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US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
Monday, November 8, 1993
BRIEFER: Michael McCurry
Subject Page
ANNOUNCEMENT
Secretary to Testify on Hill November 4 and 5 .. 1
-- No Daily Press Briefing on Those Days....... 1
SOMALIA
Ambassador Oakley's Meetings/Civil Order Impact 1-2
Responsibility for Deaths of Pakistani Troops .. 2
Political Agreements/Disarmament ............... 3-7
Withdrawal of US Troops ........................ 3,7-9
HAITI
Implementation of Governor's Island Accord .... 6
Aristide's Ability to Govern ................. 14-15
Sanctions/Naval Blockade/Discussions/US Marines 15-20
-- Countries Participating/Considering ....... 17,19-20
-- Assets Frozen in US ........................ 15-16
Upcoming Talks with Parties by Caputo/Puezzulo . 18-20
NORTH KOREA
Has Blix Report on Safeguards/US Concern ....... 9
IAEA Inspections/Replacement of Film ........... 9-10
North-South Talks .............................. 9-10,21
US Incentives re: Conformance with IAEA Regime 10-11,22
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Talks between Israel and PLO ................... 11-13
-- Status of Israeli Troops in Occupied Territories 12
Visit by Rabin to US/Telephone Call to Secretary 13
Israeli Elections .............................. 13-14
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Investigation of Reported Improper Behavior by
UNPROFOR Troops .............................. 14,16-17
US Support for Efforts to Resolve Disputes ..... 21
HUNGARY
Demonstrations Against Restrictions on Press ... 17-18
ICELAND
Talks with US re: Military Bases ............. 20-21
RUSSIA
New Military Doctrine .......................... 22
DoD Reviewing US Strategic Doctrine ............ 22-23
DEPARTMENT
Status of Nominations .......................... 23-24
(###)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPC #145
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1993, 12:49 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. McCURRY: Good afternoon, everybody -- very nice to be with
you today. I will start with two housekeeping announcements. I'll let
you know first that Secretary Christopher will be testifying tomorrow
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at 10:00 a.m. in Room 419
of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. This will be an overall
discussion of U.S. foreign policy.
Then on Friday morning at 10:00 a.m., he will appear with
Secretary Bentsen before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Room
2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building. That will be a discussion of
NAFTA.
Because of both of those appearances by the Secretary, as is
our custom, we will not have daily briefings here -- although we will
help you out with any questions that you might have.
I don't have any other additional announcements, so I think I
can go straight to questions.
Q Well, this may not be housekeeping, but there's a little
item in the Washington Times this morning that Mr. Wharton is leaving.
Is there any truth to that?
MR. McCURRY: I'm not aware of any truth to that item. I
think the Secretary highly regards Dr. Wharton, both professionally and
personally, and I'm not aware of any plans for change in his status as
Deputy Secretary.
Q Let me ask you a real question. Could you bring us up to
date on Bob Oakley's doings, and can we drop the word "reported" from
the notion that he's meeting with eight of Aideed's subordinates?
MR. McCURRY: I wouldn't say "reported." I think he and his
party -- they are in Mogadishu today. He has met with representatives
of various Somali groups, including the SNA which is General Aideed's
political organization.
He has not met with Aideed. He has no plans to do so,
although he is in contact with elements of Habr Gedr, the sub-clan. He
is scheduled to meet the press, my understanding is, some time today
during the early evening Somali time in Mogadishu. So we may see some
reporting coming from Mogadishu on some of his efforts over the last
several days.
He leaves tomorrow for Kampala where he will be meeting with
regional leaders, and then he's due back here over the weekend. He has
clearly had an extensive round of discussions relating back to many of
the things covered on his earlier trip. He's interested in re-
establishing some of the regional security arrangements that would
involve all the various clans to maintain peace and order in Mogadishu
as the important relief efforts continue.
Q Does the U.S. still want Aideed arrested?
MR. McCURRY: I think that we still subscribe to the U.N.
Security Council resolution that says that those accountable for the
deaths of Pakistani peacekeepers must be held accountable.
Q Only Pakistani peacekeepers? I thought it included --
MR. McCURRY: The relevant resolution 837 refers to the June 5
incident; but of course we are determined to see that all of those
responsible for the deaths of U.N. peacekeepers, including U.S.
servicemen, are held accountable for those deaths.
Q I mean, it's an obvious point that the interpretation is
-- the legal interpretation is -- that that resolution does not include
the deaths of the 18 Americans.
MR. McCURRY: That resolution doesn't. But our view is that
the process of making those responsible for those deaths accountable
will help you understand more about the incidents that have occurred
since June 5 -- the fighting in and around south Mogadishu -- and in
fact that may be, as you know from our discussion of Ambassador Oakley's
previous trip there, another reason why an independent commission of
inquiry that could establish certain facts might be very useful in that
regard.
Q In your view, has Ambassador Oakley's extensive
consultations this time in Somalia brought closer the day when the
Clinton Administration will be able to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia
or brought closer the day when Somalia's political situation will be
such that the U.N. operation can withdraw?
MR. McCURRY: I look at it a different way, Ralph. I'd say
that his efforts there have clearly quickened the pace of the political
efforts that might help in the restoration of a civil order within
Mogadishu that would allow Somalis to take responsibilities for their
own affairs.
The Addis Ababa agreements from March that had been more or
less placed on the shelf seem to be back in play now as a framework for
discussion by the regional leaders. There seem to be other discussions
under way with leaders within the region that provide some prospects for
a diplomatic and political track that would bring some continuity to the
effort to establish a political order in Somalia. That, obviously, is
related to the President's desire to keep a U.S. presence in Somalia
until March 1994 while these efforts continue.
