US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING FRIDAY JANUARY 28, 1994 BRIEFER: Christine Shelly Subject Page RUSSIA Reported Statement on Occupation of Baltics .................1 FORMER YUGOSLAVIA Report to Secretary General re Tuzla/ S........................................................1-2 Fighting/Reports of Serbian Regulars/Arms ...........1-3,11-12 -- Monitoring Troop Movements ............................2-3 -- Status of Tuzla and Srebrenica ......................11-12 US Diplomatic Contacts with Allies ..................3-4,10-13 Security of Macedonia.......................................13 VIETNAM Non-Binding Senate Resolution to Lift Embargo .............4-6 IRELAND Conditions for US Visa for Gerry Adams ....................6-9 JAPAN Reported Agreement on Political Reform Package ..............9 MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS Bilateral Talks/Format ...................................9-10 CHINA Discussion of Agreement with US re: Missile Non-Proliferation .....................................13-14 Vice Foreign Minister's Meeting with Secretary/ Others ...................................................14 (###)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
FRIDAY, JANUARY 28, 1994, 1:19 P.M. (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MS. SHELLY: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I don't have any announcements to make so I'd be pleased to proceed directly to your questions.
Q I have a question. Mr. Churkin's speech yesterday, have you seen it -- his remarks at a news conference about the Baltic republics?
MS. SHELLY: No, I have not.
Q You haven't? Well, let me read you some quotes and try and get a snap judgment.
He said about the so-called incorporation of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union in 1940 -- he said, "From a legal aspect, the 1940 events cannot be interpreted as an invasion or occupation." No reaction?
MS. SHELLY: As you know, we have a fairly firm policy about not reacting to reports of remarks until we've had a chance to study the text; and I certainly am going to have to do this in this case, so unfortunately I don't want to comment on parts of it as it's reported.
Q Christine, Boutros Ghali apparently sent a letter to the Security Council with his own recommendations for Tuzla and Srebrenica. In your understanding, what is the next step now? What are we heading to?
MS. SHELLY: I understood that Boutros Ghali was supposed to be getting a report on this from UNPROFOR and that then was going to be discussed, I assume, within the Security Council; and that's where it stands.
As to specifically what the timeframe is for scheduled meetings, I don't have any information on that.
Q Do you have anything further -- have you been able to look into the reports that regular Serb Army units are moving into Bosnia?
MS. SHELLY: I think I have a little. Reports of increased, direct "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" support to the Bosnian Serb militias certainly continue to be disturbing. Individual advisors and small combat teams, including some wearing Serbian Army uniforms, have been operating in Bosnia for some time.
Serbian paramilitary groups from across the border in Serbia have been fighting on the side of the Bosnian Serb army since the beginning of the conflict.
Serbian involvement in the struggle in Bosnia has been central, of course, to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. It's particularly because of this involvement and Serbia's contribution to the war effort that the United Nations has imposed this strict regime of economic sanctions against Serbia which, of course, has had the impact of profoundly weakening the Serbian economy.
The United States has remained engaged in trying to secure Serbia's diplomatic and economic isolation for these activities from the international community.
Q But you having nothing in the way of verification of the reports that Army units have been moving into Bosnia in increasing numbers? Reports of columns of artillery, for instance?
MS. SHELLY: We've seen the reports. We're continuing to look into them. Until we have back a little bit more in the way of definitive information, I don't think I can take it much further.
Q Christine, when you're talking about the next stage being discussions within the Security Council, are you talking about a formal meeting of the Security Council or informal consultations? If I recollect correctly, yesterday Michael (McCurry) said there was no need for a meeting of the Security Council?
MS. SHELLY: I understood that Boutros Ghali, when he received this report, was going to consult with Security Council members as to whether it's a formal meeting or not and the way in which this consultation would take place. I don't really have any further details on that.
Q But you don't expect any kind of vote on what Boutros Ghali has to propose?
MS. SHELLY: I just don't have any more information on where this is headed at this time.
Q Christine, the Administration's inability to see -- apparent inability to see what's going on on the ground in Bosnia is clear to me from the State Department's inability to confirm or deny the movement of Belgrade's troops into Bosnia. Is the Administration considering improving its ability to see what's going on in Bosnia- Herzegovina?
