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US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1993

                                          BRIEFER:  Christine Shelly

Subject                                               Page

NORTH KOREA
Nuclear Inspections:
-- US-DPRK Informal Meeting in New York ................1-2
-- Blix/Sievering Statements at IAEA Meeting ...........3
-- US Conclusions re DPRK IAEA Compliance ..............3-4

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Reports of Possible Clinton-Assad Meeting ..............4

HAITI
Acting Secretary Tarnoff/Vice President 
  Gore's ...............................................4
Meeting with Prime Minister Malval .....................4-5
US Position on Malval's Resignation ....................5-7
Malval's Effectiveness as Prime Minister ...............7

ARMS CONTROL
US Proposal re Amending the ABM Treaty .................7-9

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Results of Geneva Peace Talks/Schedule for 
Next Meetings/Redman Return to the US ..................9-10

SOMALIA
US Transport of Warlord Aideed to Ethiopia .............10

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                       DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                       DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

                                                      DPC #157

               FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1993, 2:00 P.M.
              (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)


          MS. SHELLY:  Good afternoon again, ladies and gentlemen.  I 
have no further announcements to make, so I'd be pleased to proceed 
directly to questions.

          Q          Have you received any response yet from North 
Korea?

          MS. SHELLY:  I can confirm that there was an informal meeting 
between the United States and North Korean diplomats in New York at the 
United Nations this morning.  That meeting is now over.

          Q    Did they give you the response that you were hoping for?

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't really have any details on the precise 
exchange that took place.  This was the formal response to the proposal 
which we had made to the North Koreans last Wednesday, the 24th.

          I can add that the meeting took place at the working level, as 
did the last meeting.  But unfortunately I don't have any details yet.  
I just got passed the information that the meeting had finished, but I 
don't really have any details to share with you.

          Q    How long did it last?

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't have that information either.

          Q    But presumably you have some sense -- it might be fairly 
obvious if there was some positive spin to it.  You have nothing to say 
in terms of a characterization?

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't really have anything.  It was not just a 
short meeting.  I can tell you it was a meeting that lasted some time, 
even though I don't have the precise length of the meeting.  I can't 
speculate on -- I can't give you a characterization of the meeting.

          I think what happens now procedurally is that our participants 
in that meeting come back here, and we will have some internal meetings 
with those people involved in our  government who watch this issue, and 
we will look at the complete response that they gave us.  Then I presume 
that we will do what we normally do, which is also consult and then 
eventually get back to them.  But that's really about all I can tell 
you.

          Unfortunately, I wasn't able to get any precise information on 
the substance of the meeting.

          Q    In view of the intense interest in this, could we have a 
preliminary readout as to what went on today, something beyond what 
you've given us?

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't know.  I'll check and see if I can get 
anything for you.  I just don't have anything else at this time, but 
I'll check and see if there is anything else I can add later.

          Q    At least the time and the length of the meeting?  I don't 
even know where it took place.  At the U.N.?

          MS. SHELLY:  At the U.N.

          Q    Do you know where?

          MS. SHELLY:  No, I don't know specifically where.

          Q    And is it possible to know the participants on the 
American side?

          MS. SHELLY:  My understanding is that we don't normally name 
the participants by name.  We usually indicate level, and I think it's 
just simply the same level we've been doing before.  As I said, I will 
endeavor to see if there is anything we might be able to report on this 
-- a few more details at least -- later in the afternoon.

          Q    When did the North Koreans ask for this meeting?

          MS. SHELLY:  I cannot give you the precise hour.  My 
understanding was it was sometime yesterday.  I can't tell you exactly 
when.

          Q    Do you know if it was after Hans Blix made a statement in 
Vienna?

          MS. SHELLY:  Given the time difference, it's my impression 
that it was after.  Again, I can't be absolutely categoric on that.

          Q    Do you think it was pegged to that statement at all?

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't have any indication that it was pegged 
one way or the other to it, no.

          Q    Do you have anything more to say today about what Hans 
Blix said yesterday?

