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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

                                                      DPC #73

                 FRIDAY, MAY 21, 1993, 1:00 P.M.
              (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)


          MR. BOUCHER:  Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  I don't 
have any statements or announcements, so I'd be glad to take your 
questions.

          Q    Well, let's try the Bosnian situation, at least, in a 
logistical --

          MR. BOUCHER:  We've talked about that before, haven't we?

          Q    Yeah, we have.  So let's try it, just simply at the 
outset, from a logistical approach.  Now, Kozyrev is in at the luncheon 
with Mr. Christopher?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Foreign Minister Kozyrev is here at lunch with 
the Secretary and Foreign Minister Hurd.  We understand the Foreign 
Minister of Russia -- Foreign Minister Kozyrev -- has to catch a plane 
to New York.  He's going to meet, I think he said, with Alain Juppe 
tonight.  And so he probably has to leave about 1:30.

          At that point, the Secretary and Foreign Secretary Hurd will 
continue their discussions -- the two of them -- and after they finish 
their discussions, they'll probably come downstairs and say a few words 
to you on the way out.  So we've suggested that you gather about 1:45 in 
the lobby and, at that point, we'll start --

          Q    The French Foreign Minister is still due tomorrow?

          MR. BOUCHER:  The French Foreign Minister is still due 
tomorrow morning.

          Q    And does Mr. Kozyrev curve back from New York, or have we 
seen the last of him?

          MR. BOUCHER:  That, I don't quite know.

          Q    And Monday, is that still on?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Monday is still on with the French Foreign 
Minister for lunch.

          Q    Last question:  Is there a plan yet to take the French 
Foreign Minister or Mr. Hurd over to see Mr. Clinton?

          MR. BOUCHER:  I don't know.

          Q    Is there a plan to get everyone together in one big happy 
family for a major, new foreign offensive to stop the war in Bosnia?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Alan, in terms of --

          Q    Or any element of that question?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Is any element of that question true? Alan, 
there's no element of that question that's on the schedule at this 
point.

          Q    Richard, maybe you can explain to us where we are.  The 
Secretary of State came down yesterday and spoke about how there were 
areas of commonality, or whatever the cliche it was that he used on that 
particular occasion.  But the gist of it was that they put in a good 
day's work and they were coming towards agreement and then all of a 
sudden --

          Q    (Inaudible)

          Q    Right.  They had a good, and all of a sudden, this 
morning, the President came out and was expressing doubts and skepticism 
about the Russian plan.  How do you square that particular circle?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Alan, I don't see anything new there in what the 
President said.  I know there's been a little bit of excitement about 
it.  We read it over and I looked at it, and I don't frankly see much 
that's new there.

          The President expressed skepticism that some of the ideas that 
are out there, and various ones, could lead us to the kind of long-term 
solution that we're looking for.  They may have some benefits, some 
contribution in specific areas.  But, as you know, we've had other 
proposals on the table to look for a long-term solution.

          The President and the Russian Foreign Minister this morning 
had a good meeting.  The President asked the Secretary and the Russian 
Foreign Minister to continue their efforts with the British and the 
French to arrive at common ground, to arrive at a series of steps that 
we can take together.

          Overall, without going into the list of measures that they're 
discussing, I think there are a few observations I can make since you 
ask, "Where are we, in general?"  We're working with the allies to 
escalate the pressures on the Serbs, to stop their aggression, to 
contain the conflict, and to reach a negotiated solution that all the 
parties can accept.

          Q    Richard, could you explain what the President meant this 
morning when he said, "We believe in order to get that done," -- what 
you just mentioned -- "ultimately, there will have to be some reasonable 
border, some political solution to this which has a reasonable 
territorial component."

          If it is U.S. policy to try to roll back the Serbian 
aggression to end ethnic cleansing, how does a policy of containment, 
which leaves them in control of territory, satisfy that demand?

          MR. BOUCHER:  John, I don't think I just described to you a 
policy that's purely containment.  "Containment" is obviously one of the 
elements that's been of interest to us all along.  As for that specific 
remark, I think I would say, again, that's something we've talked about 
before -- the need, eventually, the need for a politically negotiated 
solution. There has to be some vehicle for reaching a negotiated 
solution.  Obviously, in the discussions that have been held so far, the 
territorial element has been the one that's been most in dispute between 
the parties.  What is going to be key in reaching that is there has to 
be a solution that's acceptable to all the parties.

