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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPC #56
FRIDAY, APRIL 16, 1993, 1:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I don't
have any announcements or statements, so I'd be glad to take your
questions.
Q Richard, could you bring us up to date, please, on the
Secretary's contacts with the Russian Foreign Minister? We understand
there have been virtually daily contacts. What's the latest
conversations?
MR. BOUCHER: The latest was the conversation from the White
House with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Mamedov. As you
know, George Stephanopoulos just reported on that. But just to review
what he said, the Secretary expressed our outrage and distress at the
continuation of the fighting in eastern Bosnia and the situation around
Srebrenica. He said, basically, that if Srebrenica were to fall or be
forced to surrender, that all bets were off as far as what the U.N. and
the Security Council should do next.
He provided the American view that it was intolerable to stand
aside in the face of this aggression. Noted -- as they both know --
that the U.N. is meeting this afternoon, and they will consider the
situation and look closely at the situation in eastern Bosnia, and noted
that there would be -- obviously, were Srebrenica to fall or be forced
to surrender, there would be support in the Council for moving
immediately to the sanctions resolution and that the United States would
support the resolution in that event.
I think it's important to review what is in that resolution.
That resolution would require member states to implement a whole series
of measures that would tighten and toughen the sanctions on Serbia and
Montenegro.
I'll run through those for you. It would permit imports,
exports and transshipment through U.N.-protected areas in Croatia and
areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled by Serb forces only with proper
authorization.
It would take steps to prevent the diversion of commodities
and products to Serbia and Montenegro. It would prevent transshipment
of commodities or products on the Danube unless specifically authorized
and effectively monitored. No vessels registered in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia would be permitted to pass through installations,
including river locks, within the territory of member states. Riparian
states would take the necessary measures to ensure that shipping on the
Danube would be in accordance with this resolution.
It would require states to bring proceedings against person
and entities that violated these resolutions.
It would require states to freeze funds and funds from
property of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -- Serbia and Montenegro.
It would prohibit the transport of all commodities and products across
land borders and to and from ports of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
with limited exceptions for medical and food stuffs, for essential
humanitarian supplies that were approved on a case-by-case basis, and
for strictly limited transshipments which might be authorized.
It would require neighboring states to prevent the passage of
all freight vehicles and rolling stock into or out of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia except at strictly limited road and rail border
crossing points.
It would require states to impound all vessels, freight
vehicles, rolling stock, and aircraft in which a majority and
controlling interest is held by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and
these items would be forfeited to the seizing state upon a determination
that they had been used to violate the resolutions.
It would require states to detain vessels, freight vehicles,
rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes suspected of violating the
sanctions.
It would prohibit most financial and non-financial services to
any person or body for business carried on in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, and it would prohibit all commercial maritime traffic from
entering the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
So, in essence, it would be a much, much tighter, much, much
stronger and much more effective and properly controlled embargo to
isolate Serbia and Montenegro; make them pay a cost for their support
for this aggression.
Q Excuse me. When you said "all bets are off" -- you know,
it's a fairly imprecise term -- you mean all bets would be off on moving
on the sanctions, or did you mean to leave the suggestion that there
might be other action apart from economic action? I assume you meant
the two-week delay might be aborted.
MR. BOUCHER: Yes. As you know, the Council has heretofore
expected to vote on the sanctions resolution on April 26. Should
Srebrenica fall or be forced to surrender, we would have to consider,
with other members in the Council, when to move on that resolution.
Q On that resolution.
MR. BOUCHER: Now, the President has said just this morning
that he's also considering other options as well.
Q Pardon me for not quite understanding this, but it seems
to me that the reason that this whole vote was delayed in the first
place was at the request of the Russians. And if the Russians still
don't agree to move forward, it seems difficult to imagine how the
Security Council can move forward since they have veto power.
MR. BOUCHER: Well, as you know, we've worked effectively with
the Russians in the past in passing the original sanctions resolutions
and working together closely in the United Nations on this crisis. They
have had their diplomatic efforts underway, as we have, to try to bring
pressure on the parties to seek a negotiated solution. They have
supported the "no-fly" resolution, and they have asked, in this
particular case of the sanctions resolution that there be a delay until
the 26th. And as Minister Kozyrev has said, that delay was in order to
give the Serbs a last chance to change their minds about the aggression,
to stop the killing and to enter the negotiating process.
