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US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
Thursday, April 7, 1994


                                                          BRIEFER:  Lynn E. Davis


COCOM
Hague Discussions on Successor Regime ...................................1
Ending of COCOM Regime--March 31, 1994 ...............................1
Target Date (10/4/94)/Framework /Goals of
    New Regime .......................................................................................2
Focus on Regions, Transparency, Rogue States ......................2,9
Russian Participation ........................................................................2,4-5,9,11
Interim Steps ........................................................................................2-4
Controls or Licensing on Sensitive Items and Arms ...........2-4
Global Focus ...........................................................................................2-3
Computers and Telecommunications ...........................................3
Working Group Meetings/Bilateral Discussions .....................4
Arms Sales to Iran ..............................................................................4-5,7
Technology/Engine Sales to India .................................................5-6
Enforcement ...........................................................................................10-11
Criteria for Membership ...................................................................11


                                                          BRIEFER:  Michael McCurry

RWANDA/BURUNDI
Outbreak of Violence .........................................................................12
Status of Americans ..........................................................................12-13
Discussions on Status of Security ..............................................13

CUBA
Refugees Returned to Bahamas ....................................................13-15

MIDDLE EAST PEACE
Violence in Afula, Ashdod, Gaza, Hebron .................................15-19
Statements by PLO and UN Security Council .........................16-19
US Contact with Arafat/PLO ........................................................17,20
Implementation of Declaration of Principles .......................15,31
Talks in Washington ..........................................................................20

LEBANON/JORDAN
Banning of Schindler's List ...........................................................19

IRAQ
Attacks on UN Peacekeepers and Journalists .......................21
Security of Americans ....................................................................21

NORTH KOREA
Establishment of Senior Policy Steering Group ..................22-23
Assistant Secretary of Defense Carter's Remarks ............23,25
Gallucci Travel to Region ..............................................................23
US Diplomatic Contacts .................................................................23

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Bosnian Serb/Government Discussions in Sarajevo ..........27
Ambassador Redman's Consultations .......................................27-29
Status of Peacekeepers to Gorazde ........................................28-29
NATO Air Support .............................................................................28-29

CHINA
Status of Mr. Wei ..............................................................................30
MFN ..........................................................................................................30

TURKEY
Possible Military Activity Against PKK .................................31

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #55

THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 1994, 12:50 P.M. (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. McCURRY: Good afternoon everybody. I've got a special attraction today that gives me delight to introduce. That's the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Lynn Davis.

Under Secretary Davis has just returned from very important negotiations at The Hague, the Netherlands, among members of formerly the COCOM who have been discussing in the post-Cold War era how do you develop and bridge to a successor regime for COCOM that will handle questions related to the export of sensitive technologies around the world. This seemed to me to be a good opportunity for you to learn more about what is going on in these discussions, where things stand, and she has graciously agreed to my request to give you a little bit of insight into where things are.

Under Secretary Davis.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: It's nice to be back, and I will just briefly give you a sense of what it is that happened last weekend in The Hague and what our hopes are for constraining dangerous arms and dual-use technologies over the coming years to meet the new security threats and dangers.

As most of you know and reported last week, COCOM ended on the 31st of March whereby we ended an East-West regime focused on preventing the sale of arms and dangerous dual-use technologies to communist countries. It was a regime borne in the Cold War and has ended with the end of the Cold War.

But at the same time the COCOM partners recognized that there are still threats to the peace in the post-Cold War world. We've set about working to establish a new multilateral regime designed to respond to these new security threats, to the possibility that there are dangers to peace and stability in now regions of the world and particularly the Middle East and South Asia and also threats posed by rogue countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.

And so our two major goals of the new regime will be to work together to deny the trade in dangerous arms and sensitive technologies to those regions and to those states. We put together last week in The Hague a framework and set as a target goal for the establishment of that regime next October 1994.

What we're doing is for the first time, seeking to put in place among the major Western suppliers of arms, a multilateral approach to information-sharing and to restraint. This will build on the discussions that followed on from the Gulf War among the five Permanent members of the Security Council. We will build on those discussions, but we will expand the regime to include not only armaments but also trade and dual-use technologies. But to succeed, we'll need to bring in, as an equal partner, Russia. We're working with the Russians to make them a founding partner. They've already participated in a working group that was held on armaments earlier on this year in London.

The one major obstacle so far to Russia's participation in this regime is whether or not they're prepared to accept all the policies of the new regime; and a particular concern of ours is their continuing sales of arms to Iran.

Between the time that COCOM disappeared and the time that we actually establish this new regime, the COCOM partners have taken some interim steps that are very important in our goals to restraining trade and dangerous arms, and also on focusing our policies towards the new security threats. What we've agreed to last week in The Hague is to continue controls or licensing on the most sensitive items in arms, as these have been listed in the COCOM list of the past, so that we will continue controls on the most sensitive items in arms by all the former COCOM partners, but we will now apply these controls on a global basis. No longer will they be applied in an East-West context, but the controls will be applied globally.

We've also agreed to exercise extreme vigilance on a global basis for all trade in the most sensitive of these items, so that we will be continuing to control these most sensitive items not only to the formerly proscribed countries of Russia and China but also now around the world to include countries such as Iran.

Through our bilateral discussions and understandings in this multilateral framework, we can say and have confidence that our respective controls will further restrict the trade that would contribute to military instability, to the support of terrorist activities, and so forth and so on.

So the end of COCOM is not the end of controls, but it is the end of a focus primarily in the East-West context and now we're looking to a global focus so that we can assure that the trade in these most sensitive items are appropriately controlled.

At the same time that we took the steps last week in The Hague, as you have also reported, we agreed to some further liberalization with respect to some of these items, particularly in the areas of computers and telecommunications.

So that's briefly our report. It's not a statement that we've put the new regime in place, but I think we've made considerable progress, and I didn't want the opportunity to pass to say that we're working there. We're not quite there, but we're aiming for October. It will be a multilateral approach, and it's taking the time necessary to bring everybody together to put in force a very serious regime.

Q Except for that caveat about liberalization, you make it sound -- at least it could be interpreted -- is you're saying there will now be a worldwide regime that is as careful about letting dual-use equipment go all over, as it used to be, just to communist countries. But the reports I've seen put a different emphasis on the story -- that motivated by the profit motive, which of course is the driving force in this administration, that you all --

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: As well as non-proliferation.

