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US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
Monday, August 23, 1993
BRIEFER: Michael McCurry
Subject Page
TERRORISM
Department to Publicize Reward for Information
on Mir Aimal Kansi
..............................................................1-3
CHINA
Han Dongfang's Passport Canceled/US Reaction ............3
Status of MFN
............................................................3
Illegal Immigration into US/US Counter Efforts ..........4
Prospects for Hosting Olympic Games ...............................4-5
Ship Suspected of Carrying CW Precursors Under
Way/Prospects for Inspection ...............................5-6
NIGERIA
US Condemns Human Rights Abuses/Refusal to
Release Election Results/US Aid ........................6-8
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
CSCE Statement re: Monitors in Kosovo/Concern
for Spillover of Conflict
....................................................8
Proposed Peace Agreement
.......................................................9-11,18-19
-- Peace Keeping/US Commitment
......................................10-11
Resignation of Steven W. Walker
...........................................11-12,15-18
Humanitarian Relief .........................................12-13
Situation in Mostar ........................................12,19
NATO Air Support/US Ambassadors Brief NATO .............12-14
Prospects for Sanction against Croatia .......................15
LITHUANIA
US Urges Complete Withdrawal of Russian Troops ........8-9
NICARAGUA
Status of US Aid ............................................19
US Discussions re: Restoration of Civil Control ............20
Hostage Stand -Off..........................................20
MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS
Resumption of Bilateral Talks .............................21
SYRIA
Report of Scuds Transported by Russia .....................21-22
LIBYA
Statement re: Pan Am 103 Bombing Suspects ................22
(###)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPC #118
MONDAY, AUGUST 23, 1993, l:0l P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. McCURRY: Good afternoon, everybody. We'll get started
here. I've got several statements at the outset that I will not read in
their entire length, but I will direct you to the Press Office and tell
you that they will be available.
The first is -- and I'll share with you again -- a part of our
effort to work cooperatively with the FBI. We'll have this available to
all of you later on; but the Department of State is initiating, at the
request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an international
publicity campaign in an effort to locate Mir Aimal Kansi. The FBI is
offering a reward of up to $l00,000 for information leading to the
arrest of Kansi, who's pictured here in this reward poster (indicating)
that will be publicized around the world.
I think many of you recall the events of January 25 earlier
this year. Kansi, who as a citizen of Pakistan was temporarily residing
in the United States, is alleged to have murdered two persons and
permanently injured three others outside the CIA Headquarters in
Langley, Virginia. Immediately after this attack Kansi fled the United
States. He's now a fugitive from justice, believed to be in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iran, or Iraq; so, appropriately working in connection with
the FBI's investigative team, we'll be publicizing the availability of
this reward from the FBI.
Second, we --
Q Wait a minute. Can we just ask you about this?
MR. McCURRY: Sure. Do you want to do it? O.K., let's do them
one at a time. Yes.
Q Is this just an announcement? Are they going to do
advertising the way you guys do in your program?
MR. McCURRY: We're actually going to assist them with the
advertising. We'll help them with the placements and determining where
they should place the individual advertisements, similar to the ones
that we showed you on our Terrorism Rewards Program that we shared last
week.
I'll tell you: This is separate from our own program, which we
talked about in recent weeks. This award payment would come out of FBI
funds. They came to us. They asked for our assistance in figuring out
the best way of spreading this message, and that's what we are
attempting to help them to do.
Q So you don't know what media organs you will put this in
or they will put this in?
MR. McCURRY: I'm not sure exactly where we will be placing
this. I can check a little further, if there's interest in that, how
exactly we will target the message. Clearly we're relying on some help
from our Embassy in Islamabad in arranging for the announcement there,
and we'll direct people to the appropriate authorities here if they've
got information or leads that we can help develop.
Q This is --
Q Is there any indication that the rewards program works at
all, or is this just --
MR. McCURRY: We actually do. I don't have the figures on
this, but I was looking into this the other day. I think since the
inception of both the International Terrorism Reward Program and then
similar rewards programs like the ones conducted by the Bureau, there
have been numerous individuals who've come forward with leads that are
then properly developed and investigated by law-enforcement officials.
So we do believe that this -- both the program itself and the attempt to
publicize these rewards -- does have the desired effect of bringing
forth some information that can help develop credible leads for the
people who are investigating.
Q Have any of these rewards been paid? Do you ever catch
anybody?
MR. McCURRY: They have dispensed some money. They have given
rewards. I remember when we looked at this in connection with the
Yousef case recently, there have been some payments made; and there have
been, certainly, leads and additional information that have been
pursued.
Q Are you talking about money dispensed after the last time
you made kind of poster on these awards?
MR. McCURRY: I'm sorry?
Q There was a kind of statement by the Department, I
remember maybe a couple of months ago, about how far it was a success
and that there was money dispensed. Do you mean you are talking about
money dispensed after that time so recent, during the last few months?
MR. McCURRY: Oh, no. I think that when we covered this --
this was in the case of Mr. Yousef when we discussed that recently -- we
did provide some information then on the payments to date. I'm not
aware if there have been additional payments since then in developing
leads; but if there are, I can get more information on that and make it
available.