          Let's try to remember where we are overall.  We've pursued 
over time a strategy of constantly increasing pressures on the Serbs -- 
the Bosnian Serbs:  sanctions, "no-fly" zone, isolation.  That's a 
strategy that continues.  There are recently-imposed sanctions on the 
Serbs that have had an obvious effect in creating strains between the 
Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs.  We've got new measures going at the United 
Nations -- border monitors, war crimes tribunal -- that will continue to 
increase the pressure.

          While the allies are not prepared to go as far as we have 
proposed at this time, they all recognize the need for stronger 
measures.  They all recognize that further stronger measures may be 
needed, and that's why these options that we proposed remain on the 
table.

          The point is:  Together with other key governments, to try to 
strengthen the pressure on the Serbs, to try to stop the fighting, 
strengthen the ability to contain the conflict.  It's important that we 
act together, that we take whatever steps -- that we take the steps that 
we can agree on now.  Each of us will play an appropriate role in 
implementing those measures.

          But you have to look at the whole picture:  The new steps, the 
sanctions, the measures that are being put in place at the United 
Nations.  The point is to escalate the pressure on the Serbian side, to 
reach a negotiated solution, and end the bloodshed.

          Q    What is a "reasonable territorial component" -- the 
President's phrase.

          MR. BOUCHER:  It's one that all the parties can accept.

          Q    In other words, it doesn't necessarily have to be the 
Vance-Owen plan anymore?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Well, again, the Secretary has talked about 
building on the Vance-Owen plan.  The Vance-Owen plan has been accepted 
by two of the parties.  But as we've been talking about here, the main 
issue of contention left that has been involved, even in getting those 
two parties to agree, has been the territorial component.

          Q    So the Vance-Owen map is dead?

          MR. BOUCHER:  No.  But a solution has to be acceptable to all 
the three parties.  That's sort of one of the fundamentals of having a 
negotiation.

          Q    Just to follow up on John's question, has the 
Administration decided that the Serbs will be allowed to keep the land 
they've gained?

          MR. BOUCHER:  No.  No.  We certainly do not accept the 
acquisition of territory by force.  We certainly do not accept Serbian 
gains; and that's why we have moved in the past and are moving further 
at the U.N. and are moving further with the discussions that we're 
having now, to escalate the pressures on the Serbs.

          Q    So, realistically, Richard, so far the Serbs -- nothing 
the international community has done nor that the Muslims have done has 
stopped the Serbs.  In fact, they've acquired more territory since the 
Clinton Administration invigorated its diplomacy on Yugoslavia.

          How, now, do you think you can possibly roll back any of that 
gain?

          MR. BOUCHER:  As I've described it, Carol, the strategy that 
we've been pursuing is one of increasing pressures.  We have a number of 
steps underway right now and under discussion right now with the allies 
to further escalate the pressures on the Serbs to try to press them to 
reach a negotiated solution that can be acceptable to all the parties.

          Q    Why did you think it can work?

          MR. BOUCHER:  I guess I just have to turn this around. You've 
got to keep doing what you can.  You've got to keep doing what you can 
get people to agree to.

          The first question I was asked was, "Why is the President 
skeptical?"  I think I explained that there has to be a certain amount 
of skepticism, which we've expressed before, that some of these ideas 
and measures can lead to a long-term solution.

          Q    So it's wishful thinking?

          Q    Richard, on monitors, have you seen the report that 
President Cosic of the Rump Yugoslavia has stated today, that they will 
not allow international monitors to patrol the Serb-Bosnian border?  And 
if you have seen it, do you have any reaction to it?

          MR. BOUCHER:  No, I haven't seen that report, Alan.

          Q    Richard, when you say that we do not accept acquisition 
of territory by force, we do not accept Serbian gain, is that both in 
the short run and the long run?  Something the Secretary said a little 
bit ago, he suggested that we cannot let ethnic cleansing stand but 
first things first.

          Are we suggesting there the possibility that at least for the 
moment to stop the fighting, the United States can accept the status quo 
and then negotiate further, or bring further pressure so that it not be 
accepted "in the long run?" Is that a possibility?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Saul, today, tomorrow, in the long run, we don't 
accept the principle of acquisition of territory by force.  We don't 
accept Serbian gains.

