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US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
Monday, August 23, 1993

                                           BRIEFER:  Michael McCurry

Subject                                                       Page

TERRORISM
Department to Publicize Reward for Information
      on Mir Aimal Kansi 
..............................................................1-3

CHINA
Han Dongfang's Passport Canceled/US Reaction ............3
Status of MFN 
............................................................3
Illegal Immigration into US/US Counter Efforts ..........4
Prospects for Hosting Olympic Games ...............................4-5
Ship Suspected of Carrying CW Precursors Under
      Way/Prospects for Inspection ...............................5-6

NIGERIA
US Condemns Human Rights Abuses/Refusal to 
      Release Election Results/US Aid ........................6-8

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
CSCE Statement re:  Monitors in Kosovo/Concern
      for Spillover of Conflict 
....................................................8
Proposed Peace Agreement 
.......................................................9-11,18-19
--  Peace Keeping/US Commitment 
......................................10-11
Resignation of Steven W. Walker 
...........................................11-12,15-18
Humanitarian Relief .........................................12-13
Situation in Mostar ........................................12,19
NATO Air Support/US Ambassadors Brief NATO .............12-14
Prospects for Sanction against Croatia .......................15

LITHUANIA
US Urges Complete Withdrawal of Russian Troops ........8-9

NICARAGUA
Status of US Aid ............................................19
US Discussions re:  Restoration of Civil Control ............20
Hostage Stand -Off..........................................20

MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS
Resumption of Bilateral Talks .............................21

SYRIA
Report of Scuds Transported by Russia .....................21-22

LIBYA
Statement re:  Pan Am 103 Bombing Suspects ................22

(###)



                           DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                           DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

                                                      DPC #118

                    MONDAY, AUGUST 23, 1993, l:0l P.M.
                  (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)


         MR. McCURRY:  Good afternoon, everybody.  We'll get started 
here.  I've got several statements at the outset that I will not read in 
their entire length, but I will direct you to the Press Office and tell 
you that they will be available.

         The first is -- and I'll share with you again -- a part of our 
effort to work cooperatively with the FBI.  We'll have this available to 
all of you later on; but the Department of State is initiating, at the 
request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an international 
publicity campaign in an effort to locate Mir Aimal Kansi.  The FBI is 
offering a reward of up to $l00,000 for information leading to the 
arrest of Kansi, who's pictured here in this reward poster (indicating) 
that will be publicized around the world.

         I think many of you recall the events of January 25 earlier 
this year.  Kansi, who as a citizen of Pakistan was temporarily residing 
in the United States, is alleged to have murdered two persons and 
permanently injured three others outside the CIA Headquarters in 
Langley, Virginia.  Immediately after this attack Kansi fled the United 
States.  He's now a fugitive from justice, believed to be in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Iran, or Iraq; so, appropriately working in connection with 
the FBI's investigative team, we'll be publicizing the availability of 
this reward from the FBI.

         Second, we --

         Q    Wait a minute.  Can we just ask you about this?

         MR. McCURRY:  Sure.  Do you want to do it?  O.K., let's do them 
one at a time.  Yes.

         Q    Is this just an announcement?  Are they going to do 
advertising the way you guys do in your program?

         MR. McCURRY:  We're actually going to assist them with the 
advertising.  We'll help them with the placements and determining where 
they should place the individual advertisements, similar to the ones 
that we showed you on our Terrorism Rewards Program that we shared last 
week.

         I'll tell you:  This is separate from our own program, which we 
talked about in recent weeks.  This award payment would come out of FBI 
funds.  They came to us.  They asked for our assistance in figuring out 
the best way of spreading this message, and that's what we are 
attempting to help them to do.

         Q    So you don't know what media organs you will put this in 
or they will put this in?

         MR. McCURRY:  I'm not sure exactly where we will be placing 
this.  I can check a little further, if there's interest in that, how 
exactly we will target the message.  Clearly we're relying on some help 
from our Embassy in Islamabad in arranging for the announcement there, 
and we'll direct people to the appropriate authorities here if they've 
got information or leads that we can help develop.

         Q    This is --

         Q    Is there any indication that the rewards program works at 
all, or is this just --

         MR. McCURRY:  We actually do.  I don't have the figures on 
this, but I was looking into this the other day.  I think since the 
inception of both the International Terrorism Reward Program and then 
similar rewards programs like the ones conducted by the Bureau, there 
have been numerous individuals who've come forward with leads that are 
then properly developed and investigated by law-enforcement officials.  
So we do believe that this -- both the program itself and the attempt to 
publicize these rewards -- does have the desired effect of bringing 
forth some information that can help develop credible leads for the 
people who are investigating.

         Q    Have any of these rewards been paid?  Do you ever catch 
anybody?

         MR. McCURRY:  They have dispensed some money.  They have given 
rewards.  I remember when we looked at this in connection with the 
Yousef case recently, there have been some payments made; and there have 
been, certainly, leads and additional information that have been 
pursued.

         Q    Are you talking about money dispensed after the last time 
you made kind of poster on these awards?

         MR. McCURRY:  I'm sorry?

         Q    There was a kind of statement by the Department, I 
remember maybe a couple of months ago, about how far it was a success 
and that there was money dispensed.  Do you mean you are talking about 
money dispensed after that time so recent, during the last few months?

