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JUNE 3, 1994
                           U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                             DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
                                I N D E X
                             Friday, June 3, 1994
                                    Briefers:  Robert L. Gallucci
                                               Christine Shelly
   IAEA Determination re Erosion of Analysis Ability   1,3-4
   History of Fuel Discharge, Accountability........   1-4,7
   Third Round of Talks with U.S., .................   2,8,13
   Next Steps, Sanctions; Goals & Expectations .....   2-7
   US Meetings with South Korea, Japan .............   2-3,5
   Possible Future Analysis of Nuclear Material ....   4
   Global Proliferation Concerns ...................   5,7
   Threat of War, Military Preparedness ............   8
   Silkworm Missile Test ...........................   9
   Russian-Proposed International Conference .......   12
   US Contacts with China ..........................   12-13
   Humanitarian Aid Flights, Dominican Republic
     Sanctions Enforcement .........................   9-11,15
   Aristide Remarks re Use of Force ................   14-15
   Fighting in south Lebanon .......................   11
   Secretary's Travel ..............................   11
CYPRUS  .............................................   14
   Report of PKK Training in Greece ................   14
   Iranian Involvement in Balkans, Germany Contacts   14


DPC #86


MS. SHELLY: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. As we indicated to you earlier, which is certainly the reason for this enhanced attendance at the State Department's normal Daily Press Briefing, we are beginning today with a short presentation by Robert Gallucci, who probably needs no further introduction to you. But, anyway, he's our Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs; and, as you know, the Chair of the Administration's senior policy Steering Group on Korea. He'll be with us for some remarks and a few questions and answers after which I'll continue with questions on other subjects.

Mr. Gallucci, would you like to take over the microphone here? Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I'd like to begin, as Christine said, with a public statement.

On June 2, the International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Hans Blix reported to the U.N. Security Council that the IAEA has now lost the ability to accurately to measure nuclear fuel discharged from the 5-megawatt experimental reactor in North Korea.

These measurements could have clarified the operating history of the reactor, and, in particular, verified North Korea's declarations of the amount of fuel it discharged from the reactor in the past.

The IAEA has reported that the loss of this technique means that its overall ability to verify the amount of plutonium previously produced by North Korea has been "seriously eroded."

Since the beginning of our negotiations with the North Koreans last June, we said that satisfactory IAEA safeguards presence during the refueling of the 5-megawatt reactor was one essential basis for continuing our dialogue with North Korea, precisely because of the importance of these fuel measurements to determine the amount of plutonium produced by North Korea.

We have clearly and consistently told North Korea that the nuclear issue cannot be resolved without eventually accounting for North Korea's past plutonium production. In our recent exchanges with North Korea, we offered to meet for a third round of high level talks in early June to discuss an overall solution on the nuclear and other issues within the broader context of movement toward normalization of relations.

As a basis for such an overall solution, we insisted that the technical possibility of fuel measurement be preserved. North Korea claimed it was ready to permit measurements as part of a political solution but it refused to schedule a third round of talks unless the U.S. dropped this requirement. Instead, North Korea began to discharge fuel at a rapid rate, claiming a non-existent safety concern.

We warned North Korea in the clearest terms that we would return the issue to the U.N. Security Council if North Korea proceeded to destroy the evidence of past reactor operations.

As recently as May 30, the President of the U.N. Security Council issued a warning urging North Korea not to proceed with the discharge of fuel except in accordance with IAEA requirements. Unfortunately, North Korea ignored these warnings from the international community. North Korea rejected every method proposed by the IAEA for preserving the technical possibility for measurement of the fuel rods in the future and proceeded to deliberately destroy evidence of its past nuclear activities.

Accordingly, we have no basis for holding a third round of high level talks with North Korea and we will seek further action in the U.N. Security Council. We have already begun consultations with our allies and with the Security Council on appropriate next steps in response to North Korea's actions, including sanctions.

That concludes the opening statement, and I'm sorry for the technical stuff. But there's no way, I think, around that in this issue.

Q Are you underway now with the South Koreans? Have you begun your meetings and -- I thought -- somehow I had heard you were going to have lunch, but it must have been an early lunch.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I still hope to have lunch with the South Koreans today; close to now, but not exactly now. Yes, we, in fact, did begin. We had a brief session this morning. We'll continue over lunch. We'll be continuing with Japanese representatives later, and we'll have trilateral meetings tomorrow.

