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US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1993
BRIEFER: Christine Shelly
Subject Page
NORTH KOREA
Nuclear Inspections:
-- US-DPRK Informal Meeting in New York ................1-2
-- Blix/Sievering Statements at IAEA Meeting ...........3
-- US Conclusions re DPRK IAEA Compliance ..............3-4
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Reports of Possible Clinton-Assad Meeting ..............4
HAITI
Acting Secretary Tarnoff/Vice President
Gore's ...............................................4
Meeting with Prime Minister Malval .....................4-5
US Position on Malval's Resignation ....................5-7
Malval's Effectiveness as Prime Minister ...............7
ARMS CONTROL
US Proposal re Amending the ABM Treaty .................7-9
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Results of Geneva Peace Talks/Schedule for
Next Meetings/Redman Return to the US ..................9-10
SOMALIA
US Transport of Warlord Aideed to Ethiopia .............10
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPC #157
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1993, 2:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MS. SHELLY: Good afternoon again, ladies and gentlemen. I
have no further announcements to make, so I'd be pleased to proceed
directly to questions.
Q Have you received any response yet from North
Korea?
MS. SHELLY: I can confirm that there was an informal meeting
between the United States and North Korean diplomats in New York at the
United Nations this morning. That meeting is now over.
Q Did they give you the response that you were hoping for?
MS. SHELLY: I don't really have any details on the precise
exchange that took place. This was the formal response to the proposal
which we had made to the North Koreans last Wednesday, the 24th.
I can add that the meeting took place at the working level, as
did the last meeting. But unfortunately I don't have any details yet.
I just got passed the information that the meeting had finished, but I
don't really have any details to share with you.
Q How long did it last?
MS. SHELLY: I don't have that information either.
Q But presumably you have some sense -- it might be fairly
obvious if there was some positive spin to it. You have nothing to say
in terms of a characterization?
MS. SHELLY: I don't really have anything. It was not just a
short meeting. I can tell you it was a meeting that lasted some time,
even though I don't have the precise length of the meeting. I can't
speculate on -- I can't give you a characterization of the meeting.
I think what happens now procedurally is that our participants
in that meeting come back here, and we will have some internal meetings
with those people involved in our government who watch this issue, and
we will look at the complete response that they gave us. Then I presume
that we will do what we normally do, which is also consult and then
eventually get back to them. But that's really about all I can tell
you.
Unfortunately, I wasn't able to get any precise information on
the substance of the meeting.
Q In view of the intense interest in this, could we have a
preliminary readout as to what went on today, something beyond what
you've given us?
MS. SHELLY: I don't know. I'll check and see if I can get
anything for you. I just don't have anything else at this time, but
I'll check and see if there is anything else I can add later.
Q At least the time and the length of the meeting? I don't
even know where it took place. At the U.N.?
MS. SHELLY: At the U.N.
Q Do you know where?
MS. SHELLY: No, I don't know specifically where.
Q And is it possible to know the participants on the
American side?
MS. SHELLY: My understanding is that we don't normally name
the participants by name. We usually indicate level, and I think it's
just simply the same level we've been doing before. As I said, I will
endeavor to see if there is anything we might be able to report on this
-- a few more details at least -- later in the afternoon.
Q When did the North Koreans ask for this meeting?
MS. SHELLY: I cannot give you the precise hour. My
understanding was it was sometime yesterday. I can't tell you exactly
when.
Q Do you know if it was after Hans Blix made a statement in
Vienna?
MS. SHELLY: Given the time difference, it's my impression
that it was after. Again, I can't be absolutely categoric on that.
Q Do you think it was pegged to that statement at all?
MS. SHELLY: I don't have any indication that it was pegged
one way or the other to it, no.
Q Do you have anything more to say today about what Hans
Blix said yesterday?
MS. SHELLY: I have a bit more on that. We've received the
full text of that statement. We continue to study it, and precisely the
language the formulations that he used in it, along with all of the
other information that we have on the North Korean nuclear program in an
effort to try to determine how best to proceed in our thinking and our
efforts to solve the problem.
As I think you're also aware, today U.S. IAEA Governor Nelson
Sievering supported the statement of yesterday -- the IAEA's efforts.
He shared the concerns that were expressed in Director General Blix's
statement on North Korea, but he also emphasized the statement that
confidence could be restored with North Korean cooperation.
He concluded that unless necessary inspections are conducted
and the continuity of safeguards is maintained, the U.S. will not
continue its discussions with North Korea and will be forced to return
this issue to the U.N. Security Council for further action.
Also, as we said yesterday, Director General Blix is going to
be reporting to the U.N. Security Council next week on this issue. We
will want to see and study that particular report, I think, before we
could offer any definitive comment on the exact state of play on the
North Korean safeguards.
