Note: This Electronic Research Collection is an archive site. For the most current information, please visit the
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPC #71
WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 1993, 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I don't
have any statements or announcements, so I'd be glad to take your
questions.
Q. I was going to ask you if our policy has changed.
Q. So how are we coming at the U.N. on Bosnia in trying to
get a U.N. resolution together that would, at a minimum, put some border
monitors between what used to be Yugoslavia and Bosnian Serb-held
territory?
MR. BOUCHER: We are coming along on that as well as on the
War Crimes Tribunal. You know that the U.N. in recent weeks has taken a
series of steps. We've imposed new and significant sanctions on Serbia
to increase the pressure on the Serbian leadership, and thereby on the
Bosnian Serbs. We've seen some kind of results from that.
We've also, obviously, been bringing diplomatic pressure to
bear on the various parties to stop the fighting and to cut off those
who continue the fighting.
Currently at the U.N. we're working on further steps. One, as
John mentioned, is the draft resolution to deploy monitors along the
Serbian-Bosnia border. This is currently under discussion and
consideration by the Council. It's a resolution that would put monitors
on the border and basically asks the Secretary General to submit to the
Council recommendations on the specific deployments.
At this point, we don't know Mr. Milosevic's position on that.
I think Foreign Minister Kozyrev mentioned yesterday, after his
meetings, that Milosevic had not taken a position at that point.
The other thing that we're doing up at the United Nations is
on the War Crimes Tribunal. Consultations are continuing among Council
members on the issue of establishing a War Crimes Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia. We expect a draft resolution to be discussed at an informal
session of the Council this afternoon with a possible vote as early as
Friday.
We support the adoption of a resolution establishing a War
Crimes Tribunal as soon as possible. The draft resolution would require
all states to cooperate fully with the War Crimes Tribunal and require
them to take any measures necessary under their domestic law to
implement the resolution, including the obligation of states to comply
with requests for assistance or orders issued by the trial chamber of
the Tribunal.
Q Richard, does this Administration think that our new
friend Milosevic and Karadzic are people who need to answer for their
actions before this tribunal, if it's formed?
MR. BOUCHER: Sid, this Administration thinks what was stated
last December by then-Secretary Eagleburger, that the Serbian leadership
-- that the leadership of all the parties, indeed -- would have the
responsibility to answer for what they did or did not do to stop these
crimes. That's an obligation under international law, and we would
specifically think that Mr. Milosevic has that obligation.
Q Eagleburger's list was very specific.
MR. BOUCHER: Yes. He mentioned --
Q It evolved to the point where he was naming names.
MR. BOUCHER: At that point -- in that section, he mentioned
Milosevic, Karadzic, and General Mladic. That would still be our view
that those things apply.
Q Richard, isn't there a legal problem here -- Retroactive
jurisdiction on crimes previously committed? Has that been checked out
by the lawyers, and are they satisfied?
MR. BOUCHER: Jim, I'm not a lawyer but I'm sure it has been
checked out by the lawyers and that they're satisfied. These
prohibitions in international law against the commission of war crimes
are long-standing and existing. This is just a matter of the procedures
being used to pursue them and prosecute them.
Q Richard, does the U.S. think the War Crimes Tribunal
should require -- or should be able to act only in cases where the
individual appears personally before the War Crimes Tribunal in The
Hague?
MR. BOUCHER: Ralph, I'm not an expert in the mandate and the
rules of the procedure that the Secretary General has developed for
this, and that is indeed what the Council is considering. I think our
general view is that people have a right to defend themselves.
Q Richard, you said "all parties" should prepare? Do you
mean Muslims, Croats, and the Serbs?
MR. BOUCHER: No. Specifically, we think, as we've said,
there are atrocities that have been committed on all sides. I was asked
specifically about Milosevic, but it is also a matter of international
law that people have to take steps to stop these sorts of things.
Q So there are Muslim government -- Muslim members of the
government who the Administration feels should also appear before this
tribunal?
MR. BOUCHER: I'm not trying to expand it at this point, Sid.
Q Going back to the first resolution for just a second.
You said you weren't sure what President Milosevic's position is. I
think you were referring to the monitors resolution; is that correct?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
Q This may seem like a silly question, but why would it
matter to the United States, or even to the United Nations, what Mr.