Any more questions on that?
Then I'll move to China. I've got a statement on the Chinese
labor activist Han Dongfang.
We deplore the Chinese government's decision to cancel the
passport of labor activist Han Dongfang. This action follows Han's
forced expulsion from China on August l4 immediately after he had
reentered his country from Hong Kong.
We call on the Chinese government to reverse its decision,
allow Han to return to China. By cancelling his passport and denying
him entry, the Chinese government is contravening Article l3 of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which provides that citizens have
a right of return to their country.
The Clinton Administration, as maybe you are aware, is deeply
concerned about human rights aspects of our relationship with China.
This was made clear in the May 28 decision announced by the President
concerning Most-Favored Nation status, and it's an issue that we
regularly and vigorously pursue with the Chinese government.
Q Is this reason enough not to give it to them again next
year?
MR. McCURRY: Well --
Q Now you have a condition attached. You're very --
MR. McCURRY: Right.
Q The administration is very clear that human rights
performance will be the gauge.
MR. McCURRY: There are very specific conditions that are
attached, both in the Executive Order signed by the President May 28 and
in the expectation that there then is a report that comes forward by the
Secretary of State to the President when they review MFN status next
year; and, certainly, exactly cases like these are the things that will
be examined and looked at carefully by the Secretary as he prepares his
recommendation to the President next year concerning MFN status.
Connie?
Q The New York Times had an article today about more Chinese
immigrants. Do you have evidence that they're still coming?
MR. McCURRY: Well, they do. I think there was a long report
-- I don't want to get too much into the details of that. They talked
specifically about an increase in the arrival by air. We've talked
often here of some of the steps that we've seen the alien smugglers take
as regards trans- shipment on the oceans, and this report I think
referred to increased activity in the air. There has not, to our
knowledge, been an increase in the numbers over the summer, but it still
remains a very real problem; and it's a real problem that the
President's June l8 policy, announced two months ago, is designed to
combat.
I think you know that there are increased diplomatic and law-
enforcement efforts associated with this new policy. There are measures
to interdict smuggling vessels, to expedite processing of entry claims
for those who have been repatriated, but then also to return economic
migrants who are attempting to come here -- often at the hands of
smugglers -- to return them expeditiously to their country of origin.
Now, we have seen this year a major upturn in alien smuggling.
The Coast Guard, I understand, has intercepted ll ships carrying Chinese
illegal immigrants. Other Chinese illegal migrants have been
intercepted at airports. Again, I'd say on specific statistics or
numbers, I would refer you to the INS. I would simply restate our own
very strong concern about the conditions that will prevail for those who
attempt to enter into this flow of illegal economic smuggling activity.
The people who conduct these activities -- the reports that many of you
have seen about snakeheads in China fully indicate that the health and
welfare of those who might be lured into this type of activity is not
the first concern of those conducting these enterprises. We remain
concerned about those who might risk their lives by engaging with those
who are smuggling; and we fully condemn those who participate in this
type of illegal economic activity.
Q One more on China. In light of these various human rights
violations, does the U.S. have a stand on China's bid for the Olympics?
Are you making any recommendation?
MR. McCURRY: Well, I think as you know, in the past we've told
you that we have shared some of our concerns and views on human rights
conditions in China with U.S. members of the International Olympic
Committee. I don't believe that we have stated a specific view on
whether or not China should host the games in the year 2000; but we have
made some of our concerns and views known to those who are on the IOC
committee that will make a decision, I understand sometime fairly soon,
on the location of the Games in the year 2000.
Q Will you present them again before they make their
decisions?
MR. McCURRY: Yes. If we have anything additional to say on
that, we certainly will say it.
Q Also on China, is there anything new on the Yin He, this
ship in the Persian Gulf?
MR. McCURRY: No. I didn't have anything brand-new on it other
than this. I think there have been reports, that I'm sure many of you
are aware of, that the vessel is now underway, or apparently will soon
be underway, I believe for Saudi Arabia, for the port of Dammam. It's
our expectation at that time that there may be an inspection made of the
vessel, but I don't have details on that at this time.
Q Is there some kind of deal? What do you mean there's
expectations? Does that mean that there have been assurances?
MR. McCURRY: I think that the issue that we've been looking at
over the last many days as it relates to the Yin He is when the vessel
might actually be examined to see if our concerns about a cargo that
might include chemical weapons precursors are valid concerns.
Q I know, but my question was --
MR. McCURRY: Yes, sir.
Q -- is there a deal?
MR. McCURRY: I think you used the word "deal." That was what
I was probably objecting to.
As we've said in the past, we've had diplomatic contacts with
governments in the region. I think that we've also indicated that China
was being cooperative in our concerns that there actually be an attempt
to inspect the vessel itself.
Q So China has agreed to the inspection?
MR. McCURRY: Yes. We had said before that we didn't know of
any objections that they had raised.
Q Mike, who would actually do the inspections?
MR. McCURRY: I don't know the answer to that. I'll take that
question. That's a good question.
