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US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING Thursday, September 9, 1993 BRIEFER: Michael McCurry Subject Page ANNOUNCEMENT US-Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective ...........................1 MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS Israeli-PLO Agreement/US Role ..................1-10 -- Signing Ceremony/Timing/Invitations ........1-5 -- US Visas for PLO Members ............... 1-4 -- Funding of Implementation ..................7-8 Conditions/Prospects for US-PLO Dialogue .......1-4 Progress on Other Tracks/Secretary's Efforts ...5-6 Secretary's Contacts with Congress .............6 US Contacts with Norway ........................7 SOMALIA Congressional Concern re: Bringing Troops Home 10-12 US Review of Command of US Troops ..............11-12 War Powers Act .................................14-16 PEACEKEEPING/PEACEMAKING US Review of Command of US Troops ..............11-12 War Powers Act .................................14-16 CUBA Announcement re: Allowing Private Enterprise ..12 FORMER YUGOSLAVIA Bosnian President's Meeting with President Clinton/Security Council/White House Briefing 13-16 War Powers Act .................................14-16 Negotiations on Political Settlement ...........16-17,20-21 -- Implementation/Peacekeeping/US Role ........16-17 War Crimes Tribunal ............................17-19 Evacuation Policy ..............................19 SOUTH KOREA Asst. Secretary Gallucci's Visit ...............19-20 NORTH KOREA Status of Talks with US ........................20 (###) DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING DPC #126 THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1993, 12:59 P. M. (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED) MR. McCURRY: Good afternoon. I've got just one quick housekeeping item before we get to your questions. There is an opening session of plenary talks on the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective. This is the global affairs basket in the overall U.S.-Japan Framework talks. They are beginning today at sort of an organizational level. I just want to alert you to that. There will be a photo opportunity at 2:15 today, and then Counselor of the Department Timothy Wirth and Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs Matsuura will be available at approximately 5:00 o'clock at the conclusion of their meeting today to give a further readout. I think they're going to do that outside the C Street entrance. I just wanted to alert everyone to that, so you would know of it. And with that, any questions? Q Mike, assuming that you're going to leave the big announcements to the White House, could you tell us about a technical problem. How would -- or what have you done so far to make it easy for a PLO official to come here for the signing? MR. McCURRY: To my knowledge, nothing at this point. The current situation -- I think as many of you saw -- the President had some remarks earlier. We are certainly delighted with the news of an agreement that has been reached, although my understanding is there are still some additional things occurring in the region that will make it possible, perhaps later today, to be able to say that they have reached an agreement that is truly historic, if not breath-taking. As we watch that development today, I think the President indicated to you he will have more to say later today. I know that a question he addressed earlier on what steps then occur to resume a dialogue with the PLO, he indicated that there would be an effort to examine the announcements by the parties themselves to see if our conditions are satisfied, and at that point he could then make some decisions on next steps. Q But he's talking about recognition, and I'm just asking the narrow question of what is -- is the way clear now for a PLO official to come here, despite all the prohibitions and Congressional restrictions? What's the mechanism that you're using? MR. McCURRY: At 1:00 p.m., at this moment, the way is not clear. But, as I say, it's our understanding that there will be some announcements and some language available later today that we'll be able to examine. The President then indicated that he would have more to say, I believe he said, about resuming a dialogue, I think. I don't believe he addressed the question of recognition. Q Are you sending any invitations for the ceremony? Who is going to come to Washington on Monday? MR. McCURRY: I don't think we have sent any invitations out, and I believe that the contingency planning that has occurred for a signing ceremony, if one could, in fact, occur on Monday, is underway. But I think of many, many details that I think would be of interest to all of you are far from settled. I expect it's really going to be tomorrow at the earliest before we can give you a good accurate game plan on what will happen. Q But, Michael, could you just tell us -- you must have some idea by now -- what kind of ceremony you envision. Are you envisioning -- MR. McCURRY: A nice one. An historic one. Q Are you envisioning inviting all the parties that came to the Madrid conference, and also has there been any talk of inviting former Secretary of State Baker and possibly former President Bush? MR. McCURRY: I think all of those are very good questions that will be addressed in due course. All of those things are questions that have been addressed that we are looking at. We just don't have a definitive game plan that we can share at this point. Q Can you spell out the different legal things that the State Department is going to have to deal with in order to resume the dialogue with the PLO, the different legislative barriers and the different problems? MR. McCURRY: There are separate questions that arise between resuming a dialogue and contacts. That's