I guess we would have to say that if the Serbs continue to
pressure Srebrenica militarily and force it to fall or force it to
surrender, then, in that case, that might constitute a Serb response to
that last chance, and we would consider it appropriate to have the
Council look at that point, and we would want to work together with the
Russians to have the Council consider what action it could take.
Q Richard, why would the threat of sanctions stop the fall
of Srebrenica?
MR. BOUCHER: Sid, the threat of sanctions is directed at a
number of things. There are a lot of efforts going on, and the threat
of sanctions is obviously one of the efforts that's going on.
There have been diplomatic efforts to try to bring about a
negotiated solution that would stop the fighting. There have been
efforts on the ground by the United Nations to try to get the cease-fire
to stick, and there have been sanctions and tightening of sanctions and
threat of further sanctions to ensure that the Serbs pay a cost for
their support and, hopefully, to make it clear to them that it's in
their interest to try to get this to stop.
Q Did the Secretary get a commitment from the Russian
Foreign Ministry that the Russians would not use their veto power in the
Security Council to block the enforcement of these sanctions?
MR. BOUCHER: My understanding -- and it's based on what
George Stephanopoulos just said -- is that they are -- the Deputy
Foreign Minister promised to raise all these questions and points with
his Minister and leadership. We didn't get a specific response at this
point.
Q Richard, the fall of Srebrenica to me almost seems beside
the point in that the Serbs are sitting within gunshot distance of the
center of the town and are able to lob shells and fire at the civilians
there with incredible accuracy and heavy casualties, as they've shown
repeatedly this week.
What is the United States prepared to do to relieve the
misery, the suffering, and the deaths of these tens of thousands of
miserable and defenseless people?
MR. BOUCHER: Alan, as you know, the United Nations forces and
humanitarian workers that have been out there have been working actively
on supplying relief supplies to people in this area, providing them with
food and medicine. We are continuing our airdrops to people who are
unable to get food and medicine due to the blockade and the sieges.
The United Nations is also working on evacuations in an
attempt to relieve the suffering of these people, as you say.
Q Wait a minute. Airdrops are nice, you know. It's nice
to eat. But when there are also shells dropping, as well as meals-
ready-to-eat, it doesn't really seem to answer the situation. Whatever
has happened, since your delay, scores of people have been killed there
and the Serbs have crept further and further into the town.
What's happening now is that the Muslims are seeking terms of
surrender. I fail to understand how anything that you've announced
changes that situation one iota?
MR. BOUCHER: Alan, I don't think we've ever claimed that the
sanctions or the diplomatic efforts would be able to change a specific
situation in one area. The sanctions are intended to make the Serbs pay
a price for their support for this. They're intended to influence them
to get them to change policy. They're intended to make it clear to them
that it's very much in their interest to stop this and to get back to
the table.
We are continuing, as I said, and the U.N. is continuing to
make very courageous and valiant efforts on the ground to try to take
care of the people who are suffering because of the fighting.
Q Richard, did you say when the sanctions would be
effective?
MR. BOUCHER: The sanctions would be effective when they're
voted.
Q Immediately?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
Q The grace period is gone?
MR. BOUCHER: The grace period is gone.
Q I thought until now the sanctions were tight and we've
already been policing traffic on the Danube and the riparian states have
already been rather tightening things. And you tell us from here that,
as far as you know, the assets of Yugoslavia have been frozen, at least,
in this country. None of that has made an impression upon the Serbs.
In addition, Reginald Bartholomew made this same warning,
personally, to the Serbs and apparently they ignored those warnings.
Why should they now decide that it isn't worth it to undergo these
sanctions in order to get a "Greater Serbia?"
MR. BOUCHER: Saul, I can't try to step in the minds of
Serbian leaders. What we can do is to ensure that there is a price to
be paid and that there is pressure that increases, that ratchets up and
that increases over time; and to look for all ways of tightening the
embargoes, of tightening the sanctions and making them understand, as
they do -- whatever calculations they do of their interests -- that
there is a price to be paid, and that they will face an increasingly
heavy burden.