Q But will it not be the United States?
MR. McCURRY: I think the last I recall there was an effort to
find a third party that would make the investigation; but as I say, I'll
check further and see exactly how they will conduct the inspection.
Q There are very short distances in that neck of the woods.
One would expect it to arrive tomorrow, right? -- unless they're taking
a zig-zag pattern.
MR. McCURRY: The information I saw earlier today indicated it
might take more like several days for the ship to arrive at port. I'm
not sure why that would be the case, but that's the information I saw
earlier.
Q The Japanese hate-bashing, since we're going about
generally the region -- can we get into that topic very quickly?
MR. McCURRY: Why don't we stay on this, and then I want to get
through some of my opening statements here -- which are less than
opening at this point.
Q What was the port you said it's going to?
MR. McCURRY: Dammam. D-a-m-m-a-m, I believe.
Q N?
MR. McCURRY: "M"? Thank you. What's the correct spelling so
I don't get it wrong?
Q D-a- --
MR. McCURRY: I'm not sure how you -- it's a transliteration in
any event, obviously.
Q It's D-a-double m-a-m.
MR. McCURRY: Yes.
Q All right.
MR. McCURRY: D-a-double M-a-m -- as in "Mary."
Another question?
Q No.
MR. McCURRY: More announcements.
On Nigeria, I think you all know we have followed the situation
there very closely.
The United States deplores the Nigerian military regime's
continued abuse of citizens' fundamental human rights. Respect for
human rights is the foundation of democratic civil society; and the
regime's constant attacks on human rights organizations, the press and
judicial independence do not auger well for the future of democracy in
Nigeria. We note with particular dismay the regime's harassment,
intimidation and detention of human rights activists, its proscriptions
of press organs, and its seizures of publications.
The United States is also deeply concerned by the regime's
refusal to release the results of the June l2 presidential election and
permit that electoral process to conclude in accordance with rules
established by the regime itself. The United States observes that the
Nigerian people, through their recent words and actions, have made it
abundantly clear that they want the military regime to step aside. The
Nigerian military regime has often promised to turn over power to
elected civilians on August 27 of this year; and I think, as many of you
know, we have brought several measures in force to express our concern
and our objection to the decision not to release the results of the
election itself.
We'll have that statement. That statement will be posted at
length.
We also --
Q Any additional steps, such as expulsions?
MR. McCURRY: There are additional steps that could very well
come into place if there is not an orderly transfer of power to civilian
rule, as indicated previously by President Babangida on August 27; and I
think those measures are now under active consideration.
Q Can you name them?
MR. McCURRY: Well, we don't want to detail anything that would
raise speculation that there are steps that we would take; but we've
talked -- in the past I think you are all aware of the steps that we
have taken involving training programs, the suspension of aid, certain
types of aid, and the steps we've taken to date. I think there are
additional measures along those lines that could be pursued; but again
we'll be watching -- indeed, the world will be watching -- to see
whether or not President Babangida makes good on a promise made long ago
to turn Nigeria to civilian rule as of the end of the month.
Q The apparent winner in the June election, whose name is
Abiola, I think, says that he is going to form a government in place.
Does the United States take any position on that?
MR. McCURRY: We don't take a position on his effort to form a
government in place. I understand that President- elect Abiola is
currently in Europe. There is some information that suggests that he
may attempt to return to Nigeria; but I think whether or not that
happens is something that we would have to see develop over the next
several days, if not weeks, and comment on it appropriately as we move
ahead.
Next we have a long statement mostly that is designed to call
your attention to a statement that has been issued by the Swedish
Foreign Minister, af Ugglas, on behalf of the CSCE concerning monitors
in Kosovo. We are essentially repeating here for your benefit her
statement and to let you know that we both concur in that and restate
the significant concern that we have about the spillover of the conflict
in the Balkans to the adjacent province of Kosovo. That's something
that has been of substantial concern to us. It's an issue that has been
raised most recently by the U.N. Security Council; and it's one that has
certainly grave implications for the Balkans, as it affects the question
of whether or not this conflict will spill over to adjacent regions.
That statement we do have available which repeats her concern at some
length.
And then, finally, I think the only other statement we did, we
clearly regret that the Russian Government arrived at the decision to
suspend the withdrawal of Russian troops remaining in Lithuania. We are
concerned that the visit to Moscow by the Lithuanian President has been
cancelled. Direct high-level contacts between Russia and Lithuania are
critical to resolve this problem, and the United States has consistently
supported unconditional and complete withdrawal of Russian forces from
all three Baltic republics.
A longer statement from the United States urging Russia to
comply with its agreement to withdraw forces will also be available.
Q You just regret that? I mean, doesn't that send an
awesome signal?
MR. McCURRY: Well, the statement, as I say, is somewhat longer
in length, but I have given you the gist of it.
Q Mike, how did you express that regret to Russia?
MR. McCURRY: I think we have raised this issue directly with
them in diplomatic contacts we have had.
Q At what level, though?
MR. McCURRY: I don't believe it has been handled at the
Secretarial level.