          MS. SHELLY:  I have a bit more on that.  We've received the 
full text of that statement.  We continue to study it, and precisely the 
language the formulations that he used in it, along with all of the 
other information that we have on the North Korean nuclear program in an 
effort to try to determine how best to proceed in our thinking and our 
efforts to solve the problem.

          As I think you're also aware, today U.S. IAEA Governor Nelson 
Sievering supported the statement of yesterday -- the IAEA's efforts.  
He shared the concerns that were expressed in Director General Blix's 
statement on North Korea, but he also emphasized the statement that 
confidence could be restored with North Korean cooperation.

          He concluded that unless necessary inspections are conducted 
and the continuity of safeguards is maintained, the U.S. will not 
continue its discussions with North Korea and will be forced to return 
this issue to the U.N. Security Council for further action.

          Also, as we said yesterday, Director General Blix is going to 
be reporting to the U.N. Security Council next week on this issue.  We 
will want to see and study that particular report, I think, before we 
could offer any definitive comment on the exact state of play on the 
North Korean safeguards.

          Q    There has been some reporting today both here and in 
Seoul that the United States basically has concluded that North Korea 
isn't going to comply with inspections.  Can you talk a little bit about 
that?

          MS. SHELLY:  I really can't talk about that because I think, 
without getting some indication of what happened in a meeting where 
obviously inspections were very much a subject of discussion, I just 
think I can't get into that.

          Q    Would you say, going into that meeting, there was 
increased pessimism on the part of officials here that you would be able 
to solve this diplomatically?

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't really think so.  Solving it 
diplomatically, of course, remains our policy objective.  We are 
certainly continuing with our diplomatic efforts.  We certainly believe 
that it's the diplomatic efforts that can bring about the best 
resolution to this problem.  But, on the other hand, as we have said 
frequently, the time for resolution is limited.

          We do consider the North Korean nuclear program to be a 
serious danger to peace and stability in the region.  That is why we are 
insisting that North Korea live up to its obligations under the NPT and 
implement their agreement with South Korea on a non-nuclear Korean 
Peninsula.

          We are constantly reviewing the issue.  If at any point in 
time we are not satisfied that North Korea is taking the necessary 
steps, we of course consult with the IAEA, with the United Nations, and 
with our allies on other appropriate actions.

          Q    Can I ask on the Middle East?

          MS. SHELLY:  Sure.

          Q    Do you expect the Secretary will be carrying an 
invitation for Hafez al-Assad to meet with the President in January?  
And is he expected to go to Rabat?  Will he be contacting the PLO during 
his visit?

          MS. SHELLY:  As to your question on the meeting, I don't have 
anything for you specifically on that.  The President and the Secretary 
are committed to helping the parties move ahead toward a comprehensive 
peace.  When the Secretary is in the region, he will be holding detailed 
discussions with all of the parties about how best to achieve that.  But 
today, from this podium, I'm simply not in a position to go any further 
than that.

          Q    Can we do Haiti?  Do you have anything to say about Prime 
Minister Malval's meetings upstairs?

          MS. SHELLY:  Haitian Prime Minister Malval came to the 
Department today to meet Acting Secretary Tarnoff and to discuss the 
situation in Haiti.  Assistant Secretary Watson, Ambassador Pezzullo and 
Ambassador Swing were present at the meeting, which has been followed by 
a working lunch.

          During the meeting Vice President Gore also came over to the 
Department, and he met with the Prime Minister and reaffirmed our 
respect and strong support for his leadership.  The Prime Minister 
briefed us on the situation in Haiti and on his general views of the 
political situation.

          The Acting Secretary told the Prime Minister that we welcome 
his visit.  We will support his efforts in Haiti.  We will also continue 
to support and enforce the international community's sanctions until the 
Haitian military fulfills the obligations it undertook at Governors 
Island.

          Q    Will there be any changes as a result of this meeting?