Q There has been some reporting today both here and in
Seoul that the United States basically has concluded that North Korea
isn't going to comply with inspections. Can you talk a little bit about
that?
MS. SHELLY: I really can't talk about that because I think,
without getting some indication of what happened in a meeting where
obviously inspections were very much a subject of discussion, I just
think I can't get into that.
Q Would you say, going into that meeting, there was
increased pessimism on the part of officials here that you would be able
to solve this diplomatically?
MS. SHELLY: I don't really think so. Solving it
diplomatically, of course, remains our policy objective. We are
certainly continuing with our diplomatic efforts. We certainly believe
that it's the diplomatic efforts that can bring about the best
resolution to this problem. But, on the other hand, as we have said
frequently, the time for resolution is limited.
We do consider the North Korean nuclear program to be a
serious danger to peace and stability in the region. That is why we are
insisting that North Korea live up to its obligations under the NPT and
implement their agreement with South Korea on a non-nuclear Korean
Peninsula.
We are constantly reviewing the issue. If at any point in
time we are not satisfied that North Korea is taking the necessary
steps, we of course consult with the IAEA, with the United Nations, and
with our allies on other appropriate actions.
Q Can I ask on the Middle East?
MS. SHELLY: Sure.
Q Do you expect the Secretary will be carrying an
invitation for Hafez al-Assad to meet with the President in January?
And is he expected to go to Rabat? Will he be contacting the PLO during
his visit?
MS. SHELLY: As to your question on the meeting, I don't have
anything for you specifically on that. The President and the Secretary
are committed to helping the parties move ahead toward a comprehensive
peace. When the Secretary is in the region, he will be holding detailed
discussions with all of the parties about how best to achieve that. But
today, from this podium, I'm simply not in a position to go any further
than that.
Q Can we do Haiti? Do you have anything to say about Prime
Minister Malval's meetings upstairs?
MS. SHELLY: Haitian Prime Minister Malval came to the
Department today to meet Acting Secretary Tarnoff and to discuss the
situation in Haiti. Assistant Secretary Watson, Ambassador Pezzullo and
Ambassador Swing were present at the meeting, which has been followed by
a working lunch.
During the meeting Vice President Gore also came over to the
Department, and he met with the Prime Minister and reaffirmed our
respect and strong support for his leadership. The Prime Minister
briefed us on the situation in Haiti and on his general views of the
political situation.
The Acting Secretary told the Prime Minister that we welcome
his visit. We will support his efforts in Haiti. We will also continue
to support and enforce the international community's sanctions until the
Haitian military fulfills the obligations it undertook at Governors
Island.
Q Will there be any changes as a result of this meeting?
MS. SHELLY: I think I've really said what I had to say on
this. I mean, clearly, also with a working lunch following a late
morning meeting, I don't have a full readout yet; and I hope that we can
say a bit more on this in the near future. But basically, in terms of
the first part of the meeting today and the continuing discussions that
are going on, I've given you the general lines of what has been
discussed. As to whether anything has changed, it's just premature for
me to get into that.
Q But if Vice President Gore and the others support for
Malval's leadership, do they know if Malval is going to be leading in
another two weeks?
MS. SHELLY: I don't think there really is anything definitive
on that. The Prime Minister himself in a press conference this morning
addressed that, and I certainly can't get into anything further beyond
that which he said himself.
Q When you announced the original sort of lineup for this
meeting, Gore's name wasn't included. When was it decided that he would
participate? It suggests that maybe the Administration felt a last-
minute effort to put some pressure on Malval to stay.
MS. SHELLY: I don't know exactly when that was decided, but I
would not assign any particular interpretation to that. I think he was
interested in coming and wanted to meet with him, and fortunately his
schedule permitted that to take place. It worked out that the best time
and way for him to do that was over here at the Department. But I just
can't ascribe a particular interpretation to that.
Q Do you know if Malval has gone to New York today to see
Boutros-Ghali?
MS. SHELLY: I don't have any information on Malval's
schedule.
Q Was an effort made to dissuade Malval from resigning?
MS. SHELLY: Again, I think you're getting into the precise
details of the meeting, which I just don't have at this moment. We've
been asked this question, and the President has commented on this. The
Secretary has commented on this earlier in the week. I just don't think
there's anything to add.
Certainly, the Prime Minister knows that we have been strongly
supportive of all of his efforts, and that we would certainly like to
see him stay on. But at the same time, we also felt that the absolute
decision to stay or to go and the timing of that was his to make.
But I think that he has certainly gotten the message about our
general views on his leadership, and I would have to leave it at that.
Q Is the United States trying to persuade him to perhaps
persuade Aristide to broaden his cabinet?