          Q    No, but --

          MR. BOUCHER:  Let me continue.  There's, I think -- I hope -- 
an obvious virtue in keeping people from getting killed.  And whatever 
contributions we can make to that, we're going to do.  But there's also 
the need for further escalating pressures to bring the Serbs to 
negotiate seriously and in good faith with other parties and to try to 
resolve this into a political settlement that people can agree to.  
That's why we're continuing this campaign of escalation pressures.

          Q    So the United State would --

          Q    (Inaudible) have been dealt with.  You've talked about 
stopping the aggression, you've talked about stopping the fighting.  You 
haven't talked about reversing the acquisition of territory.  The 
acquisition is there.

          MR. BOUCHER:  That's what the negotiated settlement, 
acceptable to all the parties, would do.

          Q    The question is:  Do the steps that the Foreign Ministers 
are agreeing on now, are they consistent with rolling back or reversing 
the aggression, the acquisition of territory by force?

          MR. BOUCHER:  They are consistent with the efforts that we've 
had underway and we'll continue to bring mounting pressure on the Serbs 
to stop the fighting, contain the conflict, and enter into good faith 
negotiations towards a negotiated settlement that all the parties can 
accept.

          Q    That means they do not deal in any way with reversing the 
aggression?  It calls for them to enter into a negotiation.  It attempts 
to get them to enter into a negotiation.

          MR. BOUCHER:  It continues the pressure that we have been 
using.  The element of a negotiation -- isn't it obvious to all of us 
that if you negotiate a settlement acceptable to all the parties, the 
Serbs are not going to be allowed to keep what they have gained.  The 
other parties will not accept that.

          I think it's obvious on the basis of what the two other 
parties have already found acceptable to them, in terms of what they've 
negotiated and accepted.

          Q    Richard, it's also obvious, or at least it seems that way 
to me, that if one of the parties will not accept a negotiated solution, 
as it hasn't up to now, that there's nothing in this formula that makes 
them give back anything they've taken.  They have to negotiate back 
anything that they're going to give up; isn't that right?

          MR. BOUCHER:  First of all, we haven't listed the formula.  
But, at the same time, I don't think I ever claimed that it would do 
that.  As we said, there are things that we can do now that we can agree 
on together that will further increase the pressure.  They have to be 
seen in the context of the further campaign to escalate the pressures 
against the Serbs with certain particular goals, and they can make a 
contribution to many different aspects of the problem -- the goals that 
we have stated.

          But I also, I think, said right up front that we continue to 
believe that further measures, stronger measures, may be needed.  We're 
not in a position to get agreement on those right now, but we do have an 
understanding that such stronger measures, or that stronger measures may 
be needed and, thus, the things that we proposed remain on the table.

          Q    Richard, then why are you signing on to a policy or a 
strategy that you're obviously admitting hasn't worked and won't work?  
Is unity with the allies more important than reality?

          MR. BOUCHER:  My turn?  I didn't say I was signing on to a 
strategy that hasn't worked and won't work.  We're continuing a strategy 
that we have.  We're doing some significant, some substantial, some 
useful things that we can do together to increase the pressures to try 
to stop the killing. I don't see any need to apologize for trying to 
take steps to keep people from dying.  But we are taking further steps 
to escalate the pressures that we've been placing on the Serbs, and this 
is a strategy and a process that we'll continue.

          Q    Does the United States now accept the idea of progressive 
implementation of the Vance-Owen plan?

          MR. BOUCHER:  John, again, I think for the last day or two 
I've been trying to avoid getting into commenting one way or the other 
on specific ideas that may be under discussion.  So I think I'll have to 
decline on that.

          Q    Richard, on that, you said in your strategy that you're 
looking for a negotiated solution that all can accept. The 96 percent 
"no" vote in the Bosnian Serb referendum seems to be pretty convincing 
evidence that one party does not accept it, as the Secretary and you 
have pointed out.

          MR. BOUCHER:  That's true.

          Q    But at the same time, you were asked, "Is Vance-Owen 
dead," and you said "no."  I see a contradiction there.  It's clear that 
the Bosnian Serbs do not accept it.

          MR. BOUCHER:  Jim, I have not tried to go any farther than 
what the Secretary said previously, that there needs to be a political 
solution.  Vance-Owen is something that can be built upon.  And I think 
I have described to you an effort to change the incentives and the 
pressure on the one party that's rejected a negotiated solution so far 
to bring them into a negotiated settlement.

          The chief element, as I think we've pointed out before, is the 
willingness of the Serbs to enter into any good faith negotiation to 
reach a political settlement.

