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US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY 
PRESS BRIEFING #5: 
State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher 

                         DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                         DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

..                           DPC #5

                 FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1993, 12:21 P. M.
                (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)


         MR. BOUCHER:  Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  I don't
have any announcements or statements today, so I'd be glad to take
your questions.

         Q    Can you say anything about Iraq and the deadline?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I would say to you what Marlin said to you this
morning that -- what Marlin said this morning was, "I would not look
for some minute-by-minute countdown anyway."

         Q    Why not?  You've delivered a 48-hour ultimatum.

         MR. BOUCHER:  Pat, we haven't gone into that level of detail
about what we actually said to the Iraqis.  We issued a warning that
was clear to them, but this is where things stand.

         Q    Well, how about an hour-for-hour countdown?  At what 
time, approximately --

         MR. BOUCHER:  Jim, if you write minute by minute, hour by hour,
you know, I just wouldn't look for it.  I just wouldn't look for it.
Marlin said that and --

         Q    Well, then what's the meaning of a 48-hour ultimatum?

         MR. BOUCHER:  We haven't gone into that level of detail on
exactly what we told the Iraqis.  They should not have had any
flights in that area to begin with.  They should not have had any
activity in that area to threaten our pilots to begin with, and we
told them that, and we said that they should rectify the situation.

         Q    Have there been any flights in the last two days?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Something you'd have to check with the Pentagon
on.  I'm not sure.  Not that I've heard of.

         Q    How are we going to -- what is going to be the
procedure for finding out if they have complied?  Are they going
to tell us?   Are we going to observe?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Are we going to believe them?

         Q    Yes.  How --

         MR. BOUCHER:  I don't think I can specify a procedure,
Sid.  You know that the United States Government has a wide
variety of information available to it, and I'm sure we will
look at our information the way we looked at information that
led us to the conclusions that they were flying and carrying out
activities that were threatening to our pilots.  We will
evaluate the information and make whatever determinations are
appropriate and take whatever action is necessary.

         Q    But it's very cloudy over Iraq today.

         MR. BOUCHER:  I haven't read the weather reports.  I'm
sorry.

         Q    Are you saying that the letter handed over
Wednesday afternoon did not include any time limit?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I haven't commented one way or the other
on time limits.

         Q    Has there been any change in the ultimatum that
was delivered to Iraq since it was --

         MR. BOUCHER:  No.  The warning that was delivered two
nights ago is operative.

         Q    And it hasn't been changed?

         MR. BOUCHER:  No.

         Q    Can you say why there is no release of the letter
that was sent?  Before the beginning of the war we were rather
open about what we wanted of the Iraqis.  Why isn't at least
part of the letter to Hamdoon --

         MR. BOUCHER:  Saul, first of all, I haven't described
the letter to Hamdoon.  Second of all, I'm not aware that before
the war and at any other time we have put out necessarily the
actual text of something.  We have made very clear to the
Iraqis.  We have described what we've said to the Iraqis.  We've
described it in public.  We've described it in clear terms, I
think, and that's what we have done.  I think we've kept you
fully informed -- almost fully informed.

         Q    You haven't gone into -- you say you haven't gone
into such detail as 48 hours or what the hour -- what the
ultimatum is?

         MR. BOUCHER:  That's right.  I haven't gone into that
detail.

         Q    So you haven't described in detail what was told
the Iraqis.

         MR. BOUCHER:  Saul, we've described accurately what
we've told the Iraqis.

         Q    But you have left some things out.

         MR. BOUCHER:  We have not given you the full text, no.

         Q    Richard, is there -- do you have anything to say
about the -- now that you've had a chance to see it and think
about it, the Iraqi Government's four-page letter which they say
they gave the four powers last night?

         MR. BOUCHER:  We're studying the Iraqi paper.  The
paper was used by the Iraqis as a basis for what they said in
the meeting by Hamdoon -- for what he said in the meetings.  He
spoke to the press after the meeting, and I'd tell you that
basically what he said in the meeting was essentially the same
thing as he said to the press outside the meeting.  In any case,
the experience has shown us that we should focus on Iraqi
actions, not their words.

