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US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 12,1993

                                BRIEFER:  Michael McCurry

Subject                                           Page

ANNOUNCEMENTS
Afghanistan: Detention of Journalists ...........  1-2
China: Discovery of WW II U.S. Aircraft Wreckage   1-2
APEC: Secretary Christopher, Spero, Lord Briefing   2

NORTH KOREA
Package Deal for Settlement of Nuclear Issue;
  Inspections; Talks with U.S., South Korea .....2-4,7  

CHINA
Waiver of Sanctions Imposed for M-11 Transfer
  to Pakistan ...................................4-5    
US Export of Satellite Technology ...............5-7    
MTCR Commitment .................................8-9   

MEXICO
Illegal Aliens Incarcerated in U.S. .............6      

MACEDONIA
Ethnic Albanian Acts Against Government .........6      

UKRAINE
START I Ratification, Nuclear Fuel Diversion, 
  U.S. Assistance ..............................7-8    

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
War Crimes Tribunal, Contributors ...............8-9  
Charges Against Milosevic, Karadzic .............8-9  

SERBIA
U.S. Position on UN Sanctions ...................9-10 

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                       DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                       DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

                                                      DPC #148

              FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1993, 1:10 P. M.
              (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)


          MR. McCURRY:  Good afternoon, everybody.  I apologize for 
being tardy, but I did want to wait.  I know most of you had an interest 
in seeing the President and Prime Minister Rabin at their press 
conference.

          I'll start with a couple of items, first about two journalists 
that are being detained in Afghanistan.  We understand that John 
Jennings of the Associated Press, a U.S. citizen, and a reporter for 
AFP, Terence White, were detained on November 8 by forces loyal to 
Afghan faction leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar when they were covering 
fighting about 30 miles east of Kabul.  Both are reportedly unharmed and 
in good health.  

          Despite assurances by Hekmatyar's organization that Jennings 
and White would be quickly released, they are still being held.

          The United States Government is concerned about this 
situation.  We have contacted the Afghan Embassy here in Washington and 
are following up with Afghan Government officials and Hekmatyar's 
representatives in Islamabad to press for Jennings' and White's 
immediate release.

          We'll obviously continue to monitor the situation very, very 
closely.

          Second, I want to call your attention -- we put out a long 
statement that some of you may or may not have seen, I guess late 
Wednesday; but it's an interesting story, and I'm really just doing this 
to draw attention to it so you can go look for the longer statement 
that's available in the press office.

          During the meetings that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu had 
here on the 4th and the 5th, among other -- obviously, I think we've 
discussed many of the things that were covered during that meeting, but 
during the course of the meetings the Vice Foreign Minister presented 
Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff with photographs and a video of a 
recently discovered crash site of a World War II era U.S. aircraft that 
I think has been embedded in a glacier and has just recently been 
uncovered.

          I just wanted to make clear that the United States deeply 
appreciates this gesture of good will on the part of the Government of 
China.  There are some interesting details about what's happening with 
the wreckage and with the remains.  Obviously, we will do everything we 
can to ascertain the identity of any of the victims, and that would 
presumably, even 50 years later, be of enormous relief to certain family 
members.

          Lastly, I would like to tell you that on Monday the Secretary 
of State, the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Joan Spero, and the 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs will be here at 
the podium at 11:00 to talk a little bit about the upcoming APEC 
meetings.  I expect because of their session we won't have a need to do 
a briefing that day.  We will be departing on Tuesday, I think as you 
know, for Seattle for the APEC meetings.  But to alert you in advance to 
the Secretary's availability here -- I expect he'll start with a short 
statement, maybe take one or two questions, and then turn it over to 
Joan Spero and to Win Lord who can do a longer workup on some of the 
aspects of the APEC meeting and some of the important bilateral sessions 
we'll be having.

          Q    Is that ON THE RECORD?

          MR. McCURRY:  They'll be ON THE RECORD.

          So with those announcements, any questions?