          MS. SHELLY:  I think I've really said what I had to say on 
this.  I mean, clearly, also with a working lunch following a late 
morning meeting, I don't have a full readout yet; and I hope that we can 
say a bit more on this in the near future.  But basically, in terms of 
the first part of the meeting today and the continuing discussions that 
are going on, I've given you the general lines of what has been 
discussed.  As to whether anything has changed, it's just premature for 
me to get into that.

          Q    But if Vice President Gore and the others support for 
Malval's leadership, do they know if Malval is going to be leading in 
another two weeks?

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't think there really is anything definitive 
on that.  The Prime Minister himself in a press conference this morning 
addressed that, and I certainly can't get into anything further beyond 
that which he said himself.

          Q    When you announced the original sort of lineup for this 
meeting, Gore's name wasn't included.  When was it decided that he would 
participate?  It suggests that maybe the Administration felt a last-
minute effort to put some pressure on Malval to stay.

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't know exactly when that was decided, but I 
would not assign any particular interpretation to that.  I think he was 
interested in coming and wanted to meet with him, and fortunately his 
schedule permitted that to take place.  It worked out that the best time 
and way for him to do that was over here at the Department.  But I just 
can't ascribe a particular interpretation to that.

          Q    Do you know if Malval has gone to New York today to see 
Boutros-Ghali?

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't have any information on Malval's 
schedule.

          Q    Was an effort made to dissuade Malval from resigning?

          MS. SHELLY:  Again, I think you're getting into the precise 
details of the meeting, which I just don't have at this moment.  We've 
been asked this question, and the President has commented on this.  The 
Secretary has commented on this earlier in the week.  I just don't think 
there's anything to add.

          Certainly, the Prime Minister knows that we have been strongly 
supportive of all of his efforts, and that we would certainly like to 
see him stay on.  But at the same time, we also felt that the absolute 
decision to stay or to go and the timing of that was his to make.

          But I think that he has certainly gotten the message about our 
general views on his leadership, and I would have to leave it at that.

          Q    Is the United States trying to persuade him to perhaps 
persuade Aristide to broaden his cabinet?

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't have any specific information on that.

          Q    Will you have something later -- a fuller description of 
the meeting later on?

          MS. SHELLY:  I will try.  I will see if we can get something 
else that we might be able to post later this afternoon with a little 
bit more information.

          Q    Christine, could I ask -- maybe I'm barking up a wrong 
tree here, but there seems to be a little crack between what you say:  
You'd like to see him stay, but it's up to him.  Have you urged him to 
stay?  Has the United States urged him to stay?

          MS. SHELLY:  Certainly the subject of his staying on -- the 
circumstances associated with that, with that being clearly a discussion 
not only with us, since we're certainly very interested in that, but 
obviously also with President Aristide -- I think that now is not the 
exact moment that it's useful for us to go any further than what we've 
said before; and that is that lots of things are under discussion right 
now, and I think he knows how we feel about his leadership.  I think 
that point has been made very clear.  But at the same time it is wrapped 
up with lots of other things going on on the scene, and I just don't 
think that to go any further or to suggest that there is some slight 
shift or difference or nuance that should be added -- I just don't think 
that that's really a very accurate thing to do.

          Q    But the point I'm trying got get at [is that] the cynics 
over in Haiti who think that there's no threat from the United States 
might conclude that the United States really would not object too much 
if Malval left and the issue faded from the scene, as everybody seems to 
think it's doing.  So the question is, if we haven't urged him, why 
haven't we, and why aren't we saying publicly that we urge him to stay?

          MS. SHELLY:  I think we have said publicly that we would like 
to see him stay on.

          Q    We'd like to see him stay, but have you urged him to 
stay?  The United States carries a great deal of weight.  Why not say to 
him "Please stay" and tell us that that's what you said to him.

          MS. SHELLY:  I think I'm getting kind of dragged into a 
discussion of degree and nuance here.  I think that I've said what has 
been said, the President and the Secretary have both commented on this 
this week, and I just really don't think there's anything else to say.

          Q    Can you tell us if he steps down, what difference does it 
make to the American policy to Haiti?