Q Yes. Well, I don't know so much about proliferation. The way the story has been projected is you've thrown out most restrictions on the theory, "Hell, everybody's selling the stuff; except for the most dangerous stuff, let's get in there and compete with the other guys, but let's make sure Libya doesn't get anything," you know, and four other pariah states.

How do you feel about that type of description of your policies?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: The Administration is committed to both liberalization, consistent with the changes in the world, and also to putting in place a non- proliferation regime that also focuses on the new security threats. So you're correct to say that both things happened last week. We liberalized at the lower end of the earlier COCOM list. We put in place -- continued in place controls on the most sensitive, the upper end, and we now are applying those globally, so that the demise of COCOM doesn't mean that there now is trade -- global trade in the most sensitive items.

So we've liberalized appropriate to the new world, but we've also put in place or continued in place controls, licensing, on those most sensitive items and arms, looking toward a new regime that will provide a formal multilateral approach to those new security dangers.

I was in The Hague, still negotiating as the discussions about liberalization were being put forward.

Q What is the mechanism for control, monitoring or consultations among the COCOM -- former COCOM members to assure that there is some common practice as far as licensing or lease of these products?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: Leading up to the decisions last week was a set of working group discussions, as well as bilateral discussions among the major suppliers, so that we have this confidence that our national policies are essentially the same with respect to trade. And we made that known in the summary of conclusions in the multilateral framework and discussions that were proceeding towards the formation of a new regime.

So essentially what I'm describing to you now is an interim set of policies, common policies, leading up to the time when we can announce more formally the establishment of the new regime.

So between now and the establishment of the new regime there will be working group meetings and also bilateral discussions that will assure us over the coming months that our policies are essentially the same.

Q Dr. Davis, it's no secret that much of Europe, and you're saying Russia, do not support our policy of containing Iran and Iraq. I assume that extends to arms sales. How big a problem is that going to be for setting up this new organization? What exactly do you want Russia to do or not to do with regard to Iran, and how do you expect to get Europe on board to this policy if they sort of outright reject it anyway?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: The common policies of our COCOM partners today with respect to sales of arms to Iran is that we don't sell arms to Iran. The suppliers of arms to Iran include Russia and China but not those that are participating in the formation of this regime.

Q Dual-use items.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: On the dual-use side, we'll be working to a common approach that will deny the trade in sensitive dual-use items for military end purposes, and I believe that there's considerable support within the members discussing this new regime for that policy as well.

So we're looking now for the Russians to do something that we believe is consistent with becoming a partner and also consistent with becoming a member of the new regime, and that is to forego future arms sales to Iran. This is something President Clinton raised with President Yeltsin when he met in Vancouver, when President Yeltsin asked President Clinton to remove the Cold War relics and to phase out COCOM. And at the same time we raised our concerns with respect to their trade in arms to Iran, and it's something that we've raised at high levels each time we've had meetings with the Russians and very much hope to find a way that they will take on these obligations.

As I mentioned, they've already begun participating in the working group on armaments for this new regime, and in that context in this multilateral approach, we hope that we can bring them to this common policy.

Q What have they said to you so far on this -- what's the most recent --

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: So far they've been saying that they don't share precisely our same view with respect to the dangers in sales to Iran, but they haven't foreclosed the possibility that this could be part of their working with us in this new regime.

Q Ms. Davis, besides the Middle East, you also mentioned South Asia as a regional security threat, and about two or three years ago the U.S. pressured Russia not to sell cryogenic engines to India -- cryogenic engine technology, and India apparently has now signed a separate agreement with Russia where the engines will be provided in lieu of technology. Is that okay by the U.S.? Can the U.S. live with that, or will it have problems with Russia selling cryogenic engines to India, or did it only have problems with the technology part of it?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: What we hope to do was to end the cooperation that was transferring not only technology but also expertise and the ability for this kind of development of capabilities. But in the context of our agreements with the Russians, we have said okay to the sale of a few engines but not the technology.

Q In the dismantling of the COCOM, doesn't that become mite? You all have a problem with a transfer of expertise and technology but no problems with engines?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: It's actually dealing with the missiles and separately. Remember, that this regime will seek to fill a gap in our non-proliferation regimes and those having to do with arms and dual-use technologies. But when I say a region of potential instability and concern, it's not that we would be seeking to deny all sales and items or arms to these regions, but rather that we would together share information improve transparency and discuss the appropriate ways of trade consistent with promoting peace and security.

So don't get the wrong idea of what we're talking about when we say that regions are regions of potential instability. Those are places where we think it's appropriate to have discussions, share information and pursue common policies of restraint, perhaps, on the most sensitive kinds of items of trade.

Q Just a quick follow-up on that, Ms. Davis. How many engines is okay for Russia to sell? You said "some engines." Have you put a number on it?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: We haven't put a precise number on it, but it's measured in a very small number.

Q When you met in The Hague last November, you set a March 31 deadline for the conclusion of the new regime.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: That's right.

Q That was the original target.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I knew that someone would remind me that I had been here once before. We became a little ambitious in our goals, but we were able by the end of March to put together an overall framework. There's a lot of work still to be done in the modalities. That's fair to say.

Q What is the progress that you can report out of this meeting that would seem to make agreement more likely in October, particularly given the staunch French opposition to including arms in this new regime? Has there been any wavering on that at all by the French?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: The French are still arguing that -- their support is for a regime involving dual-use items, but reticent to move into a multilateral approach on arms, although they, themselves, have participated in a working group among the small suppliers towards that goal. So I guess the major step in terms of our accomplishments over the last few months -- because it all came together last week in The Hague -- there's a general sense among the others that both arms and dual-use items need to be part of this regime and a willingness on the part of the French to work with us, or at least not to reserve or walk away from our discussions.

Q To develop the point you are making about Russia, Ms. Davis, if the Russians do continue to sell arms to Iran, will we be penalizing them in any way, or have we put any pressure on them on this? Is it just discussions or is there any teeth in our discussions?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: Actually, the teeth in our discussions flow from legislation -- the Iran-Iraq Non- Proliferation Act - which provides for sanctions and costs to anyone who sells destabilizing arms to Iran or Iraq. So it's not something that we would wish to hang over the Russians, but it's a fact, and that is that the U.S. Congress and the Clinton Administration support the need for restraint in arms sales -- destabilizing arms sales to that part of the world, because of the dangers posed by those kinds of activities.