          Q    Richard, the other day when you addressed territory, you 
spoke really of borders, that the United States does not support any 
change in borders.  I wonder if what you're saying now about territory 
ought to be pursued a little bit?

          Vance-Owen sets up ethnic zones, cantons, that would give the 
Bosnian Serbs more control than their percentage of the population might 
suggest.  Could it be that the State Department doesn't consider that a 
territorial gain?  That when you say, the U.S. is against territorial 
gain by aggression, you don't mean controlling internally a wider area 
than the Serbs did before the war?  Could you just be talking about 
borders, or do you mean internally, too?  Is that a territorial -- 
didn't Vance-Owen give the Bosnian Serbs territorial gain? No, I want to 
make sure that six months from now we don't come back and it turns out 
"by territorial gain," the State Department meant the border; they 
didn't mean changing who runs Sarajevo.

          MR. BOUCHER:  Now that you've got everything I've said messed 
up together, let me try to straighten --

          Q    No, I want to give you a chance to not have to apologize 
three months from now.

          MR. BOUCHER:  My chance now?

          Q    Sure.

          MR. BOUCHER:  We've made clear, I think, that there are 
various principles involved here.  There are the principles that you 
can't change international borders by force; there are the principles 
that you can't provide aggressors with the fruits of their aggression.  
We've also made clear that there are different ethnic groups involved.  
There are different ethnic groups that live inside Bosnia involved in 
this conflict, and there has to be some political settlement that's 
going to be acceptable to them all.

          The final judgment on what is a solution lies with the parties 
themselves.  We've made clear I think again and again, that the 
negotiated solution has to be one that's accepted by all the sides, by 
all the people who are trying to live in Bosnia.

          Q    So when the Bosnian Muslims, having really no alternative 
except to disappear from the face of the earth, accepted a plan that 
rewarded the Serbs with a larger part of Bosnia than they had before the 
war began, when the Muslims accepted that, their acceptance is really 
the bottom line?  The U.S. says, "Fine, if you accept it, then it's all 
right with us, too?"

          MR. BOUCHER:  First of all, I sort of want to -- I don't know 
exactly what numbers you're referring to on populations and territory.  
I'm not the expert on that, and I don't intend to be.

          But the bottom line --

          Q    The Serbs aren't 70 percent of the country, by 
population, and they have 70 percent of the territory. Vance-Owen awards 
them --

          MR. BOUCHER:  The Muslims have not accepted  -- the Muslims, 
as far as I know, have never accepted Serbian control of 70 percent of 
Bosnia.

          Q    That's true.  But they've accepted because their back is 
up against the wall something less than 70 percent but considerably more 
than the Serbs had before they began their war.

          MR. BOUCHER:  I don't know what numbers of population and 
territory you're basing this on, Barry.  The bottom line is what you 
said it is, that the solution has to be one that's acceptable to the 
parties, and what the parties can accept is the solution.

          Q    Richard, though, it seems to me that the bottom line of 
what you're saying is that the United States accepts temporarily the 
control of 70 percent of Bosnia by the Serbs in order to stop the 
fighting?

          MR. BOUCHER:  No.

          Q    Can you please say it, because that's what seems to be 
the bottom line of what you said.

          MR. BOUCHER:  I'm not going to say that because I don't agree 
with it, Saul, because I didn't say it earlier and I'm not going to say 
it now.

          Q    You're suggesting that until and at least there's a 
negotiated solution, at the moment, in order to stop the fighting -- and 
you're not apologizing for this -- the thing to do is to accept -- and I 
use that word very loosely --

          MR. BOUCHER:  Extremely loosely.

          Q    But the fact is that -- if that's not true, can you 
please tell me what the United States -- not the European allies -- but 
what the United States is going to do to reject and reverse, to not 
accept the temporary gains of the Bosnian Serbs -- of the Serbs?  Please 
tell me?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Saul, rather than letting you rephrase 
everything I say, I will stick with what I said.  I will tell you that 
I've explained it clearly.  I will tell you that I've described for you 
an entire campaign of escalating pressures, of which we're at a point of 
escalating those pressures.  I have told you what that is designed to 
do.

          Q    Richard, coming back to Carol's question for just a 
second, a little while ago, you said that the United States continues to 
think that stronger measures are necessary.  I presume "continues to 
think" means even in these discussions now with the other Foreign 
Ministers.  And yet you recognize you can't get them now -- you can't 
get those stronger measures now.

