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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 1994
 
                              I N D E X
 
 
                              Briefer:   Michael McCurry
 
 
NORTH KOREA
Draft UN Sanctions Resolution Proposed by US ....1-3,11,14-17
Withdrawal from IAEA ............................3-4
IAEA Inspectors at Site of Nuclear Defueling ....3-4
President Carter's Visit ........................4-5
Article Advocating Strikes on Nuclear
  Facilities ....................................5-6,8-11
 
CYPRUS
Foreign Minister's Meetings at Department .......6-7
 
GREECE
Air Rights re: Law of the Sea ...................7
 
TURKEY
UN Resolution Allowing Oil Pipeline Flushing.....9-10
 
HAITI
Refugee Processing Off Jamaica ..................11
Caputo Memos re: Discussion with Deputy
  Secretary .....................................11-12
Effects of Sanctions ............................12-14
 
BOSNIA
US Congressional Activities on Lifting Arms
  Embargo .......................................14-15
  --  Russian Foreign Minister's Reaction .......14-15
Contact Group Activities ........................15-15
(###)
 
 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #92

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 1994, 1:23 P.M. (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. McCURRY: Good afternoon everybody. Where would we like to start in the world today?

Q North Korea.

MR. McCURRY: North Korea. Mr. Schweid, Mr. Gedda. I'll turn to you first for questions. I can just sit here and talk for a while.

Q Let's vault past -- we know what the resolution is attempting to do, and ask how long it's contemplated it would take for the U.S. to present a resolution calling for economic sanctions? And is there an answer to the argument that this doesn't do a whole lot?

MR. McCURRY: Why don't we go through what we can say publicly on the record at this point on the draft sanctions resolution that U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright is now presenting to other members of the Security Council in New York. She is doing those consultations today.

As you can well understand, we are in a position where we would like some of our fellow members of the Security Council to hear a presentation of the resolution from us before we are too terribly specific in describing it here. But I can tell you that we do expect a draft resolution would provide for a phased-in approach to sanctions, as we've said. These could include restrictions on arms transactions, both to and from North Korea; a cut-off of U.N. assistance programs; certain financial restrictions, and other elements. For example, restrictions on air traffic in and out of North Korea.

At this point, I'm not going to get into a discussion of what different schedule there would be or how the phases of sanctions would work because, quite frankly, a lot of that depends on the behavior of North Korea.

One of the things that the resolution itself will do is to address specific things that the DPRK should not undertake to add to the capacity of its program else risk additional sanctions that would be contained in this resolution that will be under discussion.

A couple of things on this, Barry. These are a combination of political and economic sanctions on North Korea that go well beyond being symbolic. There are a number of aspects to the provisions in this resolution that would serve to isolate North Korea, to serve as the world community's steadfast statement that North Korea is not only in violation of its own agreements with the IAEA but, in a sense, has put itself outside the bounds of the world community when it comes to matters of commerce, matters of civilian uses of nuclear technology, a whole range of things that are addressed in the resolution.

Just one example -- cutting off U.N. assistance programs: North Korea has been interested in economic development, particularly in its northern region along the border with China, and there's been a significant U.N. economic development assistance project in that region that would be suspended as a result of some of the sanctions that are now under consideration by the Security Council.

So these measures do have consequence. You would not see such a sharp and provocative reaction from North Korea if they did not have consequence. I can tell you that it's going to take a great deal of determined diplomatic work by the United States and others within the Security Council to see this program of sanctions adopted.

There's not, going into this discussion at the United Nations, by no means is there a unanimous view; but there has been, as a result of the very careful diplomacy that we've done in recent weeks now a common shared understanding that North Korea has done things here that place it outside the boundaries of both the IAEA and the world community when it comes to aspects of its nuclear program.

So we've now developed a common understanding of what problem we do face. We now move into a discussion of what remedy there is through the sanctions regime that will be adopted by the United Nations. It will be some time for that final text to be adopted to be sure, but we are confident, as work this issue very patiently, carefully, but determinedly, to get the type of result that we expect the Security Council to adopt.