Q He sounded kind of resolute in his little exchange with reporters on the way in. Can you at this early point tell us if you had the same impression -- after your little meeting, that brief meeting?


Q Is South Korea as determined as you sound, as the U.S. sounds, about doing something in the U.N.?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I will say, thus far, with our brief initial meeting, I detect no differences between us and our South Korean allies.

Q Is there any possibility of the U.S. sending an envoy to Pyongyang to outline to the North Koreans what a difficult situation they've created, or to find some solution, some way out of this current crisis?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: At this moment, I am aware of no such plans. What I described to you as our plan, our next course of action, is exactly what we plan on doing.

Q What would the purpose of sanctions be? The North Koreans have already destroyed the evidence. If the purpose of sanctions is to get them back to the negotiating table, that hasn't proven to be very successful in the last year.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: The question is, what is the purpose of sanctions, especially since the North Koreans have already destroyed the evidence? Let me take this question as an opportunity, if I could.

First of all, with respect to what's been destroyed. Some evidence that bears upon what North Korea did in the past has been irretrievably, irrevocably lost. If you look at the statement or the letter sent by the Director General of the IAEA to the Secretary General for the Security Council, it notes that there are really, from the IAEA's perspective, three ways that they know of of getting at what happened in 1989 at that reactor.

One way is by additional information that could be provided by the DPRK. A second way is by a special inspection at the radioactive waste sites and by sampling. And a third way was to reconstruct the reactor operating history through non-destructive analysis of fuel when it was discharged from the reactor.

What the Director General has said is that the third way has been essentially and irrevocably destroyed as a methodology for the IAEA, and therefore the overall ability to get at what happened in the past has been, as I quoted, "seriously eroded." That does not mean destroyed.

So, the first point I'd make to you is that, with respect to what happened in the past, the agency still, with the full cooperation of the DPRK, could get at that. To what degree and the details of that, you would have to put those questions to the IAEA.

I would also say, however, that there is more here than what happened in the past in 1989. There's more here at stake in terms of the North Korean nuclear program; there's more in terms of our objectives. We have said that we are looking for a nuclear free Korean peninsula. We're looking for full NPT adherence; we're looking for full-scope safeguards; the acceptance of special inspections; and the implementation of the North/South declaration on denuclearization which includes, in addition to a supplementary inspection regime, a ban on all reprocessing on the Korean peninsula.

So there's a great deal more that we would like to see accomplished in the nuclear area.

The relevance of sanctions is -- first and foremost, I'd note to you that we have laid down our approach to this issue; that is, the United States' approach to this issue. It included an effort to negotiate a settlement just so long as the basis for those negotiations was preserved.

We have, over this last year -- and it has been a year; we began last year in June -- we have tried patiently and with some amount of tactical flexibility, I think in a principled way but with tactical flexibility, to try to negotiate a settlement. It's very much worth our effort to do that. There's a lot at stake, including the lives of a lot of people, potentially, if this situation were to get out of hand. So we wish to negotiate a resolution.

But there had to be a basis -- and there was one set -- and part of that basis was that the North Koreans preserve the opportunity for the IAEA to sort out what had happened five years ago, how much plutonium it had. By taking the step they did, they cut across that basis and destroyed that basis that we had laid down. We said if that happened, we would simply return the matter to the Security Council. So we're doing that because that is what we said we would do.

Our expectation is that if the international community acts together, even if they were to decide to move in the direction of sanctions, that activity would not, as I think your question suggested, destroy the basis for resolving the issue. But from our perspective, it would be a step in the right direction by making it clear to the North Koreans that there are limits or bounds to what they can do in this area and to what the international community will tolerate, and encourage them back to the negotiating table.

I'd also say that we have concerns about other states in the international arena that may have a nuclear weapons programs. It is extremely important, I think, that they understand that walking away from NPT obligations, ignoring safeguards obligations, is not a cost-free enterprise.