something that as recently as 1988 to 1990, of course, we had a dialogue with the PLO that was then suspended. Resuming a dialogue and having contacts with the PLO is a much different question than establishing some formal recognition. In fact, I think those are complicated questions. I don't think they're going to be addressed in the immediate future. Q Is there a kind of standing official request from the PLO to resume the dialogue with the United States Government? MR. McCURRY: Well, I think there has been from the parties in the negotiations representing the Palestinians a fairly routine -- not a routine request, but a request made very often that there be direct dialogue with their leadership. Q Wait a minute, you didn't answer my question. Spell out for us, if you can, the legal barriers that must be overcome on both reopening the dialogue and formal recognition. MR. McCURRY: I'll check and see if there are any legal barriers to re-establishing a dialogue and having contact. I'm not aware of any, and, as I say, the other question is a question involving recognition. I can't spell out for you all of the steps that would have to be taken, but I suggest to you that's probably not something that would happen in the immediate future anyhow. I think it's a question that would have to be looked at over time. Q Mike, assuming that there's a -- MR. McCURRY: Mark, you were next. Q What are the conditions for resuming the dialogue? MR. McCURRY: The President covered them I think in an abbreviated way. Q Very abbreviated. MR. McCURRY: Yes. Q They were spelled out clearly at the time that the dialogue was broken off. Can you reiterate those now, please? MR. McCURRY: I am not going to reiterate those now, because I think that clearly we'll be looking at the comments that are made by the PLO as they formalize their document to see if those conditions overall are satisfied. The President I think referred directly, as you heard him earlier today, to a declaration that Israel does have a right to exist, a renunciation of terrorism, and other steps that might be taken. I think I would just leave it at that right now. I think the President spoke on that. Q So you're holding the door open to shrinking the conditions or casting some of them aside if you're generally satisfied with the PLO document. Is that correct? MR. McCURRY: The President said that he would have to be satisfied that the necessary conditions were met, and I think he will certainly address that later today. Q But, Mike, the question is: Do the conditions that have always been there still exist, or are you setting a new set of conditions? MR. McCURRY: I wouldn't be the one to set it. I think you should ask the President later maybe. Q Mike, the Secretary has discretionary authority to give a visa to PLO members or officials under certain conditions such as, to attend an academic conference or to go to -- MR. McCURRY: Or to be available -- Q -- visit the United Nations, things like that. But would this cover something like coming to the White House? MR. McCURRY: That discretionary authority has existed to allow people to be available here to consult with the party negotiating here. Q But that's been never formally acknowledged. MR. McCURRY: We have said several times that we would certainly do nothing -- would create no impediment to the ability of the parties to formally finalize an agreement. I think that's a pretty self-evident statement. Mary. Q Michael, back to this whole issue of the signing ceremony, when you say that nothing's been solidified, is it being handled by the White House? Is the State Department involved -- MR. McCURRY: Yes. Q -- or is this being handled by the White House? MR. McCURRY: The presumption now is that it will be a White House event, so it's their venue, their address. But we've been working very closely with them -- and the Secretary, knowing that there was a possibility of a signing ceremony -- established some contingency planning procedures earlier in the week, just so we would be able to look at some of the questions that you're asking me now. We don't have answers that are satisfactory and definitive answers. Q Now, are you telling us that right now you still don't know what kind of a ceremony you want to have? MR. McCURRY: No, I'm not saying that. I think that from the outset of this -- in fact, I'd say from the time of the Secretary's meeting with Foreign Minister Peres in Santa Barbara, it's been the desire of the parties themselves to have a Washington ceremony, presumably at the White House. We haven't been neutral on that question. We were hoping all along, of course, that there would be the type of an agreement that could be signed at a ceremony at the White House. Q Mike, the Jordanians have said that the only thing holding them back from a similar agreement with Israel is the PLO agreement. Is it the Administration's understanding that once the signing between the PLO and Israel happens Monday, that the Jordanian- Israeli agreement will happen shortly thereafter? MR. McCURRY: I would not rule that out as a possibility, but it's far from clear at this moment that that is indeed what will happen. Q Could it be a dual sort of thing? MR. McCURRY: I said I wouldn't rule that out, but it is far from clear at this moment that that would happen. Q I mean a dual signing ceremony. Have you ruled that out? MR. McCURRY: I think the contingency planning that I am aware that's taking place is for the agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Q Following that up, can you shed any light on the Secretary's plans to use the signing of an Israeli-PLO accord as a springboard to achieve a more comprehensive settlement? MR. McCURRY: I can tell you that, as you know, he has been very actively working some of the other tracks in the aftermath of the news about this breakthrough, with the hope