          Q    Back on the detainees in Afghanistan, did you get a 
nationality for Terence White?

          MR. McCURRY:  There's not one listed here -- AFP reporter.  It 
doesn't say.  I can check on that.

          Q    Mike, has the Administration offered North Korea a 
package deal to settle the nuclear issue?

          MR. McCURRY:  We have been in contact with them on and off, I 
think as you know.  You are referring, I think, with a question to some 
remarks that were made by North Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Kang Sok-Ju on November 11, clarifying the position of North Korea on 
the settlement of the nuclear issue.

          I would say we've taken very careful note of this statement.  
The Vice Minister's statement includes some positive elements, such as 
North Korea's readiness to fully ensure the continuity of safeguards 
while the U.S.-North Korea talks continue.  

          We certainly welcome North Korea's stated willingness to 
pursue a settlement of the nuclear issue.  We, too, are willing to work 
toward a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue at a third round of 
talks on the basis of principles that have been set forth in the joint 
statements issued by the U.S. and the DPRK.  We have told North Korea 
that.

          Obviously, it remains the case that prompt acceptance of 
inspections by the IAEA to assure continuity of safeguards at the 
declared nuclear installations remains very important; and an agreement 
on arrangements for resumed dialogue between North and South Korea 
remains very important as we look towards scheduling a third round of 
talks on whether or not progress is sufficient to schedule a third round 
of talks.

          I'd make it clear at the moment there are no further meetings 
since the one that we mentioned earlier in the week and no further 
meetings scheduled at this point.

          Q    So actually in essence your position has not changed even 
a little bit.

          MR. McCURRY:  I'll leave it up to you to interpret the 
statement I just gave you.

          Mark.

          Q    Is this a change?  You mentioned a prompt acceptance of 
inspections on the declared sites.  You did not mention inspections -- 
the special inspections on the undeclared sites.

          MR. McCURRY:  I mentioned the prompt North Korea acceptance of 
inspections by the IAEA to assure continuity of safeguards.  Now, 
special inspections to assure the continuity of safeguards is something 
that is a technical issue that the IAEA would address; and they're the 
ones, as you know, that have asked for special inspections in connection 
with looking at those two declared sites.

          Q    But as I understand the American position before, in 
order for a third meeting to be held with Gallucci the United States 
wanted to see progress between North Korea and the IAEA on the issue of 
special inspections at the undeclared sites.  Is that correct?

          MR. McCURRY:  We wanted to see progress in their discussions 
with the IAEA.  I can't remember if we specified anything about 
inspections.  I'd have to go back and check on that.  I just don't 
remember, Mark, whether we made it that.  I think we in general talked 
in context of what the IAEA needed to be satisfied that there had been a 
continuity of the safeguards; and again that remains the most important 
aspect of this.

          Q    So, Mike, are you ruling out or ruling in the possibility 
of holding third-round talks between North Korea and the United Sates, 
not seeing the implementation of IAEA inspection and North-South 
dialogue?

          MR. McCURRY:  We're certainly not ruling out the possibility 
of a third round of talks, but again the prompt acceptance by North 
Korea of inspections conducted by the IAEA to assure the continuity of 
safeguards and again the resumed dialogue between the North and South 
will certainly make the third round of talks possible.

          Q    I'm very sorry -- however, if North Korea demands that if 
you agree to hold a third round of talks, in the talks they can offer 
the full implementation of IAEA inspections and the North-South dialogue 
and also under the condition of the United States and North Korean 
diplomatic relations.  So in essence you can still -- you cannot rule 
out that that kind of the package can be discussed in the third round of 
talks.

          MR. McCURRY:  It would require speculation well beyond where 
we are at this point.  What I've said now is that the conditions that we 
have stated often and which have not changed would certainly make 
possible a third round of talks.  I don't want to suggest that there is 
anything about that meeting that would change the nature of the agenda 
that would then be reflected.

          Q    What's the status of the working level talks in New York?

