US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990
Title: America's Stake in the Persian Gulf
Baker
Source: Secretary Baker
Description: Prepared statement before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Washington, DC
Date: Sep 4, 19909/4/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
I have come here today to speak to you and--through you to the
American people--about the conflict in the Persian Gulf and what it
means for the United States.
I would like to use my statement today to place this crisis in
a larger context. The entire world has mobilized to redress
aggression against a small country in a distant place. Already, we
are paying higher prices when we pull up to the local gas pump.
And thousands of our finest young men and women now stand
guard in the heat of the Persian Gulf.
The President has made it plain we have a straightforward
responsibility to the American people. Openly and clearly, we have
a duty to state what is at stake as a result of Saddam Hussein's
invasion of Kuwait. We have a duty to tell our people what our
immediate goals are in this conflict. And we have a duty to explain
how we plan to achieve those goals in order to further our long-run
interests in the gulf and beyond.
The Stakes
Let me start by discussing what's at stake.
First, Iraq's unprovoked aggression is a political test of how
the post-Cold War world will work. Amidst the revolutions
sweeping the globe and the transformation of East-West relations,
we stand at a critical juncture in history. The Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait is one of the defining moments of a new era--an era full of
promise but also one replete with new challenges. While the rules
of the road developed during the Cold War did, in the end, preserve
East-West peace in Europe, the task now is to build an enduring
peace that is global in scope, not limited just to Europe and not
rooted in confrontation and tension.
If we are to build a stable and more comprehensive peace, we
must respond to the defining moments of this new era, recognizing
the emerging dangers lurking before us. We are entering an era in
which ethnic and sectarian identities could easily breed new
violence and conflict. It is an era in which new hostilities and
threats could erupt as misguided leaders are tempted to assert
regional dominance before the ground rules of a new order can be
accepted.
Accordingly, we face a simple choice: Do we want to live in a
world where aggression is made less likely because it is met with a
powerful response from the international community, a world where
civilized rules of conduct apply? Or are we willing to live in a
world where aggression can go unchecked, where aggression
succeeds because we cannot muster the collective will to challenge
it?
Sadly, Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait will not be the last
act of aggression that international society will face. So long as
ruthless aggressors remain, the reality of international life is that
such predatory designs will emerge from time to time. But the
current crisis is a first opportunity to limit such dangers, to
reinforce the standards for civilized behavior found in the UN
Charter, and to help shape a more peaceful international order built
on the promise of recent trends in Europe and elsewhere. We must
seize this opportunity to solidify the ground rules of the new order.
Second, from a strategic standpoint, we must show that
intimidation and force are not successful ways of doing business in
the volatile Middle East--or anywhere else. The combination of
unresolved regional conflicts, turbulent social and political
changes, weapons of mass destruction, and much of the world's
energy supplies makes the Middle East particularly combustible. No
one is immune from conflicts in the Middle East. And no one can
feel safe when the danger of war escalating in the Middle East is so
high.
If we want to encourage peaceful change and preserve the
security of all our friends in the area, we must remain a reliable
partner for peace. We must help demonstrate that Saddam
Hussein's violent way is an anachronism, not the wave of the future.
Third, and perhaps most obviously, what is at stake
economically is the dependence of the world on access to the
energy resources of the Persian Gulf. The effects on our economy
and our people are already being felt. But this is not about
increases in the price of a gallon of gas at your local service
station. It is not just a narrow question of the flow of oil from
Kuwait and Iraq. It is about a dictator who, acting alone and
unchallenged, could strangle the global economic order, determining
by fiat whether we all enter a recession or even the darkness of a
depression.
A sustained oil price spiral--similar to what happened in
1973 and again in 1979--could easily cause higher inflation and
interest rates worldwide, sending us all into a sustained
recessionary slide. The burden could become particularly great for
the new democracies of Eastern Europe, threatening to undo the
revolutions of 1989. It would also be painfully felt in the poorer
countries of Central America, South Asia, and Africa--threatening
those who are now embracing market-oriented reforms and striving
to improve living standards for their impoverished millions.
Simply put, these are the stakes raised by Iraq's invasion
against Kuwait. How have we and the international community
responded to them?
Our Objectives
For the United States, the President has identified four immediate
goals:
One, the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal
of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait as mandated in UN Security Council
Resolution 660;
Two, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
Three, the protection of the lives of American citizens held
hostage by Iraq, both in Iraq and in Kuwait; and
Four, a commitment to the security and stability of the
Persian Gulf.
Our strategy is to lead a global political alliance to isolate
Iraq--politically, economically, and militarily. In this way, we aim
to make Iraq pay such a high price for its aggression that it will be
forced to withdraw from Kuwait and release Americans and others
held hostage. This in turn will allow the restoration of Kuwait's
legitimate government. It will also improve the opportunities for
long-term security and stability in the Persian Gulf in a way that
builds on the unprecedented international consensus that has
already been formed.
Implementing the Strategy
Our strategy has moved on two mutually supporting tracks toward
these aims. Let me summarize our efforts.
Diplomatically, we have worked from the beginning to foster a
coordinated international response to Iraq's aggression. The results
have been extraordinary and unprecedented. Five unanimous UN
Security Council resolutions have been passed. And Iraq is now
isolated.
We are gratified by the responsible and productive work we
have been able to undertake with the other permanent members--
Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of
China--as well as the support the Arab League and the Non-Aligned
Movement have provided.
In particular, the Soviet Union has proven a responsible
partner, suggesting new possibilities for active superpower
cooperation in resolving regional conflicts. The President will
work to further strengthen our ties of partnership when he meets
President Gorbachev in Helsinki this Sunday [September 9]. In
taking the long view, we should remember what this conflict would
have looked like if old-style zero-sum thinking was still driving
Soviet policy in the gulf.
NATO, the EC [European Community], and the Western
European Union have pitched in magnificently. Our NATO ally,
Turkey, should also be singled out for its fast, effective, and
courageous cooperation. Finally, a broad regional coalition--
including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the gulf states, and Syria--
have done much to foster an international cohesion.
In this regard, let me make a larger point: From the early days
of this administration, we have made a concerted effort--with our
friends in Asia and Europe, with the Soviets, and with organizations
like NATO and the EC--to focus on the explosive dangers inherent
in regional conflicts. In response to Iraq's invasion, we have drawn
upon the new international ties being shaped by this strategy.
The Kuwaitis themselves deserve our compassion and
respect. They have suffered a brutal invasion, their country
pillaged, their lives traumatized. There has been a tragic loss of
life, and thousands of Kuwaitis have fled to neighboring states,
escaping in many cases with only the clothes on their back.
The Kuwaitis, however, are fighting back heroically. They are
not collaborating with the Iraqi occupiers. All elements of Kuwaiti
society--from religious conservatives to secular liberals--have
voiced support for the restoration of the government. An indigenous
Kuwaiti resistance has emerged. It carries on the struggle against
Iraqi aggression from inside Kuwait. Moreover, the government of
Kuwait in exile is providing financial aid to support our military
effort and to help alleviate economic disruptions that have occurred
in such states as Egypt. In short, Kuwait has been occupied, not
conquered.
The political coalition, bound by the principle that Saddam
Hussein must be denied the fruits of aggression, has created an
economic embargo under UN auspices that is solidly in place. Iraq's
import-dependent economy is beginning to feel the strain, and
international pressures will continue to grow over time as
shortages mount. Sanction busters may be tempted by the lure of
financial profits, but Security Council Resolution 665--which
permits enforcement by appropriate means--should ensure that
Iraq's opportunities to export its oil and import key materials will
be severely constrained over time.
Saddam Hussein's aggression has exacted a broad range of
economic costs for countries across both the region and globe. The
destruction of the Kuwaiti economy by Iraqi invaders has caused
major economic dislocations for our friends in the region, notably
Egypt and Turkey. Other countries with fragile economies,
especially in Eastern Europe, are bearing heavy costs. The need to
offset the burden of our own military efforts must also be
addressed.
As the President announced last Thursday, we have initiated
an action plan to meet these needs. Our friends around the world
are responding. Saudi Arabia is meeting a large share of the fuel
costs for this effort. And other gulf states are providing fuel and
financial resources to the affected states.
The President has also asked [Treasury] Secretary Brady and
myself to go to key nations in the gulf, Europe, and Asia to help
mobilize and coordinate the international effort. We will attempt
to ensure that the costs and responsibilities are shared equitably
and that our various efforts complement one another. The aim is to
address the vital needs of affected parties and to maintain the
solidarity of the international coalition.
Time can be on the side of the international community.
Diplomacy can be made to work.
