US Department of State 

Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990

Title:

US Foreign Policy Priorities and FY 1991 Budget Request

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Feb 1, 19902/1/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Country: United States Subject: State Department, Arms Control, Trade/Economics, Democratization, Environment, Terrorism, Narcotics [TEXT] I welcome the opportunity this morning to review with you the Bush Administration's foreign policy priorities and our FY 1991 budget request. During my confirmation hearings before this committee a year ago, I described a world in transition and said that the only sure policy guide for us in the midst of such change is the compass of American values--democracy, respect for human rights, fair play, market principles, and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. I also said that we can advance our foreign policy objectives if we are resolved on the necessity of American leadership and on the need for bipartisanship. After a year on the job, I am even more convinced of this. The President and I have been pleased to work productively with you, Mr. Chairman [Claiborne Pell], with the members of this committee, and with others in Congress. The careful investments in leadership, realism, and pragmatism that together we have made are paying off. There are strong trends around the world toward democracy; free and open markets propel world economic growth; tensions with the Soviet Union are lessening; stabilizing arms control efforts are progressing. The old world of dogmatic dictatorships is on its way out. But the new world of secure, prosperous, and just democracies is not yet here. It will not arrive automatically. If we fail to support the principles that brought us this far, we could end up living in a future that resembles the past--the past of cold war and the conflicts that preceded it. Too many nations have won the war only to lose the peace. We cannot afford to let that happen now. The stakes are too high and can only get higher. We must work hard with our allies and partners to bring the new world about--to secure our investments in a better future by consolidating and institutionalizing democracy. As the President said last night [in his State of the Union address], our task is to consolidate the democratic revolution transforming the world. It can scarcely be otherwise, for our fundamental values--self-determination, human rights, the rule of law, and political freedom--push us in this direction. We seek to promote democratic values abroad because they reflect the best that is in ourselves. And we do so because championing democracy is in our interest. Where democratic values take hold, we find friends--not enemies. Democracies are more likely to open their economies to the world, and legitimate democratic governments are more likely to focus on the livelihood of their peoples than on foreign conquests or aggression. Truly, political freedom, economic growth, and global security are interdependent. And they are all dependent on American leadership, strengthened alliances, and worldwide engagement. We must protect, manage, and enhance our assets in this transitional period. We must reorient our thinking and apply new efforts, seeking points of mutual advantage with traditional adversaries wherever possible. We must be prepared to engage effectively in a multipolar world of increased competition and global markets, where continuing security threats, regional conflicts, age-old ethnic tensions, and nation-state dynamics remain familiar parts of the international scene, even as transnational concerns such as the environment, ballistic missiles, narcotics, and terrorism call for broad international action. I would now like to set out for you the five key foreign policy challenges we will be facing in the coming decade and toward which we will need to direct our efforts and resources.
FIVE KEY FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES WE FACE
The five challenges are: promoting democratic values; fostering market forces; promoting peace; protecting the world community against transnational dangers; and strengthening our alliances and other international ties in a time of far-reaching change.
Promoting and Consolidating Democratic Values
Our first and preeminent challenge is consolidating democracy. When the barriers to democratic values come down--as we have seen in Eastern Europe--prospects open wide for legitimate government, revitalized societies, improved relations, and lasting security. We applaud the East European peoples who have acted so courageously in their search for freedom. East and West finally have begun to overcome the legacies of the Cold War and to move forward at last toward a Europe whole and free. We of the West are well prepared for the journey, thanks to the thriving democratic systems and institutions we have developed. And the peoples of the East have realized that the ballot box will be vital equipment for the road ahead. Within the Soviet Union, efforts are underway to broaden political participation and establish the rule of law, which President Gorbachev has said is critical to the success of perestroika. As the President and I categorically have said, we very much want perestroika to succeed. But we see perestroika as a means, not an end. Our goals are to institutionalize a new strategic relationship with the Soviet Union through verifiable arms control treaties and confidence-building measures. We seek to forge a new global relationship with the Soviets by pressing them to help end regional disputes peacefully. In these ways, we will reduce the burden of defense spending over time. And we seek a more democratic Soviet Union where human rights gains are made permanent. We are expanding our human rights agenda with the Soviet Union to include cooperative efforts on the rule of law. And we will offer technical cooperation as the Soviets restructure away from command economic models. In short, we seek to probe for points of mutual advantage with the Soviet Union, turning areas of conflict into areas of cooperation wherever possible. In this way, we will benefit ourselves as well as the reformers in Moscow. I will follow up on all of these points when I see Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next week in Moscow. Ultimately, we believe that the staggering task of transforming the Soviet Union and the East European countries into democratic, prosperous societies depends on the decisions freely made by the people themselves and the extent to which Eastern leaders have the consent and confidence of the governed. Throughout our own hemisphere, democratic values have taken hold and are spreading rapidly. A new generation of democratic leaders is stripping away the layers of state control and special preference that shackled this hemisphere's productive powers for decades. Economies are opening up to the creative energies of their own people and to new trade and investment opportunities in the global marketplace. The people of Panama have welcomed the necessary use of US military forces to restore the democratic processes which they themselves endorsed in elections last May. Farther south, Chile held its first democratic elections in 15 years, while Brazil and Argentina achieved peaceful transitions of power from one party to another. Meanwhile, Colombia--besieged by guerrilla insurgencies and the terror of the drug cartels--prepares courageously for another contested presidential election this spring. Only free and fair elections can put an end to more than a decade of civil war in Nicaragua and bring relief to Haiti's long-suffering people. In Asia, India has completed more than 4 decades as the world's largest democracy. Freely elected governments in the Philippines and in Pakistan are struggling courageously to strengthen representative institutions after years of autocratic rule. In Africa, we are monitoring closely the steps being taken by the new South African government to implement its commitment to end apartheid and move toward direct negotiations with black South Africans. Release of Nelson Mandela is the next step that the De Klerk government must take in this unfolding process. Throughout the world, then, the trends are unmistakable, making the setbacks all the more stark. Governments that try to shut out universally desired democratic values--such as Castro's Cuba or in the tragic case of China--serve only to delay their people's progress. We want to see all nations freely and openly advance.
Promoting Market Principles
Our second challenge will be to promote market principles. Political and economic liberties go hand in hand. Fragile democracies are reinforced by strong economies. And open societies give scope to the creativity and entrepreneurship essential to economic success. Strategies of deregulation, privatization, and market-based structural adjustment work. Free and open markets are the key to broad-based and sustainable economic growth. Here again, America holds strong assets--a deep commitment to private enterprise, individual initiative, and a pioneering spirit. Our long-term investment in these values and the international institutions that reflect them has benefited us and ensured the strength of today's thriving global trading system. From Eastern Europe to Latin America to the least developed countries in Africa and South Asia, a major drive is underway to reduce government controls and permit freer operation of the private sector as bankrupt state-led economic strategies are discarded. This transition will inevitably involve short-term adjustment costs, but nations as diverse as Poland, Mexico, and Venezuela have shown the political courage to undertake difficult structural reforms. We must support them in their efforts. Over the past year, the United States has pursued an active agenda to ensure that the fruits of an open world trading and economic system accrue to those countries which are ready to participate on a competitive basis. Our strengthened debt strategy now incorporates debt and debt service reduction options. These provide a more solid basis for growth to countries undertaking economic reform programs. Mexico, Costa Rica, and the Philippines already have taken advantage of these options. We expect a number of other countries to follow suit this year. Meanwhile, we will continue to support strong, adequately funded, multilateral economic institutions as they foster market- oriented structural changes in the developing world. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank will shoulder additional responsibilities as East European countries seek assistance in adapting to market mechanisms. Latin American countries with structural economic problems will solicit advice from these institutions on the stabilization programs essential to the preservation of their political stability. The Uruguay Round of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations remains the highest priority for us. We are working hard with our trading partners--from both developed and developing nations--to complete a strong set of agreements in December 1990. Our bilateral assistance programs are increasingly oriented toward private sector initiatives and structural changes. In Africa, the successful development fund concept has linked assistance levels to economic performance. We are also exploring ways to structure our food aid so that we encourage the private sector.
Promoting Peace
Our third challenge is to establish the secure global environment that is vital if democratic and market values are to flourish at home and abroad. We want to build a peace that can last. The United States has played an active and essential role in promoting peace worldwide. We have invested heavily in maintaining global stability. Through sustained high-level dialogue with the Soviet Union, arms control efforts, and confidence-building measures such as our "open skies" initiative, we are working to ease East-West tension.
Arms Control
Revolutionary changes in the communist world and increasingly cooperative US--Soviet relations are creating the political conditions necessary for enduring and strategically significant arms control. We have a historic opportunity to transform East- West security competition. Uncertainty about the fate of reform in the USSR is all the more reason to negotiate agreements that reduce threats and that constrain the military options available to future Kremlin leaders, whoever they are and whatever their intentions toward us may be. We seek to strengthen deterrence at lower levels of risk. We are shaping and institutionalizing a more stable and predictable strategic relationship. At Malta, President Bush gave additional impetus to this effort by pressing President Gorbachev to accelerate ongoing negotiations in START [strategic arms reduction talks], the conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) reductions talks, and on chemical weapons (CW). Beyond our efforts to reduce US-Soviet tension, we are ready to work with all nations to deal with the increasingly immediate threats posed by the diffusion of dangerous technologies throughout the world. Curbing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, missile technologies, and nuclear explosive capabilities will continue to be high priority objectives of our arms control efforts. Building on the President's recent initiative at the United Nations, we are working in Geneva for a multilateral chemical weapons convention that would call for weapons destruction down to 500 tons after 8 years. It would then require the total elimination of stocks once all CW-capable states have joined. And we have proposed to the Soviets that, even before such a convention takes effect, the two powers should begin to destroy large portions of their stocks. With regard to stemming missile proliferation, we are also making headway. Since Administration officials testified before this committee last October: -- We agreed with our allies to strengthen the missile technology control regime, pressing to expand the group to the members of the European Community and possibly include new East European governments; -- We obtained indications of restraint from the Chinese regarding their supply of missiles to the Middle East region; and -- We initiated promising bilateral discussions with the Soviets at Malta on missile proliferation. I look forward to following these up with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at our upcoming ministerial meeting. While we can point to some progress on cooperation among suppliers of missile technology, important challenges remain. We look forward to working closely with this committee on this issue.
Regional Conflicts
US diplomacy has played a central and highly successful role in preempting and resolving regional conflicts. We will continue to support the constructive efforts of other states and of the United Nations and other organizations which are committed to these same goals. Nowhere have our efforts been more intensive than in the pursuit of a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Over the past year, we have sought to create a process that would break the decades-old confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians and then broaden the effort into a lasting peace between Israel and the entire Arab world. And we have had results. Working closely with both Israel and Egypt, we have hammered out a framework for an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue in Cairo to discuss elections for Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza. Elections offer a practical step that could launch the kind of negotiating process that could lead to a comprehensive peace--one based on UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338, security for Israel and all states in the region, and the fulfillment of the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. We are now working intensively on the practical details of getting this dialogue launched. If the parties are prepared to approach this process in a practical and broadminded way, we can make progress. In Lebanon, we support the constitutionally elected Hrawi government and are working to garner support for the process of reconciliation begun in the Taif accords. In the Persian Gulf, the no-war/no-peace situation in the Iran-Iraq conflict serves the interests of no one. We continue to support the Secretary General's effort to fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 598 through mediation between the parties. Turning to Afghanistan, where the United States played a key role in securing Soviet withdrawal, we remain committed to achieving a lasting peace by helping the Afghans establish a broad- based government through self-determination. This goal can be best realized through a political settlement supported by the Afghan people that involves a transfer of power from the Najibullah regime to a representative government. We are engaged in a dialogue with those in the region, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations toward that end. Our objective in Cambodia is to bring about a negotiated settlement that will verify Vietnamese withdrawal, prevent the return to power of the Khmer Rouge, and provide genuine self- determination for the people of Cambodia. We believe that an enhanced role for the United Nations can be a key element in a settlement process that results in free and fair elections in Cambodia. On January 16, we met in Paris with the other five permanent members of the UN Security Council to discuss such a UN role. That meeting produced agreement on 16 principles which provide a framework for crafting a UN-based settlement, which we will seek to flesh out in the permanent five context. Our security commitment to the Republic of Korea remains essential to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. We believe that the key to a reduction of tension and eventual reunification lies in a productive South-North dialogue. In this regard, we firmly support President Roh's initiatives to draw the North out of its isolation. Since October 1988, we have opened dialogue and taken other steps toward Pyongyang. We are looking for a steady, reciprocal process toward better relations both between North and South Korea and between the United States and North Korea. The United Nations is also playing a constructive role in the resolution of the Namibia dispute. Cuban troops are being withdrawn from Angola and a UN team has supervised a round of free and fair elections in Namibia. We expect the Namibian Constituent Assembly to produce a constitution shortly, leading to full independence within several months. We are also working with the Soviets and others to press for a cease-fire and direct negotiations in Angola. We fully support the Esquipulas, Tesoro Beach, and Tela accords as a lasting framework for peace in Central America. Uniting all these accords is a fundamental commitment to democracy and the democratic process. We continue to work with other nations to translate the promises in those agreements into a permanent reality--whether through El Salvador's five elections since 1982, the Nicaraguan election scheduled for February 25, or the Panamanian election last May that exposed Noriega's corruption to the entire world. We seek the support of all governments for peace and the democratic process in Central America. As we have said to President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the Soviet Union bears a special responsibility to contribute to peace in the region, because its assistance, moving through Cuba and Nicaragua, continues to underwrite violence, destruction, and war-- nowhere more than in El Salvador. Soviet behavior toward Cuba and Central America still remains the biggest obstacle to a full, across-the-board improvement in relations with the United States. In El Salvador, we believe this is the year to end the war through a negotiated settlement that guarantees safe political space for all Salvadorans. The Central American presidents have called for negotiations to resume under the United Nations' good offices, and President Cristiani has accepted. I hope the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] will return to the negotiating table and stop the war once and for all. They should subject themselves to the will of the Salvadoran people at the ballot box, just as the governing ARENA party [National Republican Alliance] did in five previous elections closely observed by the press, Members of Congress, and the entire world. In sum, the US record is clear; we have been active over the past year in bilateral and multilateral efforts to strengthen the prospects for peace across the globe.
Protecting the World Community Against Transnational Threats
Our fourth challenge for the 1990s is to work with allies, friends, and traditional adversaries alike to protect the world community against new global dangers. Today and in the future, we must take collective responsibility for ensuring the safety of the international community. Traditional concepts of what constitutes a threat to national and global security need to be updated and extended to such divergent concerns as environmental degradation, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. Our non-renewable resources, human lives, and the values of civilized society all are irreplaceable assets which we cannot fail to protect.
The Environment
When I testified before this committee last year, I spoke of the President's and my own longstanding commitment to support environmentally sound, sustainable development. Over the past year, the Bush Administration has made tangible progress. -- In my first major address as Secretary of State, I spoke to the Response Strategies Working Group of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and set out US policy on this issue. As I then stated, despite remaining scientific uncertainties, we should take those actions related to climate change which are justified in their own right. Commonly referred to as the "no-regrets" policy, this includes energy conservation, reforestation, and controls on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The President has offered to host negotiations on a framework convention on climate change to demonstrate this commitment. -- Under the Montreal protocol, we have committed the United States to phase out CFCs by the year 2000. -- We have introduced a proposal to amend the Clean Air Act, including provisions to control acid rain. -- We are increasing bilateral and multilateral assistance for environmental programs. -- We have imposed a domestic ban on the importation of ivory and successfully worked with the European Community and Japan to have the African elephant listed in the international annex of most endangered species. -- We have negotiated an agreement to control the export of hazardous waste, known as the Basel convention. -- And we have successfully led an effort in the UN General Assembly to restrict the use of driftnets on the high seas. The President and I remain committed to advancing our environmental agenda in the coming years.
Narcotics
International drug trafficking is a threat to our national security, and the President and I have made the narcotics issue a top foreign policy priority. Ultimately, the illegal narcotics trade robs freedom not only from the individual user but from entire nations. The drug pirates and profiteers attack the central nervous system and vital organs of government: the administration of justice, the integrity of government, the right of free speech. That is what happened in Noriega's Panama. This Administration has proposed a bold, comprehensive strategy to address the cocaine problem that is threatening the well-being of this hemisphere. It is designed to broaden our international efforts to assist Andean governments in their struggle against drug cultivation and trafficking. The President will travel to Cartagena, Colombia, in 2 weeks to meet with the Andean presidents. There they will endorse a multinational approach to the drug problem--the first such cooperative effort ever undertaken with our Latin neighbors. To underpin those efforts, the President is seeking a substantial increase in military and economic assistance for the Andean region. I look forward to your support for these critical efforts.
Terrorism
The Administration is committed to combating the terrorist threat. Our policy of pressuring state sponsors of terrorism, putting terrorists on trial, and refusing to negotiate with them is central to our long-term success in this struggle. In my confirmation testimony before the committee last year, I spoke of the need to develop policies of collective action against terrorism. We are working with other countries--including our European partners and the Soviet Union--to coordinate and strengthen counterterrorism efforts worldwide. To enhance aviation safety, we are now negotiating a multilateral treaty to tag plastic explosives. We will continue to seek ways to improve our counterterrorism efforts and protect our citizens abroad, just as we improve our procedures at home.
Strengthening Our Alliance and International Ties
In order to deal successfully with all the challenges that I have just described, we must meet a fifth and especially critical challenge: reshaping and renewing our alliances and other important international ties. Our investment in post-war alliances and other international instruments has proven invaluable. These collective efforts have succeeded because of the enduring strength of the principles on which they are based--liberty, democracy, shared burdens and risks, market principles. We now need to adjust our alliances and other collective arrangements to changing conditions--largely favorable conditions that we and our partners have labored hard to create. This challenge arises not from failure but from success. It is not just a question of managing success--we must channel success in a positive direction. In the 1990s, if trends continue, East-West tension will lessen and the legacy of Europe's war-torn past will recede. As I stated in Berlin in December, as Europe evolves, the organizations which have successfully promoted our interests and values--NATO, the European Community, and the Helsinki process [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--CSCE]--will serve as cornerstones in building a new Europe. NATO is critical to our quest for securing peace and democracy in Europe. As the President recently stated in Brussels, the ending of the cold war does not mean an end to the most successful alliance in modern history. We foresee NATO's vital military mission being complemented by a number of additional activities which build on its strength in protecting Western security interests. We are optimistic that a strong NATO can pursue conventional force reductions successfully in order to bring about a radically transformed European military balance. In addition, we have proposed that a NATO verification staff be organized to monitor arms agreements over the coming years in order to ensure that all parties live up to their treaty commitments. Finally, we seek to strengthen the political character of the NATO alliance, focusing on increased collaboration against the threats to our common security posed by new lethal technology and volatile regional conflicts. We believe an intensification of West European economic and political integration under the aegis of the European Community can also help strengthen the community of values that we and our European partners share. The United States has encouraged European integration from the beginning, and we support the EC's efforts to create a dynamic and open single market by 1992. We look forward to strengthened, mutually beneficial relations with the EC as integration proceeds. The EC's efforts to reduce barriers, strengthen market mechanisms, and enhance competitiveness among the West European democracies serve as attractive working examples for the reforming countries of Eastern Europe. We believe strongly that an open door for unhindered US economic engagement in an integrated Europe is essential for both the United States and Europe. Indeed, the US-EC relationship is so significant that stronger cooperative mechanisms and a strengthened set of institutional and consultative links should be developed. A new agenda is at hand for the United States and the EC on promoting political and economic reforms in the East. The United States has been playing a major part in mobilizing financial support for reform. We look forward to continued work with the EC in assisting the reformers of Eastern Europe, including possible participation in a new development bank to support East European political and economic reforms. Like NATO and the EC, the CSCE process--which brings together 33 nations of Eastern and Western Europe, the United States, and Canada--will play an important role in guiding Europe toward a new era. CSCE's 10 guiding principles for relations between states can serve as a compass for our postcontainment efforts toward reforming Eastern countries. The lengthy Vienna concluding document adopted by CSCE members a year ago contains detailed provisions filling all three "baskets" with new content. In addition to the mandate for the talks now underway to reduce conventional forces and the risk of surprise military attack through confidence-building measures, the Vienna document also mandates other specialized meetings. We view these meetings as a means of advancing political and economic reforms in the East and fostering East-West cooperation. Important examples include the Paris Meeting on the Human Dimension of the CSCE last year where the United States sponsored a free elections proposal, the upcoming Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in March, and the Copenhagen Human Rights Conference in June. Turning to our Pacific allies, for the past 40 years, the US- Japan security relationship has been and remains the bulwark of peace and stability for the entire East-Asia Pacific region. Over the same period, we have developed an increasing economic stake in the region through our burgeoning trade and investment ties. Our bilateral relationship with Japan has deepened over the past decade, as Japan has taken a more active role in world affairs. Today we are engaged in building an extensive global partnership with the Japanese, focused on how we share responsibilities to foster world stability and growth. We consult on a broad range of issues affecting international peace and stability--from East Asia to Eastern Europe, from Third World debt to the international environment. Achieving our common objectives will require a transformation of policies and attitudes in both countries. Indeed, we regard the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) process as critical to stimulating the structural adjustments necessary to sustain our global partnership. In June, at an Asia Society meeting in Washington, I called for a new Pacific partnership with all our allies and friends in Asia. I chose the word "partnership" carefully. Then I was speaking of an ongoing effort that would reflect the dynamic movement of the Pacific region itself. The substance of this effort will doubtless incorporate both the old and the new; each partner to fulfill obligations commensurate with its resources and its economic standing; each partner making a contribution to the strengthening of peace and prosperity in the region and the world as a whole. The dynamic growth of the Pacific region makes it in our long-term interest to help build and institutionalize a greater sense of collective purpose among the East Asian and Pacific nations that share our economic and political values. I think we are on our way to establishing a new institution to facilitate such cooperation. This effort can help the United States pursue a number of objectives in the region. First, it can help demonstrate strong US engagement in the region, highlighting that we are a Pacific power as well as an Atlantic one. Second, it can help coalesce bipartisan domestic support for this engagement. Third, this new group can help identify and overcome barriers to more efficient flows of trade, capital, and technology so as to enhance economic growth for all of us. Fourth, it can heighten the sense of mutual responsibility among all these economies--especially some of the newly successful ones--to support an open international trading and investment system. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in Canberra last November yielded a number of important results. First and foremost, we moved the process of Pacific economic cooperation forward. We agreed to hold two more meetings--the next in Singapore later this year, then in Korea in 1991. We established an informal support process of senior officials, based on the "sherpa model," and started to explore a specific work program. And we agreed to work together to support Uruguay Round objectives. I think we are well on our way to establishing the kind of Pacific Rim institution that will serve to consolidate our wide range of interests in the region. Meanwhile, within our own hemisphere, we are deepening relations with our closest neighbors and friends--Canada and Mexico--to jointly address some of the major challenges of the next decade. Building on the 1989 Free Trade Agreement with Canada, we are accelerating the timetable for phasing out all tariffs, working to eliminate discriminatory practices, and liberalizing regulations. Reflecting this stimulus, US- Canadian trade flows--already the world's largest--are growing and will continue to spur economic growth in both countries. We also have initiated bilateral discussions with Canada aimed at reaching an accord on acid rain, one of our key environmental priorities for the next decade. In Mexico, we are working in close partnership with President Salinas to broaden our mutual agenda. Through our Framework Agreement on Trade and Investment, we continue to encourage Mexico to deepen the extensive liberalization of its trade and investment policies now underway. Expanding on these efforts, we have developed the US- Mexico Binational Commission (BNC) as a forum to manage a wide range of bilateral issues, from finance and narcotics to immigration and environmental/border questions. This process was advanced by the visit last August of four cabinet officers to Mexico City and further strengthened by the successful visit of President Salinas last October. To complete the overview, we have an ambitious foreign affairs agenda for the 1990s. Because the challenges I outlined above are so intimately linked to basic American values, I am confident that we will be able to work together in a bipartisan way to meet them. Already, we have achieved some notable successes. With the strong support of members of this committee, we forged a common approach to peace in Central America. We responded to the dramatic political opening in Poland and Hungary with timely and appropriate economic assistance. And we provided financial support to the UN's efforts to foster democracy in an independent Namibia. Over the past year, individual committee members have constructively shaped our approaches to a number of critical issues. These range across the globe from assistance to the Philippines to support of the anti-communist resistance in Afghanistan; from protection of the environment to the procedures for admission of Soviet refugees. In a number of other areas, however, more work will be needed. Our foreign assistance legislation once again was laden with earmarks, straining our ability to respond flexibly to unanticipated challenges at this time of rapid change. We were unable to complete the important work on foreign aid reform, despite the promising start I cited in last year's testimony. For our part, we in the foreign affairs community fully recognize that we must demonstrate to you that we can effectively manage the personnel and programs needed to carry out our agenda. Responsibility and accountability are as important from our perspective as they are to the Congress.
OVERVIEW OF OUR FUNDING REQUEST
I will now discuss the particulars of our funding request for FY 1990 and FY 1991. In his State of the Union address last night, President Bush pointed to a bright future for this country. Assuming present world trends continue, the President noted that our national security requirements could be safeguarded in the context of a measured, judicious decline in real defense spending. However, we feel strongly that a sharp, sudden cut in defense spending--what some have referred to as a "peace dividend"--would not serve America's best interests. The President is keenly aware of the need to achieve major reductions in the Federal budget deficit in FY 1991. At the same time, meeting our foreign affairs agenda for the next decade will require some carefully chosen new assistance initiatives, plus small but vital investments in our own human resources to keep us fully capable of shaping the changes we see in the world. For FY 1991, we are requesting $20.8 billion in discretionary budget authority for International Affairs Budget Function 150. This represents an increase of $1.7 billion, or 8.9%, over levels appropriated for FY 1990. In real terms, the increase is about 5%. Our funding request for FY 1991 balances budgetary stringency with the need to meet the challenges of the next decade. We propose four funding initiatives for FY 1991, plus two supplemental FY 1990 initiatives--one for Panama and one for refugees. All are integral to our ability to protect American values and interests into the next decade. First, we ask for your special support for the dramatic changes underway in Eastern Europe. We will shortly introduce legislation which builds on our successful effort last year and extends economic assistance to additional East European countries undertaking political and economic reforms. We seek your assistance in providing $300 million for FY 1991 to support structural adjustment, private sector development, trade and investment programs, and environmental activities in Eastern Europe. Second, we seek $500 million in supplementary FY 1990 funds to support Panama's economic recovery. These funds comprise a portion of the comprehensive $1 billion program announced by the President to dismantle economic sanctions and stimulate a revival of business confidence. We are grateful for the bipartisan congressional support of the first stage of this recovery plan. Panama will need supplementary, one-time funding to restore financial stability and underpin a revival of private sector investment activity. Our economic support funds (ESF) would be used to help Panama regain its economic momentum following several years of mismanagement under Noriega. Together with our friends, including the Japanese, we are organizing a multilateral effort to help Panama normalize its relations with the international financial community, promote business credit, support public investment, and underpin public sector restructuring. Third, we request $441 million in military, economic, and counter-narcotics assistance to support the Andean countries in their struggle against narcotics cultivation and trafficking. This initiative is a central pillar of the President's drug strategy, and addresses a problem ranking high on our list of transnational challenges for the next decade. Our request includes $137 million in foreign military financing (FMF) to bolster the Andean governments in their efforts to maintain effective airlift and military capabilities for the interdiction of drug traffickers. The economic part of our request-- $214 million--will assist our friends in developing legitimate alternatives to the narcotics industry and implementing other structural adjustments necessary to sustain economic growth. I urge your bipartisan support for our Andean neighbors in our joint struggle against this powerful enemy. The President will look to your endorsement as he meets with the Andean presidents in Cartagena later this month. Fourth, we ask for your support in authorizing $888 million to clear US arrearages to the United Nations, other international organizations, multilateral development banks, and UN peacekeeping activities. Actual payments to international organizations would be phased in over a 5-year period as reforms are undertaken. As we have noted with Congress, all payments of arrearages would be directed toward special activities worked out between the United States and the individual organizations. The President feels strongly that a carefully structured arrears initiative is essential to maintaining U.S. leadership in these multilateral organizations. Over the next decade, we expect an invigorated United Nations to make greater contributions to peacekeeping efforts, refugee resettlement, and transnational issues including narcotics, the environment, and terrorism. To maintain our credibility and influence with these multilateral organizations as they address some of the greatest challenges of the next decade, the United States must live up to its solemn financial commitments. Fifth, we look for your support in authorizing $270 million for construction of a new embassy building in Moscow. Last year, I promised this committee that we would conduct a prompt review and submit our recommendations in our FY 1991 budget request. That review has now been completed. As I informed you in December, the Administration has decided that tearing down the existing uncompleted new structure and rebuilding it in place is the preferable approach. This option offers the most practical and timely means of obtaining sufficient, fully secure space at a reasonable cost. Sixth and finally, we seek $70 million in supplemental FY 1990 funding for urgent refugee admissions requirements. In my testimony before this committee last year, I indicated that we might need to revise our FY 1990 refugee funding request and promised to consult with you on this issue. Primarily as a result of the continued liberalization of Soviet emigration policy, we will admit 27,000 more refugees this year than were provided for in our original request. We look to your support for the resources needed to welcome these refugees. Turning now to our core budget request, let me say that it is lean. It has been pared back to the minimum. All our ongoing programs have been held to last year's levels, with only nominal increases to cover built-in costs such as inflation and pay increases. Discretionary budget authority for these important core programs represents only a 1.5% increase over last year's levels.
Security Assistance
Security assistance will continue to play an essential role in advancing our foreign policy objectives through the 1990s. No other vehicle at our disposal is as well suited to provide timely, flexible support to our allies and friends around the world. A critical component of our Andean drug strategy, for example, is the commitment of additional security assistance resources to help our friends combat a common, well-equipped enemy. Our interests in political pluralism, market-driven economic development, peacemaking, and strengthening alliances--all can be advanced by prudent use of security assistance resources. For FY 1991, our request for discretionary budget authority for security assistance programs (FMF, ESF, IMET, and peacekeeping) totals $8.5 billion. That marks a 4.4% increase over the $8.1 billion appropriated by Congress in each of the past three fiscal years. Our FY 1991 request, however, is less than amounts provided in FY 1985 through FY 1987. In our single FMFi account (FMF), we are requesting $5.02 billion in budget authority for all-grant military assistance programs, compared with the $4.83 billion appropriated in FY 1990. For our small but important international military education and training programs, our request is for $50.5 million, up from the $47.2 million appropriated for the current year. In economic support funds (ESF), our request is for $3.36 billion in grants, compared with $3.18 billion provided in the current fiscal year. All this would meet the highest priority programs only. Aid to Egypt and Israel demonstrates our commitment to help the peacemakers broaden and strengthen their vital and ongoing efforts. As in previous years, we are requesting $5.1 billion in total security assistance for the two Middle East peace partners. That represents about 61% of our total request. These funds meet military modernization requirements and contribute to economic stability and development objectives. For Pakistan, our request for $573 million in total bilateral assistance supports a fledgling democracy, encourages economic development, and assists military modernization. We salute Pakistan's continued generous support for the Afghan people in their struggle for self-determination. To bolster another fragile democracy--the Philippines--we are requesting $450 million in total bilateral assistance, plus a second installment of $200 million for the Multilateral Assistance Initiative. President Aquino needs our help to implement economic and military reforms necessary to broaden the foundations of her democratic government's stability. Discussions also begin shortly on renewing our base agreements with the Philippines. We hope to achieve agreement on continued use of these valuable facilities. For our NATO allies with whom we enjoy military base agreements--Portugal, Greece, and Turkey--we are requesting a combined total of $1.11 billion in military and economic assistance, or 13% of our total security assistance request. Greece, Turkey, and Portugal are vital to NATO's southern tier. As NATO develops new missions over the next decade, we will need to tailor our programs to meet changing requirements. It will remain critical, however, to support host government forces as a complement to our continued access to important facilities, including the Lajes Air Base in the Azores and military and intelligence assets in Greece and Turkey. To consolidate democracy and economic development in Central America, we are requesting $736 million in total assistance. As in prior years, over four-fifths of our request supports economic assistance, which is vitally needed to bolster living standards and promote market-oriented growth strategies. The key interests above--together with the security assistance component of our narcotics initiative--absorb 94% of our worldwide security assistance request. Budgetary restrictions leave us with only $511 million to meet vital security interests in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, Thailand, and elsewhere. While the challenges for the next decade are formidable, I stick by the promise I made you last April: We can do more with less. But, as I noted last year, this will only be possible if the trend toward increased earmarks, reporting requirements, and restrictions is reversed. In the current fiscal year, fully 92% of military assistance and 82% of economic support funds were earmarked. When combined with cuts in our request levels, this high degree of earmarking sets back our efforts to make the most effective use of our assistance resources. We must face together the prospect of managing tight international affairs budgets for at least the next several years. Let us agree to make legislative earmarking a last resort, and constructive consultation the primary vehicle for achieving consensus on program objectives. In particular, when resources get tight, let us agree on vehicles to ensure that our less visible but highly essential security interests do not get shortchanged in the process. Let us together explore ways to achieve greater flexibility to respond to changing circumstances.
International Development and HumanitarianAssistance
As I testified last year before this committee, the United States has a wide variety of tools at its disposal to promote an adaptive climate for world economic growth. Through our commitment to an open world trading system and the dynamism of our own economy, we contribute to the economic betterment of the developing world. Complementing the benefits of trade, private equity markets in developing countries also attract increasing interest from the world investment community. While private trade and investment flows should occupy ever greater importance in the coming decade, international development and humanitarian assistance will continue to play an important role. The United States remains the world leader in this field--through our direct provision of bilateral assistance, the emergency humanitarian aid we extend in crisis situations, and through the leadership position we take in refugee programs and international financial institutions. Indeed, it is largely through US leadership that the world assistance community has embraced such important humanitarian concerns as first asylum for refugees. And it is greatly due to our leadership that the community continues to move away from traditional state-dominated development strategies. For FY 1991, we are requesting $6.6 billion in budget authority for international development and humanitarian assistance, up from $6.1 billion actually appropriated for the current year. The increase can be wholly attributed to our new East European initiative and to efforts to clear US arrearages to the multilateral development banks. For the multilateral development banks, we are requesting $1.74 billion in budget authority, up from $1.47 billion in FY 1990. This increase is attributable almost entirely to our efforts to clear past arrearages to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Included in our request is $1.06 billion for the annual US share in the ninth replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA). This soft-loan window provides concessional World Bank financing to the poorest countries. Recognizing the need for shared responsibilities, we have agreed to contribute 21.6% of this IDA replenishment, down from our 25% share of the previous exercise. Up to half the IDA funds will be slated for sub-Saharan Africa's most urgent development and economic restructuring requirements. For our bilateral development assistance programs--managed by the Agency for International Development (AID)--we are requesting $2.89 billion in FY 1991 budget authority. This provides funding for the following programs: -- $1.23 billion for the functional development assistance program, providing for basic needs in the areas of agriculture, population, health, energy, environment, and education; -- $561 million for the Development Fund for Africa; -- $500 million for the special assistance initiatives for the Philippines ($200 million) and Eastern Europe ($300 million) that were described above; and -- $145 million for several smaller AID programs which respond to a variety of special needs--including humanitarian disaster assistance, support for American schools and hospitals abroad, and overseas housing programs. Largely through assistance and admissions efforts, the United States continues to play a preeminent role in easing the plight of the world's refugees. We are making significant progress. -- We improved our assistance to Soviet refugees by shifting our processing activities from Rome and Vienna to Moscow. -- We are working closely with Congress on special immigration legislation to supplement our refugee programs. -- We successfully negotiated an agreement with Vietnam to allow reeducation center detainees to resettle in the United States. Last month, the first 750 former detainees and their family members departed Vietnam under this program. -- We are working hard in multilateral channels to preserve the principle of first asylum for Vietnamese boat people and to make a success of the voluntary repatriation program from Hong Kong. For FY 1991, we are requesting $476 million in budget authority for refugee activities. This compares with $438 million in total FY 1990 resources, including the supplemental funding request described above. These funds will support the admission of 95,000 refugees and 15,000 Amerasian immigrants--the same number as the current year--and enable us to assist the immediate needs of millions of additional refugees and displaced persons worldwide. Other important components of our international development assistance request include: -- $898 million in budget authority for PL 480 food aid to support a $1.5 billion program level; -- $181 million for Peace Corps operating expenses; and -- $225 million for voluntary contributions to international organizations including the UN Development Program ($109 million) and UNICEF ($50 million). For international narcotics control assistance programs under the management of the State Department, we are requesting a total of $150 million in FY 1991, up from $113 million in the current fiscal year. Nearly all of this increase will be devoted to significantly expanding our coca control efforts in the Andes, with Latin American country programs increasing from $57 million to $87 million. The equipment and training we provide are essential to support interdiction and law enforcement operations against the major trafficking organizations. Most of our assistance activities meet multiple objectives. For instance, abolishing a government agricultural monopoly through a World Bank loan can stimulate a broader opening in a country's political system. Supporting political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe opens markets for US investment and exports at the same time that it provides those countries resources to address serious environmental concerns. In sum, our assistance resources provide practical vehicles by which to promote the interests of a strong America into the decade ahead. Our foreign aid request for FY 1991 totals $15 billion, up from $14.1 billion enacted in FY 1990. We believe this represents the minimum needed to help our partners around the world promote our shared interests.
Conduct of Foreign Affairs
To meet the foreign policy challenges of the next decade, our nation will require a skilled, dedicated cadre of professionals to outwit, outwork, and outmanage our competition. As transnational issues, including narcotics and the environment, become more prominent and the ideals of political and economic freedom spread, we must have the human resources in place to play a leadership role in the world. In meeting this task, our foreign affairs personnel are our principal assets--assets we must protect, nurture, and invest wisely. Put very simply, in order for the United States to manage world change effectively and channel it in a positive direction, we in the foreign policy community must first manage ourselves effectively. We have taken a number of steps over the past year to strengthen management. -- We are implementing a set of proposals that will strengthen implementation of the 1980 Foreign Service Act and are working to develop a more effective and broadly representative State Department. The measures we are taking should help us fulfill the commitment I made to this committee last year--to promote openness and diversity in the foreign affairs community. -- We are examining the need to respond to the recent dramatic developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with additional overseas staffing. To the extent possible, these prospective needs would be reprogrammed from core resources. -- We are adjusting our management approach to security in order to keep pace with changing physical and technical threat levels. -- We are modernizing our worldwide information management system and maintaining our commitment to a new worldwide telecommunications network. For State Department operations and foreign buildings, we are requesting $2.2 billion in budget authority for FY 1991, an increase of $138 million over the current year. This is the minimal level of resources we need to fund our diplomatic and consular missions overseas as well as our domestic activities. Our request provides continued funding for our highest priority infrastructure project-- the Department of State telecommunications system. It also provides funding to begin to improve the repair and rehabilitation of our valuable inventory of overseas properties. And, as I noted above, we are also requesting $270 million for reconstruction of our embassy in Moscow.
Funding for International Institutions
The President has emphasized the urgency of restoring financial viability to the United Nations and other international organizations. For FY 1991, we are requesting $695 million in budget authority to meet our current assessments to international organizations, plus an additional $464 million for the arrears initiative I mentioned before. For international peacekeeping activities, we are requesting $91 million to meet our full funding obligations, plus $157 million for arrearages. Included in our peacekeeping request is $16.6 million to meet our assessment to the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), a newly created unarmed military observer group. Public diplomacy will be one of our most valuable tools as we seek to encourage the worldwide tide of democracy and political pluralism. For the valuable work of the US Information Agency (USIA) and the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), we are requesting $1.23 billion in FY 1991 funding. This level is down slightly from the $1.32 billion provided last year, largely because of the completion of the Israeli transmitter project. Having spun around the globe several times, and spun your heads with figures, I would like to come to rest with a final thought. It is often said that there is no constituency for foreign affairs in this country. I do not agree. Just to cite a recent example, Americans of all stripes rallied behind our efforts to help restore democracy to Panama. They responded in support of one of our most cherished values--political freedom. Daily, all over the world, our foreign affairs programs promote America's fundamental values. From the refugee officer in Thailand to the aid worker in Pakistan to the trade negotiator in Geneva, our business is representing America's interests to the world. The investments we now make in fostering democracy and market principles, in promoting peace, in protecting the world community against transnational threats, and in renewing and reshaping key relationships around the world--all these are essential investments in our future. These investments will secure for us a leadership role in the next century. They will ensure that the world of the future is one in which our fundamental values continue to flourish. Yet, as any wise investor knows, you cannot protect and enhance your vital assets by eroding your resource base, by cutting into your principal, by being complacent, by poor management, or by failing to give yourself enough latitude to operate in a fast- changing environment. America's business is advancing democracy, prosperity, and peace abroad, so that we may continue to enjoy them at home. Together, let us work to ensure that America remains a leading, successful, well-managed international enterprise in the years ahead. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