You know the difficulties that have been created in the
Serbian economy. You know the problems they're having with their
banking system right now. You know about inflation, about unemployment,
about gas lines, and things like that. But we also know that there has
been some leakage, in part, by ships that evade the sanctions on the
Danube; there's been leakage, in part, by ships that have gotten in
through the coast underneath the surveillance; there's been some leakage
from transshipments in rail cars, and things like that. There have been
a series of steps to tighten those.
This resolution would, indeed, tighten those things much
further by making the sanctions much, much more difficult to evade. For
example, by barring all their ships from the territorial waters, by
barring the barges from passing through the locks, by impounding and
seizing the rolling stock, the vessels, that are used to violate the
embargo, by having everybody freeze their assets, financial transactions
that can be used to seize this. So this is what we've talked about
before, the economic isolation of Serbia.
Q When we last did this to Iraq, the United States deployed
a rather massive naval and air force with the aid of other nations,
including the Russians, as I recall, to patrol this. Is the United
States -- will there be an implementing resolution? Does the United
States plan to engage a massive military force, in conjunction with
other military forces, to patrol these borders and to tighten these
sanctions in the same way it was tightened around Iraq?
MR. BOUCHER: Saul, we and the neighboring states have been
cooperating on enforcing sanctions. Hang on.
Q As you say, it's leaking.
MR. BOUCHER: Can I finish an answer here? We and the
neighboring states have been cooperating in enforcing the sanctions. We
have programs of cooperation with sanctions assistance missions that are
being beefed up. We've been providing equipment. The West European
Union has, indeed, been providing new patrol craft. We have been
providing new patrol craft to the Danube. You know that the NATO and
the Western European Union both have naval forces in the Adriatic.
What this resolution does is provide them -- those people
enforcing sanctions, the riparian states, the others cooperating with
them and those in the Adriatic, as well as those monitoring road and
rail shipments -- with the tools necessary to make sure that the
sanctions are completely effective. So, for example, when a naval
vessel encounters another vessel on the high seas, it's not a question
of what's the cargo? Who is it intended for? Are you going here, there
or elsewhere? It is you shouldn't be here. You shouldn't be in these
territorial waters.
It's not a question, when cargo shows up -- or barges show up
at the locks -- of where you're headed, or are you going to pass
through, or do you have your paperwork right. It's you shouldn't be
here. You can't pass through these locks. So it makes it much more
clearer for these sanctions enforcers to make these things stick so that
the resolution--the leakage and the diversions and the false paperwork
that we've seen is minimized, and so that these forces that are there
can effectively impose the sanctions.
Q Sounds to me like that would take a rather massive group
of people and military people. We have sent a few Boston whalers, as I
recall. Is that what we're contemplating -- sending more Boston
whalers?
MR. BOUCHER: We've also sent a lot of people. The WEU has
sent a lot of people. We've sent equipment, we've sent coordination
teams, communication equipment. There's a fairly massive effort
underway already, and it's the one that's in the process of being beefed
up.
Q But in answer to my question, do we plan to send any more
military people or ships or any other forces to tighten the grip of
sanctions around Yugoslavia?
MR. BOUCHER: We have increased our assistance to the
neighboring states, and we will continue to increase it as necessary.
We had one back here.
Q Richard, Lord Owen suggested that the West may have to
bomb Serb supply lines in Bosnia to help end the civil war. What's the
U.S. reaction to Lord Owen's suggestion?
MR. BOUCHER: The reaction is the one the President gave this
morning. I'll stick with that.
Q Richard, a couple of things. These, I think, go central
to this issue. When the Secretary acceded Monday morning, before
leaving for Tokyo, to the request from Kozyrev for a two-week delay, he
was said to have been hopeful that the negotiations could be resumed;
hopeful even that there could be Serbian agreement on a settlement.
Does he still have that hope?
Second, the Secretary has been consistently against the use of
force in this situation. Is he now wavering? Is he now reconsidering?