On the military track, over 25 countries are now supplying
men and materiel in support of the Security Council resolutions. US
military objectives are to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and
to ensure the effective implementation of the UN sanctions. Our
military forces are also there to protect American lives and to
provide an effective and decisive military response should Iraq
escalate its aggression to active combat with the multinational
force.
Once the present danger passes, however, we must not let its
lessons go unheeded. We have a responsibility to assure the
American people that a decade from now, their sons and daughters
will not be put in jeopardy because we failed to work toward long-
run solutions to the problems of the gulf.
The historic international consensus we have built can
become a solid foundation for successfully meeting our immediate
objectives and building a safer future. It can foster a future gulf
environment that will protect our interests and help us avoid having
to make this kind of massive diplomatic and military effort again.
In the long run, we seek a stable gulf in which the nations of
that region and their peoples can live in peace, free of the fear of
coercion. We seek a region in which change can occur and
legitimate security concerns can be preserved peacefully. And we
seek a region in which energy supplies flow freely.
We will need to work together with governments in the gulf
and outside it to build a more durable order. We will want to ensure
that our friends in the area have the means to deter aggression and
defend themselves, making it less necessary to send American men
and women to help them. And we will work with the rest of the
regional and international community to prevent further Iraqi
expansionism as well as Iraqi efforts to acquire and produce
weapons of mass destruction.
Resolution of today's threat should also become a springboard
for a sustained international effort to curb the proliferation of
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in
the region and elsewhere. It can become a springboard for revived
efforts to resolve the conflicts which lie at the root of such
proliferation, including the festering conflict between Israel and
its Palestinian and Arab neighbors.
It is not enough to demonstrate that aggression and
intimidation do not pay; we must show that a pathway to
reconciliation and peace does exist and that it can be found with
good will and good faith on all sides.
Implications for America's Role in the World
Let me conclude by placing Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in
historical perspective.
For over four decades, the central fact of international
relations was the conflict between East and West. The Cold War
reverberated across the globe, affecting everyone everywhere.
Much of America's foreign policy was either driven by, or derivative
of, our efforts to contain Stalinist aggression.
Now, the central dispute of the post-war period--the East-
West conflict over the future of Europe--has been transformed.
Last year's people-power revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe
swept away the dictatorships of the past. In their place, the people
are finding freedom. Europe is becoming whole and free, and
Germany will be united in peace and freedom.
An enlightened Soviet leadership has encouraged peaceful,
democratic change as the only legitimate road to progress. This
administration has actively engaged the new thinkers and reformers
in the Soviet Union. Together, we are finding common interests that
will unite East and West. Partnership is replacing conflict.
As I have said many times before, America's role in this sea
change in world politics is straightforward: We must leave behind
not only the Cold War but also the conflicts that preceded it.
And this is why--as the President has said from the outset--
Iraq's aggression cannot stand.
The line in the sands of Arabia is also a line in time. By
crossing into Kuwait, Saddam Hussein took a dangerous step back
in history. Maybe he thought the world would consider Kuwait
expendable, that we would think of it as just a small, faraway
country of which we knew and cared little. Possibly he remembered
the 1930s when the League of Nations failed to respond effectively
to Mussolini's aggression against Abyssinia, what is today Ethiopia.
Clearly, Saddam Hussein thought his crime would pay.
But the world has decided otherwise. He must not be allowed
to hold on to what he stole.
The President has made our position clear: The world must
stand united to defend the principles enshrined in the UN Charter.
In this effort, America must lead and our people must
understand that. We remain the one nation that has the necessary
political, military, and economic instruments at our disposal to
catalyze a successful collective response by the international
community.
Geographically, we stand apart from much of the world,
separated by the Atlantic and the Pacific. But politically,
economically, and strategically, there are no oceans; and in a world
without oceans, a policy of isolationism is no option at all. Only
American engagement can shape the peaceful world our people so
deeply desire.
We believe this coordinated and comprehensive international
isolation of Iraq is the only peaceful path to meeting the objectives
set by the President. Our efforts will, however, take time and that
is what we ask most of the American people: Stand firm, be
patient, and remain united so that together we can show that
aggression does not pay. (###)
State Department Gulf Crisis Information
Emergencies: 202-647-0900 (24 hours)
Questions or comments about the Administration's Gulf policy:
202-647-6575 or 6576 Monday-Friday, 8:30 am-5 p.m (Eastern
time)(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990
Title: A Collective Effort To Reverse Iraqi Aggression
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Opening statement from news conference, Washington, DC
Date: Aug 30, 19908/30/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization
[TEXT]
"I will not change the policy of the United States, and I don't think
other leaders whose foreign nationals are in the same predicament
will change their policies, to pay homage or to give credibility to
[Iraq's] brutal move of staking out citizens and a brutal move of
holding people against their will." (1)
The United States is engaged in a collective effort involving the
overwhelming majority of the member states of the United Nations
to reverse the consequences of Iraqi aggression. Our goals,
enshrined in five Security Council resolutions, are clear: the
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from
Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; the
stability of Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf; and the protection of
American citizens.
What is at stake here is truly significant--the dependability
of America's commitments to its friends and allies; the shape of
the post-postwar world; opposition to aggression; the potential
domination of the energy resources that are crucial to the entire
world. This effort has been truly international from the very
outset. Many other countries are contributing. At last count, 22
countries have either responded to a request from Saudi Arabia to
help deter further aggression or are contributing maritime forces
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 665. Others are
providing other forms of financial and material support to these
defense efforts or to countries whose economies are affected
adversely by sanctions or by higher oil prices. Still others are
paying a heavy economic price at home for complying with the UN
sanctions.
Sharing the Burden
It is important that the considerable burden of the effort be
shared by those being defended and those who benefit from the free
flow of oil. Indeed, anyone with a stake in international order has
an interest in ensuring that all of us succeed.
The United States has large interests in the balance and has
undertaken commitments commensurate with them. We're more
than willing to bear our fair share of the burden. This includes,
above all, the thousands of men and women in our armed forces
who are now in the gulf. But we also expect others to bear their
fair share.
A number of countries already have announced their
willingness to help those adversely affected economically by this
endeavor. It's essential, though, that this be a concerted and
coordinated one and that all affected countries participate. It is
important to get the priorities right and make sure that those most
deserving of assistance receive it and that those most able to
contribute do so.
For that reason, I directed an interagency effort to develop a
strategy to accomplish this objective. The group's report was
presented at yesterday's National Security Council meeting here,
and this morning I approved an action plan. Our approach calls for
substantial economic assistance to those states--in particular, I'd
single out Turkey and Egypt, which are bearing a great part of the
burden of sanctions and higher oil prices. The plan also targets
additional countries, including Jordan, the countries of Eastern
Europe, and others for special assistance. The United States will
also seek burden-sharing for part of our own effort.
At the same time, we will be asking other governments--
including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Saudi Arabia, the [United Arab] Emirates, free Kuwait, and
others--to join us in making available financial and, where
appropriate, energy resources to countries that have been most
affected by the current situation.
Delgations to the Gulf
To facilitate this undertaking, I've asked Secretary of State
Jim Baker and Secretary of the Treasury Nick Brady to lead high-
level delegations to the Persian Gulf, Europe, and Asia. And I'll be
getting directly in touch with the leaders of these countries, before
Secretaries Baker and Brady arrive, to set forth--spell out--our
general objectives.
Let me close by repeating what I said the other day in meeting
with the congressional leaders. The basic pieces of our policy are
in place. The Iraqi regime stands in opposition to the entire world
and to the interest of the Iraqi people. It is truly Iraq against the
world. But I want to make this point clear: We have no argument
with the people of Iraq.
The sanctions are beginning to take hold. In the meantime, we
want to ensure that countries contributing to this unprecedented
collective response do not suffer for doing so. And what I've
announced today, and what I expect will be implemented in the
coming days, should help create a context in which sanctions
against Iraq can be sustained with the intended effect.
Another area where there has been unprecedented
international solidarity is OPEC's willingness to take up the slack
in oil production created by the embargo on Iraq's and Kuwait's oil.
In this connection, I met this morning with our energy advisers who
are watching the oil production situation very, very closely. We are
pleased with OPEC's decision to help take up the slack in crude oil
production. And although we're in what I would see as a transition
period, the situation appears manageable.
At the present time, we don't anticipate major imbalances in
the oil market, but we do have the strategic petroleum reserve
tested and available if it is truly needed. Our energy policy is
resulting in increased oil production and fuel switching to natural
gas and to other fuels.
I also repeat my previous request for Americans to conserve
and for all parties to act responsibly. Right now the situation, I
would say, is relatively stable, and I am very pleased by the
coordination that is taking place with so many countries in
maintaining adequate fuel levels...