          Doesn't that mean that you're accepting a process or a series 
of actions which the U.S. thinks won't work and are inadequate to do the 
job that needs to be done?  You said you think that stronger measures 
are necessary.  You can't get them, but you're buying into this.

          MR. BOUCHER:  You're using a word like "accept" 
extraordinarily loosely.  "Accepting" to me means that we would drop the 
sanctions; that we wouldn't continue the pressures; that we wouldn't 
continue to build the pressures; that we wouldn't continue to try to 
make the cut-off on the Bosnian Serb border effective; that we wouldn't 
continue to pursue a war crimes tribunal.  Those are all things we're 
doing.  We're doing them right now.  That is not accepting.

          Q    If I may, perhaps I should have worded it another way:  
That the United States is conceding the reality -- of conceding, at 
least for the moment, the reality of the Serbian advances in order to 
stop the fighting and stop the killing and would then -- because it 
doesn't accept that -- would then seek to reverse that through 
negotiation and pressure.

          MR. BOUCHER:  Once again, Saul, no.

          Q    All right, let me --

          Q    Richard --

          Q    No, let me --

          MR. BOUCHER:  Does anybody else have any rephrasings of what I 
said that they want me to reject?

          Q    (Inaudible) -- we understand that you're saying --

          Q    These are fair questions.

          MR. BOUCHER:  I don't quite understand what's going on here.

          Q    It's not you, it's the State Department policy which is 
hard to get at.  You've said two things that I can't find consistent.  
You've said the U.S. will not accept the gains of territorial 
aggression.  You've also said the bottom line is really what the parties 
will accept is fine with us.

          MR. BOUCHER:  That's right.

          Q    O.K.  The point is if the Muslims -- and it's not an "if" 
-- the Muslims, because of their circumstance, have been compelled to 
accept a plan that does reward the Serbs for territorial gain -- does 
reward the Serbs for aggression.  And the question is:  Is that all 
right with the United States?

          Saul's question seems to suggest, is it all right temporarily 
with the United States?  So put in a "temporary," if you want.  I can't 
put the two together.

          MR. BOUCHER:  No, I don't -- I understand the question, Barry.  
I don't think it's the way to describe the situation, because if you 
look at what we've done in terms of escalating the pressures on the 
Serbs and what we're continuing to do, obviously, you know, that changes 
the equation on the other end.  It's very true, as we've said many 
times, the Muslims are the principal victims of this conflict, and they 
have been disadvantaged throughout the process of negotiation.

          At the same time, we've taken a lot of steps to change the 
equation on the other side, to try to bring the pressures on people who 
otherwise have shown no inclination to negotiate; to try to bring the 
pressures and increase the pressures on them to negotiate seriously.

          Q    Richard, could I go back to my previous question? On 
Tuesday, when he testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Secretary Christopher fairly firmly closed the door on the idea of 
progressive implementation of the Vance-Owen plan.  When I asked you 
before, you essentially said you didn't want to discuss it, and by not 
discussing it, you leave open the possibility that the United States has 
now reopened the possibility of doing that.  Is that want you intended 
to do?

          MR. BOUCHER:  No.  That's not what I intended to do, John.  I 
think if you'd asked me about any specific option and idea that has been 
proposed by one or another of the Ministers that the Secretary is 
talking to right now, even as we speak, I think it's only prudent for me 
to decline to try to get into that.

          In their discussions, the Secretary I think on this particular 
one has stated some very clear views before, and I don't see any reason 
to anticipate that those have changed.

          Q    Richard, what's today's policy on safe havens?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Alan, having just replied to John that I'm not 
going to get into one specific area, and that not doing that in no way 
prejudices the outcome.  I don't think I want to.

          Q    (Multiple questions)

          Q    Well, you have been compelled because the President 
addressed certain things.  At the beginning of this briefing, you know, 
you had to restate U.S. policy because the President had remarked on the 
subject.

          Now, the President says safe havens is like Northern Ireland.  
Now, how can he be saying that while the Secretary of State and the 
French and the British and the Russians are talking about safe havens?  
Is the Secretary of State talking about --

          MR. BOUCHER:  First of all, he is the President, not me.

          Q    Well, but is the Secretary of State discussing something 
with three prominent allies that would create Northern Ireland?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Barry --

          Q    And wouldn't Northern Ireland be better than what they've 
got?  (Laughter)

          Q    How about using Gaza here?