Q When the Secretary is in touch with Kosyrev about other
matters, like Bosnia, has he had the chance to talk about this, or is
this too recent?
MR. McCURRY: I don't know whether he has talked about
Lithuania troop withdrawals in his conversations and contacts with
Foreign Minister Kosyrev, or in his recent contacts. I know that he has
had contacts with the Foreign Minister over the course of this month,
but I don't know whether this subject has been among the list of issues
that were addressed.
Q Could I ask you about the so-called peace accord, and ask
you if it's the Clinton Administration's view that the Bosnian
Government should accept this arrangement, the paternity of which isn't
clear to me in the first place?
MR. McCURRY: Well, our view has been that the parties
themselves should engage in serious direct negotiations, attempting to
achieve a political settlement that can be reached in good faith, that
can be a viable agreement, that can be enforced and fully implemented.
We have expressed our views to the parties in Geneva directly, and we
have made it clear our interest is in a political settlement that the
parties themselves can see leading to some measure of peace in the
region, some effort to return that war-torn area to a measure of
normalcy.
This agreement that has been reached and now submitted to the
peoples of the three respective entities will have to be judged by them.
We will, of course, watch over the next several days to see how the
reaction of the Bosnian Government develops. I think you are all aware
of the comments that President Izetbegovic has made, I think even as
recently as yesterday; and we have been in close contact with him and
will continue to be in close contact with him.
Q But it sounds like you're not taking a position, and you
talk about the three parties as if they are free agents. It could be
argued that the Bosnian Government doesn't have much freedom of action
there. Do you factor that in? And they themselves, or at least their
leader, say this is not an acceptable arrangement. Is this the best
that they could hope for, perhaps?
MR. McCURRY: Well, whether or not this is the best that they
could hope for is a question that they are going to examine themselves.
I think the President made very clear that he was going to submit this
to his people, to the leadership of Bosnia-Hercegovina to discuss the
consequences of not reaching a settlement along these lines and the
specific component parts of this agreement itself; but they are the ones
who have to judge whether this is an agreement that they themselves
consider to be one that can lead to some measure of peace and a
restoration of normal conditions in Bosnia itself.
Q And if they do in fact reach an agreement similar to what
is outlined in the current accord, does the U.S. pledge to provide a
large number of troops to enforce this peace still stand unequivocally,
or how would your words on that subject now read?
MR. McCURRY: I think you are aware of the commitment we have
made in the past to assist in the implementation of an agreement made
between the parties in good faith, that they themselves are in the
process of implementing.
That's what we have indicated in the past in our commitment.
That commitment stands; but again I say, as I have said often, we want
to see what specifically an agreement of this nature would look like.
We have got some indications of how this proposal would develop, but we
need to understand much more clearly what would be expected of any
country contributing troops to helping enforce such an agreement.
That's a question that, if they get to the point that there is an
agreement that all three parties have clearly entered into and are
implementing, that question then goes to the United Nations so the
United Nations can address the question of how do you configure and
develop the troop requirements necessary for implementing an agreement.
Now I will say it's a question that we have looked at very,
very carefully in the past as it related to the Vance-Owen plan, so it's
not something that we are sort of standing back waiting for someone to
make the request. We have actually looked at the question of how you
would assist in implementing a political settlement of this nature; but
again, a lot of it depends on how the settlement itself is drawn, and
then what specifically is required of the international community as the
settlement is implemented.
Q Mike, is the --
Q Wait a second. You've got somebody in Geneva, the maps
have been published. How can you say that we want to see what the
settlement would look like? You obviously know what it looks like.
MR. McCURRY: Well, we know some things about how it would
look; but there are a lot of questions associated with that that would
then have to be addressed by the parties themselves, and could
conceivably be addressed by the mediators. I think you all know that
the EC itself got involved over the last several days of the negotiation
in talking about the status of Mostar, for example. I think there are a
lot of things that are still to be fleshed out about how the agreement
would be implemented; and we just want to be cautious in saying that we
need to look and see how the settlement is drawn, what requirements then
are made of all within the international community before we talk freely
about how we would respond to meeting our commitment.
Q The bottom line, Mike, is you were saying that if all
three parties agree on the details of the plan, then the United States
would be willing to make whatever commitment is necessary to implement.
Is that what you are saying?
MR. McCURRY: Well, I said --
Q Are you saying --
MR. McCURRY: I said, as we have said in the past, that we are
willing to assist in the implementation of an agreement, including the
possible use of ground forces. We have said that in the past; but I'm
just not committing ourselves to implementing a particular agreement
until we understand much more about how it is configured and how it
looks.
Q Have you told the three parties what conditions would
hinge, though, on participation by U.S. troops?
MR. McCURRY: We have been in close contact with the parties.
I think they understand the nature of our commitment, that we haven't
talked about specific types of measures we would pursue in meeting the
commitment; but I think they are aware of the commitment. They are
aware of the role that we would play, and we are asking from them and
from the mediators themselves better understandings about how the
political settlement itself would look.
I just think, again, it's in the category of being premature at
this point to discuss a political settlement that has not yet been
entered into by the parties themselves.
