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U.S. Department of State
96/02/08 Daily Press Briefing
Office of the Spokesman


                                   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
                                    DAILY PRESS BRIEFING 

                                         INDEX

                                  Thursday, February 8, 1996 


                                               Briefer:  Glyn Davies 
 
DEPARTMENT 
Welcome to USIA Visitor Program Guest ....................1 

CHINA/TAIWAN 
U.S. Weapons Sales to Taiwan .............................1 
Gilman Legislation/Taiwan Relations Act ..................2 
Report of Sale/Transfer of Nuclear Technology to Pakistan.2-4 

PAKISTAN 
Foreign Minister Ali's Consultations w/U.S. Officials ....3,18-19 

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
Detention of Serb Officers/War Crimes Tribunal ...........5-7,10 
Implementation of Dayton Accords .........................8 
Possibility of A/S Holbrooke Return to Region ............8 
Military Meetings ........................................8 
Detention of Suspected War Criminals .....................8-12 
Reaction to EU Arbitrator's Decision on Mostar ...........12-15 

GREECE/TURKEY 
Dispute re: Islets in the Aegean .........................15-18

ZAIRE 
Report of Expulsion of Rwandans at Border ................19 
 
 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING DPB #20

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1996, 1:02 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. DAVIES: Welcome to the State Department briefing. Maybe I can just make a couple of Administrative announcements, to start off with.

First, we want to welcome some visitors. Just one visitor. Would you be Mr. Jose Rodriguez? Welcome. Mr. Rodriguez is a Mexican newspaper editor. He's in the U.S. to study bilateral issues, and he's here sponsored by the U.S. Information Agency visitor program. So, welcome.

That's it. That's my only announcement, so I'm happy to go to your questions.

George.

Q The Chinese are saying that to the extent that there are tensions in that area, in East Asia, it's because of what they describe as large quantities of weapons sales to Taiwan by the United States. Do you have anything to say about that?

MR. DAVIES: The sales of weapons that we make to Taiwan are made consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and consistent with the various communiques we have with the Chinese Government. We don't believe that those sales of weapons are at all destabilizing or should be a threat to the Chinese.

Q Do you know what the sales consisted of?

MR. DAVIES: I can't detail for you all the various sales we've made to Taiwan over the years. Do you have a specific question about a sale? I'm not sure what the Chinese were reacting to, specifically. Did they mention anything?

Q Not that I'm aware of.

MR. DAVIES: Mark.

Q Is the President going to be advised by the Secretary to veto the Gilman legislation if, in fact, it becomes law?

MR. DAVIES: Our position on the Gilman legislation is that we oppose it. We don't think that it would be helpful to write into law that the Taiwan Relations Act has any kind of legal precedence over the communiques that we've concluded with the Chinese. Both the Taiwan Relations Act and the communiques form the two balancing sides of our policy toward China and Taiwan.

There's no question that the Taiwan Relations Act -- which is a law -- is, if you will, on a higher plane than the communiques, strictly legally speaking. It simply wouldn't be helpful to pass any legislation that would tend to relegate the communiques to any other kind of a status or to try to handicap the relationship between the Taiwan Relations Act and the communiques.

Q This Department would recommend that the President veto that bill if it's passed by both houses?

MR. DAVIES: Mark, we'll wait and see what actually happens to the legislation. Whether we get to that stage, if we do, then we'll take a look at it. Right now, the legislation in its current form is not legislation that we favor for the reasons that I outlined.

Q How goes the review of the sale of Chinese equipment to Pakistan?

MR. DAVIES: It's under review, but no decision has been made. We're reviewing these reported transfers, whether the transfers, if they indeed occurred, would be inconsistent with, on the one hand, China's commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and on the other hand, inconsistent with U.S. laws -- would they trigger sanctions.

We take the matter seriously. We're thoroughly evaluating the reported information, the requirements of U.S. law and all relevant factors. Any final decision is going to be consistent with U.S. law, with our non-proliferation policy, and with our national interests.