Q Mike, does the United States have a plan for a phased
withdrawal of troops from Mogadishu or from Somalia in the period
leading up to March 31, or do we just -- on March 31, they all come
home? And I'm asking you from a political point of view rather than a
tactical one.
MR. McCURRY: So you won't let me refer you to the Pentagon?
Q I won't let you use the DoD dodge.
MR. McCURRY: Okay. No. I would say it's hard to separate
those questions in some ways because the forces that are currently
deployed in Somalia are there with different capabilities, different
missions; and it is entirely possible that some may be drawn down, some
may be rotated. But those are questions, from a political point of
view, that are consistent with the President's overall policy that we
need to keep a presence there that can continue the mission that he
outlined and that can assist in the efforts that are underway to build a
political dialogue that can return some measure of civil order to
Somalia.
Q But generally speaking then, it's the U.S. plan to keep a
force of about between 4,000-5,000 there until March 31?
MR. McCURRY: I would not want to say that, and I really would
have to refer you to the Pentagon on that. There are elements currently
there associated with our deployment that have capabilities that are
designed for a situation that is much more tense, that is much more
related to combat; and whether or not it would be possible to withdraw
some of those types of units in the period between now and March is
something that I would refer to the Pentagon -- because I really do
think they'd be in a better position.
I can say as a matter of policy, I'm not aware of anything
within current policy that would prohibit that type of drawdown.
Q Michael, does the Administration consider disarming the
factions in Somalia as a condition for the return of law and order in
this country?
MR. McCURRY: I think we do. I think since the attack on June
5, the question of the armament of the clans and the effort to disarm
them has been something that's been troubling to us. In fact, it's been
disappointing. We are working with the United Nations and with Somali
parties now on the type of political settlement that I mentioned earlier
that's based on the Addis Ababa accords signed in March, and a central
element of exactly those accords was the agreement by all the factions
who participated, including Habr Gedr, to disarm.
There is structured in there the development of these so-
called "regional councils" that are made up of various Somali leaders,
including various clan leaders, and it is our hope that those regional
councils will voluntarily cooperate with the United Nations to establish
local programs for disarmament.
At the moment, as many of you know, the instances of
politically-motivated violence outside of Mogadishu have been fairly
rare; but that doesn't obviate the need to try to address the
disarmament issue as they move toward a political effort to establish
some type of civil government.
Q You mentioned voluntary cooperation from the different
factions in Somalia. Are you satisfied by the level of cooperation from
the factions here?
MR. McCURRY: There has been some cooperation, but I think
overall, as I say, the progress on disarmament has been disappointing.
We recognize that, and I think that's one of the things that Ambassador
Oakley is addressing in his discussions in Mogadishu even today.
Q So, Mike, the Administration -- at least the troops the
Administration has there -- are unwilling to carry out the disarmament,
so we're now looking towards unarmed regional councils to carry out the
work of the United Nations -- the work that the United Nations has
called for?
MR. McCURRY: Not entirely. I think that there remains a
deployment under UNOSOM there that can assist with disarmament; but,
again, the political track that was agreed to in March is one that calls
for the voluntary disarmament of clans. Our view is that if we continue
to press that process and continue to engage the various clan elders in
a discussion about the need to disarm, that that could prove fruitful.
And that's clearly one of the things that Ambassador Oakley has on his
agenda.
Q But, Mike, what incentive is there for the clans to
disarm given the current situation?
MR. McCURRY: What incentives are there? Well, among other
things, the ability to gain international support, relief support,
economic assistance depends -- ultimately -- on the conditions of
security within Somalia, and Mogadishu in particular. They know they
will not be able to rebuild a nation, to structure an economy that can
reward the people of Somalia absent conditions of security.
Q Are you saying that aid is going to be cut off if the
clans don't disarm?
MR. McCURRY: No. I'm not suggesting that we would interrupt
humanitarian relief necessary to keep people alive. But I am suggesting
that the willingness of the international community, as it does in so
many developing countries, to enter into the picture, to assist people,
to rebuild an economy depends very much on what type of security the
international community senses in the nation that they're talking about.
Our suggestion is that we've made that very clear to the clan elders,
and they know that in many ways too.
Q What indications have you had so far that they're willing
to disarm voluntarily?
MR. McCURRY: Most importantly, their agreement in March that
they would do so. But I think we've pressed that since then with a
number of the clan leaders -- there are, as you know, 15 different clans
-- and there's a different degree of receptivity all throughout Somalia
in participating in that type of a disarmament effort. But it is one
that we will continue to press, quite clearly.
Q I'm confused, Mike, because at the peak of U.S.
deployment there in March or April of about 30,000 troops, when in fact
there might have been the ability to disarm, I thought the explicit
decision was made, "That is not our mission. We are not going to disarm
people in Mogadishu." Can you clarify that?
MR. McCURRY: I don't know necessarily that that's true. I
think at one point they were fairly extensively involved in disarmament
issues. This would be early in the period, earlier this year --
probably in the early spring.
Q I thought that there was some heavy -- the issue of heavy
weapons -- but in terms of disarming, I remember repeated statements at
the time that disarming is not what we were going to do. And now you're
saying it is. I'm very confused.
MR. McCURRY: I will look into that and clarify that. It was
prior to my arrival here, but I recall at the time that there were
discussions about how to remove technicals from the streets of Mogadishu
and steps that could be taken as part of the UNOSOM mission in regard to
that.
But there was, admittedly, ongoing through that period a focus
on the political track and on the diplomatic track.
Q Is the U.N., or the different countries participating in
UNOSOM, ready to pledge some money to buy back weapons in Somalia?
MR. McCURRY: I have not heard anything to that effect. I can
check into that. I haven't heard that.