(1) The quote is taken from the question-and-answer session
after the opening statement. The complete news conference is
printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of
September 3, 1990. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990
Title: Iraq Responsible for US Hostages
Bush
Source: President Bush
Description: Remarks to Members of Congress, Washington, DC
Date: Aug 28, 19908/28/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, Terrorism
[TEXT]
(Introductory and concluding remarks deleted.)
Meeting the challenge in the Persian Gulf is not something that I, or
this administration, can do by ourselves. We can only succeed if all
of us--executive and legislative, Republican and Democrat--work
together. And that was one of the reasons I wanted you to come
here today. Let no one at home doubt my commitment to work with
the Congress; and let no one abroad doubt our national unity or our
staying power.
Let me begin by providing some background to the unfolding
drama in the gulf. And then later, I want to hear from you and, as I
say, respond to questions.
First, the background: When this administration began, we
sought to strengthen the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq and to
improve relations with Iraq. We held no illusions about that. We
hoped, along with many in the Congress, that Iraqi behavior might
be moderated. But even before the current crisis though, Iraq was
moving at odds to our interests and to the interests of many around
the world. So we suspended the provisions of the CCC [Commodity
Credit Corporation] agricultural credits [and] stopped the export of
furnaces that had the potential to contribute to Iraq's nuclear
capabilities.
You all know the events of the last several weeks. Iraq
threatened Kuwait, lied about its intentions, and finally invaded. In
3 days, Iraq had 120,000 troops and 850 tanks in Kuwait, moving
south toward the Saudi border. And it was this clear and rapidly
escalating threat that led King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to ask for our
assistance. We knew that an Iraq that had the most powerful
military machine in the gulf and controlled 20% of the world's
proven reserves of oil would pose a threat to the Persian Gulf, to
the Middle East, and to the entire world.
We responded to this quickly, without hesitation. Our
objectives were obvious from the start:
-- The immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of
all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
-- The restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
-- The security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian
Gulf; and,
-- The protection of American citizens abroad.
Our actions to achieve these objectives have been equally
clear. Within hours of the assault, the United States moved to
freeze Iraq's assets in this country and to protect those of Kuwait.
I asked Dick Cheney--Secretary [of Defense] Cheney--to go to Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Morocco to arrange for military cooperation
between us in key Arab states. And I asked Jim Baker--Secretary
[of State] Baker--to go to Turkey and to Brussels to rally the
support of our NATO allies. Both of these missions were
extraordinarily successful. The world response to Iraq was a near
unanimous chorus of condemnation.
With great speed, the UN Security Council passed five
resolutions. These resolutions condemned Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal,
and rejected Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. The United Nations has
also mandated sanctions against Iraq, those Chapter VII sanctions,
and endorsed all measures that may be necessary to enforce these
sanctions. And the United Nations has demanded that Iraq release
all foreign nationals being held against their will without delay.
The UN sanctions are in effect and have been working
remarkably well, even on a voluntary basis. Iraqi oil no longer
flows through pipelines to ports in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. And
again, I want to thank both the Saudis and the Turks for their lead
role in all of this. And today, reports indicate that traffic through
Aqaba [Jordan] has come virtually to a halt.
US military forces stand shoulder to shoulder with forces of
many Arab and European states to deter and, if need be, defend
Saudi Arabia against attack. And US naval forces sail with the
navies of many other states to make the sanctions as watertight as
possible. This is not, as Saddam Hussein claims, the United States
against Iraq. It is truly Iraq against the majority in the Arab world;
Iraq against the rest of the world.
And so the basic elements of our strategy are now in place.
And where do we want to go? Well, our intention, and indeed the
intention of almost every country in the world, is to persuade Iraq
to withdraw; that it cannot benefit from this illegal occupation;
that it will pay a stiff price by trying to hold on and an even stiffer
price by widening the conflict. And, of course, we seek to achieve
these goals without further violence.
The United States supports the UN Secretary General and
other leaders working to promote a peaceful resolution of this
crisis on the basis of Security Council Resolution 660.
I also remain deeply concerned about the American and other
foreign nationals held hostage by Iraq. As I have said before, when
it comes to the safety and well-being of American citizens held
against their will, I will hold Baghdad responsible.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990
Title: Who Belongs to What
Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Subject: International Organizations, Trade/Economics
Arab League
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Arab Maghreb Union--Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)--Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
GROUP OF 15
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Venezuela,
Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe
OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries)
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, United Arab Emirates
OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference)
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon,
The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania,
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries)
Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela
UN Security Council (1990)--China, France, USSR, United
Kingdom, United States (the five permanent members); and
Canada, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia,
Romania, Yemen, Zaire
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990
Title: UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq's Invasion of
Kuwait
Category: Fact Sheets
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq, Kuwait
Subject: Military Affairs, United Nations
Resolution 660 (Aug. 2, 1990)
The Security Council,
Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the
military forces of Iraq,
Determining that there exists a breach of international peace
and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United
Nations,
1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and
unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were
located on 1 August 1990;
3. Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive
negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all
efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of Arab
States;
4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further
steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution.
VOTE: 14 for, 0 against, 1 abstention (Yemen)
Resolution 661 (Aug. 6, 1990)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990,
Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been
implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues with
further loss of human life and material destruction,
Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by
Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and
territorial integrity of Kuwait,
Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has
expressed its readiness to comply with resolution 660 (1990),
Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with
paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority
of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures
to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660
(1990) and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of
Kuwait;
3. Decides that all States shall prevent:
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and
products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the
date of the present resolution;
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories
which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or
trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or
Kuwait;
and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their
territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or
Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present
resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or
Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their
territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or
products, including weapons or any other military equipment,
whether or not originating in their territories but not including
supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in
humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in
Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any
business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any
activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote
or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such
commodities or products;
4. Decides that all States shall not make available to the
Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public
utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other
financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals
and any persons within their territories from removing from their
territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to
any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from
remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or
Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or
humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances,
foodstuffs;
5. Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the
United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of
the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or
license granted before the date of the present resolution;
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the
provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee
of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the
Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work
to the Council with its observations and recommendations:
(a) To examine the reports on the progress of the
implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted
by the Secretary-General;
(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the
action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of
the
provisions laid down in the present resolution;
7. Calls upon all States to co-operate fully with the
Committee in the fulfillment of its task, including supplying such
information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the
present resolution;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary
assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary
arrangements in the Secretariat for the purpose;
9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8
above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to
the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all States:
(a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the
legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies;
(b) Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying
Power;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council
on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the
first report to be submitted within thirty days;
11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue
its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq.
VOTE: 13 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen)
Resolution 662 (Aug. 9, 1990)
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) and 661 (1990),
Gravely alarmed by the declaration by Iraq of a
"comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait,
Demanding, once again, that Iraq withdraw immediately and
unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were
located on 1 August 1990,
Determined to bring the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end
and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of Kuwait,
Determined also to restore the authority of the legitimate
Government of Kuwait,
1. Decides that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form
and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null
and void;
2. Calls upon all States, international organizations and
specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to
refrain
from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect
recognition of the annexation;
3. Further demands that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to
annex Kuwait;
4. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its
efforts to put an early end to the occupation.
VOTE: Unanimous (15-0)
Resolution 664 (Aug. 18, 1990)
The Security Council,
Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of
Kuwait and resolutions 660, 661 and 662,
Deeply concerned for the safety and well being of third state
nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,
Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this regard under
international law,
Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue
urgent consultations with the Government of Iraq following the
concern and anxiety expressed by the members of the Council on
17 August 1990,
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter:
1. Demands that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate
departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries
and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to
such nationals;
2. Further demands that Iraq take no action to jeopardize the
safety, security or health of such nationals;
3. Reaffirms its decision in resolution 662 (1990) that
annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void, and therefore,
demands that the Government of Iraq rescind its orders for the
closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the
withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel, and refrain from any
such actions in the future;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on
compliance with this resolution at the earliest possible time.