The only part of this government that even wants to consider
the use of force is the Pentagon. Now, the Secretary has been
consistently putting down the use of -- it was useful last year when
they were out of office, but now it's the wrong thing to do. Has he
changed his mind? Has he got an open mind now on using force to stop
this situation?
MR. BOUCHER: Barry, first of all, I think you're mis-
characterizing views. You're saying things that the Secretary hasn't,
in fact, said himself.
The President this morning, on behalf of all of us, said that
we were considering other options, that we have not ruled any in or out
except for the intervention by American ground combat troops. The
Secretary has said that before, as you know.
The military is already involved in a variety of ways, be they
airdrops or the ships in the Adriatic or the patrol of the "no-fly"
zone. So I think you've seen our position on this. And, as the
President said this morning, we don't rule anything in or out.
Q Wait a minute. Until there's a -- first of all, you
didn't answer the first question. Maybe I threw too much at you.
MR. BOUCHER: You certainly did. You can try again at this
point.
Q All right. He took off at Tokyo and agreed to a two-week
delay, even though there was no evidence that the Serbs were relenting,
because he saw some hope that the Russians' influence would be
successful, that the Serbs would indeed resume serious bargaining. Does
he still hold out any hope for that?
MR. BOUCHER: Barry, I would go back to what we said at the
time and what the Secretary said at the time. The Russians requested a
delay until April 26, because they felt that there were serious
diplomatic efforts underway or that could be undertaken to try to bring
diplomatic pressure on the Serbs. The Secretary felt that that was a
reasonable request, and indeed you have seen various diplomatic efforts
underway, at the same time as you've seen the fighting in eastern Bosnia
and the continued pressure by Serbian forces on Srebrenica.
And, as the Secretary said this morning or said to the
Russians this morning, should Srebrenica fall, should it be forced to
surrender, that all bets were off as far as whether we'd continue to
delay on that sanctions resolution, because we have, indeed, made
diplomatic efforts. We haven't seen a change in the fighting situation,
and the Security Council will -- if that situation continues to worsen
out there -- will have to reconsider its options
Q The second point: You're not disputing, can you, that
the Secretary has been consistently counseling against the use of force?
And I'm asking if this important part of the government is now
reconsidering the view that force was the wrong -- would be the wrong
remedy?
MR. BOUCHER: Barry, apart from the Secretary's remarks on
combat forces, which he and the President and others have made --
Q I'm not talking combat forces --
MR. BOUCHER: Hang on.
Q You know, artillery, etc.
MR. BOUCHER: Barry, apart from the President's -- from the
Secretary's remarks on combat forces, I don't believe that either he or
I have gone into, in any forum, the kind of counsel that he gives inside
the Administration. I don't think I'm prepared to do that now.
Q He has stated that the President recommended last July,
beginning with taking out Serbian artillery. That was the situation
then. The situation now has changed. He hasn't explained. The
inference is there are now peacekeepers on the ground who would be at
risk.
I think he is on the record as force not being the remedy.
I'm not talking about ground troops.
MR. BOUCHER: Barry, I will -- the Secretary's been at the
White House for the Miyazawa visit. It's not a question I've been able
to ask him, if he's hopeful or has anything new to say on the use of
force. It's something we'll try to check for you. Rather than get into
a debate on the record, it should be clear to all of us.
Q Richard, can you clear up a statement that he made on the
"Today Show." He was asked about Margaret Thatcher's suggestion of
loosening the arms embargo so the Bosnians could get arms and a bombing
campaign to make it painful for the Serbs.
His reply was, "It seems to me that Prime Minister Thatcher's
prescription is one for only increasing the carnage." And he further
said, "It's a rather emotional response to an emotional problem."
That seems to contradict exactly what George Stephanopoulos
just said when he said that these -- both these options were under
consideration. Can you square that for us?
MR. BOUCHER: The President has said that we don't rule
anything in or out. We've given our views on various specific ideas
that have come up -- the Secretary has himself. Things are being looked
at and considered. There are pros and cons to every side of these
things, but I really can't get into any more detail on the counsel or
the discussions that may be taking place on specific options within the
Administration.
Q We don't want his private advice --
Q Please. Can I follow? I'm not going to give way this
time, thank you, because you've had a long monologue.
Q Yes, but we can't get an answer.