Q Mike, doesn't there seem to be a little bit of a pattern
here, in both Somalia and Haiti, where the United States is calling upon
the leaders in these countries to voluntarily adhere to agreements that
they have signed and already shown no willingness to follow. Isn't that
both the case here in talking about disarmament, and also in Haiti in
talking about adhering to the Governors Island accords?
MR. McCURRY: I think these are much different situations with
different patterns of fact, different histories, different chronologies.
I wouldn't rush to make that comparison.
Barrie.
Q But, if I may, Mike, yesterday Secretary Christopher used
-- in describing both Somalia and Haiti -- I believe he used the phrase
"failed countries." I'm wondering if this is an effort to shift the
blame for policies which, if not failed, have not been greatly
successful, onto the countries themselves; and does this signal a kind
of a washing of the hands of both these issues?
MR. McCURRY: No. I think that's a term that you've seen
others use -- including Ambassador Albright -- in the past and just
describes the conditions of nation-states that are in the era that we
now live in on the verge of or in the condition of collapse, where there
is no existing civil structure that can help people self-govern.
He just was referring to that as a shorthand way to describe
two particular situations, and he didn't offer a lengthy analysis as you
heard him yesterday.
Q But he did call for a national dialogue, and he did say
the Administration would like the help of Congress and the media and
all, and he did express it in terms of the U.S. is feeling its way in
these areas as contrasted to more successful, active approaches with
Russia and others.
MR. McCURRY: I was there, and I know a lot of you heard the
speech, too. He was clearly referring to how in this era -- the post-
Cold War era that we are now into -- how do you define the limits and
the willingness of the United States to project force abroad in
addressing situations that we've dealt with currently and ones that we
will most likely deal with in the future -- including situations in
which we're not presently engaged but are no less compelling than the
suffering that you see in places like Bosnia, like Haiti, like Somalia,
the ones that have been the focus here.
Q Some of us see this as also saying there are limits to
American diplomacy, and what it seems you're doing in these two
countries is telling the locals to work out their own problems.
MR. McCURRY: If you look at the history of what we have done
in Somalia and you can see what we are doing there currently, if you
look at what's going on in Haiti and our efforts diplomatically there
currently, I fail to see how you can say we're just sort of leaving it
up to these states to handle their own affairs. It's just not true.
Q The Pakistani commander, by the way, who's going out,
says that if the United States leaves, then the whole effort is just
going to go into the --
MR. McCURRY: That's probably an analysis that's not
incorrect. But it doesn't suggest anything about the status of our
mission in either country nor our willingness to participate in this
type of effort around the world. What the Secretary suggested and what
you know manifestly -- you can watch the debate in Congress every day --
is that there has to be a discussion and participation by those who make
policy in defining the scope and the limits of American policy in this
era that we're now in.
We can't do everything every place all at once -- that is
something that is clear -- nor are we.
Q Didn't I hear an official say that a few months ago, and
wasn't he criticized for that?
MR. McCURRY: No. He was suggesting our willingness to do so
would be conditioned or limited by our financial resources. There's a
much different argument. If you say that the projection of force, the
determination to become involved, the determination to play a role is
something that reflects our national interests, that's not conditioned
upon the availability of our treasure to do so. That's a very different
argument.
Q Mike, I don't know how long --
MR. McCURRY: I don't know that we want to replay that
argument.
Q The Secretary said yesterday there are limits to the
resources. That's very much what Peter Tarnoff said: That the resources
cannot be stretched and spent every place. He said we have to ask
ourselves if resources should be expended on failed states.
MR. McCURRY: No. I don't want to go back and replay that
argument. The argument and the problem that the Secretary had with the
remarks that the senior official mentioned made was that there was a
suggestion that the willingness to become involved and to play a role
would be conditioned first by a question of budget and a question of
resources, and that's not the way the Secretary sees things -- and he
made that pretty clear at the time.
Q Can we go to another area?
Q Let me just -- one more. I just want to call you on your
comment a minute ago about the Pakistani commander's analysis of things.
So it's now -- the Administration also shares the view that Somalia will
probably fall apart when the United States withdraws, and we're doing it
anyway?
MR. McCURRY: No. I did not mean to concur. I heard the
question differently. The question, as I understood it, was that the
U.N. deployment, the U.N. mission in Somalia, would fall apart if the
United States exited summarily from the picture.
Q He was talking about the exit date in March. He said it
would end force multipliers and the whole operation would basically
collapse.
MR. McCURRY: We disagree with that analysis, because that's
exactly why we have established the timetable between now and March and
the efforts that we're pursuing diplomatically to try to provide
conditions and habits of cooperation that would allow the U.N. mission
to withdraw and allow the Somali people to take responsibility for their
own affairs.
I was misunderstanding -- I was saying if tomorrow the United
States pulled out from Somalia, there is probably no question that
things would deteriorate and that the viability of the U.N. mission
itself certainly would be very much in question.
Q His conclusion simply was that that's going to be equally
as true on the 31st of March as it is today.
MR. McCURRY: Well, that's --
Q The helicopters will be gone, the command and control
structure will be gone, the force multipliers --
MR. McCURRY: The work of our diplomacy in the interim is to
make sure that we do everything possible to avert that outcome.
Q Mike, he also -- it was an interesting interview -- he
also said that on several occasions the forces were on the brink of
breaking Aideed's back -- such as the rocket attack on the radio
station, and so forth -- but at the last minute they pulled back and
stopped for some reason. He said if primarily the United States had
gone ahead and had the stomach to go for it, things would be very
different now. How would you respond to that?
