US Department of State Daily Briefing #72:
Monday, 5/11/92
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: Washington, DC
Date: May, 11 19925/11/92
Category: Briefings
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Eurasia, E/C Europe
Country: Israel, USSR (former), Swaziland, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, India, Angola,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Thailand, France,
North Korea
Subject: Mideast Peace Process, Development/Relief Aid,
Arms Control, Security Assistance and Sales, History,
Trade/Economics, Regional/Civil Unrest, State Department
12:36 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. If I
can, I'd like to start off with the highlights of the update on
the assistance programs and relationships that we have with the
New Independent States, and then I'll go on to make an
announcement about the Russian-Indian rocket deal, and then I'll
be glad to take your questions on any other subjects you might
want to hear about.
[Former Soviet Union: Update on US Assistance]
Among the highlights that we note for last week and -- of
course, we'll be giving you more information in a statement that
we'll put out after the briefing -- are that during President
Kravchuk's visit last week we signed a number of agreements that
will be important to our relationship with Ukraine, including a
trade agreement, Peace Corps program, Science and Technology
Center, OPIC operation and matters relating to technical
assistance and USIA's International Visitors Program.
Last Friday, May 8, U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills
signed a bilateral trade agreement with a representative from
Kyrgystan. That agreement will provide for Most Favored Nation
status for Kyrgystan once it's ratified by the Kyrgyz
legislature.
On the humanitarian aid side, there is an Air Force C-141
that departs today from Andrews for Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan.
Aboard will be 30,000 pounds of infant formula and $1 million
worth of excess Defense Department medical supplies.
Technical assistance efforts have continued to move
forward. We have sent advisers to several of the New
Independent States to assist them in defense conversion, housing
and energy efficiency, and again you'll have details on that and
other topics that I've raised in the longer statement that will
be available after the briefing.
[US Sanctions: Russian Rocket Engine Transfers to India/
US Law/MTCR Guidelines/Impact]
If there are no specific questions on that, let's talk
about the rocket deal.
For some time the United States and other member
nations of the Missile Technology Control Regime have been
involved in discussions, first with the former Soviet Government
and now with the Russian Government, about the serious concerns
we have with the transfer of the rocket engine technology from
the Russian organization Glavkosmos to the Indian Space Research
Organization. We've also been discussing our concerns directly
with the Indian Government.
The MTCR guidelines provide the international standard
for such matters. The MTCR partners have concluded that the
deal is inconsistent with those guidelines. That is why they
have urged that this deal not go through.
For its part, the United States in its own discussions
with Russia and India has also made clear that U.S. law requires
sanctions against entities engaged in activities that are
inconsistent with MTCR guidelines. Since the facts are clear
and since the parties to the transaction have declined to
terminate those activities, the United States has imposed
sanctions in accordance with our law. The sanctions are the
following:
-- First, a two-year ban on all U.S.-licensed exports
to these two entities; that is, Glavkosmos and the Indian Space
Research Organization;
-- Second is a two-year ban on all imports to the
United States from these entities; and
-- Third is a two-year ban on U.S. Government contracts
with these entities.
We're continuing to pursue discussion of the issue with
both governments. We have explained to both governments the
termination of the Glavkosmos deal could permit us to consider a
waiver of these sanctions.
Our principal objective -- and it is one that is shared
by all of our partners in the MTCR -- is to obtain the broadest
possible international cooperation in curbing the dangerous
proliferation of missile technology. We want to work with all
countries in the effort. We want Russia and India to be
important contributors to this effort, and we're going to
continue to work along those lines with them and to urge that
they respond to international concern by halting the Glavkosmos
deal.
Q Could we have a copy of that, please?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
Q (Multiple questions)
MR. BOUCHER: Hold it. Slow down, slow down.
Q Practically speaking, how exactly does this impact
-- talk a little bit about the specifics of the impact. I mean,
you seem to be directing these sanctions in a very narrow way to
the two entities that were directly involved; not against the
countries and not against any other agencies that might be
affected with those countries.
I mean, how many exports are there? How many imports
are there? How many contracts have there been between the U.S.
Government and these entities?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have those details for you,
Carol. That's something I may be able to get. My guess is that
the principal impact would be on licensed exports -- things that
they might buy from us which require an export license either
from the Department of Commerce or from the munitions list.
