place. The Iraqi regime stands in opposition to the entire world and to the interest of the Iraqi people. It is truly Iraq against the world. But I want to make this point clear: We have no argument with the people of Iraq. The sanctions are beginning to take hold. In the meantime, we want to ensure that countries contributing to this unprecedented collective response do not suffer for doing so. And what I've announced today, and what I expect will be implemented in the coming days, should help create a context in which sanctions against Iraq can be sustained with the intended effect. Another area where there has been unprecedented international solidarity is OPEC's willingness to take up the slack in oil production created by the embargo on Iraq's and Kuwait's oil. In this connection, I met this morning with our energy advisers who are watching the oil production situation very, very closely. We are pleased with OPEC's decision to help take up the slack in crude oil production. And although we're in what I would see as a transition period, the situation appears manageable. At the present time, we don't anticipate major imbalances in the oil market, but we do have the strategic petroleum reserve tested and available if it is truly needed. Our energy policy is resulting in increased oil production and fuel switching to natural gas and to other fuels. I also repeat my previous request for Americans to conserve and for all parties to act responsibly. Right now the situation, I would say, is relatively stable, and I am very pleased by the coordination that is taking place with so many countries in maintaining adequate fuel levels... (1) The quote is taken from the question-and-answer session after the opening statement. The complete news conference is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of September 3, 1990. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990 Title:

Iraq Responsible for US Hostages

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks to Members of Congress, Washington, DC Date: Aug 28, 19908/28/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Terrorism [TEXT] (Introductory and concluding remarks deleted.) Meeting the challenge in the Persian Gulf is not something that I, or this administration, can do by ourselves. We can only succeed if all of us--executive and legislative, Republican and Democrat--work together. And that was one of the reasons I wanted you to come here today. Let no one at home doubt my commitment to work with the Congress; and let no one abroad doubt our national unity or our staying power. Let me begin by providing some background to the unfolding drama in the gulf. And then later, I want to hear from you and, as I say, respond to questions. First, the background: When this administration began, we sought to strengthen the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq and to improve relations with Iraq. We held no illusions about that. We hoped, along with many in the Congress, that Iraqi behavior might be moderated. But even before the current crisis though, Iraq was moving at odds to our interests and to the interests of many around the world. So we suspended the provisions of the CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] agricultural credits [and] stopped the export of furnaces that had the potential to contribute to Iraq's nuclear capabilities. You all know the events of the last several weeks. Iraq threatened Kuwait, lied about its intentions, and finally invaded. In 3 days, Iraq had 120,000 troops and 850 tanks in Kuwait, moving south toward the Saudi border. And it was this clear and rapidly escalating threat that led King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to ask for our assistance. We knew that an Iraq that had the most powerful military machine in the gulf and controlled 20% of the world's proven reserves of oil would pose a threat to the Persian Gulf, to the Middle East, and to the entire world. We responded to this quickly, without hesitation. Our objectives were obvious from the start: -- The immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; -- The restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; -- The security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and, -- The protection of American citizens abroad. Our actions to achieve these objectives have been equally clear. Within hours of the assault, the United States moved to freeze Iraq's assets in this country and to protect those of Kuwait. I asked Dick Cheney--Secretary [of Defense] Cheney--to go to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Morocco to arrange for military cooperation between us in key Arab states. And I asked Jim Baker--Secretary [of State] Baker--to go to Turkey and to Brussels to rally the support of our NATO allies. Both of these missions were extraordinarily successful. The world response to Iraq was a near unanimous chorus of condemnation. With great speed, the UN Security Council passed five resolutions. These resolutions condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, and rejected Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. The United Nations has also mandated sanctions against Iraq, those Chapter VII sanctions, and endorsed all measures that may be necessary to enforce these sanctions. And the United Nations has demanded that Iraq release all foreign nationals being held against their will without delay. The UN sanctions are in effect and have been working remarkably well, even on a voluntary basis. Iraqi oil no longer flows through pipelines to ports in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. And again, I want to thank both the Saudis and the Turks for their lead role in all of this. And today, reports indicate that traffic through Aqaba [Jordan] has come virtually to a halt. US military forces stand shoulder to shoulder with forces of many Arab and European states to deter and, if need be, defend Saudi Arabia against attack. And US naval forces sail with the navies of many other states to make the sanctions as watertight as possible. This is not, as Saddam Hussein claims, the United States against Iraq. It is truly Iraq against the majority in the Arab world; Iraq against the rest of the world. And so the basic elements of our strategy are now in place. And where do we want to go? Well, our intention, and indeed the intention of almost every country in the world, is to persuade Iraq to withdraw; that it cannot benefit from this illegal occupation; that it will pay a stiff price by trying to hold on and an even stiffer price by widening the conflict. And, of course, we seek to achieve these goals without further violence. The United States supports the UN Secretary General and other leaders working to promote a peaceful resolution of this crisis on the basis of Security Council Resolution 660. I also remain deeply concerned about the American and other foreign nationals held hostage by Iraq. As I have said before, when it comes to the safety and well-being of American citizens held against their will, I will hold Baghdad responsible.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990 Title:

Who Belongs to What

Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90 Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Subject: International Organizations, Trade/Economics
Arab League
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Maghreb Union--Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)--Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe
OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries)
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates
OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference)
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)
Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela UN Security Council (1990)--China, France, USSR, United Kingdom, United States (the five permanent members); and Canada, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen, Zaire (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990 Title:

UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

Category: Fact Sheets Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations
Resolution 660 (Aug. 2, 1990)
The Security Council, Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq, Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; 2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990; 3. Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of Arab States; 4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution. VOTE: 14 for, 0 against, 1 abstention (Yemen)
Resolution 661 (Aug. 6, 1990)
The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and material destruction, Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait, Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed its readiness to comply with resolution 660 (1990), Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self- defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait; 2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait; 3. Decides that all States shall prevent: (a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution; (b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings; (c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products; 4. Decides that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs; 5. Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or license granted before the date of the present resolution; 6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations: (a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary-General; (b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution; 7. Calls upon all States to co-operate fully with the Committee in the fulfillment of its task, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution; 8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for the purpose; 9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all States: (a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies; (b) Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power; 10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days; 11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq. VOTE: 13 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen)
Resolution 662 (Aug. 9, 1990)
The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) and 661 (1990), Gravely alarmed by the declaration by Iraq of a "comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait, Demanding, once again, that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990, Determined to bring the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait, Determined also to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait, 1. Decides that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void; 2. Calls upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation; 3. Further demands that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait; 4. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the occupation. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0)
Resolution 664 (Aug. 18, 1990)
The Security Council, Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait and resolutions 660, 661 and 662, Deeply concerned for the safety and well being of third state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this regard under international law, Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent consultations with the Government of Iraq following the concern and anxiety expressed by the members of the Council on 17 August 1990, Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: 1. Demands that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals; 2. Further demands that Iraq take no action to jeopardize the safety, security or health of such nationals; 3. Reaffirms its decision in resolution 662 (1990) that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void, and therefore, demands that the Government of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel, and refrain from any such actions in the future; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on compliance with this resolution at the earliest possible time. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0)
Resolution 665 (Aug. 25, 1990)
The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) and demanding their full and immediate implementation, Having decided in resolution 661 (1990) to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq which imperils the existence of a Member State and to restore the legitimate authority, the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait which requires the speedy implementation of the above resolutions, Deploring the loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and determined to prevent further such losses, Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), and 664 (1990) and in particular at the conduct of the Government of Iraq in using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil, 1. Calling upon those Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstance as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990); 2. Invites Member States accordingly to co-operate as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, in accordance with paragraph l above; 3. Requests all States to provide in accordance with the Charter such assistance as may be required by the States referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution; 4. Further requests the States concerned to co-ordinate their actions in pursuit of the above paragraphs of this resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee and after consultation with the Secretary-General to submit reports to the Security Council and its Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of this resolution; 5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. VOTE: 13 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen) (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990 Title:

Country Profile: Iraq

Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90 Category: Country Data Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq Subject: Trade/Economics, History fig 35>Iraq: Outlets for Oil [TEXT] Official Name: Republic of Iraq
Area: 434,934 sq. km. (167,924 sq. mi.); about the size of California. Cities: Capital--Baghdad (pop. 3.8 million). Other cities--Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk. Terrain: Alluvial plains, mountains, and desert. Climate: Mostly hot and dry.
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Iraqi(s). Population (July 1990 est.): 18.8 million. Annual growth rate: 3.3%. Ethnic groups: Arab 75%, Kurd 15-20%. Religions: Shi'a Muslim 55%, Sunni Muslim 40%, Christian 5%. Languages: Arabic, Kurdish, Assyrian, Armenian. Education: Years compulsory--primary school (age 6 through grade 6). Literacy--70%. Health: Infant mortality rate--25/1,000. Life expectancy--56.1 yrs. Work force (1980): 3.5 million. Agriculture--44%. Industry--26%. Services--31%.
Type: Ruling Council. Independence: 1932. Interim constitution: 1970. Branches: Executive--Revolutionary Command Council (RCC); president and Council of Ministers appointed by RCC. Legislative-- National Assembly of 250 members elected in 1980 and 1984. Judicial--civil, religious, and special courts. Administrative subdivisions: 18 provinces. Political parties: Ba'ath Party dominates; Kurdish Democratic Party and Kurdish Republican Party (legal parties). Suffrage: Universal adult. National holidays: Anniversaries of the 1958 and 1968 revolutions- -July 14 and July 17. Flag: Horizontal bands of red, white, and black, with three green stars on center (white) band.
GDP (1989): $35 billion. Per capita income: $1,940. Inflation rate (1989 est.): 30-40% Natural resources: Oil, natural gas, phosphates, sulfur. Agriculture (less than 10% of GNP): Products--wheat, barley, rice, cotton, dates, poultry. Industry: Types--petroleum, petrochemical, textile, cement. Trade (1988): Exports--$12.5 billion: crude oil, dates. Major markets--Western Europe, Brazil, Japan. Imports--$10.2 billion: construction equipment, machinery, motor vehicles, agricultural commodities. Major suppliers--Japan, Western Europe, US.
International Affiliations
UN and some of its specialized agencies, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Non-Aligned Movement; Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); Arab League; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC); INTELSAT. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990 Title:

Country Profile: Kuwait

Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90 Category: Country Data Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Kuwait Subject: Trade/Economics, History Official Name: State of Kuwait
Area: 17,818 sq. km. (about 6,880 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than New Jersey. Cities: Capital--Kuwait (pop. 1.3 million). Other towns--Ahmadi, Jahra, Fahaheel. Terrain: Desert. Climate: intensely hot and dry in summers; short, cool winters.
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Kuwaiti(s). Population (1989): 570,000 Kuwaitis, 1.5 million others. Annual growth rate (including immigration): 4.5%, Kuwaiti 3.7%. Ethnic groups: Arab 75%, South Asian, Iranian, Southeast Asian. Religion: Islam 85% (Kuwaitis 100%). Languages: Arabic (official); English widely spoken. Education (free through high school): Years compulsory--8. Literacy--about 85% over age 10. Health: Infant mortality rate--19.6/1,000 (Kuwaiti). Life expectancy--70 yrs. Work force (1989): 854,000. Social services--53.8%. Construction-- 15.6%. Trade, hotels, and restaurants--11.6%. Manufacturing--7.3%. Transport, storage, and communication--5.3%. Finance, insurance, real estate, and business services--3.2%. Agriculture, hunting, and fishing--1.3%. Power and water--1%. Mining and quarrying--0.9%.
Type: Constitutional monarchy. Independence: June 19, 1961. Constitution: 1962. Branches: Executive--Amir (head of state). Legislative--elected National Assembly of 50 members. Judicial--present judicial system instituted by a 1959 Amiri decree. Political parties: None. Suffrage: Adult males who resided in Kuwait before 1920 and their male descendants 21 years and older (eligible voters--about 140,000). Subdivisions: Government is centralized, but for administrative purposes, there are five governorates: Kuwait City, Hawalli, Ahmadi, Jahra, and Farwaniya. Central government budget (1988-89): Revenues--$8.2 billion. Expenditures--$10.3 billion. Flag: Horizontal stripes of green, white, and red joining a black trapezoid at the staff side.
GDP (1989): $23.1 billion. Annual growth rate: 21.4%. Per capita GDP: $11,250. Natural resources: Petroleum, fisheries. Agriculture: Most food is imported. Cultivated land: 1%. Industry: Petroleum extraction and refining, fertilizer, petrochemicals, some construction materials. Water desalinization capacity: 215 million gallons a day. Trade (1988): Exports and reexports--$7.1 billion: oil 87%. Major export recipients (as a percentage of the Kuwaiti market) include:-- Japan 16.5%; Netherlands 10.1%; US 5.3%; Taiwan 5.1%. Imports-- $5.9 billion: machinery and manufactured goods, transport equipment, foodstuffs. Major suppliers--Japan 12.9%; US 12.2%; UK 7.5%; FRG 7.2%; other important suppliers: Italy, Turkey, France, Korea, Taiwan, China. Average US exports (1984-88)--$625 million. US exports (1989): $855 million (automobiles and transport equipment; construction machinery and equipment; air conditioning and refrigeration equipment; consumer goods and tobacco products); US imports (1989): $975 million. Economic aid extended (1988-89 fiscal year): $290 million through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. Arab countries 49%; African countries 29%; Asian countries 18%. More than $17 million in capital contributions and cofinancing to multilateral development institutions. Primary recipients: African Development Bank; Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. Aid accounts for 1.4% of GDP. Iraq is an invading force in Kuwait and has established an Iraqi- controlled puppet government there. The US continues to recognize and deal with the government and representatives of Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmed al-Jabir al-Sabah. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990 Title:

The State Department: Managing Diversity

Perkins Source: Edward J. Perkins, Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Personnel Description: Washington, DC Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America Subject: State Department [TEXT] Recently, I've read several articles urging managers to look ahead and to consolidate and expand the workplace gains of equal employment opportunity. Managers, using the techniques of "post- modern" personnel management, were to create a workplace where differences in style and subculture would not just be tolerated but would be accepted and welcomed. The articles stressed that good managers should do so because it was the right and profitable thing to do. Also, they had to do so because the US work force was developing along lines very different from its present composition. Between now and the year 2000, 22% of new workers will be immigrant males and females, 22% will be native nonwhite males and females, 42% will be native white females, and only 15% native white males.
Equal Employment Opportunity In the Workplace
Clearly, if the American work force of the future is to be dynamic and productive in work settings that are efficient and fair, the so-called US business mainstream will have to develop a new, more accommodating managerial ethic. Such a new managerial ethic may be distinct from that of a Germany or a Japan, where national traditions and the makeup of the work force allow for a very high degree of discipline and regimentation. Such an ethic, in the first place, must be effective; in addition, it must be consistent with our own national aptitudes and traditions. Can we do it? Straight away, the answer is an unqualified yes. Our country is built on a premise of diversity; we must develop such an ethic if we are to be a department of government that interacts with the world. From a Foreign Service perspective, one can see how this can be done in America--and why we in the Foreign and Civil Services can pioneer such a new organizational model.
America: Unity As Well As Variety