MR. McCURRY: I can't comment on that. I'm not familiar
enough with what he said. But I think you've seen enough replays,
enough sort of recreations of things that happened recently in Somalia,
to know that any one of these missions -- the search-and-seizure
missions that were part of UNOSOM's work during the recent past -- might
have turned out differently if there had been a different combination of
events, a stroke of luck here and there.
That's true, and you know that from those U.S. military
officers and U.S. military policymakers who have commented on the
military action that occurred in Mogadishu.
Q New subject?
Q Another subject?
MR. McCURRY: Since the State Department has seen fit to hold
briefings only two days out of five this week, I wonder if we could get
your reaction to the statements by Mr. Blix the other night on North
Korea and their compliance with their agreement?
MR. McCURRY: We did make a reaction available; and you're
aware of the comments that were made by Rick Inderfurth up at the U.N.,
I'm sure, in which he commented at some length on that. I think that we
shared Director Blix's concern about the continuity of safeguards in
North Korea. We are continuing to pursue our discussions internally
within the United States Government that are aimed at bringing about a
dialogue in which there could be sufficient progress made on the issues
that are of most concern to us as we look at our relationship and the
relationship of the world community with North Korea.
They are: (1) the resumption of the North-South dialogue; (2)
the efforts that the North Koreans can take to be in full compliance
with the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. And then, obviously, the
continued accession to the NPT treaty. Those remain of great concern to
us. We share much of the assessment provided by the Director, and we
will certainly continue to conduct our diplomacy based on his analysis.
He did not declare a break in the continuity of safeguards,
which was important; but neither did he minimize the concern that the
world community shares about the status of the North Korean nuclear
program.
Q Was one of those inducements to North Korea to become in
compliance -- does one of them include cooperating with North Korea on
peaceful uses of nuclear energy?
MR. McCURRY: It's an inducement as part of a full resolution
of the nuclear issue with North Korea. This dates back to the
suggestion that was made by both North Korea and the United States on
July 19 when they signed the joint statement at the time of the second
round of meetings -- when the United States indicated, at that point,
that we were prepared to support the introduction of light-water
reactors in North Korea and explore ways in which North Korea might
obtain light-water reactors as part of a final resolution of the nuclear
issue.
Now, why is that important to us? It presumably has many
reasons that it would be of interest to North Korea; but it's important
to us because it happens to square with many of our non-proliferation
goals. It would be much more advantageous for North Korea in its
domestic nuclear program to be engaged with light-water reactors as
opposed to graphite-moderated reactors, which present much greater
proliferation concerns to the United States.
Q Why at a time when we are going around urging Russia,
India, not to sell nuclear technology to North Korea are we willing to
give them light-water reactors?
MR. McCURRY: Because of our proliferation concerns. The
difference between a graphite-moderated reactor and light-water reactors
-- the benefits to that to us, as we look at our proliferation goals
around the world, are compelling. It involves the type of material that
is produced as a byproduct of the operation of those different types of
reactors.
Q One more on this topic. Is one of the other incentives
the U.S. is discussing or has discussed with North Korea the idea of
North Korean-American full-fledged diplomatic relations?
MR. McCURRY: There have been reports to that effect. I can't
offer you anything on that. We're certainly not at a point in our
discussions with North Korea where that's anywhere near being an issue
of discussion. There's been, as you know, not enough progress
sufficient to warrant a third round of high-level talks which would
focus first and foremost on the issues that you know continue to be
problematic.
Q So in your discussions with North Korea which you have
had up to date, that issue of full diplomatic relations had not been
anywhere near an issue of discussion -- is that correct?
MR. McCURRY: It's not anywhere near the agenda as they think
of the third round of talks and thinking about scheduling the third
round of talks.
Q But, Mike, being an object of discussion and being on the
agenda are two different things. Has it been discussed by the United
States with North Korea?
MR. McCURRY: I can't tell you. I just can't get into the
details of everything that's been discussed at the meetings that have
been held, both the high-level meetings.
Q We're not asking about everything. We're only asking
about one item, namely full diplomatic relations. You don't have to go
into all the detail.
MR. McCURRY: I can't get into the specific detail. But I can
say that the status of the bilateral relationship is something that
could very much be under discussion, but it's not at the moment because
the conditions for having a third round of talks do not obtain.
Q Mike, there's a report in the Washington Report on Middle
East Affairs this month that's quite fascinating because it quotes
Department of State and other officials as indicating that four days
after the Clinton Administration came in, they sent their proliferation
expert from here to talk to Prime Minister Rabin, to tell him that every
time they raised proliferation problems with North Korea or other
countries these other countries pointed to Israel. And Clinton asked
for the Dimona reactor to be shut down.
This is parallel to a GAO report that Byrd asked for. Could
you comment or take a question as to whether there was an attempt to
somehow get Israel to step back from proliferation activities?
MR. McCURRY: I'm not familiar with that report. I will see
if I can find out something about that, if I can.
Q On the Middle East, though, what is the U.S. analysis of
the slump in the Israeli-Palestinian talks?
MR. McCURRY: In the -- I'm sorry?
Q In the Israeli-Palestinian -- the talks on carrying out
the agreement, the September agreement, the Taba talks?
MR. McCURRY: Oh, the Taba.
Q There was a brief -- as Dancy says, you know, it's hard
to get at this just twice a week, so can you pick it up from where we
left off?
MR. McCURRY: Yes. I'm looking to see -- I had some words of
wisdom here. Our assessment was that the withdrawal was related to a
simple fact.
Q That's a follow-up. You call it a "withdrawal," not a
"redeployment?"
MR. McCURRY: They left the discussions a day early from Taba.
Q (Inaudible) withdrawal.
MR. McCURRY: They left the discussions a day early from Taba.