          MS. SHELLY:  I think that the presence of a particular person 
in that sense -- I mean, we have a policy, and our policy remains our 
policy.  He has clearly been someone with whom we have been able to work 
very closely in terms of trying to get all of the objectives that were 
identified and agreed by all of the parties at Governors Island.

          But ultimately it is Haiti that in the end has to decide what 
is the best way forward for itself, and so therefore I think we don't 
want to cross a line that involves us too much in a process where 
ultimately the Haitians themselves will have to decide the best way 
forward.

          Q    You say that you've been able to work with him very 
closely.  Do you believe that he's actually governing in Haiti or has 
any power in Haiti?  I mean, in what way has he worked with you closely 
that makes that important in terms of the situation on the ground in 
Haiti?

          MS. SHELLY:  He is the Prime Minister, and he certainly has 
fulfilled all of the functions associated with the position of Prime 
Minister as I think you and I would understand it.  So I don't think 
that you can call into question whether or not he is really fulfilling 
his mandate.  I think he certainly has been, and he has been involved in 
the process to find a solution to the problems.  He has been involved in 
international exchanges.  We have worked with him directly, indirectly, 
in a variety of different ways.  I don't really see what the question 
is.

          Q    Let me rephrase it.  Is it your belief that he has the 
normal powers associated with the head of a government in a country; 
that he is exercising those powers on the ground in a way that's 
meaningful to the people who live there?

          MS. SHELLY:  I certainly don't have any information that 
suggests that he doesn't.

          Q    Then what are we concerned about?

          MS. SHELLY:  We are concerned about the fact that there is 
still a political impasse in terms of the implementation of the 
remaining steps of the Governors Island accords.

          Q    Are you aware of any difference between the United States 
and Prime Minister Malval over the viability of the Governors Island 
accords?

          MS. SHELLY:  No, I'm not aware of any difference.

          Q    Mr. Malval met with Cedras at least twice in recent days.  
Presumably you people know a lot more now than you did this morning 
about Cedras' thinking based on his conversations with Malval.  If you 
could shed some light on what the United States knows about Cedras' 
position to us -- if not now, later on this afternoon -- that would be 
appreciated.

          MS. SHELLY:  Okay.  I'll see what I can do.

          Q    Is the Administration attempting to alter the ABM Treaty 
in some way?

          MS. SHELLY:  The U.S. is proposing to remove a long-standing 
ambiguity in the ABM Treaty in order to allow a theater missile defense 
system.  We believe that this approach addresses the real problem of 
defending against attacks from states that have or may develop shorter-
range ballistic missiles while keeping intact the ABM Treaty's 
prohibition against strategic missile defenses.

          The Administration is committed to preserving the integrity of 
the Treaty.  We've already informed our Treaty partners that we will 
adhere to the so-called "narrow interpretation" of the Treaty and will 
not seek changes to allow for deployment of a national missile defense.

          Our intention is to make clear the distinction between theater 
missile defenses not limited by the Treaty and strategic defenses that 
are limited.

          We are consulting with some of the Newly Independent States in 
a regular meeting of the ABM Treaty's Standing Consultative Commission.  
This is going on right now, and hence this is what has attracted some 
media attention to the issue.  And, as our discussions advance on this, 
we'll also be consulting with our allies and other interested states.

          As to the broader policy question, I would also add that 
Congress has been informed of this approach.  We continue to consult 
with Congress and will continue to do so as our discussions progress.

          Q    Are you saying the theater defenses are not limited by 
ABM?  If that's true, the --

          MS. SHELLY:  The distinction between the theater missile 
defenses not limited by the Treaty and strategic defenses which are 
specifically limited by the Treaty.

          Q    If they're not limited by the Treaty, then why do you 
have to propose some new change then?

          MS. SHELLY:  This is a very complex issue, as you know.  To 
get the correct answer to your question, I'd like to take that question 
because in order to make sure that I'm absolutely precise I want to 
check back with one of our experts.  I'll take it and post an answer to 
that this afternoon.

          Q    Have you had any response from the Russians yet on that?

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't have any specific information on that, 
but since I'm going to take a question on it I'll also see if there's 
anything else.