Q Well, do you know, in fact, that there has been
such commerce, say in the last two years?
MR. BOUCHER: I'm afraid I just don't have any
information on that. I'll have to try to get it for you.
Q Richard, is it the view of the United States that
it was Russian Government and Indian Government policy -- not
confined to these particular agencies, but the actual
governments themselves that led to this deal?
MR. BOUCHER: That relates in part to the first half of
Carol's question. Let me explain to you our law a little more
and then try to deal with that.
Under the law and our policy, we restrict U.S. support
for firms and organizations which are engaging in trade which
exceed the MTCR guidelines. We believe that the United States
should not help organizations which are involved in missile
sales that are inconsistent with the guidelines.
The law provides for sanctions in any case where a
non-MTCR country exports, attempts or conspires to export, or
facilitates the export of any MTCR equipment or technology that
contributes to the design, development or production of
MTCR-class missiles in another non-MTCR country. And the
sanctions must also be applied to end-users of such technology.
In this case, the Russian transfer would contribute to
the development of an MTCR-class system; that is, a system
capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload to a minimum distance
of 300 kilometers.
So what our law provides for is sanctions applied to
firms and entities that are engaged in such transactions. Of
course, we see it as within the power of governments by their
policy and their action to prevent such deals and to prevent
such trade that we feel is inconsistent with the guidelines, and
that is why we have been discussing these with the governments
involved.
Q Richard, what would happen after two years? Do
you have any deadline on these sanctions for how long they will
be --
MR. BOUCHER: They are applied for two years. I guess
we would have to see what the situation was then to see whether
they remained necessary or appropriate, if there were any other
transactions, you know, at the time, but that's pretty
speculative. It's down the road. Certainly, our hope is that
this transaction would be terminated, and that these firms
wouldn't engage in any trade that's not consistent with the
guidelines, and, therefore, we'd be in a position to waive these
sanctions before the end of two years.
Q So the sanctions could be lifted before the
two-year period is up?
MR. BOUCHER: If the transaction was terminated and
there was no evidence that they were engaging in trade that's
not consistent with the guidelines, yes.
Q Did you inform the Russian Government about this
decision? If so, when?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes, we did, and all I know is it was
before the announcement. Some time in the last few days.
Q Does the Department believe --
Q (Inaudible)
MR. BOUCHER: Hold it. Let's do one at a time.
Q If both of these are government organizations and
it is within the ability of the governments involved to
influence the activities of these specific organizations, why
then aren't the sanctions broader -- focused in a broader area,
including military sales, which would really --
MR. BOUCHER: I'm sorry, Jim. Any licensable U.S.
exports to these entities is subject to the sanctions, and,
therefore, there won't be any military sales to these entities.
Q Right. To these entities. But to the Indian
Defense Ministry, for example. The U.S. defense sales will not
be affected, is that right?
MR. BOUCHER: The way this deals -- our law and our
policy deal with these kinds of situations, Jim, is to apply the
sanctions to the entities who are involved in the
transactions. That's the way we've applied them in this case.
That's the way they've been applied in other cases.
Q Does the law allow the sanctions to be applied to
anything except this particular -- these particular entities?
MR. BOUCHER: I haven't reread the law this morning,
Mark, so I really don't know, you know, for sure exactly how
it's worded beyond the paraphrase that I've given you here. I
know that the law and the policy and the practice in previous
cases have been to apply it to the firms that were involved.
The law itself is Amendments to the Arms Export Control Act and
the Export Administration Act that are enacted pursuant to the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. So we
could all go look it up, I guess.
Q What kind of monitoring facilities do you have in
Moscow or elsewhere in the former Soviet Union to be absolutely
sure that the ban is enforced; that it can't be circumvented?
MR. BOUCHER: The ban is one on U.S. Government
transactions involving these entities. Any U.S. exporter that
wanted to export something to these entities that requires an
export license would come to the government for an export
license, and the ban is an announcement that you won't get it.
Similarly, there won't be any U.S. Government contracts or U.S.
imports from these entities, and that's something that Customs
can monitor. So it's a ban on U.S. transactions, on our
decision whether or not we support or engage in transactions
with firms that we feel are violating very important
international guidelines.
Q Richard --
MR. BOUCHER: Let's move slowly here.