Q Is the State Department a little more short-handed today
in terms of people able to analyze this agreement?
MR. McCURRY: Yes. I don't want to make light of a serious
resignation that was, in fact, submitted by Steven W. Walker today. Mr.
Walker has made valued contributions to the Foreign Service. We
certainly regret his departure, but we respect the decision he has made
to submit his resignation from the U. S. Foreign Service effective at
noon today.
Q Mike, can we go back to Mostar a bit? We all know the
situation there, unless it has changed in the last hour or so, where
people are starving. They are in the grips this time of the Croats.
There couldn't be a clearer example of relief inhibited, blocked. And
using a Christopher judgment, what remains -- what possible reason could
there be for not taking action?
MR. McCURRY: Well, most immediately the action that needs to
be taken is to try to do something about people who are starving in
Mostar. I think that right now we are looking at the question of how
you can best get relief through either Serbian territory or Croatian-
held territory into Mostar -- and I think they are also looking at the
feasibility of air drops, as well.
So I think step one is you've got to do something about people
who are starving, who need assistance, and that's a matter that we are
working on in connection with UNPROFOR.
On the larger issue of how does this activity measure up to the
criteria that have been laid out by NATO in its threatened use of air
strikes, I think you would have to acknowledge that that NATO document
is very clear about what it considers to be conditions for military
action by NATO itself -- and I'm certain that the Croats are well aware
of that criteria.
Q But you said last week, when you were asked that same
question, that the NATO document does not refer to Croats, it refers to
Serbs. Are you saying now that the Administration interprets it to
include Croatian aggression?
MR. McCURRY: No. I'm glad you asked that question because I
spoke incorrectly last week. In fact, it's good for me to have an
opportunity to clarify that.
The NATO document always had referred to Bosnian Serbs and
others who were impeding the delivery of humanitarian relief. There's
no doubt, no question, that the document itself and the debate about the
document centered more on Serb activity; but it certainly does reference
directly other parties. This was pointed out to me by Sandy Vershbow,
who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the EUR Bureau. So I think
that that is something that we certainly are very aware of, and we have
made the parties aware of.
Q Mike, can we go back a bit? Do you have anything from
the Serbs promising to assist in the relief operations for the Muslims
in Mostar?
MR. McCURRY: I'm not aware of any promise of that nature, but
I can find out more. I think the latest information is they are looking
for a way to route convoys through Serb-controlled territory, and I
don't know whether that means that UNPROFOR has reached some agreement
with the Serb commanders locally in that region or not. I can see if
that's the case.
Q I don't want to really quibble, but there is something
that bothers me here. I didn't see any caveats in what, let's call for
the moment, the Christopher doctrine. You know, that there's another
way to get relief to people who can't get relief because people are
blocking the convoys. That that somehow gets the, you know, gets the
guilty party off the hook.
MR. McCURRY: I'm sorry, what...
Q All right, let me start all over again. Christopher last
week said that the two criteria for activating the NATO plan is, well,
first was stop the siege, and the second was stop getting in the way of
relief.
Now, the fact that you might be able to air-drop stuff in
doesn't absolve the Croats from what they are doing. You mean if you
can find another way to help people just before they pass out that then
there is no guilty party to punish -- it sounds like you are saying.
MR. McCURRY: I didn't
Q Well, you talk about air lifts and you talk about going
through Serbia. These people are at the brink of starvation.
MR. McCURRY: That's right.
Q And the guilty party is very clear and very evident. It's
Croatian-Serbs who won't let the relief get through. And the question
is, is the Administration going to try to find another way to help these
people? Or will you get NATO together and do something about it, I
guess is the question.
MR. McCURRY: I think earlier, for you, I detailed exactly the
things that we are trying to look at by way of assisting those who are
on the verge of starvation. That is a very real problem. But I don't
think our anger over those who put them in that condition -- that's a
separate issue from the question of how do you deal with trying to save
lives more immediately. And the larger question, as I say, of what you
then do to insure that there is not further impeding of humanitarian
relief, that's something that I'm sure will have to be examined
carefully by NATO.
Q But, Mike, why did we not ask for a reconvening of NATO?
That was supposedly the next step: if somebody interferred with
humanitarian assistance, then they were going to call for another
meeting to determine -- take the final step before the air strikes were
called.
MR. McCURRY: There's also a need to lay before NATO
information about exactly what's happening on the ground. That's
exactly why Ambassador Redman and Ambassador Jackovich are in Brussels
today at NATO, briefing NATO on both the conditions that exist in
Sarajevo -- since that's where Ambassador Jackovich toured last week --
and Ambassador Redman is there to brief on what we see the likelihood of
the prospects of the Geneva talks being.
Our two diplomats who have been working most closely on the
situation are at NATO today discussing exactly those types of issues at
NATO.
Q Mike, is this the much-advertised additional step that
would be taken before a decision is made to launch air strikes?
MR. McCURRY: This is not a formal meeting of the Permanent
Representatives of the North Atlantic Council to initiate air strikes,
no. Part of the work that we're doing, I think you all know, has been
to gather the available information that our allies will need and that
NATO will need so that you can then proceed to other options. That's
what our folks are doing.