          Q    No, I mean, really, has the President kicked safe havens 
off the table?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Is there a question in the house?

          Q    Is safe havens on the table, or does the President's 
remark mean it's not workable?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Barry, I'll go back to what I said to you at the 
beginning.  And without getting into any details or any of the specific 
ideas that are floating out there, I think the President has expressed a 
certain amount of skepticism that some of these ideas could lead us to 
the kind of long-term solution that we have been looking for.

          At the same time, some of these steps may indeed make a 
contribution to one or another or several of the goals that we have of 
stopping the killing, containing the conflict, and pressuring the 
parties -- pressuring the Serbs, especially -- to enter into good-faith 
negotiations to reach a negotiated settlement.

          Chris.

          Q    One of the modest, concrete proposals that everyone 
pretty much seems to agree with is the idea for monitors on the border.  
Now the Yugoslav President Cosic has said that his country will not 
accept monitors on the border.

          MR. BOUCHER:  I think five minutes ago I said I hadn't heard 
of that remark, and, since I've been here for the last five minutes, I 
still haven't heard of it.

          Barrie.

          Q    Yes.  The other day, evidently, Secretary Christopher 
downplayed comparisons between the Bosnian crisis and the Holocaust, and 
this has prompted the Bosnian Ambassador to the U.N., Mr. Sacirbey, to 
publish an open letter in which he describes these as slanderous phrases 
directed at his people. Would you care to respond to that?

          MR. BOUCHER:  The Secretary never suggested that the Bosnian 
Government is guilty of genocide.  In his testimony before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday, he stated that all sides in this 
conflict have been guilty of atrocities.

           He also stated clearly, as we know, that the principal fault 
in the conflict lies with the Bosnian Serbs, and we all know as well 
that the Muslims are the primary victims of the conflict in Bosnia.  The 
Serbs have been the ones conducting a systematic campaign of aggression.  
The mass killings and rape of civilians have been part of that campaign 
known as ethnic cleansing.

          Q    Richard, the United States --

          Q    If I can just continue that for just a moment, Saul.  Did 
the Secretary say that he'd never heard of any genocide by the Jews 
against the German people, and, if he did say that, doesn't that 
imply --

          MR. BOUCHER:  It's in a much longer passage in the transcript, 
and I'd invite you to read it.

          Q    The United States urged the Bosnian Government to accept 
Vance-Owen and made certain commitments to -- I think the Secretary said 
to protect the -- not the territorial integrity, but to see that Bosnia 
survives as a state.

          Is the United States now urging Bosnia to accept some sort of 
arrangement which would stop the fighting, and is it giving that same 
commitment, and can you tell me the Bosnian state that the United States 
is committed to helping survive?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Once again, Saul, I think I have to start out by 
questioning many of the phrases and assumptions that you make in your 
question.  The United States worked with the Bosnian Government, and 
worked with the negotiators, to help them find a solution that was 
acceptable to them.

          And, as you know, during the process there were a number of 
changes made that made the agreement, and particularly the interim 
agreement, acceptable to the government side.

          The United States has been in close touch with the Bosnian 
Government.  We have worked with them all along.

          Q    We have to take a filing break for a stake-out.

          MR. BOUCHER:  Well, if we're going to go to the stake-out, I'm 
not going to stay.

          Q    No, no, some of us do.

          MR. BOUCHER:  O.K.  Other questions then.  Filing break.

          Q    Coming back to something that you said earlier on, will 
there be a Permanent Four meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Washington 
tomorrow?

          MR. BOUCHER:  There's nothing like that scheduled.

          Q    Is it under consideration?

          MR. BOUCHER:  At this point there's nothing scheduled, Ralph.

          Q    Will the Secretary of State -- does the Secretary of 
State feel any need to consult further with Boutros-Ghali? Has he done 
so today, for example?  Will he do so either later today or tomorrow?

          MR. BOUCHER:  I don't think he's talked to him at this point.  
Whether he will or not, I don't know at this point.

          Q    O.K.  Can we take it to mean, when you say there's 
nothing scheduled at this point, that there will be a P-4 meeting, but 
you're just not able to announce it at this point?

          MR. BOUCHER:  No.  It's not scheduled.  If there was nothing 
to announce, that's the way I'd phrase it.