From Revolution to Democracy: Central and Eastern Europe in the New Europe

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Prepared address at Charles University, Prague, Czechoslovakia Date: Feb 7, 19902/7/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Czechoslovakia (former) Subject: Trade/Economics, Democratization, Development/Relief Aid, EC [TEXT] On an autumn day in Washington, DC, 72 years ago, a messenger brought an envelope to the White House. A clerk stamped the enclosed letter, "Received, October 18, 1918." The letter was sent by an elderly former professor from Prague to his friend, a former professor from Princeton. The letter was timely, for on that very day--October 18--the Princeton professor, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, was considering a recent proposal from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That letter to the White House was the Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak nation. Thomas Masaryk had sent it. As our 28th President read the document from the man who would be your first President, he must have been stirred by the words that recalled our own declaration of independence from an empire. He must have been moved by the closing passage: The forces of darkness have served the victory of light--the longed-for age of humanity is dawning. We believe in democracy, we believe in liberty--and liberty ever more. That same day, October 18, Woodrow Wilson sent his reply to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a "government clothed with proper authority." And he insisted that Czechs and Slovaks, not an emperor in Vienna, should be the judges of their own destiny. But the wisdom of Masaryk and Wilson, the rationality of democracy and self-determination, did not last. The days of reason of 1918 yielded to the unreasoning darkness of 1938 and 1948. Czechoslovakia witnessed--and endured--frightening totalitarian power and the breakdown of the European order. The United States returned to Europe, and America's young men died, resisting Nazi and Fascist aggression. Then America stayed in Europe to contain Stalinist expansionism. Now the revolutions of 1989 have revived an age of reason for Czechoslovakia and Eastern and central Europe. That is what brings us together in this special place. Twenty- two years ago, students just like you--students like Jan Palach-- joined during a fateful Prague spring to restore the vibrant democratic society that once stood at the heart of Europe--only to be crushed by the twisted normality of "normalization," by the unreason of the era of stagnation. Now you, the students of this great university, have taken part, heroically and responsibly, in your velvet revolution. So it is especially fitting for me to come here, to Czechoslovakia, to Prague, to this university, to talk with you about how we might promote, perpetuate, and protect Europe's democratic revolutions. Never again should you--or any other people--have totalitarianism steal away your freedom. Never again should you be just the objects of history, unable to effect, much less shape, your own destiny, unable to do anything but cry out: "o nas, bez nas, proti nam"--about us, without us, against us.
From Revolution to Lasting Democracy
In December in Berlin, I discussed four key features of the new European architecture: NATO, the European Community (EC), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and a continuing American role in Europe. Here in Prague, I want to resume that discussion. I want to share my thoughts on how Czechoslovakia and its neighbors in central and Eastern Europe can move from revolutions to lasting democracies that draw strength from the new architecture. The historic, democratic movements that we are witnessing across Europe--here in Prague and in Bratislava, in Warsaw and Budapest, in Berlin, Sofia, Belgrade, and Bucharest-- hold great promise for all of us. They hold the promise that Europe can achieve what President Havel has called "the era of freedom;" what President Bush has called a "Europe whole and free." We must work to fulfill that promise and to protect it. Indeed, we all know that initial impulses for democracy may not be enough. If 1989 was the year of sweeping away, 1990 must become the year of building anew. Four challenges confront the newly emerging democracies of this region. First, the spirit of revolution needs to move from the streets into the government. Transitional regimes need to give way to fair and free elections that establish open parliaments with a place for opposition. The new democratic political systems need to respect the rule of law and fundamental individual rights and liberties-- including freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the press. Majority rule must respect minority rights. Second, the spirit of the new Europe needs to be reflected in security arrangements that remove the threat of military aggression or intimidation and promote the peaceful settlement of disputes. Elections and new security treaties will be mutually reinforcing, for only freely elected governments can legitimize the security arrangements the treaties will codify. Third, the spirit of economic reform needs to move forward to allow free men and women to enjoy economic liberty--including the rights to private ownership and to work alone or collectively in markets where prices are set by individual choices, not centralized diktat. The improved performance and freedom of market economies will be necessary to help sustain popular support for the new democracies. Following from these three challenges, I suggest there may also be a fourth: Some of the new democracies of the region may determine that they can better support and sustain their common effort if they do so in concert, perhaps through some form of regional cooperation. In each of these efforts, the evolving institutions of a new Europe--NATO, the EC, CSCE--will play important roles. So will America. For as you make progress toward democratic ideals, so do we, for that is the essence of America. Both Wilson and Masaryk understood that. None of us should underestimate the difficulty of the work ahead. But neither should we underestimate the great opportunity presented all of us by your courage. As President Havel said on New Year's Day: "Let us teach both ourselves and others that politics does not have to be the art of the possible, especially if this means the art of speculating, calculating, intrigues, secret agreements, and pragmatic maneuvering but that it also can be the art of the impossible, that is the art of making both ourselves and the world better."
Free Elections: The First Challenge
Two months ago in Berlin, I emphasized that governments based on the consent of the governed are the first requirement for an enduring peace in Europe. Americans value self-determination because we value the dignity and freedom of the individual. We value it, too, because the principle of self-determination is the only basis upon which legitimate governments can stand. The steps you take are not just your own; they are also steps forward for all states that have a stake in a legitimate European order, including the United States and the Soviet Union. Only through the legitimacy of democracy will we achieve a resilient and lasting stability. Governments accountable to their peoples--and more concerned with the livelihood of their citizens than with their apparats, armies, or secret police--will secure a Europe whole and free in a way armies of tanks never could. Democratic governments are far more likely to promote the well-being of their citizens than to pursue expansionist, aggressive aims. President Gorbachev also appears to have understood this opportunity. By word and deed, this new Soviet leadership seems to agree that legitimacy, not force, is the only way to ensure European stability. As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said just last month: "We are emerging from a difficult past. We are emerging from it, having learned well its main lesson: Only an advanced democracy can give guarantees against the abuse of power and can secure a nation against repression and violence." Since self-determination through a free and fair election is the right that secures all others, President Bush has called for adding free elections to CSCE nations' human rights obligations. This proposal would commit all 35 CSCE participating states to hold periodic and genuine elections, permit free party activity, and require that elections be open to foreign observers. Between now and the Copenhagen CSCE conference [on the human dimension in June], the United States will propose new provisions to support, monitor, and carry out a free elections regime within the CSCE process. Indeed, I propose that all CSCE member states join with the United States in sending observer delegations to ensure that the people-power elections of 1990 genuinely represent the will of the people. No proposal could be more timely. Last month, Romania said it would invite UN observers to its elections. Now I hope Romania will give our CSCE observer proposal greater impetus by being the first nation to invite CSCE observers. 1989 was the year the people took to the streets; 1990 should be the year the people move into their parliaments. I would like to add one cautionary note. We are troubled by indications that some of the governments in the region have engaged in practices that will obstruct truly free and fair elections. Let me be clear: The peaceful transition to democracy now underway in central and Eastern Europe will not tolerate rear guard maneuvers from any quarter. As we have seen in the German Democratic Republic and Romania, such actions will only undercut the legitimacy of this vital process. And any steps that undercut the creation of legitimate governments will increase, not decrease, instability. That is in no one's interest. We will proceed on the basis of a new democratic differentiation: Any backsliding in the movement to create legitimate governments will isolate a nation from the support we can provide.
Consolidating Changes in Europe's Security: The Second Challenge
The democratic imperative is the first and most basic challenge. But the second challenge is no less important. I want to state our objective as clearly as possible: We must leave behind not only the cold war but also the conflicts that preceded it. After 1918, you built a strong democracy and a vibrant economy, but 1938 and 1948 proved the necessity for enduring, effective security. The lesson is clear: Military changes must keep pace with political ones. And the conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) talks are a critical step toward an agreed and codified security system. Last week, President Bush made a new proposal that should bring an effective CFE treaty to a rapid conclusion. The United States is confident that such an agreement will promote a stable strategic relationship in Europe. That relationship should minimize and deter the threat of any army of invasion and end the unjust presence of any army of occupation. We also believe that enduring security necessitates a continued US military role on the continent--for as long as our allies desire it--to reassure the nations of Europe, large and small, that we will stand by them to resist invasion, intimidation, or coercion. We can make the European strategic situation more predictable and perhaps less threatening by encouraging greater openness and transparency in military affairs. Next week, for example, Canada will host the "open skies" conference in Ottawa, where we hope to begin negotiations toward implementing President Bush's proposal to overcome the suspicions of secrecy through a system of overflights on short notice. The negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures within CSCE offer a vehicle for ongoing efforts to reduce tensions on the continent. Yet our present proposals are oriented primarily toward the danger of Eastern offensive action against the West. We also need to develop measures that would impede an assertion of military might by any European nation against any other. So today I propose that we start exploring the expansion of the confidence- and security-building measures agenda. For example, we should consider new proposals to promote greater military transparency among neighboring states, especially along border areas, and to open the military budgets of all 35 CSCE nations to public scrutiny. NATO will continue to play an important role in ensuring strategic stability and predictability in Europe--West and East-- but NATO must also evolve to assume new missions. As a political alliance, NATO offers a cohesive structure that can help address old and new European animosities and fears--outside and inside NATO. As a security alliance among 16 like-minded democracies, NATO should consider how it might facilitate collective action against non-traditional threats--such as proliferation and regional conflicts. As a political and a security alliance, NATO can assist in the verification of arms control and security agreements to the benefit of all Europeans.
Economic Requirements for the New Democracies: The Third Challenge
Free elections and treaties on conventional forces and confidence- building measures will help advance and consolidate your people- power revolutions. But if steps are not taken to promote economic vitality, then the stability of Europe may be threatened again. This is one of the painful lessons of the interwar years. The newly emancipated peoples of this region now face the long and trying labor of regenerating societies devastated by half a century of totalitarian rule. A major part of this effort must clean up your rivers, lakes, forests, soil, and air--damaged just as badly by central planning as were your economies themselves. Because the circumstances of each nation differ considerably, it would be a mistake to apply a mechanistic assistance formula. I believe, however, we can identify stages of economic reform to which the United States, the EC, and the other nations of the Group of 24 should tailor support. First, some nations will need short-term emergency aid to cope with severe shortages of necessities--for example, food, medicine, and disaster relief. We will be there to break the fall. But we will seek to do so in a way that does not undercut the revitalization of homegrown solutions--especially in agriculture. The private sector can play a key role here. For instance, the American organization, AmeriCares, has sent over $80 million in medical supplies since 1982 to aid the people of this region. And their supplies are donated primarily from American pharmaceutical companies--over 800 of them. Second, all the new democracies will need help in the transition from broken down Stalinist command economies to market systems driven by the engine of private enterprise. Your new Finance Minister, Vaclav Klaus, recently made a succinct statement at an international meeting that went to the heart of the problem: We don't need the old types of cooperation, he reminded an old thinking Eastern colleague, we need business! Businesses need market prices and an opportunity to compete. It is up to you to provide a conducive legal environment, to turn over or sell factories to private owners, and to lift the heavy hand of excessive government intervention. It is up to us to help draw foreign investors, offering incentives where appropriate, and even at times to supply seed money for local private ventures. It is up to all of us to lend a hand--especially through multilateral financial support--to democratic economies struggling to manage such difficult transition problems as debt payments, stabilization of currency values, and currency convertibility. That is exactly what we are doing for Poland and Hungary, where the United States alone has offered about $1 billion in various assistance measures. And just last week, President Bush asked Congress for $300 million for assistance to Eastern Europe. While some of our assistance will be available to all, the progress a government makes in meeting the challenges I have outlined will influence the availability of the full range of aid. Third, we must integrate the new market democracies into the international economic system. You need access to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank resources. You need barriers to trade removed bilaterally and through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) so potential investors will know they can export to other markets. You need access to high technology. To meet this need, the United States is considering with its allies adjustments in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) system that could enable you to have access to technology, provided you will protect it and forego industrial espionage. We have been pleased the European Community has assumed a major role in coordinating economic assistance, because the availability of the EC market for the nations of central and Eastern Europe is vital. We recognize, as well, that others--including the United States, Japan, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) nations--should also play significant roles so the new market democracies can assume their proper independent place within the whole of Europe and the larger international system. Czechoslovakia and other nations of Eastern Europe warrant special recognition at this historic time. Therefore, I am pleased to announce that we will support the offer of the government of Czechoslovakia to locate the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) here in Prague, in the center and heart of Europe. I also look forward to the Bonn CSCE economic conference as an opportunity to establish European-wide adherence to market principles. If CSCE is to fulfill its potential, it needs a better developed economic component that will aid the transition to market economies and promote ongoing respect for economic liberty and open markets. CSCE Summit Free elections. CFE and security. Dynamic market economies. Standing alone, each of these is important. But together they are mutually reinforcing. Together they offer an agenda for the United States and others that want to ensure that the revolutions of 1989 become the democracies of the 1990s. Together they can help build governments that answer to only one power: the people. This agenda draws from and builds on the CSCE framework. It should be the agenda of a CSCE summit. Therefore, the United States stands ready to participate in a 35-nation CSCE summit this year if the summit addresses three points. One, we need to make substantial progress on the US and UK proposal to establish a CSCE commitment to hold periodic and genuine elections. Free elections should be a human right and are the baseline requirement for establishing a new, legitimate European political order. Two, we must complete the CFE treaty--so it can be signed at the summit--establishing new, legitimate security arrangements. Three, we should clearly define the summit agenda based on substantive progress and possible proposals in other areas as well, including economics. This way it can prepare for, not replace, the 1992 Helsinki review meeting and demonstrate CSCE's potential for advancing reform in a new Europe. For example, we might consider how CSCE can gradually develop institutions to support its work in the three baskets, as the Federal Republic of Germany has suggested. US Bilateral Programs for Czechoslovakia Let me say a word about our bilateral assistance program for Czechoslovakia. Under the sure guidance of the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence, Czechs and Slovaks together have shown that no change is too rapid when it is peaceful, consolidates democratic gains, and leads to a legitimate government. Our assistance can help you continue your revolution. In recognition of your country's dramatically changed human rights situation, I am pleased to announce that the President will notify the Congress that he is waiving the Jackson-Vanik amendment. This waiver will open the way for most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Czechoslovakia after we negotiate a trade agreement. And when Czechoslovakia's parliament passes new, liberal legislation on free emigration, the United States will declare Czechoslovakia in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, as we have done with Hungary, so that Czechoslovakia can enjoy MFN status without the requirement of an annual waiver. The President also will request authority for the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to operate in Czechoslovakia to encourage and offer financial support to private U.S. investors. And we will support your recent request to rejoin the IMF. The United States also will: -- Support you economically by making Czechoslovakia eligible for the export-credit guarantees of our Export-Import Bank and Commodity Credit Corporation; by seeking legislation to promote technical assistance; by negotiating a bilateral investment treaty; and by coordinating this assistance with the multilateral efforts of the Group of 24; -- Support you ecologically by proposing a joint US- Czechoslovak study to determine the most cost-effective way to deal with your serious air pollution problems; by encouraging you to participate in the Budapest Regional Environment Center announced by President Bush last July; and by intensifying our dialogue on all transnational issues, including the environment, drug trafficking, and terrorism; and -- Support closer ties between our peoples by increasing cultural and educational exchange programs; by beginning a Peace Corps English-language program here; by establishing US Information Agency cultural centers in Bratislava and in Prague; and, above all, by reopening our consulate in Bratislava. These steps will go far toward re-establishing our historical ties with both the Slovak and Czech peoples. I also have one more US initiative to announce today--an idea specially suited to safeguarding your democracy and those of your neighbors. It starts from the assumption that just as you have won your own freedom, so too will well- informed citizens protect freedom by setting wrong to right. As Thomas Jefferson wrote almost 200 years ago, "Where the press is free, and every man able to read, all is safe." These were and are wise words. The United States proposes, therefore, the establishment of a fund for independent broadcasting and a free press. Our goal is to support cooperative development of commercial and nonprofit radio and television broadcasting and free press in Czechoslovakia and the rest of central and Eastern Europe. The fund would solicit participation and contributions from Western private corporations and institutions. This fund's principal purpose would be to assist groups in the region that wish to start independent radio, television, and print enterprises. The fund could provide seed money for startup costs as well as technical assistance. It also would provide training in the United States and other Western countries in the use of equipment and development of professional broadcast and print standards.
New Associations in the Region and Europe: The Fourth Challenge
In a region that has suffered so greatly from the distortion of national interest and from international isolation, I am encouraged by the first signs of coordination and possible new association among newly democratic states. President Havel and others have opened the discussion. We recognize that the growth of legitimate multilateral organizations that reflect the economic, political, and security interests of this region will develop as they are needed, but permit me, if you will, to think out loud for a few moments. The United States has supported voluntary associations of independent nations in every other region in the world. As in Western Europe after World War II, we believe that the process of political and economic reconstruction may be strengthened by new forms of cooperation. We believe voluntary associations follow naturally from democracy and are, in a sense, a natural way for democracies to build international civil society and overcome old animosities. Indeed, associations may also give you additional strength to build democratic institutions at home, because the lessons and success of one may assist another. We welcome, for example, the recent discussions of mutually beneficial economic cooperation in the region by officials of the governments of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, including a possible free trade agreement, free flow of capital and labor, harmonized financial systems, and a convertible accounting unit. Economic integration can enhance efficiency and growth. Common infrastructure projects can assure compatible communications, transport, and energy networks. The purpose of such closer ties should not be to isolate the countries in association from others. Indeed, your nations have every interest in overcoming the enforced associations of the past that actually discouraged your entry into the European and global economies. No longer should the circumstances of this continent subject you to characterization as "the lands between." You can, instead, establish a region of recognition and respect. Working together, you might strengthen your position and fashion a special relationship with the EC, the nations of EFTA, or the United States. If you do work together, we will respect your decision by providing our assistance in a way that supports your associations. The choice of whether to associate and in what form is, of course, entirely yours to make. A Commonwealth of Free Nations Today in Prague and 2 months ago in Berlin, I have elaborated upon the President's vision of a Europe whole and free. I have described America's vital role in building that new Europe together with you. By respecting the principles of self-determination and democratic choice, we believe that the old divisions of Europe can be overcome. The legacy of 1938 and 1948 can be left behind, and the hopes of 1918 and 1968 can be fulfilled. Before I came to speak to you this morning, I visited the place where, 21 years ago, Jan Palach set himself on fire to protest fear and terror. There is little that an American official can tell this audience about his sacrifice. But I know that among the students of his old university gathered here today, the student Palach would not be a lonely man. For in affirming your dignity as individuals, you have reclaimed more than the future of your generation. In recovering your independence as Czechs and Slovaks, you have begun more than your country's historic return to Europe. You have shown that, in the words of your President, freedom is indivisible. When the "freedom trains" bearing East German citizens pulled out of Prague last year, hundreds of your countrymen stood and cheered. But the freedom train of 1989 did not stop at the East German border or the Czechoslovak border or the Hungarian border, just as it did not stop at the border of Poland or Bulgaria or Romania or Yugoslavia. It is the great promise of our historical moment that the return to freedom and the return to a whole Europe are bound together--and can only succeed together. And I believe the day will come when any European can stand in any European city--in Prague or Paris, in Berlin or Budapest--and see only countries of free individuals, a continent of free parliaments, a commonwealth of free nations. For as more and more people today understand in more and more places, freedom's journey is one that should never end. President Havel was right. Politics can be the art of the impossible. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

Narcotics: Threat to Global Security

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks before the UN General Assembly Special Session on Narcotics, New York City Date: Feb 20, 19902/20/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Subject: Narcotics [TEXT] These are promising times for the world community. From South Africa to Eastern Europe, from the democratic movements in Asia to the new generation of democratic leaders in Latin America, we hear the stirring cry of freedom. People of faith, conviction, and courage are struggling and prevailing against difficult odds. The old world of dogmatic dictatorships is on its way out. Tragic throwbacks to repression only serve to remind us that the new world of secure, prosperous, and just democracies has not yet arrived. And it will not come automatically. We all must work to bring it into being and ensure that it will last. Global war brought this organization into existence in 1945. And it was with solemn determination that the UN founders pledged, in the opening words of our Charter, "...to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war...." Especially now, at this promising time, it is critical for the nations of the world to recall the fundamental aims that unite us. For if we fail to support the goals of the UN Charter--peace, human dignity, justice, respect for sovereign rights and international law, concern for the well-being of all the world's peoples--if we fail to do our utmost to accomplish these aims, then we could end up living in a future that resembles our troubled past. Even as we work together to eliminate war and conflict, there are other troubles that will not wait and that are bringing untold sorrow to mankind. Even as we heed the cry of freedom and democracy, we must not fail to hear another cry. This cry is not the affirmation of freedom but its negation, not the uplifting of democracy but its degradation. It is the call of the drug addict. That cry concerns all of us, and it is urgent. We hear it close to home--to my home, to your home, and to the homes of our neighbors in the world community. None of us--not one nation-- remains untouched. None of us--not one--is safe from the danger of drugs. Drugs pose a serious threat to global security. We are here at this special session because we recognize this bitter truth. We fully recognize the growing importance of combatting drugs. I particularly wish to thank the governments that have played leading roles in preparing the agenda before us. I would now like to review for you the comprehensive approach my government is taking to help rid my country and the world of illicit drugs. First, I will describe America's national drug strategy, which centers on the need to reduce the use of drugs at home. Second, I want to share with you the results of the summit in Cartagena, where President Bush and the leaders of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru formed the world's first antidrug cartel. Finally, I will offer my government's thoughts on how the United Nations can best assist in the global fight against narcotics.
The US Effort
First is our national drug strategy. The American people consider drugs the number one problem facing the United States. And winning the war against drugs is a top priority for President Bush and, therefore, a top foreign priority for me. The Bureau for International Narcotics Matters at the Department of State, ably led by Assistant Secretary [Melvyn] Levitsky, has done a first-rate job of ensuring that narcotics control issues are fully integrated into our diplomatic efforts. Our drug control strategy calls for an attack on the drug problem in all its aspects--consumption, trafficking, illicit production, treatment, and rehabilitation. My government is placing greater emphasis than ever before on preventive education programs, treatment, and rehabilitation. We aim to stop the trafficking in all illicit drugs, not just cocaine. Heroin, marijuana, and the so-called designer drugs are also major threats. And we are attacking the problems of domestic cultivation and trafficking. This kind of comprehensive approach calls for increased resources. Since the Bush Administration took office, the domestic anti-drug budget has increased 67% to $7.6 billion. And our international anti-drug budget, including border and off-shore interdiction efforts, has increased 73% to $3.1 billion. We fully realize that attacking the problem of domestic consumption is our most critical challenge. As long as the demand for drugs by Americans remains voracious, our nation faces an endless, uphill struggle to halt supply. We are making progress. Domestic drug use dropped 37% from 1985 to 1988, and cocaine use was cut in half over the same period. But we have a long way to go. We are determined that drug users in the United States face the hard facts: Their behavior is not just a personal indulgence. American users act as paymasters to organized murderers. Profits from every kilo of cocaine bought in the streets of America buy the bullets which rob democracies of their dignity and freedom. American users aid and abet the drug cartels which in turn foment and exploit regional and global instabilities. When Americans feed their habits and enrich the cartels, it's like they're giving succor to terrorists. American users are accessories to criminals who poison children. Their habits also contribute to the murder of the land. Coca farmers have destroyed acres of forest lands; traffickers have dumped millions of gallons of precursor chemicals into rivers. I regret to say that narcotics has become a big business, a very big business in my country. Last fall in Los Angeles, agents seized 22 tons of warehoused cocaine. If all the kilo packages we seized were stacked, one on top of the other, the pile would be a mile and a half high--that's a mountain of misery half the height of the tallest mountain in the continental United States. It was estimated that the street value of the seized cocaine exceeds the individual gross national products of well over 100 of the nations represented in this chamber today. And this was just one warehouse. Imagine the veritable Mt. Everests of misery we haven't found! Thus, consumption and supply, dependency and exploitation, greed and violence become a vicious circle--in truth, like a dragon chasing its own barbed tail. That circle of misery and death must be broken. America is helping to break it--both at home and with our partners abroad.
The Cartagena Summit
This brings me to my second topic: last Thursday's [February 15] summit in Colombia. As you know, President Bush and I traveled to Cartagena where we met with our counterparts from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. In Cartagena, the summit partners pledged to attack the merchants of drugs and death from every angle-- production, distribution, finance, and use. President Bush was unequivocal in his commitment to reduce demand for drugs in the United States. We agreed that it was pointless to apportion the blame between producer nations and consumer nations--narcotics are a deadly threat to all nations that are exposed to them. We and our summit colleagues are determined to break the back of crack and put the illicit cartels out of business. By going to Cartagena, the President demonstrated our country's absolute determination to fight the drug war for however long it takes. We have assured our partners that we will not fail to support them in the drug fight. As part of our support, from FY 1989 to FY 1991, the United States will increase sevenfold our international drug budget for Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Our total economic assistance will more than double to those Andean nations next year as they undertake tough counternarcotics programs and apply sound economic policies. It is fitting that the summit was held in Colombia. We applaud Colombia's courageous decision to seize and destroy labs, arrest and prosecute narcotics offenders, extradite traffickers and money launderers, and challenge the cocaine empire. No nation has so bravely confronted the drug lords or made greater sacrifices. No nation here can remain indifferent to Colombia's fate. The scale of drug-related violence in Colombia is horrific, even to those among us who have experienced firsthand the violence that has been so sadly a part of our turbulent century. In one short and brutal decade in Colombia, the Medellin and Cali traffickers have killed over 1,000 public officials, 12 Supreme Court justices, over two dozen journalists, and more than 200 judges and judicial personnel, not to mention the scores of men, women, and children who happened to be going about their daily lives in the wrong place at the wrong time. And no amount of laundering can wash the blood off money stained by drugs. The so- called kings of cocaine are criminals--criminals of uncommon power and uncommon brutality. Time and again, President Barco has put his own life on the line to free his nation from the deadly grip of the drug cartels. Together with President Barco, Presidents Bush, Garcia, and Paz all recognize their responsibility to take the lead in combating cocaine, our common enemy. Together at Cartagena, we reaffirmed the need for development, trade, and investment to strengthen growth-oriented economic policies in order to offset the economic costs of counternarcotics programs. We agreed to work in concert to heighten public awareness of the debilitating effects that drug production, trafficking, and abuse have on our countries. We agreed to provide economic assistance to help strengthen the legitimate economies of the Andean nations. And we agreed to strengthen the law enforcement capabilities of our countries to bring traffickers to justice. President Bush told his Andean colleagues that he would raise these issues with the G-7 at the Houston summit and with other developed countries as well. The United States seeks to improve and strengthen narcotics consultation and cooperation with other developed countries to bolster international support of producer-country counter-narcotics efforts. Finally, we and our Andean colleagues agreed to urge all countries to ratify, as soon as possible, the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Substances. When ratified, the 1988 convention will foster worldwide cooperation in such areas as money laundering, asset seizure, precursor chemical control, extradition, investigation, intelligence gathering, and information sharing. I am pleased to report that President Bush signed the instrument of ratification for the United States on February 13. We deposited the signed instrument of ratification with the United Nations today. Ratification by all countries will help us in regional efforts to combat cocaine and also increase worldwide cooperation against illicit drugs of all kinds.
A Strengthened Role for the UN System
By fostering worldwide cooperation, the United Nations plays a crucial role. It is imperative that we make maximum use of the UN instruments and the UN system as a whole to buttress our efforts at the national and regional levels. There is no country here so proud or so great as to be able to rid itself of drugs without the help of other nations. Nor is there any country here so small that it cannot support in some way this important international effort. Together we can work more effectively than in isolation. We can accomplish more in concert that at odds with one another. This special session affords to us all, the community of nations, an opportunity to work together decisively against drugs. We must seize this opportunity now. For if we let it pass, our inaction will condemn more children to suffering and want, more families to destruction, more governments to the assaults of drug cartels. And more of the threads that hold together the very fabric of civilized society will unravel. That is why the President and I are convinced of the timeliness and efficacy of this special session. We have the opportunity to set an action-oriented course for the UN system. It is my government's hope that adoption of the Global Program of Action, and the related Political Declaration, will take us considerably closer to ridding the international community of the drug scourge--provided, of course, that the program commits us to concrete activities, that it is fully implemented by the UN agencies of the system, and that it is backed by complementary efforts at the national and regional levels. Certainly we the member governments cannot ask the United Nations to do things that we will not do at home. Nor can we ask the United Nations to undertake ambitious programs without financial backing and a strong infrastructure with which to carry them out. We must order our priorities in such a way as to accomplish our aims within the framework of a unitary approach to the entire UN system and through zero real program growth in budgets. The Global Program of Action will reinforce the solid foundation which we have built already; by this I mean the two established international drug control treaties now in effect and the new convention against illicit trafficking which I mentioned earlier. In addition, we have other mandates such as those contained in the comprehensive multi-disciplinary outline from the 1987 International Drug Conference and UN General Assembly Resolution 44/141, adopted in December 1989. All of these documents give us the legal and program basis as well as the clear authority with which to proceed. So let us use these tools effectively before we endeavor to write new treaties. We want to strengthen our systemwide efforts and ensure maximum cooperation, coordination, and efficiency in the conduct of all UN programs. To be sure, there is a good case for improving and reinforcing our multilateral infrastructure. We agree that member countries should allocate more resources to UN anti-drug efforts in order to complement domestic counternarcotics efforts. We are more committed than ever to working with other governments, so that the UN system may be a stronger, more responsive partner in the drug fight. With the help of the Secretary General and all member states, the President and I are hopeful that the Global Program of Action will energize a dynamic drug control effort of worldwide scope. In our global war against drugs, we regard as natural allies all nations sharing the resolve to resist this scourge. Traditional friends and traditional adversaries alike must pool their efforts. Indeed, many of us already have joined forces, despite political and economic differences. Together we will combat the multinational drug empires on every front. Together we will hold to account any government that grants safe havens to drug profiteers, that actively permits the laundering of money, that turns a blind and uncaring eye to drug abuse and drug trafficking. We will give no quarter.
Conclusion
I began these remarks by saying that we are living in promising times. Freedom and democracy are in the ascendancy, yet they face formidable odds. Undoubtedly drugs are among their mortal enemies, for freedom and democracy are universal ideals that speak to the dignity of every individual. And if these ideals are to be realized, every individual must make a contribution to his or her society and to the world community. An individual caught in the grip of drugs becomes a slave--no longer a free or a responsible person. And the same thing can happen to entire nations. But such tragedies do not have to happen--not to our citizens, not to our countries, not to the world community. It's up to us-- each of us, all of us together. A great deal is at stake. We know that we cannot cleanse the world of drugs in one generation. Yet I believe I am justified in ending on an optimistic note. More than ever before, nations all over the world are working together on the global drug problem. The United Nations has greatly helped to bring this about. From the Soviet Union to Jamaica, from Spain to Malaysia, nations are joining forces in the fight against narcotics. We, the peoples of the world, must keep up the fight--in the deep jungles and mountain valleys where coca and poppies are grown, in the urban jungles ruled by corruption and cruelty, in shadowy backrooms where drug-stained money is laundered, and in the dark recesses of the soul--there perhaps most of all. Now, today, for the sake of our children and our grandchildren, we must do all that is humanly possible to rid God's good earth of the evil scourge of drugs. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

