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US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
Tuesday, December 7, 1993

                                     BRIEFER:  Christine Shelly

Subject                                               Page
HAITI
Guest Briefers Pezzullo and Swing on Current
  Situation (Call for All-Haiti Talks/Etc.) .....1-11

RUSSIA
POW-MIA Commission Meetings .....................11
US Invitation to Participate in Space Station ...14

NORTH KOREA
Future Meetings .................................11-12
US Consultations with South Korea/Others ........11-13

SYRIA
Transfer of Boeing 727s from Kuwait .............13
US Policy on Sanctions ..........................13

HAITI
Training Military Officers in US ................14





                        DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                        DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

                                                      DPC #159


               TUESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1993, 1:04 P. M.
               (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)



        MS. SHELLY:  Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  We will
begin our regular press briefing today with a special briefing on
Haiti.  Your briefers will be the Secretary's Special Advisor on
Haiti, Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo, and the U.S. Ambassador to
Haiti, William Swing.  They are prepared to make short statements,
and then will be happy to take any questions that you might have
after.

        Ambassador Pezzullo, would you like to begin?

        AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  Let me begin with the recent events,
and later we can take your questions.

        As you probably know, yesterday Prime Minister Malval
announced that he would do two things:  One, he would launch a new
initiative to call for a conference of all Haitian parties -- I
mean by that not political parties but people within the society,
private sector, labor, military -- to see if they could bring a
modicum of consensus to their thinking so that they can deal with,
as he puts it, a situation which has brought the country to the end
of its rope.

        He also announced that he would be stepping down as Prime
Minister on the 15th of December, as he had previously said, but
would stay on as Acting Prime Minister during this period.  This,
we find a most intriguing initiative in the sense that what has
been lacking in the Haitian issue has been this element of
reconciliation -- of the Haitian people actually coming together
from all sources and accepting the fact that the society will keep
unravelling itself if it doesn't deal with the major problems.

        As you know, we had an international effort -- which began
early this year with the President making a major statement of U.S.
support for a negotiated settlement to be conducted under the
auspices of the U.N. and the OAS -- that led over a period of time
to the Governor's Island meeting at which both the President of the
country, Aristide, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army signed
the Governor's Island 
agreement, which saw a process which would return to
constitutional government and ultimately the return of the
President himself.

         That began a process of change within the society, saw
the return of a constitutional government with Prime Minister
Malval becoming that embodiment of the constitutional
government, and then broke down when the military failed to
uphold their portions of the agreement.

         Under the Governor's Island [agreement], there was an
automatic return of the sanctions.  The sanctions under
Governor's Island were suspended, rather than lifted, when the
Prime Minister became confirmed.  So they were lifted on his
confirmation, were suspended, and then reinstituted when the
military failed to fulfill their obligations.

         So we're under the reimposition of those sanctions,
which is pressuring the country, creating now a shortage of
gasoline and fuel, and responsible in large measure for the end
of the rope comment by the Prime Minister.  We very much endorse
his new initiative.  We're hopeful that it will force the
military to take cognizance of where they're taking this country
and bring about, as I said, a consensus within the society which
can see a return to a more peaceful way of life and ultimately
the support of the international community for a constitutional
government which is serving the people of the country.

         Let me stop here and have Ambassador Swing touch on two
other topics, and then we'll both be here to take your
questions.

         AMBASSADOR SWING:  Thank you very much.  As the
international community -- and our own country, the United
States of America -- under Security Council resolutions
continues to implement the most comprehensive sanctions and
embargo we have known in the Western hemisphere, I know that
there are at least two issues uppermost in the minds of all of
us and, I suspect, of you.  If we look at media reporting, these
issues are continually coming to the fore.

         One, of course, is the effect of sanctions on the
Haitian people, especially the most vulnerable groups in
society; and, secondly, the effect of sanctions on refugees and
migration and what we call often the "boat people," especially
as the January period, which is the principal period of exodus,
approaches.

         I thought it might be useful if I said just a little
bit on each subject to get our discussion going.  First of all,
as regards humanitarian relief, I think you know that we are
implementing a two-track policy: applying the pressure, as
Ambassador Pezzullo has already mentioned, through the sanctions
and embargo operation to try to move the democratic 
process forward; and at the same time, on the other track, to
try to protect those groups which are most affected by the
sanctions -- particularly small children and babies, mothers,
pregnant women, old and infirm people.