Q I'm really puzzled. You come out here and you
have a lot of detail about the nature of the law and how it
applies to entities and all that, and yet you're not prepared to
tell us exactly if this is really going to have an impact. It
sounds like it may not have any impact at all, except just to
sort of express U.S. displeasure in this case.
MR. BOUCHER: Well, again, Carol, I apologize for not
having tried to pull together numbers. Those are not
necessarily numbers that are kept in the State Department, and I
guess the people, including myself, who were working on this
just didn't think of it.
Q How about just an example?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, the examples, in general terms, are
the examples I gave you. If one of these entities wanted to buy
a computer that required an export license from the Department
of Commerce, it would not get it. If one of these
entities wanted to buy an oscilloscope that was on one or the
other lists, they would not get it. That's the kind of thing
we're dealing with here.
If one of these entities had an export to the United
States -- something they wanted to sell to somebody in the
United States -- that would not be permitted. So that's what
the ban is.
Q Richard, on the point of the exports, the United
States has already signed a deal with Glavkosmos to import
nuclear engines, and it's my understanding those engines haven't
been shipped yet. Does that mean that deal is off?
MR. BOUCHER: I'm sorry. I'll have to --
Q Do you "grandfather" --
MR. BOUCHER: I'm sorry. I'll have to check on that
and see. I'm not aware of that specific deal.
Q Richard, does the Administration believe that this
is the first time these two entities have traded in materials
that are in violation of MTCR guidelines?
MR. BOUCHER: I think it's the first time that we know
about it, because our law is pretty clear that we have to apply
sanctions when we're aware that these kinds of transactions are
taking place.
Q Richard, are these --
MR. BOUCHER: Let's go back there.
Q Richard, I believe Reggie Bartholomew met the
Indian Defense Minister when he came here a month ago and took
up the issue of these rockets, and he was told that it was meant
for a satellite for remote-sensing and telecommunications and
all that. And Mr. Bartholomew is supposed to have said that he
agrees this is not for military purposes, but it comes under the
(inaudible) of MTCR, and we are forced to take action.
Isn't that sticking to the letter of the law and
ignoring the spirit of it?
MR. BOUCHER: The letter of law, first of all, is quite
clear. The international guidelines on this are quite clear.
Neither the guidelines nor our the law make any distinction
between the technology that is used in ballistic missiles and
the technology for space-launched vehicles. The technology for
both systems is virtually identical, and the key criterion is
whether any rocket system -- be it a ballistic missile or a
space-launched vehicle -- is capable of delivering a
500-kilogram payload to a minimum distance of 300 kilometers.
We've dealt with this question -- I would say we've
provided a previous answer to that effect from this podium or at
least in a taken question about a week ago.
Q A follow-up on that: Under these MTCR guidelines,
isn't the United States and the other member countries basically
saying, "If you don't have a space program, India, or any other
country, now you can't develop one, because we'll impose
sanctions on you. You can't have a space program."
MR. BOUCHER: Well, Chris --
Q You can't have a launch capability.
MR. BOUCHER: That's not what we've said, first of all.
Q But isn't that the effect of it?
MR. BOUCHER: I'll leave it to you to analyze the
effect, Chris. The point that we're making is that we're very
concerned and have been very concerned about the proliferation
of missile technology in the world. You have to draw the line
somewhere, and the somewhere has been drawn at the fact that we
won't support, either by exporting our technology or dealing
with organizations that want to trade in or develop missiles
that go beyond a certain capability.
Q Richard, has this imposition of sanctions been
coordinated with other members of the MTCR? In other words, if
the United States Government bans the export of an oscilloscope,
is there anything to stop them from buying it from Germany or
France?
MR. BOUCHER: As far as I know, the sanctions result
from U.S. law, and, therefore, I think the United States is
doing it. I'll have to check and see if we know anything about
what other partners might intend -- whether they do.
Q Richard, could you try to get an answer to Carol's
question about the practical impact, because until we get that
answer, we don't know whether these are tame sanctions or
burdensome sanctions for these entities.
MR. BOUCHER: Well, George, I think the basic thing I
would point out in response to that question is that you've
certainly seen the reporting and you've been asking us for weeks
because of the objections of the other parties who are on the
opposite end of these sanctions.
They have certainly felt that these were fairly
important matters that they wanted to try to avoid or talk us
out of -- not to the point of stopping the transaction.
