US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING Monday, October 4, 1993 BRIEFER: Michael McCurry Subject Page RUSSIA Briefing by Ambassador Strobe Talbott re: Parliamentary Crisis in Russia ................1-9 Request for Medical Supplies/Assistance ........21 SOMALIA Search and Seizure Operation Yesterday .........10,12 -- US Casualties/Possible Missing Servicemen ..10,13 US Policy re: Humanitarian Relief .............10-11,12,20-21 US Policy re: Arrest of Aideed Aide ...........10,20 US Diplomatic Efforts ..........................11,13 NORTH KOREA IAEA Resolution of Concern re: Safeguards Agreements ...................................14 US Diplomatic Contacts .........................14,15,16 Meeting at University of California/Possible US Representation ................................14 SYRIA Foreign Minister's Meeting with Secretary Tomorrow .....................................16 VIETNAM Secretary's Meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister Phan Van Khai re: POWs/MIAs .........16-17,21-22 -- Request for Press Coverage .................18-19 US Investigations of POWs/MIAs/Progress ........17,18 INDIA US Aid to Earthquake Victims ...................19-20 DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING DPC #134 MONDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1993, 12:33 P. M. (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED) MR. McCURRY: Good afternoon everybody. I know your primary area of interest today is Russia. Because of that, I've got with me Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the Secretary for the New Independent States, Strobe Talbott. Ambassador Talbott has been very much at the center of things over the last 24 hours, and I thought it would be useful to all of you if he could start the briefing today and take the questions that you might have on Russia. At the conclusion of his time -- he's on a little bit of a short leash this afternoon, but as soon as he's done we can go back to any other areas that you might want to cover. So I'll turn it over to Strobe to begin. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: Good afternoon. I thought probably the best place to begin was just to say that Secretary Christopher has within the past hour talked on the telephone with Ambassador Pickering in Moscow. Secretary Christopher wanted, among other things, to thank Ambassador Pickering and his staff for the extraordinary job they've done under very arduous circumstances in the last couple of days and also, of course, to get the latest update on the situation there. We have, of course, stayed very closely in touch with our embassy and with the Russian Government throughout this period of crisis. We can confirm -- that is, our Embassy in Moscow has been able to confirm, on the basis of its own contacts with the Russian Government, that the Government forces are now back in control of the Russian White House, the Parliament Building. We've also been told independently that Messrs. Rutskoi and Khasbulatov are in custody. The United States is obviously very relieved that this situation has come to an end. At the same time, while the immediate crisis appears to have been resolved in favor of the government forces, there is still a lot of raggedness around the edges of this situation. There is still sporadic gunfire around the city, particularly in the area immediately around the Parliament Building which, of course, is also the neighborhood where the United States Embassy is located. That will continue to be a source of some concern as long as it continues; but we have confidence that the Russian Government authorities will continue to consolidate their restoration of civil order while at the same time recognizing that a certain amount of mopping up is probably going to have to go on for some time. As President Clinton indicated in his own public statement yesterday, throughout this episode, tragic as it was, the United States firmly supported President Yeltsin, his reform government and reformers throughout Russia. There has never been any question that the opposition forces provoked and led yesterday's riots and violence. We also were struck throughout the day yesterday, into the night and into this morning, by the attempt on the part of the Russian Government authorities to contain this situation as quickly and as efficiently as possible and to use only that degree of force that was absolutely necessary in order to end the outburst of violence that had occurred. It was clear to us, both from what we saw and also from what we heard from Russian Government officials throughout the night, that this operation was strategically planned and tactically executed in order to contain the situation. We obviously deeply regret the loss of life that has occurred and the bloodshed during the past 24 hours. This is a tragic moment in Russian history. We hope and trust that it's a tragic moment that has now come to an end. We hope very much that the violence will end entirely and order will be restored. It is also our understanding that five Americans have been wounded in the course of the trouble. Our Embassy is doing everything possible to ensure the safety of the entire American community in Moscow. It's the strong feeling of President Clinton and Secretary Christopher and the rest of the Administration that the thing now is to focus on what we hope, and we're sure that President Yeltsin also hopes, will next occur, and that is not only a restoration of order but a reaffirmation of the Russian's Government commitment to get on with the process of democratization and to resolve the political differences that clearly exist in that country and in that society in democratic and free elections which, as you know, are scheduled for the 11th of December. We also very much hope that this election process will be a period that will contribute to healing our international reconciliation. It's been our feeling from the very outset of this most recent episode, going back to the 21st of September, that the Russian people must decide their future. That's precisely what President Yeltsin has proposed, and that's why we continue to support him. I'll be glad to try to take you questions. Q Strobe. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: Yes, Barry. Q As you look ahead, is there something or some things the U.S. would suggest that Yeltsin do now to avoid further opposition or, more to the point, to enhance the success of his campaign? Should he play things differently in some way as you look back that might be helpful to him and, of course, obviously, you support him, and so helpful to this Administration as well? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: Barry, we have not at any point been in the position of offering advice to President Yeltsin on how to manage the extraordinarily complex political life of his country. First of all, we don't feel that that would be appropriate; and, second, we don't feel that he needs our advice. I think he has demonstrated leadership and skill throughout. I think in my opening comments I expressed a general hope which, as I also indicated, we believe he shares that this episode, tragic as it was, will pass as quickly as possible into history and that what happens next will be in a spirit not only of democratization but also of national reconciliation. Q Strobe, what is the status as far as the U.S. is concerned of Rutskoi and Khasbulatov? You said they were in custody. In whose custody? Will they be treated -- as far as U.S. information is concerned, how should they be treated as far as the U.S. concerned? And, also, can you fill us in more on the details of the Americans and perhaps others who have been non-involved but in some way injured in this incident? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: We do not know -- I do not know -- exactly where Rutskoi and Khasbulatov are. We got confirmation from our Embassy that they were in custody only moments before I came down here. We would both hope and expect that they will be treated in a way that conforms with international legal norms. As for -- you were asking about the Americans who have been wounded; is that right? Q The Americans, and if you have information about other nationalities who were wounded in this thing? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: It's been apparent to all of us who have been watching this on television that the Russian medical establishment has been working, as it were, overtime in order to deal with this crisis. The Russian Foreign Ministry, in briefing a number of foreign ambassadors -- I think it was in the early hours of this morning -- indicated that Russia would be very grateful for additional medical equipment and assistance to cope with this. Our government is already looking at that request, as I am sure other governments are as well. As I think all of you know, an American Marine guard at the Embassy did take a bullet; but we're very relieved to hear that thanks to prompt and expert care, he is out of danger and is in a stable condition, I believe still in a Moscow hospital. Is that right? (TO STAFF) I don't have anything on the others who were wounded. As for the American community more generally, Ambassador Pickering and his colleagues did suggest that Americans in Moscow stay in their homes or, if they had to go out, stay away from large crowds yesterday; and we did ask that Americans reconsider travel to Russia during this, we hope, quite limited period of some turmoil. Q Strobe, if it's not advice that we should be giving Yeltsin, what is it that we should be doing in Russia now to help alleviate the situation? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: What the United States Government believes it should be doing and is doing is proceeding apace with the multi-faceted program of partnership and cooperation with Russian reform that has been building up steam over the past several months. For example, one of the results of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation that was held here in Washington several weeks ago was the creation of several sub-commissions on very specific issues. Two of those sub-commissions have been in Moscow during this period of trouble; but they went about their work and met with their Russian counterparts, accomplished a lot. I'm referring to Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary's delegation. She, I believe, left last evening; and Dan Goldin, the Director of NASA, with whom I have spoken myself a couple of times on the phone today, is in Moscow conducting very good negotiations with Dr. Koptev, the head of the Russian Space Program. Our overall guiding principle continues to be, as it was on September 21, business as usual, plus. Q If I may follow up. These things do not get to some of the suffering of the people, like the lack of medical supplies even if this didn't happen. I'm wondering, where are the people-to-people programs that were announced by the President in -- AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: The program that President Clinton and President Yeltsin announced at the beginning April of support for Russian reform contained a very significant component of humanitarian assistance, and that included emergency food and medical supplies. We are now at the point of having obligated about 95 percent of the $1.6 billion program that was announced in Vancouver. We will obviously be very receptive to suggestions from the Russian side on ways we might either accelerate or target in some way that emergency medical assistance to help them deal with this situation. Q At what point -- 90 percent of that $1.9 billion -- AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: One point six. Q One point six billion is -- AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: Ninety-five percent has been obligated. Q Not sent? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: Some of it has been sent; but the way this works, first, you have to decide exactly how you're going to spend it which means, among other things, making sure that you have partners on the Russian side that you are confident will spend the money in the right way. We are going to proceed also this Fall with a very ambitious diplomatic calendar that's going to involve a good deal of high-level travel between the two countries. That will almost certainly include a visit to Russia and perhaps a couple of the other New Independent States of the former Soviet Union on the part of Secretary Christopher later this month. Q Strobe, can you give us your view of things happening outside of Moscow during the 48 hours that this has been unravelling? You have seen, I gather, very little of the kinds of things that the forces in the White House had been looking for, hoping for, that there would be work stoppages, large measures of support. What have you seen throughout the rest of Russia? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: Well, John, I think you've accurately characterized it. We have seen very little, and we have obviously been using our own eyes to look as well as relying on reports from there that would confirm some of the extravagant claims that were made by the Rutskoi-Khasbulatov forces about widespread support around the country. I think that the events today confirm what has been an underlying premise based, we think, on good information and good analysis from the outset of this crisis, and that is that Boris Yeltsin had the key institutions of Russian political life on his side and we also believe that he has a significant majority of the Russian people on his side. But, of course, he is going to be putting that last proposition to the test next year when he stands for election. Q As you look down the road, are you considering at all modifying your pressure and the West pressure, in general, on Yeltsin for quick economic reform? Do you think that Western pressure for accelerated economic reform has in any way helped to undermine him and create this problem? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: I really can't accept the premise, or at least one word in the premise, of your question, which is "pressure." We have never seen ourselves as applying pressure to the Russian Government in the economic area or in any other. We have tried, and I think have succeeded, in giving some meaning to the words "cooperation and partnership" in our dialogue with the Russian Government on the issue of economic reform. We have stressed what we feel is a self-evident fact, -- and that is, for international financial support, whether it comes from the private sector or whether it comes in the form of bilateral assistance or whether it comes from the international financial institutions, that money will not be well spent and it will not serve the cause of improving the lot of the Russian people unless there are fundamental economic reforms in place and underway. Under Secretary of Treasury Sommers and other experts who have visited Moscow in the recent period have come back heartened that the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin government understands that. Q Can you tell us whether you know any of the details of the terms of surrender, how it was negotiated, who negotiated it? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: I'm sorry, Mike, I just don't. Q Was there anything to the Rutskoi statement to some Western reporters that he had sought the protection of Western diplomats? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: We were as puzzled by that as I'm sure many of you were, and we have absolutely no idea what he was talking about. Q Do you think that the well-publicized but rather leisurely pace of the Western aid programs may have contributed to the underlying state of mind and unfulfilled expectations that contributed to this crisis in the first place? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: I don't think the pace has been in the least leisurely. I mentioned earlier that the Vancouver package that Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton announced in April is already 95 percent obligated. Tom Simons, our Assistance Coordinator, or Brian Atwood or one of his colleagues at AID can give you the exact figures here; but my understanding is that that is many times faster than traditional foreign assistance programs have been obligated in the past. With regard to the multilateral effort -- that is, the macro-economic stabilization support being given to the Russian economy by the international financial institutions at the instigation of the G-7 earlier this year, once again there was an unprecedented emphasis on making sure that the conditions -- and there are conditions -- are realistic, that they fit the real world of Russian politics and that money moves fairly quickly. For example, the G-7 established something called the systemic transformation facility, which has already put $1.5 billion into the Russian economy to help them in that cause. So I think we're moving as fast as possible. Tom Simons likes to say that we always have to make sure we have the right balance between quick and smart. Obviously, you don't want to be so quick that you're wasting the money, and I think we've gotten that balance about right and so do our principal partners in the Russian Government. Q Do you anticipate giving the Russians a bigger portion of the foreign assistance pie next year, in FY-95? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: Bigger than what? Q Than this year? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: We're only a few days away from our reform assistance program for this year being passed and made the law of the land. I would not want to say anything that prejudged what requests we will have for Fiscal '95; but I would say this, that it has been a premise, which we have emphasized in our constant consultations with the Congress, that 1993 was an extraordinary year. It was an extraordinary year for Russia and it was an extraordinary year for U.S.-Russian relations. One of the things that made it extraordinary, of course, is that Boris Yeltsin -- the leader, the personification of Russian reform -- was in a very serious struggle with anti-reformist forces. That's one reason that we presumed on the generosity and tolerance and understanding and strategic vision of the American people in Congress to come up with a great deal of money for Russia. Next year we will certainly want to sustain this overall policy and program because, as many of us have said all along, we're in this thing for the very long haul. We know this is a matter of years and, indeed, decades; but I would not by any means predict that we would come back with the same level of request. Also, we want to do as much as we possibly can for the other 11 New Independent States of the former Soviet Union because we consider support for reform in those countries to be very important as well. Thank you for your patience. I'm sorry. Q Strobe, could you tell us something about the level and nature of U.S. contacts with the Yeltsin Government yesterday and the period leading up to it? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: The last few days, basically? Q Yes. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: Yes. I'm sure you'll understand that I'm not going to name a great many names, but I'd be happy to name a few. Our two principal points of contact and communication with the Yeltsin Government have been through the two Ambassadors; that is, Tom Pickering in Moscow and Vladimir Lukin here. At Secretary Christopher's request, I stayed in close touch with Ambassador Lukin, passed several message back and forth through him and his colleagues. Also, at Secretary Christopher's request, I did have a long and very substantive conversation with Foreign Minister Kozyrev before he got on a plane last night to fly back to Moscow. As for Tom Pickering, he and his colleagues in Moscow have remained in extremely close contact with senior officials of the Yeltsin Government, and so we feel that we had everything that we needed as regards both reassurance and also communication. Q Strobe, could you give us an idea as to what the embassy's estimate of the casualties are in the last 24 hours? And if it's as high as the 500, which I understand Volkogonov has suggested, does that create any political problems for this Administration? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: Barrie, I've asked to join me here today John Purnell from the Office of Independent States and Commonwealth Affairs who is the captain of our task force for the Russian crisis, and I'll check with him, and Jim Collins, our DCM from Moscow, is also here; but I don't think we have any numbers of our own. STAFF: (Inaudible) They aren't going to make estimates. They just don't have the basis to do it. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: As far as we're concerned -- and I think as far as Boris Yeltsin is concerned -- one human being killed is too much. In several respects, we felt that it was quite clear and consoling in an otherwise extremely disturbing situation that the Yeltsin Government was doing as much as it could to avoid the shedding of blood. For example, this whole thing got out of control yesterday in large measure because the Ministry of Interior troops and the militiamen, who were responsible for preserving order around the White House, simply were undermanned, underarmed, and had no instructions to shoot. So as it were, the Russian people paid a price, primarily for the recklessness and willingness to shed blood on the part of the people in the Parliament Building. Then, yesterday afternoon -- those of you who watched the television will recall -- when CNN was carrying broadcast from Russian television, as it became apparent what the decision was, namely, to move in and retake the two sites -- the Parliament Building and the television station -- the announcer on Russian television repeated over and over again what was going to happen. We felt that was clearly a warning to get innocents out of the way and also to persuade anybody who was sitting on the fence, as it were, to fall onto the right side of the fence so that it would be only the hard core who would be left when they actually had to move in. Then, today, as it were, the denouement of this whole drama. I was in contact with a fairly high-up official of the Russian Government, in the wee hours of this morning, who told me that basically the Yeltsin Government had two options. They had a quick-and-dirty option, which would have meant basically going in like gangbusters and a great deal more people would have ended up dead, or they could try to do it piecemeal and do it one floor at a time, one room at a time, and try to see how many people they could get to come out peacefully and alive. So that, as far as we are concerned, while we await obviously a final count on the casualties, is exceedingly important. I think I'm about to get yanked. Q What was your reaction to that when he described his two options? What did you then say to him? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: I said "thank you for explaining your two options." Yes, sir. Q Does this Administration share Mr. Yeltsin's opinion that negotiations with his opponents is foregone and no time for them now? AMBASSADOR TALBOTT: I'm not going to try to parse everything that President Yeltsin has said. I think it has been quite clear, if you put alongside what he said publicly yesterday and what he has said to President Clinton, going back to their conversation on the 21st of September, that he is committed to having an open political process and free and fair elections. As he also made clear yesterday, certain individuals have put themselves in a rather different category from being merely political opponents, and they will no doubt be dealt with by the Russian authorities in that new category that they put themselves in yesterday. Thanks very much. MR. McCURRY: Thanks to Ambassador Talbott for that briefing, and now if you've got anything on the rest world, I'm available. Q Can we talk for a moment about Somalia and the deteriorating situation there? First of all, what is your latest on the casualties, and what do you know about sending more troops? MR. McCURRY: I have heard scattered and mixed reports on casualties. I have seen some news accounts about additional troops because of that. I understand that the Pentagon is putting together a much better accounting of the facts, and I'd like to refer to them questions that deal with the incident yesterday, the search-and-seizure operation that went on yesterday. I think they are accumulating more information and better information over there. Q Do you still feel that this is a worthwhile objective on the part of the United States, even though American hostages have now apparently been taken, even though ten more Americans were killed overnight? MR. McCURRY: I don't want to confirm any of your information. I think the Pentagon will be in the best position to provide that. I will say that we remain firmly committed to the fulfillment of UNOSOM II's humanitarian mission. That is a mission that has saved lives. Upon the death of nearly 300,000 people and the prospects of many more being killed, the United States entered the picture in Somalia to help save innocent lives. That is the purpose of that mission, and it's the disruption of security in the area of South Mogadishu that has interfered with that mission. It remains the United States' objective to prevent Somalia from reverting to the chaos and the starvation that prompted our involvement in the very first place. Q But, Mike, the U. N. requirement -- a direct follow-up there -- the U. N. requirement for the arrest and detention of Mohamed Farah Aideed is not -- it's hard, I think, for anybody to characterize that as a humanitarian mission. You are limiting -- you say you are supporting yourself -- the U. S. is supporting the humanitarian mission. Does the U. S. continue to support wholeheartedly the U. N. directive to get Aideed, the kind of mission that leads to the sort of activity that took place last night? MR. McCURRY: Well, I think the United Nations in the Security Council resolution authorized the apprehension of Aideed, but that was not the focus of the work outlined in the resolution. The focus of the work in the resolution was to maintain the type of security in the area of South Mogadishu that would allow the humanitarian effort to proceed. I think that a by-product of that was the authorization the United Nations gave those participating in UNOSOM to apprehend Aideed. Now it has been a source of very great