They are dealing with very difficult issues that are on the table. It
is not entirely surprising that they will look and judge where they are
in these discussions and make determinations about how they are going to
discuss. I don't know, you'd have to ask the PLO itself whether they
call it a "withdrawal" or whether they were asked back to Tunis for
consultations. I'm not sure how they are describing it. It's up to
them to describe it.
Q By "withdrawal," I meant, is it the U.S. understanding
that Israel is committed to redeploy its troops, or to withdraw its
troops?
MR. McCURRY: Oh, I'm sorry.
Q That's all right.
MR. McCURRY: I misunderstood the question. I thought you
were talking about the status of the negotiators, whether they --
Q It could mean both. But one of the problems seems to be:
What is it that Israel has committed itself to doing? They say to
redeploy. The PLO, not surprisingly, says to withdraw the troops. I
wonder if the U.S., since it's such an active catalyst, has an opinion?
MR. McCURRY: I don't have anything specific for you on that,
other than to say that they are very extremely complex, difficult
issues. I don't think that any side was under an illusion that
implementing the Declaration of Principles would be a simple or easy
matter. We've been in close contact with both sides. We continue to
urge them to sort out their differences.
We've seen some reports that the talks could, in fact, resume
next week, but I think you should check with the parties on that. I
will say that the Secretary had a telephone conversation with Prime
Minister Rabin -- I believe yesterday -- and has been in close contact
with the people here who have been discussing with the parties the
status of the negotiations.
Q But do we have who initiated it, and do we know when
Rabin is coming? Is it the 12th? Can you confirm that and put that to
rest?
MR. McCURRY: I think the White House did announce yesterday
that Prime Minister Rabin will be here on the 12th, and I think the
Prime Minister placed the call to the Secretary. That's my
understanding. If that's not correct, I'll make sure we post the
correct answer.
Q Was that conversation to discuss the problems Israel and
the PLO are having in implementing their agreement, or was it to discuss
the visit or broader issues of the Middle East peace process?
MR. McCURRY: I think, in general, just an update, a review on
where they are. I wouldn't offer anything more specific than that.
Q Is the U.S. being asked -- you said you're staying in
touch with the parties. But is the U.S. being asked either by the
Israelis or the PLO, or perhaps by both, to become involved somehow in
the implementation discussions that they're having in Taba?
MR. McCURRY: Not that I'm aware of at this point, no.
Q Mike, does the election result in Jerusalem make this
process more difficult?
MR. McCURRY: I don't think it makes it more difficult. There
have been assessments that you've heard from the region today about
whether or not that will have an impact on the talks. Our view of the
situation is that several of Mayor-elect Olmert's own comments, even as
late as last night, would indicate that he is committed to a dialogue
that would lead to reconciliation between Arabs and Jews. That is,
obviously, at the heart of the peace process.
Other than saying that we would certainly wish him well in his
duties as he takes up his post as mayor, and obviously compliment the
long and distinguished services of Teddy Kollek, we really don't have
any other analysis that we would offer about how the election result
plays into the peace process itself.
Q It's all local, isn't it?
MR. McCURRY: All politics is local? I don't know. Given the
elections results, broadly defined yesterday, I don't know that I'd want
to get into that discussion.
Q Mike, on a different topic?
MR. McCURRY: Yes.
Q Can we talk about Haiti?
Q No. I'd like to talk about one thing for a second. Has
the Administration done any investigation or any analysis of a story
that came out of Newsday a couple of days ago that U.N. peacekeepers in
Bosnia were going to whorehouses in which captive Muslims were held, and
raping and so forth?
MR. McCURRY: That, as you know, has been a story that has
deeply troubled the United States. We have raised it both at the United
Nations and will raise it elsewhere. We have been told by UNPROFOR
representatives that the matter is under very active and vigorous
investigation by UNPROFOR authorities in Bosnia, and we think that
that's entirely suitable given the nature of the reports.
Q Haiti?
MR. McCURRY: Yes.
Q A spokesman for Father Aristide said that the CIA
analysis questioning his sanity has resulted in the military stiffening
their resolve not to implement the Governor's Island Accord. Could you
comment on this? Does the CIA report undercut efforts by the
Administration to resolve the issue down there?
MR. McCURRY: I don't have any way of evaluating the motive of
military leaders in Haiti, and I don't know that anyone in the United
States Government does and I don't know if we can -- it would be sheer
speculation to suggest that something that they have read or heard in a
news account might somehow or other affect their actions. I suspect,
using logic, that there's a lot more that comes into play as they make
their own calculations and what they read based on evaluations from U.S.
intelligence sources. But you would have to go ask them. I just don't
know.
Q Would you like to speculate on the CIA's motives in
putting out that report?
MR. McCURRY: As you can well imagine, no, I would not.
Q Would you like to say the State Department thinks
Aristide is capable of governing? Because your folks have been calling
for him to spread control -- but then made the harmony guidance, but
that could be because you don't think you can bring him back.
MR. McCURRY: I think you're missing a very key point here.
Those types of judgments are not made here in the United States.
They're made by people who vote in democratic nations. The voters in
Haiti -- two-thirds of them -- elected President Aristide. That's how
we make determinations of who gets to govern countries.
Q I'm not questioning that. I'm just questioning how many
governments --
MR. McCURRY: We evaluate foreign leaders differently at all
times. That's the stuff that we keep confidential.
Q By the same token, you should, of course, have supported
Gamsakhurdia in Georgia, then. He was freely elected by a majority.
MR. McCURRY: Shevardnadze was elected under a constitutional
process by his Parliament that we consider to be authoritative.
Q Mike, just by way on Haiti, can you just sort of maybe
tick off for us how you're doing on the enlistment of support among
other nations for the specific -- for the targeted sanctions?