         So we are continuing, and actually increasing, our
feeding programs.  We feed approximately 680,000 Haitians one
meal a day through our own U.S. aid programs.  These are matched
probably by another 200,000 by other friendly governments and
international organizations.

         At the same time, we are providing access to various
medical services -- all the way from medicines to family
planning and AIDS prevention -- to another two million Haitians.
 These programs are on-going.

         I know there's been a lot of concern on the part of
everyone about the effect of the fuel scarcity on our ability to
keep these services going.  First of all, we prepositioned
stocks near the feeding centers well before the sanctions were
resumed in late October.

         Secondly, the private volunteer organizations on whom
we depend have already been able to get some relief from the
government's 800,000 gallon strategic fuel supply.  In addition
to that -- and I wouldn't want to go into detail in this forum
today because I think it's premature, I think decisions are
being taken probably as we talk -- we did send down to Haiti a
team from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance -- and the
United Nations has had its own officials on the spot -- to
develop together a fuel distribution plan, which would probably
be administered through some form of international cooperative
agreement with the Malval government, to ensure that fuel
continues to get to the private volunteer organizations on whom
our food stocks and our medicines and their distribution depend.

         You'll hear more about that.  We're basically
optimistic.  It's a good plan.  There are some details to be
worked out, but we are confident that this will be in place very
soon; and therefore we will be positioned for the difficult
period ahead as the sanctions and embargo begin to take full
effect.

         The second concern that I know has been reflected in a
lot of articles and editorials has to do with the on-going
question of the Haitian "boat people."  I think you should know
-- and I apologize if I'm going over old ground with you -- this
Administration has taken a very clear position on the migrant
issue.  It has essentially said that in addition to the relief
measures, which I will outline for you, that it is prepared to
review the migrant policy once the democratic system in Haiti is
restored.

         Meanwhile, what we have done is, beginning in February 
1992, to establish the possibility of being processed as an
immigrant in-land, in Haiti.  We opened our first refugee
processing center in Port-au-Prince in February 1992, moving
from our consular section then to an actual center -- which is
separate from the consulate and the embassy now and therefore
more politically acceptable -- in October '92.

         We opened a large center in Les Cayes in April '93, and
the next month in Cap Haitien, the second largest city, which is
in the northern part of the country.  I visited all those
centers.  They're functioning very well.  The numbers are up. 
We have so far processed about 51,000 people.  About something
less than 2,000 applications have now been actually approved and
more than 1,500 Haitians, under this new system, have arrived in
the United States with the assistance of the Red Cross and
volunteer organizations in the United States.

         We will continue that policy, believing that this is a
more humane policy than having people strike out to sea in
unseaworthy vessels.  I should leave it at that at this point,
and be happy to take your questions.  Thank you.

         Q    Ambassador Pezzullo, going to Prime Minister
Malval's statement yesterday about being "at the end of the
rope" and describing it as a desparate situation: Some people
have compared this to a "Hail Mary" pass in the last seconds of
the fourth quarter with very little chance of success, but the
only option open.  Do you think that has any validity?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  No, I think that's a little
overdrawn.  When we put the sanctions on originally in June to
force the military to come to the table, there was speculation
then that the military would not respond.  The betting then
among most people was that the military, under no circumstances,
would agree to any kind of an international agreement.

         Well, they did come to the table, they did come to
Governor's Island, and they did sign an agreement.  Now, they
didn't live up to its terms, but they signed that agreement. 
The first five steps had been pretty much realized before they
stumbled.

         We're now in a similar situation -- the circumstance is
different -- pressure again building up because of sanctions; a
very severe pressure.  It is that pressure and the circumstances
within the country that the Prime Minister is referring to when
he says the people of the country -- and he's including the
military -- see no future.

         What we don't know -- and we'll see what the future
brings -- is just how far they are in being convinced that they
have to reach some sort of an accord here.  This is not a "Hail
Mary."  The fact is, the sanctions are in place.  Should this
initiative prosper, as I think it has a good likelihood of 
doing, fine and dandy.  If it doesn't, then the military and
those in power are still caught up in the same reality; namely,
that the sanctions will continue, the country will be in a
position of near collapse, and they will be seen as the forces
that brought it there.