Q Is it correct to say, Mike, that the Bosnian Croats run
the risk of air strikes if they don't stop the siege of Mostar?
MR. McCURRY: I'm not upping the ante in that fashion by saying
that today. My point is that's been clear from the time that NATO first
issued its document on August 2-3, and then again on the 9th.
Q But, Mike, the Croats and the Serbs both know about the
document, and the Croats, at least, are not paying any attention to it.
Why should they if there's no possibility of -- I mean, you say there is
a possibility of air strikes, but nobody is calling for them. Why
should they pay any attention to it?
MR. McCURRY: It's a NATO document and the consequences --
Q But will it be enforced?
MR. McCURRY: I can't answer that question for you right now.
Q Another form of pressure was the possibility of economic
sanctions against Croatia. Is that now under active consideration?
MR. McCURRY: Yes.
Q Where?
MR. McCURRY: The United Nations.
Q Is the U.S. Government prepared to move ahead on that now?
MR. McCURRY: I think it's something that we'll be discussing.
It's under active consideration. It's something we'll be discussing
with our allies.
Q Is the U.S. prepared to lead that effort?
Q Does the U.S. favor it?
MR. McCURRY: At this point I want to leave it at we're
discussing it with our allies. I'm sure we'll be talking about that
further.
Q Is there a draft resolution?
MR. McCURRY: I'm not aware of a draft resolution. I don't
think they're at a phase where they've tried to formulate any -- table
any resolution.
Q Has the U.S. conveyed to the Government of Croatia its
feelings on this matter recently?
MR. McCURRY: Recently and often.
Q In the last few days?
MR. McCURRY: I'm sure it's been within the scope of things
that have been discussed by Ambassador Redman and Ambassador Jackovich
as they meet with members of the Croatian delegation, yes. It has also,
I think, been presented in other diplomatic channels, too.
Q Mike, if we could go back to the resignation of Mr. Walker
for just a second. There was a resignation letter to the Secretary.
Can you give us any sense of his state of mind in that letter? Was he
asking for something? Did he decry something?
MR. McCURRY: I don't want to describe the state of mind. I
don't think that would be fair to a person who has worked diligently
within the Foreign Service. I would say that it's clear that he
expressed his dissatisfaction with U.S. policy towards the Bosnian
conflict. He said that he felt he couldn't continue to work in support
of that policy and chose, instead, to leave the Service.
Q Doesn't it feel a little bit like mutiny on the bounty
here? That's the fourth one in a year.
MR. McCURRY: It's the fourth resignation that I'm aware of.
Q Is there any validity to the things he is saying, that
this agreement was no good, for instance; that it may draw the United
States more deeply into the conflict; his four-point proposal for U.S.
policy, which really sounds like mostly telling -- suggesting -- you
activate a policy you've threatened all along?
MR. McCURRY: I don't want to get into the details of his
recommendations. I think, in good faith, he made recommendations as to
policy as have many within the Department. In fact, what I will say is
that the Secretary has tried to seek out some of these views. He's met
with people at this level who clearly have got concerns about our policy
on Bosnia, and he's sought out the kind of advice that Mr. Walker has
tendered in this letter.
Q What does this tell you?
Q Has the letter gone to the Secretary even though he's out
of town?
MR. McCURRY: The Secretary is out of town. He was made aware
of the letter by phone this morning, and he is being sent a copy of the
letter.
Q Mike, what does this tell you about the state of policy-
making in this building and the state of the debate about Bosnia?
MR. McCURRY: Well, I think it tells you what the Secretary
himself has said on numerous occasions. This is a frustrating, terrible
problem in which answers are not easy to come by. It's just as
frustrating for the Secretary as it is for people at the Country Desk
officer level who work on the problem.
Q Has there been this kind of debate, with its bitterness
and resignations, equal to this since Vietnam that you know of in this
building?
MR. McCURRY: I can't speak to that because I don't have enough
tenure here at the Department to know the answer to that.
Q Mike, you previously referred to this as just -- I think
the last set of resignations -- normal turnover. Do you still think
this is normal turnover?
MR. McCURRY: I don't think I ever said it was normal turnover.
I said people submit resignations and tender resignations often and
frequently here and we don't comment on each and every one. This one
we're commenting upon because it's also connected to a very
controversial policy decision and because the individual indicates in
good faith he can't execute a policy. It's fair to point out that
that's a form of protest that's an honorable form of protest.
Q The last time you had a resignation there were a number of
suggestions from a number of State Department officials saying that it
was frustration because people were cut out, actually, of formulating
policy. Is that your feeling on this one as well, or is it much more --
or do you feel that the reasons are much more deeper than that?
MR. McCURRY: I would have to back through Mr. Walker's letter
more carefully. I don't know if he cited that as one of his concerns or
not. Clearly, he was principally reflecting concern over the policy
itself.