         Q    Do you have any comment on -- aside from whether
you're focusing on it or not, do you have any comment on what he
said about Iraq's sovereignty and its right to deploy its
military forces (inaudible) --

         MR. BOUCHER:  I don't have any particular comment on
that.  We've talked about those things in the past, and those
things are addressed by the United Nations Security Council in
its resolutions.

         Q    Have you seen any signs that Iraq is beginning to
comply with that ultimatum?

         MR. BOUCHER:  At this point, Pat, I'd say that we're
still evaluating the intelligence on the status of the missiles
that were of concern to us.

         Q    Has there been some movement?

         MR. BOUCHER:  This is as much as I can say on that
point.

         Q    Do you have any reaction to the formal rejection
by the parliament of Iraq this morning of the allied ultimatum?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I didn't see the parliament -- Ralph just
asked me about the Tariq Aziz statement -- oh, no, he asked me
about the Perm Five thing.  No.  I would just go back to what
I've been saying is that we judge Iraqi policy by Iraqi
actions.  What I said yesterday, the statements from the Iraqi
Government are frequent, but various and often contradictory.
And, as Marlin said this morning, they know our positions.
We'll have to wait and see.

         Q    Has there been any contacts today between the
Administration and Iraqi officials here, in Zakho, in the U.N.
or --

         MR. BOUCHER:  None that I'm aware of.  The warning was
delivered in New York and in Washington on Wednesday.  It was
also delivered through the Military Coordination Center in
Zakho, and then there were the contacts yesterday evening at the
U.N.  That's all.

         Q    Richard, several Arab countries were part of the
first coalition, or the coalition that was put together to get
Iraq out of Kuwait.  Have you been in touch or in consultation
with any of those Arab countries on this new tension with Iraq?

         MR. BOUCHER:  We've been in touch with other coalition
partners, in addition to the people who delivered the demarche
in New York and, yes, some of those are Arab.

         Q    Have any of those Arab countries signed the
demarche?

         MR. BOUCHER:  The demarche was delivered by France, the
U.K., Russia and the United States.

         Q    But no Arab country signed it or --

         MR. BOUCHER:  A demarche is not a document for
signature.

         Q    O.K.

         MR. BOUCHER:  A demarche is something you deliver.

         Q    All right.  So they didn't indicate their support
for the demarche in any way formally?

         MR. BOUCHER:  You'd have to ask individual countries
that their views are.

         Q    Could you name those countries you talked to?

         MR. BOUCHER:  No.

         Q    Has the United States heard from any of its
coalition partners or, for that matter, from any other country
through diplomatic channels in some formal way of resistance or
opposition to the warning that has been delivered by the Perm
Four?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I think I said the other day that we've
been in touch with other coalition partners, and that they agree
on the importance of the "no-fly" zone.  They agree on the
importance of Iraq complying with U.N. resolutions, including
the resolutions that require an end to the Iraqi repression,
which was the reason for the "no-fly" zone, and that they agree
on the importance of maintaining the integrity of the zone.
Without trying to speak any further for them, I'd say that that
condition remains the same today.

         Q    Richard, is simply moving the specific missiles
that you are concerned about -- is that enough to forestall
military action against Iraq?

         MR. BOUCHER:  We've described before what the warning
was.  I can go over it again.  We warned them to cease their
violations of the southern "no-fly" zone, and to cease other
actions that put coalition aircraft and pilots in jeopardy.

         Iraq was warned not to fly south of the 32nd Parallel,
and we also demanded that all the surface-to-air missile systems
south of the 32nd Parallel, which recently had been moved into
new positions, be returned to their original sites.

         Q    There was a report on television that some of
those sites, the original sites of the surface-to-air missiles,
were in fact in the protected zone.  Is that true?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I've described to you what we've warned
them about.  I think a couple days ago the Pentagon described
the basics of Iraqi missile activity.  I'd have to leave that to
them.

         Q    Richard, is what you just told us the entirety of
the warning that was given to Iraq?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Ralph, this is a very accurate rendition
of the --

         Q    Of the portion that you wish to make public.

         MR. BOUCHER:  -- of the warning.  It is not the entire
text, no.  We've said many times that we haven't given you the
entire text.

