US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING DPC #52 MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1993, 12:55 P.M. (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED) MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I don't have any statements or announcements, so I'll be glad to take your questions. George. Q Richard, can you tell us anything about these suggestions that there may have been more American POWs in Vietnam than they had acknowledged? MR. BOUCHER: George, here's what we know, and I think the first thing to say is that questions that are raised in the document will be raised with the Vietnamese by General Vessey as the first order of business on his trip to Vietnam later this week. The document that has been reported is a Russian translation of a report apparently given by General Lieutenant Tran Van Quang to the Vietnamese Politburo of the Central Committee on September l5, 1972. This report indicates that the total number of POWs held by North Vietnam at the time was l,205, even though the number of American POWs returned at homecoming in 1973 was 59l. The Administration was notified of the document in mid- February by a Congressional source. National Security Council officials contacted Harvard researcher Steve Morris and asked to meet with him at that time. Mr. Morris met with the NSC in mid-February, and there have been several subsequent conversations. Morris did not provide the NSC with a copy of the document but on the basis of the information that was provided by Morris, the White House asked the Department of Defense to evaluate the information. The Defense Intelligence Agency did so and raised some questions about it. Last month, U.S. officials, working through the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on MIA/POW affairs asked the Russians about this document, and it was turned over to Ambassador Malcolm Toon on April 8th, and it is now being evaluated by U.S. Government experts on an expedited basis. As I said, questions raised in this document will be raised by General Vessey as the first order of business in his talks in Vietnam later this week. Q Richard, what impact will this have on our move towards normalization with Vietnam? MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I can speculate on that, Sid. It is important to remember that General Vessey's trip is -- the purpose of the trip is to evaluate the progress that we have seen in POW/MIA affairs and to seek further progress on the accounting of POWs and MIAs. The President has pledged the fullest possible accounting for our service personnel and said that this must be at the core of our policy with Vietnam. There unquestionably has been progress on POW/MIA accounting in Vietnam. The issue for the President remains whether they are cooperating fully. So upon his return, General Vessey will provide the President with an assessment of that cooperation. Q Richard, is there a question about the validity of the document, or a question about the accuracy of the information contained in it? MR. BOUCHER: Mark, I can't, at this point, go any further into it. The document is being evaluated now on an expedited basis, but I don't have any conclusions for you. Q Who is evaluating this document? MR. BOUCHER: I assume the principal focus is in the Defense Intelligence Agency, but probably there are others involved as well. Q Did Russian have any knowledge of the existence of this document before we asked for it, or the U.S. Government asked for it? MR. BOUCHER: I don't know. Q Was there any hint of this in the records that the United States obtained with much fanfare -- I believe it was last year -- from the Vietnamese? All of a sudden, all these archives were opened to us. MR. BOUCHER: That, again, is probably a better question for the Pentagon than over here. That has been an ongoing process. We obtained a lot of information from the archives, but we also have researchers that continue to work in those archives. Q If this information is accurate, does it suggest that indeed there may be some American POWs alive in North Vietnam? MR. BOUCHER: Pat, I just can't speculate at this point. At this point, we are evaluating this document on an expedited basis. General Vessey is going to raise it with the Vietnamese as the first order of business on his trip, and provide us with an assessment from that end of where we stand on the cooperation in POW/MIA matters. Q It sounds like you are taking it -- MR. BOUCHER: I really can't speculate beyond that. Q It sounds like you are taking it very seriously. Does it seem to be a credible document? MR. BOUCHER: Again, I'm not in a position before the evaluation is finished to try to comment on its credibility or questions that might be raised and things like that. Ted. Q You noted that it was a Russian translation. Are you suggesting that it is possible that in the process of translating this document from the Vietnamese to the Russian to the English that the wrong impression might have been created? MR. BOUCHER: Again, Ted, I'm not able to evaluate the document. I'm just telling you what I know about it. Q Richard, since we have long believed that North Vietnam was not telling us the full story until relatively recently, I'm not sure I appreciate what the meaning of this document is, if true. Does it simply add to our fund of information about the inaccuracy of what we have been hearing from the North Vietnamese? Is it more explicit? Could you explain, if it's right, what would be significance of it, since we have already believed for a long time that they weren't telling us the truth? MR. BOUCHER: Well, again, I mean that's the sort of evaluation that we have to go through, that we have to look at. What does the document say? And what