Diplomacy for the Environment

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address before the National Governors Association, Washington, DC Date: Feb 26, 19902/26/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Subject: Environment [TEXT] I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk to you today about the environment. It is a subject that is important to me personally and also very important for the 50 states, the territories, and for our foreign policy. A little history may be in order. In 1852, Chief Seattle responded to a request of the US Government to purchase some tribal lands for the arriving pioneers. The chief replied: "The Earth does not belong to man, man belongs to the Earth. All things are connected like the blood that unites us all: man did not weave the web of life, he is merely a strand in it." And the chief warned, "Whatever he does to the web, he does to himself." The settlers kept moving West-- my great-grandfather among them. These independent, hard-working, and courageous people helped to make our great nation what it is today. Even for those of us whose ancestors did not take part in the westward saga, the pioneers still epitomize the essence of the American spirit. Yet, by century's close, it had already become evident to many Americans--from the developed East and the developing West alike- -that America's bounty was not inexhaustible. It had become apparent that we needed to take responsibility for protecting and replenishing our natural resources so that future generations could enjoy them. In 1908 at the White House, President Theodore Roosevelt convened a conference on the conservation of natural resources-- the first of its kind not only in the United States, but in the world. It was known as the Conference of Governors. And it is fair to say that the conference was the single greatest stimulus to the creation of a responsible national environmental policy for the United States. Now, as we plan ahead for the next century, we must remember the lessons of the 19th and the 20th centuries. From America's native peoples, we have learned that we cannot take nature for granted. We must cherish it and respect its God-given dignity. From our forefathers, we have learned that nature is not a cornucopia of unending supply. We must give back to the Earth if we are to continue to draw from it. From the history of the conservation movement in the United States, we have learned that state and federal governments, business and labor, national organizations, and individual citizens must work together if we are to craft effective environmental policies. Finally, we know from our own experience in this interdependent world that we must "think local and act global." We cannot serve America's environmental interests effectively unless we address worldwide environmental concerns. That is where foreign policy enters the picture. And that's what I'd like to talk about today.
The Environment and US Foreign Policy
The foreign policy objectives of the United States are grounded in our basic values. We seek to encourage democracy, foster prosperity through economic liberty, ensure security, and improve effective international cooperation that addresses our common interests. What is not well-known, however, is that our environmental concerns have a major role to play in the achievement of each of these objectives: democracy, prosperity, security, cooperation, the environment--they are all interconnected. That is why the President and I are committed to ensuring that environmental issues are fully integrated into our diplomatic efforts. This is the greening of our foreign policy.
Democracy and the Environment
So first, I would like to discuss how our efforts to consolidate democracy are linked to our environmental efforts. Democracies-- dependent as they are on an informed citizenry, an open society, and accountability in government--afford the greatest scope for responsible environmental action. The conservation movement is one of the greatest success stories for grassroots democracy in the United States. When we defend and promote democratic and environmental values, we express the essence of what we believe is essential for all nations to make progress--developed and developing nations alike. Let me give you a vivid example of how democrats and environmentalists make common cause. In Eastern Europe, environmental concerns were championed by democratic opposition groups long before the people power revolutions of last fall. In fact, environmental issues helped galvanize the push for democracy. It was an international environmental conference in Sofia, Bulgaria, which helped to spark the popular revolution. "The Ecoglasnost Association," formed in anticipation of that conference, is now one of Bulgaria's largest grassroots organizations and democratic opposition groups. So in Bulgaria, Ecoglasnost gave the term "Green Revolution" a whole new meaning. The environment is clearly one of those points of mutual advantage between East and West that the President and I are pledged to seek as we try to leave the cold war behind. To help the East Europeans help themselves in the crucial area of environment, we are offering our whole experience in dealing with these issues. We are offering to the emerging democracies grants and concessional loans; joint projects, training and technology; as well as guidance in drafting laws and regulations. For instance, we have proposed a joint US-Czechoslovak study to determine the most cost-effective way to deal with Czechoslovakia's serious air pollution problems. We are providing clean-coal technology to Poland, in part to arrest the tragic defacement of Krakow's historic architectural treasures--treasures literally being eaten away, day by day. For the region as a whole, we have promoted participation in the Budapest Regional Environmental Center, first announced by President Bush last July. With the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has agreed to my request to add to our meetings a fifth major agenda item on transnational concerns. Environment is the most prominent issue in these ongoing discussions. The sum total of all these projects will reinforce the trends toward democracy in the East--that is, governments responsible to the people and the concerns of the people. That brings us to our second major objective: promoting prosperity and economic liberty. Just as political freedom and economic liberty go hand in hand, so, too, do sustained growth and a healthy environment. Strong economies provide the material means with which to protect the environment. These relationships are symbiotic. They are expressed by the concept called "sustainable development." Sustainable development, to put it simply, is a way to fulfill the requirements of the present without compromising the future. When policies of sustainable development are followed, our economic and our environmental objectives are both achieved. In fact, America's entire approach to bilateral and multilateral assistance is based on the concept of sustainable development. Providing market-based incentives, eliminating structural impediments, and ending international trade practices that distort global markets--all will generate an economic dynamism that benefits the developed and developing world alike.
Bilateral and Multilateral Efforts
Let me cite a few examples of how we are making the concept of sustainable development work through our bilateral assistance efforts. In Rwanda, we are sponsoring a project linking the economic benefits of tourism with the conservation of two unique, species-rich protected areas. In other developing countries around the world, we are fostering biodiversity. By so doing, we can increase the availability of natural products for commercial purposes. Life-saving pharmaceuticals and other marketable goods such as food and dyes can result. An ongoing AID [Agency for International Development] project in Indonesia focuses on the management and conservation of exotic native fruits, which may prove marketable. This project also promotes the management practices needed to stem the wanton destruction of tropical forests. Innovative efforts, such as debt-for-nature swaps, are also important. These, like all other debt reduction efforts, must involve basic structural reform if they are to succeed. Debt swaps are not the panacea for debt reduction, nor can they singlehandedly solve environmental problems, but debt swaps can help with both. On the multilateral level, the development banks can play a key role in promoting environmentally sustainable growth. We will continue to encourage the multilateral development banks to strengthen their policies, staff, and training. We hope other donor countries will join our efforts to integrate environmental assessments into all operations of the development banks. I know that there are dramatic calls by some for the establishment of new financial institutions or mechanisms to provide environmental assistance. But before we spend our scarce resources on creating new bureaucracies, it makes good sense to make maximum use of the multilateral tools already in existence and to reinforce existing institutions. Similarly, before we dedicate additional resources toward international environmental efforts, we will need to know how much is required. Substantial funding for environmental projects is already available. We fully recognize, however, that developing countries may need some additional aid in order to meet the incremental costs associated with fulfilling their international environmental obligations. Our third key objective is ensuring global security. Solid democracies and sound economies cannot grow in unsafe surroundings. We have long worked in partnership with friendly nations to protect ourselves against traditional security threats from hostile governments. But in today's world, traditional concepts of threats to the security of our citizens need to be updated and extended to include the new transnational dangers-- environmental degradation among them.
Environmental Threats Are Everyone's Concern
Environmental threats respect no border. They threaten human lives and violate the territorial integrity of states from both within and without. Chernobyl--a classic example of the ills of the stagnant Brezhnev era-- showed how lives can be needlessly endangered when governments fail to act quickly and responsibly to protect their own citizens and the people of neighboring countries. Not surprisingly, the drug cartels that threaten the health of the world community also damage the environment. As I pointed out at the UN Special Session on Narcotics last week, traffickers in the Andes are destroying vast tracts of forest for their drug labs and are dumping millions of gallons of precursor chemicals into rivers. Forty years ago, we and our NATO partners pledged to "safeguard the common heritage and civilization" of Europe against our common enemies. As the President pointed out, Europe's environment is the common heritage of all Europeans, and we all must work to protect it. As we have seen, defending Europe's environment from the threat of pollution is just another way for the West to help the peoples of the East realize their dream of a Europe whole and free. Our fourth objective is enhancing effective international cooperation that addresses our common interests. As we have seen, many of today's problems--environmental problems especially-- have worldwide consequences. They demand global solutions. All nations share responsibility for the protection of the international community. No nation alone, however great, can dictate fully the course of human events nor fully protect its natural resources. And no nation, however small, is without the power to act for the health of the global community. All countries must act responsibly and work together. I am glad to say that more than ever before, nations all over the world are working together on global environmental problems. Let me give you two examples. One is global climate change. Just a few weeks ago, the President addressed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. He was the first head of state to speak before the panel. And his presence demonstrated the seriousness with which our government regards this question as well as our dedication to finding appropriate scientific, economic, and environmental solutions. The President reiterated our policy toward climate change. We call it the "no regrets" policy, and we encourage other nations to adopt a similar approach. Just what do we mean by "no regrets"? We mean that while we are pursuing the serious scientific research that is critical to any responsible approach, we're also hedging our bets in an economically sound way. We mean that the United States is making a major financial commitment to analyze these scientific issues, increasing our funding for the US Global Change Research Program to over $1 billion. And we mean that we are prepared to take actions that are fully justified in their own right and which have the added advantage of coping with greenhouse gases. They're precisely the policies we will never have cause to regret. Specifically: -- We are committed to phasing out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by the year 2000 to protect the ozone layer. CFCs also contribute significantly to the "greenhouse" effect. -- Next, the President has launched a major reforestation initiative called "America the Beautiful." Under this multiyear program, our citizens will plant 1 billion trees each year in partnership with the government and business. The trees will provide habitats for wildlife, stem soil erosion, provide recreational facilities, offer employment, and generate forest products. At the same time, the trees will help absorb carbon dioxide, a major "greenhouse" gas. -- Finally, we are dedicated to a program of energy conservation and energy efficiency. This contributes to efficient use of scarce energy supplies, reduces our dependence on foreign energy sources, and saves us all money --citizens, government, and industry alike. Moreover, decreasing the use of the fossil fuels will reduce "green-house" gas emissions. If the results of international scientific research demonstrate that climatic conditions will not change in a significant way, we will have "no regrets" for these actions because they provided other benefits. If, on the other hand, the findings of our research turn out to be more troublesome, we will have taken prudent steps toward solving the problem in a cost-effective way. We urge other nations to join us in our "no regrets" efforts. A final example of global cooperation involves a denizen of the animal family--a party animal. Some might say he is a partisan creature, but he has bipartisan virtues. Sadly, he is listed among the severely endangered species. Even the Democrats among us agree that if we let our old friend the elephant pass from the earth, we will all be diminished. Therefore, last summer the United States led the way in banning the international trade in ivory. Now, a global effort is underway. Most other nations have joined us. And although some trading in ivory continues, I believe we can all work together to develop an enforcement system that saves the African elephant. The environmental efforts that I have described here today are illustrative of the many ways the Bush Administration is acting to protect the environment nationally and internationally. This morning, I have not even begun to touch upon our no-net-loss of wetlands policy, our opening of formal discussions with Canada on acid rain, or our driftnet resolution that was adopted unanimously by the United Nations. Nor have I touched upon another major environmental initiative of this Administration: crafting a revised Clean Air Act with incentives for our private sector to find creative, market-driven solutions to enhance air quality. And I am very hopeful that we will soon be able to sign the Basel convention, which controls exports of hazardous wastes. The United States is doing all of these things because it serves our national interest to do them. We are doing them because they are fundamentally the right thing to do. The great early pioneers of American conservation recognized these truths, and they found effective ways to act upon them. Their views didn't always prevail with the officials of their era, and they certainly didn't always agree with one another. Controversies that raged around the Governor's Conference back in 1908 continue down to this day. Indeed, environmental issues have never been simple; they never will be. Environmental problems are complex and sometimes slow to develop. And sometimes, we are even slower to recognize them. Yet despite the intense debates, despite all the uncertainties, despite the sheer complexities involved, there remains before us, as before all peoples, the unquestioned responsibility to act. Emerson, the 19th century American essayist and poet, put it this way: "We do not inherit the Earth from our ancestors, we borrow it from our children." This is a sacred debt that must be honored. The splendor of nature enfolds and unites all of humankind. Now, together, the earth's peoples must work, so that this precious web of life shall embrace, in beauty and in peace, all the generations to come. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

The New Russian Revolution: Toward Democracy in the Soviet Union

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks before the International Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet, Moscow Date: Feb 10, 19902/10/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia Country: USSR (former) Subject: Democratization Members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen: It is a high honor for me and my country to have this opportunity to be with you today. I come before you as a representative of the United States of America. But I also come before you as a witness--a witness testifying on history's behalf. Testifying to you as a witness to a revolution--a revolution among your peoples, a revolution in relations between nations, and a revolution in human consciousness. As President Bush and I have said over and over: We wish you success in your revolution of perestroika, glasnost, and, above all, democratization. For what we are witnessing in this land, and in the lands of central and Eastern Europe, is a transformation of man's understanding of man. Before perestroika and the people-power revolutions of 1989, the center ruled ruthlessly and sometimes irrationally, ever fearful that the individual would assert his spirit, ever fearful that reason and the truth would triumph over dogmatism and the lie. Driven by a profound sense of insecurity, the center egotistically reserved to itself every conceivable decision; in effect, stealing away the peoples' choice. Eventually, this concentration of power impoverished these lands as the center grew more and more bloated and the people became more and more lean. In this world turned upside down, in this world of darkness at noon, if you will, words lost their honest meaning. Indeed, 54 years ago, the new Soviet constitution made this body the supreme governmental authority in the land. But while in word the Supreme Soviet governed the people, we all now sadly know that, indeed, they were ruled by someone else.
A New Soviet Union
But today, things are different. We see words fulfilled. Today, we see reason's return. Today, I come before the Founding Fathers of a new Soviet Union--a new Soviet Union that you are building. This unprecedented opportunity to appear here today symbolizes what I hope will become an enduring new era, not only in Soviet politics but also in Soviet-American relations. As you--the elected representatives of the Soviet people--assert the peoples' power and make the choices that ultimately belong to them, universal, democratic values are taking root here. And the rooting of these values in institutions like this one is securing your nation against the insecurities of the past in ways that no single leader, however well-intentioned, can. As I quoted my friend Foreign Minister Shevardnadze when I spoke in Prague on Tuesday: "Only an advanced democracy can give guarantees against the abuse of power and can secure a nation against repression." Strengthening the power of the Supreme Soviet can be one step forward that advances democracy. It is an essential step, because a working legislature embodies the basic values of democracy: sanctity of the individual; respect for those with different beliefs; the supremacy of the rule of law as reason's triumph over arbitrary rule in political life; and the right of the people to determine their fate through their freely elected representatives. The free exchange of ideas in an open, public legislated debate tempers political passions and encourages the solution of society's problems through dialogue, not through force. In this way, and through its critical oversight functions, a legislature holds the government accountable to the people. In my country, that is precisely what the Congress does. It holds me accountable to the American people. Repeatedly--far too often for anyone but a mathematician to calculate--I am requested to appear before the committees of the House and Senate. Repeatedly, I am questioned on everything from our behavior toward this great nation to the activities of a clerk in a small, remote consulate somewhere in the world. Repeatedly, I travel to Capitol Hill to fulfill my obligation to the people of the United States of America.
Perestroika
This obligation, in my view, firmly underpins our policy toward the Soviet Union. As I noted, President Bush and I have said on several occasions we very much want perestroika to succeed. In part, we wish perestroika well because perestroika and the "new thinking" promise Soviet foreign and defense policies that are fundamentally less threatening to the American people than the hostile Stalinist approaches of the past. This is, of course, in the interest of the American people. But perestroika, and especially glasnost and democratization, are also creating Soviet internal policies that allow the Soviet people the freedom they deserve. In just 5 short years, your peoples are enjoying freedom and liberty in a way that--at least to a foreign observer--seems unparalleled in Soviet history. Consequently, the essence of American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union is a search for points of mutual advantage that will create enduring improvements in our mutual relations. We can transform the Soviet-American relationships by moving away from confrontation and through dialogue to cooperation, as Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has phrased it. Let me be clear: Differences and conflicts will remain. But the hostility of the past can be replaced by understanding and even empathy. And even when we disagree, every dispute need not be turned into a crisis and every crisis need not raise the specter of war. In the cold war, every crisis was seen as a very, very dangerous threat. In tomorrow's peace, let us remember that each crisis can be an opportunity--an opportunity to build a better world. Let me now, if I might, discuss the areas where we believe we can most productively find these points of mutual advantage between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Points of Mutual Advantage
First, in Europe, we would like to work with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the continent to end the unnatural division of Europe, to create a Europe which is both whole and free. In the revolutions of 1989, President Gorbachev's far-sighted policy of noninterference is an important influence in a very, very turbulent situation. By encouraging peaceful reconciliation in the region, President Gorbachev's actions have played a vital role in supporting creation of legitimate governments. These legitimate governments happen to be the key to stability and the key to peace. As I said in Prague, these are peaceful, democratic revolutions. We should all work together to make sure that they remain so. One way that this committee of the Supreme Soviet can help, in our opinion, is to take up our proposal to send Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) observer delegations to the elections in central and Eastern Europe this spring. Observer delegations can ensure that the elections are free, that they are fair, and that the elected governments are legitimate in the most basic sense of that word. Second, in regional conflicts, our diplomacy aims for political and not military settlements to the various disputes that continue to threaten global stability. We are making progress together on some disputes; for example, in southern Africa and Southeast Asia. But we remain especially disturbed by the military shipments that your government continues to send to those seeking military solutions to conflicts in regions that the United States considers vital to us. Quite frankly, the American people and their congressional representatives have trouble understanding how your government can afford to send billions of rubles of assistance to countries like Cuba and Nicaragua, just so they can support the subversion of our democratically elected neighbors. This is even less comprehensible when it happens at a time when your people clearly need these scarce resources put to good use at home. One of the functions that our Congress exercises most carefully is the review of our foreign aid budget, especially to critical regions. And if you'll permit me to say so, I think it would be good if you did the same with regard to military assistance to Central America. Third, in arms control, we can make solid progress to control not only nuclear arms but conventional and chemical weapons as well. Much of my time in Moscow this week has been devoted to negotiations on the strategic arms reduction treaty, a treaty whose basic provisions we hope to have agreed by the time our Presidents next meet in June of this year. We also can find mutual advantage in a conventional forces agreement that will ensure a balance of forces in Europe and that will codify a more stable and predictable strategic relationship there. On chemical weapons, President Bush has presented a practical proposal that provides the best way for banning the horrific weapons from the face of the earth. I am gratified that today the United States and the Soviet Union have issued a joint announcement embracing the key elements of the President's initiative. We also want to cooperate with your government more effectively on the question of missile proliferation to Third World countries. Over the longer term, security will be enhanced when our military budgets are open to all. In Prague, I suggested that we look into ways in CSCE to open up the military budgets of all 35 CSCE member states. Legislative committees like this one have a vital role to play, ensuring that the people's money is wisely spent. Fourth, we may have something to offer you in your attempts to build a state which is based on the rule of law. I do not claim in any way that American democracy is perfect. It is the inherent nature of a democracy that it must always strive to be better. But we do have a great deal of experience to share on some issues, especially translating the protection of individual rights into legal codes and institutionalizing the operation of pluralist political institutions. In our view, the party plenum's repudiation of special political or legal means to preserve the party's monopoly on power was a tremendous step toward democracy in the Soviet Union. Fifth, we've been exploring with your experts how we can provide technical cooperation in transforming your command- administrative system into one with certain characteristics of a market-based economy. Continuing exchanges will be helpful, but some legal changes need to be made for cooperation to flourish. We also need to expand and accelerate our cooperation in combating environmental problems that threaten the welfare of all of us. In these five areas then, I think we can find points of mutual advantage for both the Soviet and the American people. I cannot promise and, of course, no one can promise that our search for cooperation will always be rewarded. But I can say this; the American people and the people of the Soviet Union have great respect for each other's achievements. Each of us is heir to great historical and cultural traditions. Yet for more than 40 years, we have waged a cold war against each other. Now is the time, if I might suggest it, to put the legacy of struggle behind us. Today, we face a different struggle, and we face it in a fast changing world. Together, we must try to understand each other. Together, we must try to agree where possible and to work together based on that agreement. And together we must search for opportunities to expand our cooperation. Now is the time for us to build a new legacy. Now it is time to move beyond the cold war. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

Democracy and American Diplomacy

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address before the World Affairs Council, Dallas, Texas Date: Mar 30, 19903/30/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: North America, Central America, E/C Europe Country: United States Subject: Democratization [TEXT] It is a privilege and an honor to address the World Affairs Council in Dallas. This group is part of many such councils established throughout the United States with a great purpose: to inform and to debate. In our rapidly changing world, that can be a tall order. Yet democracy here and elsewhere ultimately depends upon an informed citizenry, citizens able to ponder and then help set the course of international affairs. Today, I would like to talk about our world, how we understand it, and what we are doing to promote our ideals and our interests. When the President took office a little over a year ago, he talked about a new breeze blowing for freedom. That breeze has become a gale-force wind. Around the world, the old dictatorships of left and right have been swept away, and the people have been heard. Their wants are basic: freedom to think, freedom to speak, freedom to worship, freedom to work. And all of their freedoms are bound up in the call for democracy--the freedom to choose one's own government. We all have been surprised at how quickly the long-cherished democratic ideal has been translated into the reality of free and fair elections. Ever since World War II, democratic values have been shadowed by the threat of totalitarian aggression. Now, as the threat is reduced and the shadow recedes, those values are bright and shining and out in the open. Already a great, new debate--actually a great, old debate-- has broken out, an argument as old as our republic. Now that the adversaries of democracy are weaker, some say we should retire, mission accomplished, to tend to our problems at home. I am not among them. In the new world struggling to be born, like the old world now rapidly passing away, there is no substitute for American leadership. Let me put it this way: Beyond containment lies democracy. The time of sweeping away the old dictators is passing fast; the time of building up the new democracies has arrived. That is why President Bush has defined our new mission to be the promotion and consolidation of democracy. It is a task that fulfills both American ideals and American interests. I would like now to make five observations about both democracy and a democratic foreign policy.
The Meaning of Democracy
The first is that democracy means individual rights and individual responsibilities. With all the talk about changing systems, architectures, processes, and structures, it would be easy to overlook the individual. But the essence of democracy is to treat the individual's rights and responsibilities as two sides of the same coin of freedom. Just as each human being has ideal aspirations, he or she also has limits and imperfections. So the process of democracy, as President Havel of Czechoslovakia recently pointed out, is an endless journey in pursuit of our ideals--a journey spurred on by the reality that life is not always as just as we might want it to be. In ancient times, searching for a perfect order, the philosopher Plato wanted rule by the elite he called Guardians, a group specially trained in wisdom who could decide public issues and guard public morality according to strict ideals. Democracy has a place for wisdom and a place for ideals, but that place is in the hearts and minds and moral character of the ordinary people. We-- all of us--are the "Guardians" of democracy. "Trust the people" is the motto of democracy, and "we the people" live by that motto. Democracy is the aristocracy of individual excellence, and individual rights remain the basis of our approach to would-be democracies.
Democracy Brings Legitimacy
My second observation about democracy is that it offers a unique political legitimacy. Democracy's reliance upon the individual is reciprocated by the individual's consent to the rule of democratic government. That government is, therefore, considered legitimate in the most basic political sense--both lawful and proper. Unlike many other forms of government, democracy does not rely on a one-time grant of consent. Consent is reaffirmed through regular, fair, and free elections--the "ticket" for the democratic journey. A democratic society also is characterized by the rule of law and by tolerance of diversity, a tolerance that protects individual rights from abuse, whether from an arbitrary minority or a tyrannical majority. Majority rule must uphold minority rights. There is another aspect to democracy of which we should be aware: its capacity for self-correction. We know that all too often the ideal of democracy is not found in daily reality. Often in our own country's history, the practice of public life has been at sharp variance with our standards. Yet the reality is that in a democracy, the road to progress is never permanently closed. There is a self-renewal, a self-corrective element in the democratic process which allows us to overcome blunders and correct the course. Because democracy enjoys such renewable legitimacy, it can operate not only to ensure domestic progress but also to encourage international harmony. Free peoples cherishing democratic values are unlikely to go to war with one another.
The Sides of Democracy
My third observation is that democracy does not stand alone. Geometry teaches us that the triangle is the most solid configuration. The political geometry of successful democracy should teach us that a free society must be upheld by economic progress and basic security. War and poverty are the great opponents of democratic rules, democratic tolerance, and individual rights. Many of the recent democratic revolutions in Europe began when people understood at last that economic progress depended on freedom in the workplace and freedom to own property--and that such freedoms in turn depended upon a government responsive to the people. Dogmas, attempting to eliminate the entrepreneurial spirit while commanding the production of wealth, produced neither bread nor freedom. We must, therefore, build up the economic and security aspects of the new democracies even as the political base is put into place. A people with hope for a better life, at peace with themselves and their neighbors, is a people for whom democracy will be not just a temporary experiment but a permanent course. A strategy of simply applauding elections and then hoping for the best ignores the painful lessons of the past. Only a strategy that buttresses democracy with economic reforms and greater international security can give us the strength for the tough transitions that will transform the revolutions of 1989 into the democracies of the 1990s.
Foreign Policy and Democratic Values
My fourth observation is that American foreign policy abroad must reflect democratic values. This may seem all too obvious. Yet, there are those who would have America, in the name of its ideals, isolate itself from a world too often hostile to democracy. And there are others who argue for a realpolitik that has a place only for economic or military or political interests and leaves our values at home. We can recognize in this dualism a little bit of ourselves. How often do we strive for the ideal only to fall short? How frequently do we conclude after some self-serving action that maybe it was not entirely the right thing to do? As individuals, we succeed when we use each side of our nature to help the other, when we do things in this world not for selfish reasons or because we are satisfied with the status quo but in order to change it, guided by our ideals. In my view, we must adopt the same approach to our foreign policy. America's ideals are the conscience of our actions. Our power is the instrument to turn those ideals into reality. Our foreign policy, our understanding of other nations, is the blueprint for the job. As we enter a new era of democracy, the old arguments of idealism vs. realism must be replaced by idealism plus realism. If we do not understand this, then we shall risk the loss of enduring public support for our policies. I think history illustrates amply that the American people will not support for long a policy that violates their sense of humane values, no matter how it is justified as being in the national interest. I am equally convinced that Americans will reject a policy based primarily on moral exhortation which ignores our power to act. As we applaud the new trends toward democracy, we feel good. But those trends are opportunities and challenges, not permanent facts. We have to do more than feel good; we must do good.
Democracy in Diplomacy
My fifth observation is that a policy of democracy is a "force multiplier," a potent instrument for rallying international action. A policy that draws upon our domestic values and enjoys the support of the American people automatically makes our influence more effective. But a policy centered on democracy is also a "force multiplier" in that we can use it to engage our friends and allies behind a mutual purpose. It can give hope to those peoples still suffering under dictatorships. It would seem to be common sense for the United States to lead alliances of free market democracies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas in support of democracy and economic liberty. We can use our common values to pool our strength, advancing everyone's interests in a free and peaceful world. That is what we have tried to do in organizing assistance to the countries of central and Eastern Europe. There and also in Central America, we have urged our friends and allies to calibrate their actions along a democratic standard, not just their immediate geopolitical interests narrowly understood. We have done so because we believe that democracy and the national interests of the democracies reinforce each other. Still, the fact is that some people don't see it that way. Some people prefer a time when the United States had to do it all alone. Others seem to believe that if we are not the biggest contributors, if we do not micromanage every aid program, then somehow America is no longer a leader. Obviously, that is not our view. Let me tell you why. The 1940s were a great time for American leadership. We had unsurpassed resources and a world in ruins, and we rose to the challenge. We helped to put our allies on their feet and to turn our former adversaries into friends. Now, thanks to these successful policies, carried out by administrations of both parties, we have lots of help in dealing with the world's problems. To work with our allies is not a sign of American weakness; it is a proof of our strength. And that strength should be guided by a wisdom attuned to our times, just as the Americans of 45 years ago used both brain and brawn to deal with very different circumstances. We can lead today even more effectively than we did then because democracy is on the march.
Central America
These observations about democracy and our foreign policy are not speculative. They are rather guide-posts for practice, and they have played a major part both in our thinking and in some of our recent foreign policy achievements. I would cite as the first example recent events in Central America. When the President took office, US policy toward that important region--our own neighborhood--was in trouble. It was the most divisive issue we faced. Congress and the executive branch had failed to reach any lasting agreement on how to approach the problem, or for that matter, even how to define it. The American people were divided, too-- an almost certain recipe for failure. The only way out of this tangle was to return to American principles. Early last year, the President decided to define democracy as the regional objective and elections as the means to achieve that result. In each case, this turned the focus where it belonged. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas' conduct of their society-- an outpost of oppression in a region of democracies--became the central issue, not the Nicaraguan Resistance. In Panama, Gen. [Manuel] Noriega's brutal rejection of a free election verdict stripped him of his claim to legitimate rule and began the difficult trek toward Panamanian democracy. Another free election in El Salvador, conducted despite violence, gave President [Alfredo] Cristiani the popular mandate to pursue a negotiated settlement to the war and a chance to demonstrate a serious approach to human rights. An emphasis on democracy enabled us to cut the Gordian knot that prevented bipartisanship. On March 24, 1989, a bipartisan accord was signed at the White House, enabling Republicans and Democrats to join around a common purpose. Outside of Washington, the American people could be rallied in support. The United States was heard at last to be speaking with one voice. Directly as a result, the Congress voted humanitarian aid for the Resistance through February 28, 1990. We then took the bipartisan emphasis on democracy and approached the Central American countries. The Esquipulas agreement expressed their wish for peace, democracy, and the end of support for bloody revolutions in other countries. What was lacking was an effective mechanism to turn the wish into reality. Then, at Tesoro Beach, the Central American presidents agreed on a joint plan to be developed within 90 days to demobilize the Resistance, and it was widely interpreted as a defeat for the United States. But the other side of the joint plan was a requirement that the Sandinista government hold internationally supervised elections a year earlier than scheduled--February 25, 1990. This provision helped us to convince our European allies that they should condition their economic aid to Nicaragua on the holding of free and fair elections. They did. In April 1989, a donors' conference for Nicaragua was sponsored by Sweden. President [Daniel] Ortega later admitted that he received only a small fraction of what he had hoped to get before elections. Finally, we were able to use all of these developments together to take a more effective approach to the Soviet Union. We had the "force multiplier" of democracy to present the Soviets with a growing international consensus on elections. We could and did argue that if Moscow's aid were seen to be sabotaging legitimate governments--whether a freely elected democracy in El Salvador or the elections process in Nicaragua --there would be strong repercussions on overall US-Soviet relations. And we were able to contrast the Soviet feeding of conflict with their evident desire for a more cooperative relationship in dealing with regional problems. As a result, even before the elections, Moscow publicly agreed to respect both the electoral process and its outcome. We were prepared to make sure that the elections were as clean--as free and fair--as possible. Congress supported the President's request for money to support election activities, which enabled us to flood Nicaragua with international observers. The National Endowment for Democracy also contributed funds shared by the Nicaraguan parties. We considered that essential because it enabled the democratic opposition, UNO [Unified Nicaraguan Opposition], to compete on at least the minimal level against a Sandinista party utilizing the resources of the entire state. Finally, we protested vigorously and pointed out clearly every instance of unfair and arbitrary procedure. Democracy, we felt, was a fast- growing plant if only the sunshine of publicity could expose those who would kill it at the root. The pressure was on the Sandinistas to play it straight. I recite all of these facts because I believe they set a context, a climate that was most conducive to democracy in Nicaragua through the voting itself. The individual Nicaraguan--the individual upon whom democratic hopes depended--knew that he or she was not alone. Voting in a free and fair election was not a desperate, lonely act but a step toward a better future. Now that a democratic government has been elected in Nicaragua, we know that Nicaragua's recovery from years of civil war and the blight of Marxist economics will be costly and painful. There and in Panama, we must help to turn the new hopes into the reality of progress. That is why the President has proposed a new $800 million fund for democracy--our part of a multilateral effort to put our neighbors back on their feet. This is not charity. It is an investment in the democratic values we share with our neighbors. For we have a broad vista--stretching from Guatemala to Panama-- of new possibilities for democratization, demilitarization, and development which offers a bright future for all the peoples of the region. With our help and the help of other democracies, it can and will be done.
Central and Eastern Europe
My second example of how a democratic foreign policy works concerns central and Eastern Europe. Freed of fear and fiercely determined to recover their dignity and their hopes, the long- suffering peoples of those lands behind the Iron Curtain finally pulled it down. Last December, not long after the Berlin Wall was breached, I visited that divided city. I took a good look through a newly chiseled hole in that ugly wall, and what I saw was a great city striving to be reborn. And beyond it, old nations were alive with new hope. All of that was captured by the simple word "democracy." While in Prague a month ago, I talked about the consolidation of democracy throughout the region. It was important for the peoples of central and Eastern Europe to know that the challenges they faced were not theirs alone. We, too, have a challenge. We are admired for our democratic values and for the success of our economic system. People look to us for help--not charity--but the help that allows self-help. Training, advice, and sharing our experience counts for more than money. We must be prepared to give it. Our program of cooperation and assistance concentrates on three areas, not all of them economic. First, we will press the concept of free and regular elections. The President has proposed that this be adopted as a program by the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). We have also offered and are sending election observers as each Central and Eastern European country takes its first democratic steps. The objective here is to make democracy the legitimizing principle for all of Europe. Second, we are working with our allies and the Soviet Union to reduce the arms and the armies facing each other in Europe. Third, we are extending economic support for the painful transition to free market systems. This will be a very difficult task in societies just now beginning to dismantle Marxist-Leninist economic systems and often lacking the basics of a free market. We believe, however, that the United States, our allies in Europe and Japan, and international economic institutions can work together successfully to help these countries achieve the progress so long denied them. The purpose of all of these efforts should be to provide a healthy environment for the real motivator of long-lasting growth--vigorous private sector investment and development. We are tying our assistance to our values and showing how our values can be of assistance. Our support is to be measured by a single test: whether it advances democracy and economic liberty. I would add here a word about our policy of democracy and its impact on the Soviet Union. We have an interest in perestroika that goes beyond geopolitics. If perestroika results in a more democratic and open Soviet society, with individual rights and economic progress, the impact on Soviet foreign policy for the long run will be highly beneficial. Democracy in the Soviet Union is, in my view, the best guarantee of a constructive Soviet approach to international problems.
Breaking New Ground
The third and final case I would cite of democracy in action I call "breaking new ground." It has been my argument throughout this speech that democracy serves both American ideals and American interests. Furthermore, democracy is a practical tool of diplomacy, not the only tool, but a particularly valuable one with which to rally support both here and abroad for our foreign policy. Democracy speaks to universal aspirations--to use those famous old American words, "regardless of race, creed, or color." I reject and I hope America always rejects the view that democracy is for certain societies but has no place in Africa or Asia or South America, or even in the Middle East. I say instead, remember the motto, "trust the people." Because we trust the people, not only here or in Europe or in central America but everywhere, we are using democracy and elections as valuable tools in helping to end regional conflicts and to bring about national reconciliation. Let me cite briefly a few examples. -- In Namibia, whose independence celebrations I just attended, free and fair elections were a key element in the settlement that freed Africa's last colony, ended a civil war, and launched a new government with a democratic constitution. We believe that free and fair elections can play a similar role in promoting national reconciliation in Angola and South Africa. -- In the Arab-Israeli conflict, we see elections in the occupied territories as a catalyst to bring about a constructive Israeli-Palestinian dialogue that could lead to the peace both peoples so badly need. -- And in Cambodia, the five permanent members of the [UN] Security Council see a free and fair election as the best way to resolve at last the disputed government of that tortured land, giving the Cambodian people their long overdue chance to choose their own leaders. Let me conclude with this thought. When I studied classics in college, I found to my surprise that most of the ancient philosophers feared democracy. Those who study the 18th century arguments over our Constitution also will encounter this fear. It was a lingering suspicion that the individual would be corrupted, that the ordinary man or woman was simply was not up to the task of self- government. Our Founding Fathers overcame that fear and left to us a legacy of confidence in the citizen that constitutes our greatest political and moral strength. Our foreign policy has been at its best when it drew from that strength and made of our country a great force for good in the world. Now, after hard years of defending democratic values, our original confidence has been renewed. Ordinary people are truly the heroes of our time. Ordinary people broke through the [Berlin] Wall. Ordinary people turned out the dictators. Ordinary people voted for democracy in Central America. As once our Founding Fathers drew upon confidence in the citizens to build a new democratic society, so now our foreign policy must build upon that same confidence to build a newly democratic international society. That is our opportunity and our challenge. With the help of every American, I am sure we will meet it. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