Q As I understand it, the sales in question took place last year sometime, and they're not on-going. So what's to review?

MR. DAVIES: I can't comment on when these sales might have taken place. All I can say is that this is a complex matter. There's a great deal of information that we must review. Beyond that, there are obviously a number of factors that we have to weigh. Those factors include, obviously, the U.S. national interest in all of its manifestations, our non-proliferation policy and our law.

It's a process that takes a little while to play out. When we have a decision, you'll know about it.

Q These U.S. national interests, I presume, include commercial sales to China?

MR. DAVIES: Yes. Our national interest includes a number of different aspects: the security end of it; we've got political interests there, and we've got economic interests. Sure. I don't think there's any secret or question about that.

Q The Pakistani Foreign Minister is in town tomorrow. In relation to the Chinese alleged deal, will that be raised? Is Pakistan under -- being reviewed in terms of its actions and sanctions?

MR. DAVIES: The deal that's been reported in the press is one between China and Pakistan. So, of course, we're looking at both ends of that equation.

It is true that the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali, will be in town. He'll be in town tomorrow. My understanding is that he will meet with a number of officials, to include Acting Secretary Talbott. He'll also meet with Secretary of Energy O'Leary, and he may have other meetings.

I think the agenda with the Foreign Minister is broad. It includes issues like Afghanistan, for instance, but also proliferation issues.

We'll be talking over a number of subjects with him. This meeting is part of our regular series of consultations with the Government of Pakistan.

Charlie.

Q Just to follow up on that and just to make sure you know we're interested, might you consider a photo-op with Mr. Talbott and Mr. Ali's meeting tomorrow?

MR. DAVIES: I will always consider it. I will see if others will as well.

Q Could you answer the previous question on whether or not were it to be determined that there was convincing evidence of this sale having taken place, whether any actions would be taken under U.S. law against Pakistan as well as China?

MR. DAVIES: I'm not going to second guess or try to jump ahead to what actions might be taken. What I've said stands; this is something that's under consideration. I don't know what actions might be taken. Once we make a decision, we'll announce it.

Q I don't mean what actions might be taken. I mean, what actions might be required to be taken under U.S. law?

MR. DAVIES: David, I don't have the law here. I don't know precisely what actions would be required to be taken. We haven't even gotten to the stage of making a determination yet on this issue, which is to say we haven't decided whether we have a case of violation here. That's step one. After that, we get to some of these other steps. We might be able to help you out a bit later on, but we can't right now.

Q If the President's decides to waive in the national interest penalities against China, what form will that take? Will it first be a message sent to Congress on the subject? Do you know what the law requires?

MR. DAVIES: Again, David, what you're asking me to do, I think, is to either (a) speculate, or (b) give you a generic overview. I don't have the law here. All I know is that the law includes a provision for waivers. There's no secret about that, but no decision has been made on that. That's down the road. The first decisions that have to be made are decisions that relate to whether or not there's been a violation. We're not even there yet.

Q Glyn, who actually makes that determination?

MR. DAVIES: I could check that for you. My understanding is that that determination is made here by the Secretary of State, but I could get back to you and let you know.

I'll have to get the law. That's something I should know; I'll admit that, but I don't.

Q Could you address the fact that General Mladic has resurfaced and given an order to his forces to break all ties, stop all cooperation, with IFOR? How does this fit into the Dayton Accords?

MR. DAVIES: We've spoken on the question of General Mladic before. In fact, our view of General Mladic -- our view of all those indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal for humanitarian offenses -- he should not be in a position of authority. We don't recognize certainly any orders that he would give or any pronouncements that he would make.

We're not at all happy with the way that this issue has escalated, and we're taking steps to try to get the sides to come back to the table and continue their talks.