VOTE: Unanimous (15-0)
Resolution 665 (Aug. 25, 1990)
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990)
and 664 (1990) and demanding their full and immediate
implementation,
Having decided in resolution 661 (1990) to impose economic
sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq
which imperils the existence of a Member State and to restore the
legitimate authority, the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of Kuwait which requires the speedy implementation of
the above resolutions,
Deploring the loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait and determined to prevent further such losses,
Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with
resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), and 664 (1990) and in
particular at the conduct of the Government of Iraq in using Iraqi
flag vessels to export oil,
1. Calling upon those Member States cooperating with the
Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the
area to use such measures commensurate to the specific
circumstance as may be necessary under the authority of the
Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping
in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to
ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such
shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990);
2. Invites Member States accordingly to co-operate as may be
necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of resolution
661 (1990) with maximum use of political and diplomatic
measures, in accordance with paragraph l above;
3. Requests all States to provide in accordance with the
Charter such assistance as may be required by the States referred
to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;
4. Further requests the States concerned to co-ordinate their
actions in pursuit of the above paragraphs of this resolution using
as appropriate mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee and
after consultation with the Secretary-General to submit reports to
the Security Council and its Committee established under resolution
661 (1990) to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of
this resolution;
5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
VOTE: 13 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen)
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990
Title: Country Profile: Iraq
Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90
Category: Country Data
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Iraq
Subject: Trade/Economics, History
fig 35>Iraq: Outlets for Oil
[TEXT]
Official Name: Republic of Iraq
Geography
Area: 434,934 sq. km. (167,924 sq. mi.); about the size of California.
Cities: Capital--Baghdad (pop. 3.8 million). Other cities--Basra,
Mosul, Kirkuk.
Terrain: Alluvial plains, mountains, and desert.
Climate: Mostly hot and dry.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Iraqi(s).
Population (July 1990 est.): 18.8 million.
Annual growth rate: 3.3%.
Ethnic groups: Arab 75%, Kurd 15-20%.
Religions: Shi'a Muslim 55%, Sunni Muslim 40%, Christian 5%.
Languages: Arabic, Kurdish, Assyrian, Armenian.
Education: Years compulsory--primary school (age 6 through grade
6). Literacy--70%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--25/1,000. Life expectancy--56.1
yrs.
Work force (1980): 3.5 million. Agriculture--44%. Industry--26%.
Services--31%.
Government
Type: Ruling Council.
Independence: 1932.
Interim constitution: 1970.
Branches: Executive--Revolutionary Command Council (RCC);
president and Council of Ministers appointed by RCC. Legislative--
National Assembly of 250 members elected in 1980 and 1984.
Judicial--civil, religious, and special courts.
Administrative subdivisions: 18 provinces.
Political parties: Ba'ath Party dominates; Kurdish Democratic Party
and Kurdish Republican Party (legal parties).
Suffrage: Universal adult.
National holidays: Anniversaries of the 1958 and 1968 revolutions-
-July 14 and July 17.
Flag: Horizontal bands of red, white, and black, with three green
stars on center (white) band.
Economy
GDP (1989): $35 billion.
Per capita income: $1,940. Inflation rate (1989 est.): 30-40%
Natural resources: Oil, natural gas, phosphates, sulfur.
Agriculture (less than 10% of GNP): Products--wheat, barley, rice,
cotton, dates, poultry.
Industry: Types--petroleum, petrochemical, textile, cement.
Trade (1988): Exports--$12.5 billion: crude oil, dates. Major
markets--Western Europe, Brazil, Japan. Imports--$10.2 billion:
construction equipment, machinery, motor vehicles, agricultural
commodities. Major suppliers--Japan, Western Europe, US.
International Affiliations
UN and some of its specialized agencies, including the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA); Non-Aligned Movement; Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC); Arab League; Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC); Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC); INTELSAT.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990
Title: Country Profile: Kuwait
Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90
Category: Country Data
Region: MidEast/North Africa
Country: Kuwait
Subject: Trade/Economics, History
Official Name: State of Kuwait
Geography
Area: 17,818 sq. km. (about 6,880 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than New
Jersey.
Cities: Capital--Kuwait (pop. 1.3 million).
Other towns--Ahmadi, Jahra, Fahaheel.
Terrain: Desert.
Climate: intensely hot and dry in summers; short, cool winters.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Kuwaiti(s).
Population (1989): 570,000 Kuwaitis, 1.5 million others.
Annual growth rate (including immigration): 4.5%, Kuwaiti 3.7%.
Ethnic groups: Arab 75%, South Asian, Iranian, Southeast Asian.
Religion: Islam 85% (Kuwaitis 100%).
Languages: Arabic (official); English widely spoken.
Education (free through high school): Years compulsory--8.
Literacy--about 85% over age 10.
Health: Infant mortality rate--19.6/1,000 (Kuwaiti). Life
expectancy--70 yrs.
Work force (1989): 854,000. Social services--53.8%. Construction--
15.6%. Trade, hotels, and restaurants--11.6%. Manufacturing--7.3%.
Transport, storage, and communication--5.3%. Finance, insurance,
real estate, and business services--3.2%. Agriculture, hunting, and
fishing--1.3%. Power and water--1%. Mining and quarrying--0.9%.
Government
Type: Constitutional monarchy.
Independence: June 19, 1961.
Constitution: 1962.
Branches: Executive--Amir (head of state). Legislative--elected
National Assembly of 50 members. Judicial--present judicial
system instituted by a 1959 Amiri decree.
Political parties: None. Suffrage: Adult males who resided in
Kuwait
before 1920 and their male descendants 21 years and older
(eligible
voters--about 140,000).
Subdivisions: Government is centralized, but for administrative
purposes, there are five governorates: Kuwait City, Hawalli,
Ahmadi,
Jahra, and Farwaniya.
Central government budget (1988-89): Revenues--$8.2 billion.
Expenditures--$10.3 billion.
Flag: Horizontal stripes of green, white, and red joining a black
trapezoid at the staff side.
Economy
GDP (1989): $23.1 billion.
Annual growth rate: 21.4%.
Per capita GDP: $11,250.
Natural resources: Petroleum, fisheries.
Agriculture: Most food is imported. Cultivated land: 1%.
Industry: Petroleum extraction and refining, fertilizer,
petrochemicals, some construction materials. Water desalinization
capacity: 215 million gallons a day.
Trade (1988): Exports and reexports--$7.1 billion: oil 87%. Major
export recipients (as a percentage of the Kuwaiti market) include:--
Japan 16.5%; Netherlands 10.1%; US 5.3%; Taiwan 5.1%. Imports--
$5.9 billion: machinery and manufactured goods, transport
equipment, foodstuffs.
Major suppliers--Japan 12.9%; US 12.2%; UK 7.5%; FRG 7.2%;
other important suppliers: Italy, Turkey, France, Korea, Taiwan,
China.
Average US exports (1984-88)--$625 million. US exports (1989):
$855 million (automobiles and transport equipment; construction
machinery and equipment; air conditioning and refrigeration
equipment; consumer goods and tobacco products); US imports
(1989): $975 million.
Economic aid extended (1988-89 fiscal year): $290 million through
the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. Arab countries
49%; African countries 29%; Asian countries 18%.
More than $17 million in capital contributions and
cofinancing to multilateral development institutions. Primary
recipients: African Development Bank; Arab Fund for Economic and
Social Development. Aid accounts for 1.4% of GDP.
Iraq is an invading force in Kuwait and has established an Iraqi-
controlled puppet government there. The US continues to recognize
and deal with the government and representatives of Shaikh Jabir
al-Ahmed al-Jabir al-Sabah.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990
Title: The State Department: Managing Diversity
Perkins
Source: Edward J. Perkins, Director General of the Foreign
Service and Director of Personnel
Description: Washington, DC
Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Region: North America
Subject: State Department
[TEXT]
Recently, I've read several articles urging managers to look ahead
and to consolidate and expand the workplace gains of equal
employment opportunity. Managers, using the techniques of "post-
modern" personnel management, were to create a workplace where
differences in style and subculture would not just be tolerated but
would be accepted and welcomed. The articles stressed that good
managers should do so because it was the right and profitable thing
to do. Also, they had to do so because the US work force was
developing along lines very different from its present composition.
Between now and the year 2000, 22% of new workers will be
immigrant males and females, 22% will be native nonwhite males
and females, 42% will be native white females, and only 15% native
white males.
Equal Employment Opportunity In the
Workplace
Clearly, if the American work force of the future is to be
dynamic and productive in work settings that are efficient and fair,
the so-called US business mainstream will have to develop a new,
more accommodating managerial ethic. Such a new managerial
ethic may be distinct from that of a Germany or a Japan, where
national traditions and the makeup of the work force allow for a
very high degree of discipline and regimentation. Such an ethic, in
the first place, must be effective; in addition, it must be consistent
with our own national aptitudes and traditions.
Can we do it? Straight away, the answer is an unqualified
yes. Our country is built on a premise of diversity; we must develop
such an ethic if we are to be a department of government that
interacts with the world.
From a Foreign Service perspective, one can see how this can
be done in America--and why we in the Foreign and Civil Services
can pioneer such a new organizational model.