         I think he's right in the sense that his initiative is
warranted and based on a general concern within the country, and
I think it's more than just a last desperate heave.

         Q    He was ambiguous about it yesterday.  I think he
left us with the impression that there was no commitment from
the military that they will join these talks if and when they
take place.  Is that your understanding?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  He's had a series of discussions
with the military.  These are all confidential talks, and I
really don't know the depths of the discussion or just how much
they've committed themselves to.  But I share his view that he
will get a response.

         Q    It's an unfortunate scenario, it's something that
you don't want to happen, of course...  I don't know what
persuades you, that if the country is near collapse and the
military is held responsible, that somehow out of this chaos
will arise a shift toward democracy.  Wouldn't they just go for
a man on a white horse... they would be replaced, wouldn't they,
by some other repressive regime?

         Then how do you necessarily benefit if the military
rulers are held responsible -- and probably they're so
privileged they're not feeling the same pinch that the man on
the street is or the man in the alley is.  So I don't understand
how squeezing them to death is somehow going to promote
democracy, ultimately.

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  It's very interesting psychology
in that country.  When the military overthrew Aristide, they
never put a junta in place.  During all the talks we had, they
always stood behind the facade that they were not the rulers.  I
recall conversation after conversation, "Why are you talking to
me?  Talk to the government."  They had a government out there
all the time.  They love the fiction of not being the ultimate
deciders of things.

I think slowly that mask is falling off.  I don't think there
are many Haitians who are thinking that it's the Malval
government bringing this problem to them.  The fact is, a man
with a white horse is not going to resolve this problem.

         The reality is, this doesn't end.  There is no end to
this line short of a resolution that is, as we call it,
constitutional and accepts the return of Aristide.  There is no
answer.  A shift in military leadership now would mean 
nothing.  The international community would wink at it and say,
"We continue on."

         So they don't have a way out short of agreeing to the
support for a constitutional government and a change within the
military of leadership.

         Q    Is it your conclusion now that Governor's Island
was too narrowly drawn and that, in fact, the government is
going to have to be broadened if it's going to lead to some sort
of political resolution?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  Governor's Island did not state
what the government would look like.  Governor's Island was
followed by another meeting in New York -- which we called the
New York Pact -- where, indeed, you had the parliamentarians and
the political parties come together.  They wrote an agreement in
which they talked about a government of national reconciliation.
 Again, it was not defined; and then they talked about a sort of
legislative agenda that had to be fulfilled.  Something on the
way to the end of that fell down.  In other words, the
government formed didn't seem to suit or satisfy those parties
that had signed the New York Pact; that it, indeed, was a
government of national reconciliation broad enough to contain
them all.

         The terms of Governor's Island, which were specifically
dates at which different parties would comply with elements in
it, were fulfilled until we came to some of the crucial issues
of military transition, which is what I would call the gut power
issue.  But it left vague these other elements of how you
reconcile a society, how you get everybody buying into this
consensus.

         Let me just say one thing which I think is crucial in
Haiti -- probably crucial in any society.  If you don't build a
center coalition of some sort of strength that is committed to
whatever the program is that they agree with, you're always
going to be beset by those at the extremes who will rip at it.

         The military have represented that extreme for the last
two years.  The center is still ill-defined.  Aristide
represented, when he was elected, a choice of the people; but
certainly that coalition of forces that would have supported his
Presidency never jelled.

         What this proposal is aimed at is reconstituting,
basically, a political coalition in the center which would
support democratic processes and ultimately the support of the
international community.

         Q    What happened to December 15?

         Q    Sir, if that coalition forms, will it be able to
gain control of the frozen assets that I understand are now
largely under control of President Aristide?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  I would assume that would be a
normal function.  In other words, those assets belong to the
Government of Haiti.  Of course, that -- the government that
represented Haiti at the end of this process, which would be
basically an Aristide government, would draw on those frozen
assets.

         The answer to your question, what he said yesterday --
and I think he's committed to -- is that he would stay on as
Acting Prime Minister.

         Q    Beyond the 15th?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  Beyond the 15th.  His resignation
wouldn't be effective until the 15th, and then he would stay on
as Acting.

         Q    It's interesting, this question of a central
coalition.  Aristide got 70 percent of vote.  How much more do
you have to broaden a base for a government?  What's missing?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  That's for the Haitians to
decide.