that it would lead to a comprehensive peace. I'd say that we're satisfied we're making some progress. I would not indicate, as I just did, that there's any other signing ceremonies or any other successful conclusions to dialogue about to happen. But I do think there has been progress as they've worked through this, and I think, yes, the Secretary does intend to use the momentum created by this historic breakthrough to continue the hard work on some of the other tracks. Indeed, as I say, there are some indications that some of those tracks are coming together as well. Q Apart from Jordan, what else? What signs of progress are there? MR. McCURRY: Looking not just in the last several days but looking over the last several weeks from where we were prior to the Secretary's trip to the region and where we are now, for example, in the Syrian track, I think that there has been some important progress. But it's clear that that is going to take some time to unfold. Q Is there an agreement yet on when, after the historic breakthrough, the talks will resume following the high holidays? MR. McCURRY: I don't know the answer to that. That may have been something that the parties themselves have addressed, with our help, but I don't know that they've agreed on it yet. Q Has the United States yet issued an invitation on a date certain to return? MR. McCURRY: Not that I'm aware of. I'm certainly not aware of that. We're still considering the question of issuing invitations for a signing ceremony. So the next round beyond that, I don't know that we have any definitive word on that yet. Q What about the structure of the talks? Do you envision a reshaping, for instance, of the Palestinian delegation? MR. McCURRY: I don't know that anyone has made any definite determination on that. That certainly would be a possibility, I think. Q Michael, has the Secretary now started informal or formal consultations with Congress on this whole issue of the PLO? Did he meet with Congressional leaders? MR. McCURRY: I don't think that he has met with anyone yet, although he's planning to host -- a previously scheduled appointment -- he's planning to host a gathering of freshmen members of Congress this evening here at the Department. He has, I believe, had some telephone contact with various members of Congress, as have other officials within the Department. I believe that these have not been formal briefings. They've been more informal soundings out of opinions -- routine consultation. Q And can you give us a sense of where they are at on this issue of talking to the PLO again? MR. McCURRY: Well, I think many of them are in the same place the President of the United States has been in today, that they want to see more about the agreement itself, and they want to know more details. But I think that there is a receptivity to the issue. There's a great deal of anxiousness to learn more about the nature of the agreement itself. That's how I'd describe in summary. Now, that doesn't apply in each and every case obviously. Q Mike, the Foreign Minister of Norway is in Tunis to have contacts with the PLO people. Is there any kind of coordination between the U.S. Government and the Norwegians? MR. McCURRY: We have been in contact with them and we feel like there has been good exchange of information back and forth. He may not necessarily be there at this moment, but we have been in close contact with them and deeply appreciative, as I'm sure the world is, of the role that they've been playing. Q Are you aware of the mission of the Norwegian Foreign Minister in Tunisia? MR. McCURRY: I think that his role as it has been described, and as certainly we understand it, has been to help the parties conclude this historic agreement. It appears now that they have played that role successfully, and, as I say, that's something I think the entire world is appreciative of. Q Can you bring us up to date on the fund-raising effort to implement the PLO-Israel accord? MR. McCURRY: I don't have anything new. We covered, as you know, earlier in the week some of the steps we're taking to begin reaching out to the world community and to potential donor nations -- the Japanese, the Nordic nations, EC nations, Gulf Council states -- and I'd say we have made some progress on that front. I don't know that I can describe for you specific amounts that individual countries have pledged, although there have been some good conversations with individual governments. But that process will certainly continue. We'll continue to be in contact with our G-7 partners, among others, about how we build the resources necessary to make sure that this agreement, as it comes to fruition, is a successful agreement, and that the functions that transfer to the Palestinian authorities are done so in a way that they can be successful in taking on those responsibilities. Q Is there any ballpark figure for the total amount that we're seeking? MR. McCURRY: Not that we consider authoritative at this point. There have been a variety of estimates. I think some of you may have seen estimates put out by the World Bank. There have been others developed in the region that range quite -- there's quite a range, ranging from several hundred millions up to billions -- and for that reason I don't think we consider any of this authoritative. It's something that we will certainly be spending a lot of time, with expert analysis, coming to understand better. Q Have you heard from the Saudis any expression of willingness to restart their funding of the PLO and their financial aid to the PLO? MR. McCURRY: I don't know the answer to that. I think we've had discussions with them on that subject. I haven't heard anything that indicates to me that they are less than receptive, but I just don't know exactly the answer. Q Will the U.S. approve of the World Bank promise of assistance to the