MR. McCURRY: There are important discussions underway on
that. We have had some positive reactions from some governments. I'm
not going to detail the governments that have responded positively.
There are some that have indicated that they will look into the
possibility of joining in our type of sanctions, and that we will hear
more from them. There are discussions that we continue to have both
here in Washington and in New York at the United Nations on that that
would be designed to, in effect, internationalize the types of
unilateral sanctions that we have brought to bear on those that we think
that can be influential in bringing the Governor's Island process back
on line.
Q So the snapshot at this point, then, is that while some
are responding positively and they're going to look into it and get back
to you, at this point it's the U.S. doing those targeted sanctions on
its own; is that right?
MR. McCURRY: That wouldn't be accurate, but there's not more
than that that I can offer at this point.
Q What's the status of the discussions of a broader or even
full, total embargo as proposed by Aristide?
MR. McCURRY: No change from what we've said recently.
Q And what about the U.S. sanctions -- is it still 41, or
is that list being expanded any?
MR. McCURRY: I'm sorry, say again?
Q Assets frozen.
MR. McCURRY: Oh, the number of individuals --
Q Yes.
MR. McCURRY: The last number I've seen was 40, but there may
be a more accurate or detailed number than that. I don't know whether
or not Treasury has been helpful in providing any assistance on those
questions, but they're the ones that would administer that program.
Q I'm sort of getting at the policy, give or take one name
or two or adding or subtracting. I just wondered if the Administration
has concluded to cut deeper and to go deeper into to --
MR. McCURRY: I'm not aware that they've moved beyond the 40
that they've identified, but I know that they are looking at that regime
and looking at ways that they can make it more effective.
Q Treasury had 80 when they had the freeze on before.
There were 80 individuals and entities that were blocked and now there
are 40. They cannot explain why the criteria seemed to have changed.
Do you know?
MR. McCURRY: I can't, either. But I'll see if I can find out
more from a policy perspective, how we're designing and drawing the
scope of the assets freeze.
Q What are the 600 people doing on that ship? There was a
question about what their role was.
MR. McCURRY: What their role is? I think they were related
to the overall deployment. My understanding is that they were there for
logistical reasons more than strategic reasons.
Q What were the logistical reasons -- off-shore?
MR. McCURRY: They were being quartered on ships off shore
because of a shortage of space at Guantanamo. Now, I will double-check
that with the Pentagon, but that's what I was told.
Q May I follow up on the Bosnian statement? I couldn't get
my follow-up in. Does the U.S. have any evidence that any of these U.N.
troops were involved? If it's found that they are, what does the U.S.
think should be done?
MR. McCURRY: We're not independently investigating that
question.
Q Do you have a suggestion what should be done, though, if
found guilty?
MR. McCURRY: Not at the moment. We will await the
investigation that UNPROFOR is conducting.
Q Mike, back to the expanded Haiti sanctions. You say that
we are conducting, or engaged in discussions with various people on
that. One would think that the first country you'd go to would be
Switzerland, but the Swiss say today that they have not heard from the
Americans in any fashion. Both the Foreign Ministry and their version
of the Treasury Department have not heard from you all on this topic.
I know you don't want to get down to specific countries, but
is that a correct characterization?
MR. McCURRY: I don't want to take specific issue with a
foreign government, but I'll you what we did last week. We sent a cable
worldwide to instruct our embassies to explain the sanctions that we had
invoked to foreign governments, to urge those governments to join the
United States in applying sanctions against individuals who have blocked
the implementation of the Governor's Island Accord.
Again, as I say, I can't speak for other countries as to the
actions they might take. But in response to our efforts, a number of
countries are exploring the kinds of sanctions that they might be able
to impose under their legal systems. We are going to continue to urge
them to act in that fashion. We will probably continue to follow up
specifically with some countries that we think could be influential. I
don't want to single out any government. But a worldwide cable,
instructing an ambassador to make a representation to a government, is
something that I would assume that the Swiss Government would be aware
of.
Q Can you make an exception of Switzerland, which is named
-- either the New York Times is wrong or the Swiss Government is not
telling the truth. Can you --
MR. McCURRY: I can find out from our post if there was some
reason why a cable instructing the Embassy to present our views to the
Government of Switzerland was not delivered. If there is any reason why
that message had not been delivered, we can try to get that to you.
Q In the last couple of days, there were two mass
demonstrations in Budapest against some steps taken in the Hungarian
television and radio which were seen as an attempt on the curb of
freedom of speech and press. Have you got any comment on that?
MR. McCURRY: I don't have a comment on those specific
demonstrations. We can find out more about them. I will say that as a
general proposition, as we've frequently said here, we think a free
press is a necessary ingredient of a viable and functioning democracy
and can help people independently come to decisions and reflect their
political will through elections and through expression of opinion. Any
interruption of a free press in democratic nations is generally a matter
of great concern to the United States. I'll see if we can have
something specific to say on that situation.
Q How close do you watch these events in Central and
Eastern Europe?
MR. McCURRY: Through reporting from our embassies, closely.
And because of our strong interest in the emergence of democracy in the
Newly Independent States, and in the states especially of Eastern Europe
and Central Europe, it's something that we do watch very carefully
because that process of democratization is something of very real
interest to the United States.
Carol.
Q Back to Haiti. Can you just bring us up to date on the
diplomatic efforts that are going on down there? And what happens if
the military don't come to the talks?
MR. McCURRY: Our understanding was -- I've heard sort of
somewhat conflicting things. Special Envoy Caputo, from the United
Nations, will either hold talks -- I've heard in one case -- today. But
I also heard there perhaps will be a meeting tomorrow in Port-au-Prince
to explore ways to get the Governor's Island agreement back on track.