         Q    Without giving away any secrets, can you say that
you mean by -- can you expand on your statement that, "We're
still evaluating intelligence"?  That seems to indicate there is
something to evaluate; that there may be movement or not.  Can
you give us anything more than just that one sentence?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I can't, Sid.  There's information to
evaluate.  I think various people -- I guess General Powell had
some comments yesterday about what we had seen yesterday.  But
at this point today, I think I'd just say that we're still
evaluating the information, the intelligence that's available to
us.

         Q    Richard, on this surface-to-air missiles, they
have what's called a "slant range."  In other words, they can
reach out in several directions, sometimes as much as 30 miles.

         Are you quoting literally when you say that all they
have to do is move their SAM batteries just north of the 32nd
Parallel?

         MR. BOUCHER:  First of all, Jim, that's not what I
said.  And, second of all, I don't know from missiles.  If you
want to ask about slant range and 30 miles and stuff like that,
you've got to talk to the experts at the Pentagon.

         Q    Well, you said that those surface-to-air missiles
should be moved north of the 32nd Parallel.

         MR. BOUCHER:  I said we also demanded that all of the
surface-to-air missile systems south of the 32nd Parallel, which
had recently been moved into new positions, be returned to their
original sites.

         Q    And then you declined to answer the question as to
whether the original sites are located south of the 32nd
Parallel.  Is that correct?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I wasn't asked that specific question.

         Q    I thought someone did ask you that question.

         MR. BOUCHER:  Well, she asked, "Didn't they have some
missiles south of the 32nd."

         Q    Well, so let me ask the question of whether the --

         MR. BOUCHER:  I'd have to go back and say I'm not out
here to brief on the intelligence that we have on missiles, and
the Pentagon has described the situation with regard to missiles
over the last few days quite more extensively than I have, and I
leave it to them to describe it if they want to.

         Q    But, Richard, isn't it up to the U.S. Government
and specifically to the State Department to make it clear to
Iraq what it must do to comply, and doesn't the State Department
have an obligation to the American people -- and each other
country who is militarily involved an obligation to their own
people -- to explain when the conditions will be met?  If
someone meets the conditions, rather than holding up kind of a
black curtain and say, "Well, maybe they'll be met, and maybe
they won't be, but we're not going to tell you what it is that
meets them."

         MR. BOUCHER:  Ralph, I don't necessarily disagree with
you.  But I can read you for the third time a very accurate
portrayal of what we told the Iraqis they had to do.

         Q    Well, I'm not implying anything inaccurate about
what you've said or read.  It's not clear, and it's not complete
about what must be done to comply.  The people who will be
paying for and supporting with their lives perhaps the military
action that's possible here won't know whether the U.S. is
requiring that Iraq move those missiles out of the "no-fly"
zone, or whether they're requiring them to move them to the
original sites.  Are you, in fact, saying that -- I mean, are
you making a distinction between moving them out of the "no-fly"
zone and moving them to their original sites?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Ralph, I'm telling you what we told the
Iraqis they had to do.  I'm telling you that we told them not to
fly south of the 32nd Parallel; that we told them that all of
the surface-to-air missile systems south of the 32nd Parallel
which recently have been moved into new positions, be returned
to their original sites.

         I'm not in a position to tell you exactly the locations
of those missile systems, either now or before they were moved.
But in terms of what you're asking, which is what do the Iraqis
have to do, this is what they've got to do.

         Q    The question wasn't what exact -- where exactly
were the missiles located.  The question was:  How would they --
how would we know whether anyone has complied if they removed --
if they moved them to the original sites?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I'm not aware that you know -- I mean,
you're asking me where the missiles are, so I don't think you're
going to know --

         Q    No.  No, I'm not asking where the missiles are.

         MR. BOUCHER:  Ralph, hold on a second.

         Q    I'm asking you where they were in their original
sites.

         MR. BOUCHER:  And I can't tell you that.  I'm sorry.  I
just can't tell you that.  That's information that we have, that
we have described, but as in all cases where we're dealing with
intelligence information, we're not always at a point to
describe for you in exact terms what we know about the locations
of missiles.