         Q    They did decide.

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  The point is, an election is a
stage in a process of governance.  What occurred in Haiti was
that you had a coup, and that coup unsettled or overthrew a
nascent government.

         The need now is to build a political force sufficient
to ensure that the new government that will be formed under
Aristide, naturally -- he will be the President -- will have
sufficient support among elements within that society to be able
to survive.

         Q    What elements are those he needs to survive that
he doesn't have already?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  That, I say, is something the
Haitians will have to decide.  I think you better address that
to somebody like Malval, who is the man who sees the need for
this conference to bring together those forces -- financial
survival .  This is not an academic exercise that you deal with
in a school room.  This is something that has to come out of the
body politic of the Haitian people.

         Q    Maybe the Ambassador can offer... I realize this
is not academic; we're here for a briefing.  One of you must
have some opinion of what's missing in the coalition to have it
survive.

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  He is saying that what is needed 
to form a governing coalition, sufficiently strong to bring into
being a capacity to govern the country, requires this type of
conference.

         I don't think he knows exactly what these forces will
be; but his discussions over the last three weeks or so, and his
experience in governing under very adverse conditions, convinces
him that that's what's needed.

         Q    On the subject of finances, maybe Ambassador Swing
could answer.  Malval, yesterday, said that the Central Bank's
cash reserves are gone.  No money is coming in.  The country is
broke.  Yet, the military continues to operate at some degree of
subsistence.

         The theory has been that, in fact, they're running
drugs and they're a waystation between Latin America and the
United States.  Is that, in fact, the case?

         AMBASSADOR SWING:  I think our reporting that's been in
the public domain has generally shown that Haiti has been a
transit and storage point for drugs.  No one has viewed them as
a major player in the Latin American drug trade.  It doesn't
mean it's not a concern to us.  We continue to watch it.  We
continue to try to develop as much data as we can on it, but we
have no hard evidence that would take us beyond that central
conclusion that they're, at this point a transit, and storage
point.

         Q    Is that where they are getting their money to
survive?

         AMBASSADOR SWING:  The question of salaries for the
army is an issue, and it's a question every month of where do
you get the money to pay the salaries.  So you raise the
question about the frozen assets; that's not a limitless fund.

         Of course, with the drying up of everything now, both
in the job market where we've lost more than a hundred thousand
jobs since the coup, and now with the embargo on where not much
is getting in, a lot of the sources of finance, both licit and
illicit are simply being cut off as the economy grinds
inexorably to a halt.

         Q    Ambassador Pezzullo, is there anything that
President Aristide could be doing or should be doing to
facilitate this process?  For example, what precisely is his
position on the broadening of the coalition, or the creation of
a center coalition?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  He's supportive of this
initiative.  This goes back to the question before.  When you
begin this type of -- basically, it's going to be a national
dialogue with major forces on the political realm, the public
realm, the labor unions, the military, private sector --
something will emerge here in terms of a sense of what needs to
be done in various areas.  A lot of it is well known.

         For example, some of the legislation that has been held
up is clear.  Some of the attitudes that have to be changed
within the military on the renovation of the high command, and
so on, are known.

         Some of the other things, I don't think anybody can
predict yet.  But the point is, out of this conference will come
a new series of recommendations and judgments.  At that time, it
will be the responsibility of Malval to try to put these into
some focus, and the President to hopefully accept them, or to
work them in such a way that they build what I say is this
coalition of forces in the center than can provide stability in
the period ahead.

         Q    In the past, as I understand it, the President has
resisted the notion of a broader coalition.  Has this been an
impediment to resolving the issue?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  When the Cabinet was formed there
was some concern about the breadth of the Cabinet.  I think one
of the issues that will be discussed will be what kind of
participation can you bring into this government that will give
it a broader constituency.

         As I say, I don't know where this will come out, but
certainly it will be one of the issues that will be discussed.

         Q    To follow that up, I believe that President
Aristide said in the past that once Cedras and Francois step
down, then he would consider broadening the Cabinet.  Has he
changed his position?  Is he now willing to broaden the Cabinet
before --

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  The sequence of events is another
thing that's going to have to be worked out.  My own sense is
that there is such an interlapping of these things that you may
have to have almost simultaneity.  In other words, a deal stuck
at different levels and then a series of things that happen in
rapid-fire fashion -- one tied to the other, because there is a
great deal of a lack of faith in this society.  Nobody will go
first for fear that they'll be done in.