We continue to believe that provides the best framework to
reach a solution to Haiti's crises. We obviously strongly support his
efforts. Ambassador Pezzullo went to Haiti today to conduct
consultations and to support Mr. Caputo's efforts. We will certainly
see whether or not the meeting that they are trying to arrange with the
participants in the Governors Island process actually occurs.
Q But if the military doesn't show up tomorrow or Friday --
whichever day -- are you then prepared to take some further step to
increase sanctions?
MR. McCURRY: We've indicated all along we've not ruled out
any stronger or stricter sanctions or toughening the sanctions currently
in place. We also feel that the sanctions that are in place will begin
to have increasing effect and build pressure on those who are being
obstinate with respect to the Governor's Island Accords.
If there's a reluctance on the part of the military to
participate in the talks that the Special Envoy has requested, they will
continue to feel the increasing pressure to bear -- the economic
sanctions. They know that the international community and the United
States, specifically, has not ruled out additional measures.
Q So I just understand the timeline, though: If the
military doesn't show up this week, you're prepared to go into next week
and maybe even the week after, allowing the existing sanctions to
continue to work --
MR. McCURRY: I didn't say anything about timelines. I don't
have anything that I can offer to you on what the timing of the sequence
would be of looking at additional measures.
Q Still on the sanctions. If I go back and read the
transcript of what you've been saying over the last few minutes, I will
certainly not know whether there are any other nations who have joined
the United States in the targeted sanctions. You said at one point that
--
MR. McCURRY: It would be inaccurate to say that nobody has
joined us or are in the process of joining us.
Q Would it be accurate to say that nobody has joined the
United States yet?
MR. McCURRY: It may not be. There are other countries that
expressed a willingness to cooperate in at least considering the types
of sanctions that we have employed, but it really would be up to those
individual governments to announce those types of steps themselves.
Obviously, we will see what we can do to try to make
additional information available. We just can't do it at this time.
Steve.
Q Mike, I'm as confused as Ralph. Has anybody actually
done it? Has anybody -- you're saying that it's inaccurate that nobody
has considered it.
MR. McCURRY: I'm aware of at least one case in which the
government has decided to do something. I don't have specifics on what
they've done, but it will be some things that would be additional to the
OAS/UN-ordered sanctions. Others have it under active consideration and
still others that have said that they'll get back to us without
indicating whether it's something they would pursue or not.
Q And you can't identify that one country?
MR. McCURRY: I cannot, no.
Q Iceland -- can I ask a question?
MR. McCURRY: On Iceland, yes.
Q One more on Haiti, please.
MR. McCURRY: Let's stay on Haiti and then we'll come back to
Iceland. Go ahead.
Q Ambassador Pezzullo --
Q Pull up the Iceland file in the meantime.
MR. McCURRY: I will. I will.
Q Will Ambassador Pezzullo be meeting with Cedras and/or
Francois? Is he specifically trying to persuade them to attend Caputo's
meetings?
MR. McCURRY: I don't know whether he will have contact with
them or not, nor do I know the type and degree of contact we've had with
General Cedras. We have had contact with him, but I'm not sure of who,
at what level, or whether it has been Ambassador Swing, whether
Ambassador Pezzullo will be in contact with him directly or not, or
whether we route our discussions with him through the Special Envoy --
through Dante Caputo. I think our views are certainly made well known
to General Cedras. That, I can confirm.
Q This question falls into, is it bigger than a breadbox
category? Is one of the countries the "four friends"?
MR. McCURRY: I don't know. I tried to sort a lot of that
out, and it was made clear to me that we were not going to reveal the
identity of specific countries. So I couldn't help you in any event. I
made it pretty clear that it would be helpful if we could indicate who
is being cooperative.
Q Was it Iceland?
MR. McCURRY: It was not Iceland, but there is an important
matter.
Q The talks between Iceland and the U.S. Government are
slated to end today regarding U.S. military bases in Iceland. Nothing
is coming out of the talks, but all kinds of rumors are flying, like are
they going to close everything down or are they going to continue just
as if nothing had changed -- the Cold War, etc.? Would you by later
today or tomorrow be able to provide some comments, information,
rationale for the decisions that are going to be made today?
MR. McCURRY: We certainly will. I'll indicate to you that
I'm not certain that they are reaching any final decisions today. Their
representatives of both the Government of Iceland and the United States
have been having the latest in a series of bilateral consultations on
this issue over the last two days. I think they're continuing today as
well. So that's why I don't have any answer right now.
A discussion has been very much at the center of our bilateral
relationship when the Secretary met with Foreign Minister Hannibalsson
in New York on September 28. They had a very good exchange on this
issue, on the status of our deployment in Keflavik. I would not rush to
say that there is going to be a definitive announcement any time soon
because I think it's an issue that we are still very much closely in
contact with the Government of Iceland about, and will continue to be in
close contact with them about.
Q Mike, did the Administration know about the secret talks
between the Serbs and Croats in Norway, and do we support that sort of,
in this case, a sort of back-channel negotiations that didn't include
the Bosnian Government at all?
MR. McCURRY: We were aware of it. As part of our regular
consultations with the U.N. officials and with the mediators -- Lord
Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg -- we have been aware and supportive of the
efforts to address specifically the Krajina issue. That was the issue
that was under discussion apparently in the Norway talks.
We have not played a direct role in that initiative. We've
been kept informed about it, and we're aware of what they're discussing.
As a general proposition, we are strongly supportive of all efforts that
would resolve problems in Croatia and Bosnia through peaceful means. We
believe that the outstanding disputes in the region, including the
question of the status of the Krajina, can only be resolved at the
bargaining table.
Q Mike, again, the Security Council on the North/South
talks are scheduled tomorrow. Do you have any specific reaction or
specific to say?