MS. SHELLY: I think that we do get information from a variety of sources. Obviously, the reports which come in from UNPROFOR and then are shared at the U.N. are something we pay attention to. Obviously also, there is a lot of consultation with the Europeans -- with the EU -- about the situation. There obviously is consultation in NATO which takes place where the situation on the ground is looked at for a kind of more technical look at what is happening. That's obviously done within NATO, in the military side of the house.
It's difficult to get a very precise handle on many of these incidents and to be able to characterize accurately exactly what went on and who is responsible for which action. That is certainly something that we're interested in, and we do our best to get the best information that we can.
But whether we are contemplating any particular measures or actions to try to specifically increase our understanding of this, I think our plan is to continue working the way that we are.
Q On that, Christine, the NATO countries have been flying overflights over Bosnia, including the United States. They can pick up aircraft, Serbian aircraft flying around. Surely, it would be easier to pick up a column of artillery than a single helicopter. Has there been no evidence of such movement?
MS. SHELLY: I just don't have any information on that. I can't tell you. As you know, there are the NATO AWACS which are flying. They get a lot of data on their screens, on the radar, they get a lot tracks and particular things. It's not just a simple process that you look in something and see what it is. It involves a lot of technical evaluation. I'm sure that that and the other means which are available are used.
In terms of the information that I have available to me today, I'm simply not prepared to characterize it in any greater detail. We've seen the reports. We're looking into them, but I just don't have anything further.
Q Also on Bosnia. In the next week, the Secretary of State will be meeting the British Foreign Secretary, he'll be meeting the German Chancellor. Is this the next phase for the consultations on what is to be done on Bosnia?
MS. SHELLY: There are a lot of consultations going on. Certainly, as you know, we had in-depth consultations with the French. Chancellor Kohl is coming here. Foreign Secretary Hurd is here next week. That will be a very broad agenda. It will certainly cover Bosnia and all of the different things which are happening there, but it will also cover a lot of other bilateral and international issues.
There are also, I understand, consultations with the European Community -- the EU -- which are also, I think, taking place sometime within the next week or ten days. They will also be taking the subject up. So the political exchanges on this are quite active right now.
Q That will be in Brussels?
MS. SHELLY: No, I think that's taking place here.
Q At what level?
MS. SHELLY: I think it's the trilateral mechanism which includes the Presidency country, the Commission, and the United States. I'll see if I can post anything. It's just something I heard about this morning. I'm not announcing the talks at this point; but I understand that there's supposed to be some consultations with the EU in the next week or ten days.
Q If I could sort of rephrase my question. Has the United States come to agreement with either Italy or Albania on a way to enhance its ability to monitor the situation in Bosnia?
MS. SHELLY: I don't have anything specific on that.
Q Can you take that question?
MS. SHELLY: I'll look into it.
Q On Vietnam, there are reports in Hanoi that Secretary Christopher is going to go there next Saturday in connection with the supposed normalization of relations. Can you deny that?
MS. SHELLY: The Secretary has no such travel plans at this point.
Q Are there any high-level meetings planned in the coming days with Vietnamese officials so far as you know?
MS. SHELLY: As far as I know, not. I'm not aware of anything that is scheduled. Winston Lord, I think, has had the last round of talks with the Vietnamese; but I'm not aware of any other travel plans by any senior officials.
Q Do you have a reaction to the vote yesterday in the Senate?
MS. SHELLY: I don't have a lot to say on it. I think that the debate itself was quite interesting, and it certainly provided an excellent review of all of the arguments for and against lifting the trade embargo.
The President, as you know, has linked further progress in our relations with Vietnam to achieving the fullest possible accounting on the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action issue.
As you certainly also know from the most recent statements from the White House, no decision has been made there on the lifting of the trade embargo, and there isn't any timeframe for reaching such a decision. It's something which remains under review. The Administration has indicated that it would consider the views of all sides of this issue, and that certainly includes very much the Senate resolution and its expression of views as it keeps this issue under review.
Q Is it the Administration's position that having trade with Vietnam would loosen them up and get more information about the missing Americans? Or does it take the contrary view that not having the relationship that Hanoi wants is leverage to get more information?