Palestinians? MR. McCURRY: That's a general question, I think, that they move on a very specific procedure, and there are other agencies -- specifically the Treasury Department -- that are involved in that, and I really am not in a position at this point to speak for other entities that would have to look at specific applications for credit. But as a general proposition, as you've heard from the Secretary and here, that we do stand ready to help with the financial resources necessary to make this agreement work, and we will work within the international community to see that those resources are available. Q Can we go to another subject. MR. McCURRY: Any more on this? Q Yes, I have another one on this. Looking back historically, we had President Carter and his sort of hour-to-hour involvement with Camp David. We had Bush and Baker making sure that all the -- almost all the Middle East developments came right out of the White House, the announcements and so forth. We've had sort of a hands-off approach from this President. It looks like his first real personal involvement with the process is going to be standing by for the signing on Monday. We've sort of had a rash of stories saying that the Administration has been out of the loop on this, has been on the sidelines. I'm wondering whether there's a gap between the public perception and what's actually been taking place. Has there been a bigger role that this Administration's been playing in this? MR. McCURRY: I don't want to overstate the role, but I think that the history of this breakthrough will become clear in the days and the weeks ahead, and I think the United States is satisfied that we've played an important role. But the parties themselves can describe that. I think the parties' interest in gathering here to conclude this agreement speaks to our level of involvement as well. Q On Somalia -- MR. McCURRY: Yes. Before we do that, one more. Q Maybe same question. What is your self-appraisal of U.S. Government role for the success of the PLO/Palestinian negotiations? For example, do you think that it is only solely U.S. role to reach that kind of historic negotiations between the PLO and Israel, or that was worked out with the whole cooperation of worldwide diplomatic -- something like that? MR. McCURRY: No, I don't think that we take it on -- we've indicated all along that we wished to be helpful when we can be helpful. We've played that role going back from designing the Madrid process forward, and by no means are we the only country involved. I think, as you know, this entire process, which defined many of the issues and many of the positions that have now been fleshed out by the parties directly, this process itself was co-sponsored by Russia. As you know, Norway has played a very significant role here. Certainly U.S. leadership has been important, but it's not solely the role of the United States to help encourage these types of historic breakthroughs. That is, indeed, the responsibility the world community itself has. Q But in the ceremony, all the nations who had worked for the success of the negotiations could be invited to the White House ceremony or no? MR. McCURRY: I just don't know the answer to that yet. That's sort of a protocol question about who will be invited and, as I say, I don't have any firm details on that at this point. Q Can I just follow on -- I mean, when you say the history will reveal the role, I mean, are you hinting that there is -- that the U.S. was much more involved than press accounts would indicate? MR. McCURRY: No, no. I mean, I think that in reaching in what appears to be an exchange of letters between the PLO and Israel directly, I think that that came about, as we largely know, under the auspices of direct dialogue that was sponsored by Norway. What I'm suggesting is that in the overall history of this region and the attempt to reach peace, the role that we've played has been significant. I think the role we played in helping to shape some of the issues and the substance of the dialogue that's now occurred directly between the PLO and Israel has been significant as well. But I think that's something that's not for us to brag about. I think that's up to people who themselves were directly involved in the parties to talk about themselves as they reflect on what's happened here. Q Michael, do you have any expectations for secrecy to take over after the success of secret negotiations between the PLO and Israel? Do you expect secrecy to have the upper hand now? MR. McCURRY: No. That's a kind of a complicated question. Any complicated negotiation of this nature is a mix of public diplomacy and private communications and discussions informally between parties. It's probably true that no complicated, difficult negotiation is possible without a full engagement by the parties directly, and that certainly often occurs in private. But I think that there have been a variety of ways in which this discussion and this dialogue has proved to be fruitful. Q Somalia? MR. McCURRY: Yes. Nothing -- we are developing -- I think you are all aware that there are some news accounts from Mogadishu that there has been a serious incident there. News of that is being gathered at this very moment. I don't have anything further after checking with the Pentagon and others just prior to the briefing. Q That wasn't my question. My question is, there's a great debate going on on the Hill at the moment, and support for the U.S. position there seems to be eroding and opposition growing. What effect is that having on the Administration's determination to keep forces in there, keep the Rangers in there, keep the pressure on General Aideed? MR. McCURRY: I think that we understand that Congress wants a clearer definition of what the mission in Somalia is about, and we understand that there's a very great eagerness to see that our