Q Is there any possibility that the -- any kind of sanction will be actually imposed against North Korea within this month?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: When we get into the predictions about exactly what is going to happen in New York at the Security Council, it gets very difficult for me to answer with any precision. I can tell you that our plan, our expectation is that we will be consulting with our friends and allies, other members of the Security Council beginning on the weekend and through next week. We have had general consultations in the past, but, of course, with the arrival this afternoon of Director General Blix to brief the Security Council, I expect that certainly the intensity of those consultations will pick up next week.

When and how they will proceed exactly, I just am not the right person to ask, I think is really the answer.

Q In order to prevent this dispute over the past history of their program from preventing you from monitoring and supervising the program in the future, are you going to seek a modest start toward the sanctions rather than a full- court press, so to speak?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Let me say that the talks that were referred to in the first question, that we have begun already with representatives from the Republic of Korea and which will continue with the Japanese, are intended to focus on our next steps and certainly to include next steps at the U.N. and the possibility of sanctions.

Our intent, as I said, is to consult with others, obviously, and the P-5 and the other members of the Security Council on sanctions. What I don't want to do is to prejudge or get into the detail of how those discussions will proceed. These are genuine consultations. We want to find out what other nations who will be directly affected by sanctions, who will have to play an active role in the imposition of sanctions if they are voted, what their views are.

Yes, we do have views. Yes, we have thought about this in great depth and detail. But I don't really want to get into that detail until we've really had the consultations.


Q I'd like to ask a follow-up on the earlier question about the purpose of the sanctions. Obviously, it's useful in foreign policy to be clear about your goals and in articulating your policy and justifying it; it's also useful to be clear about what you're trying to do.

It sounds like you're taking a resolute stance, but it's unclear whether you're taking a minimalist position on sanctions or whether you're asking for more.

What is the purpose of the economic sanctions we are seeking in this sense? What is it that we want the North Koreans to do? Do we want them merely to resolve our concerns over the past history of the reactor? Do we want them to stop proceeding to develop new nuclear weapons by working on a second reactor? What do we expect of them? And, if you can't explain that to us, how can you explain the essence of your policy and whether you're being firm or weak with North Korea?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Provided you accept my analytical structure, you're going to find that's not a hard question to answer. The analytical structure is, I am not going to describe to you the language of a sanctions resolution and the relief that would follow from acts taken by the North Koreans, because I'm not going to talk about the details of the sanctions resolution.

But if you are serious about the way you framed the question -- "What is it that we want?" -- then what we would want the sanctions resolution to do is to play a role in the achievement of the objectives I described before, by having an impact on the calculations the North Koreans would make.

So the kinds of things we want, to put it in the terms in which we have been talking is to resolve issues. Yes, we wish to resolve what happened in 1989, the amount of plutonium that was accumulated. That's how this issue came to the Security Council in the first place, and that's why it is immediately before it right now.

We also, of course, have concerns about the direction they go in the future. To get the North Koreans to address both of those concerns is the reason for moving at this time in light of what they have done in the direction of sanctions.

Q Bob, could you just describe a little bit your proliferation concerns of a nuclear-armed North Korea? What nations you would suspect they want to sell this to? Any implications on other areas of our foreign policy that it would relate to?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: We have made no secret of our concerns about the nuclear intention of such countries as Libya, Iraq, Iran. I mention these three countries not only because we've made no secret about our concern about their nuclear intentions, but because all three of these countries are Non-Proliferation Treaty partners --- excuse me, Non- Proliferation Treaty members. And, as such, I think that if I were reflecting on countries which I would expect might draw conclusions from the way the international community responded in this case, I would number them among them as being important.

I would say also that we are, and have been, concerned about North Korean dealings in the ballistic missile area, outside of the nuclear area. Their own ballistic missile program, when mated with a nuclear weapons capability, poses a threat to all of Asia over a period of time when those missiles are developed. In the nearer term, of course, their missile exports to countries such as Iran and Syria pose a threat to peace and stability in the Middle East; and with the development of these extended range missiles, if they were to be exported to the region, of course, the degree to which it would exacerbate tensions there would even grow to a greater degree.

So we have many concerns about proliferation. The obvious ones, about the regimes that are put at risk; about the intrinsic concern about countries in the region feeling a necessity to respond to the North Korean threat in ways that would further destabilize northeast Asia; and then, of course, the possibility of the transfer either of nuclear material or ballistic missiles poses a threat of destabilizing other regions beyond Asia.