does it add to what we know? We have to compare it against everything else we know, against what we know from our side, what we have learned from other sources, and see if it adds new information that we don't have, and see if it leads us to any further conclusions. But at this point, the evaluation is underway. Q Do you know how far along the evaluation process is? How long have you -- have you obtained an original copy of this document? MR. BOUCHER: We have the Russian document. We got the Russian document on April 8th. Q And how far along are you in the evaluation? MR. BOUCHER: I don't know. I can't say that. Vessey -- the White House announced the Vessey trip on Saturday. He is out there the l8th and the l9th. Q Have you asked the Vietnamese for anything, the particular document, or an explanation? MR. BOUCHER: At this point, I think I'll just say that the document is going to be the first thing that Vessey raises when he gets out there. Q Can we move on? MR. BOUCHER: Yes. Q The omnibus has stopped rolling, it seems. Surprise, surprise I am interested in your explanation. MR. BOUCHER: Well, without getting into further metaphors and status of engines and motors on the omnibus, the Secretary was advised in a telephone call from Foreign Minister Kozyrev that the Russian Government is actively working to bring about a more responsible approach by the Bosnian Serbs to the crisis. Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic has written to Lord Owen that he is willing to participate in a resumption of talks in Geneva. We also understand that Karadzic and possibly the other parties will likely be meeting with Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen within the next two weeks. I would also point out that Ambassador Bartholomew will be in the region next week consulting with the various parties. Therefore, in order to provide an opportunity for these developments to yield results, the Russians have asked us that we delay a vote on the sanctions resolution. And in view of these factors and after other diplomatic consultations, we have agreed to urge a postponement of the vote until April 26th, on the understanding that the Russians will cooperate in the adoption on April 26th of the resolution to tighten sanctions if the Bosnian Serbs have not come into an agreement on the Vance-Owen process and ceased their military actions by then. In light of the belief expressed by Russia that progress may now be possible, and the other factors that I have mentioned, we believe this delay is reasonable. But I would also point out that you know, I think, the resolution currently before the U.N. Security Council contains a provision whereby implementation would take effect two weeks after passage of the resolution. This concept would no longer be necessary in view of the delay in the vote, and therefore the result will be that there is no delay in the actual implementation of the resolution. Q This has nothing to do whatsoever with the fact that there is a referendum coming up in Russia the day before you say that you want to enact this -- MR. BOUCHER: Alan, the Russians asked for this two-week delay. I've given you the reasons for which we agreed to it, in view of this diplomatic activity that is going on. As for any other factors that may be in their thinking, I guess you'll have to ask them. Q Have the Russians agreed to play along and said they would support the sanctions if we delayed it for two weeks? MR. BOUCHER: The Russians have told us that they are prepared to continue to work constructively to achieve a political settlement to the conflict. We are proceeding on the understanding that they will cooperate in the adoption of the resolution to tighten sanctions if the Bosnian Serbs have not come into agreement on the Vance-Owen process, and cease their military actions by then. Q Well, does that mean that they will vote for it if there has been no progress? MR. BOUCHER: Exactly how the Russians will vote, you'll have to ask them. We are proceeding on the understanding that they will cooperate in the adoption of the resolution. Q What does "cooperate in the adoption" mean? MR. BOUCHER: John, it means what I say it means. If you want to know their precise voting intentions, you'll have to ask them. Q What does "proceed on the understanding" mean? You have an understanding which you gained how and from whom? MR. BOUCHER: From our conversations with the Russians. Q The Russians have given you to understand that they will cooperate with the passing of the resolution. MR. BOUCHER: That's what I said. Q Richard, doesn't this require some -- a leap of faith to the effect that on April 26th, Boris Yeltsin will be sufficiently in control of the foreign policy apparatus of Russia to make sure that this keeps rolling? MR. BOUCHER: Mark, I don't think it requires much of a leap of faith. We are working on this in conjunction with their government representatives, and we expect to continue working with them. Q Richard, this is the first day of NATO's enforcement of the "no-fly" zone in Bosnia, and what can you tell us about it? Any trouble? MR. BOUCHER: Well, the operation, called "Operation Deny Flight", began at noon Greenwich Mean Time, which would be 8:00 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time. The United States, the Netherlands and France are currently involved in "no-fly" enforcement. The United Kingdom and Turkey have also offered fighter aircraft, but NATO is holding them in reserve, if required. NATO has AWACS and fighter aircraft monitoring compliance with the "no-fly" zone. We have l2 F-l5, l2 FA-l8, and 5 KC-l35 tankers for the operation. As I said, the operations have started. I guess -- my information was that at 8:34 Eastern Daylight Time, which would be 34 minutes