          MR. McCURRY:  As I said, there haven't been any further 
meetings since the one we mentioned.  I think it was -- was it Tuesday 
or Wednesday?  I forget now, but it was earlier this week.  There aren't 
any further meetings scheduled at this point.

          Our view on the continuity of safeguards is pretty much as it 
has been before, that it's a technical matter for the IAEA.  And again 
the current governing evaluation is the one that Hans Blix, the IAEA 
Director General, delivered, that the ability of the IAEA to ensure 
continuity of safeguards has been damaged and that the area of non-
compliance is widening.

          However, the IAEA, as you know, has not made any determination 
that there's been a break in the continuity of safeguards at this point.  
So I guess I'd sum it up by saying that the ball remains in North 
Korea's court.

          Q    Mike, also in the neighborhood, China:  Is the 
Administration ready to waive sanctions against China for the missile -- 
M-11 missile sale, as was reported in The Washington Post?

          MR. McCURRY:  There was an account earlier.  I guess I'd go 
back.  Yes, we have said since August, since the time at which the 
sanctions were imposed, that we were willing to waive; but when we 
imposed those sanctions for the transfer of M-11 related equipment to 
Pakistan, we told the Chinese that our sanctions law would allow us to 
waive the sanctions if the two sides reached an agreement that promotes 
our non-proliferation goals and the non-proliferation goals of the 
international community as reflected in the Missile Technology Control 
Regime.  We have urged them rather consistently to begin talks and a 
dialogue on exactly that type of agreement, and we have urged them as 
recently as the meetings that I referred to at the opening on November 4 
and 5.  The Chinese to this date have not agreed to do so.

          So have we decided to waive sanctions that we imposed in 
August?  No.

          Q    Okay, just to follow up:  Have we decided that the 
commercial satellite launches by Hughes Aircraft and Martin-Marietta can 
go forward providing the two companies remove certain encryption 
equipment from those rockets -- from those satellites?

          MR. McCURRY:  We have not made any final decision on the 
applicability of the sanctions law to satellite exports, individually to 
some of the license applications that are pending.  It's obviously 
something that is under review.  It's under an interagency review.  I 
think there are some fairly complex issues that are involved in 
administering the Export Administration Act when it comes to this 
matter.

          It's possible that they will find some way to proceed on 
individual sales, looking at the requirements that exist as reflected 
both on the munitions list that we administer here and on the dual-use 
technology list administered at Commerce.

          Q    Isn't it correct that if the encryption devices are 
removed from the satellites, that it doesn't become an MTCR issue, and 
State would not even become involved in the approval?  There would be 
only Commerce?

          MR. McCURRY:  I'll take that question for you, but I want to 
make it clear in answering it that I'm not saying anything about a 
specific pending sale.  I want to divorce the answer to that question, 
which is a general issue, from any specific pending sale.

          As a general practice, I think you're right that when there 
are components that fall on the State Department munitions list within a 
satellite, we tend to look at the transaction itself, whatever the 
device is.  In this case, a satellite is something that is regulated by 
our list.  The Commerce Department very often takes the view that in 
administering their list you look at the totality of the device and not 
its individual components.  Under our practice, if a device, or like a 
satellite, contains items that are on the MTCR Annex list, then we say 
that it requires a license even if the satellite itself would not 
normally require a munitions license.

          Under Commerce practices they say that dual-use items that are 
embedded in a satellite lose their independent identity and do not 
themselves trigger a requirement for a license.  Thus, there is no need 
to deny the license in that case under the Missile Sanctions statute.  
In clarifying that, I'm not suggesting anything about a specific case.

          Q    Could we go to Mexico?  I don't know whether this is a 
NAFTA question or not, but there are stories this morning that there are 
negotiations aimed at deporting a number of Mexican illegal aliens who 
happen to be incarcerated in American jails.  Do you have anything on 
that?