MS. SHELLY: Last question.

Q Bob, since North Korea has said that sanctions would constitute an act of war, what does this Administration, (a) have to say to North Korea if indeed it takes such action if sanctions are passed, and what beyond that; and Senator McCain, Senator Lugar, Ambassador Lily, all believe that the United States at this point, after threatening sanctions for so long, should take stronger action -- that is, military preparedness action -- and I wonder what you have to say about those --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Okay, there are two points there. Let me try to address both of them. First, about statements that I've heard attributed to the North Korean Government that comes out of various sources. Nothing we have done lately or over the last bunch of months has been done in a particularly surprise mode. We have been fairly clear about what North Koreans could expect under some circumstances and what they could expect under other circumstances.

I emphasized in my opening remarks that we were very clear, just recently, that we were prepared to go to a third round, prepared to continue our discussions, but if they took steps that we had outlined as long ago as a year ago, that we would not have the basis for those discussions.

So we have not done anything in a precipitate manner, and North Korean statements now are utterly inappropriate. Beyond being in appropriate, I will tell you that we will not be intimidated by them. I don't expect the international community to be intimidated by them. We will proceed deliberately in consultation with South Korea, Japan, other states in the region and the other members of the Security Council, and we will do what is proper and what we must do, given our responsibilities.

With respect to the second part of your question, without commenting on the gentlemen who you named and their views, what I would say is that General Luck is on the scene. He's well aware of his responsibilities to provide for the defense of South Korea in a way that also best defends our own 36,000 Americans who are deployed there. He makes his needs known to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense.

We are in close contact with the General in terms of his needs, and we have been over these months responsive. I think you will find, if you address this question to the Defense Department, that we are comfortable that we have done what we should be doing to provide for a deterrent posture and ultimately for the defense of South Korea, if it should come to that.

Thank you all.

Q Thank you.

MS. SHELLY: Thank you very much, Bob.

(Assistant Gallucci's briefing concluded at 1:14 p.m.)

MS. SHELLY: Everybody's staying! It's okay, you can all go. I'll be happy to proceed immediately to your questions on other subjects.

Q Are there missile tests by South Korea -- by North Korea? I don't know if the Pentagon stressed it, but, assuming they haven't, can you confirm they've done it again? A version of the Silkworm, a new test today.

MS. SHELLY: I've seen reports indicating that there was a second test of an anti-ship missile. I don't have any other details on it.

Q But they did it.

MS. SHELLY: I'd seen reports that they did it. I'm not in a position to --

Q Excuse me. Do you have your own independent reports?

MS. SHELLY: Barry, I just saw the report right before coming into the briefing, and so I'm not in a position to confirm it. I'll check on it and see if we can't give confirmation of that right after the briefing.

Q I have a question regarding Haiti. There's a missionary flight operation that was going from West Palm Beach to Haiti that was stopped around May 17, I guess by the request of the State Department. The operator of that missionary flight operation said he got a call from the State Department yesterday or the day before, indicating that he would be allowed to resume these missionary flights between Florida and Haiti sometime next week. Do you have any comment on that or can you confirm that?

MS. SHELLY: Yes. I've been looking into the question of the humanitarian aid flights and specifically by the missionary groups, because there have been some indications that these have been disrupted and obviously we are concerned about their impact on the poor.

We are very sympathetic to the supply needs of those organizations which are engaged in the humanitarian activities in Haiti, and we know that from the past patterns of this that some of the organizations do typically receive their supplies by air.

Since the sanctions effort is now fully multilateral, we must comply with our international obligations under the U.N. Security Council resolutions on this.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 917 effectively prohibits flights into Haiti other than regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights, unless the particular flight has been approved for humanitarian purposes.

The United Nations Security Council Haiti Sanctions Committee has not yet adopted the guidelines for the case-by- case review, and hence for the approval for all of these flights.

The U.S. has adopted an interim procedure for reviewing and seeking approval of the humanitarian flights which are in accordance with U.N. requirements. We expect that the United Nations will follow the precedent -- with respect to how exemptions work, let me just take a second on that.