For instance, Secretary Christopher yesterday spoke with President Milosevic and President Izetbegovic in an effort to clarify the current situation. He urged -- and we urge -- that all parties act cautiously and continue to support the letter and the spirit of the Dayton Accords.

Q The reports out of Belgrade today are that Milosevic backs the Bosnian Serb military in their position. In fact, there's an account that Karadzic has been received by Milosevic. So it indicates that Milosevic, far from cooperating, is, in fact, may be supporting the Mladic/Karadzic --

MR. DAVIES: I haven't seen that report. The President of Serbia, President Milosevic, is in no doubt about our stance on this. He has pledged to play his role as a signatory of the Dayton Agreements. Part of implementing Dayton includes turning over suspected, or indicted war criminals to the War Crimes Tribunal.

So I'll take a look at the report you're referring to, but what we want to stress here is that it's essential for contacts to resume in order for implementation of Dayton to go forward. On the other side, we've encouraged the Bosnian Government to release those who were arrested -- those who aren't suspected of war crimes -- as expeditiously as possible.

We take satisfaction from the fact that the Bosnian Government, shortly after the arrests, did get in touch with the War Crimes Tribunal and engage the War Crimes Tribunal in evaluating the cases of the eight arrested.

Q But do you know -- is there anything in the U.S. Government information data bank that indicates that any of the people arrested are indeed suspected war criminals?

MR. DAVIES: I'm not even sure I know what you're referring to when you talk about a U.S. Government data bank.

Q U.S. files on the war crimes. A lot of stuff was gathered by Americans, and I'm sure that other agencies of the government have gotten material.

MR. DAVIES: The point to stress about war criminals or those indicted is that that's up to the War Crimes Tribunal. One of the reasons that we've put so much stock -- both literally and figuratively -- in the War Crimes Tribunal is because they are the appropriate entity to deal with this because they're impartial. They have the right sorts of investigatory and prosecutorial authorities under international law, and we look to the War Crimes Tribunal to play the role of the arbitrator, the decision-making body on these issues.

That's where we are now on the case of the eight who were arrested, and that's where the issue has got to be. So that's moving forward appropriately.

Q Is that eleven, by the way?

MR. DAVIES: I think three of those arrested were -- my understanding was that there may have been eleven arrested but three of those -- from the beginning the Bosnians indicated they weren't going to hold them. They may have been released. I don't know. I could check that.

Q But you didn't answer my first question, which was how does what Mladic has done fit into the Dayton Agreement? Is that a violation --

MR. DAVIES: It doesn't fit into the Dayton Agreement.

Q (Inaudible) Dayton Agreements.

MR. DAVIES: Mladic didn't sign the Dayton Agreements, so what he does has no reference to the Dayton Agreements.

Q But he's ordered his forces to break all ties with IFOR. IFOR, obviously, needs ties with both sides. Doesn't this constitute almost on the face of it a violation of the Dayton Agreements?

MR. DAVIES: I don't know if there's going to be a specific call made on that, but I think it's irrelevant, really, to go into that. The point is that IFOR has interlocutors. It talks to people on all sides of the Dayton Agreement, including Bosnian Serb authorities.

General Mladic is not one of IFOR's interlocutors, so it's not relevant what he has to say or what orders he gives. IFOR is stressing to those that it deals with in Bosnia the importance of coming back to the table and resuming talks to move Dayton forward. That's where that stands.

Q (Inaudible) we don't recognize any orders or pronouncements he would make. Do you know whether his minions are recognizing his --

MR. DAVIES: I don't know.

Q Does IFOR have interlocutors on that side as of the time of his orders?

MR. DAVIES: That's a question for, I would suppose, Bosnian Serbs. I can't comment on whether they're recognizing it or not.

Obviously, there's a problem here. We're not trying to say that there isn't a problem here. There's been a degree of escalation that's occurred in the wake of the arrest of these eight or eleven -- however many it was. What we want to note is that the Bosnian Government, in the wake of those arrests, has done the appropriate thing in getting in touch with the War Crimes Tribunal, engaging them and pledging that the War Crimes Tribunal will make the decision in the final analysis about what's to happen with those individuals.