Q Excuse me. Can I step back a little bit. It seems to me
that when faced with this kind of persistent aggression, a government
such as the United States Government has to make a judgment as to
whether it's dealing with a rational regime or government that can be
influenced by things like sanctions, the economic well-being of its
people; or whether it's dealing with a government that is so irrational
and so evil that it will only be stopped by the use of force when
confronted and defeated.
Now, my government in the 1930s, to its everlasting shame,
made the wrong judgment about Nazi Germany, and as a result millions
upon millions of people lost their lives. Everything that you have said
today and in the past points to the conclusion that the United States
still believes that Serbia is ruled by people who are rational and who
understand pressure points such as sanctions.
In view of their record, isn't it time that you recast your
views and try to see them for what they really are and what they're
being revealed to be? That is to say, aggressors who will stop at
nothing until they're confronted and defeated.
MR. BOUCHER: Alan, I reject your analogies. The United
States has taken a stand on this issue. Secretary Christopher has taken
a stand on this issue. We have taken a stand firmly in support of a
negotiated settlement, of an end to the fighting. We have involved
ourselves in diplomatic efforts to attain that. We have involved
ourselves in humanitarian efforts to take care of people who are
suffering from the fighting, and we have imposed and led the way to
increasing economic pressures and particularly to ensuring the
tightening of sanctions, the further movement in that direction that's
been taken already, and that will be taken in the future.
We have taken a stand on this. We have made it very clear
that the Serbian leadership, however it does its calculations, is going
to have to pay a price for this aggression. We have made very clear
that these pressures will continue to increase in a whole variety of
ways if this continues. So I would say we've taken a clear stand on the
issue, we've taken action on the issue, and we'll continue to do that.
Q Richard, I'm trying to find out whether for the first
time we are hearing, in response to the question, "Are you prepared to
use force," we're hearing what we heard from George Bush before Iraq?
That is, we have not ruled anything in or out.
I have asked several times here whether it isn't unwise to
rule force out, which you've done. Now it seems to me that force is one
of the options, unless I'm overdrawing it, and I'd like to know whether
in response to the question, "Would you consider the use of force," the
answer is now, "We are not ruling anything in or out."
MR. BOUCHER: Saul, the answer is the President's answer this
morning, and the Secretary's answer the other day. There are, obviously,
to any given option, there are pros and cons. We've told you that we're
considering various things in connection with the humanitarian report
that says one of the best humanitarian things you can do would be to
create a safe-haven or stop the fighting or stop the shooting by heavy
weapons. We've said that all those options are being looked at.
So, obviously, there are a lot of options that are being
looked at. These things are always part of an ongoing process. At the
same time, I think we've laid out a clear course of action, the
Secretary laid out a clear course of action on February 10. We have
told you the steps that we're pursuing in that regard, the steps that
we've pursued to carry out that. We've told you where we are now.
We've told you where we were yesterday. And tomorrow -- if we're
somewhere else tomorrow, we'll tell you where we are then.
Q Yes, but I'm asking --
MR. BOUCHER: Terry and Gene had questions. Let --
Q Let me just one more time --
MR. BOUCHER: It's up to your colleagues.
Q I'm asking another question. The other question is, are
we confronting the Serbs with the possibility that the United States
will go beyond sanctions for the use of force, or are we simply saying
the worst they can expect is sanctions -- tough sanctions, strict
sanctions, strangle-hold sanctions, but sanctions only?
MR. BOUCHER: Saul, once again, we've told you we are
proceeding with sanctions, with strict sanctions, with tough sanctions,
with strangle-hold sanctions, as you say, and that we are indeed
proceeding in that direction. What comes beyond that, I'm really not
going to speculate on.
Terry.
Q I have two questions. The first is, describing the
Secretary's call to the Deputy Foreign Minister, it sounds as if he put
some degree of responsibility on the Russians to try to stop the fall of
Srebrenica.
Were you given any assurances at the time that you agreed to
delay of the Security Council vote, that they either thought or believed
or would be able to prevent the Serbs from advancing on Srebrenica?