Imperatives of Economic Reform: Changes in Soviet and East European Economies

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Prepared statement before the House Ways and Means Committee, Washington, DC Date: Apr 18, 19904/18/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Eurasia, E/C Europe Country: USSR (former) Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] It is a pleasure to appear before you to discuss the progress of economic reform in the Soviet Union and in the emerging democracies of central and Eastern Europe. It is also a pleasure to share with you our thoughts on the ways in which the various reform efforts will affect our bilateral economic relations with each of these countries. Before reviewing the situation in detail, I'd like to make three brief observations. First, as virtually all of the reformers have made clear, continued progress in reform will depend above all on the internal choices each government and its people make. Western policies and aid can marginally influence the prospects for reform, but the real work must be done within the countries themselves. Second, having said that, there remains much we in the West can do. These economies have so much of a negative legacy to overcome that our help can make a difference. And the potential benefits for them--and for us--are great. We in the United States need to remain engaged, to help these countries make the transition to market-oriented economies, and to ensure that these countries are integrated into, not excluded from, the broader Atlantic community of nations. Third, we need to be creative in how we define "help," and we need to be flexible in how we apply it. Few of these countries are interested in outright grants or aid. Instead, most are seeking what we call technical economic cooperation--nuts and bolts help, if you will, about the transition from central planning to markets. With these three points in mind, I'd like to turn now to discuss the state of reform in each of these countries, beginning with the Soviet Union.
SOVIET UNION
Since 1985, the Soviet Union has pursued the internal reform policies of perestroika, glasnost, and democratization. Perestroika, glasnost, and democratization--broadly understood under the heading of perestroika--are a brew of political, economic, and legal measures. As President Gorbachev has made clear, transforming the Soviet economy requires fundamental change in the political and legal landscapes--a true "revolution." The changes Gorbachev has made in the political and legal structures have sought: --A presidency with wide-ranging powers; --A Supreme Soviet that would enact laws and decrees; --A Politburo and Central Committee that would agree to radical reform; --A bureaucracy that would implement, not obstruct, reforms; and --A general public that would embrace and sustain necessary changes. Gorbachev and his allies have had to formulate and legitimize a new Soviet market system--now called a "planned market." This requires not just a technically sound program but overhauling the orientation of millions of Soviet citizens. It involves a reconsideration of Soviet doctrine in several sensitive areas. Other members of the leadership are bound to resist this assault on socialist theory and practice. We have seen signs that they could rally some support against the required renegotiation of the Soviet "social contract": The implicit agreement whereby the Soviet people have received extraordinary security and distributive equality (except for the privileged and the corrupt, a growing group) has been at the price of political dictatorship, the absence of civil liberties, few economic incentives, and limited economic opportunity. Perestroika also forces new thinking about the tradeoff between efficiency and equality. This raises the question of the roles of property and incentives. Economic incentive is the prime motivation for productivity, and private property is the key to economic incentive. The Soviets also need to reconsider the role of planners because the information explosion of the last 20 years has demonstrated that a centrally planned economy cannot compete. As we examine the Soviet reforms, we must keep in mind the vast differences separating Soviet thinking on economic questions from our own. For instance, in the Soviet command economy, output and allocation are set through quantity targets according to a central plan, not by market prices. Prices do not signal scarcity; they are an accounting tool. Rubles are not freely convertible into goods within the Soviet Union, much less outside. In short, central allocation decisions, not money and markets, still command resources. While the impetus to change may have been economic, it would be a mistake to analyze perestroika as simply an economic phenomenon. The course set by President Gorbachev involves changes throughout society. Much of it is experimental and ad hoc.
Previous Soviet Reform Efforts
Perestroika is not the first effort to reform the Soviet command and control economy. Prior attempts included the "new lands" policy in the 1950s, designed to spark agricultural production; the Lieberman reforms in the 1960s, a forerunner of current efforts to increase enterprise autonomy; and Brezhnev's increased centralization and bureaucratization in the 1970s, intended to promote management efficiency by increasing cross-sector coordination. All these efforts simply tinkered with the basic Stalinist model, and all failed. The causes of these failures may help us to understand the conditions necessary for the success of perestroika. These conditions include [these conditions are drawn from Anders Aslund's book, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (1989)]: --Top-level political support; --Clear recognition of the need for economic changes; --An openness that permits the rethinking of ideology and economic theory so as to justify change; --A conducive international environment; --Consistency in the design and implementation of reforms; and --An ability to counter the power of the anti-reform bureaucracy. As the reformers are taking on Russian as well as Soviet traditions, even these conditions may not totally suffice. Openness may bring conflict as well as progress. The first four conditions for a successful reform effort are probably present now. But the fifth and sixth pose real challenges for President Gorbachev. At this point, there are a variety of perils facing perestroika. They include a poorly designed and non- comprehensive program, reflecting compromises among the leadership; poor implementation due to bureaucratic opposition; public opposition due to the loss of benefits from the old system; and the failure to win a constituency for the reform, due to uncertainty about its staying power and legal protections. Given the magnitude of the challenge, perestroika has been not one reform program but an amalgam of many. It is an ongoing experiment ever ready to face new challenges, at times in unexpected ways. Yet it has also reflected compromises made necessary by the Soviet system of collective leadership. These compromises and contradictions have created ambiguities, which in turn have opened opportunities for bureaucratic "reinterpretations" and obstructions. It remains to be seen whether the new powers Gorbachev has assumed in the "executive presidency" will overcome these obstacles.
The Reasons for Perestroika
Perestroika arose in response to problems predating Gorbachev. Command methods swiftly industrialized the Soviet economy, if at great cost. Yet by the early 1980s, the Soviet leadership understood that some kind of economic reform was necessary. Yuri Andropov, in his few months as General Secretary of the Communist Party, outlined measures that became Gorbachev's starting point. I believe a combination of four factors convinced Andropov and the other Soviet leaders of the need for reform. The first was the sharp drop in economic growth. Growth rates fell from 5% in the late 1960s to 1.8% in the early 1980s (growth may have even been lower, or stagnant). The period of extensive Soviet economic growth, based on expanding inputs, was over. Yet the Soviet economy could not switch to intensive growth, relying on productivity gains. In part, this reflected Soviet backwardness in developing and employing technology. A second argument for reform was the declining position of the Soviet Union in the world economy. Instead of catching up with and passing the United States, as Khrushchev had boasted, the Soviets were falling further behind-- behind not just the West but the newly industrializing economies also. China, too, was instituting reforms that would leave the Soviet Union behind if it did not change. The Soviet Union's international trading position was hurt. Even in trade with Eastern Europe, the Soviets were relying more on exports of raw materials. (The fall of energy prices by the mid- 1980s exacerbated the situation by cutting into hard currency earnings.) The Soviets were looking at the possibility of being overtaken economically by the "Asian tigers" and other Third World nations. The military impact of Soviet economic failure was a third reason for reform. The US military buildup could only be offset by siphoning off an even greater share of civilian resources. The estimates of the Soviet military's share of GNP vary, from 16% to 18%, or even higher. (This compares with about 5% in the United States.) The growth of Soviet military spending was clearly damaging the economy's ability to produce sophisticated military technology. As former Soviet Chief of Staff Ogarkov stated, technological backwardness would eventually lower military capability as the Soviet economy would not cope with the Western "revolution in military affairs." The fourth factor was the emergence of new leadership in the Soviet Union--a new generation. Less rooted in the old system, less dogmatic, some were readier to experiment with new answers. The new leadership understood that the Soviet economic engine required more than minor adjustments. But it was far from agreed on what new reforms were necessary.
Perestroika as Reconstruction
Following Andropov's lead, Gorbachev initially emphasized "uskoreniye"--"acceleration" of growth through more intensive use of inputs, rather than just massing additional resources. The elements of this program included: --Higher growth targets; --A traditional focus on more investment in equipment, modernization, and machine tools; --Better quality by creating a new quality-control bureaucracy (gospriyemka); --A worker discipline effort, including the anti-alcohol campaign; and --New decrees on wages and social benefits to cope with wage leveling and the lost link between performance and income. The results of this program were unacceptable; growth continued to stagnate. Planning based on higher but unmet targets exacerbated imbalances. Extra investment did not improve efficiency because there were no market signals (prices and profits) to guide the allocation of capital. The bureaucracy rejected quality control because it hurt the ability to meet plan targets, which in turn would reduce bonuses. While it had short-term positive efforts, the anti-alcohol campaign pushed alcohol production outside the legal system, which led to a major loss of state income from the tax on alcohol, increasing the budget deficit. The wage and benefit rules also turned out to be ambiguous because enterprises still focused on quantity rather than quality or the efficiency of production. If there was any benefit from the reform, it was the recognition by the Soviet leadership that more drastic action was necessary. While not agreeing on the exact action, they knew they could not sit still.
Broader Based, Piecemeal Reforms
By 1987, Gorbachev was ready to move beyond the Andropovian approach to reform. The result was the introduction of major reform measures--specifically the Basic Provisions for Fundamental Perestroika of Economic Management and the Law on State Enterprises--at the June 1987 Central Committee Plenum. These measures addressed a number of sectors and issues of economic organization. While broad-based, these changes were neither comprehensive nor integrated with one another. While designed to foster more enterprise independence, the planners did not really let go. The absence of competition and market prices meant that decentralized authority led to higher wages, not improved efficiency and quality. Enterprise self-financing was intended to spur firms to earn their own resources, so that subsidies could be reduced. Without prices reflecting market forces, the profits (or losses) of the firms were hardly dependent on their efficiency and competitiveness. Moreover, central planners, not firms, continued to control credit and other inputs. Instead of going bankrupt, unprofitable firms were still subsidized, which contributed to the growing budget deficit. Cooperatives were supposed to give a quick boost to sales and production by permitting groups of workers to enjoy the fruits of their labors, which could demonstrate to consumers that perestroika had a payoff. They could also be a first form of private ownership to demonstrate the rewards of hard work and ingenuity. Yet the compromises of the cooperative program produced a legal and business environment that almost seemed to be designed in order to thwart the cooperative movement. Planners still channeled most inputs to state firms, forcing co-ops to operate through illegal, higher priced "black" markets. This hurt the public legitimacy of co-ops. In the absence of real competition, many co-ops earned monopoly profits, further eroding public support. The government reacted to this by granting local authorities wide latitude in taxing co-ops, which in some parts of the Soviet Union has led to harsh taxes. In addition, the government forbade co-ops from operating in certain sectors (e.g., medicine, printing) that had proven popular and profitable. What's more, the very tenuousness of the co-ops' existence has led many to distribute profits instead of reinvesting them. Despite this, the cooperative sector has prospered. According to some Soviet estimates, co-ops now account for about 5% of national income and employ about 2.5% of the work force. But the future of co-ops remains uncertain. They remain a prime target of trade union complaints. Last year, the Supreme Soviet only narrowly defeated, 205 to 190, a proposal to close all trading cooperatives. Agriculture, which led the way in the Hungarian and Chinese reforms, also has proved a disappointment. Although a new idea of "contract leasing" (long-term leaseholds to create incentive for farmers) was announced, the potential leaseholders were harassed through high taxation, refusal to deliver inputs, and a lack of legal guarantees for leaseholders. Moreover, the farmers themselves didn't know how to run farms. Their experience was as day laborers, not small businessmen. Given the uncertainty of the new incentive system, many people were also wary of the risk of running a farm. The Law of Individual Labor Activity was a cautious first step toward building a private sector. Yet this half measure limited entrepreneurs to the service sector and kept prohibitions on hiring labor. It was also contradicted by the accompanying campaign against "unearned" income--which cracked down on the same small business the law on individual labor activity was supposed to encourage. In sum, the piecemeal reforms of 1987 proved inadequate. They did not activate unused reserves or substantially increase efficiency. Government spending increased, and revenue fell. The large deficit was financed through printing more rubles, which sent inflation climbing (perhaps as high as 10%, according to some estimates). People no longer trusted the value of the ruble, which led to a hoarding of goods that made shortages worse. The leadership recognized that perestroika must move even further.
Latest Efforts: Two Steps Forward and One Backward?
The next major move came in October 1989, when Deputy Prime Minister Abalkin proposed a two-stage "moderate radical reform" program designed first to stabilize the economy and then to introduce some of the structural changes needed for further reform. This plan represented a major theoretical advance over previous reform efforts. It recognized the importance of: -- The market, and particularly the pricing mechanism, for regulating the economy; -- Competition, including from imports, to promote efficiency and keep prices down; -- Ownership rights; and -- Institutional change and reform sequencing. Abalkin's plan, though, was more impressive in theory than in practice. Its endorsement of "ownership rights" did not specifically include "private property." The timing of price reform remained uncertain, and the stabilization program was too timid. Yet even the Abalkin plan was too advanced for the Soviet political environment. As the plan was under discussion, the Supreme Soviet sought to cope with consumer shortages through traditional administrative means like a price freeze and an extension of state orders (as opposed to market, allocation) to essential foods and consumer goods. When it came time to legislate the next stage of reform in December 1989, the Soviet leadership turned to Prime Minister Ryzhkov's tepid program. While retaining the construction of Abalkin's two-step approach, Prime Minister Ryzhkov's ideas for structural reform failed to advance the status quo. Specifically the Ryzhkov program: -- Called for the re-centralization of investment decisions; -- Advocated increased investment for agriculture, instead of reliance on leasing and incentives for production; -- Envisaged a slower pace on price reform, with new wholesale and agricultural prices delayed until 1991 and a failure to commit to a timeframe for new retail prices; and -- Emphasized that major enterprises would remain "within the sphere of direct state management" and expected only 20% of Soviet enterprises to have transferred to leasing by 1995. In sum, as recently as last December, the Soviet officials were proposing increased reliance on the command-planning model as a "step" toward (but in fact away from) a more market-oriented system. Not surprisingly, the Ryzhkov proposals did not turn the economy around. In the first two months of 1990, incomes rose 14%-15%, while production rose less than 2%. Efforts to raise fuel prices for enterprises were met with protests from official trade unions and were rescinded by the government. The result was yet a third economic reform program by mid-March, shortly after Gorbachev assumed the enhanced presidency. A Council of Minister decree outlined this reform program, which calls for the transition to a "planned-market" economy. The decree lists 28 laws and decrees to be prepared by May 10. Some items on the list are already in the works, including banking and tax reforms, anti-monopoly legislation, and amending the laws on state enterprises and cooperatives. Others are new, including laws on freedom of economic activity and the development of entrepreneurship, taxation in kind, indexation of incomes, and reform of price formation. While the scope of the new program could turn out to be impressive, we have little indication of the content of the laws and programs, or of what stage of the drafting process they are in. This program could represent a major advance over the Ryzhkov plan, but we shall have to see if it improves on Abalkin's October proposals. Indeed, recent statements by Abalkin himself, "reassuring" the Soviet public that the proposed changes will not be "radical," suggest that the new program could even fall short of the October 1989 version.
Lessons From Perestroika
Perestroika to date has been comprised of a grab-bag of economic reforms. Some are striking changes from Brezhnev's economic system. Unfortunately, not much has worked in terms of economic performance. The political changes, however, have been exceptional. Gorbachev has decided that he needs to change the political system to support economic reforms. We have witnessed the rise of a Supreme Soviet with real power and of an executive presidency. The lessons of early failures are clear. -- The old Brezhnev model was totally discredited. -- The Andropovian moral discipline fix was a bust. -- GDR [German Democratic Republic]-type streamlining efficiency didn't work. -- Piecemeal reforms of enterprises and industrial organization couldn't be successful as long as they operated in a system hostile to private initiative, competition, markets, and profits. -- Even the agricultural sector--the leading edge for the Hungarians and the PRC [People's Republic of China]--was impervious to reform. The positive lesson was there too. To succeed, reform must be economically and politically comprehensive. A comprehensive program might take a number of forms, each with different risks. There are three kinds of comprehensive strategies: (1) one- shot radical reform all at once, the "Big Bang" approach, perhaps after some basic groundwork is laid; (2) gradual changes, but sequenced carefully to enable reforms to take hold; or (3) major transformation by sector. Each strategy requires a shift from the ad hoc adjustment of the past. And this is a problem. It will be exceedingly difficult for a collective leadership to develop a comprehensive effort. This is no surprise. It is hard for our decentralized political system to develop comprehensive programs, too. But our basic political and economic system works. The Soviet Union's system does not. Some analysts suggest that Gorbachev's assumption of new, extensive presidential powers is designed to remedy this weakness.
What Is To Be Done?
There is some irony in asking, as Lenin's book did in 1902, "What is to be done?" That book called for a tightly knit, highly disciplined party vanguard with strong central control to make a revolution. But in the 1920s, Lenin introduced a "new economic policy" that envisaged decentralized economic authority, at least as a temporary expedient. Some Soviet reformers seek to trace the antecedents of their market-oriented ideas to that policy. Of course, Soviet society is quite different from ours, with cultural, political, and ideological constraints unlike ours. And it remains in many ways, as Churchill well understood, an enigma. So any outsider should be cautious in offering advice for reform. That said, some economic points stand out to me personally. 1. There is no getting away from market prices. Whatever the problem, the solution keeps coming back to market prices, which: -- Enable markets to assess profitability; -- Guide efficient investment; -- Allow firms to compete for inputs, not rely on planner's allocation; -- Signal the scarcity of goods and create incentives for production; -- Establish rewards for work; and -- Are a critical step toward achieving a convertible ruble. 2. It is hard to envisage the success of price reform until the ruble's value is stabilized. The ruble overhang--created by massive deficits financed through printing money--means that if prices were freed at present, the demand for goods would send prices soaring. The ruble overhang could be reduced by: selling state-owned assets (apartments, equipment, and land); issuing financial instruments with positive rates of return after inflation; and possibly selling consumer good imports at a substantial markup. The substantial Soviet gold stocks also might be used to back the value of the ruble or government bonds. As major gold producers, the Soviets could use future gold production to regulate the money supply. It is important that these monetary policies be accompanied by fiscal restraint. Otherwise there would be a new ruble overhang. Targets for spending cuts might be: subsidies to firms, defense spending, and military aid to foreign clients (Cuba, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Cambodia). Improved production efficiency, especially in the countryside, also could reduce government spending. Higher taxes, in contrast, will hinder the development of business initiative. 3. Microeconomic reforms in industrial organization must accompany market prices and macroeconomic stabilization. Enterprises and cooperatives must have the freedom to compete. Monopolies must end. State controls should not limit the ease of entry and exit of competitors. Instead of planners, market signals should determine resource distribution. 4. The Supreme Soviet must provide legal guarantees for property rights. The new Soviet property law moves in the right direction, but it is a compromise document that avoids use of the term "private property." On the plus side, it provides the legal foundation for development of small-scale private enterprise, diversifying forms of ownership, and granting some additional rights to individuals and foreign investors. It does not, however, allow private ownership of land or the direct hiring of workers, which precludes the development of large-scale private enterprise. 5. The Soviets must move carefully in substituting tax and regulatory policies for confiscation and production directives. The power to tax remains the power to destroy, and over-regulation can choke off striving enterprises. 6. The Soviet Union will need to ensure the social welfare of those who cannot fend for themselves in the changed economic environment. At present, social welfare is managed through enterprises, and there is no real system to ease adjustments as inefficient firms adjust to meet competition or even go out of business. Competition is likely to require unemployment insurance and worker retraining programs. There will be a need for a bankruptcy law permitting the restructuring or liquidation of failed enterprises. These tasks pose a major challenge to perestroika. But even this brief analysis underscores that the necessary reforms are interrelated. Action on any one element by itself will not suffice. The different measures must act in concert if the new economic system is to work.
US Policy
For some time, this administration has made clear that it wants perestroika to succeed. Perestroika can help create a more open society, channel claims for societal resources away from the military to civilian uses, and create institutions with no interest in military adventurism. In short, perestroika can transform the Soviet Union into a cooperative member of the international community. We have a national interest in the spread of our core values: self-determination, democracy, individual rights and freedoms, economic liberty, market economics, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. So we welcome the Soviet Union's movement toward accepting these values. Realism is called for, however, in assessing the actual influence we can have on perestroika. We must avoid the siren song calling for direct aid to Moscow. As President Gorbachev has stated on numerous occasions, the success of Soviet reform depends on the Soviets themselves. It was the discarded view of General Secretary Brezhnev that Western technology, credits, and know-how could produce a Soviet economic turnaround. In our view, the best approach toward supporting both perestroika and America's interests and values is a creative search for points of mutual advantage in those areas most open to superpower cooperation: making Europe whole and free; resolving regional conflicts; negotiating stability and predictability- enhancing arms control agreements; supporting the rule of law in the Soviet Union; and working together on technical economic cooperation. Let me focus here on the strictly economic aspects of this search for mutual advantage. We have begun a program of extensive technical cooperation with the Soviets, designed to facilitate the massive task of restructuring their economy. The President presented a list of possible projects to Gorbachev at Malta. Ongoing efforts have included: -- Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Boskin recently visited Moscow to discuss Soviet reforms; -- In March, the Soviet Finance Minister and Chairman of the State Bank visited Washington for detailed discussions with Treasury Secretary Brady, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan, and me; -- In February, a group of Soviet experts spent 10 days traveling around the US under Commerce/SBA [Small Business Administration] auspices to study small business operations; -- In February, another delegation visited New York and Washington under New York Stock Exchange auspices to study financial markets and stock exchange operations; -- The IRS [Internal Revenue Service] has offered tax advisory services to the USSR, aimed at establishing efficient tax administration; and -- A group recently visited Moscow to expand cooperation in developing census and economics statistics. In addition, we are exploring a host of other steps we can take to share our experience across a broad range of sectors. In particular, if the USSR moves ahead with a major reform effort this year, as they have suggested, we might be able to offer perspectives on particular proposals. At Malta, the President presented a series of bilateral commercial initiatives designed to demonstrate our support for perestroika, serve our economic interests, and, in the process, help teach the Soviets about the practical workings of market economies. The President proposed the start of negotiations on a trade agreement with a view toward completing them by the June summit. We have had three rounds of negotiations. If the Soviets pass and implement an emigration law in conformance with international standards by the time we have completed an agreement, the President has said he intends to waive the Jackson- Vanik amendment, paving the way, with the trade agreement, for the extension of most-favored-nation (MFN) status. Also at Malta, the President told Gorbachev that once he waives Jackson-Vanik, he will explore with the Congress lifting the various restrictions on US Government lending to the USSR. We have also begun negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty, which should take some time to complete, and a revised tax treaty, on which we are making substantial progress. We have agreed in principle to a new long-term grains agreement, which should be ready for summit signature. We also are pursuing negotiations on an expanded civil aviation agreement and a maritime transportation agreement. Finally, we can continue to challenge Moscow to implement the domestic economic reforms needed for increased international economic interaction. At Malta, the President stated his support for Soviet observer status in the GATT [General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade] to help acquaint the Soviet Union with GATT norms and procedures and with the market-oriented trading policies on which the GATT is based. The President also supported cooperation with the USSR in the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. I am delighted to report that the Soviet Union at the recent CSCE Bonn Economic Conference joined in supporting the final document that included market economic principles. Soviet cooperation with the OECD would be through the recently established Center for European Economies in Transition. We continue to oppose, however, Soviet membership in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] or the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] because we believe their economy is incompatible with the market norms and transparency required of the members.
Some Conclusions about Soviet Economic Reform
Perestroika and glasnost are President Gorbachev's effort to remake the Soviet Union. That may not have been his aim in 1985, but the failures of the early reform efforts convinced him and his colleagues that change must be far more fundamental. These are practical and determined men, whose aim is not freedom for freedom's sake but the modernization of the Soviet Union. They are not the heirs of Locke and Montesquieu but of the great Russian modernizers, like Peter the Great and Alexander II. The failure to produce economic results has not deterred Gorbachev. As he has shown repeatedly, he uses obstacles to further consolidate his authority. Then he takes steps to press political and economic reforms further. He does not fold; he does not call. He raises the stakes. Nevertheless, Gorbachev and his allies still must operate as members of a collective leadership with very different notions of what reform means. The development of a Supreme Soviet with some authority has merely extended these conflicting views of the reform process to a larger body. So the decisions are often compromises. This ad hoc policy development process is a severe handicap when the objective is to overhaul a society's basic attitudes toward economic life. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the challenges are necessarily too daunting for perestroika. Over the years, Gorbachev has steadily secured greater power; his new presidential powers represent the latest and most extensive steps in this process. This accumulation of power creates, however, an irony, given Gorbachev's claimed interest in opening up the Soviet society and power structure. I would expect it will be important to examine the steps taken up to and during this summer's Party Congress to ascertain the real direction of reforms. We want perestroika and glasnost to succeed. But we also recognize the limits of our influence. This is an internal evolution whose success depends ultimately on the Soviet people. Of course, the United States will continue to pursue our national interest. But that interest does not exist in isolation from the events taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Our task is to find points of mutual advantage where both we and the Soviets can gain. This involves full engagement across the span of issues concerning our two countries: regional conflicts, arms control, human rights, transnational relations, and bilateral topics such as economics. At Malta and in the series of ministerials leading up to the spring summit, we have been doing just that. Before turning to central and Eastern Europe, I would like to make several points about the situation in Lithuania. The people of Lithuania must not be denied their rights. We support the aspirations of the Lithuanian people for self- determination. We have never recognized the forcible incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The Supreme Soviet has called the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocols illegitimate, effectively making the incorporation illegal. It's time to engage in a dialogue and not merely talk about having a dialogue. The Lithuanians want such a dialogue. That's the answer: dialogue, not economic boycotts or threats to invoke presidential rule. Our policy toward the Soviet Union is shaped by what's in our interest. -- It's in our interest to see the countries of Eastern Europe free of Soviet forces and secure from threats that could reverse their revolution. -- It's in our interest to see the Soviets destroy 40,000 tanks through a CFE [negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe] agreement. -- It's in our interest to lock in major reductions in Soviet strategic forces and to create a more stable, predictable, and secure relationship that reduces the risk of nuclear war. -- It's in our interest to settle regional conflicts in a way that fosters peace and freedom--as we did in Central America. -- And it's in our interest to see the reform process go forward in the Soviet Union so it will be more committed to internal progress than external expansion. But some of our bilateral contacts with the USSR may be more directly in their interest than in ours. And those contacts are being put to risk by Soviet actions--even short of force--in Lithuania. Our willingness and ability to take steps that benefit perestroika in the near term is, to be sure, affected by Soviet behavior. Perestroika, glasnost, and democratization cannot be divisible. The reform process won't go forward and succeed if it is applied in some republics and denied in others. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

NATO and the US Commitment to Europe

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address at the Oklahoma State University commencement, Stillwater, Oklahoma Date: May 4, 19905/4/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Subject: NATO [TEXT] (introductory remarks deleted) Postwar America was ready for peace and prosperity. But while the free world was recovering, the nations of Eastern Europe were being "consolidated" behind an Iron Curtain. So began four decades of division in Europe--and 40 long years of suspicion between superpowers. Today, you graduate at the end of an era of conflict--but a contest of a different kind, a cold and abstract war of words and walls. Now Europe and the world have entered a new era, the "age of freedom." I hope you'll forgive me if I use this great forum at your great university to handle a subject of a very serious nature... I'll be reflecting on the power and potential of democratic change in each of the commencement addresses I make this year. I begin today...with a few words on the changes and America's place in the new Europe. A few of you may be wondering what a continent 4,000 miles away has to do with you. Throughout our history, great upheavals in Europe have forced the American people to respond, to make deep judgments about the part we should play in European affairs. This has been true from the time of the French Revolution and the wars which followed it; to World War I and the flawed peace which ended it; to the Second World War and the creation of the postwar order. I believe that, now, we are poised at another such moment--a critical time in our strategic relationship with our neighbors across the Atlantic. Many of the graduates of America's class of 1916 may have wondered why the faraway war making headlines in their newspapers would have anything to do with them. They might have agreed with President Wilson, who that year said, "We are not interested" in the causes of war, in "the obscure foundations from which its stupendous flood has burst forth." But a year later, those classmates--and their country--were swept up in the torrent; carrying them to the horror of the trenches in France. Yet after the war, we again turned away from active involvement in European affairs. Instead, we sponsored a treaty to outlaw war, and then, as the outlaws gained strength, the United States passed new neutrality laws. Another generation of Americans sat in the bright sun of commencement ceremonies at colleges across the country, thinking war in Europe would pass them by. But when war came, they paid an awful price for America's isolation. When that war ended, those students no longer questioned our role in the future of Europe. They no longer asked what Europe had to do with them, because they knew the answer: everything. About a year ago in Germany, I defined the kind of Europe our country is committed to: a peaceful, stable Europe, a Europe whole and free. Today that goal is within our reach.
A New Age of Freedom
We are entering a new "age of freedom" in a time of uncertainty but great hope. Emerging democracies in Eastern Europe are going through social, political, and economic transformations; shaking loose stagnant, centralized bureaucracies that have smothered initiative for generations. In this time of transition, moving away from the postwar era and beyond containment, we cannot know what choices the people of Eastern Europe will make for their future. The process of change in the Soviet Union is also still unfinished. It will be crucial to see, for example, whether Moscow chooses coercion or peaceful dialogue in responding to the aspirations of the Lithuanian people, and [other] nationalities within the Soviet Union. The only noble answer lies in a dialogue that results in unencumbered self-determination for Lithuania. President Gorbachev has made profound progress in his country; reforms so fundamental that the clock cannot be turned back. Yet, neither can we turn the clock ahead, to know for sure what kind of country the Soviet Union will be in years to come. For the sake of the future we share with Europe, our policies and presence must be appropriate for this period of transition--with a constancy and reliability that will reassure our friends, both old and new. My European colleagues want the United States to be a part of Europe's future. I believe they are right. The United States should remain a European power in the broadest sense--politically, militarily, and economically. And, as part of our global responsibilities, the foundation for America's peaceful engagement in Europe has been--and will continue to be--NATO. Recognizing in peace what we had learned from war, we joined with the free nations of Europe to form an Atlantic community, an enduring political compact. Our engagement in Europe has meant that the Europeans accept America as part of their continent's future, taking our interests into account across the board. Our commitment is not just in defense; it must be a well-balanced mix of involvement in all dimensions of European affairs. Because of our political commitment to peace in Europe, there has not been a war on that continent in 45 years. This "long peace" should be viewed through the long lens of history: Europe has now experienced the longest uninterrupted period of international peace in the recorded history of that continent. The alliance is now ready to build on that historic achievement and define its objectives for the next century. So the alliance must join together to craft a new Western strategy for new and changing times.
Call to a Summit
Having consulted intensively with Prime Minister Thatcher in Bermuda, President Mitterrand in Florida, Chancellor Kohl at Camp David, and by telephone or cable with NATO Secretary General Woerner and all of my other allied colleagues, I am calling for an early summit meeting of all NATO leaders. Margaret Thatcher, one of freedom's greatest champions of the last decade, told me that while NATO has been fantastically successful, we should be ready now to face new challenges. The time is right for the alliance to act. The fundamental purpose of this summit should be to launch a wide-ranging NATO strategy review for the transformed Europe of the 1990s. To my NATO colleagues, I suggest that our summit direct this review by addressing four critical points: One, the political role NATO can play in the new Europe. Two, the conventional forces the alliance will need in the time ahead, and NATO's goals for conventional arms control. Three, the role of nuclear weapons based in Europe--and Western objectives in new nuclear arms control negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union. Four, strengthening the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--the CSCE--to reinforce NATO and help protect democratic values, in a Europe whole and free.
Future Political Mission of NATO
The first task the NATO summit should consider is the future political mission of the alliance. As military threats fade, the political dimension of NATO's work--always there, but seldom noticed--becomes more prominent. So at the NATO summit, we should look for ways to help our German friends sustain freedom and achieve unity--something which we and our allies have supported for over 40 years. And, we should reaffirm the importance of keeping a united Germany a full member of NATO. The alliance needs to find ways to work more closely with a vigorous European Community that is rightly asserting its own distinct views. And in Eastern Europe, governments once our adversaries are now our partners in building a new continent. So we must also talk about how to encourage further peaceful democratic change in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. But even as NATO gives more emphasis to its political mission, its guarantee of European security must remain firm. Our enemy today is uncertainty and instability, so the alliance will need to maintain a sound, collective military structure with forces in the field, backed by larger forces that can be called upon in a crisis.
Review of Conventional Forces
Which brings me to the second task for the NATO summit--a review of how the alliance should plan its conventional defenses. While we need to recognize that it will take some time before the Soviet military presence is gone from Eastern Europe--and before the major reductions contemplated by both sides can be implemented-- we need to develop our strategy for that world now. Obviously, Soviet actions will be critical. Yet even after all the planned reductions in its forces are complete--even if our current arms control proposals are agreed to and implemented--the Soviet military will still field forces, dwarfing those of any other single European state, armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. Militarily significant US forces must remain on the other side of the Atlantic for as long as our allies want--and need--them. These forces demonstrate, as no words can, the enduring political compact that binds America's fate with Europe's democracies. If the Soviet withdrawal continues and our arms control efforts are successful, we must plan for a different kind of military presence focused less on the danger of an immediate outbreak of war. We must promote long-term stability and prevent crises from escalating by relying on reduced forces that show our capability--and readiness--to respond to whatever may arise. The conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] treaty we have proposed, would be the most ambitious conventional arms control agreement ever concluded. We must finish the work on this treaty soon and plan to sign it at a CSCE summit this fall. But at the NATO summit we need to look further ahead, preparing for the follow-on negotiations after the conclusion of a CFE treaty. The NATO summit should develop the alliance's objectives for these talks.
Role of Nuclear Forces in Europe
The NATO summit should also assess the future of US nuclear forces in Europe. As democracy blooms in Eastern Europe, as Soviet troops return home and tanks are dismantled, there is less need for nuclear systems of the shortest range. The NATO summit should accelerate ongoing work within the alliance to determine the minimum number and types of weapons that will be needed to deter war--credibly and effectively. In light of these new political conditions and the limited range and flexibility of short-range nuclear missile forces based in Europe, I have reviewed our plan to produce and deploy newer, more modern, short-range nuclear missiles to replace the Lance system now in Europe. We have almost finished the research and development work for these new missiles. But I have decided, after consulting with our allies, to terminate the follow-on to [the] Lance program. I have also decided to cancel any further modernization of US nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe. There are still short-range US--and many more Soviet-- nuclear missile systems deployed in Europe. We are prepared to negotiate the reduction of these forces as well, in a new set of arms control talks. At the NATO summit, I will urge my colleagues to agree on the broad objectives for these future US-Soviet negotiations and begin preparations within the alliance for these talks. I would also like to suggest that these new US-Soviet arms control talks begin shortly after a CFE treaty on conventional forces has been signed. In taking these steps, the United States is not going to allow Europe to become "safe for conventional war." There are few lessons so clear in history as this. Only the combination of conventional forces and nuclear forces have ensured peace in Europe. But every aspect of America's engagement in Europe-- military, political, and economic--must be complementary. And one place where they all come together is in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--an organization of 35 states of Europe and North America. The CSCE is already a beacon for human rights and individual freedoms. Now, it must take on a broader role.
Strengthening CSCE
So the fourth task for a NATO summit is to reach common allied objectives for the future of CSCE. It can help the victorious forces of democracy in Eastern Europe secure their revolutions, and--as they join the commonwealth of free nations--be assured a voice in the new Europe. The CSCE should offer new guidelines for building free societies--including setting standards for truly free elections, adopting measures to strengthen the rule of law, and pointing the way in the needed, but painful, transition from centralized, command economies to free markets. The CSCE can also provide a forum for political dialogue in a more united Europe. I agree with those who have called for regular consultations among senior representatives of the CSCE countries. We should consider whether new CSCE mechanisms can help mediate and settle disputes in Europe. I believe my allied colleagues and I should agree to take up these new ideas at a CSCE summit later this year, in conjunction with the signing of a CFE treaty.
Stability and Peace
In Eastern Europe, in this hemisphere, the triumph of democracy has cast its warm light on the face of the world like a miraculous dawn. But the outcome of this struggle for freedom is not ordained, and it will not be the work of miracles. All of you who graduate here today are part of a historic decision for America's engagement in the future of Europe. I am convinced that our work to protect freedom--to build free societies--will safeguard our own peace and prosperity. The security of Europe and the world has become very complex in this century. But America's commitment to stability and peace is profoundly clear. Its motivation derives from the strength of our forefathers--from the blood of those who have died for freedom-- and for the sake of all who would live in peace. Every voice, every heart's commitment to freedom, is important. There is a story about a man trying to convince his son that in the struggle for freedom, every voice counts. They stood in a valley, watching the snow fall on a distant mountain. "Tell me the weight of a snowflake," the man said. "Almost nothing," answered the boy. As the snow swirled around them, up on the mountain they saw an avalanche whose thunder shook the earth. "Do you know which snowflake caused that?" the old man asked. "I don't," answered the boy. "Maybe," said the man, "like the last snowflake that moves a mountain, in the struggle for freedom, a single voice makes a world of difference." America's mission in Europe, like millions of individual decisions made for freedom, can make a world of difference. The cry for freedom--in Eastern Europe, in South Africa, in this hemisphere--was heard around the world in the "revolution of 1989." Today, in this new "age of freedom," add your voice to the thundering chorus. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