          Q    And, also, is one of your efforts trying to get Ukraine 
and Belarus and Kazakhstan into this meeting of other nuclear stat es?

          MS. SHELLY:  Well, certainly it is our interest in getting 
some of the other countries in.  I don't have country specific 
information to share with you, except that my understanding is that 
discussions have already started with a few of them.  I don't have 
precise information about the other attendees at this particular 
meeting, but certainly it's a subject which we are actively pursuing.

          Q    Well, is the reporting on this correct that the State 
Department and ACDA opposed this effort initially?  

          MS. SHELLY:  Again, I don't know what the historical record is 
on that, and I'll take that question also and see if there's --

          Q    Can anybody give me the definition of "theater"?

          MS. SHELLY:  I'll add that to my list of questions for this.

          Q    I'm serious.  For example, is the United States part of a 
"theater," and can it deploy a missile defense for the United States?  
And if that's deployed, why would it be any different from an anti-
missile defense that would violate ABM?

          MS. SHELLY:  Well, it sounds to me like you're identifying the 
topic for our next briefing here by experts.  (Laughter)

          Again, I don't have the answer to that.  I think it's 
certainly a valid question.  Let me see what I can provide this 
afternoon; and if there's some interest in pursuing this further in some 
other way, another kind of briefing session, I'll be happy to see what 
we can do.

          Q    Could I just ask another one, too?  The Democrats had put 
up such an opposition when the Reagan Administration wanted to fiddle 
with the ABM Treaty in order to accommodate Star Wars, and it's just 
curious now a Democratic Administration is trying to fiddle as well.  So 
if there could be some greater explanation as to --

          MS. SHELLY:  Yes, that puts this in the context; yes.  

          Q    Is Chuck Redman going to Geneva to join the talks there?  
And if so, why -- for what reason?

          MS. SHELLY:  I hope that next week I can bring you up to date 
a bit more about the status of the Geneva talks.  As you know, the 
current negotiating session ended yesterday; and we understand that 
further talks are scheduled to resume among the three parties in 
approximately two weeks.  We understand there will also be, in the 
meantime, further bilateral contacts among the parties.

          As you know, Ambassador Redman was our representative in 
Geneva -- he was there in his observer capacity -- and he is currently 
on his way back from Geneva, to come back and consult with the U.S. 
officials.  And as to what he actually does next, I don't have any 
information on that.

          Q    On Somalia, do you have any more details at all on how 
the decision was made to allow Aideed to be a passenger on a U.S. plane, 
a military plane?

          MS. SHELLY:  Well, I don't really have much beyond what I said 
yesterday.  There was simply a lot of discussion among the various 
parties that unfolded over the last several days with a view with trying 
to get all of the participants there and the heads of the various 
groups.  This was a process in which the United States had been 
involved.  We'd worked very closely with the United Nations, with the 
Government of Ethiopia.  And then we also had to work out the modalities 
in the end of getting all of the parties actually in place in Addis.

          I mentioned specifically yesterday what led to the use of a 
U.S. aircraft, which basically was the result of General Aideed 
continuing to refuse to deal directly with the U.N.

          And so that's really the process and the way that it unfolded, 
and the precise modalities of getting everybody together were really -- 
all the arrangements were really worked out on the spot; they were 
worked out locally.

          Q    There was no consultation with Washington at all, whether 
State or White House, to get an O.K.?

          MS. SHELLY:  Well, I'm not going to say that there wasn't any 
consultation on this.  My understanding is that the very precise 
decision about the use of the U.S. aircraft was made locally.  General 
Montgomery in Mogadishu authorized use of the U.S. aircraft in 
consultation with Ambassador Oakley in Addis.

          Q    Did the U.N. specifically, or Ethiopia specifically, ask 
us to do it to facilitate the discussions?

          MS. SHELLY:  I don't have more precise information than that 
which I've shared with you.

          Q    Thank you.

          MS. SHELLY:  Thank you.

          (Press briefing concluded at 2:26 p.m.) 
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