troops come home as soon as possible. That's certainly sentiments that we understand, we know are being reflected in the debate up there, and we're committed to working with Congress on those objectives. But we also feel at this time that the attempt to interrupt the ability of the United States to participate in this mission would not be helpful. Q If you understand that they want a clearer definition of what the U.S. role is there, is that a concession on your part that the definition hasn't been clearer to this point? MR. McCURRY: I think that we would acknowledge -- and I think others in the Administration have acknowledged -- that the definition of the mission has not been as clear as it needed to be. And I think that's one reason, among others, that Secretary Aspin at some great length went into that subject in his speech recently at CSIS. I'd refer you back to that speech. It's a pretty clear, comprehensive account of what the U.S. role in Somalia is about, why it's important. It looks at the history of our effort there to save lives and what has to happen there so that we can continue to save lives as part of this humanitarian effort. Q Mike, there's been news accounts recently that are saying that the Administration is so dismayed by the problems in command and control in Somalia as a U.N. peacekeeping effort, that, for instance, it's now utterly determined that if there's a peacekeeping effort in Bosnia, it's going to be handled by NATO, as the President said yesterday. Does that extend to peacekeeping missions, in general? Is there a re-thinking in the Administration of, for instance, the notion that U.S. combat troops would serve under U.N. commanders? Is there a sense that Somalia now shows that the U.N. simply can't handle this and we won't put U.S. troops under their control? MR. McCURRY: There is, I think, a Presidential review, an interagency review that's been going on on exactly those questions. It had not been completed and is still not completed. I don't believe that the principals have presented final recommendations to the President yet on that, so I don't know that there's been a re-thinking. I think there's been a "thinking" about exactly those questions. Q As Somalia unfolds or unravels, or whatever, is that going into the thinking? Is Somalia so alarming to you that the idea that was coming out of U.S. troops under U.N. command is now being thrown out the window? MR. McCURRY: I don't want to accept the characterization that you made in the question. I would say that, as you've heard others in the Administration say, as the first Chapter VII U.N. peace-making operation of its kind, that we have felt all along that there would be things we would learn from the effort in Somalia as it applies to future peacekeeping and peace-making operations. Q Well have you learned that you don't want U.S. combat troops under U.N. command? MR. McCURRY: That's not something that I'm going to say now because it's part of the things that are being -- they're being reviewed at a very high level within the Administration. Q What's the state of alarm within the Administration over just the simple fact that this debate -- noisy and quarrelsome -- has broken out on the Hill questioning why the United States is there? MR. McCURRY: What's our sense of that debate? Q No. What is your sense of -- what is the state of alarm? Are you alarmed by it? Do you feel that your support is eroding? MR. McCURRY: I don't think we are alarmed by it. I think that we understand that there are significant concerns among members of Congress that should be addressed. I think we're attempting to do that. Q Michael, does the Secretary of State know that Secretary of Defense Les Aspin wanted to travel to Sarajevo? Or did he read it in the newspaper, as Tony Lake apparently did? MR. McCURRY: I'm not aware that he was aware of plans by the Secretary to travel to Sarajevo. Q Does he think it's a good idea? Or is he glad that the Secretary appears now not to be traveling to Sarajevo? MR. McCURRY: We take no opinion on that question. Q Are you going to send him the travel advisory? MR. McCURRY: What? Q Are you going to send him the travel advisory? MR. McCURRY: No. I will resist the opportunity to say anything about it. Q Another topic. The Cuban Government announced just recently that they are going to allow some private enterprising in Cuba. Do you have anything on this? MR. McCURRY: I don't have anything new on that. We have been following some of those developments very carefully, and I'll see if I can work up some additional information on that. Q Mike, on Bosnia, after the President called on Clinton yesterday, the White House briefing threw a lot of cold water -- buckets of ice cubes -- on any notion that the U.S. is going to do anything for Bosnia. Also, I couldn't seem to get a good explanation why you're so determined -- the U.S. is -- to have any peacekeeping troops under NATO instead of U.N. command. What does Izetbegovic get out of this visit? What has he accomplished by coming here, except mispronunciation of his name? MR. McCURRY: I think he came here for several reasons. He came here, clearly and foremost, to make a presentation to the U.N. Security Council. I think it was then our view and his view that it would be good if he could come here and meet with some of the officials he met with yesterday -- the President and the Secretary -- to review the status of the Geneva negotiations and where things might go next. This is a desperately difficult problem. Understanding his point of view as they go into the negotiations, what the potential is for reaching some type of settlement, what then the United States could do to help implement such an agreement, is a very important and useful conversation. I think the President had, with President Izetbegovic yesterday, a very productive conversation