So consistent with that, but also with any multilateral approach, we wish to bring Russia in to this new regime and to that common policy.

Q Two questions, please. You used the term "rogue regimes," and you referred to "sensitive dual-use items," sensitive arms. Could you explain in terms that the American public would understand what you mean by "rogue regimes" and "sensitive dual-use" -- and the word "sensitive."

Second question, I asked you once before in another forum: Does China have ICBMs targeted on the United States?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: Let me keep to my subject for today. The first has to do with rogue countries. It's not a problem for the United States to say quite clearly that we believe that the behavior of Libya, Iran, Iraq and North Korea is inconsistent with the norms of international behavior which we think appropriate and would wish to find ways to deny them arms and dangerous dual-use technologies.

So we sometimes use "backlash states," others use "rogue states," but that's clearly what we have in mind and would wish trade in dangerous arms and sensitive items to be denied to those countries.

As to what "sensitive" items are, and I'm not an expert on that, we can follow up with some experts who can do that. But they're the things that help countries produce weapons of mass destruction, produce missiles, produce dangerous conventional weapons, long-range aircraft, and so forth. So I think from a non-expert point of view, they're things that you would expect that you wouldn't be trading to such countries as I've described.

Q Those are unimportant, too (inaudible) -- these are four of the six on the terrorism list. Are those the only four?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: Those are the ones that so far --

Q That dual-use equipment to Syria is all right with the U.S. Government?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: No. I was quite clear when I said that what we would seek to do is to maintain on a global basis licensing and controls for all the most sensitive items to all the countries in the world.

So in the interim regime that we've set up, we haven't singled out these four countries for controls or for extreme vigilance. What I've then gone to say is that in the new regime we're looking at a variety of different goals, one of which may be to focus on rogue states. Which, precisely, those rogue states would be would be matters still to be discussed.

In our view right now, there are at least four and perhaps if you add the other two, in terms of terrorism, you're right to say --

Q (Inaudible) internationally defined and accepted, or multilaterally defined and accepted list of rogue or pariah states, which would be accepted by all the countries that sign onto this regime?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I think what we would be looking for is cooperation and denial in trade. Precisely how we name or don't name or go about the modalities of that, but the end result would be that kind of a denial with respect to those countries.

Q But everyone of these states, or whatever you call them, would be the targets of this regime?

Q The top targets?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: In addition to the regime. That's one of the, I think, misperceptions of what our goals are is that it's not just about rogue states. That's clearly an important part of the new regime.

Almost as important, if not more important, is the focus on regions and information-sharing, transparency, and common policies to keep the peace in regions where war might break out.

I can't tell you that I have complete agreement on that goal, but I have remarkable agreement at this point towards those goals.

Q What happens to Russia, for example? COCOM is dead, yet still the United States is going to be restricting a lot of sensitive items to Russia.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: Right from the beginning we've said to the Russians, as we've built this strategic partnership, that there would still be certain kinds of trade that we don't trade with anybody. Some of these things we won't trade anyone, and some of them we have trade relations but only over time and they're very close allies.

This is not a surprise to the Russians. And, indeed, it was clear from the very start. I think it's only appropriate as we think about our own national security and as we build this partnership.

Q So the list will get smaller in terms of restrictions to Russia, but it is still a huge list?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: It's not a large list.

Q We still want the Germans, the French, the British to restrict trade with the Russians and the former Soviet states as well?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: Right now we have agreement from last week that we will be -- all of us -- still, on the very most sensitive items, denying this trade. So it's not simply a U.S.-unilateral policy, but this is part of our common understanding with respect to the arrangements leading into the new regime.

Q There's a lot of worries down in the bowels of the Pentagon about this new no-COM regime.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: Just for the record, I'm not going to name this regime until we have a regime. I just think it's a matter of, you just don't want to get out ahead of your negotiating ability. But that, I really do take some exception to.

Q I ask it for a reason. Specifically, there are documents floating around the Pentagon that say, for example, that this will make it far easier for the Chinese to develop cruise missiles that could be sold to nations that we don't want to have. So while you're saying that we're restricting sensitive weapons, others within the Administration are saying, "Well, no, these are actually quite sensitive weapons that are now going to be available on the world market.

Are you really comfortable with what you're doing now? Or are you whistling in the dark?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: Clearly, I'm very comfortable with what I'm doing. I also believe that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are comfortable with the policies that we've worked out. As one says, one can't please everyone; but this is something that we've worked out in considerable detail and we've gone through the lists. We've looked at each item. We've balanced off the need to liberalize the pressures to sell with our non-proliferation policies.

I think we've demonstrated that non-proliferation is the key priority of this Administration, and we care a great deal about that.

Q What is the enforcement mechanism for this new regime? You have this so-called common goal of denial of trade. But will membership be conditional on accepting which nations are considered rogue nations? Will technologies be specifically labeled as those that are sensitive? And how without a veto power can you really enforce this thing?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: We can all look back to the nostalgia of the Cold War and the things of the Cold War. But COCOM was a unique East-West regime built on a very particular threat and a very common purpose, to deny the trade in arms and the most sensitive dual-use items to communist countries.

We've put together a regime that permitted us to veto trade by others. But that's unique. All the other non- proliferation regimes go about it the way I've just been describing for this new successor regime. It's a common set of policies -- denial regimes, where appropriate; transparency, information-sharing.

So I think it's really inappropriate to think of this regime in the context of what COCOM was. It's not really replacing COCOM. It's a new approach -- a global multilateral approach to trade in conventional arms and dual- use technologies.

Q Will the Chinese be in the new regime, one question is whether the Chinese will be the new regime with the Russians. Secondly, specifically, will the new multilateral controls apply as strictly to India?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: No. The new global controls are non-discriminatory. They are now seeking to, as I said earlier, for the very most sensitive lists, ensure against their trade.