Milosevic's position is? He has stated publicly that he's going to stop
the flow of weaponry. The U.N. has forces on the ground in an
independent nation called Bosnia.
For what reason is the United States waiting for an answer of
some sort from Mr. Milosevic on this? Or am I mistaken, that you're not
waiting for such an answer?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think we're necessarily waiting for some
kind of answer. We're not waiting in terms of moving forward on the
resolution. It's important to know his views because he himself has
stated that he was going to cut off the supplies for the Bosnian Serbs
except for humanitarian supplies; and he himself stated that he was
going to enforce that. Now, if you're going to monitor that
enforcement, you would have to be where he himself has said that these
things are going to be enforced. So that's the -- it's a question of
whether he's good to his word in the end and whether he's willing to
have people see whether or not he is good to his word.
Q Can it be done without his endorsement? He's made the
public statement.
MR. BOUCHER: Well, it's something that we already monitor,
that we already watch in various ways at this point. There have been
journalists out there looking around; diplomats have been out to the
border. There have been a variety of reports of what's going on on that
border. So, yes, it's something you can monitor.
But the question that the resolution is intended to address is
that Milosevic has said that Serbia would cut off anything but
humanitarian supplies to the Bosnian Serbs, and the resolution is
designed to address that commitment and to see whether he lives up to
it.
Q Richard, I have two questions on that also. Earlier in
the week you said that the U.S. would like those monitors, if they are
put in place, to be effective. That's been interpreted to mean perhaps
arming them. Does the U.S. have a position on what sort of mandate they
should have to search or stop goods flowing across there?
And the second question is, one of Milosevic's attitudes about
the border monitors is that they should be placed on the Croatian border
also. There have been clear indications of Croatian regular forces and
weapons moving across that border into Bosnia also. Do we have a
position on whether border monitors should be placed on the Croatian
border also?
MR. BOUCHER: Tim, to try to take the first one first and try
not to forget the second, the resolution itself does not address the
number of monitors to be deployed or their weaponry. That would be the
subject of the Secretary General's report, the specific recommendations
on deployment.
What we mean by "effective," is that they can effectively
monitor the traffic, that they cover all the points that need to be
covered, that they're there whenever there might be a shipment; that
this is an effective monitoring presence and that they're not just a
presence that happens to be there some times but the rest of this stuff
is really going around the corner.
But actually, specifically, exactly who the monitors should be
and what they should carry or not, I leave to the Secretary General's
decisions on deployment.
The second part, before I forget, was Croatia. Before I say
that, let me refresh my memory.
The page is missing. Okay, there it is. Here's what we know
about this question of whether there should be border monitors on the
Bosnian border with Croatia. We understand that Russian Foreign
Minister Kozyrev has discussed this issue with Croatian authorities. So
far, we really only have press reports of the meeting. We look forward
to hearing his views on this issue when the Secretary meets with him on
Thursday.
I'd say that the focus of international attention has been to
put monitors on Serbia's border with Bosnia to help ensure that
Milosevic makes good on his pledge, as we've said before.
Q Richard, yesterday the Secretary said that containment of
the conflict in Bosnia -- it was one of the primary goals of this
Administration. What specifically is he talking about? Can you provide
us with any evidence that the Administration is moving on the border
area to actually contain it?
MR. BOUCHER: The international community, over the whole
course of this crisis, has taken a series of steps to prevent spillover,
to prevent the conflict from widening.
I think if you look back at what the Secretary has said ever
since his confirmation testimony, but in particular in February, he's
expressed the dangers that were posed by this problem, should it get out
of control. We've taken a number of steps to put monitors in adjacent
areas, and we have monitors in a number of places.
We have -- UNPROFOR has deployed, I think, 700 people already
to Macedonia, and there are CSCE observers in a number of places.
We have made clear to the Serbian leadership that any Serbian
acts of violence in places like Kosovo and Macedonia would indeed have
grave consequences for us all.
And so, yes, containment has been one of the issues that we
worked on all along. I think we've made clear to you, as the Secretary
did again yesterday, that we're looking at various options, including
options of an expanded U.S. presence in Macedonia, but I don't really
have any more details on those options at this point.
Q There are no details like, has the Macedonian Government
said that they might accept some troops? Has this moved in any way
within the U.S. Government to --
MR. BOUCHER: We're looking at various options, and that's
about as far as I can go for the moment.