Q (Inaudible) -- what kind of sanctions they were
going to be, though. I mean, they could have been sanctions
against the entire country or against a whole bunch of other
things, or whether it was -- you know, military sales?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, I think they're pretty clear on
what's required. We've explained that to them.
Q What we really would like to know is whether or
not these sanctions have any teeth. Otherwise, we don't have a
story, and you've been standing here for nothing.
MR. BOUCHER: Jan, I stand here for nothing a whole lot
of times, so I'm glad to be here.
Anybody got any other nothing questions, or can we go
eat lunch. Oh, sorry, Ruth.
Q I have a nothing question. I know it's not going
to lead anywhere, but is there any chance of getting Dennis'
[Ross] text for the opening?
MR. BOUCHER: No. I understand he's probably speaking
from notes, and we won't have those.
Q That's all right. We'll take it afterwards.
MR. BOUCHER: No, sorry. We won't have a text.
Q Richard, I have a question on MTCR. The sanctions
issue, are the other signatories to the MTCR -- are they bound
to follow the U.S. lead, according to the agreement of MTCR or
not?
MR. BOUCHER: That's essentially the same question that
Jim asked, and I'll just have to check and see if there's
anything that either binds them or implies that they intend to
do something like we're doing here.
Q You said that you've been expressing this concern
to the Russian officials about this possible deal with India for
the last few months, even when the Soviet Union was still in
existence. Did you at any point inform any of the American
entities who were conducting negotiations with the Glavkosmos
that that deal could be undermined if this deal with India goes
through?
MR. BOUCHER: You mean, in regard to the transaction
that he raised earlier?
Q Yes.
MR. BOUCHER: I'll have to check on that. I don't
know.
Connie.
Q Just a quickie. Did you have anything new on the
Angolan investigations? You know, Boren, last week, called for
Baker's help in the investigations.
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything new here. I'll
check and see if there's something.
Q Could you look at it. And do you have anything to
say on the Middle East talks? I know there's going to be a
statement soon.
MR. BOUCHER: You do?
Q There is, downstairs. But if you have anything
you can give us from up here, we'd love it.
MR. BOUCHER: I'd be interested in finding out who's
making the statement. I don't have any particular statement to
make on the occasion. I would say that these are important
talks, that we feel they are an integral part of the process.
Margaret, I think, talked to you in some detail about
how they would work. As you know, it's a working group meeting.
It'll be conducted in seminar format.
I'll go into a little more detail on the topics. There
will be presentations and discussions on the methods and concept
of arms control, the evolution of confidence and
security-building process, the history of U.S.-Soviet Hotline
Agreement, the Incidents at Sea and the Dangerous Military
Activities Agreements.
To provide participants with a practical look at what
has been achieved in the past, they will visit the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Center, which is in our building, and the On-Site
Inspection Agency, which is not.
Q One other Middle East topic: I don't know if you
have this yet, but there is a Palestinian report today about
alleged Israeli army abuses in the territories. Do you have
anything on that?
MR. BOUCHER: No. I hadn't seen that.
Q Again, if you could look into that. I'd be
grateful.
MR. BOUCHER: OK.
[Bosnia: Highlights of Deputy Secretary Eagleburger's Meeting
With Foreign Minister Siladzic]
Q Richard, do you have a readout on Secretary
Eagleburger's meeting this morning with the Bosnian Foreign
Minister?
MR. BOUCHER: If I can hit the highlights and then post
the rest of it, I'd be glad to.
At their meeting this morning, the Deputy Secretary
underscored the U.S. support for the borders, territorial
integrity and the legitimate government of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
He expressed U.S. condemnation of the aggression carried out
against Bosnia.
They talked about the role that the United States has
played in trying to urge the CSCE community to take strong
action against the clear violations of CSCE principles by
Serbian and "Yugoslav" military leaders, and he reiterated the
U.S. view on the "agreements" that were supposedly reached by
Bosnian Serb and Croat political leaders, that we oppose
arrangements to which the legitimate Government of
Bosnia-Hercegovina is not a party.
Q Do you have any reaction to the EC decision to
recall Ambassadors from Belgrade?
MR. BOUCHER: At this point, George, I think the press
reporting on that EC meeting is starting to come out. As far as
I know, we haven't had a chance to talk to the EC ourselves. As
you know, we wanted to discuss these issues very closely with
them, and I'm sure we will. So I don't have any reaction at
this point.