         MR. McCURRY:  Oh, no.  I think that when we covered this -- 
this was in the case of Mr. Yousef when we discussed that recently -- we 
did provide some information then on the payments to date.  I'm not 
aware if there have been additional payments since then in developing 
leads; but if there are, I can get more information on that and make it 
available.

         Any more questions on that?

         Then I'll move to China.  I've got a statement on the Chinese 
labor activist Han Dongfang.

         We deplore the Chinese government's decision to cancel the 
passport of labor activist Han Dongfang.  This action follows Han's 
forced expulsion from China on August l4 immediately after he had 
reentered his country from Hong Kong.

         We call on the Chinese government to reverse its decision, 
allow Han to return to China.  By cancelling his passport and denying 
him entry, the Chinese government is contravening Article l3 of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which provides that citizens have 
a right of return to their country.

         The Clinton Administration, as maybe you are aware, is deeply 
concerned about human rights aspects of our relationship with China.  
This was made clear in the May 28 decision announced by the President 
concerning Most-Favored Nation status, and it's an issue that we 
regularly and vigorously pursue with the Chinese government.

         Q    Is this reason enough not to give it to them again next 
year?

         MR. McCURRY:  Well --

         Q    Now you have a condition attached.  You're very --

         MR. McCURRY:  Right.

         Q    The administration is very clear that human rights 
performance will be the gauge.

         MR. McCURRY:  There are very specific conditions that are 
attached, both in the Executive Order signed by the President May 28 and 
in the expectation that there then is a report that comes forward by the 
Secretary of State to the President when they review MFN status next 
year; and, certainly, exactly cases like these are the things that will 
be examined and looked at carefully by the Secretary as he prepares his 
recommendation to the President next year concerning MFN status.

         Connie?

         Q    The New York Times had an article today about more Chinese 
immigrants.  Do you have evidence that they're still coming?

         MR. McCURRY:  Well, they do.  I think there was a long report 
-- I don't want to get too much into the details of that.  They talked 
specifically about an increase in the arrival by air.  We've talked 
often here of some of the steps that we've seen the alien smugglers take 
as regards trans- shipment on the oceans, and this report I think 
referred to increased activity in the air.  There has not, to our 
knowledge, been an increase in the numbers over the summer, but it still 
remains a very real problem; and it's a real problem that the 
President's June l8 policy, announced two months ago, is designed to 
combat.

         I think you know that there are increased diplomatic and law-
enforcement efforts associated with this new policy.  There are measures 
to interdict smuggling vessels, to expedite processing of entry claims 
for those who have been repatriated, but then also to return economic 
migrants who are attempting to come here -- often at the hands of 
smugglers -- to return them expeditiously to their country of origin.

         Now, we have seen this year a major upturn in alien smuggling.  
The Coast Guard, I understand, has intercepted ll ships carrying Chinese 
illegal immigrants.  Other Chinese illegal migrants have been 
intercepted at airports.  Again, I'd say on specific statistics or 
numbers, I would refer you to the INS.  I would simply restate our own 
very strong concern about the conditions that will prevail for those who 
attempt to enter into this flow of illegal economic smuggling activity.  
The people who conduct these activities -- the reports that many of you 
have seen about snakeheads in China fully indicate that the health and 
welfare of those who might be lured into this type of activity is not 
the first concern of those conducting these enterprises.  We remain 
concerned about those who might risk their lives by engaging with those 
who are smuggling; and we fully condemn those who participate in this 
type of illegal economic activity.

         Q    One more on China.  In light of these various human rights 
violations, does the U.S. have a stand on China's bid for the Olympics?  
Are you making any recommendation?

         MR. McCURRY:  Well, I think as you know, in the past we've told 
you that we have shared some of our concerns and views on human rights 
conditions in China with U.S. members of the International Olympic 
Committee.  I don't believe that we  have stated a specific view on 
whether or not China should host the games in the year 2000; but we have 
made some of our concerns and views known to those who are on the IOC 
committee that will make a decision, I understand sometime fairly soon, 
on the location of the Games in the year 2000.

         Q    Will you present them again before they make their 
decisions?

         MR. McCURRY:  Yes.  If we have anything additional to say on 
that, we certainly will say it.

         Q    Also on China, is there anything new on the Yin He, this 
ship in the Persian Gulf?

         MR. McCURRY:  No.  I didn't have anything brand-new on it other 
than this.  I think there have been reports, that I'm sure many of you 
are aware of, that the vessel is now underway, or apparently will soon 
be underway, I believe for Saudi Arabia, for the port of Dammam.  It's 
our expectation at that time that there may be an inspection made of the 
vessel, but I don't have details on that at this time.

         Q    Is there some kind of deal?  What do you mean there's 
expectations?  Does that mean that there have been assurances?

         MR. McCURRY:  I think that the issue that we've been looking at 
over the last many days as it relates to the Yin He is when the vessel 
might actually be examined to see if our concerns about a cargo that 
might include chemical weapons precursors are valid concerns.

         Q    I know, but my question was --

         MR. McCURRY:  Yes, sir.

         Q    -- is there a deal?

         MR. McCURRY:  I think you used the word "deal."  That was what 
I was probably objecting to.

         As we've said in the past, we've had diplomatic contacts with 
governments in the region.  I think that we've also indicated that China 
was being cooperative in our concerns that there actually be an attempt 
to inspect the vessel itself.

         Q    So China has agreed to the inspection?

         MR. McCURRY:  Yes.  We had said before that we didn't know of 
any objections that they had raised.