Q It seems almost like the bureaucracy here is at war with
the top levels of the State Department, and they complain often of being
cut out from major decision-making. Does that concern you? Any steps
being taken to address that issue? Is he going to meet with --
MR. McCURRY: That's exactly why the Secretary, I think, has
tried to seek out these views -- dissident views. He had a meeting the
day before he left on his recent vacation on exactly this type of
question.
Q With whom?
MR. McCURRY: The question is, "With whom?" With a wide of
variety of people -- I don't want to say a lower level -- but at more of
a middle level within the policy-making apparatus both on the question
of Bosnia and then within other bureaus as well as a way of sort of
trying to seek a cross section of opinion at that level of the
Department from people who have got concerns about our policy.
Q Was Walker one of the people he met with?
MR. McCURRY: I don't believe Mr. Walker was one of them; but I
think they were, clearly, people he worked with closely.
Q Mike, you are giving the impression that you take the
resignation of Mr. Walker in a different way than the other three, the
last three resignations. Does this have anything to do with his time of
resignation, or what?
MR. McCURRY: I don't want to say that we're taking it any
differently. All of these resignations, we understand, are very
emotional forms of protest by the individuals involved, and we respect
that type of protest.
Clearly, we regret any decision made by an officer of the
Department who feels in good faith that they have to leave a career that
may be, as in this case, has been eight years in the making; but we have
to respect those decisions.
Q Mike, a previous officer who resigned, Jon Western,
believes that there is ample evidence for a determination of genocide in
Bosnia by the Bosnian Serbs. Is the United States prepared to make such
a determination?
MR. McCURRY: I think we've often addressed that question here.
I'm not sure that there is anything new to say on the subject.
Q New subject?
MR. McCURRY: New subject.
Q One more on Geneva, please.
MR. McCURRY: Geneva.
Q Is the United States in agreement with the decision by the
mediators to impose a deadline for all the parties to agree to a
settlement?
MR. McCURRY: I don't know the answer to that. I don't know
whether we concurred in the steps that Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg
take to set some type of deadline. I think many of you are aware that
we have encouraged the parties in different ways through different means
to really be serious about the business of trying to develop some
resolution to this crisis. But I don't know whether we've specifically
agreed with the tactic of setting a deadline.
Q Since only one party has not signed on, and this setting
of a deadline could be interpreted as pressure on that remaining party,
would you take that question?
MR. McCURRY: Yes, I will. Although I will say, obviously, as
we've said before, that we don't think an agreement that's reached by
pressuring a party is going to wind up being an agreement that can be
implemented in good faith.
Q Wait a minute. Excuse me, it sounds as though you're
trying to have it both ways. You want the parties to reach an
agreement, but you're saying you don't want pressure; and you've got
somebody in Geneva, but you're not making any kind of a comment on the
deadline itself?
MR. McCURRY: We want the conflict to come to an end so that --
as I think everyone has known, as we've said often here, there is a
very real need to begin stockpiling goods and supplies to prepare for
the coming winter. And I think it's really the coming of winter that
imposes, in some sense, a deadline because there are going to be many,
many people losing lives in Bosnia unless steps begin immediately to
address the humanitarian situation.
So one of our key interests here is to see that there is a way
that the parties themselves can reach an agreement that at the very
least allows for people to get the supplies -- the health, the
nutritional things -- they need to prepare for the coming winter.
Q One quick follow-up. I may have missed it. I'm sorry if
I did. Did you say the Administration was considering airdrops to
Mostar?
MR. McCURRY: I don't know that the Administration has; I think
it's under consideration by UNPROFOR. They're looking at the
feasibility of doing so. It can be difficult because it's a highly
urbanized setting, but they're looking at the feasibility of that.
Consistent with our participation in other humanitarian airlifts, we
would be willing to participate.
Q Mike, a question on Nicaragua?
MR. McCURRY: A question on Nicaragua.
Q You've got this stand-off with everybody taking hostages
from everybody else. You also have a Helms-sponsored hold on all
economic aid that has to be reconciled in conference. Does the
Administration have a position in light of this new instability in
Nicaragua as to whether or not -- on the withholding of aid to
Nicaragua?
MR. McCURRY: I'll kind of generally characterize what we have
said in some of our direct diplomatic discussions with the Nicaraguan
Government.
I would say that we have, as many of the international donors
have, said that we strongly support President Chamorro. We want her
government to succeed in consolidating democracy, establishing the rule
of law, protecting human rights and promoting economic development. But
we are concerned that unless Nicaragua's civilian government establishes
control over the security services, further progress will be very
difficult to achieve.
I think that the action you see in Congress is one measure of
how that would become more difficult.
We've actually asked, in diplomatic context, that they act very
decisively so it becomes clear that progress can be made in restoring
civilian control of the security services in the military. I think that
we've, in a variety of ways, indicated directly to the Nicaraguan
Government that there has to be progress in this area that the
international community can see, for those to continue participating in
that type of relief effort.
Q Is further aid conditioned on these steps?
MR. McCURRY: I'd hesitate to say it's conditioned, but I think
that needing to see this progress has been made quite clear to the
Chamorro government. I think there are many in Congress who speak even
more directly than that.