Q As long as you're looking for things -- other
questions on --
Q Can we stay on Bosnia?
Q Yes, please. By all means.
Q Is that the sum of U.S. -- I mean, Sarajevo seems
like it's about to fall and you're talking about maybe kicking
Serbia out of CSCE. Is that the full extent of what the U.S. is
looking at?
MR. BOUCHER: Johanna, what the U.S. is looking at is
what we've been looking at, and that's to work closely with
other countries, especially with the EC, to bring home the
message, make clear that this kind of aggression is not
acceptable.
We've done that in support, first of all, of the EC
peace talks which convened again last week but they really
didn't make much progress.
We've urged the meeting at the CSCE -- the Committee of
Senior Officials. They were going to reconvene at 6:00 p.m.
Helsinki time today but, at this point, we haven't heard whether
or not they might be postponed until tomorrow. We understand
that some delegations may be waiting for instructions.
We have looked at this at a high level before. We have
worked with the U.N. as well. The U.N. Secretary General just
had an envoy out there. He's expected back very shortly, and
he'll be reporting to the U.N. Security Council through the
Secretary General as well.
Q I guess -- from this podium, spokesmen for the
United States have been talking for several weeks about CSCE
action to expel Serbia. It doesn't seem to have stopped their
guns. I guess the question is, do you think that's a good
stick, or do you have anything better in your arsenal?
MR. BOUCHER: Certainly, in terms of what it represents
and in terms of what it means for the legitimacy of their
representatives as being part of the democratic Europe that the
CSCE represents, it's a measure that reflects that.
We've spoken before that some people think that they,
in declaring themselves a "Yugoslav" federation, have some
desire to gain acceptance and legitimacy in the eyes of our
Government and the governments of other people in Europe. So it
certainly is a measure. Whether it's a measure sufficient to
stop the fighting is something that we would have to see.
We've been trying in any number of ways, both directly
through our meetings with people, in terms of our recognition of
those who have gone about this peacefully, and in terms of our
condemnation of the fighting, in a variety of forum, to bring
home that message -- that if the Serbs and Montenegrins want to
be accepted as the Yugoslav state, their behavior and their
sponsorship of aggression is going to have to change. In the
end, whether that stops the fighting or not is just not
something we can guess at or predict.
Q Richard, the United States has previously followed
the EC's lead on matters involving Yugoslavia. Is the
withdrawal of the American Ambassador or reduction in Embassy
personnel being considered at this point?
MR. BOUCHER: Mark, at any given point, there are a
number of options available. I can't, at this point, really
speculate on how quickly or when we might move on any specific
one.
Q Richard, did the Bosnian Foreign Minister ask for
any specific U.S. help?
MR. BOUCHER: I only had the briefest of readouts of
the meeting before I came down. It's something, I think, you'd
have to ask him.
Q Can you provide us with the -- if it is possible
-- historical numbers for how many times the United States has
imposed sanctions on entities related to the MTCR regime?
MR. BOUCHER: I'd be glad to do that.
Q I mean, is it a frequent occurrence? Is it --
MR. BOUCHER: These are recent amendments. These were
in the Fiscal Year 1991 legislation. The one that I remember is
the China-Pakistan deal. I'll see if we can get you any more on
that.
Q Richard, I understand that the Bosnian leadership
has asked the U.N. for help. I mean, armed help. Is there any
U.S. position on that?
MR. BOUCHER: Our position has been stated before. The
Secretary General has just had an envoy in the region, and he'll
be getting back, or he may be back already. The Secretary
General will report to the other members of the Security Council
to discuss this issue of peacekeeping and any other observations
from his trip there.
But our position on the difference between peace-making
and peacekeeping, I think, has been made clear before and that
hasn't changed.
Q Richard, do you have anything on Mr. Kanter's
visit in Bangkok?
MR. BOUCHER: Under Secretary Kanter arrived in
Thailand on Saturday, May 9, and will depart on Wednesday, May
13. He had no official meetings on Saturday and Sunday. On
Monday, May 11, Mr. Kanter had lunch with opposition leaders,
and he was scheduled to meet with the Commerce Minister. He's
scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Suchinda on May 12. We
don't yet have a full report on the substance of his
discussions.