          MR. McCURRY:  I don't have anything on that, George.  That is 
a general issue that has been worked over by the U.S.-Mexico Binational 
Commission.  I know it's one that we addressed in the most recent 
meetings here and that there's been some follow-up on.  I'll see if I 
can get any update on that.

          Q    To the Balkans.  Do you have any comment on the Albanian 
minority subversive activities against the government in Skopje, which 
is going on these days?

          MR. McCURRY:  I have seen some news reports on it.  I don't 
have anything on it.  I'll see if I can take the question and see if we 
have anything on it.

          Q    And more specifically, if you could confirm reports that 
the Skopje Minister of Health, who participated in these activities, 
escaped to the German Consulate in Skopje seeking political asylum?

          MR. McCURRY:  I'll see if we can find anything about that.

          Q    A follow-up on the Chinese question.  When is the 
difference between Commerce and State?  Who decides?  What the --

          MR. McCURRY:  It depends on the issue.  If we're talking about 
individual licenses, it depends on how the application is reviewed 
within the government and who it's filed with.  If you're looking at the 
overall issue of the determination of a sanctionable event, that rests 
with the  Under Secretary -- it rests with the Secretary of State; and, 
in this case, on this particular issue, the Secretary has delegated the 
determination to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs.

          But both Commerce and State regularly review license 
applications, depending on whether it's issues involving the munitions 
list that we administer or the Commerce-controlled list that they 
administer.

          Q    On North Korea, again.  Two days ago, Wednesday, the U.S. 
Under Secretary of State said at a House hearing that U.S. patience was 
running out on North Korea.  Could you elaborate about that?

          MR. McCURRY:  I think that's a pretty straightforward 
statement.  We've indicated all along that the clock is ticking, that 
the patience of the international community, in seeing that necessary 
compliance with the IAEA procedures, that would assure the continuity of 
safeguards, is indeed running thin.  I don't really have anything to add 
beyond that.  I think it's pretty straightforward what was being 
communicated.

          Q    Do you have anything to say about Ukraine, which is not 
keeping its words regarding ratification of START I?

          MR. McCURRY:  We continue to remain very hopeful that the 
Rada, during this session, will take up on its agenda ratification of 
START and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  We certainly press that issue 
very hard.  The Secretary pressed that issue very hard during our recent 
meetings in Kiev.

          I think that the Government of Ukraine well understands the 
importance that we attach to both ratification and to the possibilities 
that would then flow from ratification in working through many issues 
that are on both the economic and denuclearization agendas that we've 
discussed in our bilateral meetings with the Government of Ukraine.

          Q    Mike, can you comment on reports that nuclear fuel was 
stolen from the Ukrainian reactor?

          MR. McCURRY:  We are concerned about reports that fissile 
material may have been diverted from any country.  In this case, the 
reports are that they may have been taken from Ukraine's Chernobyl 
plant.

          I'd point out that as part of our proposed assistance package 
to Ukraine, we have offered $7.5 million to help with control and 
accountability of nuclear materials, and $2.26 million to help with 
export controls and anti-smuggling measures.  That's the type of 
assistance that could be very useful in tracking any alleged diversion 
of fissile materials from any plant.  We expect that these agreements 
will be concluded sometime next month, and they clearly could help 
address the problem, looking prospectively.  Whether or not anything has 
been transferred is something we will certainly be in contact with the 
government of Ukraine about.  They have indicated, I think, that they 
are making their own separate determination of what the facts are in 
this case.

          Q    The first session of the War Crimes Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia is getting underway in the next few days.  Do you have 
any observations?

          MR. McCURRY:  I'd just say, in general, I think as I think you 
know, the United States Government has been a major proponent of the 
U.N. War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the work that 
they will do.  The Tribunal's judges, I think, are the ones that will 
meet initially.  They have been elected, obviously, and a chief 
prosecutor has been appointed.

          The Tribunal will begin the process of investigating and 
trying those that have committed war crimes and other serious violations 
of international and humanitarian law during the period of conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia.