MR. McCURRY: Nothing too specific. We had been told that
North Korea cancelled the meeting with South Korea. It was to have been
the fourth since October 4 to discuss the exchange of special envoys and
how that might happen. That, as I was indicating earlier, is a very
important part of what we think the process of dialogue needs to be that
would be relevant to the question of a third round of U.S.-North Korea
talks. That is of concern to us.
Q So are you going to have another informal talks in New
York in the near future?
MR. McCURRY: I'm not aware of any. I will double-check and
see if at that level that we are discussing issues back and forth in New
York, whether there are plans to have an additional meeting. I'm not
aware of any currently; but if there are, we'll post that and try to let
you know.
Warren.
Q Do you have any reaction or analysis to the new military
doctrine that Yeltsin has nearly signed off on?
MR. McCURRY: On the new military doctrine, it's something
that we -- it has just been promulgated. We have not had an opportunity
to learn enough about it to provide any thorough reaction.
We would note that news accounts and discussions by Russian
officials indicate that it represents a military posture of defensive
deployment. That is something that is interesting, but it's not
something that we know enough about at the moment to comment in any
greater detail on.
Q Was it not discussed by Secretary Christopher with his
counterparts in Moscow last week?
MR. McCURRY: It was discussed. It was mentioned, I guess is
the best way to describe it, in some of the meetings he had as something
that was under review that I would describe it. If we were discussing
it within our government, you'd describe it as an interagency review.
It's clearly something that was in the process of being formulated. It
was alluded to by Foreign Minister Kozyrev and there are references to
it, but it was not discussed in any great detail nor did the Secretary
have any briefing on the emergence of the policy.
Q But was the major element of first-use of nuclear power
discussed or mentioned during those discussions?
MR. McCURRY: Not that I'm aware of. The question of how --
the posture of the strategic forces of Russia and questions about their
nuclear arsenal were something that I think were only briefly touched
upon because there was not specificity that I'm aware of that was
offered about the emerging doctrine.
Q It's still the case, isn't it, that the United States
policy is not to pledge no first-use, that the U.S. leaves open the
option or the opportunity to use its nuclear weapons at any time, is
that correct?
MR. McCURRY: Under our current doctrine. But, as you know,
Secretary Aspin has ordered a review of our strategic nuclear doctrine
as well. Those of you who are familiar with doctrinal debates on no
first-use will know that's been a contentious subject within the arms
control community over many, many years. It's likely that these issues
will again be addressed in the context of the review that Secretary
Aspin has asked for.
Q Is it possible -- it just popped into my head -- is it
possible, then, that at the moment the former Soviet Union decides to
adopt the U.S. policy and abandon its no first-use, that the United
States might move in the opposite direction? Is that under
consideration?
MR. McCURRY: If they were to move in a --
Q They're connected. Is it unrelated to one another? Is
it possible that we'd flip-flop?
MR. McCURRY: I would have to ask an expert in the building
that knows more than me. I seem to recall that the Soviet Union had
always had a doctrine of no first-use. They used to raise that on a
very regular basis.
Q And now they're going the other direction, if this
doctrine is announced. You're suggesting the United States -- the
Clinton Administration may be reviewing that with an eye toward going
toward no first-use?
MR. McCURRY: I didn't say that. That would be way too
speculative and well beyond my level of expertise.
Q A question on another subject? Do you have anything to
say about the continuing hold-up of a number of U.S. -- Clinton
Administration appointments on the Hill by members of Congress and by
debate on the Hill?
MR. McCURRY: No, I don't have anything to say. I'm aware of
the discussion that was held in the United States Senate today and the
vote on closure on the pending nominations. It's clearly something of
concern to us because we'd like to move those important personnel issues
forward as quickly as we can and get those designated ambassadors to
post.
We understand the concerns that have been raised by the
members of the Senate who were leading the filibuster. We have actually
addressed a very specific letter, I believe, to the Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee to let him know the status of the issue that
is currently blocking the consideration of those ambassadorial nominees
and to explain what we have done to refer the matter of concern to those
Senators to the Inspector General and the reasons why -- because it is
under review by the Inspector General -- we're not in a position to
provide any great comment on it at this point.
I am at a point, the Secretary is at a point, and those are
putting forth the nomination at a point where there's not anything we
can do to satisfy the concerns of those who are raising the issue in the
Senate because it's a matter that is under an internal investigation.
Q Usually, he can give you some guidance as to whether he's
going to have something by New Year's, Christmas, Easter or never or
whatever.
MR. McCURRY: You could. You're free to call him and you can
for many --
Q He's more likely to take Mr. Christopher's call than
mine.
MR. McCURRY: No, no, no. For many obvious reasons, we have
not been inclined to call and inquire on the status of this lest anyone
suggests that was an effort to somehow or other bring pressure to bear
on the investigation. It's obviously a matter of great sensitivity and
it's something that I think, as the record will show, this Secretary and
this Department has handled impeccably. From the day the first report
appeared, within 24 hours it was an issue that had been reviewed by the
Legal Advisor and had been referred to the Inspector General. That's
entirely appropriate. And the last thing we're going to do now is to
violate the appropriateness of that procedure by commenting on something
that's not been complete.
Q But just for the record, you were asked whether you
called his office to ask how the review is going. Setting that aside
for a second, have you been informed by his office of how the review is
going, or how long it might take?
MR. McCURRY: I have not been.
Q Has the Secretary of State been informed?
MR. McCURRY: I'm not sure if the Secretary has been. It is
my understanding from people who have been informed that the matter is
nearing completion. I think that really is up to the Inspector General
to comment further on it.
Q Thank you.
(Press briefing concluded at 1:45 p.m.)
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