         Q    So it would not be accurate, Richard, to say as --
if we're quoting you, that they have to be returned to their
original sites south of the 32nd Parallel?

         MR. BOUCHER:  It would be accurate to say what I said.

         Q    Well, I don't have the record of the last couple
of days in front of me, I'm afraid.  I'd have to go back and
look it up.  It seems to me at least anyway in recent days the
U.S. Government has said that the missiles or the launchers were
moved south -- were moved south of the 32nd Parallel, which is
the defining line for the "no-fly" zone -- moved into the
"no-fly" zone.

         If your statement today is that they only need to move
them to original sites and you won't tell us whether those sites
were south of the 32nd Parallel, then there's been a change in
the rule.

         MR. BOUCHER:  Ralph, there's been no change.  The
warning that I'm describing to you here was the warning we gave
to them Wednesday evening, and I believe it's the same way that
it was described when Marlin and others described it.

         Q    And you spoke, I think, a few minutes ago about
maintaining the integrity -- the other coalition partners wanted
to maintain the integrity of the "no-fly" zone.  If Iraq moves
its missiles, as you have stated today, to its original -- to
their original sites, in those original sites will the integrity
of the "no-fly" zone be maintained?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Ralph, there's two elements here that I
think you have to focus on.  The first is that Iraq has violated
the "no-fly" zone by flying aircraft, and we had a dramatic
demonstration of what happens when they do that on December 27
-- that when the zone is violated, when its integrity was
violated, their aircraft get shot down.

         Second of all, there is the element of actions that
Iraq has taken in the zone with its missiles, which we consider
jeopardize the safety of the pilots who are there to enforce the
zone -- a zone, let me remind you, which is being enforced to
prevent the Iraqis from attacking people with aircraft.

         So those are the two elements.  What we have asked or
told Iraq to do -- response to those two elements -- don't fly,
and move the missiles, and those are the elements that we think
need to be respected.

         Q    You can't say anything more about the deadline?
Why are you reluctant to discuss that question?

         MR. BOUCHER:  George, if I had to stand up here and
explain reluctance to discuss every single question that we have
reasons not to discuss, we'd probably be here until midnight.

         Q    Is there a deadline today?

         Q    A deadline, period?

         MR. BOUCHER:  We're not going to get into that level of
detail on the demarche that we gave them.

         Q    Is there a deadline at all?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Again, I've described to you, I think,
accurately what we've told the Iraqis to do.  They should not
have been flying in the zone.  They should not have been
threatening our pilots, and, as I said yesterday, we told them
to stop those things right away.

         Q    So you're refusing to confirm or deny whether
there is a deadline?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I'm not commenting on a deadline.

         Q    Was there an oral message, in addition to the
piece of paper that was handed over to Hamdoon?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Flip it around, Jim.  A demarche is
basically an oral message, and often a piece of paper is left.

         Q    Well, were they identical?  In other words, was --

         MR. BOUCHER:  Yes.

         Q    So everything that he knows is on a piece of paper
-- officially.

         MR. BOUCHER:  Everything that he knows?

         Q    Well, about the --

         MR. BOUCHER:  What he was told -- I believe they left a
piece of paper on Wednesday, yes.

         Q    But I mean there is no other winks or nods as the
Perm Four walked out the door?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Jim, I wasn't there.  I don't know winks
and nods.  The Iraqis were told explicitly what they had to do
to comply.

         Q    Have the Iraqis flown over southern Iraq since
Wednesday evening?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Sid just asked me that.  I'm not aware of
anything, you'd have to check it out with the Pentagon.

         Q    Hamdoon asked for talks, wanted a Congressional
delegation to discuss this matter.  What do you think of that?

         MR. BOUCHER:  As far as talks, Marlin said this morning
that, you know, we're not interested in a dialogue; we're
interested in seeing them take the necessary actions to comply.

         As far as the Congressional delegation, the invitation
to members of Congress, we really don't take that seriously.

         Q    Why not?

         MR. BOUCHER:  We don't think it's a serious proposal.

         Q    Is it stalling for time?

         MR. BOUCHER:  We don't think it's a serious proposal.
I haven't analyzed it to give it any other characterization.