         Q    Mike, who would actually do the inspections?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't know the answer to that.  I'll take that 
question.  That's a good question.

         Q    But will it not be the United States?

         MR. McCURRY:  I think the last I recall there was an effort to 
find a third party that would make the investigation; but as I say, I'll 
check further and see exactly how they will conduct the inspection.

         Q    There are very short distances in that neck of the woods.  
One would expect it to arrive tomorrow, right? -- unless they're taking 
a zig-zag pattern.

         MR. McCURRY:  The information I saw earlier today indicated it 
might take more like several days for the ship to arrive at port.  I'm 
not sure why that would be the case, but that's the information I saw 
earlier.

         Q    The Japanese hate-bashing, since we're going about 
generally the region -- can we get into that topic very quickly?

         MR. McCURRY:  Why don't we stay on this, and then I want to get 
through some of my opening statements here -- which are less than 
opening at this point.

         Q    What was the port you said it's going to?

         MR. McCURRY:  Dammam.  D-a-m-m-a-m, I believe.

         Q    N?

         MR. McCURRY:  "M"?  Thank you.  What's the correct spelling so 
I don't get it wrong?

         Q    D-a- --

         MR. McCURRY:  I'm not sure how you -- it's a transliteration in 
any event, obviously.

         Q    It's D-a-double m-a-m.

         MR. McCURRY:  Yes.

         Q    All right.

         MR. McCURRY:  D-a-double M-a-m -- as in "Mary."

         Another question?

         Q    No.

         MR. McCURRY:  More announcements.

         On Nigeria, I think you all know we have followed the situation 
there very closely.

         The United States deplores the Nigerian military regime's 
continued abuse of citizens' fundamental human rights.  Respect for 
human rights is the foundation of democratic civil society; and the 
regime's constant attacks on human rights organizations, the press and 
judicial independence do not auger well for the future of democracy in 
Nigeria.  We note with particular dismay the regime's harassment, 
intimidation and detention of human rights activists, its proscriptions 
of press organs, and its seizures of publications.

         The United States is also deeply concerned by the regime's 
refusal to release the results of the June l2 presidential election and 
permit that electoral process to conclude in accordance with rules 
established by the regime itself.  The United States observes that the 
Nigerian people, through their recent words and actions, have made it 
abundantly clear that they want the military regime to step aside.  The 
Nigerian military regime has often promised to turn over power to 
elected civilians on August 27 of this year; and I think, as many of you 
know, we have brought several measures in force to express our concern 
and our objection to the decision not to release the results of the 
election itself.

         We'll have that statement.  That statement will be posted at 
length.

         We also --

         Q    Any additional steps, such as expulsions?

         MR. McCURRY:  There are additional steps that could very well 
come into place if there is not an orderly transfer of power to civilian 
rule, as indicated previously by President Babangida on August 27; and I 
think those measures are now under active consideration.

         Q    Can you name them?

         MR. McCURRY:  Well, we don't want to detail anything that would 
raise speculation that there are steps that we would take; but we've 
talked -- in the past I think you are all aware of the steps that we 
have taken involving training programs, the suspension of aid, certain 
types of aid, and the steps we've taken to date.  I think there are 
additional measures along those lines that could be pursued; but again 
we'll be watching -- indeed, the world will be watching -- to see 
whether or not President Babangida makes good on a promise made long ago 
to turn Nigeria to civilian rule as of the end of the month.

         Q    The apparent winner in the June election, whose name is 
Abiola, I think, says that he is going to form a government in place.  
Does the United States take any position on that?

         MR. McCURRY:  We don't take a position on his effort to form a 
government in place.  I understand that President- elect Abiola is 
currently in Europe.  There is some information that suggests that he 
may attempt to return to Nigeria; but I think whether or not that 
happens is something that we would have to see develop over the next 
several days, if not weeks, and comment on it appropriately as we move 
ahead.

         Next we have a long statement mostly that is designed to call 
your attention to a statement that has been issued by the Swedish 
Foreign Minister, af Ugglas, on behalf of the CSCE concerning monitors 
in Kosovo.  We are essentially repeating here for your benefit her 
statement and to let you know that we both concur in that and restate 
the significant concern that we have about the spillover of the conflict 
in the Balkans to the adjacent province of Kosovo.  That's something 
that has been of substantial concern to us.  It's an issue that has been 
raised most recently by the U.N. Security Council; and it's one that has 
certainly grave implications for the Balkans, as it affects the question 
of whether or not this conflict will spill over to adjacent regions.  
That statement we do have available which repeats her concern at some 
length.

         And then, finally, I think the only other statement we did, we 
clearly regret that the Russian Government arrived at the decision to 
suspend the withdrawal of Russian troops remaining in Lithuania.  We are 
concerned that the visit to Moscow by the Lithuanian President has been 
cancelled.  Direct high-level contacts between Russia and Lithuania are 
critical to resolve this problem, and the United States has consistently 
supported unconditional and complete withdrawal of Russian forces from 
all three Baltic republics.

         A longer statement from the United States urging Russia to 
comply with its agreement to withdraw forces will also be available.

         Q    You just regret that?  I mean, doesn't that send an 
awesome signal?

         MR. McCURRY:  Well, the statement, as I say, is somewhat longer 
in length, but I have given you the gist of it.

         Q    Mike, how did you express that regret to Russia?

         MR. McCURRY:  I think we have raised this issue directly with 
them in diplomatic contacts we have had.