Q On the Middle East, please. Has the State
Department submitted a report on the Israeli settlements in the
occupied territories to the Congress? And, if so, when are you
going to make that public?
MR. BOUCHER: We did submit a report that was requested
by the House Appropriations Committee. It went up on Friday,
May 1. The report was entitled "Israeli Settlement in the
Occupied Territories." This was done specifically in response
to a request by the Committee, and I'm afraid for further
details or for any decisions on whether we can release it or
not, we have to defer to the wishes of the Appropriations
Committee.
Q Do you have any reaction to any of the foreign
policy pronouncements by Mikhail Gorbachev while he's touring
the United States? How seriously, or how indifferently are you
taking those?
MR. BOUCHER: Boy, I'm in a box. I don't have a
reaction, but I'm sure we're taking them seriously.
The trip, I think, is a private trip. I'm sure that
the analysts and the people here are very interested in what he
says and have been paying attention to the speeches, but I don't
have any reactions to them.
Q So the State Department was paying any attention
to what he has to say?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes, we are paying attention to what he
has to say.
Q Do you have anything on what Mr. Baker and Mr.
Dumas talked about this morning?
MR. BOUCHER: They had a fairly lengthy meeting that I
would characterize as one-on-one. I'm told it was worthwhile
and useful, but that was about all the Secretary was able to
tell us before he took off for the White House.
But, as I said, the meeting was largely one-on-one.
There was a very brief session with some other people, but it's
not the kind of meeting that we usually have details about.
They'll be, of course, continuing discussions with the President
this afternoon.
Q IAEA started to investigate and inspect the North
Korean nuclear facility today. Do you have any comment on that
matter?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't believe they had a full-scale
inspection going. I think the Director Hans Blix was --
Q Not full scale, but the Secretary General already
visited North Korea today -- this morning -- and started to
begin the inspection.
MR. BOUCHER: Well, again, I would say that this is not
a formal inspection and that there will have to be a series of
formal inspections to verify and analyze the information that
the North Koreans have provided to the IAEA. I think we said
last week that we welcome that information. We welcome the fact
that Director General Blix has been able to travel there and
continue these discussions. But most of all, we look forward to
the process of inspections going forward in a careful manner.
Q Do you think that IAEA has reserved the right to
execute so-called expeditious inspection? What do you think the
possibility is -- whether the IAEA would do a challenging
inspection this time?
MR. BOUCHER: Again, that's something that the IAEA, I
think, will have to answer. It's not a question for us.
Q Coming back to that rocket issue. Do you think
that your decision -- these sanctions against the Russian
Federation entity will in any way undermine the forthcoming trip
by Boris Yeltsin to the United States? Do you think it will be
kind of a difficult backdrop for the visit?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I would put it that way.
We have a whole host of issues to discuss with the Russian
Government. This is an issue that we've discussed before with
the Russian Government. We certainly look forward to their
cooperation and the cooperation of other countries on the issues
of missile proliferation and other proliferation in the world.
But there are many important things that we're doing together
that we'll continue to do together.
Q Richard, I don't think you directly answered the
question about whether, in the view of the United States, this
deal was conducted for peaceful or non-peaceful purposes. Do
you have anything to say on that?
MR. BOUCHER: What I said basically, Mark, is, we're
dealing with a class of technology that's virtually identical no
matter what the purpose of it is. If you support entities that
are engaging in that kind of trade, there's no way to draw the
line between peaceful and non-peaceful purposes. So you have to
draw the line on the basis of the technology involved. That's
the way the international understandings on this work, and
that's the way our law works in terms of applying sanctions.
Q Richard, how long have you all known this deal was
in the offing?
MR. BOUCHER: It's been a subject of discussion for
over a year actually, that I'm aware of, that there have been
discussions between us and between MTCR partners with the
various countries involved.
Q That's my understanding, too, that India has
actually made a large payment on this deal. That's what I'm
told. Why are you waiting until now to tell them -- to send
this message?
MR. BOUCHER: I guess the answer would be that we tried
at various levels and in various ways to talk them out of it and
it doesn't look like we've succeeded.
Q Richard, on that quickly. Did the United States
offer any help in an alternative form of launching this
communication satellite, so it would not require --
MR. BOUCHER: I don't know, Jim, if we did. I'd have
to see.
Q Thank you.
(Press briefing concluded at 1:06 p.m.)