after it started, but at that point, there had been no reported incidents. So the first 34 minutes went fine. You can check with the Pentagon for an update on that. Q Richard, can you tell us anything about the rules of engagement for these pilots? MR. BOUCHER: I can't. As you know, we really don't comment in any detail on the rules of engagement. I'd say -- I've told you about what we have out there. We think that NATO's participating fighters are capable of intercepting aircraft that are violating the U.N. sanctions. NATO and its participating nations have agreed to strict rules of engagement that will ensure action is taken by the Alliance in proportionate terms. The United Nations has also approved these rules of engagement. Q Richard, I'd like to ask you about the touching faith that you have in the Serbs having a sudden change in heart, given their record -- MR. BOUCHER: I think I have expressed no such faith, Alan. Q Well, you have expressed a certain amount of optimism, at least in terms of being willing to delay this resolution, which only last Friday you said the United States wanted to see adopted soon. And I think you even used the words "very soon." All of a sudden you are convinced or persuaded by the Russians that there is new hope, and I want to ask on what basis this hope rests, given the Serbs record, given the fact that the United States itself has declared your interlocutors as war criminals, given the fact that they are even today bombing of Sarajevo again and Srebenica again. What's it based on? MR. BOUCHER: Alan, if I had expressed any such hope, I might be willing to agree with you and express doubts of it; but, in fact, I haven't. We continue to believe that it is necessary to bring pressure on the Serbs. Toughening sanctions on the Serbs is certainly an important aspect of that. We have agreed to a two-week delay in the vote that will not delay the actual implementation of the tougher sanctions, and which, therefore, has the effect of continuing the pressure on the Serbs. The activity that I have described to you is activity directed at bringing pressure on the Serbs. It is U.S. activity, Russian activity, and others, to try to get the Serbs to take a different approach, and that diplomatic activity will continue, and we have an understanding, as I said, about proceeding with a vote on April 26th. And that continues to be a factor that we expect will bring further pressure on the Serbs. Q How hard and fast is this sort of deadline? It is a kind of deadline. How hard and fast is it? MR. BOUCHER: Well, it's a clear understanding that we will proceed with this resolution on April 26th. If the Serbs have not by that time joined -- agreed to reach agreement within the Vance-Owen process, or otherwise ceased their military activity. Q Can they further stall? I mean, the Serbs have been pretty good at stalling and so have the Russians, for that matter, as in the "no-fly" zone? MR. BOUCHER: I gave you the factors that would lead to any further delay. If they stop the killing and join the peace process, then that's what we're trying to get. Q So supposing they declared a cease-fire -- I know this is a hypothetical, but given their past -- MR. BOUCHER: It's a hypothetical. We've seen tons of cease- fires declared before. We've seen declarations of a cease-fire. That didn't prevent us from proceeding with a "no-fly" enforcement, which was also where we did the same kind of arrangement, a delay in that vote for one week with a commensurate taking out of the resolution a one-week delay in implementation. Q So they have to sign -- MR. BOUCHER: So we've had the same kind of arrangement here. They have the same kind of pressure hanging over them, and we have a full intention to proceed unless we see a real change in the situation. Q Richard, going to another aspect of the same subject? Can you elaborate any further than you are quoted as having done over the weekend, and as the White House has done, on this report by the team that was sent to Bosnia on safe havens? MR. BOUCHER: I don't know if you'll consider it "any further," but I will tell you what I can about it. The Secretary, as you know, on February 10, said that we would be sending a U.S. Government team to assess further humanitarian needs. An interagency humanitarian assessment team that was focused on the urgent crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina traveled to many parts of the former Yugoslavia between February 24 and March 10. Parts of that team visited a large number of locations in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The team identified a wide range of options for augmenting U.S. contributions to the large and ongoing international relief effort. A large majority of the team's findings fall within the competency of various departments -- that would be the State Department, the Agency for International Development, or the Department of Defense -- to follow through on, and appropriate actions are already under study or, in some cases, actually underway. In a few cases, possible courses of actions have broader implications either for money, for their impact on other initiatives, or their affect on diplomatic efforts, and those implications must be considered at the policy level of the Administration. The review process of those particular issues is not yet concluded. And until that process is concluded, we're not prepared to comment on the specifics of those issues. Q But how does that square with the White House saying that we haven't received any report? MR. BOUCHER: As I said, the report -- the recommendations and ideas in the report have been divided up basically on two tracks. Some of them solely in the area of humanitarian deliveries are being looked at or implemented by individual