concern to us that this one individual clan leader does remain in a position to disrupt the security of the UNOSOM mission itself and of the humanitarian relief efforts in that part of South Mogadishu in which he is predominant; but again the focus of that mission has to be on maintaining the type of civil order that will allow the restoration of the humanitarian work and the ability of the Somali people to take responsibility for their own affairs by establishing the right types of civil institutions that can carry on the work of self-government. Q Yes, but from what I heard from American officials last week that they were sort of going to down-play, as it were, not forget about but down-play the idea of going after Aideed and concentrate instead on the political solution, even if it meant ignoring or circumventing or isolating Aideed. MR. McCURRY: Well, those are not contradictory pieces of information. I think the continuing focus on a political track -- which is to help the Somali people have those institutions necessary for restoring law and order and to carry out their own functions of self-government -- remains a very critical part of the overall effort of UNOSOM. Why is it critical? Because it relates directly to the ability of the world community to turn back over to the Somali people the responsibility they have for governing their own affairs. Now that track has been a focus of a substantial degree of work on the part of the United States. I think, as you all know, the Secretary of State was actively engaged in working on that issue during his meetings in New York last week at the time of the United Nations General Assembly and in meetings with high officials at the United Nations itself. The focus of the work has to be both simultaneously to secure the situation in South Mogadishu and then also to ensure that the types of institutions are available that will help the Somali people govern themselves. Q Mike, are you not concerned that the United States is going to get bogged down in an affair that goes well beyond the mission outlines that were originally announced? MR. McCURRY: Well, bogging down -- that's a phrase that we tend to use in connection with military operations. I will leave that to the Pentagon. They are in the best position to describe how they are handling their current efforts there. I can tell you that we are not bogged down when it comes to the diplomatic effort to help address the security concerns of those who would like to see a return to normal life in South Mogadishu and in working with the United Nations to pursue that political track. That's a very active area of diplomacy that we hope will be a fruitful area of diplomacy, because it will allow ultimately the Somali people to take over responsibility for their own affairs. Q Two related questions. The first is, was this military mission that was taken in the last 24 hours, was that taken by the U.S. at the U.S.'s behest or at the U.N.'s behest? MR. McCURRY: The U.S. troops participating in that mission were operating in conjunction with UNOSOM, as they have been during their deployment. Q So it was a UNOSOM command structure that directed this. MR. McCURRY: Well, command structure is something I would rather leave to the Pentagon to address. It was under the authority of UNOSOM, which is, of course, under the authority of the United Nations itself. Q Since our QRF is not under -- do not have blue helmets, are not under the command formally but cooperates with them, does the U. S. have to decide before major missions like this whether it will participate? And in this case, do you know, did the U. S. make a decision that it would take part in this? MR. McCURRY: Well, again, that's a question, I think, where you are referring to a specific incident that I would like the Pentagon to address in greater detail. As a general practice, we have very closely coordinated with the military planners involved in the UNOSOM mission itself. Q As you know, some in Congress suggest that we are sub-contracting our foreign policy decisions out, something that the President, I guess, in his U. N. speech said we weren't doing; but it is a question of whether the U. N. commanders are making these decisions and the U. S. is being dragged along, or whether we are going along very eagerly and willingly. MR. McCURRY: Well, I think the Secretary, the President and others have been very clear about our unwillingness to sub-contract out important decisions of foreign policy, and that includes important decisions involving the lives of U. S. service men and service women abroad. You are asking about a specific incident, and again I would say that the Pentagon is in the best position to address the decision-making as it related to the search-and-seizure operation that ran yesterday. Q Mike, just coming back to your -- you remain committed to the -- firmly committed -- to the UNOSOM humanitarian mission. You chose not to use those words when referring to the military operation. Does the U. S. -- I want to give you a clear opportunity not to use them -- does the U.S. remain firmly committed to the kind of military operation that was conducted last night? MR. McCURRY: Well, we continue to believe that a military presence in Somalia is necessary to maintain the type of security that will prevent Somalia from slipping back into the anarchy and chaos which prompted our involvement in the very first place. Q A U. S. military presence? MR. McCURRY: I think, as you have heard senior administration officials yesterday and in recent days say, it's a commitment that we have to be there, to be a part of this effort as the transition occurs back to Somalia and under the auspices of the United Nations as it operates under UNOSOM. That presence is certainly something that will not change in the immediate future. Q I don't think any of us followed up on the question of hostages, Mike. Are there U.S. hostages currently in Somalia? If so, what diplomatic steps is the United States taking to end that hostage situation? MR. McCURRY: We are in very close contact with the Pentagon, which is assembling the best available information. I understand that they do have more to say about service personnel that may at the moment be missing and unaccounted for, whose status is listed as whereabouts unknown; but I would really prefer, since they have got the best available information, prefer to leave it to them to describe to you the numbers that I am sure you are interested in. Q Is the U.S. asking the U.N. to do anything to recover those hostages? MR. McCURRY: Well, we will be in -- as you can very well imagine given that situation, if that is indeed the situation that we face, we