America: Unity As Well As Variety
Americans who have grown up seeing our country only from a
domestic point of view may be more conscious than we are of our
domestic problems and of our regional, economic, and ethnic
differences. But with distance often comes perspective. The
Foreign Service observer looks at America and sees two sets of
characteristics relevant to the theme of this article.
First, for all of its variety, America viewed from abroad
seems a remarkably unified, harmonious composition. The details
and color fall into place, as those of a painting do when seen from
the right distance. Many average, native-born Americans discover
this too: African-Americans, Irish-Americans, Greek-Americans
who go back to their countries of origin learn a lot, including just
how American they are and how important this "Americanism" is in
the eyes of the citizens of their "cultural background country."
Similarly, new immigrants often are impressed by how rapidly our
society accepts them and their children. There never could have
been an Edmund Muskie, a Henry Kissinger, a Zbigniew Brzezinski,
a Hermann F. Eilts, or a Carl Schurz (to go back a while) anywhere
but in the United States of America. Two of our recent Rhodes
scholars were children of Vietnamese refugees.
The unity and cohesion of America become even more evident
with South Africa in discernible transition to a possible multi-
racial country of unlimited possibilities, as the communist ice cap
recedes, and as centrifugal force pulls at the former Iron Curtain
countries--and even the USSR itself.
Second, America's openness, energy, and creativity continue
to astonish and to motivate much of the world. Our culture and even
our language--American English--are welcoming and egalitarian;
our universities--the best in the world--reflect these American
traits and are a Mecca for foreign students everywhere. Senegalese
President Diouf has specifically said he wants his cadre of new
government workers to have a practical education--best obtained,
says he, in the United States.
Unity, openness, energy--these characteristics help to show
how Americans created history's first and only multi-racial, multi-
ethnic democracy of continental proportions. Our Constitution and
the ideals underlying it enable us coherently to organize
unparalleled variety into a working nation-state. More importantly,
many societies seem to embody these principles, as we have, but
without the constitutionally structured commitment.
The Department As a Model of Diversity
This brings us back to the immediate question: How can the
Department of State take the American ability to evoke a unified
national effort out of varying cultural traditions and apply it to
itself?
We can start by becoming more self-conscious of what is
being done in the private sector as companies anticipate and
respond to the changing composition of our society and use it as a
useful tool. Leading companies accept the fact and consequences of
a more varied work force. They use various techniques better to tap
the potential for their employees: cultural audits, management-
labor seminars, sensitivity training, networking, mentoring, plus
the specific celebration of ethnic customs, food, and history. In
such companies, minorities see themselves not as recipients of a
sort of managerial charity but as an important and well-integrated
part of the organization's work and culture. Companies have found
that by constructively managing diversity--by accepting and even
celebrating it--they can improve organization morale and
performance, and, most importantly, they learn more about their
country and its people.
The Department of State employs many similar management
techniques and procedures to create a more participatory
workplace. In some respects, we may even be in advance of the
private sector. How many corporations would consider assigning
women to top positions in Saudi Arabia or other Arabian Peninsula
nations or sending an African-American to represent the
organization in South Africa?
We keep trying, moreover. In 1990, for instance, our Foreign
Service officer generalist study was completed and implemented,
and we have undertaken a unified recruiting effort that includes
more vigorous minority outreach. Other studies are underway of the
Foreign Service specialist function, of Foreign Service secretaries,
of Civil Service employees at the Department of State, and of the
role of our American family members, and there are more. In these
studies, we have sought to build and arrive at consensus by the
freest exchange we could devise.
A common, fundamental purpose of these studies--and of the
process by which they are conducted--is to reduce or eliminate
whatever in our institution impedes the open, efficient conduct of
business among Foreign Service people. Time must elapse before
we know how effective our changes will be. There is some reason
for optimism, though, because our changes reflect extensive
internal discussions and a capacity for internal self-education.
They have the benefit, moreover, of building on the efforts of
previous years.
Even before our current initiatives were announced, our
institution was becoming more open, flexible, and representative.
We have made progress toward making our workplaces congenial
to Americans of every sort and background. We must continue
proactively and vigorously.
Our current criteria show there have been gradual, steady
increases in the percentages of minorities serving as Foreign
Service officer generalists. Between 1981 and 1989, the totals of
minority Foreign Service officers rose from 9% to 13.1% and that of
women from 16.4% of the Foreign Service officer corps to 23.4%. At
the same time, the percentage of white males declined from 76.9%
to 67.4%. Relative progress is even more visible if we consider the
gains made by minorities and women at the junior- and mid-levels
from 1981 to 1989.
Conclusion
None of these accomplishments is sufficient reason to celebrate.
What has so far been achieved shows only that results are possible;
it should motivate us to try harder. But the more I study our
institution and travel to posts overseas, the more I am convinced
that we are a more welcoming institution than we were in the past.
I sense a genuine evolution of spirit within our service. I expect
that because of the kind of people we profess to be.
I repeat: Much remains to be done. In any career institution,
there can be a significant time lag between a shift in an
organization's culture and when this shift is reflected at all levels
of that organization. But I believe that we have approached a
watershed and that the driving force for a more tolerant, open, and
representative institution comes increasingly from my Foreign and
Civil Service colleagues themselves.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990
Title: International Narcotics Control
Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90
Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements
Subject: Narcotics, International Law
[TEXT]
Trafficking and consumption of illegal narcotics have assumed
global proportions, and virtually no nation is immune. Leaders of
nations around the world and from across the ideological spectrum
have declared an all-out war on drugs. Rhetoric and blame are
being replaced by cooperative efforts aimed at breaking the cycle of
drug production and consumption. As a result, consumption in
some areas has decreased slightly, but trafficking needs to be
reduced more. US experts, in particular, are watching with concern
an upswing in world heroin production.
Although illicit drugs are produced primarily in the developing
world and used mainly by consumers in more affluent nations,
producing and trafficking countries also are confronting growing
drug use problems of their own.
US Policy
International cooperation to stop production and trafficking is a
central element of US foreign policy. Few foreign policy concerns
have as direct a domestic impact as international narcotics.
Ninety-five percent of the illicit narcotics consumed in the United
States comes from other countries. It is essential, therefore, to
gain international cooperation to reduce drug supplies while the
United States works to reduce demand at home. For example, the
government of Colombia--where most of the world's cocaine is
processed--has declared war on drug dealers.
As the lead federal agency responsible for America's
international narcotics control efforts, the Department of State
implements key elements of the national drug control strategy.
They include:
-- Disrupting and dismantling drug-trafficking organizations;
-- Reducing the cocaine supply by giving law enforcement,
military, and economic assistance to Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia to
isolate coca-producing regions, block delivery of chemicals used in
processing, and dismantle drug-running networks;
-- Reducing heroin supply by convincing other countries to
pressure opium growers to cut heroin processing and distribution;
-- Reducing marijuana supply through strengthened foreign
law enforcement and eradication; and
-- Encouraging European Community and other multilateral
efforts aimed at source country and transit country production and
distribution and at European consumption.
Other international objectives include:
-- Making anti-drug efforts a priority in US bilateral
relations
with almost every country;
-- Urging other nations to ratify the UN Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which
the United States ratified in February 1990;
-- Enforcing strictly existing US laws that make foreign aid
contingent on the recipient countries' compliance with anti-
narcotics efforts; and
-- Strengthening domestic and international efforts against
"laundering" (disguising) of drug money.
In January 1990, President Bush issued a National Drug
Control Strategy that calls for increased international cooperation
against drug production, trafficking, and abuse. A critical part of
the strategy is increased emphasis on cooperative efforts with
three Andean countries (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia) to dismantle
cocaine trafficking organizations and disrupt cocaine processing
and trafficking as close to the source as possible. In FY 1990, $423
million in economic, military, and law enforcement assistance is
being provided to the three nations to strengthen their ability to
meet these objectives. Additional economic aid will be available to
these countries in FY 1991 if they use current resources effectively
and establish sound economic policies.
In February 1990, President Bush met with the presidents of
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia at the Andean summit in Cartagena,
Colombia. The four presidents agreed to work closely in a number
of critical counter-narcotics areas, including the control of
precursor chemicals, drug education, exchange of tax information,
and a broadened role for each country's military in fighting
narcotics.
The four countries signed various multilateral and bilateral
agreements and understandings. The United States and Bolivia
signed agreements on the control of essential chemicals, on control
of weapons exports, and on public awareness. The United States
and Peru signed accords on the exchange of tax information and
public awareness and exchanged notes on extradition. Similar
agreements are under negotiation with Colombia. The summit
nations agreed to hold a high-level follow-up meeting within 6
months.