With respect to China, one of the things we've been working through in terms of the new regime is to set the criteria for membership. We've made very clear that the criteria will be non-discriminatory in the sense that we will require effective export controls, adherence to the global non-proliferation regimes and acceptance of the policies of the new regimes. So in that way, were China to meet those criteria, they would become a member. But so far there at some distance in their policies from that.

Q Can India also be a member?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: That's right. It's a non- discriminatory set of criteria.

Q One last quick one. Can this thing you're trying to create be created without Russia?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: What we're saying is, it's very important that we have Russia as a founding member and equal partner. That will be critical to the success of this regime. That's what we'll be working hard on between now and October. Indeed, why it is that this is not -- we haven't in a sense, established the regime because we want them to be there from the beginning.

Q Can we get a copy of some of those conclusions from the meeting?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I'm not sure whether we've put them out, but let me check.

Q How about the statement you made at the beginning?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: We certainly can give you the statement that I made at the beginning.

Thanks very much.

MR. McCURRY: Other questions, ladies and gentlemen?

Q Mike, do you have anything on the report that the human rights leader in Rwanda has been taken away and killed --

MR. McCURRY: Barry, I do not have anything on that. Obviously, in Rwanda today there is a very significant outbreak of violence that's resulted in the deaths not only of the two Presidents, who died in the airplane crash last night, but today increasing violence that's resulted in the death of members of the government as well.

Because of the situation in Rwanda today, Americans have been advised to stay at home. The Embassy in Kigali is not open for business today. The Ambassador has been monitoring the situation as best we can based on the reports that we are able to get.

So in this case, we don't have any direct information at this point. Obviously, it's a very troubling report that we have heard, and we will continue to be, as best we can, looking into the situation on the ground.

There's some significant interest in the status of Americans. As far as we know, Americans there are safe. They're are approximately 200 Americans in Rwanda. There are about 180 in Burundi. There is, to our knowledge, at this point, not any violence that we're aware of in Burundi, although we have taken some precautionary measures there. About half of the Americans in Rwanda and Burundi -- I think in both cases -- are official Americans and dependents. But to our knowledge they're all safe, and both embassies have activated the warning system so that Americans can check on each other's safety.

It's a very troubling development. You're all aware that the President already today has expressed his own personal shock and sadness at the death of the two Presidents and has condemned the violence which has resulted today in the death of the Acting Prime Minister, among others.

Q You're not evacuating the dependents yet?

MR. McCURRY: There will be discussions on-going today with other foreign governments about the status of security in Rwanda. We certainly will take any appropriate measures to protect the safety of Americans. But that step has not been offered at this point.

Q Do you have any information regarding some 19 Cuban refugees who were trying to come into the United States from the Bahamas and they were turned back by U.S. Coast Guards?

MR. McCURRY: I have some. Sid, you didn't have another question?

Q No.

Q Does the United States have any information on how this airplane crashed?

MR. McCURRY: No, we don't know the cause of the crash. There are reports the plane was fired and shot down. But to our knowledge, those reports have not been confirmed at this point.

On the Coast Guard -- referring to the 19 Cubans who were returned to the Bahamas yesterday, the Coast Guard determined that these individuals were coming from the Bahamas, not from Cuba, and the Coast Guard confirmed this with the Bahamian Government which agreed to accept their return. In accordance with our standard practice, they were then returned to Nassau. That's what I think we have on their status at this point.

Q Isn't that a change in policy? On February 22, there were Cubans coming from the Cayman Islands that ended up in Key West.

MR. McCURRY: It's not a change of policy. Our policy remains that we accept Cuban rafters fleeing directly from Cuba into the United States. These folks had reached safety in the Bahamas. The Bahamian Government agreed to take them back and they were not in danger.

There are cases in which we have -- when there's a medical emergency or things like that, the Coast Guard will bring to the United States people who they consider to be in dire circumstances. But in this case, the 19 were considered safe, and they could be safely returned to the Bahamas. That is in accord with our existing policy.

Q What do they have to do to come to this country from the Bahamas? Do they have to file for a visa like any other citizen?

MR. McCURRY: Yes. They are now in a third country that will be cooperative where they're safe. They're eligible to immigrate under U.S. Immigration law. They can seek entry through appropriate procedures by visiting the U.S. Embassy there and filing the appropriate applications that will be reviewed and screened by INS officials.

Q Could this also be interpreted as a warning to other Cubans who are also in other islands and are trying to attempt to come to the U.S., that this will no longer be tolerated?

MR. McCURRY: This is just a practice that is consistent with U.S. law and U.S. policy. We, of course, urge all Cubans not to attempt to cross the floor of the straits on boats, rafts, inner tubes, or any type of unseaworthy vessel. It's just not safe to do so. They're going to end up putting themselves in danger.

Our policies -- we've discussed this, as a matter of fact, frequently as it relates to Haiti. Our policy is designed to protect those who would like to immigrate.

There is a lawful procedure underway that is administered by the United States Government under U.S. law, and appropriate procedures that can be followed to determine the status of an immigration request.

In the case of Cuban nationals, there are also specific applications that fall under the Cuban Adjustment Act that apply. All of those applicable U.S. laws, of course, are followed, as they should be.

Q Why does the United States accept Cuban rafters coming across the area and not accept Haitian rafters coming across a similar piece of water?

MR. McCURRY: Because we are required to by an act of Congress.

Q Required to what? Accept the Cuban rafters?

MR. McCURRY: The Cuban Adjustment Act provides that those Cuban nationals who have been inspected and admitted or paroled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service can be allowed into the country. There is a different provision of law that exists in that case than applies to those coming from Haiti, by act of Congress.

Q Does that not seem somewhat discriminatory to the State Department understanding that you would simply have to abide by the will of Congress, but it is rather quirky, isn't it?

MR. McCURRY: It's the job of the Executive Branch of the Government to execute the laws passed by Congress.

Q Of course, you could, Mike, adjust that inequity by accepting and processing Haitian refugees who make it here. That would remove that appearance of racism.

MR. McCURRY: We have a procedure that we use to process applications from Haitian citizens in accordance with U.S. law. It works as effectively as it can. We believe it has been effective.

Joe.

Q Mike, do you have anything -- a statement today -- about the massacre in Afula in light of what happened in Ashdod?