Citizens Democracy Corps Proposed for Eastern Europe

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Commencement address at the University of South Carolina, Columbia Date: May 12, 19905/12/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: E/C Europe Country: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (former), Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania Subject: Trade/Economics [TEXT] In the past year, one nation after another has pulled itself out from under communism onto the threshold of democracy. Each has endured great suffering--tremendous economic damage. We have all seen the images of long lines and empty shelves. But what we cannot see so easily--what is beneath the surface but no less real- -is the moral damage: the deep scars on the spirit left by 4 decades of communist rule. Because in these regimes, the human spirit was subject to systematic assault. Religion, morality, right, and wrong--any challenge to the rule of the state became the enemy of the state. Believers were persecuted, churches and cemeteries razed. Citizens were turned one against the other--enlisted into the ranks of the regime's informers. Nothing stood outside the reach of the regime--not even the past. History--it was rewritten to suit the needs of the present, yesterday's heroes airbrushed from the pages of history. Milan Kundera, the Czech author, called it "organized forgetting." Of course, these nations had laws. They had courts. They had constitutions. All in service to the state. They had--in name at least--rights and freedoms. In reality--the empty shell of liberty. Not the rule of law but the perversion of law; rules made not to serve the will of the people but the whim of the party. That is how, in Romania, the law made it illegal for three or more people to have a conversation in the street. That is how, in another country, a man whose so-called crime was teaching others about religion was jailed for 6 months--the trumped-up charge: walking on flower beds. We will never know how many dissidents were punished as "common criminals" and how many millions of others were frozen by fear into silence and submission. That is the legacy--the landscape of moral destruction. The tragic consequence of 4 decades of communist rule; a breakdown of trust. From ancient times, the great minds have recognized the link between the law and trust. As Aristotle wrote: "Law is a pledge that the citizens of a state will do justice to one another"--the bond that makes the collection of individuals into a community, into a nation.
Reconstructing Trust
Fortunately, the moral destruction in Eastern Europe, as you all know, was not complete. Individuals somehow managed to maintain an inner strength--their moral compass--to sustain the will to break through the regime's wall of lies. They did so, as Vaclav Havel [President of Czechoslovakia] put it, by the simple act of "living in truth." They created "flying universities" where lecturers taught in private homes. They formed underground publishing houses and groups to monitor human rights--an authentic "civil society" beyond the reach of the ruling establishment. And today, the builders of those civil societies no longer live underground. They are the new leaders of Eastern Europe. And they have begun to build on the ruins of communist rule; democratic systems based on trust. Today, I want to focus on how America can help these nations secure their freedoms, become a part of a Europe whole and free. Early this year in the State of the Union, I talked about America's role as a shining example, about the importance of America--not as a nation but as an idea alive in the minds of men and women everywhere. And that idea was, without doubt, a guiding force in the revolution of 1989. Let me share a story with you about a recent American visitor to Romania who asked the people she met what they needed now, what was most important to them. This simple question produced some unexpected answers. In Timisoara, one woman pulled from her purse a worn copy of TV Guide, an issue from July 1987, containing a bicentennial copy of the US Constitution. And she held it out to the American visitor. And she said, "What we need is more of these." And there on the streets of Timisoara--in a country where food is in short supply, where homes are without heat and streets dark at night--there a woman pins her hopes on our Constitution. What that Romanian woman wanted--what all the nations of Eastern Europe aspire to--is democratic life based on justice and the rule of law. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary stand now, in the spring of 1990, as America stood in the summer of 1787. Who will be their Franklins, their Washingtons, their Hamiltons, their Madisons--their men and women of towering genius? The nation-builders who will set in place the firm foundations of self-government? Some of them we know by name--the heroes of the revolution of 1989. But for Eastern Europe's constitution-builders, the work has only now begun. Because the fate of freedom depends not just on the character of the people who govern but whether they themselves are governed by the rule of law. And just as the framers of our own Constitution looked to the lessons of history, Eastern Europe's new democracies will look to their own parliamentary past--to Europe's example and, of course, to our own American Constitution. That is why we must export our experience--our 2 centuries of accumulated wisdom on the workings of free government. Already we are actively engaged with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, with an ongoing series of exchanges bringing jurists and parliamentarians, political leaders here to the United States to meet their American counterparts. And today, I am pleased to announce four new initiatives--four steps that the United States will take to support democractic development in Eastern Europe.
Supporting Economic Development
First, America will continue to act to advance economic freedom. In the past year, we have committed more than $1 billion in direct economic assistance to Eastern Europe. We have extended loans and credits, opened our markets through most-favored-nation (MFN) status, and promoted American investment. And today, I am pleased to announce yet another economic initiative--the Export-Import Bank will provide Poland a new line of medium-term export credits and loan guarantees for purchasing machinery, technology, and services from American suppliers. Second, the United States will work to help ensure free and fair elections in Eastern Europe. Next week, we will send a presidential delegation to observe the elections in Romania and another team to next month's elections in Bulgaria. Third, America will work to broaden the mandate of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Less than a month from now, as one of the 35 nations of the CSCE, the United States will take part in a conference on human rights, including free elections, political pluralism, and the rule of law. I have instructed Ambassador Max Kampelman, head of our delegation, to seek a new consensus on these cornerstones of freedoms, rights, and democracy. As I said last week at Oklahoma State University, we must work within the CSCE to bring Eastern Europe's new democracies into this commonwealth of free nations. Fourth and finally, we will work to strengthen the foundations of free society in Eastern Europe, and I am pleased to announce today the creation of a Citizens Democracy Corps. Its first mission--to establish a center and a clearinghouse for American private sector assistance and volunteer activities in Eastern Europe. We know the real strength of our democracy is its citizens, the collective strength of individual Americans. We are going to focus that energy where it can do the most good. America has much to contribute, much it can do to help these nations move forward on the path to democracy. We can help them build political systems based on: -- Respect for individual freedoms; -- For the right to speak our mind, to live as we wish, and to worship as our conscience tells us we must; -- Systems based on respect for property and the sanctity of contract; -- Laws that are necessary not to amass fortunes, not to build towers of gold and greed but to provide for ourselves, for our families; -- Systems that allow free associations--trade unions, professional groups, political parties--the building blocks of a free society; -- We have got to help the emerging democracies build legal systems that secure the procedural rights that preserve freedom; -- And above all, a system that supports a strict equality of rights, one that guarantees that all men and women--whatever their race or ancestry--stand equal before the law. In this century, we have learned a painful truth about the monumental evil that can be done in the name of humanity. We have learned how a vision of Utopia can become a hell on Earth for millions of men and women. We have learned, through hard experience, that the only alternative to tyranny of man is the rule of law. That is the essence of our vision for Europe, a Europe where not only are the dictators dethroned but where the rule of law-- reflecting the will of the people--ensures the freedoms millions have fought so hard to gain. There is still work to be done. In the Baltic states, where people struggle for the right to determine their own futures, we Americans--so free to chart our own course--identify with their hopes and aspirations. For, you see, we are committed to self- determination for Lithuania and Latvia and Estonia. And ultimately, the Soviet Union itself, now committed to openness and reform, will benefit from a Europe that is whole and free. Democracy and freedom threaten absolutely no one. We sometimes hear today that with freedom's great triumph-- and, oh, what exciting times we are living in--that America's work is done. Nothing could be further from the truth. I want to close today with a story about the enduring power of the American idea and the unfinished business that awaits the generation that you proudly represent. It is about a town called Pilsen in Czechoslovakia, a town that just last week celebrated the day, 45 years ago, when it was liberated by American troops. Of course, within a few short years, Pilsen's dream of freedom vanished behind the Iron Curtain and with it, the truth about that day back in 1945. A generation grew up being taught that Pilsen had been freed not by your fathers and granddads in the US Army but by Soviet soldiers dressed in American uniforms. But the people--the people of Pilsen knew better. They never forgot. And today--finally free to speak the truth--the town invited their true liberators back. After 45 long years, those old American soldiers returned to the streets of Pilsen, to the sounds of the Star Spangled Banner--to a hero's welcome. Those GIs, my generation, were your age in 1945. And now it falls upon you, the graduating class of this great university, to uphold our American ideals; not in times of war, thank God, but in a time of tremendous excitement--helping these nations secure the freedom that your fathers and grandfathers fought for, the freedom millions only dreamed of, until today. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

The Common European Interest: America and the New Politics Among Nations

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Address before the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, upon receiving the 7th annual Hans J. Morgenthau Memorial Award, New York, New York Date: May 14, 19905/14/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Subject: Democratization, NATO, EC [TEXT] I am very pleased to receive the Hans J. Morgenthau Memorial Award and to join the prestigious company of the six preceding recipients. Of course, I have spent most of my life in the law, many of my last 20 years in public service, and much of that time concerned with domestic issues. So it is a real honor to be recognized here tonight for service to the foreign relations of the United States of America. Above all, it is an honor to receive an award that remembers a man such as Hans Morgenthau. Driven from Europe by Hitler, Hans Morgenthau spent the rest of his life educating America about the world beyond its shores. It was a world that seemed to be in headlong flight from civilization. As an international lawyer, Hans Morgenthau saw the League of Nations collapse. As a political philosopher, he witnessed the tragedies of fascism and Stalinism. As a diplomatic historian, he lived through two hot wars and then the ebb and flow of a cold one. A personal victim of politics gone bad, he was driven to shake America out of its traditional isolationist slumber. And he would do so using the lessons of history, the oftentimes bitter realities of international politics, and, above all, the reason of national interest. Nowhere was Hans Morgenthau more effective or more eloquent than in his 1946 classic, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics. There he wrote, "The age is forever searching for the philosopher's stone, the magic formula, which, mechanically applied, will . . . substitute for the uncertainties and risks of political action the certitude of rational calculation." And he continued: "Since, however, what the seekers after the magic formula want is simple, rational, mechanical, and what they have to deal with is complicated, irrational, incalculable, they are compelled . . . to simplify the reality of international politics and to develop what one might call the 'method of the single cause'." Hans Morgenthau believed there could be no single cause of war nor any single solution to the problems of power and peace. Most of his career was spent debunking those who followed the "method of the single cause." Tonight, I would like to join company with Hans Morgenthau. I would like to argue against the "method of the single cause" as it applies to the most dramatic event of our time: Europe's recent dawn of freedom and unity. The visible reduction in the Soviet threat has led some to assume that our only reason for being in Europe over the last 40 years was to contain that threat. Beyond containment, in their view, lies the end of the American role. And so as the alleged "single cause" of America's involvement--fear of Soviet aggression--recedes, America's position in Europe should recede with it. This would be the most profound and strategic mistake of the generation. We must leave not only the cold war behind but also the conflicts that preceded the cold war. The reduction of the Soviet threat need not cause Europe to revert to an unsteady balance of power or a fresh outbreak of national rivalries and ethnic tensions. Perestroika in the Soviet Union, the democratic revolutions of Central and Eastern Europe, and the unification of Germany create a new opportunity for Europe and for America: to cast our vision beyond the prevention of war . . . to the actual building of peace. To prevent war, we must continue to deter aggression and contain the residual threat. To build the peace, however, America's role must go beyond balancing itself against remaining Soviet military power. American engagement must be recast to suit the new circumstances. Removed by an ocean but bound historically, politically, economically, and strategically to Europe, we can be a guiding hand toward the common interest. Fostering the European common interest can be one of our key national interests. As Professor Morgenthau wrote years ago, "Diplomacy has here the new task of creating and maintaining new institutions and procedures through which new common interests of nations can be pursued." So tonight, ladies and gentlemen, I want to outline for you America's new diplomatic tasks and to review with you those common interests: political legitimacy, economic prosperity, and military security. And I want to discuss America's role in helping to achieve those interests, both for ourselves and for Europe.
Political Legitimacy
The first task we face is fostering political legitimacy--or, to put it plainly, governments elected by the people and responsible to them. After sweeping away the dictators of the past, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are working to build legitimate political orders that can endure. America must continue to stand with them, reassuring them of our commitment to their new democracies. The surest building block will be free and fair elections. Last May in Mainz, the President put forward a free elections proposal for the 35 nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). He augmented it just 2 days ago, calling in his speech at the University of South Carolina for CSCE to build a new consensus around free elections, political pluralism, and the rule of law. Next month in Copenhagen, we hope to see CSCE move forward on these ideas. In order to ensure that the elections in Central and Eastern Europe this spring are free and fair, I proposed in February in Prague that the CSCE member states send observer delegations to these elections. The United States has sent observers to the elections that have already been held, and we will send presidential delegations to the upcoming elections in Bulgaria and Romania. And I am pleased to report that many states have joined us in this effort. But in some cases, observers may not be enough. We are concerned that a pattern of intimidation and violence may be undermining the election campaign in Romania. As we consider institutions capable of fostering political legitimacy throughout Europe, CSCE can play an important part. It remains the one European organization that includes as members almost all European states as well as the United States and Canada. It is well placed to enhance the European consensus on the political and economic values that should be our guiding lights. It can become, if you will, the "conscience of the continent." To strengthen CSCE, we need to regularize its meetings, develop new guidelines for free societies, and promote it as a forum for political dialogue in the new Europe. In this way, the new democracies of the East can be assured a voice in the new Europe. While CSCE's 10 principles embody Western values, NATO should remain the place where Western democracies join in guaranteeing the new peace of Europe. Alongside its role as a military alliance, NATO has for 40 years been a primary political forum where democratic minds have met and resolved to go forward. The alliance will remain a central forum for political consultations about Europe's future. Therefore, as the President has made clear, we believe NATO should use this summer's summit to accelerate its adaptation to new political realities in Europe. This process has already begun. The alliance has worked vigorously on implementing our proposal for a NATO arms control verification staff since we proposed the idea in Berlin in December. And since that time, the alliance's political consultations have been enhanced, including a special ministerial 11 days ago to discuss developments in the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, and ways to strengthen CSCE. In this regard, I would like to raise an idea that may be worth further consideration. Already, the North Atlantic Assembly has invited East European parliamentarians to some meetings. The Western European Union (WEU) and NATO need to consider how they might reach out and reassure the peoples and governments of the East. These institutions should consider developing, for example, a solid political and military dialogue with the Central and East Europeans and with the Soviets. In this way, we may be able to heighten understanding of the West's continuing commitment to legitimacy and stability. Over the longer term, as democracy grows in Central and Eastern Europe, the United States will expand bilateral ties with the new democracies and add diplomatic resources and facilities in the region. We will open new cultural centers across Eastern Europe and do much more to satisfy the large demand for the teaching of English. Already, we have proposed a fund for independent broadcasting and a free press. Democracy can only flourish with extensive citizen participation. That's why the President has proposed a Citizens Democracy Corps. By involving American citizens with private citizens and groups in Eastern Europe, and perhaps eventually the Soviet Union as well, the give-and-take of democracy can flourish across the Atlantic.
Economic Liberty and Prosperity
Economic liberty and prosperity is the second common interest behind which all Europeans can unite. Europe, politically and economically, needs to be made an inclusive and integrated whole, open to the world. Our bilateral economic efforts involve three areas. First, we are standing with those new democracies in crisis situations, providing desperately needed emergency aid; Second, we are actively supporting efforts aimed to facilitate the transition from Stalinist command economies to private-sector-driven free markets; and Third, we are working to integrate the new market democracies into the international economic system. The United States has led the way on several key assistance issues, including the creation of the Polish stabilization fund to support Poland's courageous reforms. We have launched innovative enterprise funds for Poland and Hungary to assist the growth of the private sector in those countries. The United States will continue to broaden its trade and assistance programs with the emerging democracies, and the more market-oriented these economies become, the wider the avenue will be for our economic relations. Institutionally, a European Community (EC) closely tied to the United States and open to association to the East can serve the interests of all. For the West Europeans, it can provide expanded and freer markets. For Americans, it can provide an open door to all of Europe. And for the East Europeans, it can open their emerging private sectors to both Western Europe and the United States, assuring them of a market for the products of their transformed economies. We have taken steps to increase our consultations with the EC on economics and politics. For example, our work together in the area of standards could help eliminate unintended trade barriers. We now have regularly scheduled ministerials as well as president- to-president meetings. In the context of the European Political Cooperation process, we are striving to intensify our dialogue on political issues, including Eastern Europe and regional conflicts. Working together, an involved America, the G-24, the EC, the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Center for European Economies in Transition, and the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development can create an inclusive, not exclusive, economic climate.
Military Security
Political legitimacy and economic prosperity will need to be buttressed by military security. With conditions changing, the President has said we now need to develop our strategy for dealing with a new European strategic environment. As Soviet troops leave Central and Eastern Europe and Moscow proceeds with further reductions in its forces, we will be able to change NATO's strategy and forces significantly from those we've relied upon in the past. In thinking about the American conventional military presence in Europe, Soviet actions will remain critical. As the "new thinking" is translated into a new Soviet force structure, we will be able to alter our posture. Indeed, the opportunity to draw down our forces is due in no small part to President Gorbachev's withdrawing of Soviet troops and redefining more realistically Soviet security interests in Europe. Yet even if all Soviet armed forces return to the USSR and conventional arms control moves forward, the Soviet military will retain forces many times larger than those possessed by any other single state. American troops will, therefore, need to remain in Europe for as long as they are wanted. But the nature and composition of the American military presence in Europe should change with the threat. If we codify the political changes in democratic governments and the military changes in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), we will need to plan differently. Thus, in the near future, we may be able to plan less for the danger of an immediate outbreak of war and more on how to promote long-term military stability in Europe. The President also has stressed the need for the NATO summit to assess the future of US nuclear forces in Europe. Here, too, military strategy must reflect political reality. Circumstances and conditions are changing. We need to pay close attention to the numbers, kinds, and deterrent missions of our nuclear weapons in Europe. As part of this reassessment, the President has called upon the alliance to agree on broad objectives for future US-Soviet negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Conventional and nuclear arms control must be a central element in our planning. As I stressed in San Francisco last October, arms control can lock in positive changes, require the Soviets to destroy weapons in an effectively verifiable manner, and make the changes difficult and costly to reverse. Not only should we sign a treaty on CFE this year, but we must accelerate its follow-on negotiations to cope with those residual security concerns states may have even after CFE. We also must strengthen our efforts at promoting strategic predictability in the confidence- and security-building measures talks (CSBMs) in Vienna. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is broadening military-to-military exchanges, both with the Soviets and with the East Europeans. On the civilian side, we should undertake a similar dialogue with our counterparts, focusing not on day-to-day events but rather the doctrinal concepts we use in thinking about war and peace. As we adapt to changed conditions, let me stress one point: We cannot afford to allow Europe to become safe for any type of war. Deterrence must be maintained by an appropriate and reliable mix of conventional and nuclear forces. As for the longer term, we are interested in exploring the possibilities of a CSCE mechanism for peaceful resolution of disputes. We encourage such efforts, provided they complement but do not supplant existing institutions like NATO and the WEU. Together, the old and the new can complement one another, creating multiple institutions to cope with evolving problems.
New Institutions and the Common Interest: Two-Plus- Four
From my discussion of our three common interests, I hope one point is clear: As there is no single cause for America's involvement in Europe, so too there can be no single tie which binds us together. Nor can any single institution embody our diverse involvement across the Atlantic. This is why we are interested in developing America's relations with the primary institutions of Europe--NATO, the EC, and CSCE. But, as I noted last winter in Berlin and in Prague, new institutions and mechanisms may need to be created. For example, in Prague I stressed the role regional or voluntary associations might play in promoting common interests of Central and East Europeans. As Europe is reconciled and integrated, all of the common political, economic, and security interests overlap in a single project: the unification of Germany in peace and freedom. A unified Germany and the process which brings it about will put an indelible stamp on our hopes for the future. The Two-Plus-Four process for German unification is a prime example of how mechanisms, even temporary ones, may need to be invented to assist in articulating the common interest while complementing the ongoing work of existing institutions. Far from being an attempt to dictate the future of Germany or Europe, the Two-Plus-Four exists for a different purpose: to ratify the already clear will of the German people to unite in freedom and self-determination while providing a forum to discuss unification's external ramifications. A primary task of the Two-Plus-Four will be to arrive at a formula by which all remaining Four Power rights and responsibilities, including over Berlin, will be terminated and transferred to a fully sovereign Germany, a Germany united within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and Berlin. In general, the Two-Plus-Four should act as a "steering group," directing to appropriate European fora those external issues related to German unification that can best be decided elsewhere -- such as in the CFE and CSBM talks, the upcoming short-range nuclear forces talks, or CSCE. This approach can involve the relevant European states and assure action on important external issues, without singling out Germany and thereby planting seeds of future instability. Thus, decisions can be reached in fora already created to support common interests.
The New Politics Among Nations
There is no single cause of the freedom that swept across Europe in the last year. And there can be no single solution to ensure that Europe becomes and remains whole and free. Effective solutions will demand the multiple talents that the American people have to offer their neighbors across the Atlantic. As Soviet troops return home, our military requirements for Europe's defense can be refashioned and many, though not all, of our troops can be brought home to the United States. With effectively verifiable arms control agreements in place, our overall military burden can be significantly reduced. There is much talk of a "peace dividend." If the peace we are now building in Europe can be made solid and durable, there will be real dividends. They will be more than financial, more than a controlled and gradual reduction in the defense budget. Just as importantly, they will come in the form of new exchange opportunities for our students and cooperative ventures for our scientists, increased economic opportunities for our businessmen, and improved political understanding for our people. But these returns require investments of a new type. Precisely for that reason--to ensure the peace and realize its benefits--as some of our troops depart Europe, our students, businessmen, and diplomats should arrive. And they should cross the Atlantic in numbers larger than ever before. But when they cross the Atlantic, they must do so with a firm understanding of America's purpose in the new Europe. Articulating the common interest in a Europe whole and free and establishing institutions and procedures built on those interests are the key tasks of the 1990s. The alternative is for Europe to drift back toward the familiar politics among nations described by Hans Morgenthau and so much feared by him. I do not believe that anyone in Europe today--or any nation for that matter --wants to go back to "business as usual." The history of our century, unfortunately, is full of well-meaning but failed experiments in collective security. They failed because nations either lost sight of common interests or lacked the wisdom and the courage to uphold them. As the world's preeminent democracy, we have sacrificed for two generations so that Europe's dream of unity and freedom might be realized. Now, the final impediments to that dream are being removed. As the President put it, a new commonwealth of nations is at hand. The great Americans, hardened by World War II, who joined our nation's destiny to that of Europe's 40 years ago must find their counterpart today in this generation. For we, too, have been hardened by a war--a war whose casualties can be seen in the ruined societies now being reborn on the other side of the breached Berlin Wall. It was a struggle that overshadowed our lives and the lives of our families and darkened the spirit. Now that struggle draws to a close. Surely the lesson that Hans Morgenthau taught, of America's necessary enrollment in the ranks of those striving for democracy and peace, is a lesson that transcends the cold war. We must therefore pledge ourselves anew to secure those vital common interests in Europe and elsewhere which can redeem the sacrifices of the 20th century with peace and freedom. In short, we must build the peace. Then, indeed, shall we see a new politics among nations. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

CSCE: The Conscience of a Continent

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Conference on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen, Denmark Date: Jun 6, 19906/6/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Subject: CSCE [TEXT] We are present at the creation of a new age of Europe. It is a time of discussion of new architectures, councils, committees, confederations, and common houses. These are, no doubt, weighty matters. But all these deliberations of statesmen and diplomats, scholars and lawgivers, will amount to nothing if they forget a basic premise. This premise is that "all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these, are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." It is "to secure these Rights [that] Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed." That is why we are here. Human rights is a modern phrase, but it recalls the words-- and the spirit--of committed men and women throughout Europe's history. The codes of King Canute. The Magna Carta. The Bill of Rights. The Declaration on the Rights of Man. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Helsinki Final Act. At times over the years, these words could not be heard because of yelling crowds, prison gates, and secret police. At times, these words have been burned and banned. But they kept returning on the lips of successor generations. They could not be destroyed, because they are in the soul of man. The very ideas that so stirred Jefferson and Montesquieu resonate today in the words of Havel and Geremek. They echo in our collective historical memory, and they illuminate our path to the future. Time and again, we have seen how governments' contempt for human dignity led to suffering on an unprecedented scale. Each generation, including ours, has learned what our forefathers discovered -- that it is to our collective peril that we close our eyes to the suffering inflicted by intolerance and oppression. Thomas Jefferson put it this way 200 years ago: We must swear "upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man." And so, today, we, representatives of the people of 35 nations, must rededicate ourselves to the cause of human rights; we must reaffirm the democratic values that are our legacy from the past. We are now closer than ever to realizing CSCE's long- cherished vision of a Europe whole and free. But as we approach our work, as we consider grand designs and institutional concepts, it is useful to find our bearings by recalling another gathering 15 years ago. Then the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe still lived in an artificially divided Europe, isolated behind a wall--a dark curtain through which the light of world concern reached but dimly. It was at that dark time that a band of intrepid men and women in a small flat in Moscow risked their freedom to form the first Helsinki monitoring group. They rejected the darkness of tyranny, and they pledged to bring the denial of human rights to light. Their leader, Yuriy Orlov, who is with us now, launched the Helsinki movement with a toast that was as sardonic as it was defiant: "To the success of our hopeless cause!" Dr. Orlov and his colleagues paid dearly for that pledge. One by one, they were persecuted, arrested, exiled. They all suffered. Some of them died. Yet, inspired by their selfless example, one by one, others throughout the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe took up the spirit of Helsinki. And one by one, these courageous men and women breathed life into the Helsinki process. They infused the words with meaning. Before long, these words inspired acts of bravery that dictators and one-party states could never comprehend. In Katowice, in Poland, democratic activists considered the Final Act to be so important that they braved the blows of security forces to distribute copies of it to their neighbors. And it was to the Madrid meeting of Helsinki signatory states that exiled Solidarity leaders appealed in the aftermath of martial law, proclaiming that there can be no social peace without social justice. Time and again, Czechoslovakia's Charter '77 cited the Helsinki Final Act in defense of their unjustly persecuted countrymen. They were persecuted for "living in truth," for accepting the praiseworthy folly, as Vaclav Havel put it, of believing their words and ideals could make a difference. Now the charter's original members--President Havel and Foreign Minister Dienstbier to name only two--are leading the new Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to democracy. When Bucharest's beautiful old buildings were bulldozed and entire villages were threatened by the whim of a dictator, people turned to the CSCE human rights mechanism to spare further destruction of Romania's priceless cultural heritage. Just before the Berlin Wall fell, scores of East German refugees sought to transit through Hungary to freedom. The reforming Hungarian government, confronted with demands from East German authorities to place old rules in the way of new freedoms, turned to a different set of rules. The Hungarians cited their CSCE obligations to justify the crucial act of safe passage. And it was the holding in Sofia of a CSCE environmental meeting that coalesced the democratic opposition, precipitating the movement that has brought unprecedented change to Bulgaria. As we leave the cold war behind us, we confront again many age-old national, religious, and ethnic conflicts that have so sorrowed our common civilization. CSCE, NATO, the European Community, and other democratic institutions of Europe must now play a greater part in deepening and broadening European unity. We must ensure that these organizations continue to complement and reinforce one another. NATO will continue to serve as the indispensable guarantor of peace--and, therefore, the ultimate guardian of democracy and prosperity. The alliance will work to lock in stabilizing arms control agreements, to reshape its defense strategy to meet fundamentally changed conditions, and to build bridges of political cooperation to the newly emerging democracies of the East. As President Bush stressed with President Gorbachev at last week's Washington summit, we believe NATO will remain a cornerstone of both military security and political legitimacy in the new Europe. Working in concert, the G-24, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Community, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Council of Europe, the United States, and Canada can foster an inclusive European order, involving Central and East European nations and the Soviet Union in the new Europe by assisting market-based reform and the building of democratic institutions. The prospects for the fulfillment and protection of human rights have never been greater. It is a time for CSCE to take on additional responsibilities--but never at the price of forgetting its fundamental purposes. If CSCE is to help build a new Europe, a Europe different from all those empires and regimes that rose and fell, it must build from the liberty of man. Three challenges lie before us. First, we must ensure that the freedoms so recently won are rooted in societies governed by the rule of law and the consent of the governed. Second, we must ensure that all peoples of Europe may know the prosperity that comes from economic liberty and competitive markets. Third, we must ensure that we are not drawn into either inadvertent conflict or a replay of the disputes that preceded the cold war. CSCE is the one forum where our nations can meet on common ground to channel our political will toward meeting these challenges for the entire continent. CSCE's three baskets are uniquely suited to today's political, economic, and security challenges. Although it lacks military or economic power, CSCE can resonate with a powerful and irresistible voice. It can speak to Europe's collective concerns and interests. It can become, if you will, "the conscience of the continent."
Deepening Our Consensus on Human Rights
Today, I would like to share with you our views on how a strengthened CSCE can meet the first challenge we face--forging a deepened consensus on human rights, political legitimacy through free elections, and the rule of law. We are all familiar with the Danish author Hans Christian Andersen's tale, The Emperor's New Clothes. Although written over a century ago, it is an ageless parable. In it, imperious authority cloaks itself in attractive falsehoods, deluding itself in the process. But, in the end, the naked truth is revealed by a small, insistent voice that refuses to be hushed. It grows into a popular cry. The year 1989 was not kind to the Stalinist dictators who cloaked themselves with false authority and ignored the insistent voice and will of the people. Now in Central and Eastern Europe, the emerging democracies are working to construct legitimate and enduring political orders. CSCE can help by deepening our consensus on the key building blocks of freedom--genuine elections, political pluralism, and the rule of law. The new social compacts between government and governed now being written in Eastern and Central Europe must be constantly renewed through free elections. As we all know well, democracy-- like CSCE--is a process. Democracy evolves through give-and-take, consensus-building, and compromise. It thrives on tolerance, where the political will of the majority does not nullify the fundamental rights of the minority. The free-elections proposal that the United Kingdom and the United States tabled last year in Paris has gathered strength from the dramatic events of last fall and the new elections of this spring. In my travels to Eastern and Central Europe, democratic activists enthusiastically supported the proposal. They also emphasized the importance they attach to the presence of international observers as their countries undergo the new experience of elections. In February, in Prague, I called upon the CSCE member states to send observer delegations to the elections in Eastern and Central Europe. And I am pleased to note that many states have joined us in doing so. Our revised proposal reflects our experience observing the elections, not only on voting day but also during the electoral campaign. We welcome the strong support that our text is receiving and will work to see it adopted here in Copenhagen. And when the 35 consider proposals to institutionalize CSCE, I urge all to start with mechanisms to ensure that governments are freely chosen by the people. But free and fair elections alone do not ensure that the new democracies will succeed. The irreducible condition of successful democracy, beyond legitimate elections, is clear. Fundamental individual freedoms must be guaranteed by restraints on state power. Where these guarantees are absent, there is no true democracy. Indeed, where they are absent, the risk of dictatorship always looms. For this reason, the watchword of reformers everywhere is the rule of law. As the late Andrey Sakharov said, democratic change must be accomplished through democratic methods-- peacefully, through legal processes. But what do we really mean by rule of law? The law, after all, has been used as a tool of repression in societies where rulers make the rules to serve themselves, not the people. As President Bush stressed last month in a speech at the University of South Carolina, the rule of law means the supremacy of laws written through democratic processes, applied in an equal fashion, and upheld by independent judiciaries. Therefore, we strongly support efforts at this meeting to set forth for CSCE the elements of a democratic society operating under the rule of law. In this regard, President Bush told President Gorbachev how highly we value Soviet efforts to institutionalize the rule of law, glasnost, and democratization in the USSR. To this same end, we are engaging in cooperative technical efforts to strengthen democratic political cultures and institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. A closing thought on our human rights agenda. As we turn to the ambitious task of consolidating democracy in entire societies, we must not lose sight of individual liberty, for democracy begins and ends with the citizen and his or her rights. Despite the dramatic gains in human rights that we witness today, men and women in some participating states are still made to suffer because they want to be free, still are targets of intolerance, still cannot emigrate, still may not exercise their full Helsinki rights. We must continue to press until CSCE's high standards of human rights prevail throughout Europe, until they extend to every individual. Before turning to ways we might strengthen CSCE, I would like to say a word abut Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. At the Washington summit, President Bush conveyed our deep misgivings about Soviet policy toward Baltic independence. He stressed again our view that a systematic dialogue must be initiated so that the aspirations of the Baltic peoples can be achieved.
A New Consensus on Strengthening the CSCE Process
The scope for meaningful cooperation in CSCE is widening, and our consensus is deepening in CSCE's human dimension. But in order to have CSCE fulfill its potential in this important area and in CSCE's other baskets, the Helsinki process itself must be enhanced. I recently shared with colleagues six ideas on how we can work together to improve CSCE as a process by reinforcing CSCE's organization.
Six Ideas to Improve CSCE
First, the United States favors regular consultations among the signatory states. Ministers may wish to meet at least once a year, and their senior officials should convene at least twice a year. Such exchanges will invigorate the CSCE as a forum for high-level political dialogue. Second, we support the holding of CSCE review conferences on a more frequent basis, perhaps every 2 years, and with a fixed duration of about 3 months. Third, to ensure that the political commitments we make in CSCE strengthen political legitimacy, we seek adoption in Copenhagen and confirmation at the summit of the principle of free and fair elections, political pluralism, and the rule of law. Fourth, we seek confirmation at the summit of the Bonn Principles of Economic Cooperation. These principles make clear our mutual commitment to the supportive relationship between political and economic liberty. Specifically, 35 nations will endeavor to achieve or maintain the free flow of trade and capital, market economies with prices based on supply and demand, and protection for all property, including private property and intellectual property. Fifth, CSCE can play a major role in dispute management. We, therefore, hope that the CSCE summit will reinforce the mandate of the January 1991 Valletta Conference on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes so that it can achieve concrete results. We also believe CSCE can foster military openness and transparency through innovative proposals in the Vienna CSBM [confidence- and security- building measures] talks, for example, the proposal for a mechanism to request clarification of unusual military activities. In particular, we believe that CSCE should consider a mechanism to improve communications among member states. Our approach might be similar in essence, if not in structure, to the mechanism we have established in the human dimension area as well as to the one which we plan to establish for CFE [conventional armed forces in Europe]. We should find a way of constructively addressing compliance questions with regard to CSCE security obligations. This might include observations and inspection reports in accordance with the Stockholm agreement. We should provide for meetings to exchange information and to discuss the implications of military activities or other unusual occurrences having security implications. Sixth, I proposed that we begin preparatory work for a possible CSCE summit through a meeting of officials this summer-- so I am, of course, pleased that the 35 nations have now agreed that our officials will meet next month in Vienna. I am also pleased that the 35 have agreed to our offer to host a CSCE ministerial meeting this fall in connection with the UN General Assembly. Then, at the CSCE summit, we would expect to sign a CFE agreement, and President Gorbachev last week indicated he shared this view. At the 35-nation summit, we also would expect to review, record, and consolidate progress in all three Helsinki baskets to strengthen CSCE as a process and to plan ahead for the 1992 review conference. Our work, both before the summit and during it, must also address the subject of institutionalizing CSCE. Until now, CSCE has shown a remarkable ability to both reflect and change with the times. I am confident that it will continue to do so, provided we preserve the flexibility that has made it effective. As we consider proposals for CSCE's development--either for adoption at the summit or by referral by the summit leaders to other upcoming meetings of the CSCE--the United States will be guided by three key principles.
Three Key Principles
One, proposals should reinforce fundamental democratic and market values. Two, suggestions for new institutions should complement rather than duplicate roles assigned to existing institutions and fora. Three, proposals should result in a stronger transatlantic process of dialogue and consultation regarding Europe's future. The American delegation to this Copenhagen meeting, which is headed by Ambassador Max Kampelman and which has the complete confidence of President Bush and, of course, myself, will be guided by these criteria. I began my remarks with a tribute to the Helsinki monitors who risked their lives and liberty to advance the cause of freedom for others. Many have lived to see the dawn of a much more hopeful day. Some of the monitors are with us in this chamber, and many of them serve as elected representatives of the newly emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. One of the founding monitors of Charter '77 now honors us by leading the distinguished delegation from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Ambassador Hajek, you and your courageous colleagues are the very embodiment of CSCE's human dimension. You have given this process a heart, a mind, and a searching conscience. When many viewed CSCE with cynicism, you answered them with dynamism. You taught us to raise our sights and raise our voices. The Danish author Isak Dinesen was another believer in the power of the human will. One of her favorite mottos was Je responderay!--I will respond. She lived by that principle, and she was proud to recount how occupied Denmark lived by it during the dark days of the Second World War. The Danish people took it upon themselves to save the entire Jewish community of Denmark--some 8,000 men, women, and children. By honoring human dignity and the ties that bind all of us, by their efforts and the grace of God, they succeeded beyond all expectation. Their example is proof positive that commitment of will matters, that responsibility to others matters, and that individual freedoms to act and think and feel can shape not only the moment but the future of one's country. These same strengths must shape Europe's future. Channeled through CSCE, they can become the conscience of the continent. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