Q Richard, the Secretary indicated yesterday, as I recall
in that part of the testimony, that there would be something coming soon
from the Administration on this issue. Do you know of any plans to do
that? He indicated that there would be some sort of announcements on
it.
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any announcements for you today,
Saul.
Q On the business of the border guards, have we yet decided
whether the United States is prepared to contribute to that border guard
if the U.N. resolution passes and if they are needed, as you say, to be
as effective as the United States wants it to be?
MR. BOUCHER: At this point, Saul, I guess the question is
somewhat academic. We're trying to get the resolution. We, indeed,
support the resolution, and then we'll look to the Secretary General's
recommendations on deployments.
Q Just to challenge the "academic" part of it. Just the
other day you put out the answer to a taken question in which you
pointed out that the U.S. had been asked by one of -- the new mediator
whether the U.S. is considering putting border patrols -- putting U.S.
troops in part of that border patrol.
Has the U.S. Government come up with an answer for the U.N.
mediator, regardless of whether you're willing to tell us what that
answer is? It's not an academic issue. It has been put to the U.S.
formally, and I presume the U.S. is going to answer that.
MR. BOUCHER: At this point, I don't have an answer for you,
Ralph.
Q Richard, speaking of meetings, does the Secretary plan to
meet Douglas Hurd?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
Q When?
MR. BOUCHER: When he said. He said Friday; it's Friday.
Let me run down through the plans.
Q The question, please?
MR. BOUCHER: Does the Secretary plan on meeting Douglas Hurd?
Yes. As you know, we've been consulting with friends and allies here in
Washington, at the U.N. and in capitals.
The Secretary spoke with Spanish Foreign Minister, Mr. Solana,
by telephone yesterday. He talked to British Foreign Secretary Douglas
Hurd this morning. He'll meet Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev
tomorrow. The Secretary will meet with the British Foreign Secretary,
Mr. Hurd, on Friday and the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Juppe, on
Monday.
Q What are the times for all those meetings?
MR. BOUCHER: Kozyrev is tomorrow morning. It starts about
8:30. They'll probably come out about 10:00 or 10:30. The meetings with
Hurd and Juppe are both lunches, so they'll start about 12:30 and go to
about 2:00.
Q Will there be a photo-op with Kozyrev?
MR. BOUCHER: I'll talk to you about arrangements a little
later.
Q Richard, on another subject. In light of UNITA's refusal
to take --
Q Excuse me. I just want to ask one question. I hope it's
final. Has there been any more definitive reply to McCloskey's question
of yesterday about whether what's going on is genocide, and what the
definition of "genocide" is?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, I think the Secretary replied to
McCloskey's question yesterday. He gave him the definition and
expressed our view on it.
Q Is the meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev tomorrow
pretty much confined to the Bosnia issue, or is it going to be a broader
review of U.S.-Russian relations and other aspects -- other foreign
policy issues, and so on?
MR. BOUCHER: There is --
Q I realize they can bring up anything they want to bring
up, but what's the intention at this point?
MR. BOUCHER: (A) They're the Ministers; they can discuss
whatever they want. (B) We would expect Bosnia to be a principal
subject of conversations since the Russian Foreign Minister has just
been travelling in the area and having meetings on the subject.
Obviously, we're all very concerned about it.
They've been discussing in recent days the peacekeeping
ministerial; talking about that. That would probably come up. And, yes,
they may be other subjects, but I can't promise any specific ones at
this point.
Q Do you know if Kozyrev will go to the White House for any
meetings on this visit?
MR. BOUCHER: It's something you'd have to check with the
White House.
Q Can I just follow on Saul's question? About this
Genocide Convention of 1948, for those of us that don't know -- myself
being of them -- what is the Genocide Convention of 1948, and who signed
it?
MR. BOUCHER: It's the Genocide Convention that was signed by
the people who signed it in 1948 and subsequently. I'll have to get you
-- do you want the whole history of the thing? I'd have to get that for
you.
Q One other question you might try to answer, or take,
please. That is, if it is genocide, what would be the obligations of
the member states of the genocide -- signators to the Genocide
Convention, of which the United States is one?
MR. BOUCHER: I think that's available in the Convention. My
recollection of what vaguely I know about it is that it obligates states
to prevent genocide from taking place on their territory.
Q On their territory?
MR. BOUCHER: On their territory.