MS. SHELLY: I'm not sure that we would specifically put it in one category or the other. We've made it very clear that it is the policy of this Administration that there be this full accounting. I think that as we have gone over this and we've revisited this issue of the accounting and what's happened in the most recent timeframe, in fact we have been pleased with the degree of cooperation which has occurred on this. I think that there are some who believe that to move on to the normalization of relations, that this could perhaps give an even greater impetus to this. There are others who think that the continued accounting absolutely must come first.
I think that there are arguments that can be made on both sides, but I don't think the Administration has specifically taken a position on one or the other. The key thing for us is to get to the point where we are completely satisfied with the accounting for the POWs and the MIAs and then to take things from there.
Q Is there a feeling that they have more information than they're willing to give out? Does the Administration feel that they're holding back or they're not digging hard enough? I don't know what more "a fuller accounting" means. They're not providing information that they already have, or they're not doing their best to get more information?
MS. SHELLY: I think that we feel that they are making -- that the Vietnamese Government continues to make a rather considerable effort on this. I think we gave a fairly detailed account when Winston Lord went there the last time about some of the things that had happened and about the opening up of some of the archives and things like that, which, in fact, was a major step forward in terms of making information available to us as well as specific cases in which they have come in with information.
I don't think that we have any indication that there has been any slackening in this. Certainly, the trend has been very much an upward one. So if a specific action were to accelerate that, or if we felt that it would somehow break some kind of a logjam -- I don't think that we feel that there is a logjam. I think we feel there's been steady progress on this.
Q Christine, the Vietnamese welcomed the vote in the Senate in a very enthusiastic fashion. Do you think it's too premature? Their optimism is not warranted, or simply too premature?
MS. SHELLY: We've certainly seen their reaction to the Senate vote, and we certainly can understand that they would be pleased with the sentiment expressed in it. But as to being able to take this one step further, again, the White House has said where we are on this, and I just don't have anything further to add.
Q Christine, could you bring us up to date on the Gerry Adams visa issue?
MS. SHELLY: Sure. As I think you know, because this subject has come up several times in this briefing over the last several days, the Administration has been reviewing Gerry Adams' January 14 application to attend the Conference on Northern Ireland, which is being hosted by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, which is to take place on February 1, 1994.
In light of the events which have been flowing from the December 15 joint declaration by Prime Minister Reynolds and Prime Minister Major, in making a decision on this about whether or not to grant him a waiver of his ineligibility, which we had described before, we felt that it was important for us to have an understanding of Gerry Adams' position on achieving peace in Northern Ireland.
We have consulted quite a bit with the Irish and the British Governments on this. As a consequence of those consultations, we instructed our Embassy in Dublin and our Consulate General in Belfast to determine whether or not Gerry Adams would be prepared to publicly renounce violence and to support the joint declaration which, of course, is also something that the United States supports very strongly as well. We have indicated that our decision on whether or not to provide him with a visa would depend on his response.
I can confirm that we did have a meeting with Gerry Adams this morning. He met with our Consul General in Belfast. Our Consul General reviewed the status of the application and specifically the points that I raised earlier with him. So we've had the conversation; the meeting has taken place.
I can go on to tell you that no decision has been taken. The visa has not been issued. It was a rather lengthy meeting. It was, I think, a good exchange on this, but there wasn't a kind of on-the-spot result to that. I expect that he will probably be saying something or conveying what his response to our points to him were at some time in the near future.
Q What was he to do at the conference? Just participate in the conference?
MS. SHELLY: I don't have any details on that. I just know he was invited to attend, and that was the context in which he put in this visa application.
Q I don't ask it so much as, like you should do the journalism for us. I'm trying to figure out why he would have to renounce violence if he was only going to participate in a conference.
The State Department routinely let PLO people come into this country. You've imposed some restrictions on how far they could go; but the notion was, they were coming in, they were going to be in some educational thing or speak at some conference, and there was no problem. They didn't have to -- in fact, they still haven't renounced their covenant and they get handshakes at the White House and marching bands.
I don't understand why the free-speech provision wouldn't take precedence, why you would require somebody to renounce his views to speak in a conference, unless he wanted to do more than that and you knew that, or he was going to have bombs laced inside his overcoat. I don't know.
MS. SHELLY: I want to try to answer your question as best as I can. As you know, Gerry Adams has applied for and had been refused a visa on eight previous occasions. The visa refusals which took place, which were under the immigration law -- Immigration and Nationality Act, actually -- they exclude admission to the U.S. of persons who supported terrorist activities.