The NATO Alliance and the Future of Europe

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Excerpts from the prepared intervention before the North Atlantic Council meeting, Turnberry, Scotland Date: Jun 7, 19906/7/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe Subject: NATO, CSCE [TEXT] Next month, our leaders will gather in London to chart the future of this alliance. In their first meeting since the liberating democratic upheavals of 1989, their task will be to adjust NATO's missions and capabilities to a world free of the conflict that divided this continent for over a generation. NATO will need to solidify and build the peace in the decades ahead as effectively as it has prevented war for 40 years. Our alliance, in short, must be suited to the task of ensuring the new Europe's legitimacy, prosperity, and stability while maintaining the capability to contain and deter aggression. Our task is to lay the groundwork for a successful summit--to accelerate the alliance's ongoing process of reassessment and renewal. I would like to begin this task today by reviewing with you last week's meetings between President Bush and President Gorbachev and by discussing the implications for our work. The President's meetings with President Gorbachev were a success because of both the agreements we completed and the personal relationship and chemistry that developed between the two leaders. They were able to talk frankly and openly, with 1 full day spent in discussions in a very relaxed setting. Even where they disagreed, the tone of the meetings was not confrontational.
Bush-Gorbachev Agreements
The mutual search for common interests carried over into the agreements that were reached. While Gorbachev and the center are clearly under pressure, he demonstrated that he can make decisions. On nuclear arms control, we issued joint statements on START [strategic arms reduction talks] and on future nuclear and space arms negotiations. Our joint statement on START recorded agreement on almost all the major substantive issues. Some of the remaining issues are difficult--for example, heavy missile testing and Soviet assurance on the Backfire bomber. But we believe they can be solved, and we believe that we will be able to meet both Presidents' objective of signing the actual treaty later this year. Our statement on future negotiations made it clear that the nuclear arms control process will continue after START. This statement moves us in a very important direction. It reflects a joint commitment to extend the search for strategic stability and predictability. In particular, it outlines a commitment to reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic arms, notably including heavy missiles and MIRVed [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles] ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]. Movement toward de-MIRVing land-based missiles will, we believe, greatly bolster strategic stability and lower potential fears of a first strike. On nuclear testing, we completed a 15-year effort by signing the protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. On chemical weapons, we signed a bilateral accord to destroy the vast majority of our stockpiles. This agreement, and the destruction of vast quantities of chemical weapons mandated by it, is valuable both as a stand-alone result and as a practical road map for achieving the President's goal of a global ban on these horrific weapons. It demonstrates the commitment of both East and West to extend our arms control agenda to cope with the dangerous weaponry of regional and worldwide conflict. I hope it will provide an impetus for the alliance to lead the way in rapidly moving forward the Geneva negotiations. We also signed a long-term grains agreement and a commercial trade agreement. We will not send the commercial trade agreement to our Congress until the Soviets pass their emigration legislation. In addition, we explained that we did not believe the Congress will approve this agreement until the deadlock over Lithuania is broken. Lithuania was one of the two key issues on which President Bush and President Gorbachev remain far apart. We again heard from President Gorbachev a commitment to settling the Lithuanian crisis peacefully and through dialogue. We also believe we heard a commitment to compromise. The gap may be narrowing between the Soviets and Lithuanians, but we are not there yet. The two presidents also had extensive and involved discussions on Germany. The President reiterated our approach to unification and the Two-Plus-Four process. He said the peaceful unification of a democratic Germany was the realization of a long- held Western goal and that it could be accomplished in a way that made all of Europe stronger and more secure. He stressed that Four Power rights should be terminated at the same time as unification- -with no discriminatory constraints on German sovereignty and no singularization of a united, democratic Germany. President Bush also assured President Gorbachev that no one wanted to isolate the Soviets. But the Soviets' own policies on Germany could well have this effect if the Soviets were to take negative stands on the external aspects of unification. In this event, their approach would put them in conflict with most European governments, East and West. The very logic of new thinking would be contradicted. It would be a lost opportunity for the Soviet Union to develop constructive relations with a united Germany and the other democracies of Eastern, Central, and Western Europe.
The Nine Assurances
We laid out nine assurance that we and others have offered and which we believe respond to many Soviet concerns. First, we are committed to follow-on CFE [conventional armed forces in Europe] negotiations for all of Europe, which would also cover forces in the central region of Europe. Second, we have agreed to advance SNF [strategic nuclear forces] negotiations to begin once the CFE treaty is signed. Third, Germany will reaffirm its commitments neither to produce nor to possess nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Fourth, NATO is conducting a comprehensive strategic review of both conventional and nuclear force requirements and strategy to fit the changed circumstances. Fifth, NATO forces will not be extended to the former territory of the GDR for a transition period. Sixth, the Germans have agreed to a transition period for Soviet forces leaving the GDR. Seventh, Germany will make firm commitments on its borders, making clear that the territory of a unified Germany will comprise only the FRG, GDR, and Berlin. Eighth, the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process will be strengthened. Ninth, Germany has made it clear that it will seek to resolve economic issues in a way that can support perestroika. While Gorbachev was reassured by these points, German membership in NATO--and the Soviet position in Europe after unification--remained his major concern. President Bush stressed that a unified, democratic Germany would pose no threat to Soviet security, and that Germany's membership in NATO was a factor for stability and security in Europe. He reiterated his support for Germany's full membership in NATO, including participation in its integrated military structures. He said that Germany must enjoy the right, as stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act, to choose freely its own alliance and security arrangements. Gorbachev seemed to accept this point. We can and should be prepared to meet reasonable Soviet concerns. But we cannot acquiesce in an effort to block a full return to German sovereignty or to use ostensible security concerns over Germany as a surrogate for weakening the alliance.
Key Summit Questions
Let me turn now to the key questions the President believes should be addressed in either the summit communique or in a serious review process initiated by the summit. On conventional forces, we need to prepare a thorough approach to further CFE negotiations. To further enhance conventional arms control, I am pleased that NATO has now agreed to the idea of an arms control verification staff that we proposed last December; it suits well the evolving nature of the alliance. We also need to examine our conventional force structure. If, as we hope and expect, Soviet troops are withdrawn behind Soviet borders, then we should examine how best the objective of protecting the full territory of all our members can be met. We need to determine how this can be done at lower levels of conventional forces, structured to reinforce in a mobile fashion. We agree wholeheartedly that multinational units may have an important role to play as we structure our forces. On nuclear forces, we need to move rapidly on our reassessment. We need to weight the strategic rationale, military effectiveness, and political viability of changes in our nuclear posture. For our part, we want to share the nuclear risk as widely among the alliance as possible while holding to a nuclear posture that our publics and the rest of Europe find politically reassuring. Before turning to the political dimensions of our review, I want to stress one point that bears repeating. We do not want to make Europe safe for any war, conventional or nuclear. Each proposal we consider must be judged by how well it supports our fundamental goal: preventing war and deterring aggression by maintaining Western cohesion--politically and militarily.
NATO's Political Role
In conjunction with reshaping the alliance militarily, we must clearly articulate its political place in an undivided Europe. The President's speech in Stillwater, Oklahoma, raised two interrelated questions that drive to the heart of NATO's future in this new world: What should be the future political task of the alliance? And, what should be common allied objectives for the future of CSCE? Let me answer the second question first. CSCE can serve the European common interest best by acting as a forum where the states of Europe discuss common problems and concerns. I've called it the "conscience of the continent," a place where the political and moral consensus of the time can be shaped based on democratic values. CSCE's three baskets make it uniquely suited for building consensus to meet Europe's major challenges: ensuring political legitimacy, economic liberty and prosperity, and strategic stability and predictability. As I stressed yesterday in Copenhagen, CSCE should stand upon the building blocks of democracy: free and fair elections, political pluralism, and the rule of law. Yet, by its very nature--35 disparate states, each holding a veto on action--CSCE is unlikely to be able to make the difficult decisions needed to safeguard security. This does not mean we should miss an opportunity to work to strengthen CSCE; we should meet this challenge. Most of us have made proposals, including the Soviets, and we look to the upcoming preparatory conference to sort through these ideas, evaluate them, and shape some for possible action. I think views are coalescing on practical, realistic steps that can strengthen CSCE. We can build a more efficient and meaningful CSCE that complements NATO. But we must build up CSCE mindful of its comparative strengths and weaknesses. And we should not try to make it something it is not--an alliance that can maintain the peace. We believe that role ultimately must continue to reside primarily with NATO. We all know what NATO has been: the most successful alliance of free nations in history. And we all know what the alliance remains: a bedrock of stability in an era of uncertainty, even confusion. The real question is: What role will the alliance play in Europe's future? NATO will remain an important contributor to the legitimacy and stability of the new Europe, although its functions and capabilities will evolve with the new times of changing challenges. One cannot cleanly and crisply allocate responsibilities among NATO, the EC [European Community], CSCE, and other organizations. Europe faces many overlapping problems, not a single one. And in our view, overlapping, multiple institutions are the commonsensical answer to diverse, interrelated problems. Clearly, NATO must maintain itself as an irreplaceable association of free states, joining together to deter aggression and prevent war.
Building the Peace
But now, with the clear and present military danger from one source waning, surely the alliance can look beyond the narrower task of preventing war to the broader one of building the peace. The mandate for this can be found plainly stated in Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty: The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. Moving in this direction does not require a revolution in our thinking. It just requires that we adapt to new realities and build upon our proven collective defense structure a broader notion of security. This notion must recognize that NATO cannot only prevent war but can also build peace. And that the way to build the peace is to reassure the Central and East Europeans and the Soviets that they will not be left out of the new Europe. Just as other organizations are broadening their mandate to include the newly emerging democracies of the East, so, too, NATO can strengthen its ties with the rest of Europe. One way we can do this, as I stressed in a speech in New York a month ago, is through a solid dialogue and even regular consultations, both military and political. We need not necessarily do this bloc-to-bloc; indeed, there may be a virtue of having NATO reach out to all of Europe, including neutral and nonaligned nations. By embracing Europe whole and free, the London summit [NATO ministerial meeting, July 5-6, 1990] can show the world what we already know: The work of our 16 democracies through NATO will maintain some functions of a past age of Europe while adapting to the next age. In the largest sense of NATO's historical objectives, the real work of promoting and securing a Europe whole and free has just begun in earnest.(###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

Recent Developments in US-Soviet Relations

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC Date: Jun 12, 19906/12/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Europe, North America, E/C Europe Country: USSR (former), United States Subject: Military Affairs, Arms Control, Trade/Economics, Regional/Civil Unrest [TEXT] It is a real privilege to appear before the committee this morning to review these recent developments in US-Soviet relations and also to look forward to what comes next. We've just completed a US-Soviet summit. We're now in the midst of preparations for a special NATO summit. The advice and counsel of this committee are important as we deal with these matters. As the President and I have often stressed, the United States can best meet the momentous challenges that we face from the perspective of a truly bipartisan foreign policy. Recent international developments, especially the trend toward democracy and economic reform, confirm our long- held values and are clearly in our long-term interests. But, just as clearly, the aftermath of the political earthquakes of 1989 will be a complex period of rebuilding damaged structures, modifying others, and, in some cases, constructing new structures. There will be aftershocks. There also will be great opportunities to create a more democratic, more prosperous, and more secure world. Such opportunities depend, in large measure, on whether the United States and the Soviet Union can establish an enduring improvement in our relations. We are now fully engaged in trying to do just that through the search for points of mutual advantage. This search is guided by our determination, as the President says, to go beyond containment and to build a new world that leaves behind both the cold war and the conflicts that preceded that cold war. It also is guided by the potential of perestroika, the Soviet Union's attempt to reform its economy and, indeed, its entire social system. Perestroika merits our support, we think, precisely because it offers the chance for more constructive Soviet foreign and defense policies and, eventually, a more democratic Soviet Union. We know that finding points of mutual advantage is not always going to be easy or swift. As Dean Rusk wrote to me last year, "We have much to remember and we have much to forget" before we conclude that the new era is here to stay. But there has been progress, and there is, I think, promise of more progress. I would now like to review for you what we have been able to do over the last several months in the major areas of US-Soviet engagement.
A Whole and Free Europe
First of all, we have made headway toward the achievement of a whole and free Europe and, within that Europe, a Germany that is whole and free. Last month, I traveled to Bonn for the initial ministerial meeting of the Two-Plus-Four talks. We have made clear that the purpose of this process is to ratify the clear will of the German people to unite in peace and freedom while providing a forum to discuss unification's external ramifications. Discussions between the two German governments on all internal aspects of unification are proceeding quite rapidly. Meanwhile, we are trying to come to grips with the external ramifications of unification, including the question of borders, Berlin, residual Four Power rights under international law, and certain political-military issues. Here, the United States has emphasized that it would be, in our view, counterproductive to perpetuate a special status for Germany or to prolong any limitations on German sovereignty. Discriminatory limitations could only sow the seeds for future instability. For this reason, we are opposed to using these discussions to put limits on strictly German military capabilities. Such limits and other confidence- building measures belong properly to the conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, or the confidence- and security- building measures talks as well as the upcoming talks on short- range nuclear forces (SNF). A united Germany begins a new chapter in postwar European politics. But this new chapter should contain the lessons that we've learned from the old. The European Community and NATO represent the will of free peoples cooperating on both sides of the Atlantic to assure democracy, peace, and prosperity. That is why we and so many Europeans, including the Germans, believe that the new Germany should be a full member of a vigorous NATO alliance. NATO, like all European institutions, will evolve to deal with the new situation in Europe. But of this I think we can be sure: It will remain a defensive alliance with an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces designed to preserve peace and security and not to start war. It also will continue to serve, as I told the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] conference in Copenhagen last week, as the indispensable guarantor of peace. The Soviet Union opposes full membership in NATO for a unified Germany. At the May ministerial in Moscow and later at the summit, we explained to the Soviet leaders that NATO is a voluntary alliance of free peoples. Its purpose is not--and, indeed, never has been--to threaten or to attack the Soviet Union or anyone else but rather to prevent aggression and to provide an anchor against the winds of uncertainty and instability. The United States, in consultation with our NATO allies, has proposed a nine-point package of future security measures that substantiate our views. It includes the following elements: -- Follow-on CFE negotiations for all of Europe, which also would cover forces in the central region of Europe; -- SNF negotiations to begin once a conventional force treaty is signed; -- A reaffirmed German commitment neither to produce nor to possess nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; -- A NATO strategy review of both conventional and nuclear force requirements and strategy to fit the changed circumstances in Europe; -- Nonextension of NATO forces into the former territory of the German Democratic Republic for a transition period; -- Support of Germany's interest in a transition period for Soviet forces leaving the German Democratic Republic; -- Final resolution of Germany's borders to comprise only the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and Berlin; -- A willingness to strengthen the CSCE process; and -- A resolution of Soviet-German economic issues in a way that can support perestroika. To sum it up, we are trying to meet Moscow's security concerns, but it also is incumbent on the Soviets to understand why NATO is indispensable to us and, for that matter, to most all of the European nations. I must believe that in the end, the Soviet Union does not want to be isolated on this issue. Before turning to the next area of our search for points of mutual advantage, I want to say a word on the recent elections in Central and Eastern Europe. Two more countries have just faced the test of their first multiparty elections since the revolution of 1989. In Czechoslovakia, by all accounts, both the spirit and the practice of free elections were upheld. Civic Forum and its Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence, received the large plurality of votes, but the big winner was democracy. On Sunday, Bulgarians went to the polls for the first round of voting for a new parliament. Official results indicate that the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party--the former communists--took almost half the vote, prior to parliamentary runoffs and the presidential election. We cannot predict the composition of the parliament or what kind of coalition may be formed until we know the outcome of these races. Questions about possible election-day abuses are being explored by government and party representatives. We would like to reserve judgment on these matters until we have reviewed the reports of Bulgarian and foreign election observers, including the US observer delegation. We have made clear our dissatisfaction on several issues relating to the fairness of the campaign itself, including intimidation of opposition activists and supporters, serious inequalities in campaign resources and media access, and irregularities in voter lists. We will continue to work with all Bulgarians for the development of political pluralism and democratic institutions.
Arms Control
The second area of our search for points of mutual advantage with the Soviet Union concerns arms control. Our broad objective is to enhance strategic stability and predictability and to preserve deterrence at lower levels of arms and with less risk of either misunderstanding or miscalculation. Both strategic and conventional arms control must be integrated in our policy because these two aspects of the strategic balance are closely related. Finally, we want to broaden the traditional arms control agenda to deal with new global dangers, such as missile proliferation, and an old problem--chemical warfare--that unfortunately has been revived. Progress can be reported in some, though not all, of these areas. At the summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a joint statement on the START [strategic arms reduction talks] and on future nuclear and space arms negotiations. The START statement records agreement on almost all of the major issues. But before a treaty can be signed, a few very difficult problems must be resolved, and much complex and involved work has got to be completed. I believe, however, that we can overcome these final hurdles in time to meet both Presidents' objectives of actually signing a treaty later this year. The United States and the Soviet Union are both committed to future negotiations on strategic arms. Our search to lower the danger of nuclear war is not going to stop with the START agreement. These future negotiations will seek to enhance strategic stability and predictability, especially through the reduction of incentives for a nuclear first strike. We are both committed to reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic arms, notably heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles that have multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles]. On nuclear testing, we completed a long negotiating effort by signing the protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. At the summit, the United States and the Soviet Union also signed a historic bilateral accord to destroy most of our chemical arms stockpiles. Both sides are to stop production, reduce to equal, low levels, and develop appropriate inspection procedures. We also are pledged to work together in persuading all nations to join us in the eventual elimination of all chemical weapons. On conventional weapons in Europe, the CFE treaty, which requires significant reductions in Soviet forces and equipment, is an essential building block of a Europe that is whole and free. The President and I have, therefore, been heartened by recent Soviet statements renewing their commitment to seek rapid agreement on CFE. I might add that at the summit, President Gorbachev agreed with our contention that no CSCE summit will take place until a CFE treaty is signed. We and our NATO allies have agreed that talks on reducing short-range nuclear forces should commence once that conventional forces agreement is signed. Furthermore, as noted earlier, our nine points on German unification include a follow-on CFE negotiation that would cover forces in the central region of Europe. It is essential that CFE keep up with the rapid political changes that are now occurring. The stakes for both sides are too high for foot- dragging.
Regional Conflicts
The third point of our search for mutual advantage concerns regional conflicts. In testimony to the Congress and throughout our public statements, we have stressed the importance of US-Soviet cooperation in bringing to an end these terrible and unnecessary local wars. Over the past year, such cooperation has yielded good results in southern Africa where an independent Namibia is the first but hopefully not the last achievement. In Central America, the victory of democracy through the Nicaraguan election has transformed prospects for peace. We are still concerned, however, about Soviet support for Cuba and Cuban support for the rebels in El Salvador. Continued Soviet military assistance for Cuba is a striking exception to the Soviet Union's "new thinking" on regional issues. President Bush and President Gorbachev had far-ranging discussions at the summit on all regional problems. As one result, both the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement on June 2 concerning Ethiopia. In a remarkable example, I think, of our willingness to work together, we have agreed that US food will be transported on Soviet aircraft to deal with the tragedy of starvation in that country. We and the Soviets also support an international conference of governments under the auspices of the United Nations to settle at last the disastrous conflicts in the Horn of Africa.
Economic Relations
The fourth and final point I want to discuss today is US-Soviet trade. At the summit, the President signed a bilateral commercial agreement. Also, the Soviet Union agreed to a new long-term grains agreement. There is no direct relationship between the grains agreement and the commercial agreement. American grain has been sold under continuing arrangements to the Soviet Union since the early 1970s, and they are our biggest single foreign customers for this product. The grains agreement replaces and expands an existing agreement that governed sales through the end of 1990. Under the Jackson-Vanik legislation, the extension of most- favored-nation trading status requires both a waiver of Jackson- Vanik and, of course, the completion of a commercial agreement. But the waiver is conditional on Soviet emigration practices. The President has, therefore, indicated that he will neither waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment nor send the commercial agreement to Congress until the Supreme Soviet passes its emigration law. I have been assured by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that free emigration of Soviet Jews will continue and that President Gorbachev's recent comments on this issue were not intended to mean otherwise. The President told Mr. Gorbachev what the Senate had already made clear and what the House of Representatives reaffirmed. We do not believe that the Congress will approve the commercial agreement until the deadlock over Lithuania is broken. That, I think, is a fact of political life. I wish I could report that US and Soviet positions were closer on Lithuania, but I don't believe they are. However, President Gorbachev has reiterated his commitment to settling the Lithuanian crisis peacefully. We also believe we heard a commitment to compromise and are encouraged that Baltic leaders are in Moscow now. We hope this will lead not just to meetings with Soviet leaders but that it will lead, in fact, to a systematic dialogue toward a peaceful resolution of this problem. But a practical narrowing of the Soviet and Lithuanian differences, I think, still remains to be seen.
Conclusion
We are fully engaged in several vital areas of US-Soviet contact. Our purpose throughout is to find those points of mutual advantage that will provide a solid underpinning for a lasting improvement of US-Soviet relations. The immense changes now sweeping away old dogmas and dictatorships offer both of our countries an historic opportunity. As I said in the opening of my statement, however, after earthquakes there are always aftershocks. The work of reconstruction and building anew has really just begun. But I think that we have made a good beginning. Part of that good beginning is the rapport we saw at the summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. Differences notwithstanding, the tone and clarity and comfort of the discussions were unprecedented. I think that indicates an underlying desire to work problems out, an attitude that builds confidence for the future. Another very important confidence builder is the progress we have just made at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Scotland. As you know, the President has called for a special NATO summit next month to spell out NATO's political role and to adjust NATO's military strategy and structure in guaranteeing the peace of the new Europe. We have had very good discussions at Turnberry. I could summarize them by saying that NATO is preparing to do more than just prevent war. I think NATO also is willing and able to build the peace. We want to build a peace defined not just by the absence of war from the Baltic to the Adriatic but by a community of democratic values that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals. I would conclude now by reiterating what I said to the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension in Copenhagen last week. At the urging of the United States and others, the CSCE is now going to quicken its pace and increase its activities in its role as the conscience of Europe, but we and all the other nations who participate in the up-building of the new Europe must never forget a fundamental purpose. We must build on the basis of an unalienable right--human liberty. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

Enterprise for the Americas Initiative

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Remarks before administration officials and business people, Washington, DC Date: Jun 27, 19906/27/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Caribbean, Central America, South America, North America Subject: Trade/Economics, Environment [TEXT] Thank you all very much for coming to the White House. It is my pleasure to welcome so many distinguished guests with such strong interests in the vital Latin American and Caribbean region. In the past 12 months every one of us, from the men in the White House to the man on the street, has been fascinated by the tremendous changes, the positive changes, taking place around the world. Freedom has made great gains, not just in Eastern Europe, but right here in the Americas. We've seen a resurgence of democratic rule, a rising tide of democracy never before witnessed in the history of this beloved hemisphere. And with one exception, Cuba, the transition to democracy is moving toward completion. We can all sense the excitement that the day is not far off when Cuba joins the ranks of world democracies and makes the Americas fully free. With one exception, that's the case. But the political transformation sweeping the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean has its parallel in the economic sphere. Throughout the region, nations are turning away from the statist economic policies that stifle growth and are now looking to the power of the free market to help this hemisphere realize its untapped potential for progress. A new leadership has emerged backed by the strength of the peoples' mandate-- leadership that understands that the future of Latin America lies with free government and free markets. In the words of Colombia's courageous leader, Virgilio Barco, President Barco: "The long- running match between Karl Marx and Adam Smith is finally coming to an end" with the "recognition that open economies with access to markets can lead to social progress." For the United States, these are welcome developments-- developments that we're eager to support. But we recognize that each nation in the region must make its own choices. There is no blueprint, no one-size-fits-all approach to reform. The primary responsibility for achieving economic growth lies with each individual country. Our challenge in this country is to respond in ways that support the positive changes now taking place in the hemisphere. We must forge a genuine partnership for free market reform. Back in February, I met in Cartagena [Colombia] with heads of the three Andean nations. And I came away from that meeting convinced that the United States must review its approach not only to that region but to Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole. I asked Treasury Secretary Brady to lead a review of US economic policy toward this vital region, to make a fresh assessment of the problems and opportunities we'll encounter in the decade ahead. That review is now complete, and the results are in. And the need for new economic initiatives is clear and compelling. All signs point to the fact that we must shift the focus of our economic interaction toward a new economic partnership because prosperity in our hemisphere depends on trade, not aid. I've asked you here today to share with you some of the ideas, some of the ways we can build a broad-based partnership for the 1990s--to announce the new Enterprise for the Americas Initiative that creates incentives to reinforce Latin America's growing recognition that free market reform is the key to sustained growth and political stability. The three pillars of our new initiative are trade, investment, and debt. To expand trade, I propose that we begin the process of creating a hemisphere-wide free trade zone; to increase investment, that we adopt measures to create a new flow of capital into the region; and to further ease the debt--the burden of debt--a new approach to debt in the region with important benefits for our environment.
Trade
In the 1980s, trade within our hemisphere trailed the overall pace of growth in world trade. One principal reason for that: over- restrictive trade barriers that wall off the economies of our region from each other, and from the United States, at great cost to us all. These barriers are the legacy of the misguided notion that a nation's economy needs protection in order to thrive. The great economic lesson of this century is that protectionism still stifles progress, and free markets breed prosperity. To this end, we've formulated a three-point trade plan to encourage the emerging trend toward free market reform and that is now gathering forces in the Americas. First, as we enter the final months of the current Uruguay Round of the world trade talks, I pledge close cooperation with the nations of this hemisphere. The successful completion of the Uruguay Round remains the most effective way of promoting long- term trade growth in Latin America and the increased integration of Latin nations into the overall global trading system. Our aim in the Uruguay Round is free and fair trade. Through these talks, we are seeking to strengthen existing trade rules and to expand them to areas that do not now have agreed rules of fair play. To show our commitment to our neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean, we will seek deeper tariff reductions in this round on products of special interest to them. Second, we must build on the trend we see toward free markets and make our ultimate aim a free trade system that links all of the Americas--North, Central, and South. We look forward to the day when not only are the Americas the first fully free democratic hemisphere but when all are equal partners in a free trade zone stretching from the port of Anchorage to the Tierra del Fuego. I'm announcing today that the United States stands ready to enter into free trade agreements with other markets in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly with groups of countries that have associated for purposes of trade liberalization. The first step in this process is the now-announced free trade agreement with Mexico. On June 11, 1990, Presidents Bush and Salinas endorsed the goal of a comprehensive free trade agreement between the United States and Mexico. The presidents have directed their trade ministers to undertake the consultations and preparatory work needed to initiate such negotiations and to report back to them before the two presidents' next meeting in December 1990. [Editors note: This initiative later developed into the North America Free Trade Agreement] We must all recognize that we won't bring down barriers to free trade overnight; changes so far- reaching may take years of preparation and tough negotiations. But the payoff in terms of prosperity is worth every effort. And now is the time to make a comprehensive free trade zone for the Americas our long-term goal. And third, I understand that some countries aren't yet ready to take that dramatic step to a full free trade agreement. And that's why we're prepared to negotiate with any interested nation in the region bilateral framework agreements to open markets and develop closer trade ties. Such agreements already exist with Mexico and Bolivia. Framework agreements will enable us to move forward on a step-by-step basis to eliminate counterproductive barriers to trade and toward our ultimate goal of free trade. And that's a prescription for greater growth and a higher standard of living in Latin America and, right here at home, a new market for American products and more jobs for American workers. Promoting free trade is just one of three key elements in our new Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Our second pillar is increased investment.
Investment Reform
The competition for capital today is fierce. And the key to increased investment is to be competitive, to turn around the conditions that have discouraged both foreign and domestic investment, reduce the regulatory burden, clear away the thicket of bureaucratic barriers that choke off Latin America's aspiring entrepreneurs. In one large Latin city, for instance, it takes almost 300 days to cut through thered tape to open a small garment shop. In another country, the average overseas caller has to make five phone calls to get through, and the wait for a new telephone line can be as long as 5 years--and that's got to change. Investment reform is essential to make it easier to start new business ventures and make it possible for international investors to participate and profit in Latin American markets. In order to create incentives for investment reform, the United States is prepared to take the following steps. First, the United States will work with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to create a new lending program for nations that take significant steps to remove impediments to international investment. The World Bank could also contribute to this effort. Second, we propose the creation of a new investment fund for the Americas. This fund, administered by the IDB, could provide up to $300 million a year in grants in response to market-oriented investment reforms in progress in privatization. The United States intends to contribute $100 million to the fund, and we will seek matching contributions from Europe and Japan. But in order to create an attractive climate for new investment, we must build on our successful efforts to ease the debt burden. That's the third pillar of this new Enterprise for the Americas initiative.
Easing the Debt Burden
Many nations have already undertaken painful economic reforms for the sake of future growth. But the investment climate remains clouded, weighted down by the heavy debt burden. Under the Brady plan, we are making significant progress. The agreements reached with Mexico and Costa Rica and Venezuela are already having a positive impact on investment in those countries. Mexico, to take just one example, has already seen a reversal of the destructive capital flight that drained so many Latin American nations of precious investment resources. That's critical. If we restore confidence, capital will follow. As one means of expanding our debt strategy, we propose that the IDB add its efforts and resources to those of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to support commercial bank debt reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean and, as in the case of World Bank and IMF, IDB funds should be directly linked to economic reform. While the Brady plan has helped nations reduce commercial bank debt for nations with high levels of official debt--debt owed to governments rather than private financial institution--the burden remains heavy. And today, across Latin America, official debt owed to the US Government amounts to nearly $12 billion, with $7 billion of that amount in concessional loans. In many cases, the heaviest official debt burdens fall on some of the region's smallest nations, countries like Honduras, El Salvador and Jamaica. That's a problem we must address today. As the key component in addressing the region's debt problem, I am proposing a major new initiative to reduce Latin America's and the Caribbean's official debt to the United States for countries that adopt strong economic and investment reform programs with the support of international institutions. Our debt reduction program will deal separately with concessional and commercial types of loans. On the concessional debt, loans made from aid or food for peace accounts, we will propose substantial debt reductions for the most heavily burdened countries. And we will also sell a portion of outstanding commercial loans to facilitate these debt-for-equity and debt-for- nature swaps in countries that have set up such programs.
Strengthening Environmental Policies
These actions will be taken on a case-by-case basis. One measure of prosperity in the most important long-term investment any nation can make is environmental well-being. As part of our Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, we will take action to strengthen environmental policies in this hemisphere. Debt-for-nature swaps are one example--patterned after the innovative agreements reached by some Latin American nations and their commercial creditors. We will also call for the creation of environmental trusts, where interest payments owed on restructured US debt will be paid in local currency and set aside to fund environmental projects in the debtor countries. These innovative agreements offer a powerful new tool for preserving the natural wonders of this hemisphere that we share. From the vistas of the unspoiled Arctic, to the beauties of the barrier reef off Belize, to the rich rain forests of the Amazons, we must protect this living legacy that we hold in trust.
Conclusion
For an increasing number of our neighbors, the need for free market reform is clear. These nations need economic breathing room to enact bold reforms. And this official debt initiative is one answer- -a way out from under the crushing burden of debt that slows the process of reform. I know there is some concern that the revolutionary changes that we've witnessed this past year in Eastern Europe will shift our attention away from Latin America. But I want to assure all of you here today, as I've assured many democratic leaders in Central and South America and the Caribbean and Mexico, the United States will not lose sight of the tremendous challenges and opportunities right here in our own hemisphere. And indeed, as we talk with the leaders of the G-24 about the emerging democracies in Europe, I've been talking to them also about their supporting democracy and economic freedom in Central America. Our aim is a closer partnership between the Americas and our friends in Europe and in Asia. Two years from now, our hemisphere will celebrate the 500th anniversary of an epic event, Columbus' discovery of America, our New World. And we trace our origins, our shared history to the time of Columbus' voyage and the courageous quest for the advancement of man. Today, the bonds of our common heritage are strengthened by the love of freedom and a common commitment to democracy. Our challenge, the challenge in this new era of the Americas, is to secure this shared dream and all its fruits for all the people of the Americas--North, Central, and South. The comprehensive plan that I've just outlined is proof positive the United States is serious about forging a new partnership with our Latin American and Caribbean neighbors. We're ready to play a constructive role at this critical time to make ours the first fully free hemisphere in all of history. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

Assistance and Reform: Eastern Europe and Central America

Baker Source: Secretary Baker Description: Remarks at the G-24 ministerial meeting, Palais D'Egmont, Brussels, Belgium Date: Jul 4, 19907/4/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: Central America, E/C Europe Subject: Trade/Economics, Development/Relief Aid [TEXT] Almost a year has passed since leaders at the Paris economic summit asked the European Commission to coordinate Western assistance in support of fundamental reform in Poland and Hungary. Since then, the commission and the member states of the G-24* have committed more than $14 billion in economic assistance and investment credits to support the transition of these two countries to democratic governments and market-oriented economies. I would like to congratulate President Delors [France] and his colleagues, especially Vice President Andriessen [Netherlands], as well as the commission as a whole for their highly capable efforts. This is a transition never before undertaken by so many so quickly. The G-24's broad support for reform in Poland and Hungary is based on the recognition of a simple fact: The people of these two countries are determined as never before to shake off the mistakes of the past. In April 1989, President Bush indicated that our support for Poland was predicated on tough decisions that only the Polish people could make. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Mazowiecki, the Polish government, supported by a majority of the people, has not hesitated to make such tough decisions. We have also begun to work constructively with Prime Minister Antall and the other members of the new, freely elected Hungarian government. We are pleased that on September 6, this new government will open the Budapest Environmental Center, an idea first proposed by President Bush last year. With a Hungarian executive director, an American program manager, and broad European support, the center will become a prime example of transnational cooperation for progress in Central and Eastern Europe. We look forward to hearing assessments from our Polish and Hungarian colleagues on the progress they have made and on how our efforts can be channeled to meet the challenges ahead. But, today, we have another important task before us--to welcome Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic into this process. In December, we opened the way for G-24 coordinated assistance for these countries as soon as they met the political and economic criteria for such assistance. Now, they have done so. In the June 8-9 election, the Czech and Slovak people firmly endorsed the "velvet" revolution and the leadership of Vaclav Havel, Civic Forum, and the Public Against Violence. Yugoslavia has embarked on an ambitious program of economic and political reform. Just last week, the Markovic government announced a broad expansion of its economic reform program. We believe this program charts a solid course for Yugoslavian prosperity. The Republics of Slovenia and Croatia have recently held free elections, and other republics are expected to hold such elections in the near future. Set against this progress, however, are rising internal tensions, particularly in the province of Kosovo. This concerns us greatly. We of the G-24 should collectively call upon the people and the leaders of Yugoslavia and its republics to resolve their difficulties peacefully and with full respect for human rights. Political and economic reform, even when fully supported and nurtured by friends and neighbors, cannot succeed if it is undermined by intolerance from within. In Bulgaria, we have expressed our deep concern about the fairness of the recent elections. Nevertheless, pending formation of the new Bulgarian government and assuming continued democratization, we believe that progress toward reform has been sufficient for Bulgaria to be eligible now for G-24 assistance. The United States will continue to monitor closely the process of democratization and free-market reform in Bulgaria. We are prepared to provide tangible support for this process. At the same time, we need to keep in mind that G-24 conditionality is not a one- time threshold but a continuing requirement. The German Democratic Republic is, of course, a special case and needs to be treated as such. I believe the events of this week are the first steps toward a bright economic and political future for all the people of Germany. Pending German political unification, however, it is appropriate for the G-24 to recognize the tremendous progress that has been made in the GDR toward political and economic reform. Unfortunately, Romania has not yet met the conditions required for G-24 support. The Iliescu regime's complicity with the miners' violent repression of demonstrators and the arrest of the political opposition raised serious questions about its commitment to democratic reform and basic human rights. We look forward to the day when we can include Romania in the G-24 process. However, we will require demonstrable progress on both political and economic reform and respect for human rights before that day can come. The United States believes it is essential that we maintain the integrity of the G-24 process. As I noted at the outset, this process was established to support Poland and Hungary as they moved to embrace the principles of political and economic freedom. Following those principles, the G-24 has helped both countries to follow through on their own decisions to join the community of democratic nations. Our decision to expand the process to the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe recognized their progress in political and economic reform.
Five Criteria for Eligibility
The commission, working with the G-24 member states, has developed the following five criteria that should determine eligibility for G-24 coordinated assistance: -- Adherence to the rule of law; -- Respect for human rights; -- Introduction of multi-party systems; -- The holding of fair and free elections; and -- The development of market-oriented economies. These criteria--the criteria that our CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] meetings in Bonn and Copenhagen have set for all of Europe--send a clear message to reformers and old thinkers alike. Western assistance is designed to support fundamental political and economic reform. Its purpose is not to maintain the status quo or to revert to the problems of the past. We also appreciate the contributions of the IMF [International Monetary Fund], World Bank, OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and the Paris Club [official bilateral creditors]. These institutions are playing major roles in assisting the political and economic transition of Central and Eastern Europe. And our policies of assistance should complement the programs of these international institutions. We believe that other international institutions that play significant roles should also be invited to participate in G-24 ministerials and senior experts' meetings. For example, the ILO [International Labor Organization] plays an important part in the working group on training, and the effective handling of labor issues is essential to successful economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe. We also need to be creative about adapting current institutions to meet new needs. Therefore, I propose that the OECD create a new affiliate status to meet a new need. This new status would be available for those states that have developed democratic political systems, committed themselves to creating market economies, participated in the OECD Center for European Economies in Transition, and shown an interest in eventual OECD membership. Affiliate involvement in OECD activities would be tailored to their unique needs and interests. Affiliate status would, in short, be one more way to foster a greater sense of inclusion for the newly democratizing countries.
Central America
Before closing, I would like to say a few words about our proposal for a G-24 effort in Central America. Recognizing the great success of the G-24 mechanism in Europe, the United States has proposed to the 12 EC foreign ministers, President Delors, Japan, and Canada that we develop a G-24-like mechanism to broaden support for democracy and development in Central America. I have discussed it with a number of you and with the Central American presidents. At their June 18 economic summit, the presidents welcomed the idea as a way of maintaining international attention on the region's economic and political progress, despite competing events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They believe, as we do, that we cannot let the great events of Europe lead us to overlook other opportunities and needs elsewhere. We have not yet worked out specifics of the structure and functioning of the mechanism, because we wanted to solicit views from the Central Americans and other interested governments. Although inspired by the East European G-24, the mechanism for Central America would be a separate and distinct process, reflecting the different realities of the two regions. At this point, we see the mechanism serving two main functions: -- Bringing together developed countries and the Central American states to discuss needs and resources; and -- Acting as a clearinghouse for information. It might also prove useful for preparing coordinated needs assessments and pursuing a small number of joint projects too large for any single donor nation. Let me close with this observation. Last year when the European commission and the member states of the G-24 undertook the task of coordinating Western assistance to Poland and Hungary, it was truly a leap into the unknown. Now we are fully engaged in a task with a great redeeming purpose: helping to bring the long- denied benefits of democracy and economic liberty to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Working through the commission and the G-24, our collective efforts must continue to quicken the courage of the peoples we have promised to help in their quest for freedom and prosperity. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