will be in very close coordination with the United Nations at a very high level on the status of any personnel that are missing. Q Mike, you indicated that the United States is not bogged down when it comes to diplomatic efforts. It seems difficult to separate what has transpired in the last 24 to 48 hours from the diplomatic effort, if in fact there are hostages, if in fact there are many more casualties and the fighting is much more intense, with reports of American bodies being dragged around the streets. How does that not qualify as getting bogged down in this mess in South Mogadishu? MR. McCURRY: Again, you are asking questions that have got information imbedded in the questions that I am not necessarily confirming. What I am telling you is that there is a very active effort underway to address the political conditions that are necessary for the Somali people to take responsibility for their own affairs; and we think that on that score we are making progress. Now a lot of the rest of your question is interpretive. Q Mike, how will these events impact on any future U. S. commitments for peace-keeping roles, using U.S. forces? MR. McCURRY: It's hard for me to answer that. I'm not aware of any immediate impact. Q Mike? MR. McCURRY: Yes. Q What about the status of U. S. policy on possible sanctions against North Korea? There was an IAEA declaration that North Korea was in violation of its treaty obligations over inspections of its nuclear sites. MR. McCURRY: That's right. The IAEA's general conference passed a resolution expressing its concern that North Korea has failed to accept the ad hoc and routine inspections that are required by its safeguards agreement as it relates to nuclear installations. That resolution was cosponsored by the United States and by 42 other countries and passed by a vote of 72 in favor, 2 opposed. The United States remains quite concerned about North Korea's failure to agree to these IAEA inspections. Along with other concerned governments, we remain committed to working with North Korea toward a solution which promotes peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and which strengthens the international non-proliferation regime. Q Are there any plans for talks then -- further talks with representatives of Pyongyang? MR. McCURRY: I don't have anything for you on that. Q There's a dialogue going on -- just to follow up on this very subject -- there's some kind of a security meeting being sponsored by the University of California at San Diego this week at which North Korean representatives are expected to attend. Do you know who's going to be representing the State Department? MR. McCURRY: No, I don't. I saw some things on that and saw a proposal that the United States be represented, but I don't know the outcome of that. I'm not sure whether or not we are participating, but I can check further and see if we are sending a delegation to that meeting. We were certainly aware of it, and we're considering a request to participate. Q Is there another meeting between the United States and North Korea taking place in Beijing either today or tomorrow? MR. McCURRY: I'm not aware of any meeting taking place in Beijing today or tomorrow. Q How about New York? MR. McCURRY: How about other places? Q How about other places like New York or Geneva? I don't want to be boxed in by specifying a location. MR. McCURRY: Right. I'm walking a very careful line in not describing any diplomatic contacts that may or may not have been held in recent days involving North Korea. I'm just not in a position to provide any detail on any contacts. Q In view of the fact that you have previously announced meetings, both before and after they've occurred, is there a change in the policy toward North Korea now about -- MR. McCURRY: No. I believe in the case, for example, at the political coordinator's level, which is the meetings that occur in Beijing, I believe we've had 34 meetings now, and to my knowledge not each and every such meeting has been announced, nor am I suggesting that there has been recently a meeting of that nature. But I just can't describe for you the nature of the diplomatic contact going on. It remains to be a problem of very urgent concern to the United States clearly. Q But there is some contact? Are you confirming some contact somewhere in the world on this issue? MR. McCURRY: Some may have read into what I just said in a very tortured way that interpretation. So be it. Q And it would be okay to do that, right? It would be accurate to do that. MR. McCURRY: It wouldn't be inaccurate to say we have not been pursuing this problem. (Laughter) Q Could I approach it from another way? About mid-September -- MR. McCURRY: Not clear? Q Triple negative. Try to figure that one out. MR. McCURRY: Okay. Q Mid-September -- MR. McCURRY: I've said enough on the subject. Q Gallucci said to the North Koreans back in mid-September that they had not fulfilled certain requirements for the dialogue to continue. What has changed since then? MR. McCURRY: I'm not certain that anything has changed. He referred to the progress that we wanted to see in certain areas in order for a third round of talks to be held. To my knowledge, we have not seen the progress that we would like to see at this point, and therefore there has been no third round of talks scheduled. The question earlier went to the issue of whether or not there has been diplomatic contact. Q There may not have been a round, but there may have been some contact. MR. McCURRY: There may have been some discussion of this issue, I guess some might interpret. Q Another subject. Can you tell me whether the visit of Shara, Foreign Minister Shara is still on for tomorrow, and what his schedule is or what the schedule is? MR. McCURRY: I am not certain of what time they are meeting tomorrow. He does plan to visit with the Syrian Foreign Minister tomorrow. I believe it's in the morning, but we'll certainly be getting you more schedule information as it's available. Again, the purpose of the meeting, as you heard the Secretary describe it, is to assess progress toward the comprehensive Middle East peace, specifically progress in the Syrian-Israeli track. Q One other meeting now. Can you tell us why the Secretary is seeing the senior Vietnamese official this afternoon? Did I miss something? What's the purpose? MR. McCURRY: Secretary Christopher is going to be meeting with Vietnam's First Deputy Prime Minister, Phan Van Khai, this afternoon. The purpose of the meeting is for the Secretary to emphasize President Clinton's strong commitment to the POW/MIA issue; to urge Vietnam to take further steps to help us achieve our goals with the fullest possible