         Q    At what level, though?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't believe it has been handled at the 
Secretarial level.

         Q    When the Secretary is in touch with Kosyrev about other 
matters, like Bosnia, has he had the chance to talk about this, or is 
this too recent?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't know whether he has talked about 
Lithuania troop withdrawals in his conversations and contacts with 
Foreign Minister Kosyrev, or in his recent contacts.  I know that he has 
had contacts with the Foreign Minister over the course of this month, 
but I don't know whether this subject has been among the list of issues 
that were addressed.

         Q    Could I ask you about the so-called peace accord, and ask 
you if it's the Clinton Administration's view that the Bosnian 
Government should accept this arrangement, the paternity of which isn't 
clear to me in the first place?

         MR. McCURRY:  Well, our view has been that the parties 
themselves should engage in serious direct negotiations, attempting to 
achieve a political settlement that can be reached in good faith, that 
can be a viable agreement, that can be enforced and fully implemented.  
We have expressed our views to the parties in Geneva directly, and we 
have made it clear our interest is in a political settlement that the 
parties themselves can see leading to some measure of peace in the 
region, some effort to return that war-torn area to a measure of 
normalcy.

         This agreement that has been reached and now submitted to the 
peoples of the three respective entities will have to be judged by them.  
We will, of course, watch over the next several days to see how the 
reaction of the Bosnian Government develops.  I think you are all aware 
of the comments that President Izetbegovic has made, I think even as 
recently as yesterday; and we have been in close contact with him and 
will continue to be in close contact with him.

         Q    But it sounds like you're not taking a position, and you 
talk about the three parties as if they are free agents.  It could be 
argued that the Bosnian Government doesn't have much freedom of action 
there.  Do you factor that in?  And they themselves, or at least their 
leader, say this is not an acceptable arrangement.  Is this the best 
that they could hope for, perhaps?

         MR. McCURRY:  Well, whether or not this is the best that they 
could hope for is a question that they are going to  examine themselves.  
I think the President made very clear that he was going to submit this 
to his people, to the leadership of Bosnia-Hercegovina to discuss the 
consequences of not reaching a settlement along these lines and the 
specific component parts of this agreement itself; but they are the ones 
who have to judge whether this is an agreement that they themselves 
consider to be one that can lead to some measure of peace and a 
restoration of normal conditions in Bosnia itself.

         Q    And if they do in fact reach an agreement similar to what 
is outlined in the current accord, does the U.S. pledge to provide a 
large number of troops to enforce this peace still stand unequivocally, 
or how would your words on that subject now read?

         MR. McCURRY:  I think you are aware of the commitment we have 
made in the past to assist in the implementation of an agreement made 
between the parties in good faith, that they themselves are in the 
process of implementing.

         That's what we have indicated in the past in our commitment.  
That commitment stands; but again I say, as I have said often, we want 
to see what specifically an agreement of this nature would look like.  
We have got some indications of how this proposal would develop, but we 
need to understand much more clearly what would be expected of any 
country contributing troops to helping enforce such an agreement.  
That's a question that, if they get to the point that there is an 
agreement that all three parties have clearly entered into and are 
implementing, that question then goes to the United Nations so the 
United Nations can address the question of how do you configure and 
develop the troop requirements necessary for implementing an agreement.

         Now I will say it's a question that we have looked at very, 
very carefully in the past as it related to the Vance-Owen plan, so it's 
not something that we are sort of standing back waiting for someone to 
make the request.  We have actually looked at the question of how you 
would assist in implementing a political settlement of this nature; but 
again, a lot of it depends on how the settlement itself is drawn, and 
then what specifically is required of the international community as the 
settlement is implemented.

         Q    Mike, is the --

         Q    Wait a second.  You've got somebody in Geneva, the maps 
have been published.  How can you say that we want to see what the 
settlement would look like?  You obviously know what it looks like.

         MR. McCURRY:  Well, we know some things about how it would 
look; but there are a lot of questions associated with that that would 
then have to be addressed by the parties themselves, and could 
conceivably be addressed by the mediators.  I think you all know that 
the EC itself got involved over the last several days of the negotiation 
in talking about the status of Mostar, for example.  I think there are a 
lot of things that are still to be fleshed out about how the agreement 
would be implemented; and we just want to be cautious in saying that we 
need to look and see how the settlement is drawn, what requirements then 
are made of all within the international community before we talk freely 
about how we would respond to meeting our commitment.

         Q    The bottom line, Mike, is you were saying that if all 
three parties agree on the details of the plan, then the United States 
would be willing to make whatever commitment is necessary to implement.  
Is that what you are saying?

         MR. McCURRY:  Well, I said --

         Q    Are you saying --

         MR. McCURRY:  I said, as we have said in the past, that we are 
willing to assist in the implementation of an agreement, including the 
possible use of ground forces.  We have said that in the past; but I'm 
just not committing ourselves to implementing a particular agreement 
until we understand much more about how it is configured and how it 
looks.

         Q    Have you told the three parties what conditions would 
hinge, though, on participation by U.S. troops?

         MR. McCURRY:  We have been in close contact with the parties.  
I think they understand the nature of our commitment, that we haven't 
talked about specific types of measures we would pursue in meeting the 
commitment; but I think they are aware of the commitment.  They are 
aware of the role that we would play, and we are asking from them and 
from the mediators themselves better understandings about how the 
political settlement itself would look.