Q Mike, were the (inaudible) restrictions that you referred to be mandatory or will they be voluntary?

MR. McCURRY: I don't want to get into aspects of that. That is a question of how the resolution and aspects establishing a sanctions committee and have different levels of responsibility to individual member nations to enforce aspects of the resolution. I'm just not in a position at this point to describe in any great detail the type of enforcement mechanism that's envisioned by the resolution.

Q Just a brief follow-up. There's a pattern of passing resolutions in other conflicts like Bosnia where you have a "no-fly" zone with no enforcement and then six or nine months later, after flagrant violations -- repeated flagrant violations -- to go to enforcement. Is that going to happen this time?

MR. McCURRY: We are determined to see that a sanctions regime enacted by the Security Council would be effective, in seeing that North Korea meets its obligations to honor both its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and also to cooperate fully with the IAEA to see that aspects of its program become transparent to the world community.

We will be determined in assuring that any sanctions regime adopted by the United Nations be an effective one.

Q Has the State Department or anybody else actually seen the formal notice of the North Korean withdrawal from the IAEA?

MR. McCURRY: Yes. That was, I believe, delivered through the U.N. Mission -- the DPRK U.N. Mission in New York -- to the U.S. Mission and then transmitted by fax to Secretary Christopher yesterday. The letter was addressed to the Secretary, as would be appropriate under the IAEA statutes since the United States is the depository nation.

Q It was, as advertised -- it is a flat withdrawal?

MR. McCURRY: Yes. It is a withdrawal effective June 13, 1994, done in accordance with Paragraph D of Article 18 of the IAEA's statute.

Q Taking effect --

MR. McCURRY: Taking effect June 13.

Q So what happens now with the two inspectors?

MR. McCURRY: The two inspectors, in their report, they conducted inspection-related observations today at the Yongbyon facility. We're not aware as of earlier today any change in their status.

Q Do you know if there's been any change in the status of the fuel rods that are in the cooling pond?

MR. McCURRY: We're not aware of any, and that's specifically what the IAEA inspectors, among other things, are observing.

Q Don Gregg and Selig Harrison were on the MacNeil/Lehrer report on Monday. I don't know if you addressed this yesterday or not. Their point of view was that we were misreading the North Koreans -- grossly misreading them -- and all they really want is to talk economics with us.

I would like to know what the State Department thinks about this point of view?

MR. McCURRY: We are aware that they have recently made a trip to North Korea. I believe we have some people who are going to talk to them and get some better understanding of their views. I'd say our assessment of North Korea's intentions leads to the path that we are now on diplomatically and leads us to seek the sanctions that we are now presenting to other members of the Security Council.

Q Mike, back on the other. Since it's presumably a public document, is there any reason why you can't make that available to us?

MR. McCURRY: I'm inclined always to say yes, and then someone comes along and explains in detail why the answer is no. I don't see any reason why it can't be. I'll act myself, with the assumption that we can make it public.

The letter itself is simply a formal notice that they are withdrawing. And it is attached to a copy of the statement that the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK made on June 13. That is a publicly available statement that many of your news organizations have reported upon. I'd say that the statement of policy from the DPRK on this issue is the one that's contained in the statement that they have already made public, and the letter to the Secretary merely transmits that statement and provides the proper legal language that notifies withdrawal from the IAEA, according to the statute.

Q Can we have another shot at what former President Carter might be doing in the U.S.'s behalf? South Korean -- I forget where it comes from in South Korea -- but they say he's carrying a package of proposals.

There's a thin line, I'm sure, between him knowing what the U.S. policy is and actually having a proposal. Can you sort of speak to that?

MR. McCURRY: That is not a thin line, because both we - -

Q He knows the U.S. position.

MR. McCURRY: -- and the President have said that he is not carrying any type of message. That would include any type of formal diplomatic presentation. You are correct, he's travelling with a understanding of U.S. policy. We've not only briefed him but we've also kept in touch with him as he begins his travel in the DPRK today.