         So I think there's going to be a need for sort of a
package approach which will satisfy, after the discussions and
the negotiations, all the parties; and then it will just happen
-- all these things.  The departure of certain military, the
transfer of others, legislation, the shape of the government,
the program of the government will all have to be brought
together quickly.

         Q    My question goes to the safety issue.  You had a
number of legislators who were afraid to come out of hiding to
attend legislation sessions and who, I believe, some of them
were in this country or were out of Haiti.  Has that situation 
changed?  Is the security situation different?  Are these people
willing to come home?  Can this conference be held with any
degree of certainly that people are going to attend and not be
killed?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  It's a central question.  Absent
that, you couldn't have a conference that would be meaningful,
certainly.

         Q    Right.  What do we think will happen to ensure
that the conference can take place given that problem?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  The military leaders and police
leaders in that country are going to have to provide the
security conditions that permit people to discuss and meet and
participate in this conference.

         Q    Is there any assurance that that will happen?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  We will see.  I think it will
happen.  I think it will happen -- aaain, because of the
pressure of circumstances.

         Q    Can I ask a question about the refugee policy, the
migrant policy?  You said that once democracy is restored the
U.S. will review that policy.

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  Right.

         Q    That suggests that even after democracy is
restored the policy of forced repatriation may continue; is that
the case?

         AMBASSADOR SWING:  No.  What we're saying by that is we
have done what we could do within the constraints of our own
legislation to ameliorate the conditions of persons seeking to
flee.  In other words, that they not take to unseaworthy vessels
but rather go to our refugee processing centers, fill out the
necessary forms, talk to a counselor, eventually be interviewed
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service officers who are
there, and then be processed and receive the assistance of the
Red Cross to travel to the United States.

         I believe all that we meant by saying that we were
prepared to review once there was a democratic government is,
that once democracy is restored, and if that democratic
government comes to us with a proposition, we'd have to look at
it.  I think that's all we mean by that.

         MS. SHELLY:  One more question.

         Q    Well, my third.  But I suppose you could answer
this by saying it will be up to the Haitian people.  Obviously,
I'm intrigued by the U.S. -- you describe a policy 
that's having an effect because it's crippling Haiti's economy. 
What I see is a U.S. Government that can't get Aristide back
into power and is not willing to cut a deal that broadens his
coalition to include military people.

         I shouldn't be surprised.  In Somalia, we're flying
Aideed around after we try to get him killed and blamed him for
killing peacekeepers.  It's a pragmatic time we live in.

         The question is, who is ineligible -- and don't tell me
the Haitian who make that decision -- who is ineligible among
the military to be part of this coalition from your view?  Can
it be the same butchers that have been running the country for
years, or --

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  Of course not.

         Q    -- just the top three guys --

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  Of course not.

         Q    Where are you going to get these democratic
military people in Haiti that never existed?

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  Of course not.

         Q    Impertinently, he asks.

         AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO:  Impertinently, I answer, of
course not -- three times.  There are military in that country
who were not in leadership positions, who have not been part of
any repression and don't particularly favor what's been going
on.  Those are the people who will have to emerge as the
military in Haiti.

         Thank you.

         MS. SHELLY:  Thank you very much to our briefers.  

         Q    You know about Malcolm Toon receiving the class
ring of a downed -- I don't know if he was a pilot -- American
serviceman.  Is that the first -- I think Dunham is his name --
is that the first the U.S. Government knew that he was missing
in Russia?

         MS. SHELLY:  When we saw the press report on this this
morning, we started to look into this.  All I can really tell
you is the POW-MIA commission has been meeting in Moscow these
last few days, and this information has come forward in the
context of those meetings.

         I don't have a specific readout on those meetings.  I'd
be very happy to take the question and see if we can post
something later this afternoon.

         Q    Has another meeting with the North Koreans been
arranged?

         MS. SHELLY:  Not so far.

         Q    Are you expecting one?

         MS. SHELLY:  I think you are aware of what the
political sequencing on this is now, based on what was said
yesterday by the President.  The next step on this is that we
are going to consult with the South Koreans, and then we will
inform North Korea of our response.  So that's the political
sequencing on this, and I don't have any information on meetings
at this point.