MR. McCURRY: Clearly, as we did yesterday, we condemn in the strongest terms these despicable acts of terrorism. I think, as you know, there have been additional attacks in Ashdod today, I think in Gaza, and perhaps in Hebron as well. I think there's been an outbreak of violence.

We extend our deepest condolences and sympathies to the families of those killed, and our sincere hopes for a quick recovery of those who have been injured. Once again, we urge all sides to exercise calm, reason, and restraint.

Again, I can only state as strongly as I did yesterday, that acts of violence such as these only serve the objectives of the enemies of peace, and the parties to the peace process must not permit this type of violence to deter them from continuing their discussions and continuing the search for the implementation of the Declaration and for a pathway to a peace process that can change the very conditions that sometimes cause support for these acts to arise.

We believe it's essential now for the parties to redouble their efforts, to conclude an agreement. That can begin shortly by implementing the Declaration of Principles.

Q If I may continue with this, please. Have any of the Arab Governments, and especially Mr. Arafat, come out with any condemnatory statement about this? And what is the United Nations doing with respect to the massacre in Afula, especially those countries that sponsored the resolution of condemnation?

MR. McCURRY: Several questions there. I think, first, you're aware probably that the PLO has issued an official statement which expresses regret and offers condolences for the attack.

We've seen news accounts of this statement, but I don't think we've yet seen a full text.

As to the Security Council, you're probably aware that on behalf of the members of the U.N. Security Council last night, the U.N. Security Council President issued a very strong statement expressing shock and outrage at the attack on Israeli civilians in Afula on April 6.

The statement said that members of the Security Council condemn this act of terror and extend condolences to the wounded and the families of those who have lost their lives.

It also called once again, on behalf of the international community, on behalf of the United Nations, for the parties themselves to continue a very determined effort to reach a peaceful settlement and full implementation of the Declaration. So the international community has spoken, and the PLO has issued a statement. Certainly, the United States has been outspoken in condemning these acts of violence.

Carol.

Q Is this PLO statement enough? Wouldn't you expect something stronger than from Arafat himself?

MR. McCURRY: Yes, we would.

Q Have you been in contact with --

Q (Inaudible) from Arafat in public?

MR. McCURRY: I don't know whether we're waiting, but there hasn't been such a statement.

Q Mike, isn't it already, in a sense, too late? Because if he does come out with a statement, it will look forced, it will look like it's a reaction to urgings of others? Certainly, there's no sense of the spontaneity of Rabin's, for instance, statement after Hebron had.

MR. McCURRY: I don't think any statement condemning the violence and condemning those who carry out the violence would be unwelcomed.

Sid.

Q It sounds like we are so far unsatisfied with the PLO, dissatisfied with the PLO's response.

MR. McCURRY: I would say yes.

Q And what about other Arab governments? Have you heard a lot of condemnation from any --

MR. McCURRY: I haven't had an opportunity to check how individual governments in the region are responding to this atrocious incident.

Q Has the United States been in touch with Arafat and his people to impress upon them how important it is for some sort of stronger statement?

MR. McCURRY: Yes.

Q And what has been the response?

MR. McCURRY: You've seen the response. Joe.

Q After Hebron, there was great agitation to do something about protecting people and so on. The Israeli Government has responded to the U.N. condemnation; there's an international presence. Everybody in Israel -- all the politicians, the rabbis, and everybody deplore this -- say that we're ashamed, etc., etc. Yet, we hear nothing from the Islamic peoples all the way from Jakarta to Rabat deploring this thing. It happened.

Can't there be something more significant be done like closing down the consulate in east Jerusalem, or getting a U.N. resolution calling on the Islamic world to take cognizance of this and implore the governments that house and protect the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad peoples to cut it out?

MR. McCURRY: We do believe that people should join with the international community, as recognized last night in the statement by the U.N. Security Council President in condemning these acts of violence -- all acts of violence -- that are conducted by the enemies of the peace process itself.

Q I'm talking about the religious element in the Islamic world. Have they said anything about this?

MR. McCURRY: As I said, I haven't had a chance to survey the full range of statements, but neither can I speak on their behalf.

Q You may have mentioned about the quality of life, if it's improved; that would settle everything. But that doesn't seem to be the philosophy of the peoples who have conducted the massacre in Hamas and their own statements all the way down the line.

MR. McCURRY: That's correct. The people who conduct this violence prey on fear. Their aim and objective is to raise fear in the region as a way of destroying the peace process. That is their objective. And, as I say again, the way to counter that, the cure for that terrible tendency, is for the peace process itself to move ahead so that hope can replace the fear of those who --

Q That's what I'm getting at is hope. But there's nothing specific, nothing concrete. Would the State Department consider some action like closing down the consulate in east Jerusalem temporarily?

MR. McCURRY: We think the concrete actions that could make a difference in this region are those things that will occur as the Declaration is implemented, as the peace process moves forward. That's what we're looking for.

Q A question on Korea.

Q The same subject.

MR. McCURRY: Saul. One more, Saul.

Q Maybe I can ask a question as to whether the State Department -- the United States -- can do anything else except ask for a condemnation, besides just asking? Is there something else that the United States can do to more forcefully seek some sort of statement from the Arab world?

MR. McCURRY: I think we can raise it diplomatically. We can continue our discussions. We can't force people to make statements that they're unwilling to make. But we can, in fact, raise this as an issue. We can point out the importance of doing this. We can point out the importance to the process itself, and we can remind those in the region that the international community has expressed its shock at this type of violence and the need to join with the international community in condemning it.

Sid.

Q Can I ask if each Ambassador in the Islamic countries is personally raising it on behalf of the United States in asking the leader of that country to -- is that's what happening or can you --

MR. McCURRY: As are all aspects of the peace process, this particular incident and the views of the United States will be part of the on-going dialogue that each Ambassador, or each diplomat at posts around the region have.

Q (Inaudible) from what you're saying at the podium, there's nothing special being done, is there?

MR. McCURRY: It is being raised diplomatically in contacts we have throughout the region. It's part of the way we work the peace process itself.

Q Mike, the Holocaust this day today. Can I ask you if you also noted that "Schindler's List" has been banned in Lebanon in Jordan, two countries which are in the peace process?

MR. McCURRY: I didn't have that information. I'm sorry. I had only that it's not been released in Indonesia, not been released in the Philippines for reasons relating to the content of the movie. I will check further on that. Someone had asked that question before, and I'm sorry I didn't have an answer today.