         I just think, again, it's in the category of being premature at 
this point to discuss a political settlement that has not yet been 
entered into by the parties themselves.

         Q    Is the State Department a little more short-handed today 
in terms of people able to analyze this agreement?

         MR. McCURRY:  Yes.  I don't want to make light of a serious 
resignation that was, in fact, submitted by Steven W. Walker today.  Mr. 
Walker has made valued contributions to the Foreign Service.  We 
certainly regret his departure, but we respect the decision he has made 
to submit his resignation from the U. S. Foreign Service effective at 
noon today.

         Q    Mike, can we go back to Mostar a bit?  We all know the 
situation there, unless it has changed in the last hour or so, where 
people are starving.  They are in the grips this time of the Croats.  
There couldn't be a clearer example of relief inhibited, blocked.  And 
using a Christopher judgment, what remains -- what possible reason could 
there be for not taking action?

         MR. McCURRY:  Well, most immediately the action that needs to 
be taken is to try to do something about people who are starving in 
Mostar.  I think that right now we are looking at the question of how 
you can best get relief through either Serbian territory or Croatian-
held territory into Mostar -- and I think they are also looking at the 
feasibility of air drops, as well.  

         So I think step one is you've got to do something about people 
who are starving, who need assistance, and that's a matter that we are 
working on in connection with UNPROFOR.

         On the larger issue of how does this activity measure up to the 
criteria that have been laid out by NATO in its threatened use of air 
strikes, I think you would have to acknowledge that that NATO document 
is very clear about what it considers to be conditions for military 
action by NATO itself --  and I'm certain that the Croats are well aware 
of that criteria.

         Q    But you said last week, when you were asked that same 
question, that the NATO document does not refer to Croats, it refers to 
Serbs.  Are you saying now that the Administration interprets it to 
include Croatian aggression?

         MR. McCURRY:  No.  I'm glad you asked that question because I 
spoke incorrectly last week.  In fact, it's good for me to have an 
opportunity to clarify that.  

         The NATO document always had referred to Bosnian Serbs and 
others who were impeding the delivery of humanitarian relief.  There's 
no doubt, no question, that the document itself and the debate about the 
document centered more on Serb activity; but it certainly does reference 
directly other parties.  This was pointed out to me by Sandy Vershbow, 
who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the EUR Bureau.  So I think 
that that is something that we certainly are very aware of, and we have 
made the parties aware of.

         Q    Mike, can we go back a bit?  Do you have anything  from 
the Serbs promising to assist in the relief operations for the Muslims 
in Mostar?

         MR. McCURRY:  I'm not aware of any promise of that nature, but 
I can find out more.  I think the latest information is they are looking 
for a way to route convoys through Serb-controlled territory, and I 
don't know whether that means that UNPROFOR has reached some agreement 
with the Serb commanders locally in that region or not.  I can see if 
that's the case.

         Q    I don't want to really quibble, but there is something 
that bothers me here.  I didn't see any caveats in what, let's call for 
the moment, the Christopher doctrine.  You know, that there's another 
way to get relief to people who can't get relief because people are 
blocking the convoys.  That that somehow gets the, you know, gets the 
guilty party off the hook.

         MR. McCURRY:  I'm sorry, what...

         Q    All right, let me start all over again.  Christopher last 
week said that the two criteria for activating the NATO plan is, well, 
first was stop the siege, and the second was stop getting in the way of 
relief.

         Now, the fact that you might be able to air-drop stuff in 
doesn't absolve the Croats from what they are doing.  You mean if you 
can find another way to help people just before they pass out that then 
there is no guilty party to punish -- it sounds like you are saying.

         MR. McCURRY:  I didn't  

         Q    Well, you talk about air lifts and you talk about going 
through Serbia.  These people are at the brink of starvation.

         MR. McCURRY:  That's right.

         Q    And the guilty party is very clear and very evident.  It's 
Croatian-Serbs who won't let the relief get through.  And the question 
is, is the Administration going to try to find another way to help these 
people?  Or will you get NATO together and do something about it, I 
guess is the question.

         MR. McCURRY:  I think earlier, for you, I detailed exactly the 
things that we are trying to look at by way of assisting those who are 
on the verge of starvation.  That is a very real problem.  But I don't 
think our anger over those who put them in that condition -- that's a 
separate issue from the question of how do you deal with trying to save 
lives more immediately.  And the larger question, as I say, of what you 
then do to insure that there is not further impeding of humanitarian 
relief, that's something that I'm sure will have to be examined 
carefully by NATO.

         Q    But, Mike, why did we not ask for a reconvening of NATO?  
That was supposedly the next step: if somebody interferred with 
humanitarian assistance, then they were going to call for another 
meeting to determine -- take the final step before the air strikes were 
called.

         MR. McCURRY:  There's also a need to lay before NATO 
information about exactly what's happening on the ground.  That's 
exactly why Ambassador Redman and Ambassador Jackovich are in Brussels 
today at NATO, briefing NATO on both the conditions that exist in 
Sarajevo -- since that's where Ambassador Jackovich toured last week -- 
and Ambassador Redman is there to brief on what we see the likelihood of 
the prospects of the Geneva talks being.

         Our two diplomats who have been working most closely on the 
situation are at NATO today discussing exactly those types of issues at 
NATO.

         Q    Mike, is this the much-advertised additional step that 
would be taken before a decision is made to launch air strikes?