Q Not on other people's territories?
MR. BOUCHER: That's my understanding, yes.
Q So, in other words, these people who are not signatories
to the Genocide Convention, they can happily massacre whoever they want
and nobody is going to take any action?
MR. BOUCHER: Jan, I don't think that's really a good summary
of what's going on here.
First of all, I point out that there are many international
conventions that everybody is obligated to by customary international
law and by signatures not to undertake these atrocities. Whether you
call them "genocide" or whether you call them "willful killing" or
"torture" or whatever, as we've reported many, many of these crimes to
the United Nations, and we do believe that all these crimes need to be
prosecuted.
Second of all, we have made a point that it should be within
the mandate of the War Crimes Tribunal to pursue crimes of genocide that
might have occurred. And therefore that is something that the U.N.
Tribunal, I think, has put in the mandate. And when it's approved with
a new resolution, that will be part of their effort as well. If they
determine that crimes of genocide have occurred, that would be something
that they would pursue.
Q Does the United States now view that there is, as
McCloskey and somebody else put it yesterday, a moral equivalence to
what is going on to the war crimes, or atrocities going on -- that have
gone on in Bosnia?
MR. BOUCHER: Saul, the Secretary was asked that question in
various ways at various times yesterday. He made very clear in his
opening statement that the principal source of problems was Serbian
aggression. I think he called them the principal perpetrators of the
conflict and of the crimes and atrocities that have occurred.
He also noted, I think several times, that atrocities have
been reported and occurred on all side. If you look at our atrocity
reports, the whole series of them, as the Secretary did, in fact, look
at them before his hearing, you'll see that the same conclusions that he
conveyed, that there have been atrocities on all sides. But, indeed,
the vast majority or the bulk of the fault lies at the hands of the
Serbs.
Q Back on the border patrol resolution again, for a second.
You said the issue of weaponry would be dealt with not in the resolution
but in the report of the Secretary -- or the administrative handling of
it, essentially, by the Secretary General. Will the issue of
"effectiveness" be dealt with in the resolution? Or is that also
something to be essentially deferred to a lower level?
MR. BOUCHER: The specifics of the deployments -- where, how
many, what they should carry, who they should be, and that sort of stuff
-- is to be worked out in the recommendations of the Secretary General.
Q How about the issue of effectiveness? Will that be in
the resolution?
MR. BOUCHER: Those all the kinds of things you mean by
"effectiveness."
Q I'm wondering what you mean by them, not what I--
MR. BOUCHER: I mean what I said before. The ways you ensure
the effectiveness is by having an appropriate level of deployments at an
appropriate number of places with appropriate equipment and personnel,
and those things will be specified once the resolution passes -- would
be specified in the Secretary General's recommendations.
Q Is it fair for us to conclude, then, that the United
States essentially has decided not to press for language requiring an
effective border patrol in the resolution? It's decided it would not
succeed in getting that language?
MR. BOUCHER: Ralph, we've been working with a lot of other
governments in terms of putting this resolution together. As you know,
we support it. We support an effective monitoring presence. I'm sure
the other governments in the United Nations do as well.
If you look at many, many of the U.N. resolutions that we've
passed in this case and in other cases, the Council passes a resolution
saying what it thinks should be done and then the details are developed
subsequently and without too much delay in most cases.
Q So did you say -- I thought you said that's something the
Secretary General is to determine. Did I misunderstand?
MR. BOUCHER: I think I said about 13 times that the Secretary
General would determine the specifics of the deployments. Yes.
Q No, I mean, you're leaving to the Secretary General, who
has specific, pronounced and divergent views from the U.S. Government on
what to do on Bosnia, to decide whether these monitors should carry
weapons and in other ways perform their duties effectively. Is that
fair?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, first of all, I don't agree with your
characterization of the Secretary General and his views, but I'll leave
it to him. But, second of all, I think if the Security Council makes
clear that the monitoring presence should be there -- asks the Secretary
General to report on it as he's done in many other cases -- he's worked
out an appropriate and effective plan.
Q I thought the Secretary General was on the record as
being against the use of force in Bosnia. Maybe I misunderstand. I
thought he did that weeks ago, even while you're developing your own
position --
MR. BOUCHER: I don't understand why you're imposing --
imputing a view to the Secretary General on the issue of border monitors
at this point.