Q What is the fact that Mladic has resurfaced and is issuing orders when his continued presence on the scene after Dayton was judged from the podium to be inconceivable -- what effect does that have, and what does that show about the strength of the Dayton Accords at this point?

MR. DAVIES: I don't think it's a commentary on the strength of the Dayton Accords. I think it may be a commentary on the degree to which some of the actors in Bosnia take seriously the Dayton Accords. What we're doing, as a nation that had a lot to do with the Dayton Accords, is stressing to all sides on the issue the importance of getting back on track firmly with the Dayton Accords. So I wouldn't read too much into Mladic coming up out of his hole and issuing orders.

I think what's important here is that the signatories to the Dayton Accord, the various parties to the Accord, get back to the table and get back to the very important work of implementing Dayton. The Dayton Accords are their hope for a lasting peace in Bosnia, and they realize that, I think. We expect that this will get back on track, and we're working on it.

Q How does it stand now? Have the Serbs and the Croats suspended all implementation cooperation?

MR. DAVIES: I don't know to what extent all implementation cooperation is on or off. I have seen the press reports and heard some reports that would indicate that they're still at an impasse. That is something that, obviously, we are working on, IFOR is working on, Carl Bildt and his people are working on. Everyone involved is working on getting them back to the table, as it were, to deal with the important work of implementing Dayton.

I don't know right now the degree of the precise state of play beyond essentially what I've seen in the press reports.

Q If you wouldn't read too much into Mladic issuing orders, would the Department read much into the Serbs following his orders?

MR. DAVIES: That's a hypothetical question. I don't know to what extent Serbs are following his orders. Perhaps we can revisit that if this continues. But our fervent hope is that this impasse won't continue, and everybody's efforts are now engaged in trying to bring it to an end.

Q Is it possible that Holbrooke will go to the region, or has he become involved in trying to solve this problem?

MR. DAVIES: I don't have anything on his plans. I know he's in Europe, but I don't know whether he'll return to the region. I don't know if that's contemplated.

David.

Q Do you know whether any of the sort of lower-level meetings that have been going on between military personnel happened today and included Bosnian Serbs or not?

MR. DAVIES: I don't, David. I don't know.

Q And, secondly, if I remember correctly, you said yesterday that the Croats are holding as many as 90 people who they believe are -- who they suspect of war crimes. You were listing, were you not --

MR. DAVIES: Right. I'm not sure. Was 90 the number, or was it 50? I'm not sure. It was a big number.

Q It was a large number.

MR. DAVIES: Right.

Q In any case, let me ask you this: Are any of the parties within their rights to arrest people that they suspect of war crimes who have not been charged by the War Crimes Tribunal?

MR. DAVIES: I think what's important here is to try to get the discussion off of the strict legalities. It may be that it is strictly legal for some of these arrests to occur. But this is really not a legal issue; this is a political issue. The issue is balancing the requirements in Dayton for bringing suspected war criminals or indicted war criminals to justice with the very important provisions in Dayton that call for freedom of movement.

What's important is that the parties not engage in arrests that are arbitrary, that are simply meant to provoke the other sides on the ground. That's the point we're trying to make, that if there are arrests made, those arrested -- their cases have to be brought to the attention of the War Crimes Tribunal post haste. That message is the message that we're giving out.

Q Excuse me, but you say it's not a legal issue. It seems to me that to people on the ground in Bosnia it has to be a legal issue. You're saying, are you, that it's all right for parties in Bosnia to arrest people because they think they're war criminals and then to quickly call the War Crimes Tribunal and ask them if they are or not?

MR. DAVIES: The parties are obligated to bring suspected war criminals to the bar of justice, the bar of justice being the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

Q How do you define who those people are? Who defines --

MR. DAVIES: The War Crimes Tribunal.