MR. BOUCHER: The efforts of the United States and indeed the
Russians in delaying the vote -- and I'm sure of others as well in the
international community -- have been to try to bring pressure,
diplomatic pressure, during this intervening period, as Kozyrev
described it, to give the Serbs a last chance to stop the fighting and
rejoin the peace talks.
That's always been part of our portfolio. It's part of Reggie
Bartholomew's portfolio. Ambassador Bartholomew has just traveled in
the region and is now in Paris, I guess, today. So I don't know if I
can, sort of, give you specific assurances. If you want to ask the
Russians about their diplomatic activity, you can. But the efforts that
were underway, that we were both attempting to do, that they were
attempting to do, and their own explanations of it --
Q Does the U.S. believe it has --
MR. BOUCHER: -- is to get the fighting to stop.
Q Does the U.S. believe that there's any sort of standstill
agreement ensured by the Russians that if you give them these ten days,
that what is happening now would not happen, or was it not in that
context?
MR. BOUCHER: They, like we, felt that there was an
opportunity for diplomatic efforts, and that therefore it was reasonable
to delay the sanctions resolution while reaffirming its inevitability if
there shouldn't be any change in course.
Q I had two separate questions. The other question is for
a period of time the Serbs were held outside of the town, an went on for
a period of, I guess weeks, a couple of months now. Now, in the last
few days it had a succession of events. The sanctions were delayed.
The French General who put himself on the line to avoid the fall of
Srebrenica was withdrawn and is being told, in fact, he is being
recalled back to France. The U.S. Government and the British Government
both brushed off Margaret Thatcher's public call for military action.
Taking these events together, it would seem that this sends a
signal to the Serbs that, I guess, the West isnŐt that serious; that
each of these events in effect undercuts whatever diplomacy is underway
and the credibility with diplomacy that's underway. Why isn't that the
case?
MR. BOUCHER: Terry, I mean, you're laying up a pile of things
which, if you choose to, you could interpret as sending one signal. I
would say in fact if you look at the direct actions we've been taking,
you will see a completely different signal having been sent.
Ambassador Bartholomew was in the region talking to the
parties. He had a meeting -- a candid and direct meeting with Milosevic
and Karadzic and the others; laid out the things that we were doing and
going to do in terms of sanctions and the possibility of looking at the
arms embargo, and things like that -- direct.
We have started to enforce the "no-fly" zone. The NATO planes
have taken to the skies and are flying to deter flights in violation of
that zone. We have gotten agreement on the certainty of passage of a
sanctions resolution if the Serbs don't change their behavior. I would
argue, I guess, that those steps that we have taken in this intervening
period have been direct steps and clear steps.
Q Richard, back-benchers have a hard time here, but --
MR. BOUCHER: Sorry.
Q Alistair Lyon of Reuters' very significant report -- can
you confirm or deny out of Ankara that NATO has invited the Turks to
send the first Moslem aircraft into action from Italy?
MR. BOUCHER: I have not seen that report.
Q Eighteen of them are supposed to arrive in Italy in the
next two days.
MR. BOUCHER: I'm afraid I haven't seen that report. You might
check with NATO --
Q Could you check on that?
MR. BOUCHER: -- but we'll check as well.
Q Now, a follow-up question on that. Since there are other
non-NATO planes working on the "no-fly" zone, is it possible that you
might reach out to other Moslem countries outside of NATO for coverage?
MR. BOUCHER: That would be speculative on my part. The planes
flying at this point are NATO planes. I think NATO has been asked by
the Security Council and the U.N. to carry out this operation. Whether
others could be involved or integrated, I don't know. I mean, in
previous cases, we've said we would welcome contributions from others.
I just don't know exactly in this operation.
Q Richard, you just said a minute ago that you've got
agreement on the certainty of passage of the sanctions resolution.
MR. BOUCHER: If the Serbs don't change their behavior. That
was the understanding that was reached and which we described to you the
other day.
Q All right. But that does not include an agreement of
certainty of passage of this resolution in the discussions with the
Russians today?
MR. BOUCHER: The understanding that was reached the other day
was that the Russians would cooperate, and certainly the other members
intend to -- the Russians would cooperate with the intention to pass the
resolution on April 26. In the Secretary's phone call today, given the
events in Srebrenica, that, you know, he basically said all bets are off
as far as that delay if this aggression against Srebrenica continues.