Q No, no. I'm saying because on the issue of Bosnia the
Secretary General has a specific view which is not parallel to the
Administration's approach to try to end the war.
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think anybody has questioned the
Secretary General's credibility or ability to carry out the wishes of
the Council in this matter.
Q How about his neutrality?
Q If the Secretary General were to decide in this
administrative way that in order to have an effective force, it would
have to include the presence of U.S. personnel, is the U.S. essentially
deferring that authority or that decision to the U.N. Secretary General
under the umbrella of this resolution that the U.S. supports?
MR. BOUCHER: That's pretty hypothetical, Ralph. I don't
think I should get ahead of that at this point.
Q Any more hypothetical than your description a minute ago
of whether they should have weapons or not have weapons or where they
should be placed or anything?
MR. BOUCHER: I didn't come down and tell you how that should
be handled. I just said that the current draft of the resolution deals
with those issues by asking the Secretary General to come up with a
specific deployment plan with all those questions in there.
Q And the U.S. supports that. So the question is --
MR. BOUCHER: And we support that idea, because that's the way
many resolutions at the United Nations work. I see no reason to doubt
that having discussed all these things in the Council and once the
Council passes a resolution, that we will not see in fairly short order
an effective plan that meets the wishes of the Security Council.
Q Richard, you've lost me on this last one. How can the
members of the Security Council, when they vote for the resolution, be
assured that it will be "an effective force" without knowing what the
numbers are and what the deployment and what the weapons are that they
will be carrying?
MR. BOUCHER: Jim, these -- the Council makes its wishes
clear. Somehow you seem to be looking for some disconnect between the
Security Council and the Secretary General, and frankly we just don't
see one. I guess that's the bottom line that I would give you on this.
Q Well, basically what --
Q No. The U.S. had to come back months later and have an
enforcement resolution. I guess we're asking why the U.S. is willing --
MR. BOUCHER: Well, let's take the "no-fly" zone for example.
Q All right.
MR. BOUCHER: The Council passed a resolution saying that
there should be no flights in Bosnia, and that there should be a
subsequent resolution. Now, it took the Council several months, as you
pointed out, to pass a subsequent resolution saying, "O.K., now we're
going to enforce this 'no-fly' resolution."
Q Exactly.
MR. BOUCHER: But, if you remember correctly, that resolution
I don't think specified the numbers of airplanes or anything else like
that. It asked certain regional organizations to work with the U.N. and
to set up an effective plan, and within days we had an effective
enforcement of the "no-fly" zone. So I don't see any reason to doubt
that that shouldn't occur when we pass a border monitor resolution.
Q If the United States is interested in having an effective
monitoring, doesn't it stand to reason that the United States would sort
of take the lead in suggesting to the Security Council that it, the
United States, and other Security Council members would be willing to
take part to make sure that this is an effective thing, and thus leave
it to no one's imagination about how effective it might be.
MR. BOUCHER: Saul, I guess you're acting on an assumption
that nobody else can do anything effectively except the United States.
And while that's not necessarily an assumption that I want to ascribe
to, I -- you know, these are things that we work out in each specific
instance with other members of the Council and with the Secretary
General and with whoever is working on them. We have worked them out
effectively in all previous resolutions, and I frankly find it rather
silly to doubt that that would occur in this case as well.
Q Well, I suppose the reason I'm asking is because
something the --
Q (Inaudible) -- the reason for the "no-fly" resolution --
it took months (inaudible).
Q Yes.
MR. BOUCHER: The "no-fly" resolution specifically provided
that there should be a second resolution on enforcement. Once the
enforcement resolution was passed, you had enforcement seven days later
by an effective force of airplanes.
Q Richard, you wanted prompt enforcement. You said it a
million times from this podium.
MR. BOUCHER: And we didn't get it.
Q And you didn't get it. Now, our question is you now say
you want an effective monitoring of the border. The question is, are we
going to sit around for another four months waiting for effective
monitoring, or is the United States doing something, either by offering
to participate or by offering language that specifies what an effective
enforcement would be to assure that? That's the question.
MR. BOUCHER: Ralph, the answer is no.
Q Can you -- here's an easier one. (Laughter) The
Secretary said -- the Secretary was moving toward a consensus on the use
of force on his trip to Europe, and a consensus hasn't developed. He's
had several conversations now with Mr. Kozyrev, with the Spanish Foreign
Minister, with Mr. Hurd. There will be more.