that President Izetbegovic himself thanked President Clinton for at some great length, and I think was very satisfied with the tone of the conversation and with the assistance that the United States has been rendering to Bosnia in the course of this difficult negotiation. Q Well, at first, we had the image yesterday of the U.S. Representative to the U.N. running up and down the hallways of the U.N. chastising the French and British for their stony silence when this man makes this appeal. Then, we had you speaking of the need to get relief through; again, warning that the NATO Council could meet on short notice and all. You go over to the White House, it's a different Administration. It's an Administration that called for one thing -- for flexibility from him, as well -- I don't know what he's supposed to flexible about. Flexibility on all sides. That wasn't Mr. Christopher's line last week. Is it a lost cause that you've just given up on? You see no conflict? MR. McCURRY: I have to say I am totally mystified by your question. Q All right, please read the transcript, if you could -- if you have it -- of last night's White House briefing and you'll see, "there's limits to what the outside world can do, we need flexibility on all sides." It was just absolutely go-chase-yourself -- the Bosnian President. MR. McCURRY: I discussed with I believe one of the participants in that briefing -- I had a good conversation with late last night -- and have a much different understanding of the message conveyed at that briefing. I'm sorry if -- Q Who had a much different impression? There were two briefers. MR. McCURRY: Apparently, you've had difficulty understanding what they were trying to suggest. Q I think a lot of us -- well, the same briefer said there's nothing special about asking Congress to approve sending troops overseas; it's always been done, which sort of rules out Vietnam, Panama, Grenada, and other such events. I don't know where I was yesterday, but I sure wasn't at the State Department where things were a little clearer. MR. McCURRY: I am so grateful that you consider the briefings that occur here -- Q Much better. MR. McCURRY: -- so much clearer than those that you receive elsewhere. Q Does this mean that this Administration now supports the War Powers Act and agrees that Congress has a role before you send troops into a potential hostile situation? MR. McCURRY: The President and others suggested at the White House yesterday that on this difficult problem of Bosnia we're going to consult with Congress. Why is that a surprise or of interest here? A Because they didn't on Vietnam, Panama, and Grenada. The U.S. Government -- your government or mine -- sent U.S. troops racing out there to get killed and to intervene in foreign wars without Congress having a say, except the little tricky bit about appropriations. There wasn't Congressional approval. And now we're being told, this is just routine. MR. McCURRY: I think consulting with Congress about Bosnia and the next steps in Bosnia is something that the Administration has indicated regularly -- Q The President said more that "consulting." Q Seriously, Mike, the two previous Administrations have absolutely refused to have anything to do with the War Powers Act, which requires them to consult with Congress before they send troops into a hostile situation. Are you saying that it will be the policy of this Administration to recognize the War Powers Act and, thus, to consult with Congress? MR. McCURRY: Absolutely not. Q It will not (inaudible) -- Q I would like some clarification -- MR. McCURRY: I'm not saying that. Q Is it the State Department's view that before peacekeeping -- before American forces are sent in for peacekeeping -- that the United States -- that the President needs Congressional agreement? Because that's what the briefer at the White House seemed to think last night. Specifically, the President himself said that he's going to get Congressional agreement and support. MR. McCURRY: I don't recall that the President said anything about War Powers last night. I think he indicated he was -- Q I'm not interjecting that. I'm simply asking, as a matter of course, as the President has not sought Congressional agreement to go into Somalia, and, as a matter of fact, you're resisting a Congressional effort to get troops out of Somalia. President Bush did not ask for Congressional agreement before sending troops into Somalia. And now the President is saying that before he sends any forces in as peacekeepers, he's got to get Congressional approval. Is that so? MR. McCURRY: For a precise clarification of what may or may not have been said at the White House by whoever briefed last night, I would refer you to the White House. I want to put that question to them because apparently there were some things said at the briefing last night that I just can't speak to here. I think I would refer to them. Second, on the question of War Powers, I don't want to say anything further on that question other than to say, as you all know here, that as a matter of history and as a matter of policy, that is an issue upon which the Executive Branch of government has very firm and strong views. I don't want to recount that now in the context of a discussion of Bosnia. What I will tell you on Bosnia is that the President suggested last night that he's going to consult with Congress about what we need to do if we are going to participate in part of the implementation of a political settlement there. That's as far as I think I need to address the matter. Q Apparently, there was a contradiction just yesterday between the White House briefer and you. MR. McCURRY: A contradiction? No! Q I just want to find out what the truth is. The President promised to participate in any peacekeeping operation to enforce a peace agreement. You said from the podium yesterday