On previous occasions, Mr. Adams was found ineligible because of his personal advocacy of violence, and also the use of violence, particularly, as a means to achieve political ends.
As President of the Provisional Sinn Fein, the political arm of the IRA, he has been committed to the armed struggle in Northern Ireland. The Department of State -- when this has come up before -- has never recommended a waiver of his ineligibility.
In this particular case, as you know, it is long-standing U.S. Government policy to avoid substantive contacts with him, with Sinn Fein, with the IRA. We chose to do this now because it's in the aftermath of the joint declaration. We think the joint declaration represents the first real opportunity that has been there in years for Sinn Fein to take a seat at the negotiating table. I think our move was designed to demonstrate that we recognize that Adams has an important role to play in securing peace, and we certainly would like to encourage him to move in the right direction.
I think that's what we felt -- it was a kind of gesture, a kind of overture to him, but I think we felt that it was simply necessary to know, in the aftermath of the joint declaration, where he was on violence and on the joint declaration. And depending on what his response was to our queries on this, we could then determine whether or not we would want to recommend a waiver for his visa ineligibility.
Q You said in your initial answer that he has to renounce violence publicly. You've had a meeting with him, a private meeting, in which he may have said all sorts of things, but what has to happen now? Are you just going to evaluate what he said at the meeting and make a decision, or are you waiting for him to call a press conference or go on television or hold a public confessional, or what?
MS. SHELLY: As I said, I understand the meeting took some time this morning and various things were reviewed with him. I don't know really how much of a position he was in to give his response to this on the spot.
I think it's our feeling that, in fact, he will communicate to us what his response to our query to him is. I can't tell you in what way he's going to do that because I don't know. He could come back to us privately. He could make a public statement. That certainly is a possibility.
As the news broke last night and this morning about our communication with him and what our points were that we wanted to query before we felt we could make a decision, certainly, I think some of that had been in the public domain, and I assume it had reached him. But whether he was actually in a position at that moment to say definitively yes or no -- but he presumably will give some kind of a response, be it public or private. That information will then be conveyed back here and then a decision will be made on whether or not to recommend the waiver for his ineligibility.
Q So you're saying something different now. You're saying --
MS. SHELLY: No, I'm not.
Q -- the response can be public or private. Whereas, before, I thought you said that he has to publicly renounce --
MS. SHELLY: What I said was that we instructed our Embassy to determine whether or not he would do this. But what he is prepared to do -- it may be that he will come back in and say, "I'm prepared to do this," or "I'm not prepared to do this." It may also be that he'll make a public statement on that. It's not quite that simple. We have conveyed our position on this and he has to respond, and then we will be able to make the determination on the recommendation on the waiver.
Q Do you have the name of the Consul General?
MS. SHELLY: Her name is Val Martinez.
MS. SHELLY: Val.
Q The conference is Tuesday, presumably he has to leave Monday at the latest, which gives you about 48 hours to make up your mind, and could you let us know what your decision is when it is reached, please?
MS. SHELLY: Yes. We'll be happy to do that.
Q And, of course, what he had to do -- what he did to get your decision.
MS. SHELLY: We'll give you as much as we can as soon as we can.
Q Do you have any reaction to the Japanese Government's compromise agreement on the political reform bill, which makes Hosokawa to stay as Prime Minister?
MS. SHELLY: We understand that the Prime Minister -- understand that he has reached agreement with the leader of the largest opposition party, the LDP, on a political reform package. We understand that the package must still be approved in the Diet where a vote is possible on January 29, which I think is the last day of the current Diet session.
We still don't have all of the details of this agreement. We're continuing to follow the developments very closely, and I think that this is what we understand to be the case, and we certainly hope that that proves to be successful.
Q Were there Mideast negotiations today, do you know, it being Friday?
MS. SHELLY: No, I don't think there were any meetings. No, they were not meeting today. I understand all four tracks will be resuming next week.
Q That's what I wondered, of course. And are you going into another format? Are you going to have full -- the full delegations are meeting with the Jordanians -- but is there going to be full delegations on all --
MS. SHELLY: I'm not sure that I would characterize it being full delegations with the Jordanians. I understand that the Jordanians have brought in a couple of experts who are supporting the delegation head.
Q They get to the table.