departments; others with broader implications are being studied and reviewed. So that review is ongoing. Q Richard, what is your response to the allegation which is being made by -- people actually even in this building -- that the senior levels of the State Department are attempting to suppress or censor this report? MR. BOUCHER: Look, there hasn't been any suppression. We have not aired in public all the specific ideas or recommendations that came out of this group. We normally don't air in public things that are still under deliberation and discussion that are being looked at and reviewed, as I said. But all of the ideas that they put forth are being looked at. As I said, they've been divided up. There are some -- those relating directly to humanitarian deliveries -- that are being seriously considered, studied, and in some cases, implemented. There's a separate set that has broader implications, and those also are being looked at separately as part of an ongoing policy review. Q Would you care to comment on the whole notion of setting up enclaves which would have to be protected by an international force? MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I would at this point, Barrie. Clearly, it's an idea that you know has been around for a while. It's been discussed and raised many times in the past. I think it was discussed and raised at the conference in December in Geneva. So it's an idea that's been around. It's something, obviously, that gets looked at periodically. Q It's an idea in that report? MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I can get, at this point, into specifics of what's in the report. Q (Inaudible) the comprehensive review that the Administration did prior to what it announced on the 10th of February? MR. BOUCHER: I'm not sure, John, that I'm in any more position to lay out the specific ideas that were deliberated upon at that time before the 10th of February -- Q But you said you were looking at every aspect. MR. BOUCHER: Well, then, I'm sure that every aspect was looked at. Q There are reports of food supplies running low to Bosnia. What can you tell us about that? MR. BOUCHER: I don't have precise figures. There are some shipments that are their way from the United States and Canada. There are secondary warehouses in Bosnia that apparently have some food in them, but we are concerned that there may not be enough food in the pipeline for coming months and we're raising the issues at high levels with donor governments. Q Richard, can I just take you back to this report for just a moment? What about the question of members of this team testifying behind closed doors on the Hill last week and not addressing the controversial recommendations? Were they told to keep their mouths shut? MR. BOUCHER: As I said, Barrie, in the process of reviewing ideas and recommendations from any group, whether it's people looking at military options or diplomatic options or humanitarian options, we normally don't lay out our various options or ideas as they're being studied, whether it's on the Hill or in public. We are proceeding with looking at these different options in separate tracks. But we're looking at the options and really don't have anything to lay out for people now. Obviously, everything that we've decided to do, or directions that we've decided to go in this process, we've always consulted with Congress. Q Is the Administration embarrassed by the leaking of this draft report? MR. BOUCHER: What can I say, Barrie? We're working on these ideas. We're working on these recommendations that came out of the report. The team was one that we sent out there, and we're taking their work and it's receiving the attention that it deserves. I don't think there's anything to apologize for in that. Q There was an instruction not to brief members of Congress on the recommendations that had broader policy implications; is that correct? MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I'd phrase it that way, Mark. I'd phrase it the way I did, and just tell you what I can. And that's that we don't normally and wouldn't normally lay out policy recommendations, especially those with these broader recommendations until we've had a chance to proceed with our deliberations, and that policy is something that still continues today. Q Back on the resolution, isn't it a fact that the United States really doesn't want to do anything between now and the 25th that could possibly undermine Boris Yeltsin? MR. BOUCHER: Mark, I've given you the reasons to which we agreed to the delay that was requested by the Russians. We think that those requests are reasonable. There is a lot of diplomatic activity going on. Vitaly Churkin was just out in the region. The Russians are trying to get the Serbs to take a more constructive approach. We have Ambassador Bartholomew in the region right now, and those are the reasons for which we agreed to this delay. Q But this was a request, as I heard you say it, from Kozyrev to Christopher. Was that made personally? MR. BOUCHER: It was discussed in their telephone calls, yes. Q When was the call? MR. BOUCHER: They talked once on Saturday and once again this morning. Let's go to the back. Q What does the State Department think of Israeli Government decision to seal off the occupied territories indefinitely, until further review? MR. BOUCHER: We have, I think, expressed ourselves on subjects like this before, and I'm really not going to get into any specifics. Our general view is, first of all, to note that we deplore the increasing violence. It has claimed innocent lives in both the occupied territories and in Israel. We've made it clear that we believe the Israeli Government has the responsibility of providing security for its people and for the security