Americans who have grown up seeing our country only from a domestic point of view may be more conscious than we are of our domestic problems and of our regional, economic, and ethnic differences. But with distance often comes perspective. The Foreign Service observer looks at America and sees two sets of characteristics relevant to the theme of this article. First, for all of its variety, America viewed from abroad seems a remarkably unified, harmonious composition. The details and color fall into place, as those of a painting do when seen from the right distance. Many average, native-born Americans discover this too: African-Americans, Irish-Americans, Greek-Americans who go back to their countries of origin learn a lot, including just how American they are and how important this "Americanism" is in the eyes of the citizens of their "cultural background country." Similarly, new immigrants often are impressed by how rapidly our society accepts them and their children. There never could have been an Edmund Muskie, a Henry Kissinger, a Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Hermann F. Eilts, or a Carl Schurz (to go back a while) anywhere but in the United States of America. Two of our recent Rhodes scholars were children of Vietnamese refugees. The unity and cohesion of America become even more evident with South Africa in discernible transition to a possible multi- racial country of unlimited possibilities, as the communist ice cap recedes, and as centrifugal force pulls at the former Iron Curtain countries--and even the USSR itself. Second, America's openness, energy, and creativity continue to astonish and to motivate much of the world. Our culture and even our language--American English--are welcoming and egalitarian; our universities--the best in the world--reflect these American traits and are a Mecca for foreign students everywhere. Senegalese President Diouf has specifically said he wants his cadre of new government workers to have a practical education--best obtained, says he, in the United States. Unity, openness, energy--these characteristics help to show how Americans created history's first and only multi-racial, multi- ethnic democracy of continental proportions. Our Constitution and the ideals underlying it enable us coherently to organize unparalleled variety into a working nation-state. More importantly, many societies seem to embody these principles, as we have, but without the constitutionally structured commitment.
The Department As a Model of Diversity
This brings us back to the immediate question: How can the Department of State take the American ability to evoke a unified national effort out of varying cultural traditions and apply it to itself? We can start by becoming more self-conscious of what is being done in the private sector as companies anticipate and respond to the changing composition of our society and use it as a useful tool. Leading companies accept the fact and consequences of a more varied work force. They use various techniques better to tap the potential for their employees: cultural audits, management- labor seminars, sensitivity training, networking, mentoring, plus the specific celebration of ethnic customs, food, and history. In such companies, minorities see themselves not as recipients of a sort of managerial charity but as an important and well-integrated part of the organization's work and culture. Companies have found that by constructively managing diversity--by accepting and even celebrating it--they can improve organization morale and performance, and, most importantly, they learn more about their country and its people. The Department of State employs many similar management techniques and procedures to create a more participatory workplace. In some respects, we may even be in advance of the private sector. How many corporations would consider assigning women to top positions in Saudi Arabia or other Arabian Peninsula nations or sending an African-American to represent the organization in South Africa? We keep trying, moreover. In 1990, for instance, our Foreign Service officer generalist study was completed and implemented, and we have undertaken a unified recruiting effort that includes more vigorous minority outreach. Other studies are underway of the Foreign Service specialist function, of Foreign Service secretaries, of Civil Service employees at the Department of State, and of the role of our American family members, and there are more. In these studies, we have sought to build and arrive at consensus by the freest exchange we could devise. A common, fundamental purpose of these studies--and of the process by which they are conducted--is to reduce or eliminate whatever in our institution impedes the open, efficient conduct of business among Foreign Service people. Time must elapse before we know how effective our changes will be. There is some reason for optimism, though, because our changes reflect extensive internal discussions and a capacity for internal self-education. They have the benefit, moreover, of building on the efforts of previous years. Even before our current initiatives were announced, our institution was becoming more open, flexible, and representative. We have made progress toward making our workplaces congenial to Americans of every sort and background. We must continue proactively and vigorously. Our current criteria show there have been gradual, steady increases in the percentages of minorities serving as Foreign Service officer generalists. Between 1981 and 1989, the totals of minority Foreign Service officers rose from 9% to 13.1% and that of women from 16.4% of the Foreign Service officer corps to 23.4%. At the same time, the percentage of white males declined from 76.9% to 67.4%. Relative progress is even more visible if we consider the gains made by minorities and women at the junior- and mid-levels from 1981 to 1989.
None of these accomplishments is sufficient reason to celebrate. What has so far been achieved shows only that results are possible; it should motivate us to try harder. But the more I study our institution and travel to posts overseas, the more I am convinced that we are a more welcoming institution than we were in the past. I sense a genuine evolution of spirit within our service. I expect that because of the kind of people we profess to be. I repeat: Much remains to be done. In any career institution, there can be a significant time lag between a shift in an organization's culture and when this shift is reflected at all levels of that organization. But I believe that we have approached a watershed and that the driving force for a more tolerant, open, and representative institution comes increasingly from my Foreign and Civil Service colleagues themselves. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990 Title:

International Narcotics Control

Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Subject: Narcotics, International Law [TEXT] Trafficking and consumption of illegal narcotics have assumed global proportions, and virtually no nation is immune. Leaders of nations around the world and from across the ideological spectrum have declared an all-out war on drugs. Rhetoric and blame are being replaced by cooperative efforts aimed at breaking the cycle of drug production and consumption. As a result, consumption in some areas has decreased slightly, but trafficking needs to be reduced more. US experts, in particular, are watching with concern an upswing in world heroin production. Although illicit drugs are produced primarily in the developing world and used mainly by consumers in more affluent nations, producing and trafficking countries also are confronting growing drug use problems of their own.
US Policy
International cooperation to stop production and trafficking is a central element of US foreign policy. Few foreign policy concerns have as direct a domestic impact as international narcotics. Ninety-five percent of the illicit narcotics consumed in the United States comes from other countries. It is essential, therefore, to gain international cooperation to reduce drug supplies while the United States works to reduce demand at home. For example, the government of Colombia--where most of the world's cocaine is processed--has declared war on drug dealers. As the lead federal agency responsible for America's international narcotics control efforts, the Department of State implements key elements of the national drug control strategy. They include: -- Disrupting and dismantling drug-trafficking organizations; -- Reducing the cocaine supply by giving law enforcement, military, and economic assistance to Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia to isolate coca-producing regions, block delivery of chemicals used in processing, and dismantle drug-running networks; -- Reducing heroin supply by convincing other countries to pressure opium growers to cut heroin processing and distribution; -- Reducing marijuana supply through strengthened foreign law enforcement and eradication; and -- Encouraging European Community and other multilateral efforts aimed at source country and transit country production and distribution and at European consumption. Other international objectives include: -- Making anti-drug efforts a priority in US bilateral relations with almost every country; -- Urging other nations to ratify the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which the United States ratified in February 1990; -- Enforcing strictly existing US laws that make foreign aid contingent on the recipient countries' compliance with anti- narcotics efforts; and -- Strengthening domestic and international efforts against "laundering" (disguising) of drug money. In January 1990, President Bush issued a National Drug Control Strategy that calls for increased international cooperation against drug production, trafficking, and abuse. A critical part of the strategy is increased emphasis on cooperative efforts with three Andean countries (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia) to dismantle cocaine trafficking organizations and disrupt cocaine processing and trafficking as close to the source as possible. In FY 1990, $423 million in economic, military, and law enforcement assistance is being provided to the three nations to strengthen their ability to meet these objectives. Additional economic aid will be available to these countries in FY 1991 if they use current resources effectively and establish sound economic policies. In February 1990, President Bush met with the presidents of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia at the Andean summit in Cartagena, Colombia. The four presidents agreed to work closely in a number of critical counter-narcotics areas, including the control of precursor chemicals, drug education, exchange of tax information, and a broadened role for each country's military in fighting narcotics. The four countries signed various multilateral and bilateral agreements and understandings. The United States and Bolivia signed agreements on the control of essential chemicals, on control of weapons exports, and on public awareness. The United States and Peru signed accords on the exchange of tax information and public awareness and exchanged notes on extradition. Similar agreements are under negotiation with Colombia. The summit nations agreed to hold a high-level follow-up meeting within 6 months. Since the summit, Peru and the United States have signed an agreement to control essential chemicals, and the United States and Colombia have signed an agreement on the sharing of seized trafficker assets. The United States is negotiating similar agreements with other countries. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, which has a budget of $150 million, provides $58 million to the Andean strategy funding. It has counter-narcotics programs in South and Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Southeast and Southwest Asia.
Toward Greater Cooperation
Developed nations play a key role in global efforts to fight narcotics production and trafficking. The President's drug control strategy calls on European nations, Canada, Japan, and Australia to take greater steps to help Andean, Caribbean, and Asian countries reduce drug supply and demand. An informal consultative mechanism is being established for this purpose. Trafficking organizations are seeking new markets for cocaine and heroin. Developed nations, recognizing the threat, are responding. For instance, the Soviet Union, which long denied the existence of a drug problem within its borders, now has major official and unofficial programs to curb drug use. Effective enforcement of international narcotics control programs involves interdiction, criminal penalties against traffickers, and eradication. International cooperation in these endeavors has led to some progress in fighting illegal narcotics. In August 1988, 30 countries joined in a month-long cocaine- control project under the auspices of the International Drug Enforcement Conference. Thirty countries (from Europe and North, Central, and South America) participated in a cooperative, coordinated, multinational law-enforcement operation to improve capabilities to seize cocaine and cash, track down fugitives, and crack down on the laundering of drug money. The United States committed National Guard units in four states to work with the US Customs Service inspecting cargo. Since most cocaine comes to the United States through the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico, the US government is strengthening anti-drug programs in those transit areas. Joint Information Coordination Centers have been established in the Caribbean area to develop and disseminate information that will result in more arrests. Twenty-six Caribbean countries have improved their ability to communicate with one another and with US law enforcement agencies through INTERPOL (an international police coordination network). In Latin America, the US Government supports law enforcement activities through training and technical assistance. Nine of the 11 countries with which the United States has major narcotics control programs are in the Caribbean and Latin America.(1) (1)The United States has bilateral narcotics control programs with the following countries: The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela.
Recent Progress
More and more, government leaders are focusing on the international narcotics threat and on positive solutions. During the July 1989 economic summit of industrialized nations, Secretary Baker urged Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany to take more aggressive actions against the laundering of drug money. The seven summit partners created a financial action task force, which met in the fall of 1989 and was to make recommendations by April 1990. A new US financial crimes center will collect, analyze, and disseminate information to law enforcement agencies to help combat money laundering. A recent UN special session was devoted entirely to the narcotics issue. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sponsored a joint UN-UK ministerial conference on cocaine and demand reduction in the spring of 1990. Recent Colombian counter-narcotics operations have resulted in the extradition of 20 narcotics traffickers and money launderers to face justice in the United States, the seizure of about 19 metric tons of cocaine at a major drug trafficking transportation complex in southern Colombia, and the confiscation of numerous properties and other assets belonging to drug "kingpins." Coca prices in Bolivia dropped because of increased anti-drug pressure in Colombia and Bolivia, encouraging many coca farmers to participate in voluntary eradication programs. For this reason, the United States is convinced that interdiction and alternative development go hand-in-hand. As long as coca leaf is more profitable than legitimate crops, no alternative development program can succeed. Progress has occurred in other countries as well. Mexico seized 34 metric tons of cocaine in 1989 and drug trafficking has diminished in and around The Bahamas. Last year, Jamaica further reduced its marijuana crop. Ecuador has been successful in eliminating coca production, and Pakistan reduced its opium crop. Still, much remains to be done. The estimated production of illicit narcotics supplies increased in 1989. Most dramatically, Burma's opium crop doubled as the Burmese turned their attention away from narcotics control. Worldwide, coca production grew by about 10% last year.