As, I mentioned to you yesterday, Secretary Christopher reached out and reviewed some of the developments of the last 48 hours with him in a phone call yesterday. That's important so that he understands in detail our thinking as to how this crisis might be resolved and what steps we are now taking in order to seek compliance by the DPRK with the will of the international community.

It's important for the former President to understand that. Even though he's travelling as a private citizen and travelling at the invitation of North Korea, he sought out an opportunity to better understand the policy we're pursuing, and we appreciated the opportunity to so brief him.

Q Two former officials -- they have formulas for action. But Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Kantor, in the Washington Post this morning, are suggesting -- well, a couple of things. They're saying that you don't have a lot of time; that if the North Koreans did what you all suspect they did, they could have six to eight bombs by the end of the year -- they may one or two already -- that's suggesting that the U.S. may bomb the reprocessing facility. That would be kind of an extreme sanction, I guess.

Does the U.S. have any -- does this Administration -- have the officials recommended to the Administration privately before they went to the Washington Post? And, secondly, do you have a reaction to it?

MR. McCURRY: The argument that they make in that op-ed piece that appears in The Post today, which they did share with us prior to its publication, is one that certainly senior policy makers in the U.S. Government understand very well, both as to the potential benefit of such an approach and also the enormous risk associated with that approach.

That argument is not one that senior policy makers have overlooked or will overlook.

Q Could you explain why it was rejected, or at least set aside at this time?

MR. McCURRY: I said neither that it was rejected nor set aside.

Q Are you saying then that such an option is under active consideration?

MR. McCURRY: I said it had not been overlooked. Lambros.

Q On Cyprus. Since Cypriot Foreign Minister, and your Ambassador to Cyprus, Mr. Boucher, are in Washington, I'm wondering if you have anything on Cyprus issue?

MR. McCURRY: Not much new on that. I think earlier this year both sides, as you probably know, agreed in principle to certain confidence-building measures, discussions over the past few months centered --

Q Meeting at 2:00 between Talbott and the Foreign Minister?

MR. McCURRY: As you know, both sides had agreed in principle earlier this year to certain confidence building measures involving the airport in Russia. Discussions over the past few months centered on how to implement these measures. The Greek Cypriots accepted the U.N. proposals in March. The Turkish Cypriots accepted a variation in June.

The question is whether the two views can now be reconciled within the context of the U.N.'s efforts to achieve an overall settlement on this issue. It's something that various parties have addressed with a great deal of urgency and determination, in just recent weeks, as I'm sure you know. Options on how to proceed are something now that the U.N. Security Council itself is looking at it.

Now, beyond that, there's not a lot additional that I can provide to the discussion.

Q It's reported today that there was telephone communication between Secretary of State, Mr. Christopher, and the President of Cyprus. Do you have anything on that, or can you confirm this conversation?

MR. McCURRY: A --

Q Mr. Christopher with the Cypriot President on the phone?

MR. McCURRY: A conversation today?

Q Yes.

MR. McCURRY: Today or within recent days? I'm not aware of that. I would have to check into that. I'm not aware that such a call took place.

Q One more question. On the Aegean question. Important. In answer to my question yesterday you stated, quote: "That Greece claims a 10-mile air space and six miles territorial waters in the Aegean." Greece, however, has already a 10-mile air space -- it's not a matter of claim since 1930 -- and a 6-mile territorial waters. According to the law of the sea, Greece has the exclusive right, internationally recognized, with the exception of Turkey, to extend its territorial waters to 12.

Since in the same answer you are saying, "The U.S. recognized that the air space should be equal to the territorial sea." That means the Greek national air space is already two miles short. Could you please clarify the U.S. position on the meaning of the "territorial waters?" Do you accept otherwise the established of six or 12 miles?

MR. McCURRY: I had exactly that question on a SAT exam at one time, I'm sure. (Laughter) Twelve minus the two --

Q I'm simply questioning the U.S. Government position.

MR. McCURRY: Maybe it was the LSAT. That's why I never became a lawyer. (Laughter)

That one, I'm going to have to check a little bit further on, if you don't mind. You're questioning the interpretation of how we applied the territorial limit as it regarded air space. I want to back and I'll review the question that you ask and see if we can do a better job.