Since the summit, Peru and the United States have signed an
agreement to control essential chemicals, and the United States and
Colombia have signed an agreement on the sharing of seized
trafficker assets. The United States is negotiating similar
agreements with other countries.
The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics
Matters, which has a budget of $150 million, provides $58 million
to the Andean strategy funding. It has counter-narcotics programs
in South and Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Southeast
and Southwest Asia.
Toward Greater Cooperation
Developed nations play a key role in global efforts to fight
narcotics production and trafficking. The President's drug control
strategy calls on European nations, Canada, Japan, and Australia to
take greater steps to help Andean, Caribbean, and Asian countries
reduce drug supply and demand. An informal consultative
mechanism is being established for this purpose. Trafficking
organizations are seeking new markets for cocaine and heroin.
Developed nations, recognizing the threat, are responding. For
instance, the Soviet Union, which long denied the existence of a
drug problem within its borders, now has major official and
unofficial programs to curb drug use.
Effective enforcement of international narcotics control
programs involves interdiction, criminal penalties against
traffickers, and eradication. International cooperation in these
endeavors has led to some progress in fighting illegal narcotics.
In August 1988, 30 countries joined in a month-long cocaine-
control project under the auspices of the International Drug
Enforcement Conference. Thirty countries (from Europe and North,
Central, and South America) participated in a cooperative,
coordinated, multinational law-enforcement operation to improve
capabilities to seize cocaine and cash, track down fugitives, and
crack down on the laundering of drug money. The United States
committed National Guard units in four states to work with the US
Customs Service inspecting cargo.
Since most cocaine comes to the United States through the
Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico, the US government is
strengthening anti-drug programs in those transit areas. Joint
Information Coordination Centers have been established in the
Caribbean area to develop and disseminate information that will
result in more arrests. Twenty-six Caribbean countries have
improved their ability to communicate with one another and with US
law enforcement agencies through INTERPOL (an international
police coordination network). In Latin America, the US Government
supports law enforcement activities through training and technical
assistance. Nine of the 11 countries with which the United States
has major narcotics control programs are in the Caribbean and Latin
America.(1)
(1)The United States has bilateral narcotics control programs
with the following countries: The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and
Venezuela.
Recent Progress
More and more, government leaders are focusing on the
international narcotics threat and on positive solutions. During the
July 1989 economic summit of industrialized nations, Secretary
Baker urged Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
West Germany to take more aggressive actions against the
laundering of drug money. The seven summit partners created a
financial action task force, which met in the fall of 1989 and was
to make recommendations by April 1990. A new US financial crimes
center will collect, analyze, and disseminate information to law
enforcement agencies to help combat money laundering. A recent
UN special session was devoted entirely to the narcotics issue.
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sponsored a joint UN-UK
ministerial conference on cocaine and demand reduction in the
spring of 1990.
Recent Colombian counter-narcotics operations have resulted
in the extradition of 20 narcotics traffickers and money launderers
to face justice in the United States, the seizure of about 19 metric
tons of cocaine at a major drug trafficking transportation complex
in southern Colombia, and the confiscation of numerous properties
and other assets belonging to drug "kingpins." Coca prices in
Bolivia dropped because of increased anti-drug pressure in
Colombia and Bolivia, encouraging many coca farmers to
participate in voluntary eradication programs. For this reason, the
United States is convinced that interdiction and alternative
development go hand-in-hand. As long as coca leaf is more
profitable than legitimate crops, no alternative development
program can succeed.
Progress has occurred in other countries as well. Mexico
seized 34 metric tons of cocaine in 1989 and drug trafficking has
diminished in and around The Bahamas. Last year, Jamaica further
reduced its marijuana crop. Ecuador has been successful in
eliminating coca production, and Pakistan reduced its opium crop.
Still, much remains to be done. The estimated production of
illicit narcotics supplies increased in 1989. Most dramatically,
Burma's opium crop doubled as the Burmese turned their attention
away from narcotics control. Worldwide, coca production grew by
about 10% last year.
Economic Development and Growth in the
Andes
The United States understands the cost to the legitimate economy
in Colombia of the drug war and the importance of the "coca
economy" in Peru and Bolivia. Direct economic assistance
(conditioned on anti-narcotics performance and the implementation
of sound economic policy) will help over the short term. In July
1990, President Bush announced that he would seek from Congress
tariff preferences for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Over a
10-year period, they would be allowed one-way free trade on a
number of important products. The President's Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative should lay the foundation for long-term
economic growth and development by encouraging economic reform
in the Andes to attract foreign investment as well as encouraging
debt reduction and, ultimately, two-way free trade agreements
with the United States.
Coca Production and the Environment
Although the primary motivation of the United States in the drug
war is to halt the devastation caused by drugs to citizens and
communities, the effect on the environment is another important
concern. Coca production destroys the world's most fragile
environments, just as cocaine destroys the minds and bodies of its
users. The earth is being damaged every day by farmers who grow
coca and by the middlemen who process the raw product into
cocaine. This devastation is, in part, being financed by American
drug users.
Coca cultivation and the production of cocaine causes serious
and irreparable damage, since coca is grown in some of the world's
most fragile ecological zones--not on traditional farmland. For
example, the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru, the world's largest
coca cultivation area, is populated by migrants who are there
specifically to grow coca.
Coca growers and processors damage the environment in
three ways.
Deforestation.
Coca production has
caused the deforestation of 700,000 hectares of jungles in the
Amazon regions of Peru and Bolivia--an area almost 40% larger than
the State of Delaware. The land is cleared not only for coca, but for
food crops, dwelling places, landing strips, and cocaine
laboratories. Growers exhaust parcels of land and abandon them.
Already, scientists in Peru report the loss of some plant and animal
species due to the clearance of 120,000 hectares of that country's
most biologically diverse region. Coca is produced on about 54,000
hectares of Bolivian land.
Deforestation also has resulted in soil erosion, flooding, and
firewood shortages. A constant smoke haze covers the Upper
Huallaga Valley in August and September as growers slash and
burn to clear more land for coca production. Even national forests
and parks in Peru and Bolivia have been invaded by coca growers.
Use of Herbicides.
Since coca cultivators
are interested solely in profit and are ignorant about chemical
usage, massive quantities of strong herbicides are frequently used
to eliminate weeds. As a result, these chemicals soon saturate the
soil and travel through the waterways, poisoning the water system
and adversely affecting the species that depend upon it. Although
the extent of the damage is still unknown, Latin American
environmentalists believe that the effects will be grave.
Cocaine Processing.
The ecological
effects of cocaine processing are even worse. Since the production
process requires huge quantities of toxic chemicals, and
laboratories are located near running water, several fish species
have disappeared in Peru. Scientists have estimated that in one
single year, production-related pollution in Peru resulted in the
discharge of about 57 million liters of kerosene, 32 million liters
of sulfuric acid, 16,000 metric tons of lime, 3,000 metric tons of
carbide, 6 million liters of acetone, 6 million liters of toluene, and
16,000 metric tons of toilet paper into the nation's waterways.
Conclusion
The growing consensus that the solution to the world's drug problem
must be international in scope means addressing all elements of the
grower-to-user chain. While some progress has been made in the
fight against production, trafficking, and consumption of illegal
narcotics, much still needs to be done. The United States remains
committed to fostering even greater international cooperation as a
central element in its strategy to control drugs.
International Control Efforts (chart)
1909 -- International Conference on Narcotic Drugs leads to signing
of 1912 International Opium Convention.
1920 -- League of Nations creates Advisory Committee on Traffic
in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs.
1931 -- Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs.
1946 -- Protocol transfers drug control functions to the UN
Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
1988 -- UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances.
Summary of Cartegena Actions (chart)
Declaration of Cartagena--Key Points
In February 1990, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and the United States
pledged to seek a comprehensive solution to end the regional drug
problem by:
Attacking the production, transport, and consumption of
illegal drugs;
Stimulating regional economies to provide increased
legitimate economic opportunities;
Increasing public awareness of the problem to encourage
citizen cooperation with control efforts; and
Seeking cooperation from the Europeans, Japanese, and
multilateral organizations in these efforts.
Bilateral Agreements
The US and Bolivia signed a(n):
-- Essential Chemicals Control Agreement to provide a basis for
monitoring and controlling all facets of drug precursor- chemical
movement;
-- Weapons Export Control Memorandum of Understanding to ensure
greater cooperation in ensuring that US weapons exports are not
acquired by narco-traffickers; and
-- Public Awareness Memorandum of Understanding to build public
support for programs against production, trafficking, and
consumption.