         Q    Could I ask you about another subject?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Please.

         Q    In Angola, some people involved there say that it
looks like the war has begun again and that the peace
negotiations, in effect, have broken down totally.  Would you
agree with that assessment?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I thought I talked in quite great length
yesterday about the fighting, and we put up a taken question
yesterday about some recent contacts.

         Q    Yes.  Well, since then there's been continued
fighting.

         MR. BOUCHER:  It's continued, yes.

         Q    And, then, do you believe that the war has
resumed?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I would describe the situation the way I
described it yesterday.  I mean I went into great detail on the
military actions that the people had taken; and, yes, there's
plenty of fighting around and it hasn't stopped.

         Q    Back to the Iraqi thing, can you review what
measures U.S. posts overseas have taken in terms of possible
protection against terrorist attacks?  And I gather some
measures were instituted or stepped up after the downing of the
MiG, and has anything been added this week?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I'm not aware of anything that's been
added recently.  Obviously, you know, our posts are always
maintaining proper security and should periodically check their
security procedures.

         As far as Americans go, we have a standing caution on
travel to -- and I think I have a copy of it here -- to the
Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa -- that's related to
the tensions in the Gulf.  It advises Americans to exercise
caution because of possible risk of hostile actions against the
U.S. Government and U.S. citizens in the area.  That has been on
the books since August 2lst.  That remains valid.

         And, of course, if we had specific and credible
information on some other threat, we would share that.

         Q    Richard, there's a story in The Post saying that
the United States is willing to have troops under U.N. command
-- I believe in Somalia.  Do you have anything on that?

         MR. BOUCHER:  We've been working with the U.N. on the
second phase, on what's called UNOSOM II.  I think to some
extent Ambassador Oakley described that the other day.

         We remain in consultations with U.N. officials over the
projected size of the UNOSOM II troop levels in Somalia and the
scope and the mandate that would be given to those troops.

         We do foresee providing support to UNOSOM II, but it's
too early to describe the nature or the scale of that support or
to speculate about its command structure.

         I would point out that U.S. military forces have
participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1948.  These
include something called UNTSO, which is Arab-Israeli; UNIKOM,
in Iraq-Kuwait; MINURSO, which is the Western Sahara; UNTAC, in
Cambodia; and UNPROFOR, in the former Yugoslavia.

         Q    Richard, are you trying to say that all the pieces
are not completely put in place, or are you saying that this
idea, as reported in the story, suggests that the United States
has given greater sort of credence to the notion of putting its
troops under U.N. command than you want to say at this moment?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I don't think I said either of those things.

         At the start of the operation, I remember the first
briefings by -- I think it was General Powell -- who said that
after we had gone in and secured the situation for food
deliveries and then, as we started to pull out, that there
probably would be some units, special units -- logistical units
and others -- that would be left there to assist and support the
U.N. in the second phase.  So that's been something that's clear
from the start.  The second phase is called UNOSOM II.  It's the
U.N. peacekeeping operation.

         I think the article this morning said that it would be
unusual to have U.S. personnel under a U.N. command, but as I'm
pointing out, we've had U.S. personnel under U.N. command for
quite a number of other incidents.

         Q    But not 5,000 people that that story reports, and
not during --

         MR. BOUCHER:  It's really too early to try to describe
the nature or the scale of that support.

         Q    A couple more still on Iraq.  Has there been any
further contact with the Iraqi Government, either by the Perm
Four or by the U.S. Government, since last night's meeting with
Hamdoon?  Contact with or message from --

         MR. BOUCHER:  By the Perm Four individually, I'm not
sure I could account for each of the governments involved --

         Q    No.  I meant all.

         MR. BOUCHER:  -- but as a group, none that I'm aware of.

         Q    And how about --

         MR. BOUCHER:  I checked this morning and people told me no.

         Q    And how about with the U.S. directly -- I mean 
bilaterally.?

         MR. BOUCHER:  No.

         Q    Also, do you expect -- is there any further U.N.
action or U.N. message or anything that the U.S. thinks should
happen or will happen or should not happen in the course of
today?  Or, let's say, rather than in the course of today, until
the expiration of the warning or anything of that sort?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Should one exist.