Q On November 21, 1994, you are going to sign a new Law of the Sea. So I would like to know the U.S. position on the limits -- six or 12? That's the main issue of the problem.

MR. McCURRY: The issue really is, under the pending Law of the Sea, if and when it takes full effect, how does the territorial limits now apply to the assertion of air space rights? We'll look further into that.

Sid.

Q Just to go back to North Korea on the Scrowcroft- Kantor article. It sounded like an important piece of rhetoric. I'd just like to get a little flesh on the bones - -

MR. McCURRY: The article?

Q No, your --

MR. McCURRY: The article is a serious article, and we're treating it seriously.

Q But your statement -- a couple of questions. First one: Why did they present that to you all privately beforehand? And, secondly, you mentioned the benefits of a pre-emptive strike. You mentioned the great dangers. Can you say anything about what the Administration feels would be the benefits and what would be the great dangers?

MR. McCURRY: For the obvious reason that I'm not in a position to discuss options the Commander-in-Chief of the United States would have to rule in or out. I don't want to explore all of the details of the argument presented by these two former officials of the government.

But they do suggest in that article the timing that exists and the question of access to that facility if reprocessing is going to occur. They do address, although I believe it would be fair to say it's somewhat understated, the risk which is armed military conflict between North and South involving the United States.

Q A follow-up on that. Because this issue is some important, it's more than tantalizing to leave out there this idea that this option has not been overlooked. What do you want people to draw from that?

MR. McCURRY: There's an important argument they make in this piece. We acknowledge that argument. We say we are aware of that argument, and we have not overlooked it. That's as simply and as straightforwardly as I can say that.

You also know I've just spent the beginning of this briefing describing the sanctions and the diplomatic work we are now doing at the United Nations that we believe can lead to a peaceful resolution of this issue.

Q So that is not an option at this point?

MR. McCURRY: The path we are pursuing at this moment is the path of diplomatic work through the sanctions process at the United Nations that would be designed to encourage North Korea to recognize that a peaceful solution of this crisis presents itself; and complying fully with the requirements of the IAEA with respect to safeguards and inspection activities for the program itself; and obviously no further diversion of material for reprocessing, which is the issue that the article itself addressed.

Q Why would their views -- were they asked to come in to brief you all?

MR. McCURRY: I'm just aware of the fact that they had a discussion with someone in our government and had an opportunity to provide an article. I don't know whether they did that as a courtesy, but I am aware that we saw the article prior to it appearing today in the Post.

Q Can you say who they presented that to?

MR. McCURRY: I think they met with Ambassador Gallucci -- I don't know whether both of them did or one or the other. I'm aware that Ambassador Gallucci met with Mr. Scrowcroft. But I don't know what the circumstances of that meeting were, and he did get a copy of the article at that point.

Q You say you acknowledge the argument. Does the Administration agree with the timetable which it sets out about the potential for eight bombs by the end of this year?

MR. McCURRY: I can't remember how specific the article is. But I do believe that its general description of the capabilities and the timing is accurate, as far as we know.

Q That suggests that sanctions do not have very long to become effective?

MR. McCURRY: It suggests that there is a timeframe in which reprocessing could occur should the DPRK make that grievous choice. That is a timetable that is understood by - - it's a question, in some cases, of technically how long certain procedures take.

Jim and then Steve.

Q Still on Korea. I have another question about the Security Council -- a Security Council resolution. Yesterday, Pelletreau, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that a resolution would be presented to the Security Council in the next couple of days about flushing the Iraqi fuel line that goes through Turkey. One, has that presented? And, two, what is the state of play on that?

MR. McCURRY: Jim, my best information on that subject dates back now to our discussions with the Government of Turkey in Istanbul. As Ambassador Pelletreau indicated, there would be an effort within the Security Council to present a resolution that would allow for flushing that would be consistent with U.N. Resolutions 706 and 712 which provides -- the United Nations envisioned the circumstances under which there could be a sale of Iraqi oil to address certain humanitarian needs within Iraq. Any effort to flush the pipeline or to carry oil through the pipeline would be related to that overall approach in that regime envisioned under 706 and 712.