Sid.

Q If I could just go back to the condemnation briefly. Not too many years ago, in a very similar situation, the United States, in response to Arafat's refusal to condemn an attack, or cut off the dialogue, is that -- Arafat has also agreed in writing to condemn these attacks.

Is cutting off the dialogue a possible recourse now, or is that completely out of the question?

MR. McCURRY: You mean cutting off contacts between the United States and the PLO?

Q Yes, as they did in '82 or '83?

MR. McCURRY: The contacts the United States has with the PLO right now are designed to advance the peace process, which is central to changing the facts in the territories. I think, in that sense, I'm not aware of any plans for a change.

Q Would Israel be justified in holding Arafat to his vow in cutting off their dialogue?

MR. McCURRY: I can't speak for the Government of Israel on that point.

Jim.

Q Speaking of the negotiations, there were hopes recently that these talks in Washington, at the Secretary's invitation, would begin this month. Are there still hopes that that will occur?

MR. McCURRY: Yes.

Q And when? Do you know?

MR. McCURRY: This month, we hope.

Q Do you have a specific date?

MR. McCURRY: No.

Q I know yesterday you were asked a question about the Syrians and terrorists groups operating within Syria and south Lebanon. Can you add anything to that? Have we made any representations to Syria in the last 24 hours?

And, secondly, is Syria's conduct coming anywhere close to falling into the definition of "rogue" regimes, as we heard from Secretary Davis before?

MR. McCURRY: I don't want to comment on Secretary Davis' presentation on -- we have no information that would lead us to view the perpetrator of the act of violence in Afula as any organization other than Hamas, which is not Damascus-based. But, as I said yesterday, we do, on a regular basis, raise the activities of those rejectionists groups and organizations based in Damascus with the Government of Syria. We implore them to use their influence to curb the activities of those who are attempting to disrupt the peace process.

Betsy.

Q Can I have a filing break?

MR. McCURRY: Filing break has been requested. I don't see any objections. Betsy.

Q Do you have anymore information about the situation in northern Iraq -- the attacks on U.N. workers --

MR. McCURRY: No, I don't. We've seen the response of the Iraqis denying that. I would state again that we have very good reason to believe that the information that we've been given as to bounties and to the attacks and as to the possible involvement of the Iraqi Government is credible information.

Once again, we can't express enough how appalling it is that they would take the work of the international presence in northern Iraq and attempt to disrupt the work of those who are attempting to do humanitarian work and other types of work on behalf of the international community in northern Iraq.

Q In a taken question, you said that there are Americans in northern Iraq participating in the peacekeeping --

MR. McCURRY: In some of the humanitarian work; approximately 50, I believe.

Q Are we doing anything special, or are they, to protect themselves?

MR. McCURRY: We are taking steps related to their security. We are concerned about their safety, but I'd rather not get into that publicly.

Q On Iraq?

MR. McCURRY: Yes.

Q You issued a statement last night on the situation in southern Iraq, saying --

MR. McCURRY: The demarches.

Q -- there's evidence that there's been increased fighting. Can you shed any light on the nature of the evidence that you cite?

MR. McCURRY: I can't, no. I'll see if we can get some more. We got the information that we worked up for the answer last night, but I didn't get any beyond just the information we had.

Joe.

Q Mike, there was a matter of contrast. A very important newspaper editorially came out and said Afula was an incident, Hebron was an atrocity. I mean, this sort of stuff, coming out from an important media, what do you think about stuff like that?

MR. McCURRY: We've said a lot on it, and it's clear that we consider both acts to have been atrocious and terrible, and I'm not aware of which commentary you're referring to, but I think our commentary has been very clear.

Carol.

Q On Korea, has there been any advance in trying to bring North Korea along on this section?

MR. McCURRY: I'm not aware of anything new on that. There's one thing I would like to tell you about. President Clinton has directed the establishment of a senior policy steering group on Korea that will be responsible for coordinating all aspects of U.S. policy dealing with the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. That group will be composed of representatives from all the relevant agencies and departments. It will report directly to the principals' committee of the National Security Council, and I think the establishment of that policy steering group reflects the importance that the Administration places on efforts to find a solution to the issue.

The Chair of the group will be Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs Robert Gallucci, who will have the personal rank of ambassador in discharging those duties. Assistant Secretary Gallucci, as I think all of you know, has been involved in all phases of the Korean issue. He's been the one that's conducted the high-level dialogue with the DPRK when we've had that dialogue, and he headed the U.S. delegation that went, I think, to Geneva for discussions with North Korea earlier.

The NSC's senior director, Daniel Poneman, will be the Vice Chair of that group.

I wanted to pass that on. There's no anything that is newly developing, I think, in any of the discussions today on that.

Q Excuse me, a question on North Korea. Ash Carter today at a Defense Writer's Group breakfast seemed to strike a very conciliatory, extremely moderate note when he said that our main goal is "to prevent a future spurt in North Korea's nuclear activities." I quote, "Job one is to freeze in place their program to not allow a leap forward." And I'm wondering if this is a small change or just a nuance --

MR. McCURRY: No. I'm not aware of anything -- I haven't seen his full remarks, but I've seen some news accounts of it, and I think he was speaking consistent with the views that you've heard the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State reflect.

Q What would the next step be? When will this committee meet, for example?

MR. McCURRY: This committee has already met. They've held their first meeting. There will be some additional follow-up. I expect Assistant Secretary Gallucci, I guess now Ambassador Gallucci, to travel to the region in advance of Secretary Perry's arrival in South Korea for discussions that will occur later this month.

I think that you are aware, of course, that the United Nations has issued a statement on the North Korean issue that calls on North Korea to meet certain obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The International Atomic Energy Agency is, I think, probably in the final stages of analyzing data that they were able to gather during their March inspections of facilities, which would and should shed some further light on the status of the program. But that is the status.

Obviously, we have extensive diplomatic contact going on now with, among others, Japan, China, of course South Korea, and Russia concerning the issue, and the united view of the international community is that North Korea has obligations it must meet to the world community as reflected in the agreement between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency that was signed on February 15 of this year.