         Q    Should one exist, yes.

         MR. BOUCHER:  Not that I'm aware of.

         Q    And, finally, earlier you talked about having had
contacts with other coalition partners but declined to describe
them.  Have you been in contact with Iraq's neighbors regarding
this warning?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Iraq has a lot of neighbors.

         Q    Yes, it does.

         MR. BOUCHER:  I don't --

         Q    -- some of whom are coalition partners and some of
whom are not.

         MR. BOUCHER:  Some of whom we have excellent relations
with and some of which we have --

         Q    Right.

         MR. BOUCHER:  -- no relations with.

         Q    I guess I'm trying to get at --

         MR. BOUCHER:  That's a pretty vague term, Ralph.  I
would just stick to what I've said already.

         Q    O.K.  Well, then I'll be more specific about it.
It's not vague when you talk about Israel's neighbors.  Iraq's
neighbors are equally clear.  Has the United States --

         MR. BOUCHER:  Iraq's neighbors, as far as I know, are
Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait --

         Q    Right.

         MR. BOUCHER: -- Saudi Arabia.

         Q    Saudi Arabia.

         MR. BOUCHER:  Yes.  We've been in touch with some of
those countries.

         Q    Have you been in touch with Iran?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I'm going to decline to get into
specifics on this.

         Q    So it was too vague the first time, but too
specific the second time.  (Laughter)  Is there something
in-between there that --

         MR. BOUCHER:  I'm afraid not.

         Q    Richard, did Secretary Eagleburger participate in
the President's meeting this morning over at the White House?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I think by protocol I have to leave that
to the White House.

         Q    Can you talk about the meeting with the President
of Bosnia?

         MR. BOUCHER:  The Secretary will meet with Bosnian
President Izetbegovic this afternoon.  We expect the Secretary
and President Izetbegovic will discuss the entire range of
issues involved in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including
the current negotiations in Geneva.

         Q    Will there be a photo op on that?

         MR. BOUCHER:  No.

         Q    Is it true the United State is embarrassed by his
visit, or is that another phony newspaper report?

         MR. BOUCHER:  George, the Secretary and President
Izetbegovic have met a number of times in the past.  They've
met, I would almost say, frequently.  I do think the last time
they met was in New York, at the U.N.  As in the past, when they
have an opportunity to meet, they have met.

         Q    Are you going to do any kind of posting or any
kind of readout on it?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I hadn't planned on it at this point.

         Q    Will Secretary Eagleburger come down to the Lobby
to greet Mr. Izetbegovic or escort him out?

         MR. BOUCHER:  I don't know.

         Q    Could we know the answer to that question before
it occurs?  (Laughter)

         MR. BOUCHER:  Yes.  I'll try to find out for you.

         Q    This morning, at the Carnegie Institute, the
Bosnian President said that he's going to request an end to the
international embargo against arms to Bosnia and that he's going
to ask for air strikes against the Serbians.  Not to anticipate
this meeting, but what has been the U.S. policy on those two
issues?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Jim, not to anticipate this meeting,
since they haven't had it yet, I think I'd refer you back to
what the Secretary said during his trip to Europe -- when he
went to Stockholm, Geneva, and NATO.  During that time he was
exploring various activities and described where he had gotten
to on the arms situation, in particular.

         Q    Richard, you said you've provided the Red Cross
with estimates on the number of prisoners in Bosnia.  Have you
provided the Red Cross with an estimate on the number of camps?
You said the other day that you don't have a number, but do you
have now a number?

         MR. BOUCHER:  No, I said I didn't want to have one for
you.

         Q    Yes.

         MR. BOUCHER:  -- the other day.

         First of all, we provided the Red Cross with a lot of
information -- with the information that we have on the possible
places of detention, numbers of people, and that sort of thing.

         There could be in our estimate, as many as -- and,
again, this is as one of those "as many as"; it could be much
lower -- 45 or so places of detention, ranging from camps to
small sites, that the Red Cross has not gotten into.  But the
Red Cross also has been actively pursuing this kind of
information, and it will take the kind of access and the kind of
disclosure that they've been seeking and we've been supporting
to narrow this down, and figure out much more specifically how
many people there are and how many sites there are.