I'd have to go back and see whether they've actually presented that now at the United Nations. I hadn't heard that, but we'll check on that and see if they've presented a formal resolution to that effect.

Steve.

Q Mike, going back to Korea. If I heard you correctly, you said yesterday or suggested yesterday we might be briefed by some of the principles in this whole sanctions issue -- perhaps Ambassador Albright, Assistant Secretary of State Gallucci. My impression was that that briefing would happen in concurrence with the introduction or circulation. Today, you're saying that you cannot really elaborate beyond a few bare bones statements about what the sanctions are because we want to make sure that those who would take the issue up know about this privately.

What changed between then and now? An assessment of the stand of the interlocutors? Did the sanctions change, or was it just a bureaucratic change?

MR. McCURRY: No. I think it was just really availability. We've got Ambassador Albright in New York doing presentations today. I had sort of seen us doing some type of briefing on the sanctions package at whatever point we formally presented it to other members of the Security Council. I don't think it's going to be possible to do that today.

I can try to arrange -- since Ambassador Albright is in New York, at whatever point she finishes today -- I'll see if she can do -- she's going to do some things publicly, I am told, because she is being covered by a number of news organizations while she moves around at the United Nations today. I'll see about her availability up there. It's really more of a question of what we can handle down here.

Maybe we should see if we can arrange something for tomorrow on just walking through what the sanctions are. I'm prepared to take whatever questions I can take. I can't get into a lot of detail. I'm providing you, frankly, with about as much detail as I think we'd be able to brief in a formal session here anyhow.

Q Is there any truth to the Washington Post story today that there would be a grace period before sanctions begin?

MR. McCURRY: The resolution envisions setting a period of time in which the DPRK could comply with the terms of the resolution and fulfill its obligations to the IAEA and thus avoid some of the sanctions measures that are drawn up in the resolution.

Q What type of time period?

MR. McCURRY: That will be under discussion at the Security Council. Not a lengthy one.

Q Can we do Haiti? Do you have anything on the opening of the processing center in Jamaica today?

MR. McCURRY: I don't know that it's open. The procedures for using the on-board facility in Jamaica, they've been set since the UNHCR and the United States reached agreement over this past weekend. So the procedures are in place. But to my knowledge, they have not been used to process any Haitian migrants at this point.

Q Are they open for business?

MR. McCURRY: I think the procedures are set and ready as far as I understand.

Q Does that mean if people were picked up today, they would be taken to the USS Comfort?

MR. McCURRY: I don't know for a fact that that is true, but it is probably within a matter of days that that could occur, yes.

Q Back again to Korea, two questions.

Q Wait, wait.

Q Oh, you want --

Q Could we finish up on Haiti? The Washington Times has a story today about the Caputo documents. I don't know whether you've addressed it from that podium. Do you have anything to say on the subject?

MR. McCURRY: On this thing that Caputo wrote a memo to Boutros-Ghali?

Q Yes.

MR. McCURRY: Caputo himself put out a statement that disputed somewhat some of the news accounts that I think originally were broadcast on ABC, if I'm not mistaken. And I think they made clear that Deputy Secretary Talbott told neither Mr. Caputo, the U.N.-OAS Special Envoy, nor anyone else that the United States is going to invade Haiti within a certain time period or at any time. There was no discussion of that nature involving an invasion plan.

Q Did they discuss the possibility of an end-of-July time frame?

MR. McCURRY: I don't know that they discussed a time frame.

Q So you're leaving open the possibility that the story might be correct?

MR. McCURRY: I'm saying that the story was real specific and said that the United States is preparing an invasion of Haiti by July 31, and that doesn't resemble any discussion that Deputy Secretary Talbott recalls, and Caputo himself has put out a statement saying that there had been no discussion -- or said that contrary to press reports, U.S. officials have not given any deadline.

Q Did he leave off the date part? Just leave off the date. Say the U.S. is preparing for invasion of Haiti. How would you respond to that?