Q Okay. And they do it retroactively or -- the question -- well, you understand the question.

MR. DAVIES: Right. I do understand the question, and obviously this is complex. This is not neat. But the point is a rule of reason has to apply on the ground in Bosnia on the part of the parties to the Dayton Accords. If they do suspect somebody of a war crime, they should get in touch with the War Crimes Tribunal. That's where we're coming from on this. You're asking, is it okay for them to pick this person up.

Q Do you think the parties can be counted on to be reasonable in this matter?

MR. DAVIES: The parties had better be counted on to be reasonable. It's their Accord. They're the ones who have to implement it. They signed up to these provisions and these obligations.

Every single eventuality is obviously not addressed in Dayton. It can't be. Despite the fact that it's an unprecedented, thick, serious document with a lot in it, it doesn't go into every permutation, every possibility on this or any other matter.

So what's needed here is some restraint, some common sense, and really a rule of reason. We are pleased that the Bosnian authorities went immediately, or in very short order, to the War Crimes Tribunal with the cases of those people that were arrested. That's the point I've been trying to make.

Q Is your position that those who have not been described by Judge Goldstone as possible suspects should now be released immediately or not?

MR. DAVIES: Absolutely. Yes. If Judge Goldstone and his people determine that any of those incarcerated as suspected war criminals are not indeed wanted by the War Crimes Tribunal, they should be released immediately. No question about it.

Q When you said yesterday that Judge Goldstone had requested that two of the people arrested be detained --

MR. DAVIES: That's right. He said that.

Q He said that. Can you tell me where the process is for trying to determine if these two should indeed continue to be held, or are there War Crimes Tribunal people in Sarajevo who are going over information that the Muslims may have?

MR. DAVIES: My understanding is there are War Crimes Tribunal people there. That's right.

Q Do you know where this process stands for these two particular people?

MR. DAVIES: I don't. That's a question you could put to the War Crimes Tribunal. They're the ones essentially in charge of this process.

Q Are you aware of any others that are being held that Judge Goldstone has expressed an interest in?

MR. DAVIES: I'm not. All I'm familiar with is the press communique that he issued yesterday. I don't know of any further developments today.

Q So then is it your position that all the other people, including the 50 or the 90 that the Croats are holding, should be immediately released?

MR. DAVIES: It's our position that anybody who has been arrested on suspicion of war crimes -- that those individuals should be referred to the War Crimes Tribunal to make a decision about how to proceed.

Q Sorry to belabor this, but how long is it reasonable to expect that the War Crimes Tribunal should be given to consider these cases while people are held without charges by their enemies?

MR. DAVIES: It would certainly be unreasonable to hold them indefinitely -- seven days, two weeks, a month, two months -- I can't help you with that right now.

Q I would just offer the observation, having been in Bosnia recently, that this approach pretty well guarantees large numbers of people being arrested, many of them probably quite innocent people.

MR. DAVIES: I'll pass that observation along, David.

Q Has here been any communication with Judge Goldstone, urging him to speed the whole process up so that this crisis, or whatever you want to call it, blows over fast?

MR. DAVIES: I don't know if there's been any specific communication with Judge Goldstone. I know we consult with Judge Goldstone and his people all the time. But whether we've sent any such message, I would suspect not. He's an independent actor. We've got a great deal of confidence in Judge Goldstone and his people, and we're very confident that they're acting with all the haste they can muster.

Q Isn't this a form of preventive detention, and isn't there precedent for the United States taking a position of principle on it in various places, including the West Bank or Northern Ireland?

MR. DAVIES: The United States, obviously, associates itself with international norms for such matters, for the handling of cases, both cases through the regular courts that deal with criminals of various stripes, and more so for cases that involve those suspected of war crimes. I mean, there's a body of precedents that's out there. There are international norms. I'm not an international lawyer or international human rights expert, so I can't go into the kind of depth or detail you might like.