MS. SHELLY: I don't have any specific information on that.
Q Will you have something later -- a fuller description of
the meeting later on?
MS. SHELLY: I will try. I will see if we can get something
else that we might be able to post later this afternoon with a little
bit more information.
Q Christine, could I ask -- maybe I'm barking up a wrong
tree here, but there seems to be a little crack between what you say:
You'd like to see him stay, but it's up to him. Have you urged him to
stay? Has the United States urged him to stay?
MS. SHELLY: Certainly the subject of his staying on -- the
circumstances associated with that, with that being clearly a discussion
not only with us, since we're certainly very interested in that, but
obviously also with President Aristide -- I think that now is not the
exact moment that it's useful for us to go any further than what we've
said before; and that is that lots of things are under discussion right
now, and I think he knows how we feel about his leadership. I think
that point has been made very clear. But at the same time it is wrapped
up with lots of other things going on on the scene, and I just don't
think that to go any further or to suggest that there is some slight
shift or difference or nuance that should be added -- I just don't think
that that's really a very accurate thing to do.
Q But the point I'm trying got get at [is that] the cynics
over in Haiti who think that there's no threat from the United States
might conclude that the United States really would not object too much
if Malval left and the issue faded from the scene, as everybody seems to
think it's doing. So the question is, if we haven't urged him, why
haven't we, and why aren't we saying publicly that we urge him to stay?
MS. SHELLY: I think we have said publicly that we would like
to see him stay on.
Q We'd like to see him stay, but have you urged him to
stay? The United States carries a great deal of weight. Why not say to
him "Please stay" and tell us that that's what you said to him.
MS. SHELLY: I think I'm getting kind of dragged into a
discussion of degree and nuance here. I think that I've said what has
been said, the President and the Secretary have both commented on this
this week, and I just really don't think there's anything else to say.
Q Can you tell us if he steps down, what difference does it
make to the American policy to Haiti?
MS. SHELLY: I think that the presence of a particular person
in that sense -- I mean, we have a policy, and our policy remains our
policy. He has clearly been someone with whom we have been able to work
very closely in terms of trying to get all of the objectives that were
identified and agreed by all of the parties at Governors Island.
But ultimately it is Haiti that in the end has to decide what
is the best way forward for itself, and so therefore I think we don't
want to cross a line that involves us too much in a process where
ultimately the Haitians themselves will have to decide the best way
forward.
Q You say that you've been able to work with him very
closely. Do you believe that he's actually governing in Haiti or has
any power in Haiti? I mean, in what way has he worked with you closely
that makes that important in terms of the situation on the ground in
Haiti?
MS. SHELLY: He is the Prime Minister, and he certainly has
fulfilled all of the functions associated with the position of Prime
Minister as I think you and I would understand it. So I don't think
that you can call into question whether or not he is really fulfilling
his mandate. I think he certainly has been, and he has been involved in
the process to find a solution to the problems. He has been involved in
international exchanges. We have worked with him directly, indirectly,
in a variety of different ways. I don't really see what the question
is.
Q Let me rephrase it. Is it your belief that he has the
normal powers associated with the head of a government in a country;
that he is exercising those powers on the ground in a way that's
meaningful to the people who live there?
MS. SHELLY: I certainly don't have any information that
suggests that he doesn't.
Q Then what are we concerned about?
MS. SHELLY: We are concerned about the fact that there is
still a political impasse in terms of the implementation of the
remaining steps of the Governors Island accords.
Q Are you aware of any difference between the United States
and Prime Minister Malval over the viability of the Governors Island
accords?
MS. SHELLY: No, I'm not aware of any difference.
Q Mr. Malval met with Cedras at least twice in recent days.
Presumably you people know a lot more now than you did this morning
about Cedras' thinking based on his conversations with Malval. If you
could shed some light on what the United States knows about Cedras'
position to us -- if not now, later on this afternoon -- that would be
appreciated.
MS. SHELLY: Okay. I'll see what I can do.
Q Is the Administration attempting to alter the ABM Treaty
in some way?
MS. SHELLY: The U.S. is proposing to remove a long-standing
ambiguity in the ABM Treaty in order to allow a theater missile defense
system. We believe that this approach addresses the real problem of
defending against attacks from states that have or may develop shorter-
range ballistic missiles while keeping intact the ABM Treaty's
prohibition against strategic missile defenses.
The Administration is committed to preserving the integrity of
the Treaty. We've already informed our Treaty partners that we will
adhere to the so-called "narrow interpretation" of the Treaty and will
not seek changes to allow for deployment of a national missile defense.
Our intention is to make clear the distinction between theater
missile defenses not limited by the Treaty and strategic defenses that
are limited.
We are consulting with some of the Newly Independent States in
a regular meeting of the ABM Treaty's Standing Consultative Commission.