The US and Peru signed a(n):
-- Tax Information Exchange Agreement to provide for bilateral
exchanges of tax-related financial information in order to
prosecute
those who gain financially from trafficking;
-- Exchange of Notes on Extradition to confirm explicitly that
narcotics trafficking and related drug offenses are incorporated by
reference in the 1899 US-Peru Extradition Treaty; and
-- Public Awareness Memorandum of Understanding to build
support for anti- narcotics programs.
The US and Colombia pledged to:
-- Continue efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs;
-- Seek ways to maintain economic growth and stability;
-- Explore means of opening US markets to Colombian products;
and -- Work toward expanding US-Colombian trade.
Money Laundering (chart)
The international drug economy runs on cash--lots of it. Worldwide
drug profits were estimated to be as high as $240 billion in 1987.
Drug trafficking is profitable because illegal narcotic crops are
cheap to cultivate and process, while their street value is high.
Although typical drug trafficking operations have several
layers of intermediaries, most of the gains go to a rich, small elite
that has come to wield impressive economic and political power.
Some members are believed to have a personal worth that exceeds
their country's national debt. They buy land and other assets for
investment purposes and control numerous domestic businesses.
They also bribe and intimidate local politicians, judges, and police,
who in turn allow illegal activities to continue in an ever-widening
circle of corruption.
Although some traffickers have engaged in token philanthropic
projects, the vast amount of their profits do not stay in the
countries where narcotics are produced. They are usually
transferred abroad and transformed into a more manageable form to
conceal their illicit origin. Laundering schemes include electronic
funds transfers, depositing funds in international tax shelters, or
setting up dummy "shell" corporations. Such capital flight rarely
benefits the developing countries where most drugs originate.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990
Title: Focus on Central and Eastern Europe: 9/10/90
Date: Sep 10, 19909/10/90
Category: Focus on Emerging Democracies
Region: E/C Europe
Subject: Trade/Economics
[TEXT]
Following is a periodic update on public- and private-sector
initiatives to promote democracy and free-market economies in
Central and Eastern Europe.
Poland
Business Opportunities.
Poland's new privatization plan will be the focus of an October 2
conference to be hosted by the National Foreign Trade Council and
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The new
Polish action clears the way for foreign and domestic private
participation in the 7,600 state-owned companies that now
represent 80% of Poland's GNP. The conference, to be held at the
Pierre Hotel in New York, will be attended by senior Polish
government officials; people with
successful business ventures in Poland; experts in tax, legal, and
insurance matters; and US government representatives. Corporate
sponsors include American International Group of New York, Cole
Corette ∧ Abrutyn law offices of Washington and London, Price
Waterhouse of Washington and London, and LOT Polish Airlines.
For more information, call Conference Coordinator Ernest McCrary
at 202-223-8098.
Local Issues Addressed.
A 3-day visit to Poland in June of a Phoenix, Arizona, mayoral
delegation led to a draft proposal from the city of Gdynia regarding
exchanges, commercial promotion, and mutual assistance. The visit
was coordinated by the US Information Agency (USIA).
Hungary
Attorneys General Group Visits.
USIA's Office of Citizens Exchanges supported a visit of the
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) to Budapest in
June, which Hungarians saw as additional proof of US interest in
Hungarian efforts to solidify
democratic institutions and the rule of law. Attorney General Mary
Sue Terry of Virginia invited Hungarian Chief Prosecutor Kalman
Gyorgyi to attend the next NAAG annual meeting in Williamsburg
this December. NAAG also announced the creation of a special
exchange and internship program for promising young members of
the chief prosecutor's staff.
Free-Trade Unionists Complete Samuel Gompers
Program.
Eight Hungarian free-trade unionists traveled to
seven US cities in June and July. Their talks with US trade union
officials focused on organization and day-to-day maintenance of
unions.
East Germany
West Germans Help Exchanges.
The West German Bundestag leadership plans to place some US
students in high schools in East Germany this September under the
Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Program. Although no East
Germans will come to the US under this program in 1990 (all
students were chosen last fall), the Germans announced plans to
expand the program by 109 students in 1991-92, bringing the total
to 495. The 109 new participants will come from East Germany,
and the Bundestag will pay all costs for them (about $350,000-
400,000). The United States has been invited to send a similar
number of students.
Fulbright Teacher Exchange
Three teachers of English from the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) have been placed in US schools to teach as Fulbright teacher
exchangees. This is the first year that the GDR has participated in
this program. The teachers will be placed in schools in
Pennsylvania and Virginia.
Romania
Workshop for Journalists
Eight Romanian print journalists participated in a Voice of America
(VOA) workshop that examined issues such as news gathering and
news writing, laws protecting freedom of the press and of
information, the role of a free mass media in a democracy, public
opinion, and socio-political dialogue and education. The workshop,
held in July and August, was the second USIA/VOA-sponsored
program of its type for Central and East European (CEE) countries.
The first was held in May with Northwestern University for a group
of Polish broadcasters. For additional details, call VOA's Office of
External Affairs at 202-619-2538.
Conference on the Political and Economic
Environments
The Department of State's Bureau for International Communications
and Information Policy hosted a conference for US communications
and broadcast businesses in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
that focused on opportunities for telecommunications and
broadcasting in CEE countries and the USSR. The July 26 conference
included broadcast executives, congressional staff, "think tank"
experts, and the trade press.
Coalition for Democracy and Enterprise
The Business-Higher Education Forum, a non-profit organization of
about 90 chief executives from major US corporations, colleges, and
universities, has created a Coalition for Democracy and Enterprise
to help CEE countries. The coalition aims to strengthen businesses,
government agencies, unions, media, voluntary organizations, and
universities that are vital to the transition to democratic, free-
market-oriented societies.
The coalition has formed a 22-member steering committee,
co-chaired by the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of ITT,
Rand Araskog, and the President of Northwestern University, Arnold
Weber. They met with key government, business, and academic
leaders in Hungary and Poland and established contact with
leaders in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The coalition has
received formal requests for assistance from the Polish government
and Hungary's Foundation for Progress in Technology (a private-
sector group).
CEE countries have requested programs in five areas:
changing work place attitudes and incentives; small business
development; management methods; environmental cleanup; and
media development. This fall, coalition members and staff will go
to Budapest and Warsaw to hold more planning sessions and to
conduct the first workshops on a trial basis. In December, the
coalition will select projects.
For additional information, contact Don Blandin, Director,
Business-Higher Education Forum, at 202-939-9345.
VOA: Teaching English
In September, the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Polish, and Yugoslav
services of VOA will begin English-language teaching via the
airwaves. VOA will use a program created for USIA by the Maxwell-
Macmillan publishing company.
Candidates Selected for Media Fellowships
Times Mirror Inc., which publishes the Los Angeles Times and other
newspapers, is sponsoring a program to show CEE journalists how
the free press works in the United States. Times Mirror will award
fellowships to eight CEE journalists. Two journalists from
Czechoslovakia, three from Hungary, and three from Poland will
begin their internships in September.
Young Leader Environmental Project
Ten young leaders from six CEE countries visited the United States
for 4 weeks in July and August to examine environmental issues.
The project was conducted by the University of South Carolina and
included classes, field trips to examine environmental projects, and
short stops in Washington, DC, and New York City to examine
public policy and corporate involvement in environmental protection
efforts.
Conference on Global Climate Change
The USIA post in Stuttgart, Germany, co-sponsored a conference on
global climate change, June 20-22. Participants from
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania joined
representatives from West Germany and the United States in
examining the political and scientific aspects of environmental
protection.
Economic Update on East Germany (chart)
Economic Trends
-- GNP growth slumped to about l% in 1989. The big exodus of
workers (340,000 during the year) pushed the economy into a
recession in the fourth quarter. Now that German economic and
monetary union has been accomplished, East Germany is expected
to experience economic disruptions, the extent and duration of
which are difficult to predict.
-- Prices spurted up after November with growing use of the
deutsche mark and replacement of many local goods by more
expensive products from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
Inflationary pressures are likely to persist.
-- Unemployment rose during July to 273,000 people, up from
130,000 in June. That figure could rise to more than 800,000 by the
end of 1990. Also at the end of July, there were 798,000 part-time
workers who were receiving government assistance. That figure
could rise to about 1.3 million workers by the end of 1990.
Hard Currency Trade and Debt
-- Imports from the West in 1989 rose twice as fast as exports,
nearly eliminating the sizeable trade surplus maintained through
most of the 1980s.
-- Gross debt is estimated at more than $21 billion. The debt-
service ratio jumped to 45% in 1989, but reserves also are high
(estimated at more than $8 billion).