that you presume he means ground troops. The briefer said the President has not said any such thing and to make no such presumption. Now, most people are saying -- and Izetbegovic suggested -- that only ground troops, that American presence on the ground, would, or NATO presence on the ground, would help keep that peace. Can you clarify? Do we mean ground troops when we talk about participation? MR. McCURRY: When we have talked about participating in a viable, enforceable agreement negotiated by the parties in good faith, we have talked about the U.S. participation possibly including ground troops. It was not the duty of the White House briefer, or the State Department briefer, yesterday to go beyond that commitment which does stand and which was discussed directly with President Izetbegovic yesterday -- possibly including ground troops. Q That's all you told him -- possibly -- we didn't promise ground troops? MR. McCURRY: I think I said presumably. I think there has been some presumption and, indeed, there has been some planning on the question of using U.S. ground troops; but the commitment that exists currently is possibly using groups troops. It was not the job of Dee Dee [Myers] or my job to move beyond that point yesterday. Q Could you add anything to why -- you know, why the President put emphasis on having whoever goes there under NATO, and he specifically said not the U.N. command? Is there something there? MR. McCURRY: There are several reasons. Multilateral peacekeeping is hard. There is no question about that. The multilateral peacekeeping is what NATO has been about all these many years. The type of integrated command structure, the integrated operations and procedures that have been developed historically through NATO and the ability to handle different nations working in a command structure is something that's very, very valuable. And it's something that, particularly in a problem that lies in the heart of Europe, could be effectively employed. I think it's our view that NATO, as it has proven with "no- fly" zone enforcement, and the command and control structures for "no- fly," is in a good position to help carry out some of the missions that may or may not be attached to implementing a peace agreement in Bosnia. Q Does this have anything to do with trying to keep at a minimum the number of forces -- wrong word -- the number of hands that would be involved in the operation? As you realize, doing something which you guys haven't done yet about a NATO military response, you have to have the U.N. Secretary General approve the first strike, at least. Is that factored into this? You want to keep it neater and more streamlined? MR. McCURRY: I think that it grows out of a desire to employ those things that historically have proven to work effectively. I think there is now, even in Bosnia, some work that's been done under the sponsorship of the United Nations with an involvement by NATO where these roles have been sorted out effectively. I think the desire is to build on that experience historically with NATO, and then specifically in the case of Bosnia. Q Mike, correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe starting in February, in a number of carefully prepared statements here by the Secretary, the United States has pledged to help implement a peace agreement in Bosnia without ever mentioning getting Congressional approval beforehand. Can you tell us why this policy has suddenly been changed? MR. McCURRY: In May and elsewhere there was extensive, exhaustive consulting with Congress on the options that exist. You all remember members of Congress spending long hours in the early spring over at the White House. I think all along there has been a commitment to having the understanding of Congress as we reach these decisions. Q Mike, to put it in sort of plain and undiplomatic language, there is about what the President said yesterday the air of an attempt to weasel out of a commitment. Is that what this Administration is doing? MR. McCURRY: No. Q Do you have anything about the situation at the Security Council where behind-the-scenes politicking seems to have stalled the selection of a prosecutor in the War Crimes Tribunal? It seems to raise real questions about whether that process is a serious one and whether it has any credibility and whether it's being watered down. MR. McCURRY: It has been of concern to us. It's something, through Ambassador Albright there, we have been pressing. My understanding is that they were getting ready to actually have an election for judges that will occur -- Q That's not the issue. The issue is really a prosecutor who will set the tone and the effectiveness of this whole thing. MR. McCURRY: There have been significant disagreements within the United Nations on that subject that we have been addressing and that others have been addressing. Q Let me suggest that this seems to be a behind-closed- doors replay of the issue of going there to have the arms embargo lifted; that we have a candidate that we contend we prefer -- Professor Bassiouni from Chicago. He is the preferred candidate of the Secretary General. He's supported by the non-aligned movement. And apparently when the U.S., when it had the chair -- when Madeleine Albright had the chair, (inaudible) members, two or three threatened a veto and the U.S., basically, backed off and has been left to cast around for an alternative, someone who is less aggressive, presumably, to satisfy the Europeans. That raises the question about whether this whole thing is a charade. MR. McCURRY: I don't know. Why does that raise that question? Q Because you're unable to get the approval of someone who has been very involved in cataloguing and documenting war crimes. The Europeans will not go along with that, apparently, and so the U.S. has backed off on its own candidate and dropped