Are you in a position to say whether the allies are even less
interested in threatening force than they were when he was in Europe?
Where would you place them now on their interest or their support for
the President's initiative?
MR. BOUCHER: Barry, I don't think I can characterize the
views of our allies. It's for them to characterize their views. The
Secretary made clear in his testimony yesterday that all options,
including the option that he took to Europe-- of using military force,
lifting the arms embargo and having standby air power -- that that
option was still on the table.
You've heard from them, from the Europeans, previously in
their public statements that no options were excluded. I would
characterize the overall situation the way I have before: That we have
done a number of things in recent weeks, including the new sanctions, to
bring more pressure on the Serbs. We have had diplomatic activity, both
on the ground by the United Nations and by others, to bring pressure on
the Serbs and indeed the Croats to stop the fighting, and for everybody
to use their influence to see that the fighting stops.
Second of all, we are doing more at this present moment in
terms of increasing the pressure by passing these U.N. resolutions --
the one that we're working on in the War Crimes Tribunal, and then the
resolution to try to test Milosevic on his word that he would cut off
the supplies to the Bosnian Serbs. And, third of all, that we will do
more; that we have gone forth to the Europeans with our ideas of -- as
the Secretary described it yesterday, of the preferred course.
We are hearing back from them on different ideas as well. And
the Secretary will be having and is having a series of discussions with
the European Foreign Ministers in order to arrive at common ground to
concert our efforts on steps that we can take together.
Q By "preferred course", you mean military.
MR. BOUCHER: The preferred course being the one that he laid
out, lifting the arms embargo and having standby air power.
Q Richard, can you shed any light on the President's
remarks yesterday? He said -- he was asked if Vance-Owen was dead, and
he said it's now clear that the process is alive. Do you know what he's
talking about?
MR. BOUCHER: The Secretary, I think, made the point yesterday
and again this morning at the photo op that there has to be a
negotiating process; there has to be an ability at least to build on
Vance-Owen, because in the end there has to be a negotiated settlement.
Q And is that what the President thinks is --
MR. BOUCHER: You want to ask the President further about his
views, but I think what everybody is saying has been pretty consistent
on this point.
Q Richard, could I ask you about Angola?
MR. BOUCHER: Sure.
Q In the light of UNITA's refusal to go along with the U.S.
and U.N. proposal for a cease-fire and settlement, is the United States
now prepared to set up diplomatic recognition of the Luanda Government?
MR. BOUCHER: Jim, I think I have to stick with the answer
that the Secretary gave this morning, and that is that --
Q I wasn't at the Photo Op.
MR. BOUCHER: Well, I'm sorry, but I'll repeat it for you.
The Secretary said one of his duties was not to pre-empt the President,
and it's one of my duties as well. Obviously, we've been considering
the question of recognition of Angola. It's been under active review.
The President's been consulting with a number of senior
advisers, including the Secretary of State, on the subject, and I'd
leave it to the President to announce his decision.
Q Well, was the premise of my question correct, which is
that the U.S. Government places the burden of blame on UNITA for the
failure to end the fighting?
MR. BOUCHER: Jim, we have, I think, addressed these issues
before. As you know, there was what was generally recognized as a free
and fair election in Angola in December. The election didn't proceed to
the second round because of the outbreak of fighting, and we've said
very clearly that we thought that fighting was largely due to UNITA.
At the same time, we've called on both sides to make efforts
to try to resolve this situation and get back to the settlement that
they previously agreed to. The parties are negotiating now in Abidjan.
They haven't reached yet an agreement on a final cease-fire. We've
continued to urge the parties, especially UNITA, to redouble their
efforts over the next few days to try to overcome the remaining
obstacles in order to bring the talks to a swift and a constructive
conclusion.
Q Well, this is not totally hypothetical, but what
difference would it make if there were in fact formal diplomatic
relations between the United States and the Angolan Government?
MR. BOUCHER: Jim, that's a good question for us to answer
should we announce that we were recognizing them.
Q Could I ask two questions about Cuba? Do you have any
new information or can you update us as to the efforts from within this
building or elsewhere in the government to secure the release of those
three Cuban-Americans grabbed on Saturday in international waters?
There seems to be some sort of contention that the Cuban Government may
have acted legally.