MR. McCURRY: My understanding is that would not reflect the discussions that were held between Deputy Secretary Talbott and Mr. Caputo.

Q Do you have a progress report on sanctions? Mr. Gray has been saying that the sanctions are going to be scrutinized on a daily basis, weekly basis. They were imposed, as I recall, more than three weeks ago. Do you have an update on how they're working?

MR. McCURRY: I'm tempted to say they must be working, based on what Mr. Francois' brother had to say yesterday, but I think that would be too flip of an answer.

I think that our assessment is that they are having an impact. There is anecdotal information coming from Port-au- Prince, indicating that members of the business and economic and social elite in Haiti seem to be feeling some of the effects of these sanctions now more so than they have in the past, and there's sporadic evidence involving fuel prices and other things, indicating that there has been some measurable impact by the new regime of sanctions.

Simultaneously, there have been some indications that there is tension within the ranks of the military leadership itself. That is only speculation on our part, since we can't define motive, but it is no doubt, in part, triggered by the impact of sanctions themselves.

So the sanctions since they are designed to pressure the Haitian military authorities into doing what they have promised to do within the framework of the Governors Island process, they seem to at least have the effect of building that type of pressure at this point.

We are assessing if there are ways that we can make it more effective. We are looking at all the sanction enforcement efforts involving both the Dominican Republic on the border and then also maritime interdictions, and obviously, because that's a very complex operation, to interdict that type of maritime traffic, there has to be constant assessment as to effectiveness of enforcement.

Sid.

Q I assume the evidence you're talking about in part at least is from Francois' brother yesterday. Is that an assessment that the State Department shares that there's a split?

MR. McCURRY: He made an interesting statement yesterday, but our view of this matter now is that, not only the United States but the international community itself, requires concrete actions and not mere statements on the part of those who are in a position to resolve this crisis by doing what they know they are going to have to do, which is depart.

Carol.

Q Mike, you talked about tensions within the leadership. Can you give any examples of how the United States sees that being manifested?

MR. McCURRY: The public statement there is one indication. I think there have been some others. There have been some others -- not all that I can describe in adequate detail here.

Lee.

Q Two questions on Korea if everyone is done with Haiti. The first one is, has there been any change in Administration thinking since Defense Secretary Perry about ten days (ago) said that a pre-emptive strike was something that he would not recommend?

MR. McCURRY: My understanding was that Defense Secretary Perry said that a pre-emptive strike was not something that is ruled out. I would have to go back and check and see what he said.

Q So there's no change?

MR. McCURRY: No change in our view on that, no.

Q Number two: In terms of the sanctions, is this an effort that could take a long time to get through the Security Council, even months?

MR. McCURRY: It is an effort that will take some time, because we are going to have to get it right, and there are a number of concerns that are going to have to be addressed by other members of the world community. I think the best evidence that this is a sanctions package with some bite and some consequence is the degree to which other nations are going to want to negotiate over various aspects of the sanctions regime itself.

We are prepared to do that, because we think keeping a united world community as we address this crisis is very much in our interests and in the interests of the world community itself. But I do expect it will take some time. I am not in any position to predict how long, but I think Ambassador Albright herself has said it's not likely to take days, but she also said it's not likely to take months. So you can guess that it's somewhere in between.

Q Mike, in today's Post, an article by Margaret Shapiro, about the vote in the House of Representatives and for that matter in the Senate to lift the arms ban being a risk of world war, according to -- this is Kozyrev speaking - - that this is really detrimental to the good relations between Russia and the United States; and he went on to say in this article that the Serbs would have to seek peace, they would have to want peace, and they would have to give up something more than the 70 percent that they're holding in Bosnia currently.

Can you comment on this particular matter with Kozyrev?

MR. McCURRY: I can only say about that that I believe that Foreign Minister Kozyrev's comments reflected a view within the Russian Government that there are implications to unilateral actions by any member nation of the United Nations to lift a U.N.-imposed arms embargo, and for that reason the Russian Government has a great deal of concern about some of the discussions that have occurred in the United States Congress.