Q Let me try something else.
Q No. What is your understanding of the 3:00 p.m.
consultations at the Security Council today?
MR. BOUCHER: The consultations in the Security Council this
afternoon is an informal meeting. I think it was called on a different
subject, but at the same time they will certainly consider the situation
in eastern Bosnia. The Council has been watching the situation out
there closely and at 3:00 p.m. will discuss the sit MR.
BOUCHER: 3:00 p.m. It might be 3:30, I'm not sure.
Q Well, whatever -- this afternoon. No action is
anticipated -- discussion --
MR. BOUCHER: I really couldn't speculate. My understanding
is the Council will meet, and obviously people will discuss what they
think ought to be done and what the situation is on the ground.
Q Middle East -- the other ongoing saga of U.S. diplomacy.
A Palestinian spokeswoman today said that the Palestinians would seek a
postponement of the April 20 round. What's your reaction to that?
MR. BOUCHER: Alan, there's been no new definitive answers
from the parties. We think it's in the parties' interest to recommence
the negotiations and indeed to recommence them as soon as possible. We
have invited the parties to return to negotiations on April 20. We
would look forward to having the parties start their negotiations on
April 20.
Just to review, we had consultations this week with all the
parties. These consultations were useful. They helped us focus the
parties -- focus with the parties on the substance that they will need
to address when they do return.
As you know, the Arabs and the Palestinians are meeting in
Damascus to make the decision to return to the negotiating table. We
believe that the time to make that decision is now. We think that too
much time has already been lost since the last round in December. It's
our firm conviction that the needs and the concerns of all the parties,
especially those of the Palestinians, can be addressed most effectively
at the negotiating table.
As in the past, there may be opponents of peace who would try
to sabotage the talks. We continue to believe that they cannot be
allowed to succeed. It's important for all the parties and all the
supporters of peace to focus on the negotiations,comprehensive peace
based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
Q Having been told by the Palestinians, one assumes that
they will be seeking a postponement, do you remain confident, as you
have been all along, that the talks will indeed resume on April 20 with
the participation of all the parties?
MR. BOUCHER: Alan, my understanding is that the Arabs and the
Palestinians are meeting in Damascus to make decisions on returning to
the table. We don't have the final answers from them. We look forward
to seeing them on April 20.
Q Are you confident?
MR. BOUCHER: We remain -- we continue to have our level of
confidence, yes.
Q You have been saying that you expect them to show up.
MR. BOUCHER: We expect them to show up.
Q You still expect them to show up. Have you been turned
down by anybody? I mean, have you heard from the Palestinians that
they're not coming?
MR. BOUCHER: No.
Q Richard, the Palestinians' main beef was -- with the
Administration -- that they failed to get the type of explanation they
wanted on Secretary Christopher's promise of good things. What's your
comment to that?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't know that I've seen them say that. I'm
not going to go into -- well, I didn't. The Palestinians are aware of
the prospects of what could happen once they make the decision to return
to the table. Until they make that decision, I'm not going to be in a
position to go into any more detail or to describe things, but we have
had full and extensive discussions with them.
Q Has Secretary Christopher been on the phone or in contact
otherwise with any of the leaders in Damascus or in the Arab capitals in
the last -- since returning last night?
MR. BOUCHER: Since last night?
Q Well, let's say since --
Q Or on the road.
Q Let me rephrase the question.
MR. BOUCHER: I don't know, Alan. I'll have to check. You
mean in the last few days, has he been directly in touch with them?
Q Yes. The Palestinians have told us, and I assume that
they told you yesterday, that they were going to recommend a
postponement, a delay. In the light of that, has there been a U.S.
effort to persuade the parties once more to come forward on that we've
had complete and extensive discussions with the Palestinians here in
Washington. I'll check for you and see if there's anything else,
messages to and from the Secretary, subsequent to that.
Q Do you have an accounting of how many Serbian assets the
U.S. has seized and is holding? Is there a quantitative assessment?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't. I suspect Treasury would have
that, but I'll see if I can get it.
Q Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:38 p.m.)
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