Generally speaking, with respect to the U.N. regime, we do expect in the case of Haiti that the U.N. will follow the precedent of other previously established U.N. sanctions regimes. And that is that there has to be a demonstration of a humanitarian need not only for the goods in question but for the flight itself in order to get that U.N. approval.

The requirements will most likely be met if the flight is required for an urgent medical evacuation, if the flight is carrying some kind of a perishable item in urgent need or in short supply or spare parts or supplies which are urgently needed for a functioning humanitarian operation.

The sufficient justification to meet these kinds of standards has not yet been provided by air freight operators that have submitted these requests. We hope this would be the case very shortly.

There are some alternate means, as I think you're aware, to ship most humanitarian supplies. Humanitarian and missionary organizations can be supplied by ship or over land from the Dominican Republic or using cargo space on regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights.

But we hope that this process, whereby the requests can be expedited, will be in track fairly shortly, obviously in conformity with what the U.N. requirements are for humanitarian flights to Haiti.

Q What kind of a time frame are we looking at, because our understanding from this operation in West Palm Beach is that starting -- she got the indication that starting next Thursday, he would probably be able to start -- resume flights. Does that seem realistic in your view?

MS. SHELLY: I don't have a precise day on this, but as far as I know, that would be consistent with the time frame of my general understanding of this. I think that sounds about right.


Q Southern Lebanon, Israel. Do you have an update and also a reaction to what's been going on?

MS. SHELLY: I have a little bit on that for you, not a kind of factual account of what's happened. We obviously have been tracking the hostilities and exchanges which have been going on. We have not seen any reports of further exchanges overnight.

As I think you know, we have been in touch through our diplomatic missions in the region -- with the Israeli, with the Lebanese and with the Syrian leaderships. We have raised the matter with the Chiefs of Mission of the Embassies in Washington of those countries as well. We've urged them to exercise restraint and to try to use their influence to end the violence.

Q Christine, could you tell us whether the Secretary is or is not going to the Middle East after this trip? I understand that his schedule is now known within the Department, and I wonder if you could tell us.

MS. SHELLY: I don't have a lot to add for you on that today. The Secretary has said on several occasions that he expected to be going back to the region at some point in this general time frame after he made this trip to Europe with the President.

No decision has been taken as to the exact timing of that trip, and certainly he will make a decision on the timing of that at the moment that he feels that a trip would be most useful. But no decision has been taken so far.

Q No decision has been made one way or the other on whether he's going to make Istanbul his last stop on this trip?

MS. SHELLY: Right. That's correct.

Other topics.

Q Can you take a Korean question?

MS. SHELLY: I can try. I don't promise to have the answer right at my fingertips.

Q What is the United States' position on the Russian proposed international conference?

MS. SHELLY: I can't tell you a lot on this right at the moment, because this is also something that the President and the Secretary of State have been involved in out on the road. I think there have been some telephone calls that either have taken place or are going to take place on this where I think there will be -- and perhaps out of the President's party or from the Secretary's party there will be a little more information.

What I can tell you generally in terms of our reaction to this is that we feel generally it's very important for the international community to work together on the issue. Russia's objective in proposing the multilateral conference, we feel, is certainly a constructive one, and it reflects Russia's desire to find a negotiated solution to the issue.

As we have indicated and as even the President himself indicated yesterday, we believe now that the issue still belongs in the U.N. Security Council for discussion, and that is certainly the direction that we're headed.

We hope that the discussions in the Security Council are going to establish the basis for resolution of the nuclear issue through negotiations. Russia's proposal for a conference may be appropriate at some point. I certainly can't be any more specific than that, but we think that the first order of business right now is the discussion in the Security Council.

As I said, there may be more on that coming from the President or the Secretary as their consultations on this unfold.

Q If I may have another one. The one thing that we did not hear from Mr. Gallucci is whether there have been any specific contacts with China or the Chinese delegate at the U.N. on this issue? And what, if anything, we've heard from them.

MS. SHELLY: We have been in nearly continuous contact with the Chinese on this. I think not so much in the optic of high-level visits but more in the context of either discussions in New York among the Perm Five or discussions that take place by our various bilateral mechanisms with the Chinese. I can't point to a specific high-level envoy going way or another but we have been in continuous discussion with them, including most recently through their normal channels.