of the territories under its control. We've also urged all parties to act with restraint. At the end of the day, only a political settlement will help solve the problems underlying the violence in the Middle East. The increase in violence makes it all the more important to renew the peace negotiations. Q Same region, different topic. Has the U.S. Embassy in Cairo been conducting discussions with the group that's been accused of bombing the New York Trade Center? And did we cut them off as we did with Hamas? MR. BOUCHER: The Islamic Group, as it's known, has repeatedly claimed responsibility for acts of terror in Egypt. There's been no effort on our part to establish contact with members of this group. The Islamic Group has not contacted us to discuss human rights or any other issue. We strongly oppose the terrorist tactics by any organization to achieve its political goals, and we have no interest in conducting a dialogue with groups who advocate the violent overthrow of governments or resort to extremist acts. Q So you do not flatly deny that U.S. Embassy officials in Cairo met with representatives of the Islamic Group? MR. BOUCHER: We meet with a wide variety of people around the world to keep abreast of trends that affect our interests. We don't have meetings -- we do not have meetings with anyone we know to be in this group. I know the article says -- I think quotes some of the people as saying they met with us but they didn't tell us of any affiliation with this group. But we don't have any meetings with people we know to be in this group. We do have meetings with opposition people in Egypt. We have meetings with people who are affiliated with the Moslem Brotherhood in parliament, but that group does not advocate the violent overthrow of the Government of Egypt. Q Richard, were any contacts suspended immediately after the World Trade Center bombing? MR. BOUCHER: Mark, as I said, we don't have any contacts with anyone we know to be in this group. We have no intention of establishing those contacts and no one has contacted us. So I don't -- Q Were any contacts with the Egyptians who may or may not be in this group suspended after the World Trade Center bombing? MR. BOUCHER: You mean, is there somebody who we met with before who we won't meet with again? Is that the kind of idea? Q Yes. MR. BOUCHER: That's something I'll have to check on, Mark. I don't know. Q Just going back to -- in these conversations on Saturday and today between Kozyrev and the Secretary, did they also talk about politics in Russia? MR. BOUCHER: My understanding is that they talked about this resolution and, of course, they'll see each other again in Tokyo. They talked a little bit about that. Q Did, perhaps, the Foreign Minister bring the Secretary up- to-date on what's going on inside Russia? MR. BOUCHER: Not that I know of, Saul. Q Richard, could you take us to Armenia and Azerbaijan and give us your reading of the situation there? Is the U.S. Government engaged in any effort of mediation been the Armenians and the Azeris? MR. BOUCHER: We have -- the short answer to your last part is basically "no." We have continued to urge both sides to support the Minsk Group talks as the best avenue for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. We're going to reaffirm that point to both parties in the meetings that the Deputy Secretary is having today, and we'll press for an end to the fighting as well. In terms of what's going on out there on the ground, the fighting continues in the region, including around the Azerbaijani town of Fizuli in southwestern Azerbaijan. We have no reports of any new offensives. The Acting Secretary, as you know, met this morning with the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister to discuss the recent offensive in the Kelbajar District, and the peace process. He's meeting this afternoon with the Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister, Libaridian. They'll discuss the same issues as with the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister. As you know, we have condemned the offensive, and he will reiterate our condemnation of the continued offensive by ethnic Armenians. He'll press the Government of Armenia to do what it can to end the fighting and bring about the withdrawal of ethnic Armenian forces from Kelbajar, and then we'll see what we can do to urge the parties to get back to the Minsk Group talks. Q Richard, do you have any information on Turkish pilots who were shot down and taken captive a couple of weeks ago in Armenia? MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't. Q Richard, do you have any comment on all these optimistic reports about a settlement being imminent in Haiti? MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't, except to say that Foreign Minister Caputo is heading back to the region tomorrow, or at least early this week. We remain in close touch with him. Ambassador Redman down in Haiti, and Ambassador Pezzullo up here have been in close contact with him, and we'll leave it to Dante Caputo to comment on the status of the talks. Q Any further word on who is coming Tuesday? MR. BOUCHER: Tuesday and Wednesday, we have some people coming. The Assistant Secretary, Ed Djerejian, and others in the peace team will meet with the Jordanians and Syrians on Tuesday, and with the Palestinians and Lebanese on Wednesday. We also expect to meet with Israeli representatives early next week. Q Are these the actual delegations, or is there a different level? MR. BOUCHER: I don't have the exact list of who they are. I think they're basically at the delegation level. Q We have not had any formal responses, have we, on -- MR. BOUCHER: No changes in the formal responses. Q Thank you. (Press briefing concluded at 1:25 p.m.) (###)