The Arabian Peninsula: US Principles

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address to the nation from the Oval Office of the White House, Washington, DC Date: Aug 8, 19908/8/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] In the life of a nation, we're called upon to define who we are and what we believe. Sometimes, these choices are not easy. But today as President, I ask for your support in a decision I've made to stand up for what's right and condemn what's wrong--all in the cause of peace. At my direction, elements of the 82d Airborne Division, as well as key units of the United States Air Force, are arriving today to take up defensive positions in Saudi Arabia. I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian government in the defense of its homeland. No one commits America's armed forces to a dangerous mission lightly. But after perhaps unparalleled international consultation and exhausting every alternative, it became necessary to take this action. Let me tell you why. Less than a week ago, in the early morning hours of August 2, Iraqi armed forces, without provocation or warning, invaded a peaceful Kuwait. Facing negligible resistance from its much smaller neighbor, Iraq's tanks stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few short hours. With more than 100,000 troops, along with tanks, artillery, and surface-to-surface missiles, Iraq now occupies Kuwait. This aggression came just hours after Saddam Hussein specifically assured numerous countries in the area that there would be no invasion. There is no justification whatsoever for this outrageous and brutal act of aggression. A puppet regime imposed from the outside is unacceptable. The acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable. No one, friend or foe, should doubt our desire for peace, and no one should underestimate our determination to confront aggression.
Four simple principles guide our policy.
First
, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
Second
, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime.
Third
, my administration, as has been the case with every President from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.
Fourth
, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad. Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, I ordered an embargo of all trade with Iraq and, together with many other nations, announced sanctions that both froze all Iraqi assets in this country and protected Kuwait's assets. The stakes are high. Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the world's second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. It's the fourth largest military in the world. Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. Much of the world is even more dependent upon imported oil and is even more vulnerable to Iraqi threats. We succeeded in the struggle for freedom in Europe because we and our allies remain stalwart. Keeping the peace in the Middle East will require no less. We're beginning a new era. This new era can be full of promise--an age of freedom; a time of peace for all peoples. But if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1980s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors. Only 14 days ago, Saddam Hussein promised his friends he would not invade Kuwait. And 4 days ago, he promised the world he would withdraw. And twice we have seen what his promises mean. His promises mean nothing. In the last few days, I've spoken with political leaders from the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Americas, and I've met with [British] Prime Minister Thatcher, [Canadian] Prime Minister Mulroney, and NATO Secretary General Woerner. And all agree that Iraq cannot be allowed to benefit from its invasion of Kuwait. We agree that this is not an American problem or a European problem or a Middle East problem. It is the world's problem. And that's why, soon after the Iraqi invasion, the UN Security Council, without dissent, condemned Iraq, calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait. The Arab world, through both the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, courageously announced its opposition to Iraqi aggression. Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and other governments around the world have imposed severe sanctions. The Soviet Union and China ended all arms sales to Iraq. And this past Monday [August 6], the UN Security Council approved for the first time in 23 years mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These sanctions, now enshrined in international law, have the potential to deny Iraq the fruits of aggression, while sharply limiting its ability to either import or export anything of value--especially oil. I pledge here today that the United States will do its part to see that these sanctions are effective and to induce Iraq to withdraw without delay from Kuwait. But we must recognize that Iraq may not stop using force to advance its ambitions. Iraq has massed an enormous war machine on the Saudi border, capable of initiating hostilities with little or no additional preparation. Given the Iraqi government's history of aggression against its own citizens as well as its neighbors, to assume Iraq will not attack again would be unwise and unrealistic. And, therefore, after consulting with King Fahd, I sent Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to discuss cooperative measures we could take. Following those meetings, the Saudi government requested our help. And I responded to that request by ordering US air and ground forces to deploy to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Let me be clear. The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States. This decision, which I shared with the congressional leadership, grows out of the longstanding friendship and security relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. US forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other nations to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia and to deter further Iraqi aggression. Through their presence, as well as through training and exercises, these multinational forces will enhance the overall capability of Saudi armed forces to defend the kingdom. I want to be clear about what we are doing and why. America does not seek conflict, nor do we seek to chart the destiny of other nations. But America will stand by its friends. The mission of our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will not be needed long. They will not initiate hostilities, but they will defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other friends in the Persian Gulf. We are working around the clock to deter Iraqi aggression and to enforce UN sanctions. I'm continuing my conversations with world leaders. Secretary of Defense Cheney has just returned from valuable consultations with President Mubarak of Egypt and King Hassan of Morocco. Secretary of State Baker has consulted with his counterparts in many nations, including the Soviet Union. Today he heads for Europe to consult with President Ozal of Turkey, a staunch friend of the United States, and he'll then consult with the NATO foreign ministers. I will ask oil-producing nations to do what they can to increase production in order to minimize any impact that oil flow reductions will have on the world economy. And I will explore whether we and our allies should draw down our strategic petroleum reserves. Conservation measures can also help. Americans everywhere must do their part. And one more thing. I'm asking the oil companies to do their fair share. They should show restraint and not abuse today's uncertainties to raise prices. Standing up for our principles will not come easy. It may take time and possibly cost a great deal. But we are asking no more of anyone than of the brave young men and women of our armed forces and their families. And I ask that in the churches around the country, prayers be said for those who are committed to protect and defend America's interests. Standing up for our principles is an American tradition. As it has so many times before, it may take time and tremendous effort. But most of all, it will take unity of purpose. As I've witnessed throughout my life in both war and peace, America has never wavered when its purpose is driven by principle. And on this August day, at home and abroad, I know it will do no less. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address to employees at the Pentagon, Washington, DC Date: Aug 15, 19908/15/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] Thank you, [Defense] Secretary Cheney and [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General Powell and distinguished members of the Joint Chiefs, [Head of the US Central Command] General Schwarzkopf and all of you who do all the work. Thank all of you for joining us today and, really, most of all for your hard work in defense of freedom and America every day. Over the past 10 days you have launched what history will judge as one of the most important deployments of allied military power since the Second World War. As I told the American people last week, let no one underestimate our determination to confront aggression. It's you-- the men and women of the Department of Defense--who turn these words into deeds that transform hope and promise into reality. I have just received a briefing from Secretary Cheney and General Powell. Our objectives remain clear: the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad. We will achieve these honorable goals. We have worked for decades to develop an international order- -a common code and rule of law that promotes cooperation in place of conflict. This order is imperfect; we know. But without it, peace and freedom are impossible. The rule of law gives way to the law of the jungle. So when the question is asked: Where does America stand? I answer: America stands where it always has-- against aggression. Today, the brave American and allied forces are keeping watch along the sands and off the shores of Saudi Arabia. They are there for a purpose: to serve the cause of justice and freedom--a cause the world supports. But Saddam Hussein would have us believe that his unprovoked invasion of a friendly Arab nation is a struggle between Arabs and Americans. That is clearly false. It is Saddam who lied to his Arab neighbors. It is Saddam who invaded an Arab state. It is Saddam who now threatens the Arab nation. We, by contrast, seek to assist our Arab friends in their hour of need. Saddam has claimed that this is a holy war of Arab against infidel--this from the man who has used poison gas against the men, women, and children of his own country, who invaded Iran in a war that cost the lives of more than half a million Muslims, and who now plunders Kuwait. Atrocities have been committed by Saddam's soldiers and henchmen. The reports out of Kuwait tell a sordid tale of brutality. Saddam would also have us believe that this is a struggle between the "haves" and the "have nots." But Iraq is one of the haves--next to Saudi Arabia, Iraq has the largest oil reserves in the world. But thanks to Saddam's ruinous policies of war against other Muslims, he has transformed wealth into poverty. Sadly, it is the Iraqi people who suffer today because of the raw territorial ambition of Saddam Hussein. Our action in the gulf is not about religion, greed, or cultural differences--as Iraq's leader would have us believe. What is at stake is truly vital. Our action in the gulf is about fighting aggression and preserving the sovereignty of nations. It is about keeping our word and standing by old friends. It is about our own national security interests and ensuring the peace and stability of the world. We are also talking about maintaining access to energy resources that are key--not just to the functioning of this country but to the entire world. Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein. So, we have made our stand--not simply to protect resources or real estate but to protect the freedom of nations. We are making good on longstanding assurances to protect and defend our friends, who have the courage to stand up to evil and are asking for our help. We are striking a blow for the principle that might does not make right. Kuwait is small. But one conquered nation is one too many. A half-century ago our nation and the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should--and could--have been stopped. We are not about to make the same mistake twice. Today, Saddam Hussein's Iraq has been cut off by the Arab and Islamic nations that surround it. The Arab League itself has condemned Iraq's aggression. We stand with them--and we are not alone. Sanctions are working. The armies and air forces of Egypt, Morocco, the United Kingdom, and the Gulf Cooperation Council states are shoulder-to-shoulder with us in Saudi Arabia's defense. Ships of numerous countries are sailing with ours to see that UN sanctions--approved without dissent--are enforced. Together we must ensure that no goods get in and that not one drop of oil gets out. The American people are with us. Congress is with us. Our allies are with us. And the vast majority of the Arab people are with us. No one should doubt our staying power or determination. We are in a new era--one full of promise. But events of the past 2 weeks remind us that there is no substitute for American leadership, and American leadership can not be effective in the absence of American strength. I know that this strength does not come cheaply or easily. You pay for it every day in the work you do, in the sacrifices you make, in the time you spend away from your families. I am relying on you to shape the forces of the future--to preserve peace and freedom in the face of new threats and new dangers. General Powell told me today that it's a great honor, during these dangerous times, to serve as an American soldier. I know it's a great honor for me to serve as your Commander-in-Chief. I thank you, and I join people everywhere in praying for you, for those in the field, and for the United States of America. God bless you all, and thank you for what you're doing for your country. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

America's Stand Against Aggression

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Address to the 91st national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Baltimore, Maryland Date: Aug 20, 19908/20/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] (introductory remarks deleted) This morning, I am grateful to have this special opportunity to discuss an issue of great concern to all Americans: the crisis in the Persian Gulf; a crisis that will require American planning, patience, and, yes, personal sacrifice. But a crisis that we must--and will-- meet if we are to stop aggression, help our friends, and protect our own interests and the peace and stability of countries around the globe. Eighteen days ago, these beliefs prompted me to take action in the Middle East to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait and deter those who threaten friendly countries and the vital interests of America. I acted knowing that our cause would not be easy--but that our cause is right. And that while one should not underestimate those who endanger peace, an even greater mistake would be to underestimate America's commitment to our friends when our friends are imperiled, or our commitment to international order when that, too, is imperiled. Today, the outcome is not yet decided. Hard choices remain. But of this we are certain: America will not be intimidated. When some ask, where does America stand, our answer is, America stands where it always has--against aggression, against those who would use force to replace the rule of law. And who better than this group know? Throughout history, we have learned that we must stand up to evil. It is a truth which the past 18 days have reaffirmed. Its lessons speak to America and to the world. The first lesson is as vivid as the memories of Normandy, Khe Sanh, Pork Chop Hill. We have been reminded again that aggression must and will be checked. So at the request of our friends, we have sent US forces to the Middle East--reluctantly, but decisively. Knowing as Teddy Roosevelt said, that America "means many things. Among them, equality of rights and, therefore, equality of duty and obligation." Yet we are not acting alone, but in concert--helping to protect our own national security interests as well as those of the broader community of nations. Which brings me to the second lesson reaffirmed by the past 18 days. By itself, America can do much. Together, with its friends and allies, America can do much more-- for peace and for justice. Think back with me to World War II, when together allies confronted a horror which embodied hell on Earth. Or Korea, where UN forces opposed totalitarianism. Today, once again, many nations--many of them Muslim--have joined to counter aggression and, thus, to restore the peace. Our Saudi friends, under the wise leadership of King Fahd, asked for our help in deterring further aggression by Iraq. I salute the many countries who have courageously responded to Saudi Arabia's request. I also salute those governments who were responding to the Emir of Kuwait's call for the full enforcement of UN sanctions. We must not delude ourselves--Iraq's invasion was more than a military attack on tiny Kuwait; it was a ruthless assault on the very essence of international order and civilized ideals. And now, in a further offense against all norms of international behavior, Iraq has imposed restrictions on innocent civilians from many countries. This is unacceptable. And that is why the UN Security Council voted unanimously Saturday night [August 18] to condemn Iraq's action, just as it earlier voted to condemn the invasion itself. They know, as we do, that leaders who use citizens as pawns deserve--and will receive--the scorn and condemnation of the entire world. And so to the leaders of Iraq I will now make two points clear. In moving foreign citizens against their will, you are violating the norms of your own religion. You are going against the age-old Arab tradition of showing kindness and hospitality to visitors. And so my message is: Release all foreigners now. Give them the right to come and go as they wish. Adhere to international law and UN Security Council Resolution 664. We have been reluctant to use the term "hostage." But when Saddam Hussein specifically offers to trade the freedom of those citizens of the many nations he holds against their will in return for concessions, there can be little doubt that whatever these innocent people are called, they are, in fact, hostages. And I want there to be no misunderstanding. I will hold the government of Iraq responsible for the safety and well-being of American citizens held against their will. Let me also take a moment to thank [Soviet] President Gorbachev for his recent words condemning the Iraqi invasion. He has shown, if anyone doubted it, that nations which joined to fight aggression in World War II can work together to stop the aggressors of today. A third lesson has also been reaffirmed by the last 18 days-- as veterans, it will not surprise you--the steadfast character of the American will. Look to the sands of Saudi Arabia and the waters offshore where brave Americans are doing their duty, just as you did at Anzio and Inchon and Hamburger Hill, and think of the men and women aboard our planes and ships--young, alone, and so very far from home. They make us humble. They make us proud. And I salute the finest soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines that any nation could possibly have. And moreover, I pledge to you: We will do whatever it takes to help them complete their mission. This means realizing the fourth lesson reaffirmed by the past 18 days. Although the size of America's Armed Forces in the years ahead will be smaller because the threat to our security is changing, future American defense capacity must be even more "a lean, mean fighting machine." By 1993, we estimate that our security needs can be met by an active force 25% smaller than today's--the lowest level since 1950. And yet, we must ensure that a reduction of numbers does not mean a reduction in American strength. Operation Desert Shield proves vividly that instead of relieving past contingencies, we must prepare for the challenges of the 1990s and beyond. By ensuring that our troops are ready and trained, we can exert our presence in key areas and respond effectively to crisis. And this is readiness measured in days and hours, not weeks and months. Operation Desert Shield has underscored the need to be able to get our soldiers where they are needed, and when they are needed. This kind of responsiveness will be critical in the crises of the future. Recently, our outstanding Chairman of the Joint Chiefs [of Staff], Gen. Colin Powell, spoke to this when he praised "the finest peacetime military in the history of America." We will be smaller in troop strength and restructured, but we will remain purposeful, proud, and effective. Just look at the last 18 days. Desert Shield has been a classic case of America's military at its best. I think, for instance, of Airman First Class Wade West, home on leave to be married. On August 7th, he was called up. And within an hour he had the ceremony performed and left for the Middle East. And he is now stationed over in Saudi Arabia. You talk about a guy that gets things done. But I would like to empathize with his bride wherever she may be. And another example: 7 years ago, Diana Kroptavich worried at home while her husband, Walter, steamed off the Lebanon coast on the USS New Jersey defending the Marines. Today, their roles are reversed. Retired, Walter is at home with their 6-year-old son, and Diana serves aboard the destroyer USS Yellowstone. Here's an Army couple: Today, Paratrooper Joseph Hudert of the 82d Airborne Division is serving in Saudi Arabia, and his wife, Nurse Dominique Allen of the 44th Medical Brigade, will be deployed there within the next 2 weeks. Finally, recall the 8-year- old who, watching her dad leave for the Mediterranean, spoke truth from the months of babes. "I just think," she said, "that they should not let daddies go away this long. But they still have to, to keep the world safe." These profiles show the true caliber of America and the vital essence of our mission. What is more, they remind us of the fifth and final lesson reaffirmed by the past 18 days: The need for a continued strong defense budget to support American troops. Or as George Washington said in his first inaugural address, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving the peace." History has shown the wisdom of his words--especially in our century. What Desert Shield has shown is that America can ensure the peace by remaining militarily strong. Now, I know that we are operating in a time of budget restraint. We have limited resources--we must use them wisely. The budget deficit is a threat to our vital interests at home, and will not be made easier by today's threat abroad. Everyone realizes that the deficit is too large, that it's got to be brought down, and that Congress must act--courageously and immediately--when it returns from recess. But here is the point--we cannot attack the deficit by attacking the very heart of our armed forces--committed men and women who are motivated and ready. Last week, I asked Congress to do what we have done; produce a budget proposal, including defense, that is both responsive and responsible and most of all, fair. When they do, I will listen--listen, but not break faith with the troops who are defending our nation. Make no mistake: to prevent aggression, to keep America militarily prepared, I will oppose the defense budget-slashers who are out of tune with what America needs to keep freedom secure and safe. You know, most Americans know that when it comes to national defense, finishing second means finishing last. So they reject what the House Armed Services Committee recently suggested: unacceptable cuts from our defense budget for fiscal year 1991. Most Americans know, too, that giving peace a chance does not mean taking a chance on peace. So they endorse giving the military the tools to do its job: the Peacekeeper, the Midgetman, B- 2 bomber, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. Americans want arms negotiations to succeed but they know that even a START [strategic arms reduction talks] treaty will not help our security if we disarm unilaterally. Let us never forget that our strong national defense policies have helped us gain the peace. We need a strong defense today to maintain that peace. I will fight for that defense, and I need your help. So help me convince the Congress, given recent events, to take another look and to adequately fund our defense budget. Let me tell you a little story about why I feel so strongly. I was talking to some of the young soldiers who liberated Panama; we invited them to come with General Thurman and others to the Cabinet Room for a briefing from me. I asked one of them, a medic, about the operation. Corporal Roderick Ringstaff spoke of combat and he spoke of the heroics of others, but not of his own. Next to him was his commanding officer, and his commanding officer filled in the rest. This medic had been wounded, but repeatedly braved fire to rescue other wounded, pulling soldier after soldier to safety. For that, he was awarded the Silver Star for bravery. Listening, I thought to myself: I will never send young men and women into battle with less than the very best that this nation can provide them. I will never--I will never, ever--let Americans like this down. August 1990 has witnessed what history will judge one of the most crucial deployments of allied power since World War II. Two weeks ago, I called for the complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; second, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; third, the security and the stability of Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf; and fourth, the safety and protection of American citizens abroad. Today, I say, those objectives are, and will remain, unchanged. Will it take time? Of course, for we are engaged in a cause larger than ourselves--a cause perhaps best shown by words many of you remember--words spoken by one of the greatest Americans of our time to allied soldiers and sailors and airmen. "The eyes of the world are upon you," he told them. "The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you." And then he concluded with this moving prayer: "Let us all beseech the blessing of almighty God, upon this great and noble undertaking." Fellow veterans, more than half of all VFW members fought in World War II--many of you serving under the man who spoke those words, Dwight David Eisenhower. You know how America remains the hope of "liberty-loving people everywhere." Half a century ago, the world had the chance to stop a ruthless aggressor and missed it. I pledge to you: We will not make that mistake again. For, you see, together we can successfully oppose tyranny and help those nations who look to us for leadership and vision. Thank you for your support and your prayers. And may God bless the land we so deeply love--the United States of America. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

The Persian Gulf: Pursuing Multinational Objectives

Bush Source: President Bush Description: Opening statement from news conference at Walker's Point, Kennebunkport, Maine Date: Aug 22, 19908/22/90 Category: Speeches, Testimony, Statements Region: MidEast/North Africa Country: Iraq, Kuwait Subject: Military Affairs, Democratization [TEXT] First, Secretary [of Defense] Cheney and [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General Powell have just given me a very full and, I would say, encouraging briefing on the status of our deployment to the Persian Gulf. This has been a very complicated mission calling for precision, calling for maximum coordination with Saudi Arabia and the other nations providing forces. The process has gone smoothly. And we've now moved what amounts to a medium-sized American city completely capable of sustaining itself all the way over to the Middle East. The Secretary reports that the men and women in the armed forces have performed with extraordinary ability, their morale is high, and they've accepted the challenge of their mission with extraordinary dedication to duty. And I'm very proud of each and every single one of them, and I want them to know that the American people are behind them 100%, supporting them strongly. It's also crucial that everyone understand that we are not in this alone. We stand shoulder to shoulder right there in the Middle East with the armed forces of 22 other nations from the Middle East, from Europe, and around the world. Secretary Dick Cheney reports an impressive alliance of multinational forces that stands behind the UN resolve that Iraq completely and unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait with the restoration of the legitimate government in that country. The United Nations has provided enormous leadership to the whole world community in pursuing this objective and voting the sanctions necessary to carrying it out. And let's be clear--as the deployment of the forces of the many nations shows and as the votes in the United Nations show, this is not a matter between Iraq and the United States of America. It is between Iraq and the entire world community. Arab and non-Arab alike, all the nations of the world lined up to oppose aggression. As our forces continue to arrive, they can look forward to the support of the finest reserve components in the world. We are activating those special categories of reservists that are essential to completing our mission. The United States considers its reserve forces to be an integral part of the total military command. These essential personnel will soon be joining the cohesive organization required to support the military operations in and around the Arabian Peninsula. And I have the highest confidence in their ability to augment the active forces in this operation. We continue to pursue our objectives with absolute determination. I might add that I talked to the four leaders of Congress today, and I am very pleased that they are giving us the strong support they have been--the Speaker, Senator Mitchell, Senator Dole, Congressman Michel. The world simply cannot waiver in its opposition to the threat that Iraq has placed on the doorstep of all nations who cherish freedom and the rule of law. . . . The complete news conference is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of August 27, 1990. (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