MS. SHELLY: The talks are still -- we indicated several days ago that, in fact, even though the format was heads of delegation talks, that that would not prevent any of the heads from bringing in one or two other people into the room, if they felt that was necessary.
But as to the way in which it's continuing next week, my understanding is that the talks are continuing in the head of delegation format.
Q Some of the former Secretaries of State had a conference here this morning and --
MS. SHELLY: They're still conferring.
Q Are they?
MS. SHELLY: Yes, they're having lunch now.
Q In any event, there were some observations made by a number of them, and among those was former Secretary Baker who said that Bosnia is essentially a lost cause, and that it's time to turn attention to Macedonia to contain the thing and to get some very serious commitments from the European partners about what can be done to contain it; what specifically would be done if it starts to spill over.
Does that reflect the thinking around here at all? Is it -- (a) is Bosnia a lost cause, and (b) is something being done with the European allies to try to develop some rational containment policy?
MS. SHELLY: Again, I can't get into a characterization of the remarks, because unfortunately I was not in a position to hear anything except the Secretary's opening remarks this morning.
As to "is Bosnia a lost cause," that is certainly not our view. As you know, we have been having discussions and I just mentioned what some of them are. A point on which we have a very strong convergence of opinion with the French is that we certainly can agree with a need to re-double, or whatever multiple you might want to use, diplomatic efforts in an effort to try to secure an end to the fighting.
So certainly the pace of the exchanges is picking up, and we very much want to try to find a political solution to the problem and not one which is just ultimately going to be a military one or one where some kind of a solution is imposed on any of the parties.
So diplomacy is very much on track and is continuing. And no, we don't think Bosnia is a lost cause.
Q Can you explain a little bit how you are going to change the diplomacy, or how you would have it changed? I mean, I'm a little baffled. I hate to do this, but, I mean, you're not going to impose a settlement on them, which the French want to do. The Secretary had a position that they are entitled -- a few months ago -- I don't know whatever happened to it -- that as unfair as the international prescription was, make it a little better, give them a couple or two or three percent more territory or something, and that's when we left it last.
So I feel, in all honesty, I have to ask you why you're saying something that's kind of a -- I don't know what to call it -- it's almost a throw-away line -- "re-double our diplomatic efforts."
How so? How is the U.S. going to re-double its diplomatic effort now? What mechanism, what procedures, what activity? Will anybody be going some place? Will you ask for a new proposal from the international leaders? In what form will this new energetic diplomacy take?
MS. SHELLY: I'd certainly like to be as specific as I can on this, Barry. First of all, I think the point of departure for the current phase is still very much the decisions taken at the NATO Summit. It's not just a question of Srebrenica, Tuzla, whatever; it's a question of the whole track of contacts which is taking place.
Certain decisions were passed on to the NATO military authorities. They were asked to study certain aspects of the Srebrenica and Tuzla decisions, which they have been doing. I understand that that work is well in progress; the results of the reports coming out of UNPROFOR itself that were going back to the United Nations. So these things are continuing, but they also require study. These were just not things that could be put into practice overnight.
The Secretary, of course, has been back out to Europe. He was in Paris. He had the discussions with the French. These discussions are still very much continuing, and we've mentioned the contacts with the Germans, the contacts with the British, the round of consultations in the trilateral format with the EU.
I think it's very clear that the political efforts on this to try to work on the next steps -- the parties themselves, I think, have agreed to resume their talks in Geneva on the 10th of February. So obviously much of the diplomatic effort is designed to build toward that point so that hopefully they can make more progress than they made in Geneva at their last meeting.
Q Well, the Serbs seem to have this -- you know, this genius for having something just straight ahead, that somehow the U.S. Government -- which is not too eager to intervene anyhow -- uses as a rationale to wait for results. I mean, there are always talks resuming.
Can I ask you, if you have it, what is the assessment now of the situation at Tuzla and Srebrenica? Are they will encircled? Can the airport be opened? Can the troops -- the peacekeepers be relieved in Srebrenica?
MS. SHELLY: I just don't have the information on that. I'll be happy to look into it and see if I can post an answer for you this later afternoon.
Q You see, what some of us are trying to track is the State Department keeps laying down markers, telling the Serbs in dramatic tones that if they do this -- if they don't stop doing this, they're going to get it, and then somehow they don't stop doing it, and they never quite get it, but there's always another meeting ahead. You know, that raises some -- I don't know, some hope of a new, you know, a new way to get at this problem.
