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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman Taken Questions for August 26, 1993 1. SUDAN: NEW SUDANESE AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. Q: Has the former head of the Sudanese Mission to the U.N. presented his credentials to be the Ambassador to the U.S.? A: -- AMBASSADOR AHMED SULIMAN GAVE A COPY OF HIS CREDENTIALS TO THE PROTOCOL OFFICE AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON MONDAY. HOWEVER, HE HAS NOT YET BEEN SCHEDULED TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS TO THE PRESIDENT. 2. CHINA/IRAN: YIN HE Q. What international agreements cover the possible transfer of precursor chemicals to Iran from the Chinese vessel "Yin He"? A. -- CHINA IS A SIGNATORY OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, WHICH CALLS FOR STATES PARTY NOT TO ACT IN ANY WAY TO FACILITATE OTHER STATES' EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND NOT TO ACT IN ANY WAY TO DEFEAT THE PURPOSES OF THE CONVENTION. -- THOUGH THAT TREATY IS NOT YET IN EFFECT, THE U.S. PLACES A HIGH PRIORITY ON WORKING WITH NATIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TO HALT THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. - CHINA HAS REPEATEDLY ASSURED THE U.S THAT IT OPPOSES THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THAT EXPORTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRECURSORS FROM CHINA ARE PROHIBITED. 3. MTCR: RANGE/PAYLOAD RESTRICTIONS Q. Any reaction to Pakistani claims the M-ll missile cannot carry a 500 kilogram payload 300 kilometers and so does not fall under the MTCR restrictions? A. -- THE MISSILE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY REGIME (MTCR) ANNEX COVERS ITEMS AND TECHNOLOGY THAT CAN BE USED TO PRODUCE OR DEVELOP MISSILES THAT CAN CARRY A 500 KILOGRAM PAYLOAD 300 KILOMETERS, AS WELL AS THE MISSILES THEMSELVES. -- THE DETERMINATION MADE TUESDAY [August 24, 1993] WAS THAT MATERIALS MEETING THAT DESCRIPTION WERE TRANSFERRED FROM CHINA TO PAKISTAN. 4. ISRAEL: GAO REPORT ON ARROW MISSILE Q. Any comment on the General Accounting Office (GAO) report's charge that the U.S./Israeli Arrow missile program has not been subject to adequate oversight and control? A. -- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTROLS THE EXPORT OF U.S. COMPONENTS AND TECHNOLOGY FOR THE ARROW PROGRAM THROUGH ESTABLISHED LICENSING PROCEDURES OPERATED BY THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND COMMERCE. WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THESE PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE, OR THAT ISRAEL HAS FAILED TO HONOR END-USE ASSURANCES PROVIDED UNDER OUR MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT. -- WE ARE AWARE OF THE GAO'S CONCLUSIONS AND ARE EXAMINING WAYS TO FURTHER IMPROVE EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR OVERSIGHT OF THE ARROW PROGRAM. Q. Given questions in the GAO report about the Arrow's performance, will the U.S. continue the program or look for alternatives? A. -- WE ARE COMMITTED TO FUNDING THE ARROW/ACES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. -- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THIS PROGRAM RECOGNIZES THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT ISRAEL FACES. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR LONG-STANDING COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND TO MAINTAINING ITS QUALITATIVE EDGE. -- THE ARROW IS AN ADVANCED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, WHICH NECESSARILY INVOLVES TECHNICAL RISK. THERE IS CURRENTLY NO U.S. ALTERNATIVE THAT IS FURTHER ALONG IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. Q. Is there any evidence that Israel is using Arrow technologies and/or components for other missile or weapons programs? A. -- WE HAVE NO BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT ISRAEL HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN UNAUTHORIZED DIVERSIONS OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATED WITH THE ARROW PROGRAM. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ENSURE THAT FUNDS AND TECHNOLOGY INTENDED FOR THE ARROW ARE NOT USED TO SUPPORT OTHER ISRAELI PROGRAMS. (###)