          We expect the Tribunal to pursue its mandate vigorously, and 
we welcome the fact that the Tribunal has already begun its work.  Its 
judges are meeting to decide issues related to the procedures of 
operation, to review the rules of evidence and procedure that the 
Tribunal itself will use.  The chief prosecutor will be assembling his 
staff and setting up his office.  The facilities for the Tribunal are 
being readied in The Hague, Netherlands.

          The U.S., as you know, has contributed funds, personnel 
documents, and material to support the work of the Commission.  We've 
contributed, I think, $500,000 directly to the Commission.  We've got 
U.S. Government personnel assisting with the Commission's 
investigations, submitting reports for their use on alleged war crimes 
violations.

          We've also, from the Department of Defense, contributed excess 
property worth approximately $200,000.  This is all in furtherance of 
our belief that holding those accountable for the war crimes that have 
occurred is something of a matter of international justice and something 
deeply important to the United States.

          Q    Mike, does this Administration, as the previous one did, 
believe that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic -- the Serbian 
President -- and the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, should 
appear before this Tribunal to explain what they did to stop alleged 
genocide?          

          MR. McCURRY:  That is not a question that I will try to answer 
from here.  The importance of having an international War Crimes 
Tribunal now is that there is a process in place to make exactly those 
determinations and to bring before the international bar of justice 
those who are accountable.  If, as it has been suggested in the past Mr. 
Milosevic or others are responsible for war crimes, I think the 
important thing is there is now a procedure and an entity in place for 
those crimes to be prosecuted.  So that's a judgment that will be made 
by the prosecutor who will bring evidence and the judges who will sit in 
review of that evidence.

          Q    Do you know which countries, if any, besides the United 
States, are making contributions of funds and documents and so forth?

          MR. McCURRY:  I'm not aware.  I understand from news accounts 
that there may not be many.  I think we attach great importance to the 
work of this Tribunal, and we certainly would encourage other countries, 
other nations, especially those within the Security Council who assisted 
in establishing the Commission, to provide the type of assistance to the 
Tribunal necessary for its effective work.

          Q    Let's go back to China for a second, Mike.  There's one 
point I didn't quite understand, specifically, on the MTCR.  As I 
recall, there was a letter from the Chinese to Baker some time in '92 in 
which they stated that they would be willing to adhere to the guidelines 
set forth in the MTCR.  Are we now asking the Chinese to in some way 
strengthen that adherence?

          MR. McCURRY:  No.  I think that those assurances that were 
given in the letter to Secretary Baker are exactly the ones that 
prompted a great deal of our concern when we reviewed the M-11 issue.  
In fact, we suggested at the time that one of the things that would be 
very important to us, as we looked at the question of the sanctions and 
whether or not they could be waived, is whether or not China is 
determined to adhere to those commitments made to Secretary Baker.  So 
we're not in any sense asking them to do anything beyond the commitments 
that were given to the United States in the form of the assurances they 
gave Secretary Baker in 1991.

          Q    And the Chinese haven't come back in the last couple of 
days and said they're willing to begin this dialogue?

          MR. McCURRY:  They have not come back since the meetings on 
the 4th and the 5th here.  Last question.

          Q    Since there is a lot of discussion in recent days, could 
you please clarify once again the U.S. position on the U.N. imposed 
sanctions against Serbia?

          MR. McCURRY:  The U.N.-imposed sanctions?  I think I may have 
addressed that yesterday.  I believe U.N. Security Council Resolution 8 
--.  I just blanked.  I can't remember.  You don't remember either.

          The relevant Security Council resolution sets forth a very 
specific criteria by which sanctions could be removed now on Serbia.  We 
adhere to that criteria as it is currently defined by the Security 
Council.  We are aware that there are some suggestions that other 
countries are looking at possible changes in those criteria.  We have 
indicated that's something that we do not greet with enthusiasm.

          Q    Thank you.

          MR. McCURRY:  Thank you.

          (Press briefing concluded at 1:34 p.m.)

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