And, secondly, do you have anything new on the most recent
incident yesterday involving a MiG and some boat traffic in the straits?
MR. BOUCHER: I had not heard about the more recent incident
involving a MiG and boat traffic. As far as the three that were picked
up on Saturday, there was a Florida-registered boat with three
passengers, three I think Cuban-born people who were living in the
United States, who were picked up by the Cubans on Saturday.
We've expressed our strong concerns about this incident to the
Cuban Government. We've been pressing for Consular access to the
passengers. The Cuban Government told us none were U.S. citizens, and
they have denied our request, but we're continuing to seek to have
contact with these people.
The Cuban Government has also told us that the passengers were
in good health, and we'll continue to follow the situation closely.
Q What about this contention that they may have been picked
up legally?
MR. BOUCHER: You mean in international waters --
Q Right.
MR. BOUCHER: -- or within the Cuban waters. That kind of
question I think you have to get from Coast Guard. They're the ones who
would know.
Q How about the incident with the MiG, the Cuban jet
fighter that buzzed a small Cessna plane?
MR. BOUCHER: Again, I'm sorry. I hadn't heard about that.
If I can get you something this afternoon, I'll try to get you something
on it.
Q Richard, does the U.S. think those three are U.S.
citizens?
MR. BOUCHER: At this point I can't tell you one way or the
other, Ralph.
Q So you're asking for Consular access as -- essentially at
the moment on the basis of courtesy.
MR. BOUCHER: Well, we're concerned about these people and
acting on the presumption that they may be U.S. citizens. We think we
should have Consular access. But in any case we're concerned about
these people having been picked up, and we would like to have access to
them and see them.
Q Richard, what can you tell us about follow-up discussions
with the Israelis and Palestinians on the document? Are there other
consultations taking place here? Are they taking place by phone? Are
there Americans that have been sent out to the region? What's the
follow-up?
MR. BOUCHER: The follow-up is that we continue to be in touch
with both the Israelis and the Palestinians, and I think that's about
all I know at this point.
Q That's what the Secretary said yesterday, too.
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
Q On a related matter, just out of curiosity, are you
prepared to announce or disclose the conduct of the Middle East
multilateral negotiations on arms control? Where are they taking place?
When did they begin? When will they end? And are there other sessions
of the multilaterals hosted by the U.S. and Russia that are underway now
or soon to be underway?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have the full list of multilateral
dates. Several of the sessions have already taken place. I'm not sure
if this is the last one or if there's one more to come, but I think we
previously posted all the dates, probably more than a month ago, and I'm
sure we can get that for you from the Press Office.
What's taking place in Washington this week is the third
meeting of the Middle East Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control
and Regional Security. They convened Tuesday. The first day was
cordial and productive. The United States and Russia are the co-
sponsors of this working group. This is part of the multilateral track
of the peace process that was initiated in Madrid in October of 1991.
We have 25 regional and non-regional parties in attendance. I
have the list for you if you'd like it. The first meeting of this group
was held in Washington in May of '92. The second meeting was in Moscow
in September of '92, and this particular session concludes on Thursday
afternoon.
Q And can you be any more specific about what it is that
was productive on the first day?
MR. BOUCHER: I think maybe we better leave it to the end to
sort of summarize the results of it. The purpose is to identify
practical next steps, possible confidence-building measures, which the
parties to this conference can explore; try to intensify the pace of
their work and expand the scope of contacts within the group.
Q Did the Syrians and Lebanese show up?
MR. BOUCHER: No.
Q Neither.
Q We can see the list afterwards, you said, though.
MR. BOUCHER: Yes. We'll give you the list afterwards. Do
you want me to read it?
Q No, no. As long as it's available --
MR. BOUCHER: O.K.
Q Have you scheduled the talks with North Korea?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything new on that.
Q (Inaudible)
Q Is Lord back?
MR. BOUCHER: No. He comes back, I think, at the end of the
week.
Q When you announce that a preparatory talk has been held
the other day. It could be understood that you have already agreed to
have high-level talk with North Korea in principle. Then when did you
agree to have that next high-level talk?
MR. BOUCHER: I think for several weeks now we said we're
willing to engage in such discussions if they could help further the
international effort to get North Korea to reverse its decision and to
abide by its safeguards.
At this point we're -- well, as we said, we had a preparatory
meeting, working-level meeting in New York on Monday. We don't have any
arrangements to announce at this point.