         MR. McCURRY:  This is not a formal meeting of the Permanent 
Representatives of the North Atlantic Council to initiate air strikes, 
no.  Part of the work that we're doing, I think you all know, has been 
to gather the available information that our allies will need and that 
NATO will need so that you can then proceed to other options.  That's 
what our folks are doing.

         Q    Is it correct to say, Mike, that the Bosnian Croats run 
the risk of air strikes if they don't stop the siege of Mostar?

         MR. McCURRY:  I'm not upping the ante in that fashion by saying 
that today.  My point is that's been clear from the time that NATO first 
issued its document on August 2-3, and then again on the 9th.

         Q    But, Mike, the Croats and the Serbs both know about the 
document, and the Croats, at least, are not paying any attention to it.  
Why should they if there's no possibility of -- I mean, you say there is 
a possibility of air strikes, but nobody is calling for them.  Why 
should they pay any attention to it?

         MR. McCURRY:  It's a NATO document and the consequences --

         Q    But will it be enforced?

         MR. McCURRY:  I can't answer that question for you right now.

         Q    Another form of pressure was the possibility of economic 
sanctions against Croatia.  Is that now under active consideration?

         MR. McCURRY:  Yes.

         Q    Where?

         MR. McCURRY:  The United Nations.

         Q    Is the U.S. Government prepared to move ahead on that now?

         MR. McCURRY:  I think it's something that we'll be discussing.  
It's under active consideration.  It's something we'll be discussing 
with our allies.

         Q    Is the U.S. prepared to lead that effort?

         Q    Does the U.S. favor it?

         MR. McCURRY:  At this point I want to leave it at we're 
discussing it with our allies.  I'm sure we'll be talking about that 
further.

         Q    Is there a draft resolution?

         MR. McCURRY:  I'm not aware of a draft resolution.  I don't 
think they're at a phase where they've tried to formulate any -- table 
any resolution.

         Q    Has the U.S. conveyed to the Government of Croatia its 
feelings on this matter recently?

         MR. McCURRY:  Recently and often.

         Q    In the last few days?

         MR. McCURRY:  I'm sure it's been within the scope of things 
that have been discussed by Ambassador Redman and Ambassador Jackovich 
as they meet with members of the Croatian delegation, yes.  It has also, 
I think, been presented in other diplomatic channels, too.

         Q    Mike, if we could go back to the resignation of Mr. Walker 
for just a second.  There was a resignation letter to the Secretary.  
Can you give us any sense of his state of mind in that letter?  Was he 
asking for something?  Did he decry something?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't want to describe the state of mind.  I 
don't think that would be fair to a person who has worked diligently 
within the Foreign Service.  I would say that it's clear that he 
expressed his dissatisfaction with U.S. policy towards the Bosnian 
conflict.  He said that he felt he  couldn't continue to work in support 
of that policy and chose, instead, to leave the Service.

         Q    Doesn't it feel a little bit like mutiny on the bounty 
here?  That's the fourth one in a year.

         MR. McCURRY:  It's the fourth resignation that I'm aware of.

         Q    Is there any validity to the things he is saying, that 
this agreement was no good, for instance; that it may draw the United 
States more deeply into the conflict; his four-point proposal for U.S. 
policy, which really sounds like mostly telling -- suggesting -- you 
activate a policy you've threatened all along?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't want to get into the details of his 
recommendations.  I think, in good faith, he made recommendations as to 
policy as have many within the Department.  In fact, what I will say is 
that the Secretary has tried to seek out some of these views.  He's met 
with people at this level who clearly have got concerns about our policy 
on Bosnia, and he's sought out the kind of advice that Mr. Walker has 
tendered in this letter.

         Q    What does this tell you?

         Q    Has the letter gone to the Secretary even though he's out 
of town?

         MR. McCURRY:  The Secretary is out of town.  He was made aware 
of the letter by phone this morning, and he is being sent a copy of the 
letter.

         Q    Mike, what does this tell you about the state of policy-
making in this building and the state of the debate about Bosnia?

         MR. McCURRY:  Well, I think it tells you what the Secretary 
himself has said on numerous occasions.  This is a frustrating, terrible 
problem in which answers are not easy to come by.  It's just as 
frustrating for the Secretary as it is for people at the Country Desk 
officer level who work on the problem.

         Q    Has there been this kind of debate, with its bitterness 
and resignations, equal to this since Vietnam that you know of in this 
building?

         MR. McCURRY:  I can't speak to that because I don't have enough 
tenure here at the Department to know the answer to that.

         Q    Mike, you previously referred to this as just -- I think 
the last set of resignations -- normal turnover.  Do  you still think 
this is normal turnover?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't think I ever said it was normal turnover.  
I said people submit resignations and tender resignations often and 
frequently here and we don't comment on each and every one.  This one 
we're commenting upon because it's also connected to a very 
controversial policy decision and because the individual indicates in 
good faith he can't execute a policy.  It's fair to point out that 
that's a form of protest that's an honorable form of protest.

         Q    The last time you had a resignation there were a number of 
suggestions from a number of State Department officials saying that it 
was frustration because people were cut out, actually, of formulating 
policy.  Is that your feeling on this one as well, or is it much more -- 
or do you feel that the reasons are much more deeper than that?

         MR. McCURRY:  I would have to back through Mr. Walker's letter 
more carefully.  I don't know if he cited that as one of his concerns or 
not.  Clearly, he was principally reflecting concern over the policy 
itself.