Q I assume we know what their position is?

MS. SHELLY: There have been a lot of exchanges, but I'm not really in a position right now to get any more specific to what they've told us so far.

Q And different than what we've heard in public -- that is, that they're opposed to sanctions?

MS. SHELLY: I think it's a little more complicated than that. They are certainly very concerned with the issue. And in terms of their commitment to the broader objectives which, of course, we share, which is toward a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, none of those things have changed. They have always indicated that they felt that the issue could be resolved through dialogue. And, of course, we would like to see it resolved through dialogue as well.

I don't think that there is any -- at least, in terms of the most recent timeframe -- any shift that we're picking up in the Chinese position. As this is under very intensive discussion, I think I'm just going to have to leave that one there.

Q Can I ask one more on that? When Mr. Armacost went over there, did he raise this issue of China in his discussions, even though he was there dealing with MFN specifically?

MS. SHELLY: I just don't have any information on that.

Q Have you heard what Mr. Gallucci said: One can assume that the channel of communication between the United States and North Korea might be shut down for the time being; is that correct?

MS. SHELLY: Again, I'm just not going to take this any farther than what Bob Gallucci got into. He really was our speaker on this today. I really am very hesitant to take his briefing on this one step further. As much as I'd like to take a stab at answering your question, I'm going to have to decline.

Other subjects?

Q Do you have any comment on the arrest (inaudible) report on the Cyprus issue?

MS. SHELLY: No, I don't. I'm aware of the fact that there is a report on this. We may have had guidance on this in the last couple of days. I will check. And if not, I'm sure we can get an answer to that this afternoon.

Q Christine, since the Turkish Ambassador, Mr. Kandemir, still continues to feed in the Turkish press with unfounded stories that Kurdish PKK members have been trained in Greece, based on the conversation he had here in the State Department on May 20 with Assistant Secretary Mr. Oxman -- actually, Mr. Kandemir was attributed the specific statement to Mr. Oxman's mouth. Could you please clarify the context of this conversation, to clarify the misunderstanding?

MS. SHELLY: I'm going to take the question. I don't have an answer with me, and I'm not going to speculate on that without having something. So I'll post an answer to that this afternoon.

Q Another subject?


Q It was reported yesterday by Associated Press and the Washington Times that more than 400 Iranians, if I'm correct, are already in Bosnia via Zagreb, Croatia, for activities against Serbs. Since Germany has special ties with Croatia and since Germany, on April 30, signed an agreement with the Iran on cooperation and intelligence matters, I'm wondering, did your government get in touch with the German Government to find out what is going on with this unusual Iranian involvement in the Balkans?

MS. SHELLY: I'm going to have to check on that one as well.

Q One more on Haiti. Did you see Mr. Aristide's comments this morning that the sanctions are not going to work and it's time for the U.S. to help him out in a military way? Do you have any reaction?

MS. SHELLY: We did see his statements this morning. Let me just get what I've got on that, if you'll give me a second here.

We certainly noted with interest President Aristide's remarks. There were several things that he addressed in that. He talked about the surgical action possibility. He made reference to a 4-point plan. He also levied some criticism about the effectiveness of the international sanctions effort so far.

We certainly read his remarks with interest. As you know, President Clinton has not ruled the military option in or out, and we're still focusing our attention on working with the world community to try to bring international pressure to bear on the regime through the stiffer enforcement of sanctions.

As the comprehensive U.N. sanctions went into effect less than two weeks ago, I think that it's still a little early to make a kind of sweeping response to that. In the last week, the Dominican Republic has demonstrated its willingness to take some very concrete steps to halt the leakage across its border. We talked about that a little bit earlier in the week.

In addition, the Dominican Republic has also asked that a multilateral force of up to 60 work with the Dominican counterparts to assist in controlling smuggling along the border. So we and the international community are working very hard to try to ensure that the sanctions are rigorously enforced.

I know you didn't ask about this specifically, but on the 4-point plan -- this is actually not something that we have seen at this point, and so on that one we'll have to wait and get a few more details on it.

Anything else? Thanks.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:28 p.m.) (###)

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