accounting for POW/MIAs from the Vietnam war era. Those of you who have followed this, know that there have been some specific things that we have been looking for that are related to further steps that we see important in developing as our contact with Vietnam occurs on this issue, and they were set out by the President in July. They included obtaining additional remains; the resolution of several cases that are in discrepancy; a trilateral investigation with the Lao about certain cases that remain unsolved; and then access to POW/MIA related documents that we have some interest in. To my knowledge, that will be the focus of their meeting today. Q There will be no discussion of the issue of business -- economic relations with Vietnam or diplomatic relations with Vietnam? MR. McCURRY: It's my understanding that what is foremost on the agenda -- I don't want to rule out the possibility they may talk about others issues -- but foremost on the agenda is certainly the most urgent question we face in dealing with Vietnam, which is the POW/MIA issue. Q Do you have an evaluation of the Vietnamese cooperation since the President laid out those conditions in July? MR. McCURRY: I guess the way to describe what we feel has been some concrete progress on the issue is to say, as you know, that the President has taken two steps fairly recently to recognize that progress. First, in July we lifted our objection to Vietnam's access to lending from international financial institutions. And then in September, a month ago, at the time the President renewed the embargo, assessed the embargo generally, he looked toward adjusting the terms of the embargo so that U.S. firms could participate in development projects in Vietnam that are funded by the IFFIs themselves. Now, those two steps, I think, reflected what we considered to be progress that we're making as we continue this dialogue with Vietnam on the POW/MIA issue. Q But you can't itemize the progress. I just wanted, if you can, to itemize -- MR. McCURRY: Itemize the progress. In the case on remains, which is an important issue, since the beginning of the year we have repatriated 44 sets of remains from Vietnam in an effort to account for missing servicemen. There will be an additional discussion this week of some cases of repatriation that we are asking for. Second, on discrepancy cases, a special team of U.S. experts is investigating a high priority, last-known-alive cases. The investigations that have been conducted so far have enabled the Defense Department to determine the fate of 116 individuals. There are 80 cases that remain to be investigated and are being investigated. On the issue of cooperation with Vietnam and Laos, we have agreed to conduct field investigations of POW/MIA cases along the border, and the first such investigation is to be conducted jointly with U.S. experts, and that will begin in December. I'll say parenthetically here -- it's not here in the prepared answer -- but we also received indications when the Secretary met with the Cambodian First Prime Minister and Second Prime Minister last week, that Cambodia would continue its close cooperation with us on those same types of issues. On the question of archives, on August 30, Vietnam provided us access to wartime aircraft shoot-down records which may be related to 14 individuals that are heretofore unaccounted for. Then on September 1, we gained access to what may prove to be the largest compilation of documents that have ever been received from the Vietnamese. It was a 46-page document on shoot-downs of approximately 2,500 aircraft, and that again could help us resolve a lot of the cases that are currently outstanding. That, I think, pretty much covers where we are currently in working through a lot of these issues with Vietnam. Obviously, I don't expect the Secretary to go at that great a detail into his discussions today, but I do think that he will certainly press the importance of all of these issues and the importance of moving ahead as they resolve some of these cases that are still outstanding. Q Mike, in those talks, do you expect the Secretary to take up the allegations involving Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and the alleged bribe by Vietnam to enlist his help in ending the U.S. trade embargo? MR. McCURRY: No. Q He won't take it up? MR. McCURRY: No. Q What's his view of those allegations? MR. McCURRY: I'm sorry? Q Of those allegations. MR. McCURRY: I don't know that we have been in a position to follow those allegations closely enough to raise them. I think that's something that should be checked at the Justice Department,* I understand. Q Well, but wait a minute, the contacts with Vietnam are -- as far as I know -- are being conducted through the State Department. Perhaps there are other contacts you could tell us about. Through the contacts with Vietnam, is the United States Government making any effort to either prove the validity or disprove the allegations about that case? MR. McCURRY: This is not a State Department matter. This is a Justice Department* matter. Q Why are reporters being kept out of that photo op this afternoon? MR. McCURRY: We're having a cameras-only photo opportunity, as we frequently do. Correction: Commerce Department. Q On that same subject, the Secretary had spoken as being at the head of the America Desk -- Q Why? MR. McCURRY: What? Well, we frequently have, as is the case with a country that we don't have -- we're not having a full bilateral meeting with, we frequently just have a photo session informally in the Secretary's office. Q Arafat was up there on September 13. Q Yes. There also are cases -- MR. McCURRY: We had a cameras -- it was supposed to be a cameras-only photo opportunity, but we were benevolent in allowing certain questions to be asked. Q For whatever it's worth, I think a number of us would like to request that since the Secretary has made a big public deal about being on the America Desk and advocating U.S. business interests around the world, including he specifically indicated Vietnam, that the State Department ought to allow full press coverage of his meeting with the Vietnamese official. MR. McCURRY: I've covered for you in some considerable detail what we anticipate to be the focus of that meeting. I'll take your request -- Q With all due respect, you're not the Secretary of State. MR. McCURRY: I'll take your request under consideration. Q One last question on this subject. You made, a couple minutes ago, a reference to 44 sets of remains having been returned this year. Would you take the question as to whether these remains have been confirmed as American servicemen? MR. McCURRY: I'll take that question. Q