That agreement has not been fulfilled, and the world community has been very united in calling on North Korea to fully implement aspects of that agreement. We continue to hope that they will understand the importance of doing so and proceed.

Saul.

Q Has the United States made a formal reply to North Korea to the letter that we spoke of the other day?

MR. McCURRY: Yes. We actually did a little bit of that last week, but in late March we did receive a letter and did respond to the letter, and it was consistent with what I think you're aware of and what we've said publicly.

Q Was there anything else in the letter? Any other "give" somewhere? As I understand it, the North Koreans are now saying they'll proceed with inspections if the United States resumes the talks before the exchange of envoys. Is there any "give" in anybody's position on that?

MR. McCURRY: There is discussion, but, as I said, what we have communicated to the North Koreans is very consistent with what our view has been; that there should be exchange of envoys, and there should be satisfactory completion of the IAEA inspections in order to proceed to the third round.

Q But does one have to come before the other specifically or is there some possibility that --

MR. McCURRY: Those things have to happen. What the sequence they happen in is important, but it's not something that I'm prepared to say anything about.

Q The fact that you say there's discussion about this now suggests to me -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- that there may be some more give in your position than there was the last three or four times that you stood up here and said the conditions are -- the conditions and (inaudible) --

MR. McCURRY: I'm not making any change in that. We need to see a satisfactory completion of the inspections and an exchange of envoys in order to proceed to the third round. No change.

Q Then what's the discussion about?

MR. McCURRY: The discussions we have with those that we're working on in the international community is what types of responses are likely from North Korea, what happens if they're not the proper type of responses, and what can we do. I mean, it's pretty obvious, we're discussing it.

Q Was there flexibility on the part of the United States in terms of the timing and the sequencing of these things?

MR. McCURRY: I didn't say that, no.

Q So there's no flexibility on the part of the United States?

MR. McCURRY: I just said our position has not moved. It's where it's been.

Q You said that the letter -- that the reply is consistent with the position --

MR. McCURRY: That we have taken.

Q -- that is, that it has to be X, Y and Z. But what I'm trying to find out is whether the North Koreans have -- whether the United States might make it possible for this to happen, not necessarily on a quid pro quo basis as it was in the past.

MR. McCURRY: I think North Korea knows our views and knows what we're looking for.

Q But we don't know.

Q Excuse me. Assistant Secretary Carter's remarks this morning went far beyond the one or two bomb question and enough plutonium for the one or two bombs, when he clearly said that our goal now is to prevent this future burst of activity. And I'm just -- I --

MR. McCURRY: I still don't understand. My guess is he was commenting on some of these recent reports that the North Koreans may have added to their capacity at their Yongbyon facility, and that we want to make sure that they don't use that added capacity with a spurt of activity, and I think we certainly share those views. I'm not sure -- what are you finding new? Maybe you could tell me what's new.

Q Perhaps I'm missing something here, but it seems that we are -- at least in his views this morning -- that we have moved away from the inspection issue and now are focusing -- the top priority on containing expansion.

MR. McCURRY: No, no. The inspections are necessary to make sure that -- if I understand, I'll have to look at his remarks more carefully -- but you need to inspect to know whether or not there's been a diversion of nuclear material, and we haven't satisfactorily completed the inspections necessary to answer that question. We can't be assured that the program is frozen, and that there's been a continuity of safeguards, unless the IAEA can successfully complete the inspections that North Korea agreed to in February.

So all we're seeking is simply for those inspections necessary to satisfy that there's been no diversion of material to occur and the second point, which remains the same, that the North and the South exchange envoys, and that we can get on with a discussion with them at a higher level about ways to resolve the overall issue. That by no means resolves all the questions that we might have, and Ash Carter is presumably talking about the additional capacity to move forward in a program, and that's certainly what we need to know more about.

But the first thing is to establish that there's been a continuity in the program, and that there has not been a diversion of material that would allow for the processing of additional plutonium for weapons.

Sid.

Q Would it be correct to say that we're proposing with our allies on ways to get things going again with North Korea? One of the things under consideration is looking at the sequencing of these three steps.

MR. McCURRY: Part one, of course, we're talking to them about ways in which we can try to move this process off dead center. Question two, I don't want to get into that issue because I don't think there's any change in our views on that issue.

Q Just a follow-up to this: You talk about inspections, so forth and so on. What happens if we go in and the IAEA inspects tomorrow and we find there is a diversion? What then? Is the State Department now --

MR. McCURRY: If there's been a diversion -- we've said all along if there's been diversion of material and a change in the status of the program, there's no grounds by which we could continue the dialogue.

Q Well, let's go further. Is the State Department or the United States Government in consultation with other countries, friendly countries, insofar as doing something about this if we find there's a diversion? So what if there's a diversion and we don't do anything?

MR. McCURRY: We have conversations, as I indicated, frequently. Any other questions?

Q Is the U.S. still considering the Russian proposal to have a roundtable?

MR. McCURRY: We've considered it, asked some questions about it, and I'm not certain whether the Russian Government is still thinking about that proposal. It's been categorically rejected by North Korea and other governments have expressed negative views on it. We have asked some questions about how it would work and remain interested in learning more about the concept. I believe there have been some discussions underway on it, but the problem is that there has not been a willingness on the part of others that were suggested as participants by Russia to indicate a willingness to participate.

Carol.

Q China.

Q Bosnia.

MR. McCURRY: I have one for Bosnia.

Q Michael Rose gets turned away, and they try to have cease-fire talks, but now those don't appear to be moving very far. Discouragement on the U.S. What's your view here?

MR. McCURRY: There's discussions that are occurring in and around Sarajevo between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Government. We remain hopeful that they will have some discussion of a general cease-fire, if not for all of Bosnia, for Gorazde in particular. Ambassador Redman is in Zagreb now, has met with Akashi, the Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations. He's also met with General Rose, I think. I'm not absolutely sure if he's seen Rose.

Q (Inaudible)

MR. McCURRY: Yes, I think he's in Zagreb, I am told. I'll double-check that, but I'm confident that that's right - - as confident as I think I can be. (Laughter) I'm almost confident that he's in -- no, I'm pretty sure we had a report from him just a short while ago that he's in Zagreb, had those meetings. There is clearly some discussion back and forth between the parties about having a cease-fire discussion. There's a discussion about a discussion, and we'll just have to see how that plays out.