Q Is that why the Secretary was so hopeful?
Q (Inaudible)
MR. BOUCHER: At the director level.
Q The Secretary was making positive noises yesterday, but
he didn't --
MR. BOUCHER: Well, the North Koreans also --
Q He wasn't asked to give a -- he wasn't asked to explain
why he felt we were a little bit up on that.
MR. BOUCHER: I think we've explained before that North Korea
had allowed some access by the IAEA, and that that was useful, although
it didn't comply fully with the requirements of the February 25 Board of
Governors decision. That's what we think should still happen.
Q And that spills over to the renunciation?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
Q Are you hopeful of that, too, because of --
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I could really go farther than
that. There have been some positive signs in respect to their allowing
the IAEA in for some limited monitoring safeguards activities, but they
still have not reversed their decision or agreed to comply fully with
the requirements of the IAEA, and that's what the international
community expects from them.
Q Is that what the Secretary was referring to yesterday
when he said he was referring to the previous admission of IAEA
inspectors prior to their decision to withdraw?
MR. BOUCHER: No, no. In recent -- in the last two weeks or
so some IAEA inspectors have --
Q Did you mean you did not agree to have high-level talk in
principle with North Korea? When you said preparatory --
MR. BOUCHER: At this point we've said we're willing. I don't
have any arrangements or any definitive information for you at this
point.
Q One more: You said that if you meet North Korean people,
that should be executed with the context of international -- as a member
of international community to urge North Korea to solve nuclear matters.
And before the preparatory talks, have we had any prior consultation
with international society, including United Nations Security members,
or after the preparatory talk you have some consultation with the
members?
MR. BOUCHER: We've been in very close contact with other
members of the Security Council, with our South Korean allies, with the
IAEA and elsewhere. This is something that we've worked very closely
with other members of the Council and various other people on.
Q Do you have any next -- preparatory -- even preparatory
talks scheduled?
MR. BOUCHER: Nothing for you at this point.
Q Thank you.
Q Could I have just one more, please?
Q Richard, do you have any comment on Maastricht?
MR. BOUCHER: The United States has supported the idea of
greater European economic and political integration since the end of the
second World War. It is our conviction that European unity is good for
Europe, good for the United States and good for the world.
At the same time, we've said that the pace and the particulars
of European integration are for the Europeans to decide.
Q Speaking of the Security Council again for just a second,
you had -- went at great length the other day to describe the U.S. view
toward Foreign Minister Kozyrev's proposal for a Security Council
meeting this week.
Do you have anything to say about the possibility of such a
meeting following Secretary Christopher's consultations with Kozyrev,
Hurd and Juppe, such as next week?
MR. BOUCHER: Ralph, there's no Security Council meeting on
Bosnia scheduled. The Council does work on virtually a daily basis on
the question of Bosnia. Obviously, the subject that Foreign Minister
Kozyrev has raised -- and we would expect him to raise it tomorrow, and
we would expect it to be discussed with the Secretary -- so I don't
think I can give you a final answer at this point, but I think our
general view is that meetings at this level should be useful, they
should be productive and adequately prepared. And we would discuss it
with Foreign Minister Kozyrev in that context.
Q The Secretary used the word "postpone." I don't know if
that was a polite -- he chose a polite word, or you literally mean that
the Russians have agreed only to postpone this round. This is on the
peace --
MR. BOUCHER: There's kind of a merger of everything that
really ought to be kept somewhat separate, because there have been two
ideas floated out there, and at some points they have started to merge
in people's minds.
There was a basic agreement in mid-April to hold a ministerial
meeting of the Security Council on the issue of U.N. peacekeeping.
Q Correct.
MR. BOUCHER: Subsequent to our telling the Russians and
others that we believe that we needed more time to prepare, that there
was more preparatory work that needed to be done, it was agreed, and the
Russians have announced, that that meeting would be postponed. That
meeting's not been rescheduled.
There has also been floating this idea that perhaps there
should be a Foreign Ministers meeting on Bosnia, and that is something
that we would expect to discuss tomorrow with Foreign Minister Kozyrev.
Q One more question on Cuba. The boat was in international
waters?
MR. BOUCHER: Again, that's a question I think I referred
earlier to the Coast Guard. I would leave it to them to define.
Q Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:21 p.m.)
(###)