its own candidate and is left with, at the moment, nobody on the table for this job. MR. McCURRY: The United States is actively consulting with other members of the Council to identify an acceptable candidate who will be fully qualified and who will actively prosecute cases brought before the Tribunal. That doesn't imply anything about the ineffectiveness of the Tribunal itself or the lack of determination to proceed with the activities of the Tribunal. Q If you can't get someone who is clearly an aggressive prosecutor approved by the Europeans, that suggests this process is not very credible and it is very political. MR. McCURRY: That's your interpretation. There may be someone there who can be mutually acceptable who can vigorously prosecute these crimes as that person would be expected to do. Q How soon do you expect there would be a -- MR. McCURRY: We have been working within the Security Council to make sure that that is quite soon. And, as I say, we have been pressing the issue aggressively. In fact, the Secretary himself personally has felt that this is an important matter and is taking steps directly to help press the matter. Q What has he done? MR. McCURRY: I can't describe to you everything he's done. He's pushed the issue both within the United States and I think he's also raised this with others. Q Can you shed some light on a Bosnia question, which is a bureaucratic dispute over one part of the bureaucracy wanting to get the troop of "Hair," the operatic production, out of Sarajevo, and one part of the government arguing you should only be evacuating people who are wounded and who desperately need to go; the other part saying it's a great cultural thing to get them out. Where does that stand? MR. McCURRY: You got it pretty well right. Q AP got it right. Q Is there a resolution of this dispute? MR. McCURRY: No, there's not a resolution at the moment. I'll describe for you what I know and where matters stands at the moment. There are transport planes that are taking supplies into Sarajevo, as you know, that then return to their bases empty, for all practical purposes, that might be able to accommodate some individuals and certain special circumstances who would leave Sarajevo for things like studying in the United States or participating in theatrical productions or whatever. How you handle those cases -- how you make sure that you're, one, complying with the U.N. guidelines and then, two, how do you this in a way that is fair. If one group gets to come, why not another group? How do you establish some way of handling those types of issues is something that, frankly, it dangled around for a while, it's not been taken up at a very high level within the government, and I expect they're going to resolve it very, very shortly. Q Mike, could you confirm the Washington Times report this morning that a senior U.S. nuclear official went to South Korea concerning North Korean matter, please? MR. McCURRY: I'm not sure if I'm supposed to or not, but I think I can confirm that Bob Gallucci is going to South Korea and I think plan to have discussions there. Q He's going to South Korea? Q He is going? MR. McCURRY: I think he is going or may be on the way there. His intent was to have meetings with the South Koreans and to discuss with the South Koreans developments -- a wide variety of issues, but also including discussions with North Korea. Q What is his schedule there, please? MR. McCURRY: I'll try to find out more about it. I'm not sure when he left and when he's meeting there, but we'll find out more. Q The second talk, Geneva talk, between the United State and North Korea, the statement said that within two months you are going to have a third round of U.S.-North Korean talks. Two months is nearly consumed by one week or so. So do you have a clear deadline for that kind of two months? MR. McCURRY: I'm not sure there's a clear deadline. I believe that a third round of high-level talks between North Korea and the United States were dependent on significant progress being made in talks that the DPRK would have with the International Atomic Energy Authority and a resumption of the North-South dialogue. I don't believe that those conditions have been satisfied in our mind, and I don't believe there are currently any plans to have a third round of discussions. Q So there's no definite deadline? In the second talk, the statement said that within two months you're going to have a third round of talks. So that is not definitely a deadline for the third round? MR. McCURRY: The agreement was within that period that dialogue would occur if the necessary conditions had been met and if progress was made, as I say, on the North-South talks and on the talks that North Korea would then have with the IAEA. That has not happened to our satisfaction. Therefore, the talks have not been held. Q So, Mike, do you regard this as a serious setback, that those things haven't happened and you're not having a third round of talks? MR. McCURRY: I think it is of some concern to us that those things have not happened, and I believe that's, among other things, that's certainly what Assistant Secretary Gallucci will explore while he's in the region. Q Will he meet with the North Koreans while he's there? Is there any talk -- MR. McCURRY: I'm not aware of any plans for him to do that, no. Q By chance, do you have any word on the resumption of the Bosnian peace -- or maybe partition -- talks in New York, Geneva? The President spoke possibly of next week. MR. McCURRY: I don't. I should have checked. I'm not saying that's not within the realm of the possible. I just forgot to check and see where they go next. Q I thought if the U.S. hosted -- you know, that word might come here first. MR. McCURRY: Not that I'm aware of. I think they would stay in Geneva. Q Thank you. (Press briefing concluded at 1:48 p.m.) (###)