The United States Government and the Clinton Administration share many of those concerns, and we have ourselves indicated our strong public opposition to unilateral efforts to life the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.

Q Does the State Department then -- well, condemn would be the wrong word, I think -- but oppose the action taken by Congress publicly?

MR. McCURRY: It's not final at this point, because the action that -- various amendments that address the question of lifting the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia are still working their way through Congress in, I think, two separate measures pending. But we do oppose language that would require unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. That works contrary to the peace process that's now underway. Discussions begin again tomorrow within the Contact Group, and the goal of those discussions is a peaceful end to the conflict in Bosnia. Lifting the arms embargo works in many ways in the opposite direction.

Q On the Contact Group, can you bring us up to date on the status of that peace proposal? Do you expect that tomorrow will be the final meeting? Is there a Foreign Ministers' meeting this week?

MR. McCURRY: A couple things on that. The Contact Group -- they will resume tomorrow. I'm not certain how long they plan to meet nor whether that will necessarily be the last meeting. It is their goal to complete a proposal that would be based on the 51/49 percent allocations that have been discussed prior, to present that proposal eventually to the parties, but most likely also to present it to Foreign Ministers at some point. There's no timing at this point that I'm aware of.

I'll tell you that Secretary Christopher did discuss both the Contact work and then the Ministers involved met in a phone call with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd this morning, and they reviewed where things stand: I think agreed that this coming meeting of the Contact Group was very important; would, hopefully, they both felt, resolve a proposal that would then be presented to the parties. But they have got some work left to do on that, and there are some gray areas that need to be addressed before they can resolve the work of the Contact Group.

Q Mike, can you be more specific about the gray areas, the issue of putting pressure on all sides? Is that still --

MR. McCURRY: No. The gray areas are more territorial than procedural.

Q And what about a Foreign Ministers' meeting next week? What's the possibility of that?

MR. McCURRY: Not one scheduled at this point. Possibility? I'm just not in a position to know at this point.

Q Anything on travel?

MR. McCURRY: Still being assessed. No plans scheduled at the moment to travel to the Middle East or elsewhere next week.

Q Thank you.

MR. McCURRY: One last question here, I'm sorry.

Q Mike, back on Korea. You've mentioned that in the draft resolution a financial restriction would be included. Does this involve stopping remittances from Japan to North Korea?

MR. McCURRY: That would be a likely inclusion, but you'll note very specifically I did not indicate anything on that provision as to timing or how that would be sequenced in this phased-in approach to sanctions that we are taking. That is something that I think will be under discussion, and we very much welcome the statement by the Government of Japan that they certainly would work to comply with and help enforce any program of sanctions developed by the United Nations.

Q Are you saying that what there is going to be is one resolution in which various things will kick in at various times if the Koreans undertake certain actions or if they fail to undertake other actions?

MR. McCURRY: Yes. I think as I indicated yesterday, we envision a resolution that would both apply sanctions for actions and steps that have been taken by the DPRK, and it would also apply measures that could be used to discourage the DPRK from taking certain further steps. And the key one, as you all know and as we have discussed, would be any decision by the DPRK to expel the two IAEA inspectors who are now on hand.

We have said that would be a very serious development. We also believe that that type of development ought to be addressed within the context of the sanctions resolution that will be under discussion.

Q So the precedent is that, you know, with Iraq there were multiple resolutions that keep going back to tighten the sanctions, to toughen the sanctions, and ultimately to decide on military measures. And in the case of Serbia also there have been multiple resolutions.

What you're envisaging here is a resolution that doesn't require going back every two weeks or every month to get another resolution in order to tighten the embargo?

MR. McCURRY: There might be a program of activity, such as I've suggested that would be outlined in the resolution, but then enforcing that resolution as you moved procedurally and step by step might require additional resolutions. But on the specific question -- is there a way of designing a resolution that would address prospectively certain things that the DPRK might do, that you wanted to discourage them from doing -- we do foresee that type of resolution.

Q Thank you.

MR. McCURRY: You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 2:01 p.m.) (###)

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