Mike, any update on the U.S. assistance to the earthquake victims in India beyond what USAID has done over the weekend? MR. McCURRY: No. I understand that USAID did have some good detail out. Q Nothing beyond that? MR. McCURRY: Nothing beyond that. We have heard from the Indian Government that it is grateful for the assistance that we are providing. We continue to encourage private individuals in the United States to make cash contributions through the private voluntary organizations that you can see listed in your local newspaper. I will cover, just in case you have not already gotten it from AID, for those who may be interested, we have committed $3 million to relief efforts. Two U.S. C-5 aircraft arrived at Bombay Sunday evening loaded with tents, plastic sheeting, for approximately 20,000 victims, plastic water jugs and medical supplies. A convoy was quickly loaded and is on its way now to the disaster site and should arrive by midnight local time. We are continuing our assessments of what other assistance may be required, and I think, as you know, from a statement that the White House put out over the weekend, the President has appointed Ambassador Ray Flynn as his personal representative in charge of the relief effort. Ambassador Flynn has been briefed by senior Indian officials and will travel to the disaster site some time tomorrow, I understand. Lee. Q Two questions on Somalia. One, following up on Saul's question, I guess rather simply, given the sentiments last week expressed by senior U.S. officials, is the search for Aideed on or off, or is it still a good idea to go hunting for him in South Mogadishu? MR. McCURRY: I think we covered that at length already. Q Well, I didn't really hear an answer that was "yes" or "no," or -- MR. McCURRY: I talked a lot about U.S. participation in the effort to apprehend Aideed as it relates to the U.N. Security Council resolution. Q The second question was, there's still been a lot of congressional criticism and there's obviously going to be even more after today. Is there some sense of what went wrong -- maybe the hand-off to the U.N.? Is there a reassessment? Is there a question of what went wrong in this operation in its original goal? MR. McCURRY: I have often heard -- from Ambassador Albright and others -- describe the lessons that they are learning from this mission. But I really don't know of any specific thing that they would point to. I think that, as they have indicated in the past, they are learning from this mission, and they're clearly seeking ways to improve the effectiveness of the mission which, as you know, may involve further efforts by U.N. people to travel directly to Mogadishu to assess the effectiveness of the UNOSOM mission itself. Q In your view, did anything go wrong in Somalia? MR. McCURRY: Did anything go -- Q Has anything gone wrong as far as the mission is concerned? MR. McCURRY: What's gone wrong is a warlord continues to thwart the ability of the world community to deliver humanitarian relief and to help the Somali people build the institutions necessary for self-government. That's gone very wrong, and that is the responsibility of a clan leader that has been -- whose arrest an apprehension has been ordered by the United Nations. Q One more on Russia. I realize it may be too late for this, but perhaps you know the answer. Something you said on India made me think of it again. Talbott mentioned that the U.S. was taking under consideration a request for medical equipment or medical supplies or assistance of some sort to the government, and then he talked later about the aid program that had been underway since Vancouver. Is the U.S. considering some other kind of assistance request, or is it basically a case of directing the assistance that has already been put in the pipeline? MR. McCURRY: He was referring to a request for medical assistance that had been made, I think just related to the events surrounding the White House itself. That was not a question of the overall flow of assistance that's going in. I think, as you will recall -- and we've said often -- of the bulk of the aid that the United States is offering through many of the different facilities within the Russian aid package are aimed for outside of Moscow. First of all, to areas that really are trying to accelerate the pace of economic liberalization and political modernization. So a lot of this goes outside of Moscow itself. And, secondly, it's focused on non-government entities, so this would be something that we'd be actually working with local grass roots efforts at. Q Do you have any indication or any idea you can give us now as to what kind of assistance Yeltsin's people are asking for in this matter, and what kind of assistance the United States is considering in connection with this episode? MR. McCURRY: I'll check further. I think that the initial request that I overheard was related to blood plasma. They were concerned about just the availability of blood supplies within Moscow. But I'll check and see if there's anything in addition to that that has been requested. Q Mike, one last question on the Secretary's meeting with Phan Van Khai. Does this mark the first time that a Secretary of State has met a Vietnamese leader since the end of the war? MR. McCURRY: No, I don't think so. I think it's the first time -- he's probably the most senior Vietnamese official who's visited the United States since the war. I think, as you all know, he's in New York to attend the UNGA. But in October, 1992, Acting Secretary Eagleburger met here at the Department with the Foreign Minister of Vietnam. The Foreign Minister was also in the United States at the same time for the U.N. General Assembly meetings. Former Secretary Baker, I think, met with Vietnam's Foreign Minister in 1991 on the margins of an international conference on Cambodia in Paris. And then in 1990, Secretary Baker met again with the Foreign Minister. Q I think we have pictures of Christopher meeting with the Foreign Minister in Singapore, don't we? MR. McCURRY: With the Foreign Minister? Q With the Foreign Minister. MR. McCURRY: I can't remember. I think it was scheduled, but because he cut that trip short, I'm not sure whether he actually made that meeting or not. But, in any event, as Deputy Prime Minister he would be the most senior Vietnamese official to visit the United States since the war. Q Mike, another subject. MR. McCURRY: I think we're almost done. One last subject. Q Regarding last Friday's conference here, are there any points of contention between the United States and any of the other participants that remain outstanding? MR. McCURRY: No. Q Thank you. (The briefing concluded at 1:33 p.m.) (###)