Q Will the resolution of this particular crisis play into
that? Are you looking at how the Chamorro government resolves this
current crisis?
MR. McCURRY: I don't want to say that this is one particular
benchmark. Certainly, we will watch and see how this situation is
addressed. We have additional concerns. I think you're all familiar
with the arms cache that was discovered on May 23. There are other
things that we are looking at as well.
The hostage stand-off is but one measure of how effectively the
Nicaraguan Government can control the security and military apparatus.
Q Are you in a position to name names? Would the dismissal
of Humberto Ortega be a good first step?
MR. McCURRY: I don't want to name names because I don't want
to indicate that there's one particular individual that is more
important than another. I think what is more important is for the
United States to feel confident that the Nicaraguan Government has
worked through the problems that clearly exist in bringing security
forces and military commanders under the control of civilian rule,
rather than focus on one individual -- more on the problem itself which
we, clearly, are insisting needs to be addressed.
Q Mike, is there a role for the Sandinistas in the
Nicaraguan Government?
MR. McCURRY: That's really an internal question that goes to
the composition.
Q Well, they control the security forces. Are you calling
on Chamorro to get them under control? I would suspect your diplomatic
message was that she should get them out?
MR. McCURRY: Right. That's a different thing than saying that
there should be no Sandinista elements in the constitution of the
government, which is a separate question that's really an internal
matter for the Nicaraguan people.
There was a question back there.
Q I want to move to a new issue. You are looking at the
Eleventh Round of Middle Eastern peace talks. I want to ask, is there
any concern that internal problems in both camps will make any
breakthrough mission impossible? What is the level of expectations?
And can we consider it a break-or-make round of talks?
MR. McCURRY: In one sense, kind of easy questions because you
get predictable answers. I think we would hesitate to declare any
aspect of this on-going discussion to be "make or break" because this is
-- you've heard the Secretary say often that we make progress, it's
either inch by inch or millimeter by millimeter. I can't remember
whether we were metric or otherwise.
This is an on-going dialogue that the Secretary certainly
expects will occupy a considerable amount of time for the balance of
this year. The next step is the parties gathering again here in
Washington for direct negotiations to build on some of the ideas that
were exchanged, some of the important decisions that have to be made.
The next step, as they gather again in Washington, is for the parties to
look back at those very tough choices that have to be made if they truly
want peace and to begin to fashion some type of consensus on how those
decisions can be implemented. That's what the work of this next round
will be about.
We don't have anything new unless there was something said at
the end of last week on acceptances or when precisely we expect them to
begin. I think we're still waiting to hear from some of the parties.
We expect they will recommence here on either the 30th or the 31st, I
believe.
Q The last time you said you received a response from
Israel.
MR. McCURRY: The Israelis.
Q Other responses. It's still Israel only?
MR. McCURRY: I should have checked today to see if there was
anything new over the weekend and I didn't. Once we have indication
from the parties that they are ready to reconvene, we'll certainly alert
you to that -- although I'll remind you that just prior to the last
round of talks the acceptances came in quite late, I think almost on the
eve of the talks themselves. As soon as we have word of their precise
arrival times and things like that, we'll share that information.
Q Mike, just to go back over some old ground; maybe you have
a different response. The question is, is Syria's purchase of Scud
missile components here on the eve, so to speak, of a next round, and
Russia's transportation of them consistent with their role as
participant and co-sponsor of the talks?
MR. McCURRY: I confess I haven't been able to get satisfactory
answers to that question. You've asked it religiously, and I will
formally take it now and see if we can't use the process of taking a
question to maybe get a more direct answer.
Q In about the same area.
MR. McCURRY: Same area.
Q About. Libya is now suggesting resuming diplomatic
relations with the United States as a precondition for yielding their
two suspects to the U.S. or to the Government of Great Britain. Do you
have any comment on that?
MR. McCURRY: That's not the last bizarre suggestion that will
come from Libya. I think that they know precisely the expectations that
the world community has on them as it relates to the two Pam Am 103
suspects. They need to be delivered to those who can effectively
prosecute and try them for their alleged crimes promptly. That's the
urgent question that's before Libya and it's the reason why the
international community -- and specifically Britain, the United States,
and France -- are contemplating additional tougher sanctions to be
placed on Libya.
Q Before we go, I thought it might help to make clear
whether -- you know, we were hearing everyday about the warnings that
the Serbs faced about the strangulation of Sarajevo. Is the United
States, now with this meeting over at NATO in Brussels, warning the
Croatian side about the strangulation of Mostar with NATO air power, or
just merely pointing out that that option exists?
MR. McCURRY: All I'm doing right now, I'm not issuing any
warnings from the podium here today. I am just simply telling you what
has been clear since the time NATO addressed this issue itself: that the
prospect of further military action did relate directly to the provision
of humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that those
responsible -- I believe it says Bosnian Serbs and others -- could face
the impact of that threat directly. But, specific warnings from NATO
will come from NATO itself.
Thank you.
MR. McCURRY: You're welcome.
(Press briefing concluded at 1:55 p.m.)
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