This is going on right now, and hence this is what has attracted some
media attention to the issue. And, as our discussions advance on this,
we'll also be consulting with our allies and other interested states.
As to the broader policy question, I would also add that
Congress has been informed of this approach. We continue to consult
with Congress and will continue to do so as our discussions progress.
Q Are you saying the theater defenses are not limited by
ABM? If that's true, the --
MS. SHELLY: The distinction between the theater missile
defenses not limited by the Treaty and strategic defenses which are
specifically limited by the Treaty.
Q If they're not limited by the Treaty, then why do you
have to propose some new change then?
MS. SHELLY: This is a very complex issue, as you know. To
get the correct answer to your question, I'd like to take that question
because in order to make sure that I'm absolutely precise I want to
check back with one of our experts. I'll take it and post an answer to
that this afternoon.
Q Have you had any response from the Russians yet on that?
MS. SHELLY: I don't have any specific information on that,
but since I'm going to take a question on it I'll also see if there's
anything else.
Q And, also, is one of your efforts trying to get Ukraine
and Belarus and Kazakhstan into this meeting of other nuclear stat es?
MS. SHELLY: Well, certainly it is our interest in getting
some of the other countries in. I don't have country specific
information to share with you, except that my understanding is that
discussions have already started with a few of them. I don't have
precise information about the other attendees at this particular
meeting, but certainly it's a subject which we are actively pursuing.
Q Well, is the reporting on this correct that the State
Department and ACDA opposed this effort initially?
MS. SHELLY: Again, I don't know what the historical record is
on that, and I'll take that question also and see if there's --
Q Can anybody give me the definition of "theater"?
MS. SHELLY: I'll add that to my list of questions for this.
Q I'm serious. For example, is the United States part of a
"theater," and can it deploy a missile defense for the United States?
And if that's deployed, why would it be any different from an anti-
missile defense that would violate ABM?
MS. SHELLY: Well, it sounds to me like you're identifying the
topic for our next briefing here by experts. (Laughter)
Again, I don't have the answer to that. I think it's
certainly a valid question. Let me see what I can provide this
afternoon; and if there's some interest in pursuing this further in some
other way, another kind of briefing session, I'll be happy to see what
we can do.
Q Could I just ask another one, too? The Democrats had put
up such an opposition when the Reagan Administration wanted to fiddle
with the ABM Treaty in order to accommodate Star Wars, and it's just
curious now a Democratic Administration is trying to fiddle as well. So
if there could be some greater explanation as to --
MS. SHELLY: Yes, that puts this in the context; yes.
Q Is Chuck Redman going to Geneva to join the talks there?
And if so, why -- for what reason?
MS. SHELLY: I hope that next week I can bring you up to date
a bit more about the status of the Geneva talks. As you know, the
current negotiating session ended yesterday; and we understand that
further talks are scheduled to resume among the three parties in
approximately two weeks. We understand there will also be, in the
meantime, further bilateral contacts among the parties.
As you know, Ambassador Redman was our representative in
Geneva -- he was there in his observer capacity -- and he is currently
on his way back from Geneva, to come back and consult with the U.S.
officials. And as to what he actually does next, I don't have any
information on that.
Q On Somalia, do you have any more details at all on how
the decision was made to allow Aideed to be a passenger on a U.S. plane,
a military plane?
MS. SHELLY: Well, I don't really have much beyond what I said
yesterday. There was simply a lot of discussion among the various
parties that unfolded over the last several days with a view with trying
to get all of the participants there and the heads of the various
groups. This was a process in which the United States had been
involved. We'd worked very closely with the United Nations, with the
Government of Ethiopia. And then we also had to work out the modalities
in the end of getting all of the parties actually in place in Addis.
I mentioned specifically yesterday what led to the use of a
U.S. aircraft, which basically was the result of General Aideed
continuing to refuse to deal directly with the U.N.
And so that's really the process and the way that it unfolded,
and the precise modalities of getting everybody together were really --
all the arrangements were really worked out on the spot; they were
worked out locally.
Q There was no consultation with Washington at all, whether
State or White House, to get an O.K.?
MS. SHELLY: Well, I'm not going to say that there wasn't any
consultation on this. My understanding is that the very precise
decision about the use of the U.S. aircraft was made locally. General
Montgomery in Mogadishu authorized use of the U.S. aircraft in
consultation with Ambassador Oakley in Addis.
Q Did the U.N. specifically, or Ethiopia specifically, ask
us to do it to facilitate the discussions?
MS. SHELLY: I don't have more precise information than that
which I've shared with you.
Q Thank you.
MS. SHELLY: Thank you.
(Press briefing concluded at 2:26 p.m.)
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