         Q    But the higher -- the higher estimate that you
provided to the Red Cross is 45 detention sites?

         MR. BOUCHER:  There could be as many as, yes.  And
things ranging from, you know, real camp-type facilities like
we've seen elsewhere to very small places of detention.

         Q    One of the United Nations Security Council
resolutions calls for the dismantling of certain camps and to
provide access to the camps and for the United Nations to gain
access to these camps by any means necessary -- to these camps,
by all necessary means.

         This morning, the Bosnian President suggested that in
spite of a promise made in Helsinki by the President and by
others to gain access to such camps and to get humanitarian aid,
even perhaps with force if necessary, none of this has happened.
 And I'm wondering whether you can address why we've taken no
action to try to get into these camps and get them dismantled --
not "we," the United States, but why the United States hasn't
contributed to the effort of the United Nations to get into the
camps?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Saul, we've discussed this now for about
three days running.  I think I have described to you the actions
that we have taken to try to get the Red Cross into these camps.
 I've described to you in the past the successes that they had
in getting thousands of people released from these camps,
including getting some of the camps closed.

         I've also described for you the difficulties that they
have faced in getting into other places of detention and the
support that we've given them in trying to get them into these
other places.

         Q    Richard, could I change our focus a little bit
from one human tragedy to another?

         In Kashmir, the response yesterday I hope is going to
be followed by greater detail, but I don't really understand
what's going on in Kashmir and India, has been going on as long
-- much longer than what's going on in Yugoslavia.  It's equally
deplorable -- the same types of offenses:  rape, murder,
indiscriminate firing on civilians by Indians in uniform.  What
is our position on that conflict?  And why can't we get anything
but a sentence out of the State Department on it?  Do we --

         MR. BOUCHER:  Well, hang on, Sid.  I was asked
specifically about one reported incident, which occurred
yesterday; and the sentence yesterday said we didn't have
information on that particular incident, but we've been looking
into it.

         If you want the entire U.S. policy on Kashmir and
everything we've done on Kashmir, look at our record.  It's
clear; it's out there.

         Q    Well, it's a record -- it's a non-existent record, Richard 
--

         MR. BOUCHER:  I --

         Q    -- because it's a pattern of --

         MR. BOUCHER:  I will make it materialize before your
very eyes because I remember myself discussing the issue quite a
bit here.

         Q    O.K.  Well, specifically, what is our position on
the way the Indian Government is handling the situation in
Kashmir?

         MR. BOUCHER:  Our position has been expressed before on
the situation in Kashmir, on the means to resolve it, and on our
efforts to help the parties seek to resolve it peacefully, and
I'd be glad to get that for you again.

         Q    If you would, please.

         Q    Richard, a clarification on that figure of 45
detention sites that you're giving us today.  Are those 45 on
top of whatever has already been declared by the Red Cross, I
mean, or visited by the Red Cross?

         MR. BOUCHER:  The way it was described to me, it was as
many as 45 places where people may be held that they haven't yet
gotten access to.

         But, as I said, they, too, are collecting such
information and I think they're taking our information and
integrating it with what they have.  And they'll be looking to
see maybe we know about some places people might be held that
they, in fact, know more about than we do.

         So, you know, they'll use our information, but they're
the best people in a position to really try to identify the
places where people are held and to get in there.

         Q    Back to Iraq -- northern Iraq, this time -- what
do you know at this point about the Australian relief official
who was shot dead there and culpability for the Iraqi or Kurds
or --

         MR. BOUCHER:  Culpability is unclear.  We have the
reports.  We've seen the reports of -- there was an attack on a car in
which the Australian CARE representative.  He was killed, and three
other passengers were injured.

         The Australians, I think, have released a statement --
maybe it was CARE that released the statement -- that said what
they knew preliminarily about possible culpability.  They said
it, indeed, may have been a local incident -- something based on
local differences.

         We don't have any more information than that, so the
circumstances are indeed unclear.  And I really can't speculate
on who may have been responsible.

         Q    Thank you.

         (The briefing concluded at 12:53 p.m.)

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