But we have taken principle positions on what we regard as appropriate for the handling of those incarcerated for various crimes. I can perhaps review those and get back to you, Mark, with some specific information. But your question seemed to suggest that we simply have never taken a position on this, and that's not the case at all.

Q If this conflicts with positions that the United States has taken in the past, can you report that to us?

MR. DAVIES: That might be an awfully complex undertaking to kind of figure that out, but, sure, I'm happy to look into whether any of the precedents that are out there about our positions on these issues can be applied to this specific, very complex, very unique case. Sure.

Q Regarding the --

MR. DAVIES: I'm sorry. Do we have any more Bosnia questions?

Q Could you discuss the situation in Mostar? What is your position on that?

MR. DAVIES: Obviously, we've been following what's occurred in Mostar. The report issued by the EU arbitrator, we associated ourselves with. We think it's unfortunate that he's been, I guess, roughed up, or his car was assaulted. We've seen, more to the point, reports that Croatian authorities in Mostar have broken off contacts with the EU representative, Mr. Koschnick. We support the European Union effort -- Mr. Koschnick's decision -- in their effort to resolve the situation in Mostar.

Both sides have indicated that they'll accept the decision of the EU Administrator, so they should do so now. We're very concerned at the apparent refusal by the Croatians to accept the decision. Our general point -- we obviously reiterate our conviction that the Dayton Accords represent an integrated whole, and that the parties must abide by all its aspects.

Q What are you going to do about it?

MR. DAVIES: The EU is engaged here with Mr. Koschnick. I think in the first instance, obviously, we look to that process to play out. We've expressed our concern to the parties, including the Croatian authorities, and that's what we're doing about it. We're obviously fully engaged on the question of Mostar.

Q If President Tudjman has significant influence, if not determining influence, over what the Bosnian Croats do, has anybody called him up and asked him to exert all influence?

MR. DAVIES: I don't know if we've necessarily spoken to President Tudjman. I'm certain that this issue is being raised with the Croatian authorities.

Q You have a case here where the designated mediator has really had almost a threat to his life, and the whole EU is under assault there by the local government. This is not just simply uncontrolled elements. This is totally controlled elements. So it's not simply something that's just happening and unfolding; it's something that's being directed. Ordinarily in a case like this, you would go to President Tudjman and insist that he rein his allies in.

MR. DAVIES: I don't know the precise route that our diplomacy will take, but I can reiterate that we're engaged on this. We're concerned about it. There's no secret to the parties involved where we stand on this issue, and obviously we'll do everything that we can to try to bring it to a satisfactory resolution.

What happened to Mr. Koschnick obviously was something that we regret very much, and we would hope it not happen in the future. That's the kind of message that we're giving out.

Q It just seems to me that your response is almost -- you know, not quite routine, but not quite reflecting what the situation seems to demand. The whole Washington accord rests in a sense on what happens in Mostar. The Washington accord was written in this city, in this building, and the whole federation rests on what happens in Mostar, so these are --

MR. DAVIES: We've got an important role to play. There's no question about that. But this is really an issue for the parties to the Dayton peace accord and to the -- this is an issue for the parties to the accord relating to Mostar to work out. I mean, it's in their interests to resolve this and resolve this peacefully. They signed up to this process.

Mr. Koschnick made a decision in his effort to resolve the situation in Mostar. We fully support that. We've told everyone involved that that's our position, and I'm sure that as this diplomacy plays out, we'll continue to make these points and make them very strongly to those concerned.

Q Would you agree that this riot in which he was almost beaten up was a staged affair?

MR. DAVIES: Jim, I don't know. I just don't know if it was a staged affair or to what extent there was control behind the mob. I don't have anything on that.

Q Well, police stood by. According to the European Union, police stood by and watched it, so clearly this was done with their connivance. And the Mayor came to rescue Koschnick and then announced that he was breaking all ties with the EU. This suggests complete connivance.