Current Treaty Actions: January - July 1990

Date: Jul 30, 19907/30/90 Category: Treaties/Agreements Country: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia (former), Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, South Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, USSR (former), United Kingdom, Vanuatu, Yugoslavia (former), Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe Subject: International Law, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Resource Management, Trade/Economics, Immigration, Human Rights, Environment, Narcotics, Media/Telecommunications, POW/MIA Issues, Science/Technology, United Nations [TEXT]
Multilateral
Agriculture--Diseases
International agreement for the creation at Paris of an International Office for Epizootics, with annex. Done at Paris Jan. 25, 1924. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1925; for the US July 29, 1975. TIAS 8141. Accession deposited: Burma, Aug. 24, 1989.
Atomic Energy
Amendment of Article VI.A.1 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency of Oct. 26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668). Done at Vienna Sept. 27, 1984. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-7. Acceptances deposited: Cote d'Ivoire, Oct. 27, 1989; Jamaica, Dec. 28, 1989; Luxembourg, Jan. 11, 1990. Entered into force: Dec. 28, 1989. Amendment of Article VI.A.1 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency of Oct. 26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668). Done at Vienna Sept. 27, 1984. Entered into force Dec. 28, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-7. Acceptances deposited: Mali, Mar. 13, 1990; South Africa, May 25, 1990. Agreement regarding protection of information transferred into the United States in connection with the initial phase of a project for the establishment of a uranium enrichment installation in the United States based upon the gas centrifuge process developed within the three European countries [Fed. Rep. of Germany, Netherlands, UK]. Signed at Washington Apr. 11, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1990. Parties: Germany, Fed. Rep., Netherlands, UK, US.
Aviation
Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Sept. 14, 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4, 1969. TIAS 6768. Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic, Jan. 10, 1989;1 Marshall Islands, May 15, 1989; Zimbabwe, Mar. 8, 1989. Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. Accession deposited: Vanuatu, Nov. 6, 1989. Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation. Done at Montreal Feb. 24, 1988. Entered into force Aug. 6, 1989.2 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-19. Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 22, 1989. Protocol relating to an amendment (Article 56) to the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal Oct. 6, 1989. Enters into force on the date on which the 108th instrument of ratification is deposited. Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation, supplementary to the convention of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS 7570). Done at Montreal Feb. 24, 1988. Entered into force Aug. 6, 1989.2 Ratifications deposited: Austria, Dec. 28, 1989; Chile, Aug. 15, 1989; Denmark, Nov. 23, 1989;3 France, Sept. 6, 1989.1 International air services transit agreement. Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1945; for the US Feb. 8, 1945. EAS 487. Acceptance deposited: German Dem. Rep., Apr. 2, 1990. Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. Adherence deposited: German Dem. Rep., Apr. 2, 1990.
Coffee
Extension of the international coffee agreement, 1983.4 Done at London July 3, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1989. Acceptances deposited prior to Oct. 1, 1989: Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Fed. Rep. of Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, US, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Notifications of provisional application deposited prior to Oct. 1, 1989: Belgium, Brazil, Central African Rep., Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, European Economic Community, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Spain, UK, Venezuela. Accessions deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, Nov. 13, 1989; Singapore, Nov. 28, 1989; Sierra Leone, Nov. 29, 1989. International coffee agreement, 1983, with annexes, done at London Sept. 16, 1982, as extended July 3, 1989.4 Entered into force Oct. 1, 1989. Acceptances deposited: Ethiopia, Mar. 26, 1990; Japan, July 17, 1990; Peru, Mar. 14, 1990; Venezuela, Mar. 2, 1990. Accession deposited: Jamaica, Mar. 22, 1990.
Conservation
Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249. Ratification deposited: Poland, Dec. 12, 1989. Accession deposited: Burkina Faso, Oct. 13, 1989.
Consular Relations
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations, concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the US Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. Accessions deposited: Hungary, Dec. 8, 1989; Nicaragua, Jan. 9, 1990.
Containers
International convention for safe containers, with annexes, as amended. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the US Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037, 10220, 10914. Accession deposited: Dem. People's Rep. of Korea, Oct. 18, 1989; Indonesia, Sept. 25, 1989. Copyright Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris July 24, 1971, and amended on Oct. 2, 1979. Entered into force for the US Mar. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-27. Accession deposited: Honduras, Oct. 24, 1989. Ratification deposited: UK, Sept. 29, 1989.
Cultural Property
Statutes of the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property. Adopted at New Delhi Nov.-Dec. 1956, as amended at Rome Apr. 24, 1963, and Apr. 14-17, 1969. TIAS 7038. Accession deposited: Mali, Oct. 9, 1989. Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Done at Paris Nov. 14, 1970. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1972; for the US Dec. 2, 1983. Acceptance deposited: Australia, Oct. 30, 1989.12 Ratifications deposited: Belize, Jan. 26, 1990; Madagascar, June 21, 1989.
Customs
Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1975; for the US May 12, 1985. Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, Mar. 23, 1990. Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1952; for the US Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. Accessions deposited: German Dem. Rep., Mar. 27, 1990; Iraq, June 6, 1990; Togo, Feb. 12, 1990.
Diplomatic Relations
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the US Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502. Accession deposited: Hungary, Dec. 8, 1989; Nicaragua, Jan. 9, 1990.
Finance
Agreement establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with annexes. Done at Paris May 29, 1990. Enters into force when instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval have been deposited by signatories whose initial subscriptions represent not less than two-thirds of total subscriptions set forth in Annex A. Signature: US, May 29, 1990.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the US Feb. 23, 1989. Accession deposited: Bahrain, Mar. 27, 1990.
Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.2 Ratification deposited: Ireland, Dec. 8, 1989.5 International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.2 Ratification deposited: Ireland, Dec. 8, 1989. International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.2 Accessions deposited: Burundi, May 9, 1990; Korea, Rep. of, Apr. 10, 1990; Somalia, Jan. 24, 1990. International covenant on civil and political rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.2 Accessions deposited: Burundi, May 9, 1990; Korea, Rep. of, Apr. 10, 1990;5 Somalia, Jan. 24, 1990.
Judicial Procedure
Additional protocol to the Inter-American convention on letters rogatory, with annex. Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entered into force June 14, 1980; for the US Aug. 27, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 98-27. Accession deposited: Chile, Jan. 11, 1990.5
Maritime Matters
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation and protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms on the Continental Shelf. Done at Rome Mar. 10, 1988.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-1. Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 22, 1989. International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979. Entered into force June 22, 1985. Ratification deposited: Greece, Sept. 4, 1989.1 International convention on standards of training, certification, and watchkeeping for seafarers, 1978. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1984.2 Accession deposited: Cape Verde, Sept. 18, 1989. International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London Apr. 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720. Accession deposited: Dem. People's Rep. of Korea, Oct. 18, 1989. International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969. Entered into force July 18, 1982; for the US Feb. 10, 1983. TIAS 10490. Accession deposited: Dem. People's Rep. of Korea, Oct. 18, 1989. Convention on the International Maritime Organization. Done at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. Acceptance deposited: Monaco, Dec. 22, 1989. Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London Apr. 9, 1965. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1967; for the US May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. Accession deposited: Seychelles, Dec. 13, 1989. Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation. Done at Rome Mar. 10, 1988.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-1. Ratification deposited: Italy, Jan. 26, 1990.
Migration
Amendments to the constitution of the intergovernmental committee for migration of Oct. 19, 1953 (TIAS 3197). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1987. Entered into force: Nov. 14, 1989.
Narcotic Drugs
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4. Senate Advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 22, 1989. Instrument of Ratification signed by the President: Feb. 13, 1990. Signatures: Brunei, Oct. 26, 1989; Gabon, Dec. 20, 1989, Pakistan Dec. 20, 1989; Switzerland, Nov. 16, 1989. Ratifications deposited: China, Oct. 25, 1989; Nigeria, Nov. 1, 1989; Senegal, Nov. 27, 1989.
Nuclear Accidents
Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. Done at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986. Entered into force Feb. 26, 1987; for the US Oct. 20, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-4. Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, Nov. 3, 1989.1 Ratification deposited: Austria, Nov. 21, 1989.1 Convention on the early notification of a nuclear accident. Done at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986. Entered into force Oct. 27, 1986; for the US Oct. 20, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-4. Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, Nov. 3, 1989.1
Nuclear Weapons
--Non-Proliferation Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. Ratification deposited: Kuwait, Nov. 17, 1989.
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733. Ratification deposited: Canada, Oct. 2, 1989.
Pollution
Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22, 1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. Ratification deposited: Argentina, Jan. 18, 1990. Accessions deposited: China, Sept. 11, 1989; Tunisia, Sept. 25, 1989; Syrian Arab Rep., Dec. 12, 1989; United Arab Emirates, Dec. 22, 1989; Fiji, Oct. 23, 1989; South Africa, Jan. 15, 1990; Sri Lanka, Dec. 15, 1989; Syrian Arab Republic, Dec. 12, 1989; Zambia, Jan. 24, 1990. Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-10. Accession deposited: Tunisia, Sept. 25, 1989; Syrian Arab Rep., Dec. 12, 1989; United Arab Emirates, Dec. 22, 1989; Fiji, Oct. 23, 1989; Guatemala, Nov. 7, 1989; South Africa, Jan. 15, 1990; Sri Lanka, Dec. 15, 1989; Zambia, Jan. 24, 1990. Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 8165. Accession deposited: Malta, Jan. 19, 1990. Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1983. Accessions deposited: Togo, Feb. 9, 1990; Djibouti, Mar. 1, 1990.11 International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. Accessions deposited: China, Feb. 23, 1990; Djibouti, Mar. 1, 1990. Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of pollution by substances other than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. Entered into force Mar. 30, 1983. TIAS 10561. Accession deposited: China, Feb. 23, 1990. Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. Accession deposited: Cyprus, June 7, 1990.
Pollution--Ships
Annex V to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. Entered into force Dec. 31, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-3. Acceptances deposited: Ecuador, May 18, 1990; Switzerland, Apr. 30, 1990. Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1983. Accession deposited: Ecuador, May 18, 1990.
Poplar Commission
Convention placing the International Poplar Commission within the framework of the Food and Agriculture Organization. Approved at Rome Nov. 19, 1959. Entered into force Sept. 26, 1961; for the US Aug. 13, 1970. TIAS 6952. Acceptance deposited: Chile, Jan. 29, 1990.
Prisoner Transfer
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 10824. Signature: Iceland, Sept. 19, 1989.
Property--Industrial
Nice agreement, as revised, concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purpose of the registration of marks. Done at Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979; for the US Feb. 29, 1984. Notification of accession deposited: Japan, Nov. 20, 1989.
Property--Intellectual
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the US Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. Accessions deposited: Thailand, Sept. 25, 1989; People's Dem. Rep. of Yemen, Sept. 27, 1989. Ratification deposited: Madagascar, Sept. 22, 1989.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.2 Notification of succession deposited: St. Lucia, Feb. 14, 1990; effective Feb. 22, 1979. Accession deposited: Bahrain, Mar. 27, 1990.
Red Cross
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.2 Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug.12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.2 Accession deposited: Algeria, Aug. 16, 1989.7 Ratifications deposited: Bulgaria, Sept. 26, 1989; Byelorussian USSR, Oct. 23, 1989;7 Cote d'Ivoire, Sept. 20, 1989; Liechtenstein, Aug. 10, 1989;7,8 Luxembourg, Aug. 29, 1989; Peru, July 14, 1989; USSR, Sept. 29, 1989.9
Rubber
International natural rubber agreement, 1987, with annexes. Done at Geneva Mar. 20, 1987. Entered into force provisionally Dec. 29, 1988; definitively Apr. 3, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-9. Accession deposited: Nigeria, Nov. 28, 1989. International natural rubber agreement, 1987, with annexes. Done at Geneva Mar. 20, 1987. Entered into force provisionally Dec. 29, 1988; definitively Apr. 3, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-9. Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, July 11, 1990.
Safety at Sea
Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700), concerning passenger ro-ro ferries. Adopted at London Apr. 21, 1988. Entered into force: Oct. 22, 1989. International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700. Accession deposited: New Zealand, Feb. 23, 1990.5 Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009. Accessions deposited: New Zealand, Feb. 23, 1990;5 Saudi Arabia, Mar. 2, 1990. International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700. Accession deposited: Sudan, May 15, 1990.
Satellite Communications Systems
Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. Accession deposited: Mozambique, Nov. 15, 1989. Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. Signature: Empressa Nacional de Telecomunicacoes de Mocambique, Nov. 15, 1989. Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. Accession deposited: Cuba, July 25, 1989. Ratification deposited: Turkey, Nov. 16, 1989. Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. Accession deposited: Romania, May 7, 1990. Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. Signature: Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of Romania, May 7, 1990. Convention on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. Accession deposited: Mozambique, Apr. 18, 1990. Operating agreement on the internatitonal maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. Signature: Mozambique, Apr. 18, 1990.
Slavery
Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 25, 1926. Entered into force Mar. 9, 1927; for the US Mar. 21, 1929. TS 778. Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 1926 (TS 778), and annex. Done at New York Dec. 7, 1953. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1953, for the protocol; July 7, 1955, for the annex to the protocol; for the US Mar. 7, 1956. TIAS 3532. Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 1957; for the US Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418. Notification of succession deposited: St. Lucia, Feb. 14, 1990; effective Feb. 22, 1979. Accession deposited: Bahrain, Mar. 27, 1990.
Sugar
International sugar agreement, 1987, with annexes. Done at London Sept. 11, 1987. Entered into force provisionally Mar. 24, 1988. Accession deposited: Jamaica, Jan. 25, 1990.
Taxation--Assistance
Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters. Done at Strasbourg Jan. 25, 1988. Signature: Finland, Dec. 11, 1989.6 Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters. Done at Strasbourg Jan. 25, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-6.6 Ratification deposited: Sweden, July 4, 1990.12 Terrorism International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the US Jan. 6, 1985. Accessions deposited: Australia, May 21, 1990; Mali, Feb. 8, 1990; Nepal, Mar. 9, 1990; Sudan, June 19, 1990; Romania, May 17, 1990. Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532. Accession deposited: Nepal, Mar. 9, 1990.
Timber
International tropical timber agreement, 1983, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 18, 1983. Entered into force provisionally Apr. 1, 1985; for the US Apr. 26, 1985. Accession deposited: Colombia, Mar. 27, 1990. International tropical timber agreement, 1983, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 18, 1983. Entered into force provisionally Apr. 1, 1985; for the US Apr. 26, 1985. Accession deposited: Togo, May 8, 1990. Acceptance deposited: U.S., May 25, 1990.
Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987.2 Signature: Paraguay, Oct. 23, 1989. Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987.2 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20. Signature: Paraguay, Oct. 23, 1989. Ratification deposited: Paraguay, Mar. 12, 1990. Accessions deposited: Guatemala, Jan. 5, 1990,1 Somalia, Jan. 24, 1990.
Trade
United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262] Accession deposited: Ukrainian SSR, Jan. 3, 1990. Ratifications deposited: Chile, Feb. 7, 1990; Fed. Rep. of Germany, Dec. 21, 1989. United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262] Accession deposited: Switzerland, Feb. 21, 1990. UN convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262.] Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, Mar. 5, 1990.12 Accession deposited: Bulgaria, July 9, 1990; Iraq, Mar. 5, 1990.
Treaties
Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.2 Accessions deposited: Liechtenstein, Feb. 8, 1990; Switzerland, May 7, 1990. Ratification deposited: Sudan, Apr. 18, 1990. Vienna convention on the law of treaties between states and international organizations or between international organizations, with annex. Done at Vienna Mar. 21, 1986.6 Accessions deposited: Liechtenstein, Feb. 8, 1990; Switzerland, May 7, 1990.
United Nations
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, TS 993. Admitted to membership: Namibia, Apr. 23, 1990.
UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into force June 21, 1985. TIAS 1985. Ratification deposited: Liberia, May 10, 1990. Accession deposited: Burma, Apr. 12, 1990.
Weights and Measures
Convention establishing an International Organization of Legal Metrology. Done at Paris Oct. 12, 1955. Entered into force May 28, 1958; for the US Oct. 22, 1972, as amended Jan. 18, 1968. TIAS 7533. Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, Oct. 19, 1989.
Whaling
International whaling convention and schedule of whaling regulations. Done at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849. Notification of withdrawal: Solomon Islands, Nov. 23, 1989; effective June 30, 1990. Amendments to the schedule of the international convention for the regulation of whaling, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at San Diego June 12-16, 1989. Entered into force: Sept. 25, 1989.
Wheat
Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at London Mar. 14, 1986. Entered into force July 1, 1986; definitively for the US Jan. 27, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-1. Food aid convention, 1986. Done at London Mar. 13, 1986. Entered into force July 1, 1986; definitively for the US Jan. 27, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-1. Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Dec. 29, 1989. Ratification deposited: Argentina, Feb. 1, 1990.
Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Done at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.2 Signature: Belize, Mar. 7, 1990. Ratifications deposited: Belize, May 16, 1990; Bolivia, June 8, 1990; Trinidad and Tobago, Jan. 12, 1990. Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the US July 7, 1976. TIAS 8289. Ratification deposited: Paraguay, Feb. 22, 1990.
Bilateral
Argentina
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Buenos Aires Dec. 14, 1989. Entered into force Jan. 22, 1990.
Australia
Agreement concerning defense communications services, with annexes. Signed at Canberra Nov. 6, 1989. Entered into force Nov. 6, 1989. Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Mar. 9, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 9, 1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Framework for an arrangement on steel trade liberalization, with appendices, and related letters. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Mar. 9, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 9,1990. Agreement amending the agreement of May 29, 1980, as amended (TIAS 9781, 10198), providing for the continuation of a cooperative program facilitating space flight operations. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra Jan. 17 and May 2, 1990. Entered into force May 2, 1990.
Austria
Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Vienna Nov. 20 and Dec. 7, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1989; effective Oct. 1, 1989.
The Bahamas
Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters. Signed at Nassau June 12 and Aug. 18, 1987.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-17. Senate advice and consent to ratification: Oct. 24, 1989.10 Agreement amending and extending the implementing arrangement of Apr. 5, 1984, to the agreement concerning US defense facilities in The Bahamas. Effected by exchanges of notes at Nassau Aug. 20, 1987, and Jan. 25, Feb. 3 and 23, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1988; effective Jan. 26, 1988.
Bangladesh
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Feb. 19 and 24, 1986, as amended, relating to trade in certain apparel categories. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 23 and Aug. 23, 1989. Entered into force Aug. 23, 1989; effective Feb. 1, 1989.
Barbados
Memorandum of understanding concerning the operation of the INTELPOST service, with details of implementation. Signed at Bridgetown and Washington Oct. 18 and 26, 1989. Entered into force Feb. 15, 1990.
Belgium
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with attachment. Signed at Washington Jan. 28, 1988.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-16. Senate advice and consent to ratification: Oct. 24, 1989.10
Belize
Memorandum of understanding concerning a cooperative medical research program. Signed at Belmopan Dec. 12, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1989.
Benin
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agency, with annexes. Signed at Cotonou Nov. 20, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 28, 1989.
Bolivia
Agreement extending the swap agreement of Sept. 15, 1989, between the US Treasury and the Central Bank of Bolivia/Government of Bolivia. Signed at La Paz and Washington Dec. 15, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 15, 1989. Swap agreement among the US Treasury and the Central Bank of Bolivia/Government of Bolivia, with related letter. Signed at Washington and La Paz Dec. 27, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1989. Agreement supplementing and amending the agreement of Feb. 24, 1987, as revised, concerning cooperation to combat narcotics trafficking, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 9, 1990. Entered into force May 9, 1990.
Botswana
Agreement extending the agreement of Mar. 28, 1980 (TIAS 9741), providing for a radio facility for the purpose of relaying Voice of America programs to areas in Africa. Effected by exchange of notes at Gaborone Mar. 13 and 20, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1990; effective Mar. 28, 1990.
Brazil
Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Feb. 26 and Mar. 5, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies. Signed at Brasilia Mar. 14, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 19, 1990. Agreement on steel trade liberalization, with appendices and related letter. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Feb. 26 and Mar. 5, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1990.
Bulgaria
Memorandum of understanding concerning the operation of the INTELPOST service, with details of implementation. Signed at Sofia and Washington Apr. 20 and June 13, 1990. Entered into force June 25, 1990.
Burundi
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Bujumbura and Washington Nov. 10 and Dec. 13, 1989. Entered into force Jan. 15, 1990.
Cameroon
Agreement regarding the phased discharge of certain debts owed to the Government of the United States, with annexes. Signed at Yaounde Jan. 3, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1990. Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Yaounde Jan. 3, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1990. International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Yaounde and Washington Apr. 25 and June 22, 1990. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1990.
Canada
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with annex. Signed at Quebec Mar. 18, 1985. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-14. Senate advice and consent to ratification: Oct. 24, 1989.10 Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with annex. Signed at Quebec City Mar. 18, 1985. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-14. Instrument of ratification signed by the President: January 2, 1990.10 Instruments of ratification exchanged: Jan. 24, 1990. Entered into force: Jan. 24, 1990. Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of June 4, 1979 (TIAS 9585), for cooperation in the research and development of tar sands (oil sands) and heavy oil. Signed at Washington, Edmonton, and Ottawa Oct. 27, Nov. 9, and Dec. 1, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1989. Agreement for the establishment of a binational educational exchange foundation. Signed at Ottawa Feb. 13, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 13, 1990.
Central African Republic
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Bangui Mar. 22, 1990. Entered into force May 3, 1990.
Chile
Memorandum of understanding regarding cooperation in establishing and implementing emergency procedures to ensure the safety of fresh fruit exported to the US from Chile. Signed at Washington Oct. 27, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 27, 1989. Air transport agreement, with annexes. Signed at New York Sept. 27, 1989. Enters into force on a date to be determined in an exchange of notes indicating that all internal procedures have been completed by both parties.
China
Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Signed at Washington Apr. 19, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 19, 1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Agreement extending the agreement of Jan. 31, 1979 (TIAS 9179), relating to cooperation in science and technology. Effected by exchange of notes at Beijing Oct. 24 and 30, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 30, 1989. Agreement extending the agreement of Jan. 31, 1979 (TIAS 9179), on cooperation in science and technology, as extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Beijing Apr. 30 and May 1, 1990. Entered into force May 1, 1990.
Colombia
Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 6 and Mar. 1, 1988, relating to trade in cotton sateen fabrics. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota Jan. 6 and Sept. 20, 1989. Entered into force: Sept. 20, 1989; effective Jan. 1, 1989.
Congo
Treaty concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment, with annex. Signed at Washington Feb. 12, 1990. Enters into force 30 days after the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.
Costa Rica
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies. Signed at San Jose Feb. 22, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 9, 1990. Swap agreement among the US Treasury and the Central Bank of Costa Rica/Government of Costa Rica. Signed at Washington and San Jose May 18, 1990. Entered into force May 18, 1990.
Cuba
Agreement extending provisional application of the maritime boundary agreement of Dec. 16, 1977. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 26, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 26, 1989.
Customs Coop. Council
Tax reimbursement agreement, with annex. Signed at Brussels Jan. 26, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1990.
Czechoslovakia
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of June 25 and July 3 and 22, 1986, as amended, relating to trade in certain textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Prague June 12 and Aug. 10, 1989. Entered into force Aug. 10, 1989; effective June 1, 1989. Agreement on trade relations, with related exchanges of letters. Signed at Washington Apr. 12, 1990. Enters into force on the date of exchange of written notices of acceptance.
Denmark
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of June 11, 1984, concerning Faroese fishing in fisheries off the coasts of the US. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 28, 1989. Entered into force: Nov. 15, 1989; effective July 1, 1989.
Dominican Republic
Agreement for the exchange of information with respect to taxes. Signed at Santo Domingo Aug. 7, 1989. Entered into force: Oct. 13, 1989.
Ecuador
International express mail agreement with detailed regulations. Signed at Quito and Washington Mar. 20 and Apr. 11, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 30, 1990.
Egypt
Third amendment to the grant agreement of Sept. 26, 1984, for Cairo Sewerage II. Signed at Cairo June 14, 1989. Entered into force June 14, 1989. Project grant agreement for power sector support. Signed at Cairo Sept. 27, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 27, 1989.
El Salvador
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at San Salvador and Washington Aug. 29 and Oct. 6, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 30, 1989. Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Mar. 2 and Apr. 30, 1987, as amended, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at San Salvador Dec. 18 and 27, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1989; effective Jan. 1, 1990.
European Communities
Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Brussels Nov. 20, 1989. Entered into force Nov. 20, 1989; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Arrangement concerning trade in steel pipes and tubes, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Brussels Nov. 20, 1989. Entered into force Nov. 20, 1989; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Agreement on steel trade liberalization, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Brussels Nov. 20, 1989. Entered into force Nov. 20, 1989.
European Space Agency
Memorandum of understanding concerning the Solar Terrestrial Science Program, with related exchange of letters. Signed at Washington Nov. 30, 1989. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1989.
Finland
Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Helsinki Feb. 16 and Mar. 7, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 7, 1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Agreement on removal of trade distorting practices in steel, with appendix and related exchange of letters. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Helsinki Feb. 28 and Mar. 23, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1990.
France
Agreement concerning the wreck of the CSS Alabama. Signed at Paris Oct. 3, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 3, 1989. Memorandum of agreement concerning a cooperative program of information exchange and development of cooperative research projects on free electron laser technology. Signed at Paris Jan. 31, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 31, 1990.
Gabon
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Libreville Mar. 5, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 9, 1990.
German Democratic Republic
Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Berlin Nov. 21 and Dec. 8, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 8, 1989; effective Oct. 1, 1989.
Germany, Federal Republic of
Memorandum of understanding concerning the joint research, development and demonstration of advanced armor protection systems (AAPS), with annexes. Signed at Washington and Bonn Jan. 4 and 11, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 11, 1990. Memorandum of understanding on the mutual exchange of documents. Signed at Bonn and Washington Jan. 18, 1989, and Feb. 9, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 9, 1990.
Ghana
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Accra and Washington Feb. 9 and Mar. 1, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 16, 1990.
Greece
Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 8, 1983 (TIAS 10814), on defense and economic cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens Feb. 27, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 27, 1990. Agreement extending the interim agreement on air services, with memorandum of understanding, of Apr. 9, 1985, as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens Apr. 18 and 25, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1990.
Guatemala
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Guatemala and Washington Nov. 7 and Dec. 19, 1989. Entered into force Feb. 15, 1990. Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees, with agreement and addendum. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 22 and 23, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1990.
Guinea
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Conakry Nov. 22, 1989. Entered into force Jan. 22, 1990.
Honduras
Agreement on mutual cooperation to combat the production of and illicit trafficking in drugs. Signed at Tegucigalpa Nov. 14, 1988. Entered into force: May 15, 1989. Project grant agreement for the economic stabilization and recovery program III. Signed at Tegucigalpa Mar. 29, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 29, 1990.
Hong Kong
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 4, 1986, as amended, relating to trade in certain textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Dec. 20 and 21, 1989, and Jan. 5, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 5, 1990.
Hungary
Agreement regarding new chancery facilities in Budapest, with associated agreement on purchase of lots. Signed at Budapest Sept. 29, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 29, 1989. Investment guaranty agreement. Signed at Budapest Oct. 9, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1989. Air transport agreement, with annex and memorandum of understanding. Signed at Budapest July 12, 1989. Entered into force definitively: Feb. 8, 1990. Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Signed at Washington Sept. 27, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 27, 1989; effective Oct. 1, 1989.
India
Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 6, 1987, as amended, relating to trade in textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at New Delhi Dec. 6 and 21, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 21, 1989. Mutual cooperation agreement for reducing demand, preventing illicit use of and traffic in drugs, and for matters relating to licit trade in opiates. Signed at New Delhi Mar. 29, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 29, 1990.
Indonesia
Agreement extending the agreement of Dec. 11, 1978, as amended and extended (TIAS 9609), for cooperation in scientific research and technological development. Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta Sept. 16 and 28, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 28, 1989. Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 25 and Oct. 3, 1985, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta May 7 and 19, 1990. Entered into force May 19, 1990. International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Tax reimbursement agreement, with annex. Signed at Geneva Jan. 19, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 19, 1990.
Ireland
Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 3, 1945, as amended relating to air transport services (EAS 460, TIAS 1620, 4007, 7660). Effected by exchange of notes at Dublin Jan. 25, 1988, and Sept. 29, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 29, 1989.
Israel
Memorandum of understanding regarding transfers of materials, supplies, and equipment for cooperative research and development programs. Signed at Washington Sept. 8, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 8, 1989. Agreement amending and extending the agreement of May 6, 1985, in the field of health. Signed at Jerusalem Jan. 7, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 7, 1990. Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 18, 1989, concerning the construction of diplomatic facilities. Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv Jan. 22 and 30, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 30, 1990. Memorandum of understanding on scientific and technical cooperation in the field of water resources development, with annexes. Signed at Washington and Haifa Jan. 26 and Feb. 8, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 8, 1990.
Jamaica
Agreement relating to the agreement of Jan. 15, 1987, as amended, for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Kingston Nov. 24, 1989. Entered into force Nov. 24, 1989. Agreement amending the agreement of of July 6, 1989, regarding the consolidation of debts. Effected by the exchange of notes at Kingston Nov. 27, 1989, and Jan. 18, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 18, 1990.
Japan
Agreement extending the agreement of May 2, 1979, as extended (TIAS 9463), on cooperation in research and development in energy and related fields. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 31, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 31, 1989. Agreement concerning cooperation regarding the Geotail Scientific Satellite Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Sept. 25, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1989. Agreement extending the agreement of Sept. 10, 1982, as amended and extended, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the US (TIAS 10480). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 6, 1989. Entered into force: Dec. 31, 1989. Agreement amending and extending the agreement of May 2, 1979, as extended (TIAS 9463), on cooperation in research and development in energy and related fields. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Feb. 1, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 1, 1990. Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Feb. 14, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 14, 1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Framework on steel trade liberalization, with appendix. Signed at Washington Feb. 14, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 14, 1990. Agreement concerning the acquisition and production in Japan of the Sparrow Missile System (AIM-7M). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Mar. 27, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 27, 1990. Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 31, 1989, concerning the acquisition and production in Japan of the SH-60J and UH-60J aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Mar. 30, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 30, 1990. Agreement regarding squid and large-mesh driftnet fisheries, with annexes and attachment. Effected by exchange of letters at Tokyo and Silver Spring Apr. 12, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 12, 1990.
Jordan
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Amman Oct. 31, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1989. Agreement concerning the reciprocal exemption from income tax of income derived from the international operation of ships and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Amman Apr. 7, 1988. Entered into force: Apr. 7, 1988.
Kenya
International express mail agreement. Signed at Washington Dec. 11, 1989. Entered into force Jan. 30, 1990.
Kirabati
Investment incentive agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Suva and Tarawa Jan. 22, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 22, 1990.
Korea
Agreement regarding the high seas squid driftnet fisheries in the North Pacific Ocean, with record of discussions and exchange of letters. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sept. 13 and 26, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 26, 1989. Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Apr. 20, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Framework for agreements on steel trade liberalization, with appendices and exchange of letters. Signed at Washington Apr. 20, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1990.
Kuwait
Agreement on investment guaranties. Signed at Kuwait April 24, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1989.
Laos
Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation on narcotics issues. Signed at Vientiane Jan. 9, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 9, 1990.
Malaysia
Agreement concerning reciprocal exemption with respect to taxes on income of shipping and air transport enterprises. Signed at Kuala Lumpur Apr. 18, 1989. Entered into force: Mar. 12, 1990.
Malta
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Floriana Feb. 6 and 13, 1989. Entered into force Feb. 13, 1989.
Marshall Islands
Agreement amending the governmental representation provisions of the Compact of Free Association of June 25, 1983. Signed at Washington Mar. 18, 1988. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1989. Agreement regarding augmentation of educational assistance. Signed at Washington Sept. 7, 1988. Entered into force Sept. 7, 1988. Agreement concerning the reciprocal exemption from income tax of income derived from the international operation of ships and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Majuro Dec. 5, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 5, 1989; effective with respect to taxable years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 1987.
Mauritania
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agency, with annexes. Signed at Nouakchott Feb. 4, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 12, 1990.
Mexico
Treaty on cooperation for mutual legal assistance. Signed at Mexico City Dec. 9, 1987.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-13. Senate advice and consent to ratification: Oct. 24, 1989.10 Agreement on the development and facilitation of tourism. Signed at Washington Oct. 3, 1989. Enters into force upon receipt of the later notification of the completion of necessary legal requirements in each country. Agreement for the exchange of information with respect to taxes. Signed at Washington Nov. 9, 1989. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes confirming their mutual agreement that both sides have met all constitutional requirements necessary to effectuate agreement. Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 13, 1988, as amended, concerning trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and Washington Oct. 2 and Nov. 1, 1989. Entered into force Nov. 1, 1989. Exchange stabilization agreement among the US Treasury and the Banco de Mexico/Government of Mexico. Signed at Washington and Mexico Jan. 12, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1990. Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Signed at Washington Oct. 3, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 3, 1989; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Agreement on steel trade liberalization, with appendices. Signed at Washington Oct. 3, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 3, 1989. Agreement for the exchange of information with respect to taxes. Signed at Washington Nov. 9, 1989. Entered into force: Jan. 18, 1990. Swap agreement among the US Treasury and the Banco de Mexico/Government of Mexico, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Washington and Mexico Mar. 23, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1990. Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies. Signed at Mexico Mar. 14, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 23, 1990. Agreement on maritime search and rescue. Signed at Mexico Aug. 7, 1989. Entered into force: June 25, 1990.
Micronesia
Agreement amending the governmental representation provisions of the Compact of Free Association of Oct. 1, 1982. Signed at Washington Mar. 9, 1988. Entered into force Aug. 24, 1989. Agreement relating to radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Kolonia Apr. 4 and Sept. 12, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 12, 1989. Agreement concerning certain technical assistance to be provided by the Department of the Army. Signed at Honolulu Sept. 21, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 21, 1989.
Mozambique
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies. Signed at Maputo Mar. 6, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 23, 1990.
Nepal
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of May 30 and June 1, 1986, as amended, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Kathmandu Dec. 21, 1989, and Jan. 10, 1990.
Netherlands
Memorandum of understanding regarding the joint training of Royal Netherlands Air Force and United States Air Force aircrews on the F-16 weapons system in the US. Signed at The Hague Oct. 30, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 30, 1989. Protocol to the agreement on social security and administrative arrangement of Dec. 8, 1987. Signed at The Hague Dec. 7, 1989. Enters into force upon entry into force of the agreement of Dec. 8, 1987. Agreement on mutual administrative assistance in the exchange of information in securities matters. Signed at The Hague Dec. 11, 1989. Enters into force on the first day of the second month following the date on which the parties have informed each other in writing that their constitutional procedures have been complied with.
Nigeria
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies. Signed at Lagos Dec. 4, 1989. Entered into force Jan. 22, 1990. Postal money order agreement, with attachments. Signed at Lagos and Washington June 14 and 28, 1990. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1990.
NATO Maintenance
and Supply Organization Amendment one to the basic agreement of Feb. 2, 1982, on mutual support. Signed at Stuttgart and Capellen Apr. 30 and May 7, 1990. Entered into force May 7, 1990.
Norway
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical cooperation in the earth sciences, with annexes. Signed at Reston and Trondheim Sept. 14 and Oct. 12, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 12, 1989. Agreement concerning the reciprocal exemption from income tax off income derived from the international operation of ships and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington, DC, May 24, 1990. Entered into force May 24, 1990.
Pakistan
Memorandum of understanding on co-assembly and co-production of AN/UAS-12A night sight equipment, with appendix. Signed at Rawalpindi Jan. 27, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1990.
Panama
Mutual cooperation for reducing demand, preventing illicit use, and combating illicit production and traffic of drugs. Signed at Panama Jan. 10, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 10, 1990. Memorandum of agreement concerning assistance in developing and modernizing Panama's civil aviation infrastructure, with annexes. Signed at Panama and Washington Jan. 24 and Feb. 15, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 15, 1990. Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Panama. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 1, 1990. Enters into force upon Panamanian notification to US that constitutional requirements have been completed.
Papua New Guinea
Memorandum of understanding concerning joint and combined military activities by Papua New Guinea defense forces and US military forces in independent Papua New Guinea, with appendices. Signed at Port Moresby Mar. 26, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1990. Development cooperation agreement. Signed at Port Moresby May 7, 1990. Entered into force May 7, 1990.
Peru
Agreement for the exchange of tax information. Signed at Cartagena Feb. 15, 1990. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes confirming that both sides have met all constitutional and statutory requirements necessary to effectuate agreement. Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Signed at Lima July 26, 1989. Entered into force July 26, 1989; effective May 1, 1984. Agreement extending the air transport services agreement of Dec. 16, 1986. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima June 6 and 7, 1990. Entered into force June 7, 1990.
Philippines
Agreement amending the agreement of May 16, 1988, regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Apr. 25, 1989. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1989. Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Manila Nov. 3, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1989. Agreement continuing the operations of the US Department of Veterans Affairs in the Philippines. Signed at Manila May 3, 1990. Entered into force May 3, 1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Project grant agreement for the family planning assistance project. Signed at Manila May 10, 1990. Entered into force May 10, 1990.
Poland
Agreement on the development and facilitation of tourism. Signed at Warsaw Sept. 20, 1989. Enters into force on the date on which each party has informed the other that it has completed all necessary legal requirements. Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Warsaw Nov. 30, 1989. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1989. International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Washington Dec. 11, 1989. Entered into force Feb. 1, 1990. Treaty concerning business and economic relations, with annex, protocol and related exchanges of letters. Signed at Washington Mar. 21, 1990. Enters into force on the 30th day following the date of exchange of ratifications. Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Signed at Washington Sept. 12, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 12, 1989; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Investment guaranty agreement. Signed at Warsaw Oct. 13, 1989. Entered into force Feb. 21, 1990. Agreement for collaboration to demonstrate an emerging retrofit of clean coal technology at a powerplant in Cracow, Poland, with annexes. Signed at Washington Mar. 15, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 15, 1990.
Romania
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Washington Dec. 14, 1989. Entered into force Feb. 15, 1990. Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Bucharest Oct. 27 and Mar. 13, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 13, 1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989.
Spain
Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with patent addendum. Signed at Vienna Sept. 27, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 27, 1989. Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with protocol. Signed at Madrid Feb. 22, 1990. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.
Sri Lanka
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Colombo and Washington Feb. 1 and 14, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 30, 1990.
Swaziland
Agreement for economic, technical, and related assistance. Signed at Mbabane Dec. 5, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 5, 1989.
Sweden
Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with patent addendum. Signed at Stockholm Oct. 4, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1989.
Thailand
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with attachments. Signed at Bangkok Mar. 19, 1986.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 110-18. Senate advice and consent to ratification: Oct. 24, 1989. Air transport agreement, with annexes. Signed at Bangkok Dec. 7, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1979. TIAS 9704. Memorandum of understanding relating to annex 1 of the 1979 air transport agreement. Signed at Washington June 15, 1984. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1984. Notice of termination: Presented by Thailand, Oct. 31, 1989, effective Nov. 2, 1990. Memorandum of agreement concerning mapping, charting, and geodesy. Signed at Bangkok and Fairfax Feb. 27 and Mar. 15, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 15, 1990.
Trinidad and Tobago
Agreement for the exchange of information with respect to taxes. Signed at Port of Spain Jan. 11, 1989. Entered into force: Feb. 9, 1990. Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Port-of-Spain and Washington Mar. 9 and 21, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 21, 1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Air transport agreement, with annexes. Signed at Port-of-Spain May 23, 1990. Entered into force May 23, 1990. Supersedes agreements of Feb. 11, 1946 (TIAS 1507), Nov. 22, 1961 (TIAS 4955), and Sept. 27 and Oct. 8, 1962 (TIAS 5209). Agreement on removal of trade distorting practices in steel trade, with appendices and exchange of letters. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Port-of-Spain Mar. 29 and Apr. 12, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 12, 1990.
Tunisia
Supplementary protocol to the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income of June 17, 1985. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of the convention and the supplementary protocol. Agreement relating to the agreement of Mar. 16, 1988, for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Tunis Sept. 28, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 28, 1989. Treaty concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment, with protocol. Signed at Washington May 15, 1990. Enters into force 30 days after exchange of ratifications.
Turkey
Memorandum of understanding concerning the operation of the BUREAUFAX service. Signed at Ankara and Washington Feb. 14 and Mar. 14, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 15, 1990. Treaty concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investments, with protocol. Signed at Washington Dec. 3, 1985. Entered into force: May 18, 1990.
Uganda
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Kampala Dec. 19, 1989. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1990.
USSR
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in geoscience, with annexes. Signed at Washington and Moscow May 6, 1989. Entered into force May 6, 1989. Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation in the pursuit of Nazi war criminals. Signed at Moscow Oct. 19, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 19, 1989. Agreement on the prevention of dangerous military activities, with annexes and agreed statements. Signed at Moscow June 12, 1989. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1990. Memorandum of understanding regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to prohibition of chemical weapons. Signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Sept. 23, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 23, 1989. Agreement on reciprocal advance notification of major strategic exercises. Signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Sept. 23, 1989. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1990. Agreement concerning mutual visits by inhabitants of the Bering Straits region. Signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Sept. 23, 1989. Enters into force on the date the parties exchange notes notifying each other that necessary internal procedures have been completed. Agreement extending the agreement of June 19, 1973, on cooperation in studies of the world's oceans (TIAS 7651, 9349). Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow Dec. 11 and 15, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 15, 1989. Agreement extending the agreement of June 21, 1973, as amended and extended (TIAS 7655, 10757), on scientific and technical cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow Nov. 21 and Dec. 12, 1989. Entered into force Dec 12, 1989. Agreement relating to trade in certain cotton textile fabric products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Dec. 28, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 28, 1989; effective Jan. 1, 1990. Agreement on principles of implementing trial verification and stability measures that would be carried out pending the conclusion of the US-Soviet treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Sept. 23, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 23, 1989. Agreement on a mutual understanding on cooperation in the struggle against the illicit traffic in narcotics. Signed at Washington Jan. 31, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 31, 1990. Agreement concerning the conduct of reciprocal demonstrations of reentry vehicle inspection procedures, with appendix. Effected by exchange of letters at Geneva Jan. 22, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1990. Agreement on the maritime boundary, with annex. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. Enters into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. Agreement regarding certain maritime matters, with annexes. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes certifying completion of the first forecasting requirements provided for in Annex III. Agreement on cooperation on ocean studies, with annexes. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. Entered into force June 1, 1990. Supersedes the agreement of June 19, 1973, as amended and extended (TIAS 7651, 9349). Civil air transport agreement, with annexes. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. Entered into force June 1, 1990. Supersedes the agreement of Nov. 4, 1966, as amended (TIAS 6135). Agreement on expansion of undergraduate exchanges. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. Entered into force June 1, 1990. Memorandum of understanding to increase distribution of the magazines America and Soviet Life. Signed at Washington June 2, 1990. Entered into force June 2, 1990. Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, with annex. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. Entered into force June 1, 1990. Agreement regarding cooperation and mutual assistance between their customs services. Signed at Washington June 2, 1990. Enters into force on the 90th day following an exchange of notes in which the parties notify each other that they have accepted its terms and that all necessary legal requirements have been fulfilled. Agreement on the supply of grain. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. Entered into force June 1, 1990. Protocol to the treaty of July 3, 1974, on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. Enters into force on the date of entry into force of the treaty. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-19. Protocol to the treaty of May 28, 1976, on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. Enters into force on the date of entry into force of the treaty. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-19. Agreement on trade relations, with related exchanges of letters. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes in which the parties notify each other that all necessary legal requirements have been fulfilled.
United Kingdom
Memorandum of understanding concerning the exchange of reserve officers. Signed at Washington Sept. 11, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 11, 1989. Treaty concerning the Cayman Islands relating to mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with attachments, protocol, and exchange of notes. Signed at Grand Cayman July 3, 1986.6 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-8. Senate advice and consent to ratification: Oct. 24, 1989.1 Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 14, 1987, as extended, concerning the British Virgin Islands and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 9, 1989. Entered into force Nov. 9, 1989; effective Nov. 12, 1989. Agreement extending the agreement of July 26, 1984, as extended, concerning the Cayman Islands and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 28, 1989. Entered into force Nov. 28, 1989. Agreement extending the agreement of Mar. 11, 1987, as extended, concerning Anguilla and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 21, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 21, 1989; effective Dec. 27, 1989. Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation in the development of a satellite communications modulator/demodulator and associated equipment resistant to electronic counter-measures and nuclear effects (Universal Modem), with annexes. Signed at Washington and London Oct. 25 and Dec. 8, 1989. Entered into force Dec. 8, 1989. Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 14, 1987, as extended, concerning the British Virgin Islands and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Feb. 9, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 9, 1990; effective Feb. 12, 1990. Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 14, 1987, as extended, concerning the British Virgin Islands and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 9, 1990. Entered into force May 9, 1990; effective May 12, 1990. Memorandum of understanding concerning the establishment of a radar site in the Cayman Islands as part of the Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN). Signed at Washington Feb. 26, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 26, 1990. Memorandum of understanding concerning the provision, trial, and operation of a relocatable over the horizon radar (ROTHR) in the United Kingdom, with annex. Signed at Washington Apr. 20, 1990. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1990. Agreement extending the agreement of Mar. 11, 1987, as extended, concerning Anguilla and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 26, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1990; effective Mar. 27, 1990. Agreement extending the agreement of May 14, 1987, as extended, concerning Montserrat and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 29, 1990. Entered into force May 29, 1990; effective June 1, 1990. Vanuatu Memorandum of understanding on the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Vanuatu. Signed at Port Vila Oct. 2, 1989. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1989. Venezuela Agreement on the development and facilitation of tourism. Signed at New York Sept. 27, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 27, 1989. Arrangement concerning trade in certain steel products, with appendices. Signed at Washington Feb. 1, 1990. Entered into force Feb. 1, 1990; effective Oct. 1, 1989. Swap agreement among the US Treasury and the Central Bank of Venezuela/Government of Venezuela, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Washington and Caracas Mar. 16, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 16, 1990. Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Washington June 22, 1990. Entered into force June 22, 1990.
Yugoslavia
Memorandum of understanding relating to the air transport agreement of Dec. 15, 1977, as amended (TIAS (9364), and the nonscheduled air services agreement of Sept. 27, 1973, as amended (TIAS 7819, 9460). Signed at Belgrade June 28, 1989. Entered into force provisionally June 28, 1989; enters into force definitively on the date of an exchange of notes indicating approval by both parties in accordance with their constitutional requirements. Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 5 and 26, 1986, as amended, relating to trade in certain cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade Dec. 19, 1989, and Jan. 3, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1990; effective Jan. 1, 1990. International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Belgrade and Washington Jan. 22 and Mar. 1, 1990. Entered into force Mar. 30, 1990.
Zaire
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the US Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Kinshasa Dec. 23, 1989. Entered into force Feb. 5, 1990.
Zambia
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Lusaka June 26, 1989, and Jan. 4, 1990. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1990.
Zimbabwe
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Harare June 20, 1990. Entered into force June 20, 1990. 1 With reservation(s). 2 Not in force for the US. 3 Not applicable to the Faroe Islands. 4 Certain provisions of the agreement were suspended. 5 With declaration(s). 6 Not in force. 7 With declaration(s) concerning Protocol I. 8 With reservation(s) concerning Protocols I and II. 9 With declaration(s) concerning Protocols I and II. 10 With understanding(s). 11Does not accept optional annexes. 12With reservation(s) /declaratin(s) (###)
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 1, No 1, September 3, 1990 Title:

Ambassadorial Appointments: Jan-July 1990

Date: Jul 30, 19907/30/90 Category: Ambassadorial Appointments Subject: State Department [TEXT]
Ambassadorial Appointments
Bangladesh--William B. Milam, June 27, 1990 Botswana--David Passage, June 27, 1990 Chad--Richard Wayne Bogosian, June 27, 1990 Congo--James Daniel Phillips, June 27, 1990 Ecuador--Paul C. Lambert, June 27, 1990 Guinea--Dane Farnsworth Smith Jr., June 27, 1990 Hong Kong--Richard Llewellyn Williams (Consul General, assigned June 1, 1990) Hungary--Charles H. Thomas, June 27, 1990 Jordan--Roger Gran Harrison, June 27, 1990 Liberia--Peter Jon de Vos, June 27, 1990 Luxembourg--Edward Morgan Rowell, April 1, 1990 Marshall Islands--William Bodde Jr., June 27, 1990 Mongolia--Joseph Edward Lake, June 27, 1990 Nicaragua--Harry W. Shlaudeman, May 25, 1990 Panama--Deane Roesch Hinton, April 6, 1990 Papua New Guinea (also to Solomon Islands and the Republic of Vanuatu)--Robert William Farrand, March 8, 1990 Portugal--Everett Ellis Briggs, April 1, 1990 Somalia--James Keough Bishop, June 27, 1990 Zimbabwe--J. Steven Rhodes, March 8, 1990 US Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development--Alan P. Larson, June 28, 1990 (###)