Economic Development and Growth in the Andes
The United States understands the cost to the legitimate economy in Colombia of the drug war and the importance of the "coca economy" in Peru and Bolivia. Direct economic assistance (conditioned on anti-narcotics performance and the implementation of sound economic policy) will help over the short term. In July 1990, President Bush announced that he would seek from Congress tariff preferences for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Over a 10-year period, they would be allowed one-way free trade on a number of important products. The President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative should lay the foundation for long-term economic growth and development by encouraging economic reform in the Andes to attract foreign investment as well as encouraging debt reduction and, ultimately, two-way free trade agreements with the United States.
Coca Production and the Environment
Although the primary motivation of the United States in the drug war is to halt the devastation caused by drugs to citizens and communities, the effect on the environment is another important concern. Coca production destroys the world's most fragile environments, just as cocaine destroys the minds and bodies of its users. The earth is being damaged every day by farmers who grow coca and by the middlemen who process the raw product into cocaine. This devastation is, in part, being financed by American drug users. Coca cultivation and the production of cocaine causes serious and irreparable damage, since coca is grown in some of the world's most fragile ecological zones--not on traditional farmland. For example, the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru, the world's largest coca cultivation area, is populated by migrants who are there specifically to grow coca. Coca growers and processors damage the environment in three ways.
Coca production has caused the deforestation of 700,000 hectares of jungles in the Amazon regions of Peru and Bolivia--an area almost 40% larger than the State of Delaware. The land is cleared not only for coca, but for food crops, dwelling places, landing strips, and cocaine laboratories. Growers exhaust parcels of land and abandon them. Already, scientists in Peru report the loss of some plant and animal species due to the clearance of 120,000 hectares of that country's most biologically diverse region. Coca is produced on about 54,000 hectares of Bolivian land. Deforestation also has resulted in soil erosion, flooding, and firewood shortages. A constant smoke haze covers the Upper Huallaga Valley in August and September as growers slash and burn to clear more land for coca production. Even national forests and parks in Peru and Bolivia have been invaded by coca growers.
Use of Herbicides.
Since coca cultivators are interested solely in profit and are ignorant about chemical usage, massive quantities of strong herbicides are frequently used to eliminate weeds. As a result, these chemicals soon saturate the soil and travel through the waterways, poisoning the water system and adversely affecting the species that depend upon it. Although the extent of the damage is still unknown, Latin American environmentalists believe that the effects will be grave.
Cocaine Processing.
The ecological effects of cocaine processing are even worse. Since the production process requires huge quantities of toxic chemicals, and laboratories are located near running water, several fish species have disappeared in Peru. Scientists have estimated that in one single year, production-related pollution in Peru resulted in the discharge of about 57 million liters of kerosene, 32 million liters of sulfuric acid, 16,000 metric tons of lime, 3,000 metric tons of carbide, 6 million liters of acetone, 6 million liters of toluene, and 16,000 metric tons of toilet paper into the nation's waterways.
The growing consensus that the solution to the world's drug problem must be international in scope means addressing all elements of the grower-to-user chain. While some progress has been made in the fight against production, trafficking, and consumption of illegal narcotics, much still needs to be done. The United States remains committed to fostering even greater international cooperation as a central element in its strategy to control drugs.
International Control Efforts (chart)
1909 -- International Conference on Narcotic Drugs leads to signing of 1912 International Opium Convention. 1920 -- League of Nations creates Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs. 1931 -- Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs. 1946 -- Protocol transfers drug control functions to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 1988 -- UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
Summary of Cartegena Actions (chart)
Declaration of Cartagena--Key Points
In February 1990, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and the United States pledged to seek a comprehensive solution to end the regional drug problem by: Attacking the production, transport, and consumption of illegal drugs; Stimulating regional economies to provide increased legitimate economic opportunities; Increasing public awareness of the problem to encourage citizen cooperation with control efforts; and Seeking cooperation from the Europeans, Japanese, and multilateral organizations in these efforts.
Bilateral Agreements
The US and Bolivia signed a(n): -- Essential Chemicals Control Agreement to provide a basis for monitoring and controlling all facets of drug precursor- chemical movement; -- Weapons Export Control Memorandum of Understanding to ensure greater cooperation in ensuring that US weapons exports are not acquired by narco-traffickers; and -- Public Awareness Memorandum of Understanding to build public support for programs against production, trafficking, and consumption. The US and Peru signed a(n): -- Tax Information Exchange Agreement to provide for bilateral exchanges of tax-related financial information in order to prosecute those who gain financially from trafficking; -- Exchange of Notes on Extradition to confirm explicitly that narcotics trafficking and related drug offenses are incorporated by reference in the 1899 US-Peru Extradition Treaty; and -- Public Awareness Memorandum of Understanding to build support for anti- narcotics programs. The US and Colombia pledged to: -- Continue efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs; -- Seek ways to maintain economic growth and stability; -- Explore means of opening US markets to Colombian products; and -- Work toward expanding US-Colombian trade.
Money Laundering (chart)
The international drug economy runs on cash--lots of it. Worldwide drug profits were estimated to be as high as $240 billion in 1987. Drug trafficking is profitable because illegal narcotic crops are cheap to cultivate and process, while their street value is high. Although typical drug trafficking operations have several layers of intermediaries, most of the gains go to a rich, small elite that has come to wield impressive economic and political power. Some members are believed to have a personal worth that exceeds their country's national debt. They buy land and other assets for investment purposes and control numerous domestic businesses. They also bribe and intimidate local politicians, judges, and police, who in turn allow illegal activities to continue in an ever-widening circle of corruption. Although some traffickers have engaged in token philanthropic projects, the vast amount of their profits do not stay in the countries where narcotics are produced. They are usually transferred abroad and transformed into a more manageable form to conceal their illicit origin. Laundering schemes include electronic funds transfers, depositing funds in international tax shelters, or setting up dummy "shell" corporations. Such capital flight rarely benefits the developing countries where most drugs originate. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990 Title:

Focus on Central and Eastern Europe: 9/10/90

Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90 Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies Region: E/C Europe Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] Following is a periodic update on public- and private-sector initiatives to promote democracy and free-market economies in Central and Eastern Europe.
Business Opportunities.
Poland's new privatization plan will be the focus of an October 2 conference to be hosted by the National Foreign Trade Council and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The new Polish action clears the way for foreign and domestic private participation in the 7,600 state-owned companies that now represent 80% of Poland's GNP. The conference, to be held at the Pierre Hotel in New York, will be attended by senior Polish government officials; people with successful business ventures in Poland; experts in tax, legal, and insurance matters; and US government representatives. Corporate sponsors include American International Group of New York, Cole Corette ∧ Abrutyn law offices of Washington and London, Price Waterhouse of Washington and London, and LOT Polish Airlines. For more information, call Conference Coordinator Ernest McCrary at 202-223-8098.
Local Issues Addressed.
A 3-day visit to Poland in June of a Phoenix, Arizona, mayoral delegation led to a draft proposal from the city of Gdynia regarding exchanges, commercial promotion, and mutual assistance. The visit was coordinated by the US Information Agency (USIA).
Attorneys General Group Visits.
USIA's Office of Citizens Exchanges supported a visit of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) to Budapest in June, which Hungarians saw as additional proof of US interest in Hungarian efforts to solidify democratic institutions and the rule of law. Attorney General Mary Sue Terry of Virginia invited Hungarian Chief Prosecutor Kalman Gyorgyi to attend the next NAAG annual meeting in Williamsburg this December. NAAG also announced the creation of a special exchange and internship program for promising young members of the chief prosecutor's staff.
Free-Trade Unionists Complete Samuel Gompers Program.
Eight Hungarian free-trade unionists traveled to seven US cities in June and July. Their talks with US trade union officials focused on organization and day-to-day maintenance of unions.
East Germany
West Germans Help Exchanges.
The West German Bundestag leadership plans to place some US students in high schools in East Germany this September under the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Program. Although no East Germans will come to the US under this program in 1990 (all students were chosen last fall), the Germans announced plans to expand the program by 109 students in 1991-92, bringing the total to 495. The 109 new participants will come from East Germany, and the Bundestag will pay all costs for them (about $350,000- 400,000). The United States has been invited to send a similar number of students.
Fulbright Teacher Exchange
Three teachers of English from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) have been placed in US schools to teach as Fulbright teacher exchangees. This is the first year that the GDR has participated in this program. The teachers will be placed in schools in Pennsylvania and Virginia.
Workshop for Journalists
Eight Romanian print journalists participated in a Voice of America (VOA) workshop that examined issues such as news gathering and news writing, laws protecting freedom of the press and of information, the role of a free mass media in a democracy, public opinion, and socio-political dialogue and education. The workshop, held in July and August, was the second USIA/VOA-sponsored program of its type for Central and East European (CEE) countries. The first was held in May with Northwestern University for a group of Polish broadcasters. For additional details, call VOA's Office of External Affairs at 202-619-2538.
Conference on the Political and Economic Environments
The Department of State's Bureau for International Communications and Information Policy hosted a conference for US communications and broadcast businesses in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that focused on opportunities for telecommunications and broadcasting in CEE countries and the USSR. The July 26 conference included broadcast executives, congressional staff, "think tank" experts, and the trade press.
Coalition for Democracy and Enterprise
The Business-Higher Education Forum, a non-profit organization of about 90 chief executives from major US corporations, colleges, and universities, has created a Coalition for Democracy and Enterprise to help CEE countries. The coalition aims to strengthen businesses, government agencies, unions, media, voluntary organizations, and universities that are vital to the transition to democratic, free- market-oriented societies. The coalition has formed a 22-member steering committee, co-chaired by the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of ITT, Rand Araskog, and the President of Northwestern University, Arnold Weber. They met with key government, business, and academic leaders in Hungary and Poland and established contact with leaders in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The coalition has received formal requests for assistance from the Polish government and Hungary's Foundation for Progress in Technology (a private- sector group). CEE countries have requested programs in five areas: changing work place attitudes and incentives; small business development; management methods; environmental cleanup; and media development. This fall, coalition members and staff will go to Budapest and Warsaw to hold more planning sessions and to conduct the first workshops on a trial basis. In December, the coalition will select projects. For additional information, contact Don Blandin, Director, Business-Higher Education Forum, at 202-939-9345.
VOA: Teaching English
In September, the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Polish, and Yugoslav services of VOA will begin English-language teaching via the airwaves. VOA will use a program created for USIA by the Maxwell- Macmillan publishing company.
Candidates Selected for Media Fellowships
Times Mirror Inc., which publishes the Los Angeles Times and other newspapers, is sponsoring a program to show CEE journalists how the free press works in the United States. Times Mirror will award fellowships to eight CEE journalists. Two journalists from Czechoslovakia, three from Hungary, and three from Poland will begin their internships in September.
Young Leader Environmental Project
Ten young leaders from six CEE countries visited the United States for 4 weeks in July and August to examine environmental issues. The project was conducted by the University of South Carolina and included classes, field trips to examine environmental projects, and short stops in Washington, DC, and New York City to examine public policy and corporate involvement in environmental protection efforts.
Conference on Global Climate Change
The USIA post in Stuttgart, Germany, co-sponsored a conference on global climate change, June 20-22. Participants from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania joined representatives from West Germany and the United States in examining the political and scientific aspects of environmental protection.
Economic Update on East Germany (chart)
Economic Trends
-- GNP growth slumped to about l% in 1989. The big exodus of workers (340,000 during the year) pushed the economy into a recession in the fourth quarter. Now that German economic and monetary union has been accomplished, East Germany is expected to experience economic disruptions, the extent and duration of which are difficult to predict. -- Prices spurted up after November with growing use of the deutsche mark and replacement of many local goods by more expensive products from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Inflationary pressures are likely to persist. -- Unemployment rose during July to 273,000 people, up from 130,000 in June. That figure could rise to more than 800,000 by the end of 1990. Also at the end of July, there were 798,000 part-time workers who were receiving government assistance. That figure could rise to about 1.3 million workers by the end of 1990.
Hard Currency Trade and Debt
-- Imports from the West in 1989 rose twice as fast as exports, nearly eliminating the sizeable trade surplus maintained through most of the 1980s. -- Gross debt is estimated at more than $21 billion. The debt- service ratio jumped to 45% in 1989, but reserves also are high (estimated at more than $8 billion).
Trade With the USSR
-- Estimates vary, but as much as 40% of East German trade is with the USSR, which supplies nearly all the East Germany's energy imports and much of its raw materials. The USSR is the major market for East German machinery and equipment. Some 15% of all East German industrial jobs are linked to Soviet trade. -- Since the German economic and monetary union on July 1, trade accounting has shifted to the deutsche mark against the transferable ruble. Trade will change fully toward currency and world prices on January 1, 1991.
Status of Economic Reform
-- Unlike the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, East Germany achieved immediate price reform and currency convertibility through economic and monetary union with the FRG. -- FRG laws and regulations, including property rights, took effect on July l. -- The cost of economic and monetary union with the FRG will be high. Anywhere from 25-50% of all East German companies could collapse, and those that survive may need substantial assistance. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990 Title:

Current Treaty Actions, August 1990

Date: Aug 30, 19908/30/90 Category: Treaties/Agreements Country: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Germany, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Israel, Lesotho, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Peru, Poland, Seychelles, Spain, USSR (former), United Kingdom, United States, Western Samoa, Yugoslavia (former), Zaire Subject: International Law
International coffee agreement, 1983, with annexes, done at London Sept. 16, 1982, as extended July 3, 1989.(1) Entered into force Oct. 1, 1989. Acceptance deposited: Cuba, Aug. 3, 1990. Accessions deposited: Congo, July 30, 1990; Vietnam, Aug. 3, 1990.
International convention for safe containers, with annexes, as amended. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the US Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037, 10220, 10914. Accession deposited: Morocco, July 5, 1990.
Statute of the International Agency for Research on Cancer. Done at Geneva May 20, 1965. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1965. TIAS 5873. Notification of withdrawal: Australia, June 29, 1990; effective Dec. 29, 1990.
Satellite Communications Systems
Convention relating to the distribution of programme-carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974. Entered into force Aug. 25, 1979; for the US Mar. 7, 1985. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 98-31. Accession deposited: Australia, July 26, 1990.
Agreement on technical barriers to trade (standards code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616. Acceptance deposited: Israel, Feb. 16, 1990. Agreement on interpretation and application of articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (subsidies and countervailing duties code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9619. Acceptance deposited: Colombia, May 7, 1990.(2) United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262] Accession deposited: Spain, July 24, 1990.
Agreement concerning cooperative development of the digital chart of the world. Signed at Washington June 22, 1990. Entered into force June 22, 1990.
Agreement on social security, with administrative arrangement. Signed at Vienna July 13, 1990. Enters into force on the first day of the third month following written notification by the parties of compliance with all statutory and constitutional requirements.
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Brasilia and Washington July 19 and Aug. 14, 1990. Entered into force Oct. 15, 1990.
Agreement concerning compensation in the deaths of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt, with annex. Signed at Santiago June 11, 1990. Enters into force upon notification to the US by Chile that it has completed the proceedings necessary under Chilean law.
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of July 23, 1985, as amended, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 14 and 22, 1990. Entered into force: Aug. 8, 1990; effective July 1, 1990.
Agreement concerning the establishment of a Peace Corps program in the Congo. Effected by exchange of notes at Brazzaville Apr. 21, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 21, 1990.
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Quito and Washington Aug.1 and 8, 1990. Enters into force Oct. 15, 1990.
Grant agreement to assist Egypt with its balance of payments. Signed at Cairo July 9, 1990. Entered into force July 9, 1990.
Memorandum of understanding concerning the operation of the INTELPOST service, with details of implementation. Signed at Addis Ababa and Washington Mar. 26 and July 16, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 15, 1990.
German Democratic Republic
Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 13, 1983, as amended and extended (TIAS 10687), concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Jan.16 and Apr. 5, 1990. Enters into force: Aug. 3, 1990; effective July 1, 1990.
Swap agreement among the US Treasury and the Bank of Guyana/Republic of Guyana, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Georgetown and Washington June 19 and 20, 1990. Entered into force June 20, 1990.
Swap agreement among the US Treasury and the Central Bank of Honduras/Government of Honduras, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Tegucigalpa and Washington June 27 and 28, 1990. Entered into force June 28, 1990.
Swap agreement among the US Treasury and the National Bank of Hungary/Government of Hungary, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Washington and Budapest June 19, 1990. Entered into force June 19, 1990. Agreement concerning the operations of the US Peace Corps in Hungary. Signed at Budapest Feb. 14, 1990. Entered into force July 12, 1990.
Agreement extending the agreement of June 3, 1984, as extended, on cooperation in energy research and development. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Jerusalem May 18 and June 11, 1990. Entered into force June 11, 1990; effective June 3, 1990.
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Maseru and Washington June 19 and July 20, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1990.
Agreement on cooperation in combating narcotics trafficking and drug dependency. Signed at Mexico Feb. 23, 1989. Entered into force July 30, 1990. Memorandum of understanding for the exchange of technical information and for cooperation in the field of air quality research. Signed at Washington July 19, 1990. Entered into force July 19, 1990. Agreement on cooperation for the protection and improvement of the environment in the metropolitan area of Mexico City. Signed at Washington Oct. 3, 1989. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1990. Agreement of cooperation regarding international transport of urban air pollution, with appendix. Signed at Washington Oct. 3, 1989. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1990.
Agreement on cooperation through the US Peace Corps in Mongolia. Signed at Ulaanbaatar Aug. 2, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 2, 1990.
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Maputo and Washington July 9 and 23, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1990.
Multinational Force and Observers
Agreement concerning the settlement of claims by the United States against the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Effected by exchange of notes at Rome May 3, 1990. Entered into force May 3, 1990.
Agreement concerning scientific and technical cooperation in the earth and mapping sciences, with annexes. Signed at Lima July 19, 1990. Entered into force July 19, 1990.
Agreement concerning the program of the US Peace Corps in Poland. Signed at Warsaw Feb. 23, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1990.
Agreement amending the agreement of June 29, 1976, as amended (TIAS 8385, 10173), relating to the establishment, operation, and maintenance of a tracking and telemetry facility on the island of Mahe. Effected by exchange of notes at Victoria May 29 and June 15, 1990. Entered into force June 29, 1990.
Agreement regarding mutual assistance between customs services. Signed at Madrid July 3, 1990. Enters into force on the 90th day following notification by the parties that they have accepted the agreement's terms and that all necessary national legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Visa arrangement concerning textiles and textile products, with attachment. Signed at Washington July 2, 1990. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1990.
United Kingdom
Agreement extending the agreement of Mar. 11, 1987, as extended, concerning Anguilla and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 26, 1990. Entered into force June 26, 1990; effective June 27, 1990. Memorandum of understanding on collaboration in energy research and development. Signed at Washington June 11, 1990. Entered into force June 11, 1990.
Western Samoa
Status of forces agreement. Signed at Apia June 25, 1990. Entered into force June 25, 1990.
Agreement regarding mutual assistance between customs administrations. Signed at Belgrade Apr. 11, 1990. Enters into force on the 90th day following notification by the parties that all necessary national legal requirements have been fulfilled.
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Kinshasa and Washington June 29 and July 20, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1990. (1) Certain provisions of the agreement suspended. (2) With declaration(s). (###)