          Q    On that question, Richard, there are five Permanent 
Members of the United Nations.  What is the arrangement with the 
Chinese?  Have they agreed just to sit this one out, or are they being 
consulted at any point along the line?

          MR. BOUCHER:  If you want to ask the Chinese for their 
position, you'll have to ask them.  We obviously keep in touch with a 
number of other members of the Security Council, principally through New 
York.

          Q    When was the P-3 meeting that is occurring right now 
scheduled?

          MR. BOUCHER:  When was it scheduled?

          Q    Yes.

          MR. BOUCHER:  The lunch?  The lunch was scheduled with Hurd --

          Q    Right.

          MR. BOUCHER:  -- days ago.

          Q    That was the P-2 meeting.

          MR. BOUCHER:  We told you about it, right?

          Q    Right.  I'm just trying to get at here, you know, since 
something isn't scheduled for tomorrow --

          MR. BOUCHER:  We're going to get PT-109 in a minute here.

          Q    It arrived -- suddenly a P-3 meeting occurred today.  
When was that scheduled?  To use your phrase, "scheduled."

          Q    And who did the inviting?

          Q    Is there going to be a Permanent Four meeting tomorrow at 
the end of this thing?

          MR. BOUCHER:  I don't know at this point.

          Q    O.K.

          MR. BOUCHER:  When we know, we'll tell you.

          Q    O.K.  Is it possible that you won't tell us until after 
it occurs?

          Q    Like Juppe?

          Q    I mean, essentially what happened today?

          MR. BOUCHER:  I don't think that, no, Ralph.  And, first of 
all, we told you about today the first thing this morning, I believe, or 
at least by several hours in advance of the fact.  I think it was 
decided last night that Kozyrev would join the lunch.

          Q    Richard, you didn't tell us about Juppe.

          Q    On another subject, in Latin America there was an article 
last week in the Clarin, a daily in Buenos Aires, which reported about a 
visit by Morton Rosenthal, the International Director of the Anti-
Defamation League, who was hosted on a visit by the USAID and by the 
American Embassy.

          He was down there to try and defend the ADL against the 
information that had been spread in the Argentinian press about the 
criminal investigation in San Francisco of the ADL office which was 
suspected of espionage, with giving information on individuals in the 
United States to South Africa.

          In that respect, the Clarin article said that Rabbi Rosenthal 
attacked political individuals and organizations in the United States 
which he accused of spreading this information in the Argentinian press.

          MR. BOUCHER:  Do we have a question here?

          Q    The question is, is the USAID or the State Department 
sponsoring activities of the ADL at a time when the ADL is in fact under 
a criminal investigation by the Department of Justice?  And, if so, how 
do you justify this?

          MR. BOUCHER:  I have no idea what you're talking about.  
Perhaps you wrote the article that you're reciting for me.

          Q    No, I didn't, but I read it.

          MR. BOUCHER:  But at the same time, I think if you're dealing 
with the question of exchanges, you might check with USIA.

          Q    Richard, on East Timor, do you have any comment about the 
decisions that were handed down?

          MR. BOUCHER:  We apparently just learned of the verdict from 
our Embassy in Jakarta.  We have not had an opportunity to study it in 
detail at this point.  We understand that Mr. Gusmao was found guilty of 
the primary charge of attacking the Indonesian Government, and he was 
given the maximum sentence of life in prison.

          The Judge's statement did not address a secondary charge, 
illegal possession of firearms, which carried a possible death sentence.  
We understand the secondary charges will not be considered further.

          We, I think, have expressed concerns about the trials, about 
the fact that Gusmao was not allowed to read his own statement during 
the trial.  There were U.S. and other diplomats, as well as Indonesian 
and foreign press present at the May 21st session.  However, U.S. and 
other diplomats were excluded from some of the critical trial sessions, 
including the session where he was scheduled to read his own defense 
statement.

          Q    Richard, on that --

          Q    Can I follow up.  I mean, what are you doing about it 
here?  Have you called anybody -- (to colleague) can I get some records 
so that it's for broadcast?  Thank you.

          I mean, are you following it up here?  Have people been called 
in to discuss it?

          MR. BOUCHER:  At this point I think we want to get ahold of 
the judgment, get ahold of the verdict and look at it more closely.

          Q    I still have a follow-up on this question:  Vice 
President Gore recently made a statement in which he was very critical 
of the human rights situation in East Timor.  A couple of days ago, 
President Clinton in the Oval Office during the meeting with Bishop Tutu 
was asked about East Timor, and he said there had been discussions on 
it, and he would address the situation at a later stage.