MS. SHELLY: Well, Barry --
Q I don't know where to pick up from -- I mean, I don't know how you grab a hold of this thing, because you guys keep changing the criteria -- the bad things they shouldn't do, and those bad things keep changing, and they still do them, and, you know -- I don't know what the question is at the end of this, but --
MS. SHELLY: Barry, there are a lot of --
Q -- re-doubling diplomatic efforts just doesn't work any more.
MS. SHELLY: Okay. There are a lot of frustrations by I think everyone concerned. We certainly would be very happy if the diplomatic track could proceed faster. I think that the contacts, which I've described, point very clearly to an intensification in particularly high-level contacts and discussion of this issue, and that's where we are. And I really don't have anything more.
Q Christine, on the European Union, you say it's a trilateral commission. Who's the third party there?
MS. SHELLY: The United States.
Q The European Union and?
MS. SHELLY: The Presidency country. We meet very often in our consultations with the EU in a trilateral format, which involves the United States, it involves the European Commission, and the EC Presidency country -- the EU Presidency.
Q A quick policy check. Does this Administration still support the territorial integrity of all U.N. members?
MS. SHELLY: Is that --
Q It's a trick question.
MS. SHELLY: What's the point of the question?
Q It's a question to see if that's still this Administration's policy. That's all.
MS. SHELLY: Between yesterday and today, there have not been any changes on that score in U.S. policy.
Q You haven't said anything in months on that particular point.
MS. SHELLY: Our policy hasn't changed on that in the last 24 hours.
Q Can I follow on the Macedonia question? Is there a coherent plan for containing this, apart from the 300 observers there in Macedonia? Is there an ongoing effort with the Europeans to try and come up with some plan, a contingency in the event of a spillover?
MS. SHELLY: The situation of Macedonia, the possibility of a spillover -- that's something that's always on the plate and is considered. I'm not aware of anything new happening on that in the last couple of days.
Q Is former Secretary Cyrus Vance now working on that? Is he now going to Macedonia and working on that?
MS. SHELLY: I haven't seen anything to that effect.
Q Could I ask a question on China?
MS. SHELLY: Sure.
Q Can you give me any more details on the proposed binding bilateral agreement that Lynn Davis is proposing to the Chinese on missile non-proliferation? Exactly what type of bilateral agreement would it be? Would it be a memorandum of understanding or something else? Is it structured along the lines of the September agreement between the U.S. and Russia, and anything else you can give.
MS. SHELLY: I don't really have much specifically that I can say on that. As you know, where we were yesterday at this briefing, our Under Secretary for Security Affairs Lynn Davis had completed her meetings, and the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister was still to have a meeting in the afternoon with Secretary Christopher.
The Secretary and the Vice Foreign Minister discussed a range of bilateral and international issues, and they reviewed the Vice Foreign Minister's discussions in Washington on the proliferation topics.
The Secretary in his own talks emphasized the importance of concluding this binding international agreement on missile non- proliferation that would confirm both governments commitment to observe the current guidelines and annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and to prevent the future export of certain missiles and missile technology to Pakistan.
They also in that meeting stressed the importance of making progress in human rights in accordance with the President's May 28 Executive Order.
But on your specific point, the discussion on all of these issues at this point are continuing. They're continuing here. They'll also continue in Beijing. And I don't really have much more to add to that.
Q Mr. McCurry said yesterday that it's going to be along the similar lines of the one between Russia -- or because of Russia and the India transfers, there's an agreement -- the memorandum of understanding in September. Is that what he was talking about?
MS. SHELLY: I'd have to go back and check on that. I just don't have anything further with me.
Q Christine, did the Secretary make any more headway with the Vice Foreign Minister than Dr. Davis did on the MTCR issue?
MS. SHELLY: I think the Secretary stressed what's important to the United States, but I think that at the end of the day the discussions still were pretty much at the same point that they were when we reported to you yesterday at mid-day.
Q One more question on that: He also mentioned yesterday that we would -- at the same time if they sign an agreement, we'll be willing to lift the sanctions from August 1993. Will we also be willing to lift the sanctions after Tiananmen Square?
MS. SHELLY: I don't have an answer on that.
Q Thanks very much.
(The briefing concluded at 1:52 p.m.)
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