         Q    Only the South Koreans, Christine, or also -- I
was under the impression also that the Japanese and even the
Chinese might be part of the consultation process.

         MS. SHELLY:  I think that the intention is to consult
the South Koreans first and to have other consultations with our
allies, our normal interlocutors, on this one, and then the idea
would be to go back to the North Koreans.

         As to exactly which countries we would be consulting
with when, I don't have any precise information on that.

         Q    As a general proposition, a process like this
would take, what -- several days, a week or beyond that?  What
kind of a timeframe are we looking at?

         MS. SHELLY:  As the intention is to keep the pressure
up on this and to keep it moving fairly quickly, I would guess
that we are talking about a few days.  But there is no fixed
deadline of time by when these particular things have to take
place.  But I think things will proceed fairly quickly.

         Q    Have there been any consultations with the South
Koreans up until now -- since the President made his decision
yesterday?

         MS. SHELLY:  My understanding is that there was a
telephone call this morning between President Clinton and South
Korean President Kim Young Sam.  I would have to refer you
specifically to the White House for details of that, but I
understand that this morning there was a telephone call.

         Q    Is that the consultation that was foreseen?  Is
that what you're talking about?

         MS. SHELLY:  I don't know.  I just know there was a
telephone call.  Whether that is exactly the vehicle by which we
are consulting with the South Koreans, I just don't have any
further information on that.  I just got the information on the
call right before we came out.

         Q    Are you in a position to say whether the United
States and South Korea are agreed on what to tell the North
Koreans?

         MS. SHELLY:  No, I'm not in a position to say that.

         Q    Is China considered an ally, for purposes of this
negotiation?

         MS. SHELLY:  I would hesitate to get into definitions
of which countries are allies in which situations.  We have
consulted with the Chinese on this before.  We've had
consultations with them on this as recently as in Seattle.  I
would expect that we would continue to consult with them on
this.

         Q    If you happen to know, because this gets into "B"
copy or into fine print, were there sanctions that somehow the
United States could have applied to Kuwait's transfer of
commercial planes to Syria?  I'm a little confused [about] what
the mechanism is that somehow has been set aside, if there is
such a thing.  If you have it.  I mean, the main point is
established -- they're to get the planes with the U.S.'s
blessing -- but I just wondered if there were sanctions against
that.  I don't know how there could be.  I don't understand.

         MS. SHELLY:  My understanding is that the sanctions
themselves that exist still have not been eased and there isn't
any change in the sanctions regime; but that in the context of
the existing sanctions, the U.S. approved the re-export of these
three aging Boeing 727 passenger jets from Kuwait to Syria.

         Q    Having been manufactured originally in the United
States must be the point.  That's how we keep a string on them?

         MS. SHELLY:  I believe that that is the link.

         Q    Okay.  But doesn't that represent an easing of
sanctions?

         MS. SHELLY:  The sanctions question really, I think, is
a broader policy question; and on the specific angles on that
and where this fits into the bigger picture of our policy toward
Syria, I really would have to refer you to the [Secretary's]
party.

         Q    Can you tell me, if you have it -- I see in the
papers -- you know, without attribution, as if everybody knows
-- that Syria has not been found to have done anything to
support terrorism for something like eight years.  Is that the
State Department's assessment of Syria?  If so, why are they on
the terrorist list?

         MS. SHELLY:  That is very definitely a policy question.
  I'm just going to have to decline to answer that.

         Q    Anything about the participation of Russia in the
international space station?

         MS. SHELLY:  I have a little bit more for you on that. 
Yesterday afternoon, I think you are aware, we did put up an
answer to the question about what had occurred at the space
station meeting yesterday in the Department.  I mentioned
specifically in that that an invitation to participate in these
talks is being conveyed to the Government of the Russian
Federation through diplomatic channels.

         Q    Okay.  Thank you.

         Q    Wait.  One more.

         Q    There was a report yesterday -- I think it was in
the Boston Globe -- that a group of Haitian military officers
continued to be trained in the United States after the coup, and
it went on well into '92.  What would be the justification for
continuing a program like that when all aid was cut off?

         MS. SHELLY:  I don't have anything specific for you on
that.  I'd be happy to take the question.

         Q    Thank you.

         (The press briefing concluded at 1:10 p.m.)

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