          The position that you have -- the policy position that you 
have here in the State Department, which was drafted, I believe, during 
President Carter's term, of recognizing the incorporation of East Timor, 
is it being reviewed?  Is it being analyzed?  Is it under any process -- 
any dynamic process of consideration?

          MR. BOUCHER:  I'm not aware of any change at all in that 
policy.

          Q    Could I put then another element into it?  Quoting you 
today, you said you don't accept the acquisition of territory by force 
and further on provide aggressors with the fruits of their aggression.  
This does define some sort of a policy which I assume is this 
Administration's policy, and it does apply to the situation of East 
Timor occupied in 1975.

          MR. BOUCHER:  I think our policy on East Timor, as you 
probably know better than I do, is quite a bit more precise than that.

          Q    On Venezuela:  Do you have anything on the ruling of the 
Supreme Court against President Perez?

          MR. BOUCHER:  Just to say that what's happening in Venezuela 
is for Venezuelans to work out.  Our support for Venezuelan democracy is 
very well known, and we continue to support democracy in Venezuela.

          Q    Richard, do you have any notion whether you're pulling 
back William Pennington, I think it is, from Moscow?

          MR. BOUCHER:  At this point there's nothing specific I can 
say, including the individual's name.  The situation, I think as we 
understand it, is this way:  There's a U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow 
who was involved in an auto accident May 16.  Regrettably, three Russian 
pedestrians were injured.  One of them, a ten-year-old child, later 
died.

          We want to express our deepest sympathy to the victims and 
their families. The Embassy has conducted an investigation of this 
unfortunate incident and has taken into account the reports by the 
Russian authorities.  The results of the Embassy's investigation 
revealed no evidence to support the claim that the driver of the vehicle 
was intoxicated.

          Embassy officials have met with representatives of the Moscow 
militia and the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding the incident.

          Q    And do you intend to pull him back?

          MR. BOUCHER:  At this point, Jim, that's as far as I can go.

          Q    Is the question of compensation arising here for -- since 
he has diplomatic immunity and can't be charged, presumably the victims 
have no recourse through the courts. Would the question of compensation 
arise here as a gesture of -- without permission?

          MR. BOUCHER:  At this point, Alan, I saw the word in the wire 
before I came out here.  I didn't have time to look into it.  I'll see 
if there's any such question that arises.

          Q    May I just follow up a little on East Timor still just to 
clarify one aspect.  The Secretary of State said here when he met with 
the Foreign Minister of Indonesia that he suggested that he was pleased 
with the opening of the territory to journalists and other monitors.

          Then we had the May 11 incident that you referred there when 
an American diplomat from Jakarta could not attend the trial, was 
prevented from attending the trial, and today a crew of Portuguese 
television -- two newsmen, Mr. Rui Araujo and Mr. Guedes -- were 
attacked -- physically attacked outside the courtroom soon after the 
sentence was read.

          These incidents -- will they provoke a revision of this joy 
displayed with the openness by the Indonesians there?

          MR. BOUCHER:  I guess I'd say we've called them the way we see 
them.  We have long held that this trial should be opened.  We've 
pressed for things like Red Cross visits, which indeed have occurred.  
When the trial has been open, when people have been allowed to go there 
and report on it, when the trial has -- when the gentleman has been 
visited by the Red Cross and others, we've expressed our appreciation 
for that.  And when those things have been denied, such as what I talked 
about today, we've expressed our criticism of that.

          Q    Israeli Radio reports this morning that a delegation from 
the State Department is awaited in Jerusalem in June to have talks with 
the Israelis and Palestinians.  Do you have anything on that?

          MR. BOUCHER:  No.

          Q    One more, please.

          MR. BOUCHER:  One more?  O.K.

          Q    South Korean Foreign Minister expressed yesterday that he 
would have no objection if United States would have diplomatic relations 
with North Korea, and that that kind of expression could affect your 
policy toward North Korea in the sense of the diplomatic relations with 
the country?

          MR. BOUCHER:  I have not seen that declaration, so I think I 
better hold off.  I think our policy on recognition, lack thereof, is 
pretty well-known.

          Q    Any development of high-level talks?

          MR. BOUCHER:  No.  Not at this point.  Nothing.

          Q    Thank you.

          (The briefing concluded at 1:43 p.m.)
(###)

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