MR. DAVIES: I'll look into whether or not we view this as complete connivance. I think that's somewhat off point, though. What's important here is that the parties to the agreement that was reached on how to handle the Mostar situation have got to step up to their commitment, which was to abide by the decision of Mr. Koschnick. That's got to happen.

To the extent there may be links between those parties and mobs on the ground, obviously, they should knock it off. If they're directing police to stand by, or directing mobs to attack his car, that's beyond the pale as far as we're concerned.

We're making these points, obviously, to the parties on the ground. We're playing a role, and we believe that the parties to this issue on Mostar should step up to their obligations and follow through.

Q NATO has also -- in this case -- NATO is present. You've got enough troops to ensure security for the chosen representatives of the international community. It seems to be that NATO failed in this case.

I'm puzzled that you don't even have steps that you're taking to make sure that respect is restored.

MR. DAVIES: You're calling for a swat team to go --

Q I'm not calling for anything. I'm just saying that you have this challenge. They have confronted you with this challenge. It seems to me that there's no response.

MR. DAVIES: "You" -- the United States of America?

Q "You" the United States as the leader of NATO, as the leader of the entire IFOR force.

MR. DAVIES: I'm not going to criticize NATO on this. I think this is first and foremost a challenge to those who signed up to solve the Mostar dispute. They're the ones who have to solve this problem, to abide by the undertakings they made.

I can't predict how NATO will act on this in coming hours or days, or how the United States will necessarily act. But I have laid out for you our view of it, which is a highly negative view of the developments that have occurred. So I'm certain that the necessary steps will be taken to try to straighten this out. We'll take the temperature of this again, if you like.

Any more on Bosnia?

Q Regarding Kardak solution in yesterday's State Department statement, did you get any reaction from the Turkish Government and the Greek Government?

MR. DAVIES: Yesterday's statement on Kardak?

Q Yes.

MR. DAVIES: Which statement are you referring to?

Q Press guidance solution is going to --

MR. DAVIES: This alleged document that was faxed out that is supposed to be press guidance?

Q Yes.

MR. DAVIES: I'm not going to dignify that piece of paper as being press guidance. If a piece of paper like that is faxed out of this building -- leaked, as it were -- as far as I'm concerned it essentially has no standing. So I'm not going to react to that alleged press guidance.

Q A follow up, please?

MR. DAVIES: This is a follow-up here.

Q You said you don't recognize the opinion that was expressed - -

MR. DAVIES: No, look, what I had to say -- I'm happy to repeat what I said yesterday about the International Court of Justice. Do you want a repetition of yesterday?

We can't speak for the Government of Turkey on this matter about its position on the World Court. Obviously, that's up to them to address that issue or the issue of other arbitration. If you'd like, you can ask the Turkish Government their view.

But we've said -- and I'm happy to say again -- that we believe that the best way for Greece and Turkey to resolve their disagreements - - differences -- in the Aegean is through peaceful means, without force or the threat of force. There are a number of venues conceivably that could be used to do that. One of them is the International Court of Justice or any other consensual body. We've made that suggestion.

Mr. Lambros.

Q With respect to your statement, you said the "supposed press guidance." Otherwise, you consider that is a fabricated one?

MR. DAVIES: No, I didn't say that.

Q Why does the U.S. suppose -- it's a "supposed press guidance?" It comes from the Department of State?

MR. DAVIES: It was not spoken from this podium. It was not formally posted in the Press Office. Therefore, it has no standing. That's what I'm saying. That's why it's a "supposed press guidance."

Q It's valid?

MR. DAVIES: Is the press guidance valid? Is press guidance a legal document? I don't think so.

Q It's context?

MR. DAVIES: I'm sorry?

Q It's context?

MR. DAVIES: It's contents?

Q The statement as far as the International Court of Justice -- (inaudible) press guidance. Clarify for us: How do you consider this press guidance -- as a document, a none-existent document, a fabricated one?