Trade With the USSR
-- Estimates vary, but as much as 40% of East German trade is with
the USSR, which supplies nearly all the East Germany's energy
imports and much of its raw materials. The USSR is the major
market for East German machinery and equipment. Some 15% of
all East German industrial jobs are linked to Soviet trade.
-- Since the German economic and monetary union on July 1, trade
accounting has shifted to the deutsche mark against the
transferable ruble. Trade will change fully toward currency and
world prices on January 1, 1991.
Status of Economic Reform
-- Unlike the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, East Germany
achieved immediate price reform and currency convertibility
through
economic and monetary union with the FRG.
-- FRG laws and regulations, including property rights, took effect
on July l.
-- The cost of economic and monetary union with the FRG will be
high. Anywhere from 25-50% of all East German companies could
collapse, and those that survive may need substantial assistance.
(###)
US Department of State Dispatch,
Vol 1, No 2, September 10, 1990
Title: Current Treaty Actions, August 1990
Date: Aug 30, 19908/30/90
Category: Treaties/Agreements
Country: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, Congo,
Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Germany, Guyana,
Honduras, Hungary, Israel, Lesotho, Mexico,
Mongolia, Mozambique, Peru, Poland, Seychelles,
Spain, USSR (former), United Kingdom,
United States, Western Samoa, Yugoslavia (former), Zaire
Subject: International Law
Multilateral
Coffee
International coffee agreement, 1983, with annexes, done at London
Sept. 16, 1982, as extended July 3, 1989.(1) Entered into force Oct.
1, 1989.
Acceptance deposited: Cuba, Aug. 3, 1990.
Accessions deposited: Congo, July 30, 1990; Vietnam, Aug. 3,
1990.
Containers
International convention for safe containers, with annexes, as
amended. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept.
6, 1977; for the US Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037, 10220, 10914.
Accession deposited: Morocco, July 5, 1990.
Health
Statute of the International Agency for Research on Cancer. Done
at Geneva May 20, 1965. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1965. TIAS
5873.
Notification of withdrawal: Australia, June 29, 1990; effective
Dec.
29, 1990.
Satellite Communications Systems
Convention relating to the distribution of programme-carrying
signals transmitted by satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974.
Entered into force Aug. 25, 1979; for the US Mar. 7, 1985. [Senate]
Treaty Doc. 98-31.
Accession deposited: Australia, July 26, 1990.
Trade
Agreement on technical barriers to trade (standards code). Done at
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.
TIAS 9616.
Acceptance deposited: Israel, Feb. 16, 1990.
Agreement on interpretation and application of articles VI, XVI, and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (subsidies and
countervailing duties code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979.
Entered
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9619.
Acceptance deposited: Colombia, May 7, 1990.(2)
United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of
goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262]
Accession deposited: Spain, July 24, 1990.
Bilateral
Australia
Agreement concerning cooperative development of the digital chart
of the world. Signed at Washington June 22, 1990.
Entered into force June 22, 1990.
Austria
Agreement on social security, with administrative arrangement.
Signed at Vienna July 13, 1990. Enters into force on the first day
of
the third month following written notification by the parties of
compliance with all statutory and constitutional requirements.
Brazil
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Brasilia and Washington
July 19 and Aug. 14, 1990. Entered into force Oct. 15, 1990.
Chile
Agreement concerning compensation in the deaths of Orlando
Letelier and Ronni Moffitt, with annex. Signed at Santiago June 11,
1990. Enters into force upon notification to the US by Chile that it
has completed the proceedings necessary under Chilean law.
China
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of July 23,
1985, as amended, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United
States. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 14 and 22,
1990.
Entered into force: Aug. 8, 1990; effective July 1, 1990.
Congo
Agreement concerning the establishment of a Peace Corps program
in the Congo. Effected by exchange of notes at Brazzaville Apr. 21,
1990. Entered into force Apr. 21, 1990.
Ecuador
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Quito and Washington
Aug.1 and 8, 1990. Enters into force Oct. 15, 1990.
Egypt
Grant agreement to assist Egypt with its balance of payments.
Signed at Cairo July 9, 1990. Entered into force July 9, 1990.
Ethiopia
Memorandum of understanding concerning the operation of the
INTELPOST service, with details of implementation. Signed at
Addis Ababa and Washington Mar. 26 and July 16, 1990. Entered into
force Aug. 15, 1990.
German Democratic Republic
Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 13, 1983, as amended
and extended (TIAS 10687), concerning fisheries off the coasts of
the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
Jan.16 and Apr. 5, 1990.
Enters into force: Aug. 3, 1990; effective July 1, 1990.
Guyana
Swap agreement among the US Treasury and the Bank of
Guyana/Republic of Guyana, with memorandum of understanding.
Signed at Georgetown and Washington June 19 and 20, 1990.
Entered into force June 20, 1990.
Honduras
Swap agreement among the US Treasury and the Central Bank of
Honduras/Government of Honduras, with memorandum of
understanding. Signed at Tegucigalpa and Washington June 27
and 28, 1990. Entered into force June 28, 1990.
Hungary
Swap agreement among the US Treasury and the National Bank of
Hungary/Government of Hungary, with memorandum of
understanding.
Signed at Washington and Budapest June 19, 1990. Entered into
force June 19, 1990.
Agreement concerning the operations of the US Peace Corps in
Hungary. Signed at Budapest Feb. 14, 1990. Entered into force
July 12, 1990.
Israel
Agreement extending the agreement of June 3, 1984, as extended,
on cooperation in energy research and development. Effected by
exchange of letters at Washington and Jerusalem May 18 and June
11, 1990. Entered into force June 11, 1990; effective June 3, 1990.
Lesotho
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.
Signed at Maseru and Washington June 19 and
July 20, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1990.
Mexico
Agreement on cooperation in combating narcotics trafficking and
drug dependency. Signed at Mexico Feb. 23, 1989. Entered into
force July 30, 1990.
Memorandum of understanding for the exchange of technical
information and for cooperation in the field of air quality research.
Signed at Washington July 19, 1990. Entered into force July 19,
1990.
Agreement on cooperation for the protection and improvement of
the
environment in the metropolitan area of Mexico City. Signed at
Washington Oct. 3, 1989. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1990.
Agreement of cooperation regarding international transport of urban
air pollution, with appendix. Signed at Washington Oct. 3, 1989.
Entered into force Aug. 22, 1990.
Mongolia
Agreement on cooperation through the US Peace Corps in
Mongolia.
Signed at Ulaanbaatar Aug. 2, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 2,
1990.
Mozambique
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.
Signed at Maputo and Washington July 9 and 23, 1990. Entered
into force Aug. 30, 1990.
Multinational Force and Observers
Agreement concerning the settlement of claims by the United
States
against the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Effected by
exchange of notes at Rome May 3, 1990. Entered into force May 3,
1990.
Peru
Agreement concerning scientific and technical cooperation in the
earth and mapping sciences, with annexes. Signed at Lima July 19,
1990. Entered into force July 19, 1990.
Poland
Agreement concerning the program of the US Peace Corps in
Poland.
Signed at Warsaw Feb. 23, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1990.
Seychelles
Agreement amending the agreement of June 29, 1976, as amended
(TIAS 8385, 10173), relating to the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of a tracking and telemetry facility on the island of
Mahe. Effected by exchange of notes at Victoria May 29 and June
15, 1990. Entered into force June 29, 1990.
Spain
Agreement regarding mutual assistance between customs services.
Signed at Madrid July 3, 1990. Enters into force on the 90th day
following notification by the parties that they have accepted the
agreement's terms and that all necessary national legal
requirements have been fulfilled.
USSR
Visa arrangement concerning textiles and textile products, with
attachment. Signed at Washington July 2, 1990. Entered into force
Sept. 1, 1990.
United Kingdom
Agreement extending the agreement of Mar. 11, 1987, as extended,
concerning Anguilla and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington June 26, 1990. Entered into force June 26,
1990; effective June 27, 1990.
Memorandum of understanding on collaboration in energy research
and development. Signed at Washington June 11, 1990. Entered
into force June 11, 1990.
Western Samoa
Status of forces agreement. Signed at Apia June 25, 1990. Entered
into force June 25, 1990.
Yugoslavia
Agreement regarding mutual assistance between customs
administrations. Signed at Belgrade Apr. 11, 1990. Enters into
force on the 90th day following notification by the parties that all
necessary national legal requirements have been fulfilled.
Zaire
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.
Signed at Kinshasa and Washington June 29 and July 20, 1990.
Entered into force Aug. 30, 1990.
(1) Certain provisions of the agreement suspended.
(2) With declaration(s).
(###)