         Q    It seems almost like the bureaucracy here is at war with 
the top levels of the State Department, and they complain often of being 
cut out from major decision-making.  Does that concern you?  Any steps 
being taken to address that issue?  Is he going to meet with --

         MR. McCURRY:  That's exactly why the Secretary, I think, has 
tried to seek out these views -- dissident views.  He had a meeting the 
day before he left on his recent vacation on exactly this type of 
question.

         Q    With whom?

         MR. McCURRY:  The question is, "With whom?"  With a wide of 
variety of people -- I don't want to say a lower level -- but at more of 
a middle level within the policy-making apparatus both on the question 
of Bosnia and then within other bureaus as well as a way of sort of 
trying to seek a cross section of opinion at that level of the 
Department from people who have got concerns about our policy.

         Q    Was Walker one of the people he met with?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't believe Mr. Walker was one of them; but I 
think they were, clearly, people he worked with closely.

         Q    Mike, you are giving the impression that you take the 
resignation of Mr. Walker in a different way than the other three, the 
last three resignations.  Does this have anything to do with his time of 
resignation, or what?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't want to say that we're taking it any 
differently.  All of these resignations, we understand, are very 
emotional forms of protest  by the individuals involved, and we respect 
that type of protest.

         Clearly, we regret any decision made by an officer of the 
Department who feels in good faith that they have to leave a career that 
may be, as in this case, has been eight years in the making; but we have 
to respect those decisions.

         Q    Mike, a previous officer who resigned, Jon Western, 
believes that there is ample evidence for a determination of genocide in 
Bosnia by the Bosnian Serbs.  Is the United States prepared to make such 
a determination?

         MR. McCURRY:  I think we've often addressed that question here.  
I'm not sure that there is anything new to say on the subject.

         Q    New subject?

         MR. McCURRY:  New subject.

         Q    One more on Geneva, please.

         MR. McCURRY:  Geneva.

         Q    Is the United States in agreement with the decision by the 
mediators to impose a deadline for all the parties to agree to a 
settlement?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't know the answer to that.  I don't know 
whether we concurred in the steps that Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg 
take to set some type of deadline.  I think many of you are aware that 
we have encouraged the parties in different ways through different means 
to really be serious about the business of trying to develop some 
resolution to this crisis.  But I don't know whether we've specifically 
agreed with the tactic of setting a deadline.

         Q    Since only one party has not signed on, and this setting 
of a deadline could be interpreted as pressure on that remaining party, 
would you take that question?

         MR. McCURRY:  Yes, I will.  Although I will say, obviously, as 
we've said before, that we don't think an agreement that's reached by 
pressuring a party is going to wind up being an agreement that can be 
implemented in good faith.

         Q    Wait a minute.  Excuse me, it sounds as though you're 
trying to have it both ways.  You want the parties to reach an 
agreement, but you're saying you don't want pressure; and you've got 
somebody in Geneva, but you're not making any kind of a comment on the 
deadline itself?

         MR. McCURRY:  We want the conflict to come to an end so that -- 
as I think everyone has known, as we've said often  here, there is a 
very real need to begin stockpiling goods and supplies to prepare for 
the coming winter.  And I think it's really the coming of winter that 
imposes, in some sense, a deadline because there are going to be many, 
many people losing lives in Bosnia unless steps begin immediately to 
address the humanitarian situation.

         So one of our key interests here is to see that there is a way 
that the parties themselves can reach an agreement that at the very 
least allows for people to get the supplies -- the health, the 
nutritional things -- they need to prepare for the coming winter.

         Q    One quick follow-up.  I may have missed it.  I'm sorry if 
I did.  Did you say the Administration was considering airdrops to 
Mostar?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't know that the Administration has; I think 
it's under consideration by UNPROFOR.  They're looking at the 
feasibility of doing so.  It can be difficult because it's a highly 
urbanized setting, but they're looking at the feasibility of that.  
Consistent with our participation in other humanitarian airlifts, we 
would be willing to participate.

         Q    Mike, a question on Nicaragua?

         MR. McCURRY:  A question on Nicaragua.

         Q    You've got this stand-off with everybody taking hostages 
from everybody else.  You also have a Helms-sponsored hold on all 
economic aid that has to be reconciled in conference.  Does the 
Administration have a position in light of this new instability in 
Nicaragua as to whether or not -- on the withholding of aid to 
Nicaragua?

         MR. McCURRY:  I'll kind of generally characterize what we have 
said in some of our direct diplomatic discussions with the Nicaraguan 
Government.

         I would say that we have, as many of the international donors 
have, said that we strongly support President Chamorro.  We want her 
government to succeed in consolidating democracy, establishing the rule 
of law, protecting human rights and promoting economic development.  But 
we are concerned that unless Nicaragua's civilian government establishes 
control over the security services, further progress will be very 
difficult to achieve.

         I think that the action you see in Congress is one measure of 
how that would become more difficult.

         We've actually asked, in diplomatic context, that they act very 
decisively so it becomes clear that progress can be made in restoring 
civilian control of the security services in the military.  I think that 
we've, in a variety of ways, indicated directly to the Nicaraguan 
Government that there has to be progress in this area that the 
international community can see, for those to continue participating in 
that type of relief effort.

         Q    Is further aid conditioned on these steps?

         MR. McCURRY:  I'd hesitate to say it's conditioned, but I think 
that needing to see this progress has been made quite clear to the 
Chamorro government.  I think there are many in Congress who speak even 
more directly than that.