MR. DAVIES: Mr. Lambros, what's important to take away from our exchange here is that only what is said here or released officially by the Press Office is formal press guidance from the Department of State. What you have is "supposed press guidance" because it has no standing. It wasn't spoken from the podium; it wasn't posted officially. End of subject.

Q Who released that?

MR. DAVIES: Pardon?

Q Who released that press guidance? Which authority? Which agency?

MR. DAVIES: I don't know who leaks things. I don't know who releases press guidance.

Q A follow up. It was reported in a radio dispatch in Ankara, Turkey, that elements of both sides appeared again in the same area, in the Aegean, in order to play "the war of flags in the media." Do you have any information of that? And do you still monitor the area, or your monitor has been terminated in that crucial area?

MR. DAVIES: No, and then yes.

Q What -- do you still monitor the area?

MR. DAVIES: No, to your first question; yes, to your second. We're still monitoring the area.

Q Until now?

MR. DAVIES: We continue to monitor --

Q Otherwise, you're in the position to prevent a kind of activity, something like that, as the U.S. Government, because you are mediator?

MR. DAVIES: The entities that are in a position to prevent an escalation of tensions are the two parties involved -- Greece and Turkey.

You have a lot of specific questions, I can tell. It's important to answer them. I don't have a very broad, deep brief on Imia/Kardak today. If you would like I can try to put you together with an expert and you can your many questions of that expert. But what I don't want to do is to take up everybody's time with a continuing dialogue on this since I've exhausted what I can say.

Q Then I will follow your advice. Do you consider this dispute over the Greek Island of Imia as a Greek/Turkish one?

MR. DAVIES: Do I consider the dispute over --

Q (Inaudible) as a Greek/Turkish dispute?

MR. DAVIES: Yes.

Q Since Greece is a full member of the European Union, do you consider also this affair as a dispute between the European Union and Turkey, too.

MR. DAVIES: Mr. Lambros, you have a list of questions. What I'm going to do is, you come to me after the briefing and I'll try to get you an expert.

Q Can I go back to China and Pakistan --

MR. DAVIES: Sure, of course.

Q As the Foreign Minister of Pakistan will be here in this building tomorrow for talks with Mr. Talbott, would this issue be raised with him tomorrow?

MR. DAVIES: I haven't seen an agenda for those meetings. Obviously, among the issues we'll discuss, which will include issues like Afghanistan and other regional issues, will be proliferation issues, or non-proliferation issues. So I would imagine that if we get into proliferation issues, it will include, I would imagine, this issue as well. But I don't have an agenda here so I can't tell you precisely what it is we'll talk about.

Q Will the talks that you will have help in determining whether this is a --

MR. DAVIES: I don't know. They haven't happened yet. I don't know. We'll see after the talks what they've accomplished.

Q Could we get a readout after the talks, assuming that there's no -- well, whether or not there is a photo-op?

MR. DAVIES: Sure, let me ask for one.

Q Could you address the question of whether the exporting country is sanctionable only, or whether the importing country, vis-a- vis nuclear-related materials, also is sanctioned?

MR. DAVIES: Sure. George, in the abstract, I'm happy to try to find that out for you exactly what the law says. Sure.

Q (Inaudible).

MR. DAVIES: I'm sorry?

Q Will there be a photo-op after the talks?

MR. DAVIES: I'm going to ask about a photo-op. I'm going to ask about a readout -- all of this -- to see if we can't throw open the doors and windows for you.

Q On Zaire?

MR. DAVIES: On Zaire.

Q Do you have anything on -- the Zairian Government is expelling, or getting to prepared to expel thousands of Rwandans on the border?

MR. DAVIES: I don't think I do. We might have had something recently, and I might be able to dig it out for you afterward, so I can answer that question -- well, in the last day or so, but I don't have anything today. Sorry.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:45 p.m.)

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