I think Ambassador Redman is intent on staying very directly in contact with the parties, not only on the issue of a cease-fire, because, of course, the cease-fire only temporarily halts the hostilities. That would be fine, but there has to be an overall search for a political settlement.

Q Do you know if the people who were in Rose's party who were dispatched to Gorazde actually made it to --

MR. McCURRY: I don't know. I'm trying to find out more about that. I have not seen anything that amounts to a full report from them. They made it in, I understand, but I don't know that we have a full assessment yet based on their observations of where the lines of conflict are along the river to the northwest of Gorazde proper.

There have been a lot of reports of hostilities, still. There was the report this morning -- or 9:00 a.m. this morning in Gorazde, some shelling, and it then apparently subsided. There was another report that things may have picked up again around noontime, but there is still some conflicting information that we are trying to get sorted out by relying on reports coming from UNPROFOR.

Again, the key thing for us is that we think that General Rose is going to be in a position to make an assessment of what the situation is on the ground and what further steps the international community might take, both on behalf of additional UNPROFOR units moving into Gorazde or other steps that might be taken to protect them.

Sid.

Q What is the status of the peacekeepers going into Gorazde (inaudible) Ukrainians (inaudible) --

MR. McCURRY: There seems to be a strong desire to get them in sooner rather than later.

Q And as a follow-up: How firm is the United States, at least, in its willingness to provide close air support for those --

MR. McCURRY: Close air support has been something that we have consistently offered to UNPROFOR troops again. An UNPROFOR unit under attack on the ground can request from NATO close air support, and that's an offer that stands and remains very much intact.

Q And you're saying unilaterally. The U.S. will do it alone if necessary.

MR. McCURRY: It's an offer that we conduct through NATO. We have the capacity to do it through NATO. It would be an offer that NATO would extend, I believe, because we're flying there in close air support as a NATO mission.

Q Mike, there's no question, is there, that the United States supports as a full partner in the peace process support to formats laid down in the Declaration of Principles without deviation?

Q I'd like to stay on Bosnia, please. I'd like to find out whether there's anything new on -- since early this week on Perry and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the protection of Gorazde and the civilian population, if not the UNPROFOR troops, whether there's anything further that the United States wants to see done.

MR. McCURRY: We want to see the shelling stopped. Clearly, we want to see innocent civilians not placed in danger by combatants. That's very clear. I think you know that the Security Council by consensus issued a statement last night that condemned the attacks and also deplored acts of violence and terror in northern Bosnia, near Banja Luka and Prijedor, including condemning ethnic cleansing.

I think what we'd like to see at this point is something that would amount to a cease-fire, an end to the hostilities in Gorazde accomplished with an UNPROFOR presence so that that issue -- that type of fighting can be suspended as the search for a peace settlement continues.

I think what we mostly want to see is progress in the peace discussions that Ambassador Redman has been trying to further, because that's ultimately the thing that's going to make a difference in the lives of civilians in Bosnia.

Q How soon? When you talk about sooner rather than later to get UNPROFOR in, how much sooner do you think that they could get in there?

MR. McCURRY: I mean, it's an UNPROFOR question. It's really going to be up to General Rose when he thinks he can get units in.

Q Do they have the authority, the UNPROFOR people and the U.N., to break through a Serb roadblock to get in there, or whatever roadblocks are there?

MR. McCURRY: They would operate under mission plans that would be developed by UNPROFOR commanders.

Q And would they have on the way in close air support in an effort to get into Gorazde?

MR. McCURRY: They have close air support wherever they are in former Yugoslavia. It doesn't matter if they are enroute in protecting a convoy, whatever. They have the right if under attack to request assistance through UNPROFOR to NATO.

Q China. Move on to China?

MR. McCURRY: China.

Q Have you heard anything about Wei?

MR. McCURRY: I have not. I want to go back to a question yesterday. We don't have any new information on either Wei or on his personal Secretary, Tong Yi, who was apparently also picked up by the police for questioning.

I botched a question yesterday that came from Sid, I believe, and I want to go back to it. Yesterday I was asked about Wei's stature -- his status as a symbol of the democracy movement, and the point I was trying to make yesterday was that his stature -- enormous stature and symbolic importance as a leader of the democracy movement derives from the Chinese people. But I don't think I clearly enough said that, obviously, since he's appeared on the political scene 16 years ago, he's been recognized both inside and outside China as an articulate and courageous spokesman for peaceful political change in China.

Despite nearly 15 years in prison, much of which was spent in solitary confinement, Wei has again emerged as an eloquent and courageous advocate of democracy and individual freedoms in his own country, and surely that stature is one that the United States recognizes.

Carol.

Q Could the Clinton Administration renew MFN with him in detention?

MR. McCURRY: I don't want to address that question. That's something that the Secretary will have to examine when he makes his recommendation to the President.

Sid.

Q I don't know if you've seen this report on Wei, but apparently the Chinese have informed his family that he is going to undergo some sort of medical tests, and they're concerned -- have obvious concerns about what these tests may be -- (inaudible).

MR. McCURRY: I was not aware of that report, but our Embassy has consistently sought information about his whereabouts and under what terms he is being held; and, if there is such a report, I am certain that the U.S. Embassy in Beijing will be inquiring of the Chinese Government about that report. I was not aware of it prior to the briefing.

Q I have a question about the United States as a full partner in the peace process -- poses any deviation from the Declaration of Principles in the peace process?

MR. McCURRY: I believe the Declaration of Principles needs to be fully implemented as quickly as possible. It's important that they do it quickly, but it's also important that they get it right. It is important that the parties resume and continue their discussions about the details of fully implementing the Declaration, and we believe they are making progress toward that end. We hope that progress will continue and result as soon as possible in the full implementation of the Declaration.

Q Thank you.

Q Wait, wait, there's on --

Q Turkey has announced -- an arms embargo against Turkey following Turkey's announcement of a major military operation against Kurdish separatists in south Turkey. As a fellow member of NATO, is the United States concerned about escalating military activity in south Turkey?

MR. McCURRY: We are closely watching increased military activity that might be directed against the PKK and are attempting to learn more about it. We'll watch that as it develops and, if I can get you some more information, we will.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:52 p.m.)

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