         Q    Will the resolution of this particular crisis play into 
that?  Are you looking at how the Chamorro government resolves this 
current crisis?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't want to say that this is one particular 
benchmark.  Certainly, we will watch and see how this situation is 
addressed.  We have additional concerns.  I think you're all familiar 
with the arms cache that was discovered on May 23.  There are other 
things that we are looking at as well.

         The hostage stand-off is but one measure of how effectively the 
Nicaraguan Government can control the security and military apparatus.

         Q    Are you in a position to name names?  Would the dismissal 
of Humberto Ortega be a good first step?

         MR. McCURRY:  I don't want to name names because I don't want 
to indicate that there's one particular individual that is more 
important than another.  I think what is more important is for the 
United States to feel confident that the Nicaraguan Government has 
worked through the problems that clearly exist in bringing security 
forces and military commanders under the control of civilian rule, 
rather than focus on one individual -- more on the problem itself which 
we, clearly, are insisting needs to be addressed.

         Q    Mike, is there a role for the Sandinistas in the 
Nicaraguan Government?

         MR. McCURRY:  That's really an internal question that goes to 
the composition.

         Q    Well, they control the security forces.  Are you calling 
on Chamorro to get them under control?  I would suspect your diplomatic 
message was that she should get them out?

         MR. McCURRY:  Right.  That's a different thing than saying that 
there should be no Sandinista elements in the constitution of the 
government, which is a separate question  that's really an internal 
matter for the Nicaraguan people.

         There was a question back there.

         Q    I want to move to a new issue.  You are looking at the 
Eleventh Round of Middle Eastern peace talks.  I want to ask, is there 
any concern that internal problems in both camps will make any 
breakthrough mission impossible?  What is the level of expectations?  
And can we consider it a break-or-make round of talks?

         MR. McCURRY:  In one sense, kind of easy questions because you 
get predictable answers.  I think we would hesitate to declare any 
aspect of this on-going discussion to be "make or break" because this is 
-- you've heard the Secretary say often that we make progress, it's 
either inch by inch or millimeter by millimeter.  I can't remember 
whether we were metric or otherwise.

         This is an on-going dialogue that the Secretary certainly 
expects will occupy a considerable amount of time for the balance of 
this year.  The next step is the parties gathering again here in 
Washington for direct negotiations to build on some of the ideas that 
were exchanged, some of the important decisions that have to be made.  
The next step, as they gather again in Washington, is for the parties to 
look back at those very tough choices that have to be made if they truly 
want peace and to begin to fashion some type of consensus on how those 
decisions can be implemented.  That's what the work of this next round 
will be about.

         We don't have anything new unless there was something said at 
the end of last week on acceptances or when precisely we expect them to 
begin.  I think we're still waiting to hear from some of the parties.  
We expect they will recommence here on either the 30th or the 31st, I 
believe.

         Q    The last time you said you received a response from 
Israel.

         MR. McCURRY:  The Israelis.

         Q    Other responses.  It's still Israel only?

         MR. McCURRY:  I should have checked today to see if there was 
anything new over the weekend and I didn't.  Once we have indication 
from the parties that they are ready to reconvene, we'll certainly alert 
you to that  -- although I'll remind you that just prior to the last 
round of talks the acceptances came in quite late, I think almost on the 
eve of the talks themselves.  As soon as we have word of their precise 
arrival times and things like that, we'll share that information.

         Q    Mike, just to go back over some old ground; maybe you have 
a different response.  The question is, is Syria's  purchase of Scud 
missile components here on the eve, so to speak, of a next round, and 
Russia's transportation of them consistent with their role as 
participant and co-sponsor of the talks?

         MR. McCURRY:  I confess I haven't been able to get satisfactory 
answers to that question.  You've asked it religiously, and I will 
formally take it now and see if we can't use the process of taking a 
question to maybe get a more direct answer.

         Q    In about the same area.

         MR. McCURRY:  Same area.

         Q    About.  Libya is now suggesting resuming diplomatic 
relations with the United States as a precondition for yielding their 
two suspects to the U.S. or to the Government of Great Britain.  Do you 
have any comment on that?

         MR. McCURRY:  That's not the last bizarre suggestion that will 
come from Libya.  I think that they know precisely the expectations that 
the world community has on them as it relates to the two Pam Am 103 
suspects.  They need to be delivered to those who can effectively 
prosecute and try them for their alleged crimes promptly.  That's the 
urgent question that's before Libya and it's the reason why the 
international community -- and specifically Britain, the United States, 
and France -- are contemplating additional tougher sanctions to be 
placed on Libya.

         Q    Before we go, I thought it might help to make clear 
whether -- you know, we were hearing everyday about the warnings that 
the Serbs faced about the strangulation of Sarajevo.  Is the United 
States, now with this meeting over at NATO in Brussels, warning the 
Croatian side about the strangulation of Mostar with NATO air power, or 
just merely pointing out that that option exists?

         MR. McCURRY:  All I'm doing right now, I'm not issuing any 
warnings from the podium here today.  I am just simply telling you what 
has been clear since the time NATO addressed this issue itself: that the 
prospect of further military action did relate directly to the provision 
of humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that those 
responsible -- I believe it says Bosnian Serbs and others -- could face 
the impact of that threat directly.  But, specific warnings from NATO 
will come from NATO itself.

         Thank you.

         MR. McCURRY:  You're welcome.

         (Press briefing concluded at 1:55 p.m.) 

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